VOLUME 5 EDITION 9 SPRING 2012 ISSN 1756-7335

TERRORISM AND COUNTER-TERRORISM: SPOTLIGHT ON STRATEGIES AND APPROACHES

volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 arches quarterly 1 Arches Quarterly is published by

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THIS ISSUE Volume 5 Edition 9 Spring 2012 ISSN 1756-7335 Available online: thecordobafoundation.com

Anas Altikriti Chief Executive Abdullah Faliq Editor

Editorial Team: Amjad Mohamed-Saleem Ibrahim Hewitt S. Alam Arzoo Ahmed H.D. Foreman Dr Basia Spalek Kathleen Grant Amina Easat Mehrunisha Suleman

A.S. Khan Art Editor

LITERATURE PROMOTIONS: 19 European Multiculturalisms: Cultural, Religious & Ethnic Challenges (Anna Triandafyllidou, Tariq Modood & Nasar Meer) 40 Islam and Muslims (Muhammad Ali Chaudry & Robert Dickson Crane) 67 The Missing Martyrs: Why There Are So Few Muslim Terrorists (Charles Kurzman) 72 Contemporary Debates on Terrorism (Richard Jackson & Samuel Justin Sinclair) 105 The British War on Terror: Terrorism and Counterterrorism on the Home Front Since 9-11 (Steve Hewitt) 105 Snitch!: A History of the Modern Intelligence Informer (Steve Hewitt) 130 Counter-Terrorism: Community-Based Approaches to Preventing Terror Crime (Basia Spalek) 130 From Beirut to Jerusalem (Swee Chai Ang) 138 Terrorism: A Critical Introduction (Richard Jackson, Lee Jarvis, Jereon Gunning & Marie B. Smyth)

2 arches quarterly volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 INTHISISSUE

04 Editorial Abdullah Faliq

08 Foreword Anas Altikriti

10 Complicating ‘Radicalism’ – Counter-Terrorism and Muslim Identity in Britain Nasar Meer Counter-Terrorism: Police and Community Engagement in Britain and the US 20 Basia Spalek & Laura Zahra McDonald

28 A Grand American Strategy of Counter-Terrorism Robert D. Crane The Strength of Local Partnerships: Overcoming Obstacles During the War on Terror 42 Robert Lambert

50 The Use of Secret Evidence is a Threat to Human Rights Jean Lambert MEP

56 The New Prevent: Will it Work? Can it Work? Therese O’Toole, Stephen H. Jones & Daniel Nilsson DeHanas

63 Prevent Agenda and the Doctrine of Fear in the Muslim Community Imran Awan The Causes of Terrorism: Deconstructing the Myths 68 Richard Jackson, Lee Jarvis, Jereon Gunning & Marie B. Smyth

73 The Complexity of Police-Muslim Community Relations in the Shadow of 9/11 P. Daniel Silk

83 Beyond the Rhetoric – Setting a New Perspective for Partnerships Amjad Mohamed-Saleem

90 From Moulin Rouge to 9/11 Zubeda Limbada Informing Continuity: Domestic Surveillance from the Cold War to the War on Terror 100 Steve Hewitt

106 Time for Change After 10 Years of Detention Without Trial Paul Donovan

110 Shifting Paradigms: De-Radicalisation Ahmad Hassan

116 Fundamentalists vs. Moderates: The War Within Judaism Rabbi Mark L. Winer Counter-Terrorism Post 9/11 and the Erosion of Human Rights and Civil Liberties 124 Saalik Haleem

131 ‘From Beirut to Jerusalem’ 2009 - The Wounds of Gaza Swee Chai Ang

139 Youth De-Radicalisation: the Wolverhampton Experience Revd. Mason West

146 Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: Young People’s Perspectives Hussain Al-Jabir Developing Community Partnerships - A Practical Solution for Peace, Prosperity and 154 Justice Nick Maurice

162 The Muslim “Demand Curve” for U.S. Foreign Policy Charles Kurzman Behind Closed Doors - Ten Years of Secret Evidence and Human Suff ering 167 Aisha Maniar & Adrienne Burrows

171 Conviction of Thought: How Islamic Concepts are Ruled on in UK Courts Asim Qureshi Muslims in Poland and Eastern Europe: Widening the European Discourse on Islam 177 Book review by Małgorzata Wróblewska 179 Picture Gallery volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 arches quarterly 3 FROM THE EDITOR

Welcome to this special edition of • Th e total number of worldwide Arches, which examines the various attacks in 2011 dropped by almost strategies and approaches adopted to deal 12 per cent from 2010 and nearly with terrorism and counter-terrorism. Th e 29 per cent from 2007. editorial team of Arches would like to acknowledge and thank the University of • Attacks by Al-Qa’ida and its Birmingham (UK), in particular Dr Basia affi liates increased by 8 percent Spalek, for sourcing a number of excellent from 2010 to 2011. A signifi cant contributions for this edition from a increase in attacks by Al-Shabaab, conference she convened on “Political from 401 in 2010 to 544 in 2011, Transitions, Policing and Counter- off set a sharp decline in attacks Terrorism: Power, Partnership and by al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI) and a Community”. Th e Cordoba Foundation is smaller decline in attacks by al- grateful for this collaboration. Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula In this issue, experts from various (AQAP), and al-Qa’ida in the disciplines examine the threat posed by Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). terrorists; tracing the origins and source of terrorism they assess the eff ectiveness • In cases where the religious of strategies and approaches employed affi liation of terrorism casualties to respond to and challenge this threat. could be determined, Muslims Importantly, we focus on de-radicalisation suff ered between 82 and 97 per and explore alternative strategies and cent of terrorism-related fatalities approaches that deal with terrorism, which over the past fi ve years. is often exaggerated and confl ated with other issues. Without wishing to make • Of the 978 terrorism-related light of such a serious issue, it is worth kidnappings [in 2010], only three considering that Micah Zenko, writing in hostages were private US citizens, the Atlantic, argues that Americans are as or .003 per cent. A private citizen likely to be killed by their own furniture as is defi ned as ‘any US citizen not by terrorism: acting in an offi cial capacity on Th e number of US citizens who died in behalf of the U.S. government.’ terrorist attacks increased by two between 2010 and 2011; overall, a comparable • Of the 13,288 people killed by number of Americans are crushed to death by terrorist attacks last year, seventeen their televisions or furniture each year.1 were private US citizens, or .001 percent. Citing the 2011 Report on Terrorism 2 published by the National Zenko rightly points out that the CounterTerrorism Centre (which off ers the above is indicative of an irrational fear of best available data and analysis of terrorism terrorism which is both unwarranted and a to the US government), Zenko highlights poor basis on which to base public policies. the following interesting observations: Th e eff ects of this exaggeration of

4 arches quarterly volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 EDITORIAL the terrorist threat and subsequent at local, national and international levels. disproportionate spotlight have tended Th e Cordoba Foundation maintains to fall on the Muslim community, with that genuine partnerships and a sound innumerable negative implications; it understanding of issues and factors that is, for a start, projected as a “suspect give rise to distrust, tensions and confl ict community”. are essential to help dissuade people from Although Washington framed the War turning to extremism and violence; and on Terror in response to 9/11, US Secretary also better-inform those in authority to of State Hillary Clinton recognised back respond to this dilemma eff ectively. in October 2007 that “you can’t lump all Terrorists will continue to advance terrorists together” and that America has their eschewed and parochial views, been “mistake[n] to paint with such a broad often taking advantage of the freedom of brush, which has not been particularly democracy and misusing religious texts to helpful in understanding what it is we were do so. Th e response to this, however, needs up against”. Whilst accepting the threat to be measured and not disproportionate; and urgency posed by terrorists, the reality for when we limit or abandon hard-won is that the strategy of the War on Terror by freedoms and the due process of law, we the US and endorsed by other countries is are doing the terrorists’ work. Attaining one that is exaggerated, un-nuanced and a proper balance is a delicate but essential laden with grave consequences for civil process. and human rights, as well as freedom of Th ank you. expression. Th ese consequences range from “racial Abdullah Faliq profi ling” by the police; “hate speech” laws EDITOR often extended to stifl e legitimate views; the ARCHES QUARTERLY undermining and limiting of Habeas corpus by extending detention without charge, often indefi nitely; a rise in Islamophobia leading to hate crimes as well as a negative eff ect on community cohesion; “no-fl y- lists” which curtail freedom of movement, including that of peace activists; the practice of “extraordinary rendition”, Abdullah Faliq helped set-up The Cordoba Foundation resulting in suspects being tortured; pre- and edits Arches, amongst other publications, as the emptive wars to repel perceived “terrorist” foundation’s Head of Research. In 2001, he helped launch threats; and strained East-West relations, the “Declarations of European Muslims” by the Grand Mufti of Bosnia Dr Mustafa Ceric. Faliq studied Arabic and namely a hatred of America and other conducted research in Egypt, Jordan, Sudan, Palestine & Western powers in the Muslim world. Th e Bosnia as part of his MA and doctoral studies specialising in Arab political Islam and British Muslims. Active in the British list goes on but all of these factors aff ect Muslim scene since the 1980s, he is currently a trustee of individuals and communities in diff erent the London Muslim Centre and former Deputy General ways. Our broad panel of contributors not Secretary of the Islamic Forum of Europe. only off er their diff erent perspectives and experiences on these and other issues, they also off er solutions. ENDNOTES 1. Zenko, Micah (2012). “Americans Are as Likely to Be Killed Whilst we draw largely on case studies by Their Own Furniture as by Terrorism”, The Atlantic, June 6. and experiences of terrorism and counter- - http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/06/ terrorism within a British and US context, americans-are-as-likely-to-be-killed-by-their-own-furniture- Arches also off ers related discussion as-by-terrorism/258156/#.T8_ecHyMuW4.twitter 2. Report on Terrorism: 2011, The National CounterTerrorism on building partnerships and dialogue Centre, Washington, DC. - http://www.nctc.gov/docs/2011_ between cultures, societies and agencies NCTC_Annual_Report_Final.pdf

volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 arches quarterly 5 THE CORDOBA FOUNDATION

FOUNDED IN 2005, The Cordoba Foundation (TCF) is an independent Public Relations, Research and Training unit, which promotes dialogue and the culture of peaceful and positive coexistence among civilisations, ideas and people. We do this by working with decision- making circles, researchers, religious leaders, the media, and a host of other stakeholders of society for better understanding and clearer comprehension of inter-communal and inter-religious issues in Britain and beyond.

OUR ACTIVITIES INCLUDE: • Structured consultation and advisory services • Face-to-face interaction with decision-makers and fi gures of authority • In-house research • Workshops, seminars and debates on pertinent issues • Training and capacity-building • Periodicals and journals • Resourceful website 6 arches quarterly volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 thecordobafoundation.com volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 arches quarterly 7 FOREWORD BY THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE

hilst confronting terrorism has that negative and counter-productive been a pronounced objective outcomes would result. Wof the United States and other Essentially, what began as a collective Western governments since the mid-1990s, approach based on socio-economic it was the 9/11 attacks in 2001 which considerations was then transformed drove the call for comprehensive and into a security operation with ideological sophisticated counter-terrorism strategies undertones which singled out the Muslim to be introduced throughout the West. community as the target. Th e obvious Approaches which diff ered in emphasis outcome was that the Muslim community and nature from one context to another withdrew from engagement with were invariably controversial and met with government eff orts to address the problem varied levels of resistance and opposition. of extremism. Meanwhile, the media helped to fi x a particular perception of terrorism, The media helped to fi x a extremism and radicalisation in people’s particular perception of minds. Th ese are mass-produced terms with terrorism… in people’s extremely vague meanings; nevertheless, they became reference points to describe minds [which] are the threat facing Western societies. Along mass-produced terms with a selective government engagement – disengagement policy based on ideological with extremely vague and political preferences, 11 years on we meanings. remain unclear as to how to confront what The Cordoba Foundation However, what is almost certain as was founded to address a common outcome of each of these approaches is that virtually none can the relations between claim to have been remotely successful. parties holding diff ering If anything, many countries witnessed negative results from their respective views and try to prevent policies and, in some cases, counter- discussions from productive outcomes. becoming confl icts. In Britain, for example, an approach that departed from the reasonable notion Disagreement is normal of engaging with communities in which and often healthy, but to vulnerable individuals were preyed upon by “hate preachers” was suspended in disengage or eliminate favour of an even more hostile policy the other on the basis with counter-subversion as its central of disagreement is a premise. Th is was also adopted despite overwhelming expert evidence suggesting problem of our times.

8 arches quarterly volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 FOREWORD we perceive as a serious and real threat. Th e Cordoba Foundation was founded to address the relations between parties holding diff ering views and try to prevent discussions from becoming confl icts. Disagreement is normal and often healthy, but to disengage or eliminate the other on the basis of disagreement is a problem of our times that has led to countless outcomes of a tragic and violent nature. Th is edition of Arches attempts to address the questions, philosophical as well as political, social and ideological, which arise from this debate. It also attempts, through its expert contributors, to consider the myriad of possible scenarios and outcomes with which we can break the deadlock we fi nd ourselves in.

Anas Altikriti CHIEF EXECUTIVE THE CORDOBA FOUNDATION

Anas Altikriti, CEO of The Cordoba Foundation, is an internationally accredited translator and interpreter by profession and a postgraduate lecturer in the same fi eld. He was a leading fi gure of the British Anti-War Movement and Chair of the 2-million Iraq demonstration in February 2003. Altikriti helped successfully negotiate the release of Western Christian peacemakers taken hostage in Iraq in 2005. He is a media commentator and writer in Arabic and English, as well as an advisor and consultant to numerous UK and international organisations on Muslim politics, East-West relations, combating extremism, negotiations, and dialogue. He is former President of the Muslim Association of Britain, a founding member of the British Muslim Initiative and an advisor to the European Muslim Research Centre. Altikriti is also completing a PhD in Political Studies at the University of Westminster, London.

volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 arches quarterly 9 Complicating ‘Radicalism’ – Counter-Terrorism and Muslim identity in Britain

