DebatEU Jean Monnet paper No 2020/01

Damjan Lajh and Meta Novak Slovenian Bubble in the Brussels: From Best Student in Class to Passive Observer?

DebatEU Jean Monnet Paper No 2020/01 May 2020 URL: jmce-.eu

To cite this article: Lajh, D., & Novak, M. (2020). Slovenian Bubble in the Brussels: From Best Student in Class to Passive Observer? DebatEU Jean Monnet Paper, 2020/01.

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DebatEU Jean Monnet paper No 2020/01

Slovenian Bubble in the Brussels: From Best Student in Class to Passive Observer?

Damjan Lajh and Meta Novak

Abstract: With dissolution of socialist turned towards the European Union (EU) membership. Since independence the European idea has been widely acknowledged by political elite as well as general public. Due to absence of any real and successful Eurosceptic parties, main goals related to European integration became national projects, including EU membership, adoption of Euro as the national currency, entering Schengen area, and holding the Presidency of Council of the EU. During accession and full membership periods Slovenian citizens nevertheless have met various negative experiences with the EU: pressures to open the real estate market to foreigners and closing down duty free shops, imposition of austerity measures during the financial crisis, lack of effective EU policy during the migration crisis, and absence of understanding and support from the EU partners concerning the border dispute and other open issues with neighbouring . Although these events to some extent increased the level of it remained limited until today. On the other hand, Slovenian political elite with meeting all initially set goals in European integration lost concrete strategy and role Slovenia should play in the EU. After fifteen years of membership this has led to the image of Slovenia as being one of the most submissive players in the EU policymaking.

Key words: European Union, Slovenia, membership

Damjan Lajh is associate professor at Faculty of Social Sciences University of Ljubljana, Jean Monnet professor, Head of Centre for political science research, recipient of Altiero Spinelli prize for outreach 2018 and coordinator of University of Ljubljana Jean Monnet centre of excellence.

Meta Novak is assistant professor and research at the Faculty of Social Sciences University of Ljubljana.

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Introduction: Slovenian Accession and the Copenhagen Learning Process

Slovenian relationship with the European Union (EU) is as long as the history of Slovenian independence. Process of Slovenian transition from socialist political system in Yugoslavia to independence in the late 1980s and early 1990s was already characterised with the ambition to join the EU with the aim to become economically successful and internationally recognised democratic country (Lajh, 2012). In this regard the EU membership was defined as a national project even before Slovenia’s formal independence. The reformed former Slovenian League of Communists even adopted the document “Europe now – for the European quality of living” for its congress in autumn 1989 and used slogan “Europe Now!” for the first multi-party and democratic elections in 1990 (Balažic, 2002). Other political parties as well included integration with the EU in their electoral programmes for the first multiparty elections (Krašovec & Lajh, 2009). Fink-Hafner even claims that Europeanisation had ‘become a kind of substitute for the old ideology’ (Fink-Hafner, 1999). In 1991, the ambition to become the EU member was formally declared in the Basis of Slovenian Foreign Policy (Fink-Hafner & Lajh, 2005).

Among the Slovenian elite existed general consensus of Slovenian membership in the EU as a national goal. Except for the that openly expressed soft Eurosceptic stances, all other parties supported Slovenian membership in the EU and even signed a unique agreement on cooperation during the process of Slovenian accession to the EU (Lajh, 2012). Slovenian parliamentary parties along with support to EU membership also started to connect outwards and began collaboration with their European counterparts already before the Slovenian membership in the EU. This collaboration did not bring major changes in organisational structure of the parties during the accession period but only in the period of EU membership when party rules and structures changed in a direction to include parties MEPs in relevant party bodies (Krašovec & Lajh, 2009). However, the Social Democratic Party of Slovenia changed its name to Slovenian Democratic Party as a result of its cooperation with the European Peoples Party (Krašovec & Lajh, 2009).

Despite the general support to the European integration, the process of joining demanded some unwanted adaptations that Slovenians were not too happy to took over. Three most salient issues were (1) the so-called Spanish Compromise, which enabled the right of foreigners to buy Slovenian real estate and triggered fear of especially Slovenians living close to the borders that former “occupier” will again occupy the land, (2) the issue of closing down duty free shops at Italian and Austrian borders, where foreigners used to buy luxury goods such as cigarettes,

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DebatEU Jean Monnet paper No 2020/01 alcohol and cosmetics, as well as (3) transition period for the free labour movement (Krašovec & Kustec Lipicer, 2008). Open issues connected with membership in the EU triggered decrease in public support and slowly emerged some Euroscepticism among Slovenian public. Additionally, in 2002 news appeared that Slovenia due to its stable economy will join the EU as net contributor and pay more into EU funds than it would receive (Nations in Transit, 2003). Even with minor problems during the Slovenian accession to the EU the public in high percentage supported Slovenian membership in the EU even after the rumours that Slovenia might be a net contributor (Lajh, 2012).

During the process of Slovenian accession to the EU the national political system needed to adapt to new circumstances. Fink-Hafner and Lajh (2005) demonstrated that national institutions, processes, traditions and politico-cultural context remained flexible and pragmatic in its adaptation. No radical change was made instead political structures only rearranged its setup to meet the demands of the accession process. In October 1995 special units for handling EU affairs were established within most ministries and other governmental bodies. EU tasks were in this way dispersed rather than concentrated in a special unit with EU- knowledgeable elite (Fink-Hafner, 2007). At the end of 1997 the coordination of European affairs was set up. It started with the establishment of the Government Office for European Affairs (GOEA), led by a minister without portfolio that took on management and coordination of the Slovenian accession process, the formation of the Negotiating Team of the Republic of Slovenia for Accession to the EU, and inter-sectoral working groups that comprised representatives of ministries and relevant institutions to prepare negotiating positions. However, Ministry of Foreign Affairs remained chief negotiator while the Prime Minister led the coordination of managing EU affairs (Fink-Hafner, 2007, pp. 818-819). At the end of negotiations, in February 2003, the Minister for EU Affairs was prolonged into the first year of membership and GOEA was reformed and institutionalized as the central coordinating unit (Fink-Hafner, 2007). In October 2002 a Commission on Non- Governmental Organizations was established by the government to help involve NGOs in the EU accession process (Nations in Transit, 2003).

