The Case of the Serbian October Thompson, Mark R

Stolen Elections: The Case of the Serbian October Thompson, Mark R. Kuntz, Philipp. Journal of Democracy, Volume 15, Number 4, October 2004, pp. 159-172 (Article) Published by The Johns Hopkins University Press DOI: 10.1353/jod.2004.0074 For additional information about this article http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/jod/summary/v015/15.4thompson.html Access Provided by Harvard University at 03/05/11 4:37AM GMT STOLEN ELECTIONS: THE CASE OF THE SERBIAN OCTOBER Mark R. Thompson and Philipp Kuntz Mark R. Thompson is professor of political science at the University of Erlangen-Nuremberg in Germany and acting chair of Southeast Asian Studies at Passau University. His most recent book is Democratic Revo- lutions: Asia and Eastern Europe. Philipp Kuntz is lecturer in political sociology at Högskolan Dalarna in Falun, Sweden. He is completing his doctoral dissertation on Serbia’s stolen elections in comparative perspective at the University of Erlangen-Nuremberg. The overthrow of Slobodan Miloševiæ in Serbia’s so-called October Revolution four years ago was briefly celebrated by the international press, and it also received extensive attention from scholars. Such accounts focused on why and how the opposition won the September 2000 presidential ballot as well as on the organizing of the ensuing uprising. But the link between the regime’s disregard for the election results and the subsequent mass mobilization has not been adequately explained.1 Of course, most scholars recognize that Miloševiæ’s electoral defeat and his attempts to manipulate the results contributed mightily to his fall. Yet it has not made clear exactly why this stolen election had such a revolutionary outcome. Elections are considered stolen when a regime hinders an opposition victory through blatant manipulation of the vote count or through the annulment of the electoral results. In Serbia, it was only after such stolen elections had fundamentally transformed the political setting that mass protest became successful; prior to the dramatic changes brought about by the 2000 polls, attempts to organize Miloševiæ’s overthrow had failed repeatedly. The closest the opposition had previ- ously come to toppling the regime was during the startling antiregime protests that followed the government’s annulment of the November 1996 municipal-election results. The importance of developing a theory around stolen elections goes beyond the Serbian case. Scholarly research on electoral or competitive Journal of Democracy Volume 15, Number 4 October 2004 160 Journal of Democracy authoritarianism—sometimes termed pseudodemocratic rule—attempts to capture the absurdity of nondemocratic regimes’ holding of competitive elections. In the post–Cold War setting, some form of democratic legitimacy has become essential to the survival of many authoritarian regimes. In such countries, elections are often just competitive enough to allow the opposition some room to maneuver, which strengthens domestic support for the regime as well as its international standing. The structural ambiguity of electoral authoritarianism creates a de- gree of uncertainty for power holders.2 It is difficult to strike a balance between the regime’s substantive authoritarian characteristics and its procedural democratic ones: When the regime acts openly authoritarian it risks appearing dictatorial, but it is endangered if democratic proce- dures are taken too seriously. For the regime, stolen elections combine these “evils”: Not only does the competitive nature of elections enable the opposition to emerge as the true winner, but by manipulating or simply ignoring the results, the regime cannot avoid revealing its true, dictatorial colors. The academic literature on electoral authoritarianism documents how regimes, in order to retain power, steal elections that they have lost, but the consequences of such maneuvers have not been systematically ex- plored. Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way point generally to the dangers faced by regimes that too blatantly violate the electoral pro- cess, but the authors do not discuss what happens when a regime suffers a clear defeat and then ignores the results.3 In his analysis of the “nested game of democratization by elections,” Andreas Schedler regards the possibility that the “game” may end after a stolen election because the regime then either surrenders power or cracks down on the opposition.4 But he does not consider whether it might be possible for the regime to disregard the election results and still lose power. Other theorists who have considered this option have concluded that it is likely to result in a bloody and prolonged civil war.5 Elections and Revolutions In countries ruled by autocratic regimes, stolen elections often cre- ate conditions favorable for the outbreak of democratic revolutions. Elections cannot be stolen unless they are “stunning”—that is, elections in which the regime is surprised by the defeat it suffers at the hands of opposition candidates.6 In Nicaragua’s 1990 elections, the Sandinistas, stunned by their loss, briefly considered manipulating or