NASAR MEER

he formulation and implementation economy in accounting for what has been of approaches concerned with described as ‘Islamic terrorism’ (cf Phillips, Taddressing ‘radicalism’ and 2006; Gove, 2006; Cohen, 2007). In preventing violent extremism have come to contrast, in this article I explore broadly inform prevailing approaches to citizenship defi ned ‘radicalization prevention policies’, in Britain (and vice-versa) in novel and and how these have been implemented challenging ways. Of course there is a wider and justifi ed, and how they become political context in which these issues are problematic in terms of very conventional raised, and a number of contributions have Muslim identity articulations. traced how the fate of multiculturalism in Britain has become intertwined with the THE PREVENT AGENDA political identities of Muslims (see Meer Following the London bombings, and and Modood, 2009), especially the ways several aborted bombings in a similar in which Muslim claims-making is seen ‘leaderless Jihad’ (Sageman, 2008), as peculiarly ambitious and diffi cult to the Labour government (1997-2010) accommodate (Joppke, 2009, 2004; Policy created seven working groups comprising Exchange, 2007; Pew, 2006; Moore, 2004, representatives of Muslim communities 2006 cf Meer, 2012). Th is is especially under the terms of ‘Preventing Extremism the case when Muslims are perceived to Together’ (PET). Th ese were clustered as be in contravention of liberal discourses follows: (1) Engaging with young people; of individual rights and secularism that (2) Providing a full range of education are made porous by concessions implied services, in the UK, that meet the needs in multiculturalist approaches (Hutton, of the Muslim community; (3) Engaging 2007; Hansen, 2006; Toynbee, 2005). with Muslim women; (4) Supporting Th is is exemplifi ed by the way in which regional and local initiatives and visible Muslim practices such as veiling community actions; (5) Imam Training have in public discourses been reduced and accreditation and the role of Mosques to and confl ated with alleged Muslim as a resource for the whole community; practices such as forced marriages, female (6) Security – Islamophobia, protecting genital mutilation, a rejection of positive Muslims from extremism, and community law in favour of criminal shar’ia law and so on (Meer, Dwyer and Modood, The provenance of 2010). Each suggests a radical ‘otherness’ about Muslims and an illiberality about Prevent, as well as the multiculturalism, and, since the latter working groups and is alleged to license these practices, opposition to the practice, it is argued, their recommendations, necessarily invalidates the policy. Where rests in a broader a discussion of the implications of a strategy which the British security agenda has been touched upon, however, it tends to focus more on the government had been discursive issues surrounding the ways in cumulatively developing which the explanatory purchase of Muslim cultural dysfunctionality has generated an since the events of 9/11. 10 arches quarterly volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 COMPLICATING ‘RADICALISM’ – COUNTER-TERRORISM AND MUSLIM IDENTITY IN BRITAIN confi dence in policing; and (7) Tackling substantive recommendation, extremism and radicalisation. in terms of proposed structural Initiated by the Home Offi ce this would capacity building within British later fall under the remit of the subsequently Muslim communities, promoted created Department for Communities the formation of a Mosques and and Local Government (DCLG). Th ese Imams National Advisory Board working groups devised a series of (MINAB). To this end, a steering proposals to develop ‘practical means’ of group of Muslim leaders undertook tackling violent extremism. Sixty-four an extensive national consultation recommendations were put forward in on matters such as the accreditation a report published in November 2005, of imams, better governance of which contained a particular emphasis mosques and interfaith activity upon three recommendations that would (the steering group published a serve as central planks in the unfolding good practice guide for mosques of government strategies concerned with when the Advisory Board was preventing violent extremism. formally launched on 27 June 2006.) Alongside this professional • Th ese included, fi rstly, the development programme or development of a ‘Scholars ‘upskilling’ of imams and mosque Roadshow’ coordinated by British offi cials, recommendations were Muslim organisations to facilitate also made for a national campaign ‘infl uential mainstream’ Muslim and coalition to increase the thinkers to address audiences visibility of Muslim women, and of young British Muslims. Th e to specifi cally empower and equip rationale being that these speakers them in the course of becoming would distil eff ective arguments ‘active citizens’. against extremist justifi cation for terrorism in denouncing it While Prevent inevitably included some as un-Islamic, so as to ‘counter security-related work; it has been criticized the ideological and theological for a variety of reasons, ‘ranging from underpinnings of the terrorist targeting the wrong people to stigmatizing narrative’.1 Th e roadshow included Muslim communities by treating them a variety of international fi gures, all as potential terrorists’ (Bartlett and and two of the most high-profi le Birdwell, 2010: 8). Two recurring issues Muslim intellectuals to take part were that, fi rstly, intelligence agencies were were the Swiss-born Francophone using the softer cohesion aspects of Prevent scholar Tariq Ramadan and the ‘to spy and illicitly collect intelligence, American convert Hamza Yusuf which has dramatically harmed the Hanson. programme as a whole’ (ibid). Secondly, that Prevent was oriented to address wider • A second proposed plank focused social policy within Muslim communities on the creation of Muslim which implied that this policy was only forums against extremism and valuable because it contributes to counter- Islamophobia. Th ese could be led terrorism (something illustrated by the fact by key individuals and brought that Prevent funding was directly linked together members of local Muslim to the size of the Muslim population in a communities, law enforcement and local authority, not on the basis of known public service agencies to discuss risk). how to tackle extremism and Islamophobia in their area. THE CONTEST CONTEXT Th e provenance of Prevent, as • Th e third and perhaps most well as the working groups and their volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 arches quarterly 11 recommendations, rests in a broader communities to challenge and strategy which the British government had resist violent extremism; been cumulatively developing since the 5. Address the grievances that events of 9/11. Known as CONTEST, this ideologues are exploiting. broad-ranging counter-terrorism strategy was launched in 2003 and comprised Th e previous government sought four components concerned with meeting to advance these objectives through a the objectives of Pursuit (to stop terrorist variety of local community partnerships attacks); Preparedness (to mitigate their and across statutory bodies, as well as impact where they cannot be stopped); voluntary agencies and community groups Protection (to strengthen overall protection ‘with police forces, local authorities and against terrorist attacks); and Prevention their partners working closely together to (to stop people from becoming terrorists oversee and deliver the project’ (DCLG, or supporting violent extremists). 2008b: 9). To foster these outcomes the It is this last objective that was given prevent-related funding for the period from added impetus upon the news that British 2008/09 to 2010/11 was around 45 million Muslims had planned and carried out the and was distributed via local authorities. London bombings, and it is the objective that In this way the Prevent strategy signalled has most overtly sought the participation some diff usion of formal responsibilities of British Muslim communities at large. for policy implementation and service It is therefore unsurprising to learn that delivery in a way that some see as indicative a strategy premised upon entering, and to of broader developments in ‘governance’ some extent reformulating, the life worlds practices whereby ‘responsibility and of British Muslim communities has been accountability for a wide range of social the subject of critical debate in the study of issues is increasingly focused towards local ethnic relations more broadly (Spalek and levels, while at the same time centralised Imoual, 2007; Lambert, 2008; McGhee, control in terms of resources and target- 2008). Th at this objective was intended setting is maintained’ (Spalek and Imoual, could be gleaned from the fact that 2007: 188). immediately after the London bombing, While it is not immediately apparent the Home Offi ce signalled that it would in the earlier quotation, the incorporation establish a Commission on Integration too of faith-based groups from within the and Cohesion (COIC) ‘to advise on how, third sector is potentially party to novel consistent with their own religion and approaches to engaging with religious culture, there is better integration of those minorities through the practices and parts of the community inadequately models of representation, stakeholders integrated’.2 and advocacy in the consultative arena Th e Prevent strategy itself, as pursued (DeHanas, O’Toole, Modood and by the DCLG, was concerned with fi ve Meer, 2010); perhaps as a development further strands – each conceived as a of what has been termed a multicultural prophylactic in addressing the causal ‘municipal drift’ (Meer and Modood, factors for people becoming or supporting 2009). Th e extent of this shift is not terrorists or violent extremists: the central focus here, other than in 1. Undermine extremist ideology and elaborating the manner in which the support mainstream voices; Prevent agenda, in constituting part of the 2. Disrupt those who promote broad counter-terrorism strategy, appears violent extremism and strengthen to be simultaneously subject to at least two vulnerable institutions; broader prevailing dynamics comprising: 3. Support individuals who are being [fi rstly] the implementation of anti-terrorist targeted and recruited to the cause laws that can be used disproportionately of violent extremism; against Muslims leading to the potential for 4. Increase the capacity of their increased surveillance and control and

12 arches quarterly volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 COMPLICATING ‘RADICALISM’ – COUNTER-TERRORISM AND MUSLIM IDENTITY IN BRITAIN thereby serving to reduce Muslims’ trust of of State-Muslim engagement. state institutions, while [secondly] at the same Th e risk has always been that ‘active time pursuing approaches that acknowledge, citizenship’ for Muslims is to some extent and stress the importance of, the involvement framed in terms of demonstrable counter- of British … Muslim communities in helping terrorism activities in a way which assumes to combat extremism. (Spalek and Imoual, that Muslim communities at large remain 2007: 191) the ‘locus of the issue of extremism’ (Spalek and Imoual, 2007: 194). As such, while Indeed, Spalek and Imoual (2007) it is not quite the case, as Fekete (2004: frame these dynamics relationally in 25) has suggested, public policy engaging terms of ‘harder’ and ‘softer’ strategies with Muslims amounts to being ‘tough on of engagement, whereby the former may mosques, tough on the causes of mosques’, be understood as consisting of various it certainly became common to fi nd means of surveillance, policing and statements such as that made by the former intelligence gathering and so on. Th e Communities Secretary Ruth Kelly, that it latter, meanwhile, would include the is a requirement for Muslim organisations development of dialogue, participation to take ‘a proactive leadership role in and community feedback between Muslim tackling extremism and defending our communities, state agencies and voluntary shared values’ (11 October 2006). organisations in a way that may serve to increase trust in ‘the battle for hearts and Britain is no exception to minds’. For example, the Prevent strategy also emphasised and sought to extend a global trend displaying to Muslims, long-established equality evidence of pan-Muslim traditions historically orientated towards ethnic and racial minorities: solidarities. Th e Prevent strategy requires a specifi c response, but we must also make the most Th e net outcome of coupling of of the links with wider community work to diversity and anti-terrorism agendas is reduce inequalities, tackle racism and other the implication of contemporary British forms of extremism (e.g. extreme far right), multiculturalism as the culprit of Britain’s build cohesion and empower communities security woes. Gilles Kepel (2005 quoted in […] Likewise, it is recognised that the Modood, 2005b), for example, has insisted arguments of violent extremists, which rely that the bombers ‘were the children of on creating a ‘them’ and an ‘us’, are less likely Britain’s own multicultural society’ and to fi nd traction in cohesive communities. that the bombings have ‘smashed’ the (DCLG, 2008: 6–7) implicit social consensus that produced multiculturalism to ‘smithereens’. More Th is built upon other recognition recently, Prins and Salisbury (2008: within government policies and legislation 22–3) have claimed that a misplaced of Muslim religious diff erence that has deference to multiculturalism, which been manifested in other ways, including failed to lay down the line to immigrants, measures against religious discrimination has contributed to a lack of national self- as set out in the Equality Act 2006. Th e confi dence and a fragmenting society that tensions, then, surround the extent to has been exploited by Islamist terrorists. which the prevailing British citizenship Th is has prompted Modood (2008: being extended to Muslims – through 17) to insist that ‘the simplistic linkage social and community cohesion agendas between home-grown terrorism and the – are twinned with or placed within the multicultural project is unfair because it same register as anti/ counter-terrorism ends up blaming not just national policies strategies that import or rely upon certain but specifi c communities for particular securitized ‘hard’ aspects of this dimension outcomes’. In this case, Muslims as a whole volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 arches quarterly 13 are blamed for terrorism, for not standing twentieth century, globalising Britain. up to extremism and for not integrating, which not only appears unfair ‘but also Th is then invokes the idea of the Muslim divisive and so not likely to achieve the ‘ummah’ or ‘community of believers’ much-sought for integration’. (Sayyid, 2000) and echoes Ali’s (1992: 113 cited in Modood et al., 1994) assertion ISLAMISM AND BRITISH that ‘the global appeal of intellectual Islam MUSLIM ‘RADICALISM’ AND off ers the possibility of a wider world to ‘EXTREMISM’ live in’, particularly when enacted in the Th e discussion has as yet not tackled local community, since youth can use the the issue of identifi cation and the ways political and intellectual teachings of Islam in which Islamism features in debates to argue and resist parental pressure (based over radicalism and violent extremism. upon an explicitly cultural understanding With respect to the question of religious of Islam) as much as the pressures of identity, Britain is no exception to a global racism and exclusion they experience trend displaying evidence of pan-Muslim from the majority group. One element solidarities. Long established research in this process, noted by Neilsen (1984) illustrating this in the UK includes how nearly three decades ago, is the tendency Jacobson (1997), amongst others, observed for young people to reject certain customs that religion is proving much more central from overseas that their parents have than other social identities amongst a resurrected in their British localities. A variety of Muslim minorities. Earlier still signifi cant factor is the frequent encounter Knott and Khokher (1993) and Dwyer between Muslims with diff erent ethnic (1999) showed that young Muslim women backgrounds and cultural expressions, all drew a distinction between ‘religion’ of whom hold a valid claim on Islam. and ‘ethnicity’ in rejecting their parents’ What these transactions also facilitate subscription to traditions that were less is the adoption and promotion of trans- consistent which the aspirations of young national Muslim and Islamic identities women themselves. Th is frequently built that are traditionally critical of nation- upon a self-conscious exploration of religion state citizenship, and are typically termed as a means of promoting advancement ‘Islamist’. Th is requires some conceptual in education, career opportunities and disentangling that can be assisted by so forth. Jacobson (1997) referred to this turning to Mondal (2008: 35) who development as the ‘religion-ethnic culture conceives ‘Islamism’ as ‘a form of Muslim distinction’ and contrasted it with her politics concerned with political behaviour second ‘religion-ethnic origin distinction’ embedded in Islamic principles, usually which involves a perception of identity directed at creating an [supra-national] in terms of one’s attachment to a place, Islamic state’. Th is may be contrasted with while one’s religious identity as a Muslim Lambert’s (2008: 33) narrower distinction denotes belonging to a global community in insisting that an Islamist is ‘a term used which transcends national boundaries (see to describe an Islamic political or social also Baggueley and Hussain, 2008). As activist’. Th is in turn seems closer to what Mandaville (2009: 498) reiterates, Mondal, again drawing upon Mandeville, Among British Muslims born and raised casts as Muslim politics directed towards in the UK, from about the late 1980s/early ‘a more inclusive formulation that does 1990s, there emerged what might be thought not pursue the establishment of formal of as a search for a ‘universalist’ Islam. To Islamic political systems’ (ibid). Perhaps a some extent this took the form of a rejection of better defi nition of an ‘Islamist’ or ‘Islamic what they saw as the parochialised religiosity activist’ is someone who believes or states of their parents. Th is ‘village Islam’, as many that their politics is derived from Islam or saw it, was mired in a past that had little gives primacy to Islamic causes. In this relevance to the challenges of daily life in way we can distinguish it from a ‘Muslim