The Government decided that Slovenia enters the EU as a single region to receive funds for regional development from the EU. Office for Structural Policy and Regional Development was established to coordinate various national actors for balanced regional development and for the implementation of the EU’s structural and cohesion policies (Nations in Transit, 2004). In 2005 the government agreed to divide Slovenia into two

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DebatEU Jean Monnet paper No 2020/01 cohesion regions: Western Slovenia and Eastern Slovenia. The division between Western and Eastern Slovenia does not originate in geographical or historical division and was made artificially for the purpose of drawing European cohesion funds. The debate on the division of Slovenia on several regions was initiated again in 2019. New proposal suggest implementation of eleven regions.

For Slovenia to legally join international organisation and pass some of its sovereignty changes to Constitution were necessary. The process of changing Constitution is quite demanding. A proposal can be initiated by twenty deputies, the Government or at least thirty thousand voters. The initiative is than decided by two-thirds majority of present deputies. The National Assembly adopts an act to amend the Constitution by a two-thirds majority of all deputies (Article 168-171 of Slovenian Constitution). In 2003 the Constitutional amendments with the Article 3.a. were adopted that allowed delegation of execution of part of Slovenian sovereignty to the EU and article 8 was amended to set down the relationship between the national and EU political system. The Constitution had some other changes from 1997 to harmonize national legislation with the EU legislation. Article 68 was amended to allow foreigners to own property, Article 80 to reflect changes to electoral procedure, Article 47 permits the extradition of Slovene citizens in accordance with international agreements, while Article 68 gives all EU citizens the right to own property in Slovenia (Nations in Transit, 2004). In March 2004 the Act on Cooperation between the National Assembly and the Government in EU Affairs was adopted.1 The Act determined the Government for the representation and arguing of the positions of Slovenia in EU institutions. The National Assembly is entitled to cooperate in the formulation of Slovenian position on EU matters in cases that fall under jurisdiction of the parliament (Lajh, 2012).

In December 2002 at the summit in Copenhagen Slovenia was together with nine other countries invited to join the EU. This was a result of fulfilling all the requirements for the EU membership as well as an indicator of Slovenian stability just 10 years after its independence. European Commission in its report on Slovenian accession even evaluated Slovenia as a “functioning market economy with few problems” (Nations in Transit, 2003). In March 2003 60.4% of electorate participated at accession referendum to the EU. Almost 90% percent of voters supported the accession into the EU. The high support for the EU has been probably

1 Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, No. 34/2004, No. 43/2010, No. 107/2010

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DebatEU Jean Monnet paper No 2020/01 also a result of campaign “Slovenia at home in Europe” organised by Slovenian Government (Fink-Hafner & Deželan 2016, p. 476). On the same day 66% of voters also supported a referendum to join NATO.

Table 1: Overview of Slovenian relationship with the EU

15 January 1992 European Community officially recognized independent Republic of Slovenia. 13 April 1992 First diplomatic relations between Slovenia and the European Community were established. 15 March 1995 Negotiations on the Europe Agreement between the Republic of Slovenia on the one hand and the European Communities and their Member States, acting within the framework of the European Union, on the other hand, had started. 19 May 1995 Negotiations on the Europe Agreement were concluded. 10 June 1996 Europe Agreement was signed; on the same day Slovenia formally put in application for the EU membership. 11 November Interim Agreement on trade and trade relations between the 1996 European Community, European Coal and Steel Community and European Atomic Energy Community on the one hand and the Republic of Slovenia on the other was signed. 3 July 1997 Leaders of Slovenian parliamentary political parties (except the Slovenian National Party) signed a special agreement on cooperation during the process of Slovenia's accession into the EU. 13 July 1997 On the demand of the EU the National Assembly changed the Article 68 of the Slovenian Constitution as a precondition for the enforcement of the Europe Agreement. 15 July 1997 Ratification of the Europe Agreement in the National Assembly. September 1997 Slovenian government adopted the Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia on the accession into the EU. 31 March 1998 Accession negotiations to enter the EU formally started. April 1998 Slovenian National Assembly adopted a decision on the priority treatment of European legislation in order to speed up the process

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of adopting the common European legal order and its translation into the Slovenian law. 1 February 1999 European Agreement entered into force. May 1999 Slovenian government adopted the national program for the adoption of the European legal order until the end of 2002. 13 December Accession negotiations were officially concluded. 2002 25 March 2003 Accession referendum to the EU was conducted (turnover 60.4 percent; 89.6 percent of voters supported the accession into the EU). 1 May 2004 Slovenia becomes a full member of the EU. 13 June 2004 First elections to the . 1 January 2007 Slovenia adopted the common European currency Euro. 21 December Slovenia becomes a part of the Schengen area. 2007 1 January 2008 For the period of six months Slovenia took over the Presidency of the Council of the EU. 7 June 2009 Second elections to the European Parliament. 25 May 2014 Third elections to the European Parliament. 6 January 2017 Ljubljana initiative: The new draft treaty for the Constitution of the European Union 26 May 2019 Fourth elections to the European Parliament.

Source: Adapted by Fink-Hafner & Lajh, 2008 and Lajh, 2012

A Shining Star begins Blinking (2004–2009)

Slovenia became a member of the EU on 1st of May 2004. Along with the broad consent on EU membership also other EU-related issues from 2004 onwards enjoyed general support and were perceived as national projects, including introduction of the Euro, joining the Schengen area and the first Slovenian Presidency to the Council of the EU (Krašovec & Lajh, 2009). This attitude towards the EU where parties agreed not to take advantage of inter-party competition on EU matters characterised the first period of membership until

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DebatEU Jean Monnet paper No 2020/01 the period of holding EU Presidency. In May 2007 parliamentary parties on the basis of party agreement even signed an “Agreement on the co-operation of political parties, the group of unconnected deputies and representatives of national minorities in the National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia for the successful preparation and implementation of the Presidency of the EU”. The agreement was informally known as an “agreement on ‘non-attacking’ the government in the period of holding the EU Presidency” (Fink-Hafner & Lajh, 2008). Two oppositional parties – Liberal Democracy of Slovenia (LDS) and Slovenian National Party (SNS) – did not sign the agreement (Krašovec & Lajh, 2009).