annulling the results before finally acknowledging defeat. Similarly, Iranian conservatives gave in to the equally surprising victory of re- formist candidate Mohammad Khatami in the 1997 presidential polls (although they continued to exercise power by holding on to reserve domains). And in 2000, Zimbabwe experienced a political earthquake Mark R. Thompson and Philipp Kuntz 161 when President Robert Mugabe lost a constitutional referendum that he had believed to be a mere formality. He likewise admitted defeat, but as a consequence stepped up intimidation against his opponents to be better prepared for the parliamentary elections later that year. But what if a regime outright refuses to accept the results of the balloting? That is when a stunning election turns into a stolen one. In a normative sense, all forms of electoral manipulation involve stealing votes. But the consequences for political change are usually far greater when the opposition actually receives more votes, despite the regime’s attempts to rig the results. Because they have an enormous potential for triggering mass protest, stolen elections are critical junctures for the government and the opposition alike: A social movement emerging in the wake of a stolen election may be powerful enough to enforce the outcome denied to the people through the ballot box. What exactly accounts for this link? In the analysis of revolutions, events that turn revolutionary ferment into actual revolutions are termed “triggers” or “accelerators.”7 Stolen elections are triggers both in society and the regime. In society, stolen elections contribute to mass mobilization by first increasing expectations that the opposition will win, and then causing popular outrage when voters are robbed of the victory. Elections also document exactly how widespread dissatisfaction with the regime has become (as it has lost the election, often with an overwhelming majority) and serve to increase the organizational capabilities of the opposition. On the regime side, stolen elections test the loyalty of regime personnel by causing splits between those who are willing to ignore the voters’ will in order to stay in power and those who favor accepting the opposition victory or at least calculate that the opposition is likely to take power anyway. Such elite divisions weaken the regime at a time of mass mobilization, which in turn makes regime collapse in the face of societal protest more likely. Each of these points calls for brief elaboration.8 Elections increase expectations that an authoritarian regime can be changed peacefully through the ballot box. No matter how na¦ve it may appear to outsiders, voters enthusiastically participate in elections, although there is little chance that the regime would ever accept defeat. Outrage when the election is stolen is correspondingly great, as the disappointment of high expectations leads to widespread anger. Moreover, stolen elections provide a focus for discontent against the regime, which better allows the opposition to mobilize the population than at times when popular dissatisfaction is general and diffuse. Even if the regime had little popular legitimacy before the election, the stealing of the results draws a clear moral line of confrontation between the people’s will and an evil regime bent on thwarting it. The last remnants of regime legitimacy are ripped away as millions of citizens feel personally offended by the stealing of their votes. Such a situation is likely to generate the 162 Journal of Democracy sense of moral obligation necessary to overcome the “free-rider” prob- lem of rebellion; that is, this sense of moral obligation can motivate people to protest for the public good, instead of trusting other people to achieve the results from which all of society would benefit. Stolen elections also contribute to societal mobilization by creating an “imagined community” of robbed voters. When the opposition wins an election, citizens learn they are not alone in their dislike of the regime. A widespread—but hidden—anger with the regime may be long in existence, but it is the election that brings that anger into the open. This communication effect shows that further collective action is likely to receive broadbased support within society. Meanwhile, the shatter- ing of the powerholders’ nimbus of invincibility sends yet another signal that an opportunity for toppling the regime has emerged. This image of vulnerability may be reinforced by the postelectoral behavior of a stunned elite struggling to cope with its unexpected defeat. A final point pertaining to societal mobilization concerns the opposition’s organizational capabilities. The selection of an opposition candidate for president or prime minister often fosters opposition unity. Campaigning then creates strong ties between the candidate and the voters, particularly through personal campaign appearances given that opposition presence in the media is often severely limited. Preelection efforts such as door-to-door canvassing and an election-day push to “get out the vote” further contribute to the opposition’s capa- bility to organize.

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