14 arches quarterly volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 COMPLICATING ‘RADICALISM’ – COUNTER-TERRORISM AND MUSLIM IDENTITY IN BRITAIN activist’ who would be concerned with the extremism. Such tensions are elaborated in well-being of Muslims in tandem with the Lambert’s (2008: 34) insistence: well-being of society as a whole. Th e fact that al-Qaeda terrorists adapt and distort Salafi and Islamist approaches to Islam does not mean that Salafi s and The fact that al-Qaeda Islamists are implicitly linked to terrorism or terrorists adapt and extremism-nor does it mean that individual distort Salafi and Islamist Salafi s and Islamists are likely to be terrorists or extremists. […] However, it is axiomatic approaches to Islam does that by the time they become al-Qaeda not mean that Salafi s and suicide bombers (or other active terrorists) UK Muslim recruits have bought into an Islamists are implicitly ideology that distorts strands of Salafi and linked to terrorism or Islamist thinking. extremism. Th e idea of Islamism will be further discussed below and while the idea of It is argued, however, that while Islamist Salafi sm will reoccur, it won’t be centrally identities are by defi nition challenging, discussed so that it is worth noting here they neither need be ‘extremist’ not how Lambert (2008: 33), drawing upon ‘violent’. Indeed quite the opposite can Esposito (2003), uses the term to refer be true. One good illustration of this to a ‘name derived from salaf, “pious may be garnered from the former head of ancestors”, given to a reform movement the Metropolitan Police Service Muslim that emphasises the restoration of Islamic Contact Unit (MCU), Robert Lambert’s doctrines to pure form, adherence to (2008) insider account of a London-based the Qur’an and Sunnah, rejection of the police and community initiative. Th is authority of later interpretations, and initiative worked in partnership with maintenance of the unity of ummah – that British Islamist groups that are widely is, a global Muslim fellowship’. portrayed as ‘radical’ and ‘extremist’. One of the most salient Muslim Yet in a series of projects since as early illustrations of the confl ations Lambert as 1994, London-based Islamist Muslim is critiquing may be found in Th e youth workers have been galvanising Islamist – a highly infl uential account non-violent responses against Al Qaeda by the self-professed ‘former radical’ Ed propaganda through forms of community Hussein. In his memoir of a time spent engagement that champion education. in various burgeoning and politically While these groups have been challenging active Muslim groupings in London Al Qaeda propagandists long before the during the 1990s, Hussein traces and issue was recognised by the government, critically recounts a journey through a these groups’ limited inclusion in counter- number of Islamist organisations that terrorism eff orts has invited signifi cant overlapped with or operated among East controversy. London’s Bangladeshi communities, but As Lambert (2008: 33) details, this which also held transnational ambitions. controversy emerges from the charge that, Th ese allegedly included the East London in seeking Islamist involvement, the MCU Mosque, Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), Young has become an ‘appeaser of extremists’ Muslims Organisation (YMO) and the and has succumbed to an ‘ideological Islamic Society of Britain (ISB), among Stockholm Syndrome’. Th ese charges are others. Hussein’s account insists upon premised upon a confl ation of Islamism intellectual and political code tendencies and Al Qaeda philosophies or traditions in the contemporary articulations of of thought, and the powerful assumption otherwise very disparate strands of modern that ‘political radicalism’ leads to violent Islamic political thought. Th is need not volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 arches quarterly 15 be invalid, however, when he describes recognising that in this regard HT is not where Islamist activists and organisation typical of Islamist parties, as Ramadan take their own sources of infl uence and (1999: 139) reminds us: inspiration and so forth. Much of this is Th ere was never any question in al- genealogically premised upon an earlier Banna’s texts of reducing the shar’ia to the ‘Islamism’ ushered in under the austere status of a criminal code. Th e application of Islam of Wahhabism, promoted by the this code has several pre-requisites, primarily eighteenth century Arab cleric Muhammad that a society has reached a suffi cient level of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab. social justice and individual responsibility. Hussein’s account of Islamism moves […] Th e fi rst phase of applying the shari’a outwards from this earlier incarnation to should involve a process of social reform with couple Hassan al-Banna, who founded the aim of restoring very basic rights to the the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in Egypt people. Education, together with the need for in 1928, with Abu A’la Mawdudi, who involvement in the struggle for social justice, founded the Jamat-e-Islami in northern is the watch word of the Muslim Brotherhood. India in the 1930s, with another Egyptian Sayyid Qutb, writing in the 1950s and Nevertheless, what does it tell us if 1960s. What is omitted in these moves is by the beginning of the 1990s, HT the contextual bearing that each of these could count several thousand young fi gures wrote in broadly anti-colonial and British Muslim supporters among its pre- Independence eras (perhaps with ranks, in Hussein’s account? Th ese levels the exception of Qutb). Th is is repeated of recruitment refl ected a process of in Hussein’s linking of Taqi al-Nabhani, ‘political brainwashing’ that has taken who founded Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) in place on Britain’s student campuses Jerusalem in 1953, to contemporary Al and elsewhere, has exploited young Qaeda-inspired philosophies, a reading Muslims ‘caught between two cultures’ which leads Hussein (2008) to conclude and has been fostered by a segregationist that Islamists are ‘all at one with Wahhabis multiculturalism that has facilitated this in creed’3 fi rst step of ‘radicalisation’ on the path Indeed, of all these groupings it is the to ‘violent extremism’. It is worth noting, supra-national HT, outlawed in many however, that while it is true that the Muslim countries, and particularly in search for identity at moments of crisis, the ex-Soviet republics of Central Asia, what Choudhry (2007: para 8) describes as that draws his most virulent criticism. a ‘cognitive opening’, has often gone hand In Hussein’s account the crucial issue is in hand with lack of religious literacy as that such Islamist groups harbour anti- two characteristics of those drawn to fringe democratic ambitions in their desire for groups, this does not mean that young Islamic supremacy, and must not therefore people drawn to these groups remain be included as constituents in a political embedded within them over a life course. process. Not only does Hussein’s own rejection of It is certainly the case that HT openly, HT illustrate this, but also Hamid’s (2007: but non-violently, aspires towards what 157) ethnographic work with ex-members it understands as the Islamisation of reports that: societies, the world over, and boasts a Many young people … credit HT detailed conception of its supra-national for awakening their religio-political Islamic state, the Caliphate. Th is includes consciousness. HT appeals to a section among a draft constitution that, among other young people frustrated with what they see as things, outlaws any political parties they the inaction of traditional authority in their deem un-Islamic, excludes women and communities and ineff ectiveness of other non-Muslims from ruling positions, Islamic groups. […] Joining HT seems, for and sanctions capital punishment for most, to be a phase young people go through apostates.4 Th ough it is also worth while at college or university. As they grow

16 arches quarterly volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 COMPLICATING ‘RADICALISM’ – COUNTER-TERRORISM AND MUSLIM IDENTITY IN BRITAIN older, ex-members either join more moderate have forsaken everything for what we believe. groups, withdraw from the activist scene, or […] Until we feel security, you will be our in some cases join groups that are infl uenced targets. Until you stop the bombing, gassing, by HT (emphasis added). imprisonment and torture of my people we will not stop this fi ght. We are at war and Th e concern, then, should not be to I am a soldier. Now you too will taste the fi x as ‘authentic’ our reading of a variety reality of this situation. of Islamist movements but rather to view them as projects whose ‘meaning, reception Muslim trans-nationalism and political instantiation evolve’ as they enter new contexts (Mandaville, 2009: should not be treated 501). Th is could be an example of what as a post- or near- 9/11 Said (1984) once termed a ‘travelling phenomenon, but theory’ or even what McLennan (2004) has termed ‘verhicularity’. A related and rather as a space and set equally pressing critique of Hussein is that of practices that have in many ways his account is of decreasing relevance, unless one assumes that there evolved over decades. have been few advances over the last one and a half decades within or around the It is thus problematic that Hussein organizations he discusses. For example, has implicated a wide array of British Butt (2007) insists that Hussein’s account Muslim organisations, such as the Muslim ‘is dated and misleading’ for ‘the groups Council of Britain (MCB) and the Muslim he mentions, and their modus operandi, Association of Britain (MAB), among are more fl uid and sophisticated now’.5 It many others, as potentially extremist is also interesting to note how Hussein’s because they may contain Islamists description of HT as involved in violent within their ranks and/or maintain very extremism implies that violent extremists legitimate transnational links to ancestral form part of traditional party structures homelands. As Mandaville (2009: 497) and work with strategic political objectives insists, Muslim trans-nationalism should in mind. Th is appears inconsistent with not be treated as a post- or near- 9/11 what is known of such groups, as Brighton phenomenon, but rather as a space and set (2007: 14) reminds us: of practices that have evolved over decades. Al-Qaeda’s jihad … derives ‘ from the Th e events of 9/11 and 7/7, however, luxury of moral choice’. Th e ideology and certainly had enormous impact on these practice of jihad become gestural rather than institutional fi elds-not least through the deliberate, ethical rather than political. Its various responses of state authorities and attacks are moments of sanctimonious – self- the fact that they came to view Muslim sanctifying – violence, not coordinated events trans-nationalism primarily through a within a comprehensive strategy. Th us, and national security lens. while violent extremism is indeed meant Th is is related to Kundani’s (2008: 53) to accomplish certain ends, it is, as Devji critique of Hussein’s distinction between (2005: 3–5) argues, better conceived as true Islam as ‘spiritual’, ‘moderate’ and ‘gestures of duty or risk rather than acts of ‘traditional’, and a distorted form of instrumentality properly speaking’. Islam as ‘ideology’, ‘extremist’, ‘activist’, ‘literalist’, ‘anti-western’ and ‘political’ A graphic illustration of this may as over general and indeed damaging in be found in the posthumous words of its simplicity. As Lambert (2008: 34) has Mohammed Sidique Khan, the lead complained, ‘licensing and encouraging bomber of London on 7 July 2005: one religious community (e.g., Sufi s) Our words are dead until we give them against another (e.g., Salafi s and Islamists) life with our blood. I and thousands like me may prove divisive and provide further volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 arches quarterly 17 ammunition for al-Qaeda propagandists’. DeHanas, D., O’Toole, T., Modood, T., and Meer, N. (2010). ‘Muslim Participation in Contemporary Governance: A It is therefore striking that instead of Literature Review Summary’, University of Bristol. off ering a ‘non-political’ notion of Islam, Hussein is positing a very political right to Department for Communities and Local Government (2008). ‘Preventing Violent Extremism: A Strategy for Delivery’. London: name what is and what is not legitimate for HMSO. governments to engage with. Another way of putting this is to draw upon Lambert’s Fekete, L (2004). ‘Anti-Muslim Racism and the European Security State’, Race and Class, 46 (1), 4–29. (2008: 34) analogy of Irish republicanism through which he maintains that ‘one of Gove, M (2006). ‘Celsius 7/7’. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. the major lessons of that long campaign Jacobson, J (1997). ‘Perceptions of Britishness’, Nations & was UK counter-terrorism’s failure to Nationalism, 3 (2), pp. 165–79. adequately distinguish terrorists from Joppke, C (2009). ‘Limits of integration policy: Britain and the Republican Catholic communities her Muslims’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 35 (3), from where they sought support. […] Nor 453-472.

was Irish Catholicism a key pointer to Joppke, C (2004). ‘The Retreat of Multiculturalism in the Liberal Provisional IRA terrorism’. State: Theory and Policy’, British Journal of Sociology, 55 (2), Th e wider implication being that if 237–57. political lessons are to be learned, then a Lambert, R (2008). ‘Empowering Salafi s and Islamists against more fruitful means of engaging a variety of Al-Qaeda: A London counter-terrorism case study’, Political Muslim groups, across a political spectrum, Science (PS) Online January. would proceed on the understanding that Manderville, P (2009). ‘Muslim transnational identity and state complex forms of democratic politics, responses in Europe and the UK after 9/11’, Journal of Ethnic where citizens have widely diff erent sets and Migration Studies, 35 (3), 491-506. of beliefs, is a challenge for – and not an McGhee, D (2008). ‘The End of Multiculturalism? Terrorism, obstacle to – State-Muslim engagement. Integration & Human Rights’, Open University Press & McGraw- Hill Education.

Dr Nasar Meer is Senior Lecturer in Sociology at the Meer, N (2012). ‘Misrecognising Muslim Consciousness in University of Northumbria. He is currently serving as Europe’, Ethnicities, 12 (2), doi:10.1177/1468796811431295. the Minda de Gunzberg Fellow at Harvard University and a Visiting Fellow with the Institute for Advanced Meer, N (2009). ‘Identity articulations, mobilisation and Studies in the Humanities (IASH) at the University of autonomy in the movement for Muslim schools in Britain’, Race, Edinburgh. [www.nasarmeer.com] Ethnicity and Education.

Meer, N and Modood, M (2008). The Multicultural State We’re BIBLIOGRAPHY In: Muslims, ‘Multiculture’ and the ‘Civic Re-balancing’ of British Bagguley, P. and Hussain, Y (2008). ‘Riotous Citizens: Ethnic Multiculturalism’. Political Studies. Confl ict in Multicultural Britain’. London: Ashgate. Modood, T (2008a). ‘‘Multiculturalism after 7/7: A Scapegoat or Bartlett, J. and Birdwell, J (2010). ‘From Suspects to Citizens: a Hope for the Future?’, RUSI, 153 ( 2), pp. 14–17. Preventing Violent Extremism in the Big Society’. Modood, T (2008b). ‘Multicultural Citizenship and the Brighton, S (2007). ‘British Muslims, Multiculturalism and UK Shar’ia Storm’, Open Democracy, 14 February, 2008. http:// Foreign Policy: ‘intgration’ and ‘cohesion’ in and beyond the www.opendemocracy.net/faith_ideas/Europe_islam/ state’, International Aff airs, 83 (1), pp: 1-17. multiculturalism_future [Accessed 13 July 2008].

Butt, R (2007). ‘How Mohammed became Ed’, The Guardian, Modood, T (2005b). ‘Multicultural politics: Racism, ethnicity and 9 May. Muslims in Britain’. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Cameron, D (2007). ‘Address to Handsworth Mosque’, Moore, C (2006). ‘How Cromwell Gave Us Joan Collins Birmingham, 30 January. and Other Luminaries’, Daily Telegraph, 17 June. Available from: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/main. Choudhry, T (2007). ‘The Role of Muslim Identity Politics jhtml?xml=/opinion/2006/06/17/do1702.xml&sSheet=/ in Radicalisation’, Department for Communities and Local opinion/2006/06/17/ixop.html - Accessed 13 July 2008. Government. Pew (2006). ‘The Great Divide: How Westerners and Muslims View Commission on Integration and Cohesion (COIC) (2007) Our Each Other’. Washington DC: The Pew Global Attitudes Project. Shared Future: Themes, Messages and Challenges: A Final Analysis of the Key Themes from the Commission on Integration and Prins, G and Salisbury, R (2008). ‘Risk, Threat and Security’, RUSI, Cohesion Consultation. London: HMSO. 153 (1).

Cohen, N (2007). ‘What’s Left? How Liberals Lost Their Way’. Phillips, M (2006). ‘Londonistan: How Britain Created a Terror London: Harper Perennial. State Within’. London: Gibson Square Books.

18 arches quarterly volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 COMPLICATING ‘RADICALISM’ – COUNTER-TERRORISM AND MUSLIM IDENTITY IN BRITAIN

ShowPage&c=Page&cid= 1153388310360 - accessed 19 Policy Exchange (2007). ‘Living Apart Together: British Muslims Oct. 2006. The ‘Radical Middle Way’ project – http://www. and the Paradox of Multiculturalism’. London: Policy Exchange. radicalmiddleway.co.uk – was also supported by the Home Offi ce, and according to the DCLG over 30,000 people have Policy Innovation Unit (PIU) (2001). ‘Improving Labour Market presently attended the fi rst seven of twelve road shows Achievements for Ethnic Minorities in British Society’. www. and the organisers expect more than 100,000 to attend in cabinet-offi ce.gov.uk/innovation/2001 /ethnicity/scope.shtml total (see http://www.communities.gov.uk/documents/ Radcliff e, L (2004). ‘A Muslim Lobby at Whitehall?’ Islam and communities/ pdf/151792.pdf for more details). Christian-Muslim Relations, 15 (3), 365-386. 2. Outlined by Tony Blair himself. See the prime minister’s press conference, 5 Aug. 2005, http://www.pm.gov.uk/ Said, E (1984). ‘Travelling Theory’, The World, The Text, The Critic. output/Page8041.asp - accessed 9 Nov. 2005. London: Vintage. 3. Andrew Anthony’s (2004) too insists that ‘Wahabbism … informs the spread of Islamic fundamental’. ‘Multiculturalism Sageman, M (2008). ‘Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the 21st is dead. Hurrah?’ The Guardian, 8 April, 2004. Century’, University of Pennsylvania Press. 4. See http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.info/english/constitution. htm ENDNOTES 5. See also Yayha Birt’s review: http://www.yahyabirt. 1. Foreign and Commonwealth Offi ce, ‘EIWG com/?p=71 fact sheet’, http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/ Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/

BOOK PROMOTION European Multiculturalisms: Cultural, Religious & Ethnic Challenges EDITED BY ANNA TRIANDAFYLLIDOU, TARIQ MODOOD & NASAR MEER

Th is book proposes a common European intellectual framework to evaluate recent developmentsde in European multiculturalism. Th e heightened security awareness in theth wake of the 9/11 attacks and the London and Madrid bombings has resulted in a 'crisis of multiculturalism'. EachE chapter in this interdisciplinary book reviews the actual state of aff airs in severalse countries (Belgium, UK, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece and Spain) inin relation to the theories behind immigrant minority claims. With a special focus ono Muslim immigrants, the contributors look at the value issues entrenched in multiculturalismm and the policy challenges and measures adopted to address them. EuropeanE Multiculturalisms: Cultural, Religious and Ethnic Challenges provides a good overview of diff erent approaches to multiculturalism, as well as examining issues relating to citizenship, diversity, civic recognition, gender, religious diversity & education, integration, anti-discrimination policies and social policy.