In June 2004 Slovenians participated at the first elections to the European Parliament. A proportional electoral system with a single constituency and the possibility of a preference vote has been established. However, the preference vote does not have an absolute influence. The list of candidates must comprise at least 40% of representatives of each gender. At least one representative of each gender must be placed in the top half of the list. Slovenians were at first assigned seven Members of European Parliament (MEP). Similarly like in other EU member-states, position of MEP is incompatible with the position in national parliament, local representative bodies and the Government (Krašovec & Lajh, 2019). For 2004 elections at the EP the parties’ programmes changed in the direction to include more European topics although they did not take a prominent position in the manifestos. The EU topics were more emphasised in manifestos of the parties that have had some EU specialists among the leading members (Krašovec & Lajh, 2009). In many cases manifestos of their European counterparts were simply copied and translated to Slovenian language (Lajh & Krašovec, 2019). Furthermore, like in other countries, EU-related topics and issues generally remained marginal during the electoral campaign (Krašovec & Lajh, 2010). Since the first elections to the EP took place only a few months before the national parliamentary elections, they were perceived as preparation and a forecast for national elections with politicization of national topics (Krašovec & Lajh, 2019). The – Christian People’s Party (NSi) was the winner of the first elections to the EP with winning two seats (out of seven), although it was one of the smallest parties represented in the National Assembly. Two seats were won also by the biggest coalition party Liberal Democracy of Slovenia and the biggest oppositional party Slovenian Democratic Party. United List of Social Democrats won one seat (DVK, 2019). The seat was won by , president of the party. He wanted to support the list of candidate of his party and placed himself on seventh, last place on the list. However, as a popular politician, he

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DebatEU Jean Monnet paper No 2020/01 received preferential votes and was voted for MEP. In 2008 his party renamed in Social Democrats won the national elections. Pahor resigned as MEP and took over the function of Prime Minister (UP RS, 2012).

In the period of full EU membership (coinciding with the change of government in autumn 2004), the central political coordination point in the hierarchy of the domestic management of European affairs shifted towards the Prime Minister, where it was finally consolidated during Slovenia’s Presidency of the Council of the EU (Lajh, 2010). Following Slovenia’s formal entry to the EU, European affairs then became ‘internalized’ as a domestic matter (Lajh, 2010). The public administration however lacked the so-called European specialists that also moved to the EU institutions and the Permanent Representation of the Republic of Slovenia to the EU in Brussels (Lajh, 2012). Lack of ‘European’ cadre has in fact been one of the weakest links in managing EU affairs in Slovenia. What is more, EU intensive trainings for civil servants were organised quite late in the accession process since an official strategy for EU training was adopted only in 2000. Civil servants have thus operated through the negotiation period mostly with “learning-by-doing” approach (Fink-Hafner, 2007).

Shortage of EU-specialists became evident during both, the phase of Slovenia’s accession to the EU as well as also during the EU membership. Lack of specialists in particular policy fields was solved by appointing academic professors and other practitioners to sit in various boards and working groups of the Council. In 2008 when Slovenia hold the Presidency of the Council of the EU the situation became acute (Lajh, 2012). Several public officials were sent to Brussels while additional staff was found among students. Already in 2005 Slovenian government approved employment plan for 310 additional temporary positions for holding Slovenian Presidency (Fink-Hafner & Lajh, 2008). The lack of EU specialists has been noticed also within the leaderships of the parliamentarian parties. The group of EU specialists in the particular party normally includes MEP, persons interested in EU affairs or party members that are professionally related to the EU such as professors or civil servants, some deputies from the national parliament, assistants to MEP and party secretaries for international cooperation (Krašovec & Lajh, 2009).

Soon after the membership in the EU Slovenia continued with its aim to present itself as a “good student” and aimed to became a part of a core of older EU member-states. In January 2007 after having met all Maastricht convergence criteria Slovenia was the first new EU member-state to adopt the common currency Euro. Coins and banknotes were introduced

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DebatEU Jean Monnet paper No 2020/01 and dual currency circulation period was established for a short period of two weeks. In December 2007 Slovenia met another milestone and entered the Schengen Area. This meant abolition of border control on the borders with Italy, Austria and Hungary. While the border control at the border with Croatia had to be strengthened and Slovenia began performing customs, veterinary and phytosanitary controls for all EU member-states (Lajh, 2012).

In two years of membership Slovenian inhabitants learnt to take advantage of multi-level structure of the EU and turned also to EU institutions when national institutions failed them. The most noticeable was the case of “erased” persons. After the independence Slovenian inhabitants from the former Yugoslav republics that did not apply for Slovenian citizenship or renew their temporary resident status became erased from the public administration registry and legally non-existent. Some of them decided to turn to European institutions and Brussels (Nations in Transit, 2007). In June 2012, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that Slovenia violated the rights of , instructed Slovenian government to prepare a compensation scheme in one year and pay each complaint 20,000€ and 30,000€ to plaintiffs collectively for the trial expenses (Lajh, 2013).

In 2008, from 1 January to 30 June, Slovenia chaired the Council of the EU for the first time. Slovenia was the first Slavic country as well as the first member-state from Central and Eastern Europe to take over the Presidency. Preparations for the presidency took place systematically since January 2005. Fink-Hafner and Lajh (2008) evaluated that Slovenia was despite its lack of experience in foreign affairs and diplomacy efficient in co-ordination and mobilization of its resources during the Presidency. The preparations were largely based on the pre-established structure for managing EU affairs and did not radically changed model of EU coordination in the Slovenian executive. 62 million Euros were allocated for holding the EU Presidency. Before the presidency Slovenian Government even signed an agreement with non-governmental organizations to encourage efficient, interactive and transparent cooperation before and during the presidency 2 (Fink-Hafner & Lajh, 2008).