European Multiculturalisms: Cultural, Religious & Ethnic Challenges, Edited by Anna Triandafyllidou, Tariq Modood and Nasar Meer. Published in November 2011 by Edinburgh University Press volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 arches quarterly 19 Counter-Terrorism: Police and Community Engagement in Britain and the US

BASIA SPALEK & LAURA ZAHRA MCDONALD

he notion that ‘communities can be made here is between those community- defeat terrorism’ has generated based approaches to counter-terrorism that Tmuch interest in Britain and in the are community-focussed and those which US, especially in the aftermath of 9/11 are community-targeted, for there can be a and 7/7 where policy makers and others tendency to idealise and romanticise overly have begun focussing upon the potential the notion of communities countering advantages of community involvement terrorism. in counter-terrorism (Briggs et al. 2006; Th is article examines the notion that Silk, 2010). Th e notion that communities communities can defeat terrorism by can defeat terrorism heralds a potentially presenting a model of police and community progressive departure from traditional engagement which distinguishes between counter-terrorism policies and practices, community-targeted and community- which have relied historically upon focussed approaches, based upon more ‘hard’ policing tactics such as the use of than fi ve years of in-depth research into informants, covert policing operations and police and community engagement and police offi cers, the use of stop and search, partnership work in relation to counter- surveillance and other means. terrorism (Spalek & Lambert, 2008; Nonetheless, the notion that Spalek, El-Awa & McDonald, 2009; communities can defeat terrorism has Spalek & McDonald, 2009; Spalek & generated, and continues to generate, Lambert, 2010; Spalek, 2010; McDonald, much controversy in the UK as well as in 2011; Spalek, 2011). the US. Th is is partly because community- based approaches to counter-terrorism ‘COMMUNITY’, ‘ENGAGEMENT’ may be targeted at communities rather AND ‘PARTNERSHIP’: SOME than focussed upon, and supportive DEFINITIONS of, communities. So, for example, ‘Community’, ‘engagement’ and community-based approaches have been ‘partnership’ are terms that require some experienced at times as a kind of Trojan examination. Th e notion of ‘community’ horse for ‘top-down’ state security-led is problematic and highly contested; it approaches that involve the penetration of can be a catch-all phrase used as a way communities to be used as spying networks of simplifying, merging and combining (Goldsmith, 2005; Hewitt, 2010). complex social identities and groupings for Indeed, an accusation made against the the purposes of policy development and government’s Prevent strategy in Britain implementation. is that it may have alienated sections Furthermore, although the term of Muslim communities because the ‘community’ gives the outward impression policy may have encouraged community of neutrality, the ways in which the term members to watch and share information tends to be used suggests that it is loaded on suspicious neighbours or friends with with assumptions about the kinds of social police (Kundnani, 2009). In the US, identities that are included, as well as community outreach programmes have also fostered, for the purposes of community been criticised for ‘spying on communities’ participation, engagement and scrutiny of (e.g. Sullivan & Hawley, 2011). It seems, performance. therefore, that an important distinction to Many communities might be thought 20 arches quarterly volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 COUNTER-TERRORISM: POLICE AND COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT IN BRITAIN AND THE US of as being both locally and geographically violence committed for or in the name specifi c, as well as consisting of connections of communities – at local, national and between individuals across wider spaces in transnational levels – is an important relation to factors like ethnicity, culture, dynamic to consider, as popular support politics and so on. Some communities is necessary for social change (Anderson have been conceptualised as consisting 2011). of ‘diasporas’, which are both local and Community perceptions of the global in character, with the development legitimacy or not of violence should also of new technologies enabling dispersed be considered (Anderson, 2011), as should populations to interact and link together the theological infl uence in relation to important parts of their social and such perceptions, for example, in the case cultural lives (Gilroy, 2002). In diasporas, of martyrdom (Tyler, 2010). Social and individuals gain a sense of belonging, political factors should also feature when devising narratives about themselves and trying to understand community support their origins, about how they are linked to for terrorism; social factors like poverty broader global religions, nationalities and/ or disenfranchisement can play a role or ethnicities as well as to localities that are (Schmid 2007; Tyler 2010), and according ‘simultaneously home and a place of exile’ to Alden (2009): (Rew and Campbell, 1999: 167). the social nature of suicide terrorism makes societal support a necessary ingredient for its Communities constitute continued occurrence (Alden 2009:ab). sites at which the social It is important to stress that support world is experienced, within communities may fl uctuate. According to Crenshaw (1981: 388): acted upon and Lack of popular support at the outset of understood, even though a confl ict does not mean that the terrorists' aims lack general appeal. Even though they these sites may be cannot immediately mobilise widespread temporary, in constant and active support, over the course of the fl ux and underpinned by confl ict they may acquire the allegiance of power relations. the population. (Crenshaw 1981:388) Furthermore, passive support by Although the notion of community is communities may comprise the ‘backbone’ problematic, and can only partially ever of terrorist action; thus, according to be understood in relation to micro and Galam (2002: 269), only one passive macro level fl uctuations in relation to supporter is needed to aid/allow a terrorist wide-ranging factors like history, politics, at any one time. Hence, counter-terrorism geography, religion, culture and so forth, policy and practice should aim towards it is important to stress that communities reducing community support: constitute sites at which the social world is Th e strategic centre of gravity for militant experienced, acted upon and understood, Islamic terrorist groups is the popular even though these sites may be temporary, support of the Muslim world. Popular in constant fl ux and underpinned by power support provides the terrorists [with] relations. Community might be thought invaluable sources of funding, manpower, of as a space of belonging, as consisting legitimacy, and the real potential to threaten of shared meanings, comprised of one or entrenched governments in Muslim more of a combination of geographical, countries. Without this popular support, imaginative, emotional, political and other Osama bin Laden and other violent global ties (Lash, 1994; Kennedy & Roudemetof, Muslims will not be able to achieve their 2004). According to Anderson (2011), desired end-state. (Kohn 2002:4) volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 arches quarterly 21 Th e r e a l s o a p p e a r t o b e a n u m b e r o f f a c t o r s approaches. At the same time, partnership that aff ect popular and/or community work can be diffi cult as it involves power support for terrorism. It is important diff erentials and so community groups to consider the social programmes that may not feel that they are actual partners some terrorist groups may provide; for in the policy process (Th acher, 2001). example, the charitable work supported by Police-community partnerships within Hamas. Th e IRA responded to law and a counter-terrorism arena have been order issues in Northern Ireland when documented by researchers (Lambert, police were distrusted by the majority of 2008; 2010; Spalek et al. 2009, Spalek, Catholics. Th e suff ering of the collective (2010), McDonald (2011), Spalek (2011), may also infl uence public support in that Baker (2012). Community policing if the atrocities committed by terrorists are seems to have played a central role in deemed disproportionate and have created the development of key partnerships signifi cant suff ering within a community between police offi cers and community then support for the terrorist group (s) may members. According to Virta (2008), decline (Bloom, 2004). State repression although it has previously been argued may also infl uence popular support. that community-based policing is no What then is state engagement like in longer ‘in vogue’, having been replaced relation to counter-terrorism? Policing by reassurance policing or intelligence-led is one aspect of this, for police offi cers, policing, community-based policing is still whilst working on behalf of community very much prominent in policing agendas. members, are empowered to enforce state- Rather than there having been a paradigm driven laws. Engagement in relation to shift from community-based policing to policing might be considered to comprise intelligence-led policing, therefore, both of ‘the process of enabling the participation styles of policing co-exist, albeit there of citizens and communities in policing at being diff erent emphases on the diff erent their chosen level, ranging from providing styles in diff erent contexts. information… to empowering them Within the post 7/7 counter-terrorism to identify and implement solutions to context in England and Wales, linkages local problems and infl uence strategic between community-based policing and priorities and decisions’ (Myhill: 2004: 4). intelligence-based models of policing can Th is suggests that engagement can be an most clearly be seen in the way in which eff ective tool in developing a community- the recently established ‘neighbourhood focussed approach to counter-terrorism, policing’ model is being connected for engagement includes empowering explicitly to intelligence-gathering. It has citizens to identify and implement been argued that under the neighbourhood solutions to local problems. Partnership policing model, which contains elements can also be an eff ective tool. Partnership of community-based policing, in might be defi ned as involving equality, responding to individuals’ routine security transparency and legitimate cooperation concerns around issues such as anti-social between partners, which may involve behaviour or crime police offi cers will diff erent interests forming a partnership to be more likely to persuade community carry out work that they decide collectively members of the benefi ts of assisting them. to do (Cook, 2006). Neighbourhood policing is being linked Partnership work has a number of explicitly to counter-terrorism activities inherent diffi culties. For example, there in that it is argued that ‘neighbourhood may be diff erences in the resources that are policing is a process that can be harnessed available to diff erent groups, and diff erent to establish the presence of any suspicions organisations are also likely to have about potential terrorist activities’ (Innes: diff erent sets of priorities, so that there 2006: 14). can be considerable diffi culties arising Th e developments set out above in relation from, and tensions within, partnership to the British context can also be seen in

22 arches quarterly volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 COUNTER-TERRORISM: POLICE AND COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT IN BRITAIN AND THE US the US, where there has been an increasing terrorism and community policing has focus upon the utilisation of community- tended to be one dominated by a generalist based policing within a counter-terrorism approach, one which although highlighting context, with partnerships being developed the importance of local contexts, between Muslim, Arab, Sikh and South nonetheless posits that neighbourhood Asian American communities and police. policing, through responding to Muslim It is argued that these partnerships have communities’ concerns regarding a number of important strands to them: particular signal crimes like burglary, hate they are said to provide police with crime and drugs, can help build enough important cultural and linguistic insights, rapport with community members for vital information and cooperation, and them to provide police with community informed observations that can become intelligence (Innes, Abbott, Lowe & part of a productive strategy for terror Roberts, 2007). Further attention needs crime prevention. At the same time, these to be paid to specifi c partnerships between police offi cers and members of Muslim communities that have been developed, Partnerships between where young Muslims deemed at risk of police offi cers and committing acts of terrorism are targeted communities in the US for interventions. It is not necessarily the case that intelligence regarding young has been questioned as people at risk is widely available amongst a result of the extensive members of Muslim communities, but rather this intelligence is perhaps use of informants concentrated amongst particular groupings within Arab Muslim and networks, and so preventing terrorism communities alongside is not a question of necessarily engendering trust between all Muslim communities and other ‘hard’ policing police but rather developing trust between strategies. specifi c Muslim groups and police. We would also like to introduce the notion of connectors, individuals who partnerships are said to help to ensure the may experience community memberships mitigation of damage to communities that in highly complex ways, and are able to results from ‘hard’ policing strategies, negotiate forms of frame alignment so that and they also purportedly enable hate groups with very diff erent ‘positionalities’ crimes to be investigated eff ectively and are able to work with each other, for prosecuted (Ramirez, 2008). However, the common goals. A key example of this are extent to which there are real partnerships politically radical activists who maintain between police offi cers and communities their views while working with police in the US has been questioned as a result offi cers who represent a state with which of the extensive use of informants within they feel disconnect, but with whom they Arab Muslim communities alongside are willing to work in order to save lives other ‘hard’ policing strategies, which and prevent violence emanating from the have created distrust and anger from state or grassroots. within communities (Sullivan & Hawley, 2011). COMMUNITY-FOCUSSED Partnerships highlight the importance AND COMMUNITY-TARGETED of targeted work with individuals deemed APPROACHES TO COUNTER- at risk of committing acts of terrorism, TERRORISM involving community members and the For Brennan et al (2007), the notion police. Th is has been a neglected issue, of governance is to be understood as that given that the debate around preventing which includes both government and volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 arches quarterly 23 civil society, with the state and the civic targeted approaches to counter-terrorism. engaging in decision-making and other A community-targeted approach might processes, through the interaction of top- be characterised as one that ignores the down, state-led, imperatives and bottom- issue of gaining the consent of those up approaches which include networks, communities that are being targeted, with groups, communities and others that are the well-being of targeted communities part of what might be deemed civil society. often being compromised in the name Similar to traditional forms of crime, the of the broader goal of state security. At governance of ‘new terrorism’ refl ects the same time, a community-targeted broader developments in governance, approach is characterised by distrust whereby responsibility and accountability between communities and security for preventing terror crime is focused offi cials and practitioners. Community- increasingly towards local levels, whilst at focussed approaches, on the other the same time centralised control in terms of hand, can perhaps be characterised by resources and target setting is maintained. partnership between communities and Also, formal responsibilities for policy state offi cials; by community consent and implementation and service delivery are participation in the actual governance of being shared progressively across statutory, the various strategies and approaches that voluntary agencies and community groups are applied; and by trust existing between in the form of partnership work. state offi cials and security practitioners Previously, we have highlighted that in and community members (Spalek et al. relation to counter-terrorism, community 2009). At the same time, a community- can be viewed as both ‘problem’ and focussed approach embraces communities ‘solution’. Where ‘community’ is viewed as for their complexities in relation to ‘problem’, counter-terrorism strategies can ethnicity, religion, politics, emotions, be used which target those communities grievances, locales, histories and so on. deemed problematic. Where ‘community’ Th is approach seeks to work with rather is viewed as ‘solution’, then counter- than to manipulate communities. terrorism strategies can be used which Th e distinction between community- involve community members and may also focussed and community-targeted involve partnerships between communities approaches is helpful in that this allows us and statutory agencies. Interestingly, to go beyond the rather simplistic binary diff erent state and other agencies that is often portrayed in research literature and groupings may view community in relation to ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom- organisations diff erentially, and so whilst up’ approaches to counter-terrorism. one state agency or individual working Th is is because top-down approaches, within the agency, or one governmental whilst predominantly and traditionally body, may view a particular community being community-targeted, might, with group as a ‘problem’, other agencies and appropriate community consent, be individuals may view the same community community-focussed. Th us, tactics such as group through the lens of ‘solution’. stop and search and the use of surveillance Tensions are, therefore, perhaps inevitable. technology can be community-focussed Moreover, wider public opinion may where community consultation has taken also view particular community groups place, where there are partnerships between through the ‘problem’ lens, perhaps security practitioners and community for being religious fundamentalists for members, and where trust has been example; state actors involved in engaging developed. At the same time, ‘bottom-up’ and developing long-term partnerships approaches can be community-targeted with members of ‘problem’ communities rather than community-focussed where are thus likely to attract criticism. community participation is not based It is important to distinguish between on real partnerships but rather is used to community-focussed and community- instigate state-led agendas. For example,

24 arches quarterly volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 COUNTER-TERRORISM: POLICE AND COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT IN BRITAIN AND THE US be possible to dispel rumours regarding It is important for policy police operations, as well as challenge makers to develop media stereotyping. policies that are clearly Community intelligence in relation to counter-terrorism is particularly sensitive, community-focussed and especially given the pervasive use of not community-targeted. informants by intelligence and policing agencies within wide-ranging historical the use of informants draws upon the skills and international contexts (Hewitt, 2010). and networks of community members; For police offi cers, intelligence is part of however, these often operate in secrecy their everyday role; it is a fundamental with no wider community consent or aspect of policing. Intelligence that comes involvement in their governance. At to the attention of the police, through the same time, ‘top-down’ approaches the national intelligence services or other to counter-terrorism can draw upon means, is checked with other sources of communities as part of a strategy of information; the role of communities counter-subversion, where counter- can be crucial in helping to assess its subversion involves strategies which aim validity. Community members can play to target and stigmatise those groupings a crucial role in helping to risk assess deemed subversives in the same way that those individuals who have come to the terrorists would be targeted. Th is has attention of the police or other agencies the potential to add to intra and inter due to a perceived vulnerability to violent community tensions. extremism, for there may be aspects to It is important for policy makers individuals’ lives that only community to develop policies that are clearly members can witness and understand. community-focussed and not community- However, it is important that targeted. Accountability seems to be partnership is pursued as a goal in relation a key issue for policing in relation to to intelligence/information sharing community-focussed approaches to between communities and police and counter-terrorism. Accountability might other agencies. Th ere may be a danger that be understood as being accessible and statutory agencies enter into relationships visible to communities; it may also be and agreements with community members about police offi cers being open about the that may prioritise the risk and other needs fact that they are counter-terrorism offi cers. of those agencies rather than the risks Accountability is not without diffi culties. and the needs of community members It can involve some challenging interaction themselves. Community members who between police offi cers and community work with the police and other agencies members. Within the counter-terrorism as part of multi-agency forums assessing arena, which has been dominated by risk may be placing themselves at high secrecy, police offi cers will have to meet risk of reprisals from members of their with community members and provide own communities or any networks to forums through which vital exchanges which they belong. Hence, agreements can take place, even if those exchanges which represent fully both communities’ are, at times, quite tense. A key aspect and police and other statutory agencies’ to accountability is information-sharing, requirements and parameters of operation and police offi cers have to decide what are crucial. It is important to take into information to release to communities consideration, and to acknowledge, regarding terrorism and counter-terrorism that within multi-agency approaches to related issues, how to go about sharing this assessing and working with risks of violent and to whom this should be made available. extremism, community members may face Information-sharing is seen as a key way of risks that statutory agencies do not face, building trust, for through openness it can and vice versa, hence the need for clear volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 arches quarterly 25 discussion about how any protocols of there a very fi ne line in risk-assessing cases engagement can capture both the needs that involve individuals who might be of communities and those of statutory dealt with constructively under Prevent agencies (see also Baker, 2012). but who also might be dealt with under the Risk is an important and often neglected Pursue strand of the government’s counter- feature of police-community engagement terrorism strategy? Who ultimately decides and partnership in relation to counter- whether an individual has passed from terrorism. First is the risk that individuals Prevent intervention to Pursue? Moreover, working for statutory agencies may take in relation to the notion of partnership, is during the course of their work. Individuals there equality, transparency and legitimate may engage in actions which, they argue, cooperation between partners when cases helps prevent terrorism but which the which fall between Prevent and Pursue agencies that they work for will perhaps are apparent? It is also important to stress discourage them from undertaking. Th is that trust should not be exploited by may be partly because the organisational police offi cers for intelligence-gathering cultures of the agencies themselves are mechanisms. Trust can help to enable more risk averse than the individuals communities to begin to discuss openly working for them. Another issue is that of any perceived vulnerabilities they may who identifi es risk, how this is managed have in relation to violent extremism, an and, ultimately, who decides whether a issue that carries with it much sensitivity. set of vulnerabilities constitutes risk of violent extremism. For instance, there is CONCLUSION a danger that there can be a tendency for Th e single, most important, dimension over-assessing vulnerability and for too to police and community engagement in many cases to be brought to the attention relation to counter-terrorism is the extent of neighbourhood police offi cers, who then to which this is community-focussed or have to decide whether a particular case is community-targeted. It is important to so insubstantial that it does not reach the stress that this is not a binary, but rather attention of counter-terrorism units nor a continuum, so that whilst some policies of intervention providers in relation to and activities may lie more towards the preventing terrorism. community-focussed side, other policies At the same time, it may be that all and activities may lie more towards the cases deemed ‘borderline’ are passed on to community-targeted side. It is, therefore, counter-terrorism units or to intervention important to assess where a programme providers and so there is a potential here of activities, or a particular initiative or a for net-widening, for bringing in greater set of initiatives, lies on this continuum in numbers of individuals for intervention. order for policing, community and other Th ere is of course an inherent issue here: bodies to be able to implement future that in encouraging agencies and staff policies and practices. across wide-ranging sectors to look for In this article we have moved signs of vulnerability in the fi rst place this purposefully away from using the often is encouraging a society to look for risks utilised notion of community-based in relation to violent extremism. With the counter-terrorism because the research focus of the Prevent strategy having been on that we have been undertaking suggests Muslim communities there is the inherent that this is an overused notion which fails danger that Islamic beliefs and practices are to distinguish between community-based stigmatised (Spalek & McDonald, 2010). strategies that are targeted at communities A further dimension to risk is in a situation and those community-based strategies where risk is being assessed by diff erent that are focussed upon communities, agencies; whose voice carries most weight, and this distinction is fundamental to and is there a potential that communities’ understanding counter-terrorism policy voices in particular are marginalised? Is and practice.

26 arches quarterly volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 COUNTER-TERRORISM: POLICE AND COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT IN BRITAIN AND THE US

Center Of Gravity: Naval War Coll Newport Ri Joint Military Dr Basia Spalek is a Reader in Communities & Justice Operations Dept. within the Institute of Applied Social Studies at the University of Birmingham. She has led a number of Lash, S. (1994). ‘Refl exivity and its Doubles: Structure, high profi le research projects looking specifi cally at Aesthetics, Community’, in U. Beck, A. Giddens and S. Lash eds. community-based approaches to counter-terrorism, Refl exive Modernization: Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the including a Connected Communities Programme, Modern Social Order, Cambridge: Polity Press, pp.110–73. exploring confl ict within and between communities; a collaborative project involving researchers in Britain, the USA and in Northern Ireland; and a Religion & Lambert, R. (2008). ‘Salafi and Islamist Londoners: Stigmatised Society Programme examining approaches involving Minority Faith Communities Countering Al-Qaida’, Crime, Law Muslims and the police. and Social Change, 50: pp.73 – 89.

Spalek is also an Ambassador to the Make Justice Work Lambert, R. (2011). Countering al-Qaida: Police and Muslim campaign and has acted as an adviser/consultant to: Communities in Partnership, London: Hurst. inter alia, the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) and the Equality and Human Rights Commission. She Rew, A. & Campbell, J. (1999). ‘The Political Economy of Identity is a Nominated Social Expert by the Human Rights Law and Aff ect’, in: J. Campbell, J., and Rew, A. eds. Identity and Centre, University of Nottingham and the Director Aff ect: Experiences of Identity in a Global World, London: Pluto of a new international forum on police community engagement for confl ict transformation: pcct-hub.org. Press, pp.1–36.

Dr Laura Zahra McDonald is a Research Fellow at Silk, D. (2010). Planning Outreach between Muslim Communities the Institute of Applied Social Studies, University of and Police in the USA and the UK, PhD dissertation, Department Birmingham, and co-founder of PCCT Hub. Her research of Lifelong Education, Administration, and Policy, University of interests include Islam, intersectionality, community, Georgia, Athens, GA. and security. She is keen to continue developing the links between academic research, grassroots activism Spalek, B., EL Awa., S., & McDonald, L.Z. (2008). Police-Muslim and practitioner perspectives, particularly with regards to the impact of state policies on minority groups. Engagement and Partnerships for the Purposes of Counter- Terrorism: an examination //www.ahrc.ac.uk/News/Latest/Documents/Rad%20Islam%20 Summary%20Report.pdf BIBLIOGRAPHY Anderson, E. G. (2011). ‘A dynamic model of counterinsurgency Spalek, B., El-Awa, S. & McDonald, L.Z. (2009). Police-Muslim policy including the eff ects of intelligence, public security, Engagement for the Purpose of Counter-Terrorism: An popular support, and insurgent experience’ System Dynamics Examination, Birmingham, UK: The University of Birmingham. Review, 27: n/a. doi: 10.1002/sdr.443. Spalek, B. & Lambert, R. (2008). ‘Muslim Communities, Counter- Briggs, Rachel, Catherine Fieschi, and Hannah Lownsbrough. Terrorism and CounterRadicalisation: A Critically Refl ective (2006). Bringing it Home: CommunityBased Approaches to Approach to Engagement’, International Journal of Law, Crime Counter-Terrorism. London: Demos. and Justice, vol. 36, 257-70, doi:10.1016/j.ijlcj.2008.08.004.

Crenshaw M. (1981). ‘The Causes of Terrorism’ Comparative Spalek, B. & Lambert, R. (2010). ‘Partnering Muslim Politics, Vol. 13, No. 4 (Jul), pp. 379-399 Communities for the Purposes of Counter-Terrorism’ in: Goodwin, M. & Eatwell, R. eds. The ‘New’ Extremism in 21st Galam S. (2002). The September 11 attack: A percolation of Century Britain London: Taylor & Francis pp.103-122. individual passive support. The European Physical Journal, Vol. 26, No. 3, 269-272, DOI: 10.1140/epjb/e20020089 Spalek, B. (2010). ‘Community Policing, Trust and Muslim Communities in Relation to ‘New Terrorism’ Politics & Policy Vol. Gilroy, P. (2002). ‘Diaspora and the detours of identity’, in 38 (4) pp.789-815. K. Woodward ed. Identity and Diff erence, London: Sage, pp 299–346. Spalek, B. (2011, in press). ‘Researching Muslim Communities and Islam Within the Context of Counter-Terrorism: A Critical Goldsmith, A. (2005). ‘Police Reform and the Problem of Trust’ Refl ection’ Religion, State and Society. Theoretical Criminology 9 (4): 443-470. Sullivan, E. & Hawley, C. (2011). ‘Angry Over Spying, Muslims Baker, Abdul-Haqq (2011). ‘Engagement and Partnership Say: ‘Don’t Call NYPD’, November 14th. http://ap.stripes. in Community-based Approaches to Counter-Terrorism’ com/dynamic/stories/U/US_NYPD_INTELLIGENCE?SIT in: Spalek, B. ed. Community-Based Approaches to Counter- E=DCSAS&SECTION=HOME&TEMPLATE=DEFAULT&CTI Terrorism Palgrave. ME=2011-10-26-19-00-17

Baker, Abdul-Haqq (2012). ‘Engagement and Partnership in Community-based approaches to Counter-Terrorism’ in: Spalek, B., ed Community Based Approaches to Counter Terrorism, Hertfordshire: Palgrave.

Hewitt, S. (2010). Snitch!: A History of the Modern Intelligence Informer, London: Continuum.

Kennedy, P. & Roudometof, V. (2004). ‘Transnationalism in a Global Age’, in: Kennedy, P. and Roudometof , V. eds. Communities Across Borders: New Immigrants and Transnational Cultures, London: Routledge, pp.1–26.

Kohn, Bryan S. (2002). Attacking Islamic Terrorism’s Strategic volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 arches quarterly 27 A Grand American Strategy of Counter-Terrorism

ROBERT D. CRANE

GRAND STRATEGY the more amorphous threat of insurgents ountering 21st century terrorism under the banner of a politicised Islam.6 requires the same philosophy of After 9/11, this approach to the grand “grand strategy” that was developed philosophy of strategy was developed C th to counter the 20 century terrorism of further to counter the asymmetric Stalinistic Communism. Although the challenge of terrorists who use modern 19th century British fi rst used this term to technology against its originators, with support their imperial expansion in Asia, dozens of articles published in the newly the paradigmatic substance of the concept online edition of Th e American Muslim.7 was developed two millennia earlier by Sun Tzu in China and by Clausewitz in THE GRAND STRATEGY OF 18th century Europe. GLOBAL VISION: OPENING In the early 1960s, the same substance AMERICAN HEARTS AND MINDS was introduced under the term “total war” Th e challenge to Muslims in America by the French General of the Army, Andre today is how to make common cause with Beaufre, who was the personal strategist those who are determined to fi ght the for Charles de Gaulle.1 Shortly after the “evil empire” once based in the proverbial Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, this was “caves of Afghanistan”, but who think developed further at the new Centre for that to do so they must attack Islam as a Strategic Studies (later misnamed Th e global religion. Th e challenge is how to Centre for Strategic and International educate the detractors of Islam about the Studies) under the name “Philosophy of sophisticated tradition of Islamic thought Strategy”.2 so that they can distinguish the religion Later in the 1960s, the ideative core of from those Muslims who are equally what could be called holistic or tawhidian ignorant and violate all its principles. strategy was applied to specifi c foreign Eff ective education about Islam should policy issues. For example, the constructive focus on the paradigm of natural law, role of Islam in the Middle East as a force especially in its major components of justice in the rise and fall of civilisations and in as expressed in human responsibilities and distinguishing friend from foe;3 the power rights and equally in the empowerment of of the search for justice, community justice through faith-based reconciliation, coherence and supra-national regionalism because these are basic to the traditions of as a support rather than a threat to America and to the classical teachings of enlightened American foreign policy in all the world religions.8 Southeast Asia, and as a reason to reject Jeremy Henzell Th omas emphasizes the bombing civilians as a means to combat role of education and the universality of the spread of Communism from Vietnam spiritual awareness: “One of the pressing throughout Southeast Asia;4 and the challenges for America is to open its mind rehabilitation of the classical principles of and heart to the validity of non-American human rights as a framework for American perspectives, or to the existence of other foreign policy.5 ways. Th is needs to start in schools with After the fall of Communism in 1990, far greater emphasis on knowledge of world this “grand strategy” was applied to counter history, geography and other cultures. Th ere is no point in talking about 28 arches quarterly volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 A GRAND AMERICAN STRATEGY OF COUNTER-TERRORISM Americans to be open to understanding The most insidious the true message of Islam, which is the threat to every individual pursuit of peace, prosperity and freedom person, indeed to all through faith-based, compassionate justice. Th e recurring acts of terrorism by humankind, is the some Muslims aimed at America or other temptation to abandon western countries, however, create a huge disconnect between them and what Islam one’s transcendent teaches. Th ese wanton acts undermine the purpose in life and potential of interfaith understanding and one’s global vision in cooperation and hamper communication. To be sure, American Muslim leaders order to focus only on and those abroad have issued numerous mere survival, especially statements of condemnation after every terrorist incident.10 But it is obviously through religious insuffi cient to erase doubts about that tribalism. disconnect and keep the hope alive that their non-Muslim partners in the the underlying convergence of Islamic dialogue will open their hearts and minds and American principles unless their to Islam. Even those non-Muslims who followers have respect for and willingness are open to the dialogue and recognise to learn from diversity… Th e scourge is that the ongoing war in Afghanistan and tribal partisanship, whether American or the continuing confl icts in Palestine and Muslim. Th e … best hope for mankind is Kashmir, for example, tend to radicalise not the compulsion inherent in exported Muslims, get frustrated by acts of violence fundamentalist and politicised ideologies and wonder why such a disconnect exists. and religious systems, whether American Moreover, they tend to become sceptical of or Muslim, totalitarian or liberal… but it the pristine message of classical Islam. is the adherence of mankind to the ideal of It appears that unless American Muslims the fully human being represented in all take some concrete steps to confront authentic spiritual traditions.9 the problem of recurring terrorism by Th e most insidious threat to every Muslims, the prospects of the general individual person, indeed to all public opening their hearts and minds to humankind, is the temptation to abandon Islam and Muslims will remain limited. one’s transcendent purpose in life and Th is would require a strategy on the part one’s global vision in order to focus only of American Muslim leaders to create on mere survival, especially through a new paradigm that obviates the use of religious tribalism. When a civilisation violence as a response to violence. Peace becomes obsessed with maintaining order through mutual respect, personal equity, just to survive, at the expense of justice and institutional transformation and Muslim freedom, the civilisation dies. Th is is the leadership using the best of classical Islamic iron law of history. and American thought in the present will Muslims have a responsibility to build a better future for everyone. build bridges of understanding with all communities through civic engagement in THE PARADIGM OF GLOBAL public arenas. PLURALISM Opening the hearts and minds of Th e future of America and global Americans to Islam and Muslims will civilisation will depend on whether the require a two-way commitment by world’s nations can join to bring out the America’s general public on the one best of each civilisation in order to build hand and its Muslims on the other. Th e global pluralism. Th e purpose must be to spiritual and faith-based approach calls for use the best of the past in order to build volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 arches quarterly 29 a global federation of independent nations hell all who disagree with the interpreter, pursuing peace through compassionate has dominated in the presence of justice. existential fear of the “other”. Such fears Th e opposite would be mutual fuel the challengers within each religion demonisation whereby members of one who hijack it and are infused with hatred civilisation join the extremists of another for everyone who refuses to accede to their in supporting the extremists’ perversion of claims to exclusive possession of ultimate their own religion. In practice, this would truth. bring out the worst of the past to paralyse Th e inclusive approach welcomes the the present and destroy the future. followers of other paths to God as part Th e most egregious denial of human of the divine design for humanity. Th is rights is to deny the right of others to paradigm, has been the most pervasive in defi ne and interpret their own religion. In the spread of Islam throughout the world,11 order to develop objectivity, one must go especially by the Sufi s. Th ey believe that to the source of all the understanding and the purpose of divine revelation is to misunderstanding, namely, the scriptures unify in common purpose all persons and and tradition as understood by most communities at the level of worship and Muslims throughout history. morality. Th e base should be Islam as a religion, Th e common purpose is love of God, not Muslims, as they sometimes practice it which is our reason for existence, but the in pursuit of political agendas. Th is is the paths to this end are found in religious basis of respect both by and for Muslims diversity. As people converge from the edge within the community of the three toward the Oneness of God at the centre, Abrahamic traditions. Th is should be the they can become unifi ed in action. Th e basis for long-term planning, especially for spiritual leaders believe that this unity in Muslims and Jews, who throughout most purpose through diversity in means is the of the past thousand years have been each only way to achieve justice in practice; the other’s most reliable friends. only way to counter terrorism as a threat to Governments, of course, must base civilisation eff ectively. policy prudentially on practical threat Th e governing paradigm of thought analysis, not on theory, but equal emphasis among those who follow the inner should be placed on “opportunity analysis” meaning of their religion is loving in the pursuit of compassionate justice submission to God in response to God as through peaceful engagement as an the Initiator of Love. Th is gives meaning end goal in both domestic and foreign to everything else. It’s the root of the policy. Th e base case for all followers opportunity mentality and the best basis of the Abrahamic faiths who share an for mutual cooperation in addressing the opportunity mentality, as distinct from an practical issues of conscience in domestic exclusively threat mentality, should be the and foreign policy, because it is based on balanced middle as understood by the great mutual respect among the followers of all jurisprudents, philosophers and spiritual the world religions. leaders in interpreting Islamic scriptures. Th e challenge thereby becomes not a Th ese include the Qur’an, the sayings and clash of civilisations based on a chasm of practice of Prophet Muhammad and his purpose between irreconcilable cultures, early followers, and the scholarly writings nor even a chasm of meaning within of the great intellectual leaders. each civilisation, but the growing chasm Two paradigms of scriptural between humanity and God. interpretation have been debated among Muslims; should the messages of God THE POLITICS OF FEAR in the various religions be interpreted as In politics the two most powerful exclusive or inclusive? Historically, the motivators are fear and religion. Th is is exclusive approach, often condemning to especially true in places like America and