The Slovenian Presidency was the last in a trio consisting of Germany and Portugal. In the framework of the Presidency, Slovenia has given priority to developing the European perspective of the Western Balkan countries, the future of the EU by timely entry into force

2 Agreement between the Government Communication Office and Web Portal 'Predsedovanje,si' about the communication before and during the Slovenian Presidency of the EU.

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DebatEU Jean Monnet paper No 2020/01 of the Treaty of Lisbon, successfully launching the new cycle of the Lisbon Strategy, tackling energy and climate issues, and promoting intercultural dialogue. Additionally, the Ljubljana Process was launched by Slovenia during the Presidency, which laid new foundations for the vision of development of European research space and its management in April 2008 (Lajh, 2012). Slovenian Primer Minister at the time, Janez Janša, evaluated 2008 Spring European Council as successful since agreement was reached on basis principles and timeframe about energy and climate package along with 36 specific decisions. Slovenian then Foreign Minister even marked Slovenian Presidency as “new spring” comparable to the achievements of Slovenian democratization and independence (Fink-Hafner & Lajh, 2008). However, Slovenian Government was in domestic circles criticized for not having a more visible role of co-ordinator and persuader in specific issues, not taking a more proactive approach in agenda-setting during the Presidency and enforcing Slovenian initiatives that would historically marked Slovenian presidency (Fink-Hafner & Lajh, 2008). The more accurate evaluation of the presidency would thus be: “A star pupil playing it safe in the EU”3, where Slovenia acted very shy and subordinated its national project of Presidency to the EU political processes despite acting responsibly and being successful in the management of the agenda (Fink-Hafner & Lajh, 2008).

Table 2: EP elections in 2004-2019 (7, 7, 8 and 8 seats respectively) Turnout 28.35, 28.37, 20.96 and 28.89% respectively

Parties 2004 2004 2009 2009 2014 2014 2019 2019 votes seats votes seats votes seats votes Seats NSi 23.57 2 (EPP) 16.58 1 (EPP) 16.56 2 (EPP) 11.12 1 (EPP) LDS-D (21.91) 2 11.48 1 ------(ALDE) (ALDE) SDS 17.65 2 (EPP) 26.66 2 (EPP) 24.88 3 (EPP) 26.25 3 (EPP) (ZL)SD 14.15 1 (PES) 18.43 2 (PES) 8.02 1 (PES) 18.66 2 (PES)

3 »A star pupil playing it safe in the EU : An inside view of the first Slovenian EU Council«, available at Notre Europe, at http://www.notre-europe.eu/en/axes/european-democracy-in- action/works/publication/a-star-pupil-playing-it-safe-in-the-eu-an-inside-view-of-the-first-slovenian- eu-council/. Full report by Manja Klemenčič, Varna igra odlične učenke v EU, at: http://www.notre- europe.eu/uploads/tx_publication/Etud61-MKlemencic-SlovenianPresidency-si.pdf

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ZARES -- -- 9.76 1 0.94 0 -- -- (ALDE) DeSUS (21.91) 2 7.18 0 8.14 1 5.67 0 (ALDE) (ALDE) ------10.46 1 (GR) -- -- LMŠ ------15.44 2 (ALDE/ Renew)

NSi - New Slovenia (in 2014 joint list with SLS – Slovenian People’s Party), LDS-D – Liberal Democracy with Democratic Party of Retired People (DeSUS) in 2004, DeSUS (separately in 2009, 2014 and 2019) - Democratic Party of Retired People; SDS – Slovenian Democratic Party (in 2019 joint list with SLS – Slovenian People’s Party); ZLSD – United List of Social Democrats, in 2009, 2014 and 2019 SD – Social Democrats; – New Politics-Social Liberals; Verjamem – List ‘I believe’ (GREEN); LMŠ – List of Marjan Šarec.

Economic Crisis and the Drop of Trust in the EU (2009–2014)

The next few years of Slovenian membership in the EU began with the global financial and economic crisis that did not have the effect only on the EU but also on the relationship between Slovenia and the EU. After all, Slovenia was hit very hard by the crisis with poor public finance conditions and increasing public borrowing. Economic and financial crises strengthened Eurosceptic feelings among Slovenians.

During the 2009 EP elections the criticism of the EU by some Slovenian parties was related mostly to the economic and financial crisis as well as to initiative for a more responsible and socially oriented market economy in the EU (Krašovec & Deželan, 2014). In general, the campaign remained oriented at national issues (Krašovec & Lajh, 2010), important topics like Lisbon Treaty or attitudes towards further EU enlargement were not debated (Fink-Hafner & Deželan, 2016). Besides parties also mass media did not place EU topics as important during the election campaign and national themes overshadowed EU topics (Krašovec & Lajh, 2009). 12 candidate lists participated at the elections. The winner was Slovenian Democratic Party with two seats. At that time the leading governmental party – Social Democrats – received two seats as well. While New Slovenia, Liberal Democracy of Slovenia and Zares each received

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DebatEU Jean Monnet paper No 2020/01 one seat. The results of the elections also showed that voters were especially inclined towards already established MEPs and voted more for the candidate than for the party. With additional seat allocated to Slovenia with Lisbon Treaty Slovenian Democratic Party in 2011 received one more MEP.

In 2011 a Slovenian MEP Zoran Thaler from Social Democrats was involved in corruption affair disclosed by reporters of Sunday Times. Zoran Thaler as well as two other MEPs, Adrian Severin from Romania and Ernest Strasser from Austria accepted a bribe in a directed lobbying case. Thaler later that year resigned from the position of MEP. In 2014 Thaler in court hearing admitted accepting bribery. He earned two years and a half of jail time, a fine of $ 32,250 and a ban on holding public office (MMC, 2014a). The affair decreased trust of Slovenian citizens in the function of Members of European parliament.