30 arches quarterly volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 A GRAND AMERICAN STRATEGY OF COUNTER-TERRORISM the Muslim world where religion is a force ”Islamic totalitarianism” by defi nition to be harnessed in the pursuit of power. threatens the survival of the Free World. Muslims are not the only ones who Th i s si mple c h a n ge i n ter m i nolog y ser ve d exploit religion for political ends. American to short-circuit thought so that operational extremists, political and religious, exploit doctrine and specifi c military plans no religion by demonising Islam as the longer had to be based on knowledge. necessary fi rst step in a perceived war of Th e thinking is encapsulated in the new self-defence against universal evil. language, where a false symbolism becomes A principal weapon in this “war an unchallengeable reality. By a process against evil” is the orchestration of of self-fulfi lling prophecy, the danger words or symbols, known as memes, in becomes real and triggers a spiralling memetic warfare. Th is attacks the mind confrontation of action and reaction. subliminally; shaping thought without the victim knowing that his (or her) thinking PLAYING THE GAME OF has been aff ected. MEMETIC WARFARE On 1 September, 2007, presidential Gingrich was playing at memetic candidate and Republican Senator John warfare; two can play this game. Muslims McCain sent out a letter to his supporters can play by exposing the heresies against pegging his new campaign on a single, Islam that extremists, Christians and simple theme that he hoped would lead to Muslims, advance to justify a war against electoral victory in a time of great national civilisation. peril. He declared, “Th e transcendent issue A fi rst step is to recapture Islamic of the 21st century is the struggle against terminology, especially the shari’ah as a radical Islamic extremism.” code of human responsibilities and rights.12 Current presidential hopeful Newt Th is can be done by avoiding the use of Gingrich called for a “coherent strategy” denigrations like “jihad violence and sharia against Islamic totalitarianism at a supremacism” and avoiding demands that conference in February 1995. In the Muslims reject “Muhammad’s warlike American lexicon developed in the war example”, which is a fi ction promoted by against Communist global conquest, the those wishing to demonise Islam.13 world is full of harmless tyrants who seek Th e second step is to denounce the only their own power at home and therefore justifi cations used by violent criminals for can be co-opted to serve American their actions. Th ey should be denounced in purposes. Such tyranny is diff erent from terms they understand, namely, by words totalitarianism, which by defi nition seeks used in the Qur’an that apply expressly to control of the human mind not only as a them and their crimes. means to consolidate its own power but Th eir use of the term jihad for what primarily as the ultimate end of its own they say is holy war but in fact is terrorism destiny. should be called by its proper name in Whether by design or not, the use of classical Islamic terminology, which is the emotive “totalitarianism” became hiraba (unholy and demonic war to destroy an instrument of thought control and society). Th ey call themselves mujahidun escalated the battle against terrorism to the or holy warriors destined for jannah or ideological level of grand strategy, having heaven. In fact, they are muharibun been the major global threat to Western (guilty of hiraba) and mufsidun (guilty of civilisation for most of the 20th century. fasad) headed for jahannam, hell. Th ey By the mere turn of a phrase, this claim that they are fi ghting for ihtiram seminal thinker of the Neocon movement or human respect, whereas they are transformed Islam from a religion that committing istihlal, which is the cardinal occasionally has been distorted to justify sin of “playing God”. Th eir murderous terrorism into a generic monster that must assault on human rights should be exposed be fought wherever it raises its ugly head; for what it is; a monumental act of rida al volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 arches quarterly 31 shaytaniya (diabolical apostasy). because we each have much to learn from Th e last testament of the terrorist who each other.” crashed the fi rst plane into the World One of the best explorations of this Trade Centre, according to plans found in challenge in the realm of interfaith his personal eff ects, were from the Qur’an: relations is William R. Hutchison’s, “Say, my prayers, my actions, my life, and Religious Pluralism in America: Th e my death I dedicate to Allah, Lord of the Contentious History of a Founding Ideal. Worlds.” He chose to dedicate his death to Well-known scholar David Hollinger ending the lives of thousands of innocent writes that, “Th is is the most ambitious people. Th e context of this verse called him book yet from the dean of historians of instead to dedicate his life after the model religion in the United States: a wonderfully of Prophet Abraham, who loved and lived discerning exploration of how Americans for God in order to bring compassionate have variously confronted and tried to justice to all of His creation. evade the challenge of religious diversity.” Suicide bombing requires blind Hutchison’s conclusions focus on America’s fanaticism not courage. True submission failings toward its own citizens, but the to God requires the dedication of one’s analysis fi ts its failings toward the rest of life to a much more diffi cult and daunting the world. task. Th is is to transform one’s own life, Th e thesis of Hutchison’s book is that which was given as a gift created in the pluralism has never been institutionalised image of God, in order better to transform in America, much as Americans like the world in which one lives out of love, to pride themselves on being a model rather than to destroy it out of hatred. of religious freedom. Th e book can be Th is message applies to everyone in summarised in the assertion that America every religion who demonises whole leads the world in naiveté about its own communities and entire religions out of superiority as a pluralistic society. hatred. Professional Christian demonisers Like all seminal writers, Hutchison of Islam who recruit naïve young people presents his thesis in the form of a new to their cause are no diff erent from the paradigm for analysis. Calling for “new masters of terror in Al-Qaeda who recruit models for understanding”, Hutchison equally naïve young people to their cause, distinguishes “between a fact or condition because the end result is the same. called diversity and an ideal or impulse for which the best term is pluralism”. Diversity THE CHALLENGE OF is what happened to American religion in ECUMENICAL PLURALISM the fi rst half of the nineteenth century. Exposing the weaknesses of the “Radical diversifi cation” started to occur opponent is only half the battle; one only in the last half of the twentieth must also recognise one’s own. Despite century. Th e term pluralism was coined the growing wealth gap in America and in the 1920s to denote “a state of society around the world, the major cause of global in which the members of diverse ethnic, terrorism,14 America is indeed a model of racial, religious, or social groups maintain material success. Th e major challenge is an autonomous participation in and to reverse the decline in moral virtue by development of their traditional culture overcoming the solipsistic and even autistic or special interest within the confi nes of refusal to recognise its shortcomings by a common civilisation”. Th is refl ected accepting virtue beyond itself. awareness of a new state of society and of Th is requires an advance from mere the world or new awareness of an old state, toleration to diversity and beyond this to just as other terms have, witness liberalism pluralism. Toleration can mean simply “I in the 1820s, imperialism in the 1850s, and won’t kill you yet.” Diversity often means, racism in the 1930s. “You are here and I can’t do much about Th e modern defi nition of pluralism it.” Pluralism means, “We welcome you as an actual welcoming of diversity is a

32 arches quarterly volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 A GRAND AMERICAN STRATEGY OF COUNTER-TERRORISM modern concept, which historians like community suicide. Although he has no to project back, without evidence, into specifi c recommendations, the thrust of American history. Hutchison writes in the entire book advocates what should be his introduction, “Quite obviously, many called “integration”. Th is term, which he diversifi ed societies, throughout history, does not use, means that individuals of have either lacked pluralist ideals entirely, each group in society bring the wisdom of or have trumpeted such ideals and failed their tradition to enrich the overall society to make good on them. But surely the in which they live. Hutchison instead United States, the champion of religious uses the term “participation”. “Pluralism freedom and scorner of establishments, by participation,” he writes, “implies a was famously not that kind of society.” mandate for individuals and groups … to Hutchison’s latest book addresses this share responsibility for the forming and question. implementing of the society’s agenda.” He observes that the very ideas of His other important defi nitional religious freedom and pluralism have innovation involves the dynamic nature evolved in America in a “quietly persistent of the concept of religious freedom. Why process of redefi nition”, including have Americans always prided themselves “pluralism as toleration, pluralism as on off ering a model of religious freedom, inclusion, and pluralism as participation”. when in fact they never have done so? Hutchison does not dwell on the When the standard was mere tolerance in colonial history of America, which was the negative sense of not persecuting people marked by people who fl ed the intolerance who were not mainstream Protestant, of Europe only to impose their even worse Americans could argue, because of their intolerance in the New World. Summing ignorance of the world beyond Europe, up the fi rst century of the American that they were the most tolerant in the Republic, he writes, “Th rough much of world. Later when diversity gave rise to the the nineteenth century, a positive response concept of inclusion, Hutchison writes, to diversity entailed legal tolerance “Americans could generally congratulate and social tolerance – each of which themselves on the society’s inclusiveness could sometimes be little more than an even though ‘inclusion’ involved forms absence of persecution. According to this of subordination that many were already defi nition of acceptance, a deviant person viewing as patronising and generally or group should be accorded the right to unacceptable.” exist and even to thrive, but in general to Th ose most concerned about American- do so only as an outsider to the dominant born Muslims becoming aliens in their religion and culture.” He concluded that own country, as European Muslims the “inclusionist” ideology developing have in theirs, are searching for answers. during the 19th century “clearly was a move Th e response required of Muslims to the forward in any pluralist perspective”, but challenge of sophisticated disinformation “rarely granted to the newly included an about both the religion Islam and its equal or proportional right to share in the Muslim practitioners is to internalise exercise of cultural authority”. In the fi eld Hutchison's concept of progress from mere of religion this meant by analogy that, “the negative tolerance to positive pluralism newly included sat at the back of the bus”. so that they can move from the growing Perhaps Hutchison’s most controversial culture of isolationism and rejectionism conclusion, because it results in toward a culture of ecumenical outreach, recommendations, is that the “melting understanding and cooperation. pot” ideal “operated to suppress diff erences far more than to respect and utilise CLASSICAL ISLAM: POWERFUL them”. He details the lack of freedom FORCE AGAINST EXTREMISM inherent in pressures for “assimilation”, A paradigmatic transformation among which amounts to both individual and Muslims toward pluralism requires volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 arches quarterly 33 support from non-Muslims willing to join addressing diff ering assumptions and in a strategy to combat incipient terrorism views of reality. Th e major threat to the by invoking classical or “traditionalist” world today comes from the extremists, Islam. Th is can be done only when those both Muslim and non-Muslim, who are who would demonise Islam as the cause engaged in what amounts to a de facto of terrorism would instead invoke the alliance designed to pervert the classical classical teachings of both America and wisdom of Islam in their frenzy of hatred Islam on human responsibilities and rights for everyone who disagrees with them. based on freedom of religion, love, and Th e demonisers of Islam have a valid compassionate justice. point in their insistence that Muslims take Th e overwhelming majority of Muslims, the lead in countering their own demons. Christians and Jews recognise that Only Muslims can wage a war eff ectively the demonisation of an entire religion against the extremists in their midst; if is a threat to everyone. Th ey also all they can’t, then the professional Muslim recognise that there is a growing extremist bashers will claim legitimacy in blaming movement among Muslims which can Islam for all the evil in the world. lead to terrorism. However, they fear Th e Saudi King Abdullah bin Abdul that demonising Islam as the source of Aziz is struggling to overcome the culture such extremism is helping to provoke of exclusionary extremism in the symbolic it. Furthermore, citing the same bogus heartland of Islam. He can succeed, sources that extremists use to justify their howe ver, on ly i f he i s supp or te d by t he world crimes reinforces their “legitimacy”. body of Muslims, including American How do we persuade policy makers to Muslims. Th ey will be the principal use the term “radical extremists” without victims of failure to unite in exposing reference to religion in order to distinguish the heretical nature of the Wahhabi between a religion and those who carry out declaration of war against human rights crimes against humanity in its name? Th ere and the very concept of human dignity. is no such thing as Islamic extremism, any American Muslims must not be defensive more than there is Christian or Jewish and condemning and countering religious extremism, unless one wants to reduce all extremism wherever they encounter it.15 religion to the level of tribalism. Th ese are oxymorons. Unfortunately, extremists in PRINCIPLES OF RESPECT every religion have always been with us Recognition of the commonalities and always will be, so what do we do about among the world religions requires above it? all respect for each other in order to Th e fi rst requirement is to recognise that combat extremism and address some of the the traditionalist peoples in all religions underlying issues of conscience. Th e years face a common enemy. One part of the 2005 to 2010 witnessed unprecedented threat to global civilisation is the post- movement toward mutual understanding modern phenomenon of the totalitarian and cooperation. Th is culminated in what mind in the West fi xated on fighting fi re is known as the “Common Word”, the with fi re while ignoring the injustices that equivalent of universal Muslim guidance produce hatred. Another is the equally for both intra-faith and inter-faith post-modernist phenomenon of Al-Qaeda cooperation.16 which has borrowed the phenomenon Th is bold venture in interfaith of ideological totalitarianism, as distinct cooperation started in response to Pope from mere despotism, from the spawn of Benedict XVI’s Regensberg speech of the French Revolution. 12September, 2006, which was widely In the art of global strategy and long- perceived as an attack on Islam and a range forecasting, the most instructive radical change from the interfaith outreach tool is paradigm management to resolve of his predecessor, John Paul II. Th is apparently irresolvable confl icts byhelped to spark intra-faith conferences

34 arches quarterly volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 A GRAND AMERICAN STRATEGY OF COUNTER-TERRORISM that year, following the Amman Message for the fi rst time. of July, 2005, at which the leading Islamic scholars of the world convened in Jordan The 21st century will to condemn the growing practice, known as takfi ,r among Muslim extremists to be better than the condemn as apostates those who disagree 20th only if the secular with them. Th is was the fi rst such universal fatwa ideologies that brought by all six of the Islamic schools of law unprecedented global in many decades, designed to launch catastrophes are a global process of intra-faith dialogue and cooperation among Muslims. It was rendered irrelevant by obvious that the fi rst step in inter-faith policies which refl ect understanding and cooperation must be intra-faith cooperation within each the transcendent justice of the major world religions, based on inherent in world understanding that the real clash is not religions. between civilisations but within each of them. Th e fi rst initiative at the inter-faith level Th e success of this global movement following this opening was the Open Letter depends fi rst of all on the role of respect to the Pope on 12October, 2006, in which among the followers of these religions thirty-eight authoritative scholars from for each other. Th e Qur’anic guidelines every branch of Islam spoke with one voice focus on three basic principles emphasised about the true teachings of Islam. Th is throughout the Qur’an:17 was followed by a letter of 13September, 1. Freedom of religion, which includes 2007, from 138 such scholars entitled “A equality in human dignity, unity Common Word Between Us and You.” in diversity, universal conditions Th is was even more inclusive and for for salvation, and equality of the the fi rst time since the days of Prophet prophets; Muhammad declared the “common 2. Love, which includes one’s personal ground” between Christianity and Islam. relationship with God, forgiveness, In November, 2007, a group of scholars and peaceful reconciliation; and at Yale Divinity School drafted a reply to 3. Compassionate justice, which A Common Word, entitled “Loving God includes personal righteousness and and Neighbour Together: A Christian normative law. Response to ‘A Common Word Between Us and You’”, which was endorsed Together these lead to respect for by more than 300 leading Christian each other among Jews, Christians and scholars in an eff ort to reorient Muslim- Muslims and to acceptance of each other as Christian relations away from “a clash fellow “Peoples of the Book”, providing a of civilisations”. Th is, in turn, led to the framework for the global vision and grand fi rst of a series of conferences beginning strategy needed to counter terrorism. at Yale University in July, 2008, which was followed by four more at Cambridge BUILDING A STRATEGY OF University, Th e Vatican, Georgetown and TRADITION AND PROGRESS the Royal Ahl al-Bayt Institute in Jordan. Th e 21st century will be better than the Th is pioneering process was enriched 20th only if the secular ideologies that by parallel eff orts, beginning with the brought unprecedented global catastrophes conference held by King Abdullah of Saudi are rendered irrelevant by policies which Arabia in Madrid at the end of July, 2008, refl ect the transcendent justice inherent in to bring Jewish scholars into the process world religions. volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 arches quarterly 35 A major challenge of the 21st century is just as the Qutbian trend in the Islamist to combine the wisdom of the past with movement was almost entirely a product the demands for material progress. Failure of Western secular education without any will result in the elevation of both tradition real foundation in the classical wisdom of and progress to the level of false gods, each any world religion. competing to destroy the other. Th e founding vision and mission of the Circle of Tradition and Progress is A. Paradigmatic Networking described in pages 13-15 and 78-81 of the Constructive policies that promote book, Th e Grand Strategy of Justice.18 the higher purpose of justice for persons, At stake is not any single civilisation but communities and nations emerge from all civilisations and the future of a global competition among special interest groups civilisation of traditionalist cooperation for and the think-tanks which purport to all mankind ... Th ere are encouraging signs provide a higher perspective by shaping of change within the Muslim community policy agendas. worldwide that would make such ecumenical Th e key to success in policy-making, leadership possible and realistic. One of these agenda formation and paradigmatic signs is the rapid growth of an ecumenical guidance, is grand strategy, and the movement of convergence between operational key to grand strategy is traditionalist Muslims and traditionalist networking among like-minded groups. Christians, perhaps best illustrated by Th e Circle of Tradition and Progress ... which B. The Circle of Tradition and was founded initially by Shaykh Rashid Progress al Ghannouchi..., leader of al Nahda, the A major paradigm derived from enlightened Islamist movement in Tunisia, the principal mentor of America’s and by the Programme Director of both the Founders, Edmund Burke of the Scottish Relm and Earhart Foundations, Anthony Enlightenment, is known as traditionalism. Sullivan, and Professor Louis Cantori of the Both Muslim and non-Muslim scholars University of Maryland. have begun to use this term in reference to the common wisdom of classical Islamic Th e specifi c orientation of this movement and classical American thought. within the broad scope of change now In 1997, an interfaith coalition of sweeping the Muslim world is indicated scholars met in London to form Th e Circle in the founding statement's emphasis that: for Tradition and Progress as a means to We believe in the transcendence of God, develop this traditionalist paradigm. Th e the need of man for divine guidance, and the three major founders were Shaykh Rashid continuing relevance of the prophetic faiths al Ghannouchi, a philosophy professor of Muslims, Jews, and Christians ... Just as in Tunis who also founded the uniquely there has always been a Muslim imperative pacifi st Islamist party known as Al-Nahda to reform, there has also been a Western (Renaissance). In November, 2011, Al- search for God and for the modalities of Nahda won 40% of the vote in the new cultural conservation. Belief in a religiously Tunisia of the Arab Awakening, giving it rooted natural law and an acknowledgement a platform to marginalise extremism and of the importance of the claims of the past terrorism. Shaykh Rashid’s name for the have been a hallmark of Western thought at circle for Tradition and Progress in Arabic least since Th omas Aquinas. In more recent was the halaqa al asala wa taqadun. times, this Western religious imperative and Th is traditionalist project was ahead of traditionalism has manifested itself in the its time a decade ago, but the need for it work of such thinkers as Edmund Burke, has been increasing in recent years in order Eric Vogelin, Russell Kirk, and Gerhart to provide spiritual and moral direction to Niemayer. Together, we believe that the revolutionary movements that may oppose Islamic impulse to reform and the Western modernism but are very much part of it, quest for religious understanding provide a

36 arches quarterly volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 A GRAND AMERICAN STRATEGY OF COUNTER-TERRORISM solid foundation for our joint endeavours. policies. Th e three principles governing this ...this eff ort will include an encouragement movement are described on page 79 of Th e of holism in both the individual and society. Grand Strategy of Justice: Th e societal holism we seek will incorporate Professor Ghannouchi states that the accountable and democratic government, fi rst principle of this movement is tahqiq, individual liberty and human rights, and the ascertainment of reality. Th e second an economic system that is both free and principle is masawad, equality in dignity humane. What we propose is to re-establish and opportunity. And the third principle an equilibrium between the spiritual and is khadam, or servant, which is the the material, and reclaim for our time what designation that he gives to governmental have been called the “permanent things”. power. Most broadly, the intention of the Circle is to foster intellectual activities designed to rectify Th e following founding statement of this the modern rupture between economics and movement summarises succinctly the key ethics, reason and religion, and man and to global leadership in the 21st Century: God. Above all, we hope to encourage Th e modern project, derived from the greater understanding between religions and European Enlightenment, can rightly claim to contribute to reconciliation of peoples and great achievement in the technical and socio- to international cooperation. p o l i t i c a l r e a l m s . M a n y p e o p l e . . . h o w e v e r , h a v e We believe in values that are not alterable come to realise the destructive consequences and have been manifested in the teaching of occasioned by modernity: the triumph of all the prophets (peace be upon them) and materialism, the decline of morality, unequal great civilisations throughout the ages. We global economic development, the collapse of believe further in the transcendence of God, family and community, and the erosion of the need of man for divine guidance, and the religious belief. continuing relevance of the prophetic faiths of Implicit in the modernist project is Muslims, Jews, and Christians. an arrogant and naïve insistence that A commitment to reform has always human fulfi lment can be achieved solely been at the heart of the Islamic project as on materialistic bases, and a belief in the articulated in the work of such ulama and absolute autonomy of human reason and in scholars as al-Ghazali, Ibn Taymiyya, al- man’s presumed ability to create his moral Afghani, Abduh, Rida, Iqbal, Baqr al Sadr, and cultural systems in isolation from any and Malik ben Nabi. Each of these great belief in transcendence. Th e modernist reformers attempted to address the problems project issuing from a shallow, utilitarian occasioned by the recurring imbalance caused claim of value-free rationality has come to by man’s quest for earthly fulfi lment and pose a threat to life itself. material prosperity on the one hand, and the Th e Circle of Tradition and Progress has reality of God and the ultimate primacy of been established to promote and enhance matters spiritual on the other. We regard dialogue, discussion, and scholarly research the Circle of Tradition and Progress as a among academics and public fi guresnew initiative in this long and unending committed to the preservation of religious and enterprise of reform. traditional values and the achievement of Just as there has always been a Muslim progress in the Muslim world, the West, and imperative to reform, there has also always elsewhere. Special emphasis will be placed been a Western search for God and for the on counteracting the excesses of modernity, modalities of cultural conservation. Belief with particular attention to a critique of the in a religiously rooted natural law and an contemporary materialistic, behavioralist, acknowledgement of the importance of the and radically secular experiment. All the claims of the past have been a hallmark activities of the Circle will be scholarly and of Western thought at least since Th omas intellectual in nature. Th e Circle will not Aquinas. In more recent times, this Western engage in the advocacy of any specifi c public religious imperative and traditionalism... volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 arches quarterly 37 That attempts to re- Dr Robert Dickson Crane is the former adviser to the late President of the United States Richard Nixon, and invent the Cold War with is former Deputy Director (for Planning) of the United States National Security Council. He is also the former Muslims as enemies U.S. Ambassador to the United Arab Emirates (1981). In 1962 he became one of the four co-founders of the of the West, or the fi rst Washington-based foreign-policy thinktank, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). In 1966, he left to become Director of Third World West designated as an Studies at the fi rst professional futures forecasting center, The Hudson Institute, led by Herman Kahn. He incorrigible enemy of is the Chairman of the Center for Understanding Islam, and President of the Center for Policy Research. Crane Islam, are deplorable and obtained a doctorate (J.D.) at Harvard Law School (1959) in International Investment and Comparative should be avoided. Legal Systems, and was a religious instructor on Islam at the Islamic Center, Massachusetts Avenue, Washington, D.C. between 1983-86. He was the has manifested itself in the work of such director of publications for the International Institute of Islamic Thought between (1986-1988); later becoming thinkers as Edmund Burke, Eric Vogelin, the founding member of The American Muslim Council Russell Kirk, and Gerhart Niemayer. and Director of its Legal Division, 1992-1994. Together, we believe that the Islamic impulse Crane has authored a number of books and many to reform and the Western quest for religious professional articles on a range of issues. Since January 2012, Crane took up the position of director of the understanding provide a solid foundation for Center for Research on Muslim Societies in Doha, Qatar our joint endeavours. which is the new extension of the Qatar Foundation. We favour the conduct of international relations on a basis of respect for all the world’s civilisations. We oppose all attempts FURTHER READINGS Abdul Rauf, Imam Feisal. (2004). What’s Right with Islam: A to export or impose cultural systems, to support New Vision for Muslims and the West. HarperSan Francisco, 314 dictatorial regimes, or to obstruct democratic pages. transformation. It is our conviction that Adler, Mortimer J. (1997). Ten Philosophical Mistakes: Basic Errors attempts to re-invent the Cold War with in Modern Thought – How They Came About, Their Consequences, Muslims as enemies of the West, or the West and How to Avoid Them. New York, Macmillan, 200 pages. designated as an incorrigible enemy of Islam, Ansary, Tamim. (2009). Destiny Disrupted, A History of the World are deplorable and should be avoided. We are Through Islamic Eyes. New York: Public Aff airs, 416 pages. united in our belief that all such Manichaean formulations will impede cooperation ENDNOTES between Muslims and the West and are likely 1. Beaufre, Andre (1964). Introduction a la Strategie. Paris: over time to have a dramatically negative Librairie Armand Colin. Translated as Totale Kriegskunst im impact on both international stability and Frieden. Berlin: Propylaen Verlag. 189 pages. 2. Crane, Robert D. (1963). “The Cuban Missile Crisis: A Strategic world peace. Analysis of American and Soviet Policy”, Orbis: A Quarterly Journal of World Aff airs, January, pp. 528-563. Also Crane, ed. Conclusion (1963). Soviet Nuclear Strategy: A Critical Appraisal, Washington: Th ere is nothing new in the world, just The Center for Strategic Studies, August, 196 pages; and “Moral Guidelines for the American Strategy Debate”, prepared for new iterations of the old as every civilisation the Catholic Association for International Peace with Justice rises and falls ad infi nitum based on and Charity, published in The Congressional Record, August whether material power or transcendent 15, 1963; and Dulles and Crane (1965). Cold War Strategies in justice provides the civilisational paradigm Transition, Praeger, 307 pages; and “Psychostrategy: A New Concept”, in The Military-Technical Revolution: Its Impact on of ultimate purpose. Th e United States of Strategy and Foreign Policy. ed. John Erickson, Praeger, 1966 America arose as an exceptional experiment (condensed in Survival: Journal of the Institute for Strategic in faith-based justice, but it can survive and Studies, London, March-April 1965 and in The Journal of prosper as a model to counter terrorism National Defense (in Japanese) , Tokyo, October 1967; and “Some Basic Strategies of Arms Control”, in Prospects for Arms only if activists in all religions cooperate Control, eds. James E. Dougherty and John F. Lehman (1965). Jr., in solidarity to rehabilitate its traditional New York, MacFadden-Bartell, pp.108-130, a seminal essay on heritage, which once was the heritage also combining positive incentives of peaceful engagement with of classical Islam. negative incentives of deterrence. 3. Crane, Robert D. (1967). “Islam, Communism, and the West: Problems in Power and Policy in the Middle East”, Preservation of the Principles of Freedom, Freedom Foundation, August.

38 arches quarterly volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 A GRAND AMERICAN STRATEGY OF COUNTER-TERRORISM

4. Crane, Robert D. (1968). “Revolutionary Regionalism in Chaudry, Muhammad Ali and Crane, Robert D. (2011). Islam Southeast Asia: The Newest Challenge to American Policy”, The and Muslims, Basking Ridge, New Jersey, The Center for Reporter, May 2, pp.11-16, reprinted in The London Observer in Understanding Islam, two volumes, 800 pages. condensed form and in The Washington Post, June 30, 1968, 12. Crane, Robert D. (2005). “From Clashing Civilizations to and in Survival, The Institute for Strategic Studies, London, a Common Vision,” in Islam and Global Dialogue: Religious September 1968. Pluralism and the Pursuit of Peace, Roger Boase, editor, with a 5. Crane, Robert D. (1968). New Nationalisms in the Third World, Foreword by HRH Prince Hassan bin Talal, Ashcroft, 310 pages., The Ripon Forum, May, reprinted in The Best of Ripon, 1963- pp.159-177. 1968, on the political dynamics of community and cultural 13. See Crane, Robert D. (2010). The Transcendent Law of resurgence in the economic development of traditional Compassionate Justice: An Islamic Perspective, Fort Washington, societies in Africa, Asia, and Latin America; and Crane, “The Maryland, Scholars Chair, 224 pages, reissued under the title Politics and Dynamics of Human Rights”, American Journal of Islam: What It Is and What It Is Not, Washington, Virginia, Global International Law, July 1969; and Crane, “New Directions for Vision, 2012. American Foreign Policy: Some Thoughts for Macro-Modeling”, 14. Crane, Robert D. (2002). “Economic Justice: A Cure for Orbis: A Quarterly Journal of World Aff airs, Summer 1969, Terrorism”, www.theamericanmuslim.org, September 29. pp.455-475, condensed from a book of position papers with 15. See, Crane, Robert D., www.theamericanmslim.org, “The a foreword by Gerald Ford, advocating the formulation of Mission of Imams in America: Marginalizing Extremists by national self-interest from the enlightened, global perspective Revealing the Real Truth about Muhammad, June 25, 2007, and of justice and pluralism. “Mission of Muslims in America: A Grand Strategy to Marginalize 6. Crane, Robert D. (1998). Counter-Terrorism 101: Grand Extremists,” July 18, 2007. See also, Crane, “New Frontiers in Strategy, The Missing Dimension of Foreign Policy, United Confl ict Management: A Grand Strategy to Wage Jihad Against Association for Studies and Research, Policy Paper 8, Terrorist Muslims,” www.theamericanmuslim.org, September Springfi eld, Virginia, September; and The Muslim Challenge in 24, 2004, and “Counter-Terrorism 201: The Role of Islam,” www. America and the World, Islamic Institute for Strategic Studies, theamericanmuslim.org, March 4, 2005. Washington, Virginia, Policy Paper 2, March 2000, 35 pages. 16. Crane, Robert D. (2008). “Common Word and Principles of 7. Crane, Robert D. (1994). “Civilizations in Crisis: Respect: Transforming Interfaith Dialogue into Interreligious Confrontation or Peaceful Engagement”, in the ezine www. Solidarity for Justice,” condensed for delivery at the 37th Annual theamericanmuslim.org, Bel Ridge, Missouri, vol. 2, no. 9, Conference of the Association of Muslim Social Scientists Jan-Mar; “Religious Extremism: Muslim Challenge and Islamic (AMSS), entitled “Crossing Boundaries: Mobilizing Faith, Response”, September 1, 2002; “New Frontiers in Confl ict Diversity, and Dialogue,” at Harvard Divinity School on October Management: A Grand Strategy to Wage Jihad Against 24th-25th, www.amss.org. Terrorist Muslims”, September 24, 2004; “Counter-Terrorism 17. Crane, opt cit, The Transcendent Law of Compassionate 201: The Role of Islam”, March 4, 2005; “Taproot to Terrorism”, Justice, Chapter 2, pp.43-68. June 19, 2005; “Reclaiming Islam: The Missing Dimension of 18. Crane, Robert D. (2000). The Grand Strategy of Justice. Counter-Terrorism”, October 7, 2005; “Islam and Islamism: Washington, D.C.: Islamic Institute for Strategic Studies, 83 Prelude to Democracy or to a Global Caliphate”, December 10, pages. 2005; “Islamic Economics: Cause or Cure for Global Terrorism”, October 11, 2006; “Muslim Bad Guys: Distinguishing Between Monist and Monolithic”, November 10, 2006; “Mission of Muslims in America: A Grand Strategy to Marginalize Extremists”, July 18, 2007; “A Faltering Freedom Agenda: The Disillusion of Muslim Reformers: A Traditionalist Reply”, April 9, 2008; “Waging Mimetic Warfare on Tricky Terrain”, August 19, 2008; “Seize the Moment: Interfaith Cooperation against Terrorism”, September 14, 2008; “Thank God for Justice: Renewing the Spirit in Uncertain Times”, November 26, 2008; “Perception Management: Source of the Eternal Confl ict Between Good and Evil”, February 27, 2009; “Religious Tribalism: A Major Obstacle to Peace through Justice”, April 8, 2009; “The Paradigmatic Revolution of Common Ground”, June 9, 2009. 8. This theme has been expanded by Dr. Crane into a 200- page book, entitled Rehabilitating the Role of Religion in the World: Laying a New Foundation on the Natural Law of Faith-Based, Compassionate Justice, available online at www. theamericanmuslim.org in four parts on May 30th and June 6, 2009, with separate chapters on each of eight universal principles of human responsibilities and rights in Islamic normative jurisprudence. 9. Thomas, Jeremy Henzell, personal email to co-author, Dr. Robert Crane. 10. For a comprehensive list of these condemnations see Sheila Musaji’s home page in her electronic magazine, www. theamericanmuslim.org. 11. See Chapter 10. “The Spread of Islam”, 77-pages, in volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 arches quarterly 39 BOOK PROMOTION