In 2009 European Commission filed first lawsuits against Slovenia before the Court of Justice of the EU against Slovenia for not transposing a directive on environmental liability before the specific deadline. For the first time in the history of the Court the original judgment was written in Slovenian and the language of proceedings was Slovenian. No sanctions were imposed by the Court to Slovenia at that time (Lajh, 2012).

In 2012 Slovenia began to struggle with a deepening economic crisis, rising public debt and a collapsing banking sector. The government faced pressure by the European Commission to accept certain austerity measures and reforms connected with managing the consequences of the financial crisis which raised some negative attitudes towards the EU. Austerity measures were adopted in early 2012 but still did not succeed to calm down major credit agencies that doubted Slovenia could save state owned banks. In the end that triggered predictions that Slovenia will be the sixth EU member-state to require bailout (Lajh, 2013). In March 2012 EU member-states with Euro adopted fiscal rule and agreed that country’s expenditures will not exceed revenues. Slovenian Government suggested to inscribe the fiscal rule in the Constitution, which happened in 2013 by the new government. The new government of Alenka Bratušek under recommendations of the European Commission also adopted a stability program on fiscal consolidation and national reform programs with policies to promote growth such as raising the level of value-added tax (Lajh, 2014). The Prime Minister Alenka Bratušek wanted to convince the international public that Slovenia will not be the next EU member-state to request bailout. In unfortunate interview for CNN she repeatedly declared that “we do not need money, we need time”. At the end Slovenia managed to avoid the international bailout

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DebatEU Jean Monnet paper No 2020/01 with the series of austerity measures and structural reforms. In June 2015 European Commission finally allowed Slovenia to leave EU’s excessive deficit procedure (Lovec, 2017).

Nevertheless, EU was perceived as a threat by political parties during the national electoral campaign in 2011 when parties warned that Slovenia needs to solve its fiscal problems or European troika consisted of the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund will lay down the necessary measures (Krašovec & Haughton, 2011). Still, EU support remained in Slovenia higher than in some other EU member-states. At the next national elections in 2014, the campaign was still characterised by the relationship between Slovenia and the EU. Just prior to the elections European Commission issued “recommendations” for Slovenia such as consolidation of public finances, further privatisation and a fight against corruption with the deadlines to tackle the national debt and economic burden (Krašovec & Lajh, 2019).

The coordination of EU affairs has gone through a new change during the second period of membership. In 2012, with a change in government in the spring, GOEA was abolished and its tasks and most staff were transformed to a special directorate within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, now called Directorate for EU affairs (Lajh, 2012). This arrangement of coordination of EU affairs still exist. Unlike during the accession period the role of organised civil society in EU policymaking at national level decreased. Civil society organizations are to a lesser extent represented in the EU than national policymaking (Lajh & Novak, 2020 forthcoming).

Loss of Identity and Searching for the New Role in the EU (2014 – 2019)

The last period of Slovenian membership in the EU was characterised with absence of clear goal of Slovenia in the European integration. It seems like Slovenia is lost in the EU and lacks visions and ambitions of its role. Domestic circles have been critical towards the lack of political orientation since this contributed also to the passive role of Slovenia and its political actors in the EU. Up until now there is no sign that this situation would improve. However, more like in previous periods, Slovenian public and mass media are expressing more interest in EU issues and affairs.

During the campaign for the 2014 EP elections and in contrast to past EP election campaigns also some European issues were raised. Similar has been noticed also in other countries. However, EU issues were not addressed in an important manner (Krašovec & Lajh, 2019).

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Public as well as parties were focusing more on the upcoming national parliamentary elections. Some soft Euroscepticism could be noticed among new, more radical left parties that were particularly critical about policies of austerity (Krašovec & Deželan, 2014). The most successful were again the right wing parties. Slovenian Democratic Party gained three seats and New Slovenia in coalition with Slovenian Peoples Party gained two seats. Igor Šoltes, a president of new party Verjamem (I believe) became the first MEP from Slovenia to join the Greens. The remaining two seats were won by Social Democrats and Slovenian Democratic Party of Pensioners (DVK, 2019). From the party Social Democrats Tanja Fajon was again elected. She was placed second on the list but was elected with preferential votes and overtook the position over Igor Lukšič, president of Social Democrats who was placed first on the list. A new list that appeared at the election was “Dream job” (Sanjska služba) which was organised as a sarcastic response to the Slovenian politics and the attitude for European elections. Their aim was to replace politicians with ordinary people that would advocate for the common good. It was some sort of social experiment that could get to drawn candidate a dream job in European parliament. All the candidates on the election list received their place by being drawn. Some candidates admit that they decided to participate in this experiment just for fun (MMC, 2014b). However, the project was not well received by voters. At the elections they received only 3.56% of votes (DVK, 2019).

The first European Commissioner from Slovenia, Janez Potočnik, who hold this position for two mandates, covering science and research in first mandate and environment in the second mandate, was not anymore on a Government’s radar for the third Commissioner’s mandate. Instead, Prime Minister Alenka Bratušek saw an opportunity for a new job position and nominated herself for European Commissioner which resulted in disapproval of the public and political colleagues. The Government of Alenka Bratušek in fact proposed three names for the next Commissioner: Alenka Bratušek, , the president of Slovenian Democratic Party of Pensioners, and Tanja Fajon, an MEP. However, critics said that Bratušek already had a deal with the President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker. In early September, he chose her for the candidate of the Vice President of the European Commission. However, Bratušek did not survived a hearing in the EP. The new government of , despite disagreement of other parties in the Government, nominated Violeta Bulc for the Commissioner. Juncker appointed her for the Commissioner for Transport. Although she was for a short time of period Vice-President of the Slovenian Government, she was in reality a new face in Slovenian politics and thus she heavily lacked any serious political experiences.

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This was expressed also at the EU floor as according to the public affairs and communications agency BCW (Burson Cohn & Wolfe, 2019) and media EURACTIV at the end of the mandate she was among the worst rated Commissioners.

Much of the period since 2014 was marked also with tensions between Slovenia and Croatia on their border dispute, both turning to the EU institutions for receiving support. Slovenia has relied heavily on international arbitration judgment to finally resolve the border issues with Croatia that has been straining relationship between Croatia and Slovenia for several years. Slovenia even blocked Croatian EU accession negotiations (Lajh & Krašovec, 2010) and is currently blocking Croatian entry into Schengen area and to the OECD for Croatia’s supposed lack of respect of international law. In 2015 Croatian Parliament and Government decided to abandon the arbitration after Croatian newspaper disclosed a leaked conversation between a member of Slovenian delegation and of the judge on the panel (Haček, 2016). Despite this unfortunate events Slovenia insists on enforcement of arbitration judgment while Croatia insists that EU should not play a role in resolving the border issue. In June 2017 the Permanent Court of Arbitration announced the verdict, designated three quarters of the Gulf to Slovenia and established a junction between Slovenia and international seas (Lovec, 2018). The court judgment failed to be implement in the estimated period of six months. The Slovenian public also strongly condemned the Slovenian Commissioner Violeta Bulc for not sufficiently representing the interests of Slovenia in the meetings of the College of Commissioners regarding the implementation of the arbitration judgment.

Bilateral relations between Slovenia and Croatia were additionally weakened during the migration crisis between October 2015 and March 2016 when almost 480,000 migrants crossed the Schengen border between Croatia and Slovenia. Slovenia accused Croatia that they do not respect EU rules and procedures and encourage crossing of more people across the border than agreed. With final EU assistance at the border and additional EU funds the situation slowly started to improve and normalise with the closing down of the Western Balkans corridor (Haček, 2016; Lovec, 2017). The civil society however remained critical towards the EU asylum and migration policy that was not able to cope with the crisis. With the established control on the inner border between Slovenia and Austria which is still going on due to the possible illegal migrations, Slovenia faced another unpleasant experience in the EU. Slovenian politicians and MEPs are since trying to negotiate the abolishment of border control in conversations with the EU. Up until now these efforts were not successful.

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With migration/refugee wave into the EU in 2015 and the de facto decay of the EU migration policy again the Eurosceptic feelings rose (Krašovec & Lajh, 2019). During the electoral campaign for national elections in 2018, the Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS), a member of the European Peoples Party (EPP) that received the most support but did not succeed to form the coalition employed anti-migration and refugee rhetoric, aligning with the ideas from the Hungarian leader Orban and criticising the EU policy on quotas and liberal migration policies for their impact on the Slovenian culture and security in Slovenia (Krašovec & Lajh, 2019). Their anti-migration rhetoric continues also after the elections.

In 2017 another issue cooled the relationship between Slovenia and Croatia. Slovenian red wine Teran has certificate of Protected designation of origin in EU. The problem has arisen when the European Commission with the delegation act allowed also Croatia to produce and sell wine with the name Teran. Slovenia has even filed a lawsuit against the European Commission. Additionally, in October 2019 European Commission assessed that Croatia qualifies for entry into the Schengen area. Slovenian Prime Minister expressed disappointment and stated that this was a political decision (MMC, 2019d). Together with the absence of support by the EU in the implementation of the arbitration judgment these events contributed to Slovenian disappointment in the EU.

Slovenia continued with its policy of absence of clear strategy in the EU with the only goal to present itself as committed towards the idea of united Europe. After Jean Claude Juncker presented five possible scenarios for the development of the EU, Slovenia expressed clear ambition to remain in the circle of more integrated member-states. In the beginning of 2017 some of Slovenian intellectuals even wrote and signed the so-called Ljubljana initiative to start the process of adopting a new EU Constitution which aim has been to protect the European idea and to build it in all its dimensions. The initiative was supported also by the Slovenian president Borut Pahor (MMC, 2017), however, it remained ignored in the EU context. In December 2017 government accepted the document “Principal positions of the Republic of Slovenia regarding key substantive areas for discussion on the future of the European Union” where Slovenia clearly declared that: “EU is a fundamental development environment for Slovenia. Slovenia has always been committed to a strong, cohesive and unified EU that can effectively address key challenges and threats”. Slovenia believes that the EU and EU policies will need to consolidate and deepen in the near future. While Slovenia's strategic interest is to remain anchored in the most closely connected part of the EU (UKOM, 2017). Besides Slovenia's strategic interest for being close to the core of Europe other preferences were also

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DebatEU Jean Monnet paper No 2020/01 expressed such as 1) striving to continue the enlargement process in the Western Balkans region, 2) supporting the EU's joint response to the migration issue, both externally and internally, 3) the Schengen area must remain an uncontrolled area at the internal borders and 4) in the debate on the future of the EU, priority should be given to the question of how to tackle common challenges effectively over institutional issues.

Between June and October 2018 in line with the call of French president, Macron, the Slovenian government organised a series of local consultation with citizens on the future of the EU. Consultations were organised on specific focus of European integration in Idrija, Kočevje and Slovenj Gradec. The results of the consultations and the citizens' proposals were gathered in a report for the EU Heads of State and Government that met in December 2018. The consultations continued in 2019 in Ljutomer, Škofja Loka, Grosuplje, Ajdovščina and Slovenjske Konjice (UKOM, 2019a, 2019b).

Slovenian president Borut Pahor continues to support discussion on the EU and has clear pro- European position. In October 2019 he organised a consultation Building Slovenian view on the development of the EU. The aim of consultation was exchange of views on the future development of the EU and Slovenian interest in it. Experts, government representatives, representatives of National assembly and Slovenian MEPs participated at consultation (UP RS, 2019). State secretary and euro specialist Igor Mally at this consultations stated that despite all complaints Slovenia is active in the EU policymaking and also reached some important achievements especially in cohesion policy. Later on Pahor published his opinion Renaissance of the European idea in New York Times where he stated that he believes that EU has found itself in a dead end, which is partly reflected in its lower efficiency and disillusionment of Europeans. He also advocated for the rebirth of European ideas and new concepts, which would allow the Union to grow further (Pahor, 2019).

Although, president Pahor supports the idea of the European Union it turned out he is not open to further European integration in the Middle East. During the Bled Strategic Forum 2019, which brings together participants from different fields with diverse knowledge to exchange views and find innovative solutions to current and future challenges, he declared that while he supports membership of Western Balkan he would drawn the line with Turkey and Ukraine. His statement was negatively accepted by 28 Slovenian intellectuals that in a letter called on the President to resign due to inappropriate, unreasonable, xenophobic and objectively politically and diplomatically extremely harmful statement for Slovenia. The then Foreign

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Minister Miro Cerar responded to the letter by stating that Slovenia officially supports Turkey's membership in the EU (MMC, 2019e).

The last elections to the EP had an increase in voters turnout compared to the previous elections to the EP. The voters turnout was 28.5% in 2004 and 2009, 24.5% in 2014 and 28.9% in 2019. The increase in voters turnout could be hardly seen as success. The Information Office of the EP in Ljubljana led a strong campaign during the election year especially among youth to mobilise the voters. This campaign, however, proved to be completely inefficient as Slovenia remained one of the countries with the lowest voters turnouts with only Czech Republic and Slovakia having recorded worse result. The campaign for the 2019 EP elections was without clear standpoint of the parties. The issues debated in media were mostly related to migrations, Brexit, the arbitration agreement between Slovenia and Croatia, populism and some other policies such as environment, food safety, political corruption ad economy (Krašovec & Lajh, 2019). Slovenian Democratic Party, Social Democrats and List of Marjan Šarec each received two mandates. Slovenian Peoples Party (in coalition with Slovenian Democratic Party) and New Slovenia each received one mandate. The results of the elections turned out to be balanced in several aspects. Among the elected MEPs are four men and four women, four MEPs from right wing parties and four from left wing parties, four former MEPs, three new ones and one returnee. All new MEPs were elected with preferential vote but only for two these votes were crucial. The other six new MEPs would be elected also because they were placed on the first or second place of list of candidates (DVK, 2019). It was confirmed again that when it comes to European elections, Slovenians are more likely to support individual candidate than . Elections to the EP are besides low voter turnout also in this aspect perceived very differently by the voters than national or local elections.

Already before the elections to the EP it was clear that the new Government will not propose Violeta Bulc for the second mandate in the European Commission. Slovenian Government faced hard challenge who to suggest as the next Slovenian Commissioner. They decided not to follow the instructions of Ursula von der Leyen, the predicted future president of the European Commission, and sent to Brussels only the name of the male candidate instead of two candidates, one female and one male. The Prime Minister even stated that Slovenia does not need to obey every time the instructions by the EU (MMC, 2019b). The government eventually decided for Janez Lenarčič, one of the rare EU specialists in Slovenia. Lenarčič was part of several Slovenian Governments. He was State Secretary for European Affairs and Ambassador of Slovenian Permanent Representation to the EU. He was thus proposed as an unpolitical

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DebatEU Jean Monnet paper No 2020/01 candidate and for this reason he was at the one hand criticised from a part of coalition and opposition for the lack of political experiences, while at the other hand gaining support from the part of coalition and opposition for being a strong EU specialist. At the end, in the National Assembly he was approved by majority of parliamentary parties from left and right wing, while with expressing a high level of expertise he turned out to be outstanding during the hearing in the EP. He has been assigned the portfolio of crisis management in the next European Commission, which was (at the first glance) not received with the enthusiasm among the Slovenian public and some politicians. Many wanted “a more important portfolio”. However, Lenarčič himself as well as the Prime Minister were happy with the assigned portfolio. It was for the first time that Slovenian public expressed more interest in which portfolio will be assigned to Slovenia, showing that Slovenians are slowly realising that they are an active part of the EU and not just an observer.

Despite the minor increase of Euroscepticism throughout Slovenian membership in the EU, the EU still has a relatively positive image among Slovenians. The percentage of Slovenes who have a very negative image of the EU is consistently below 5% (see Table 3). Dissatisfaction with the EU was the highest in 2013 and 2014 during the economic crisis. Furthermore, Slovenian politicians in the EU, such as Slovenian Commissioner Violeta Bulc and Slovenian MEPs, have been constantly evaluated as the most popular among Slovenian public. In January 2019 among 22 most popular Slovenian politicians we could found Violeta Bulc on the 3rd place, on 4th place MEP Tanja Fajon, on 9th place MEP Igor Šoltes and on 13th place MEP (Ninamedia, 2019). However, in 2019 before the EP elections, media published different ratings of work of Slovenian politicians in the EU where they performed worse than their colleagues. Violeta Bulc was among the worst rated European Commissioners, placed on 21st place among 28 (Burson Cohn & Wolfe, 2019). Similarly unsuccessful were also Slovenian MEPs. With the exception of Tanja Fajon who was ranked on 49th place among 751 MEPs, the rest were ranked between 378 and 531 place (MEPranking, 2018).

Slovenian role in the EU was judged by the Slovenian public also after the media published that Slovenian Government was ranked on the last 25th place together with neighbouring Croatia, Latvia and Malta with regard to the common influence of the country on the European politics and policies. Slovenia was reasonably active only in the policy field of bigger European integration (European Council on Foreign Relations, 2018). Soon after these results were made public, Slovenian Government already started to discuss how to prepare for the second Presidency to the Council of the EU in 2021. 80 million Euros are intended for the next

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DebatEU Jean Monnet paper No 2020/01 presidency while 350 people will be temporarily hired. In February 2018 a working group for managing staff and finances during the presidency led by Prime Minister was established. A document “Special governmental project: Presidency of Republic of Slovenia to the Council of the EU” has been published in March 2019, where in the introduction the government states that based on the successfulness of the project will depend the reputation of Slovenia among EU member-states and beyond (Zorman Macura, 2019). Such statements already give impression that Slovenia will again concentrate on organisational aspect of presidency and forget its own preferences regarding EU policymaking. Slovenia will once more preside in trio with Germany and Portugal. It is anticipated that development of the European perspective of the Western Balkan countries will be again a priority topic for Slovenia.

The current Prime Minister, Marjan Šarec, up until know showed little interest in the EU. In 2019 he also rejected the EP when he was invited to give a speech at the EP plenary session as one of current European leaders. This decision was not well accepted among the Slovenian public that believed Šarec could and should present Slovenian interests towards the implementation of arbitration judgment and responded to inappropriate speech of Antonio Tajani, President of the EP in Trieste (MMC, 2019c). In February 2019 Tajani disappointed Slovenian and Croatian citizens with the speech in Trieste on the occasion of the Italian Day of Remembrance for the Victims of the Foybe where he said: “Long live Trieste, long live Italian Istria, long live Italian Dalmatia". The statement was understood that he believed that Italy has valid claims on parts of Croatian and Slovenian territory. Tajani under the pressures of also Slovenian and Croatian MEPs later apologised for his words and denied such understanding of his statement (MMC, 2019a).

After 15 years of membership in the EU it slowly seems that EU affairs are more acknowledged also at home. Slovenian public is mostly interested in what is the role of Slovenia in the EU and demands more active role. Based on the historic memory where Slovenia and its citizens were throughout the history subordinated to other bigger countries, many citizens hope for more important role in Europe especially when comparing to the neighbouring Croatia that went through similar historical past, but seems to be more successful in the present EU. After all, in the new European Commission the Commissioner from Croatia will probably take the position of Vice-Commissioner.

Table 3: EU landscape in 2019, seen by Slovenian citizens Country IM TR SD MV FE EC EM

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Slovenia 44-15 45-50 56-39 55-40 69-28 77-23 88-9 EU-28 45-17 44-46 55-36 56-39 61-14 73-26 62-30

IM – image of the EU, TR –trust in the EU, SD – satisfaction with the EU democracy, MV – my voice counts, FE – future of EU, EC – European citizenship, EM -Economic and Monetary Union (positive-negative).

Source: EB, Eurobarometer 91 (2019) Standard Eurobarometer, August 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/index#p=1&instrumen ts=STANDARD

Conclusion

Relationship between Slovenia and the EU has been characterised with big support towards the European integration. Slovenian parliamentary parties almost unanimously backed Slovenian membership in the EU, Eurosceptic parties were more exception than the rule and their success has been almost non-existent, while Slovenian citizens have been expressing one of the highest support and trust in the EU. At the same time, it seems that Slovenians perceive EU as some untouchable superior institution that operates independently from our involvement. After all, Slovenia is one of the EU member-states with the lowest voters turnout that remains continuously low despite the campaigning efforts to mobilise Slovenian voters. However, passive attitude towards the EU cannot be attributed solely to Slovenian citizens but also towards Slovenian politics: Slovenian MEPs have been ranked among the less active, European Commissioner from Slovenia has been evaluated among the least successful during her last mandate, and Slovenia was evaluated as one of the most passive member-states in the Council of the EU.

Nevertheless, after 15 years of membership in the EU, Slovenian public slowly starts to express more interest in EU affairs and demand more active role for Slovenia in the EU. This is probably also connected with the last events regarding implementation of arbitration judgment, protection of Teran and provisionally established internal border control with Austria where Slovenia has not been successful in finding support in the EU and is somehow perceived as a looser of the game.

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After Brexit EU has been facing challenges in adopting a new common financial framework for the next seven years (2021-2027) While some of member states clearly argue for decreasing EU budget the European parliament in name of the citizens advocates for more support from EU in majority of EU policies. The MFF initial proposal amounts to EUR 1,279 billion or 1.11% of EU-27 gross national income. Special attention is paid to new challenges, especially in the field of migration and internal and external security (eg strengthening the capacity of the European Border and Coast Guard). It was proposed to increase funding for programs in the fields of research, innovation, digitization and youth mobility (Erasmus): e.g. Erasmus + funding is increasing by more than 100% and to reduce funding for cohesion policy and the common agricultural policy. Such Financial framework has clear implications for Slovenia. The proposal reduces Slovenia's eligibility for the two largest EU policies: cohesion policy by 9% and the common agricultural policy in the field of direct payments by 16% and in the field of rural development by 26%. The cohesion region Vzhodna Slovenija belongs to the category of less developed regions, while the region Zahodna Slovenija belongs to the category of regions in transition. Slovenia will be able to use more funds from those centralized EU policies that receive a significant increase in funds. Consequently, Slovenia decided to openly lobby in Brussels among other European leaders to extend the budget for cohesion.

Meanwhile Slovenian Government started to prepare for the second Presidency to the Council of EU in 2021. There is legitimate concern that government will again focus on organisational and management aspects of presidency and will not take advantage of the opportunity to have a bigger say in EU policymaking. With the Prime Minister that places national affairs way beyond EU affairs there is also little hope for Slovenia to finally draft some political orientation and strategy in relations towards the EU. Clear Slovenian strategy in the EU is urgently needed if we want to establish our role and position in policymaking and prepare basis for public officials that draft national positions towards EU legislative proposals. Although Slovenia prepared principle starting points for Slovenia in the EU these again show that the only goal Slovenia has is remain closely integrated in the EU but has no preferences in which policies and area should be prioritised. If Slovenians want to establish more recognizable character in the EU and to regain the respect of “best student” from the time of accession, the next 15 years of membership calls for lot of work and efforts in the fields of (A) improving the political culture in Slovenian politics, (B) strengthening various opportunity structures such as open consultations and dialogues with citizens, and (C) encouraging political socialisation of youth to increase political participation at EP elections.

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