ISLAM AND MUSLIMS BY MUHAMMAD ALI CHAUDRY & ROBERT DICKSON CRANE

Th is rich two-volume, 800-page textbook, was prepared over a three-year period by Dr Muhammad Ali Chaudry and Dr Robert Dickson Crane, as part of the Center for Understanding Islam’s extensive range of publications and research.

Islam and Muslims engages the reader on a number of important subject matters, including:

Th e Spirit of Islam: Th e Faith, Th e Qur’an, Th e Sunnah, Th e Shari’ah -Universal Principles of Human Responsibilities and Rights, Islamic Principles of Economic and Social Justice, Commonalities and Diff erences among Faiths.

Life and Legacy of the Prophet Muhammad: Th e Early Years of the Muslim Community: Challenge and Response.

Th e Spread of Islam: Islamic Civilization: Science, Art, Architecture; Islamic Education, Philosophy and Science; and Contemporary Muslim World Demographics. Jihad and the Doctrine of Just War: Gender Equity, Democracy and Islam, Ecology and Islam, and Th e Role of Knowledge, Philosophy, and Th eology.

Challenge and Response: Common Misperceptions - Addressing the Main Distortions.

Interfaith Dialogue and Cooperation: Bringing Out the Best of All Faiths, Building the Future through Education and Engagement, Building a Traditionalist Paradigm, and Selected Resources on Islam.

40 arches quarterly volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 ENDORSEMENTS

Islam and Muslims is a rich resource for students of Islam and the world religions. It provides an accessible and engaging synthesis and perspective on Islam's rich tradition of faith, history, and culture."

JOHN L ESPOSITO, PRINCE ALWALEED BIN TALAL CENTER FOR MUSLIM-CHRISTIAN UNDERSTANDING, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY.

“Islam and Muslims, based on long experience, both personal and scholarly, of the Islamic religion, as well as on so many facts of Islamic civilization and the encounter between Islam and the West, is an important response to this need. It is a very accessible and authentic account which can serve as a reliable introduction to the world of Islam.”

SEYYED HOSSEIN NASR, THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY

“Th is book marshals the rich tradition in Islam and other Abrahamic faiths to help interfaith leaders translate their sacred texts' Common Word of love and compassion into solidarity of action in support of human responsibilities and universal human rights.”

IMAM FEISAL ABDUL RAUF, ASMA SOCIETY - CORDOBA HOUSE, NEW YORK CITY; AUTHOR OF WHAT IS RIGHT WITH ISLAM.

“Th is important book is long overdue. Encyclopedic in its coverage, Islam and Muslims, off ers students and general readers critical insight into how thoughtful Muslims themselves understand their faith…Th is book goes a long way to fi lling a huge gap by providing readers with insight into how Muslims themselves understand their religious tradition and its history.”

PROFESSOR CHRISTOPHER S. TAYLOR, CENTER ON RELIGION, CULTURE AND CONFLICT (CRCC), DREW UNIVERSITY.

“Islam and Muslims is a comprehensive, authoritative, extremely well-written and organised introduction to the religion of Islam. Th e authors cover material that is not usually found in other presentations and gives one a real sense of how Muslims perceive their religion and live it."

RABBI JACK BEMPORAD, DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR INTERRELIGIOUS UNDERSTANDING (CIU)

Islam and Muslims by Muhammad Ali Chaudry and Robert Dickson Crane. Published in 2011 by Centre for Understanding Islam - www.cuii.org

volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 arches quarterly 41 The Strength of Local Partnerships: Overcoming Obstacles During the War on Terror ROBERT LAMBERT

ne of the great strengths of a well- the war on terror can account for such a grounded local partnership is that seemingly perverse situation. Be that as it Oit can withstand tensions and may, it is to the enormous credit of local clashes with national and international partners in Finsbury Park and Brixton that policies. Th is is not to suggest that tensions they succeeded for as long as they did in between local and national, or between treading a fi ne line between local needs local and international policy imperatives, and national demands. are inevitable or welcome. To be sure, By developing themes in my book any local partnership is more likely to and other publications (Lambert 2008a, thrive and prosper if it is in harmony with 2008b, 2011b), I will seek to illustrate policies prescribed by central government. how the strength of well-grounded local By the same token, local partnerships partnerships can serve as a useful corrective may ultimately become untenable if they to national and international policies that threaten to subvert central government are conceived and implemented without policies that require a signifi cant degree suffi cient consideration given to the adverse of local conformity. However, local community impact they may engender. partnerships ultimately rely on local During the major period of my research legitimacy and credibility for success between September 2001 and October and when they encounter tensions with 2007 I found that the war on terror had national and international policies they both individual and cumulative adverse are duty bound to alert central government impacts on local partnership eff orts in and to navigate a middle path between the Finsbury Park, Brixton, and elsewhere in two competing requirements. London, notwithstanding the fact that In many respects this sense of locating the war on terror and the local London a middle path, between bottom-up local partnerships shared the same ostensible strategies and top-down national policy aim of combating al-Qaeda infl uence. imperatives during a period of tension, Th e police partners in Finsbury Park and describes the work of two local partnerships Brixton were police offi cers belonging to I document and analyse in my recent book the Muslim Contact Unit (MCU) a small Countering al-Qaeda in London: Police and specialist unit based within Metropolitan Muslims in Partnership (Lambert 2011a). In Police Special Branch. A crucial aspect of both Finsbury Park in North London and their success in winning trust in Muslim in Brixton in South London, police and communities was an awareness of the Muslim community partnerships worked importance of tackling unwarranted and eff ectively and harmoniously in support often violent attacks on Muslims. In the of national and public safety in tackling a immediate aftermath of 9/11 there was a threat of terrorism and violent extremism. real risk that anyone resembling a Muslim In such circumstances it is hard to envisage might face an Islamophobic incident of how such valuable work so clearly in tune some kind (Abbas 2004; Allen 2004). with British interests could be at odds with However, as time passed, just as once Irish national and international policy. Suffi ce Protestant loyalists became less likely, and to say only the particular demands of only mistakenly, confl ated with Provisional

42 arches quarterly volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 THE STRENGTH OF LOCAL PARTNERSHIPS: OVERCOMING OBSTACLES DURING THE WAR ON TERROR IRA terrorists (and a consequent threat to Islamist community groups (in London Londoners), so too would many “cultural” as elsewhere) often had the best tools with or “secular” London Muslims become less which to undermine al-Qaeda propaganda likely to be stigmatised as terrorists and within their own youth communities. subversives (even then only mistakenly) In doing so, they often faced the double than Salafi s and Islamists, who were jeopardy of attack from within their own routinely confl ated with terrorism, increasingly alienated communities— extremism and violent radicalism by where they were sometimes described as infl uential commentators during the working with the enemy, namely, Bush period under review (see for example Gove and Blair—and suspicion from without— 2006; Phillips 2006; Desai 2007; Cox and where Islamists and Salafi s are pejoratively Marks 2006). confl ated with the al-Qaeda threat. While the events of 7/7 inevitably placed London’s Muslims under the spotlight, it became increasingly apparent that While media attention London’s Salafi and Islamist communities rightly focussed on the (like London’s Irish Catholic nationalist kind of threat al-Qaeda and republican communities in the recent past) faced the greatest risk of being cast infi ltrators might have in the role of ‘suspect communities’, an posed to the police or apt term coined by Paddy Hillyard in relation to Irsih communities (Hillyard the security services, 1993). Moreover, just as London’s Irish MCU experience taught Catholic communities faced this very of the preventative value; stigmatisation, it must also be noted that their young community members were also through trusted Muslim often at high risk from Provisional IRA community leaders who propaganda and recruitment strategies. Similarly, young members of Salafi and might off set the risk. Islamist communities in the UK have also been at risk from highly developed Additionally, MCU police offi cers al-Qaeda propaganda and recruitment sought to foster a climate where the strategies since 9/11 (Lambert 2008a). suspicion and anxiety that haunted the Th e adverse impact of these instances daily life of an informant was replaced by of parallel stigmatisation of minority a healthy atmosphere where the temptation communities as terrorists and susceptibility informants sometimes felt to ‘guild the to terrorist recruitment is noteworthy - lily’ – to embellish information - or to act especially when considering the extent as the agent provocateur were removed to which New Labour and more recently (O’Callaghan 1999). To create a space a Conservative led coalition government for this kind of success; identifying and has sometimes wittingly and sometimes separating al-Qaeda propagandists from unwittingly, nurtured it. Salafi sm and the communities they sought to recruit Islamism, as causal or predictive factors, from, was a clear MCU objective from are no more signifi cant to the profi le of inception. Th is was especially important an al-Qaeda terrorist than Catholicism for offi cers who recalled how Provisional was to the profi le of a Provsional IRA IRA propagandists would covertly embed terrorist. On the contrary, the fact that themselves in organisations in London that al-Qaeda spokesmen often invoked and supported their prisoners and their political subverted Salafi and Islamist approaches cause. While media attention rightly to Islam in an attempt to legitimise their focussed on the kind of threat al-Qaeda violence during the period under review, infi ltrators might have posed to the police helps illustrate why it is that Salafi and or the security services, MCU experience volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 arches quarterly 43 taught of the preventative value; through of the Metropolitan Police. Th is became trusted Muslim community leaders who signifi cant when the MCU came to deal might off set the risk. Moreover, to help with attempts by al-Qaeda propagandists reassure Muslim communities that the to portray the Metropolitan Police in the MCU was in the partnership, and not in worst possible light, so as to encourage the recruitment business a community alienated London Muslim youth to join or partner, the editor of the London-based support them. journal Arches, published an account of the In the same Arches article, the MCU MCU’s formation: sought to explain the continuity of the In the morning after night-time air strikes terrorist purpose that it identifi ed in al- on Afghanistan launched the ‘war on terror’ I Qaeda. Th is was especially helpful in discussed the implications for London with a building bridges with sections of the long time colleague. Over a cup of coff ee in a community who felt that the current café in St. James’s Park underground station threat was being portrayed in purely two experienced counter terrorism police Muslim terms: offi cers came to the swift conclusion that By successfully targeting iconic symbols of the ‘war on terror’ was in grave danger of political and economic power the `strategists playing into the hands of al-Qaeda strategists behind 9/11 demonstrated the key purpose if it did not suffi ciently distinguish between of terrorism: political communication, what terrorists and the communities where they the Russian anarchist Peter Kropotkin called choose to operate. We reckoned: one, that the propaganda of the deed at a meeting in London terrorist enemy would already be excited by in 1881. By simultaneously achieving an the nature and tone of the ‘war on terror’; incredibly potent impact on live television the two, that sophisticated terrorist strategists same strategists took the business of terrorism would regard it as being disproportionate into a new global media arena for the fi rst and thereby boost recruitment to their cause, time. Never before had terrorists achieved and most importantly; three, that London such concentrated international attention. Muslims – fellow citizens paying a good All around the world people stopped what chunk of our wages – might begin to feel so they doing to ponder unbelievable images on alienated by the rhetoric of the ‘war on terror’ their television screens. While the majority that we would lose their critical support in could not comprehend any rational purpose combating al-Qaeda’s established infl uence to what they saw, the audacious terrorist in the capital. We determined to do all act immediately communicated itself as that we could to retain it. Th e discussion a reciprocal act of violence amongst a marked the inception of the Muslim Contact minority already in tune with al-Qaeda’s Unit (Lambert 2007). revolutionary ideology. Th e empowerment of minorities is always more important to By word of mouth, in ways that are terrorist strategists than the condemnation of characteristic of trust networks, the their actions by the majority. reputation of the MCU would be bolstered within communities (Tilley 2004). Just Combining professional experience as London Islamists contained far more with reference to academics, it became a potential allies against al-Qaeda than largely productive educational exercise potential supporters, so too did the same to off er Muslim audiences a perspective apply to London’s Salafi s – at least according on terrorism (and counter-terrorism) that to the MCU perspective. Signifi cantly, just departed at critical points from both the as many immigrant Islamists from North ‘offi cial’ Bush - Blair line and the al-Qaeda Africa had faced discriminatory and narrative. By way of illustration, the hostile policing in their home countries, positive audience reaction to Bill Tupman’s so too had many black London Salafi s deconstruction of the war on terror was experienced lesser but nonetheless rough evident at the fi rst Islam Expo gathering at treatment at the hands of some members Alexandra Palace in 2006. More generally,

44 arches quarterly volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 THE STRENGTH OF LOCAL PARTNERSHIPS: OVERCOMING OBSTACLES DURING THE WAR ON TERROR the day to day attempts to counter and the course of their work, but insists that it reduce al-Qaeda infl uence, provided a be done ‘in a dark alley’ (Godson 2007). common partnership purpose. In addition, Signifi cantly, as security research director the MCU’s express professional purpose of London’s most infl uential think-tank, of countering terrorist propaganda Policy Exchange; Godson does so in the and recruitment activity often blended knowledge that he has the support of key seamlessly with their Muslim community ACPO police offi cers and more crucially partners’ wider social purpose of correcting the ear of leading politicians (Beckett religious and political misunderstandings 2008). In the circumstances it is signifi cant within Muslim youth communities that Godson would begin to discredit the targeted by al-Qaeda for recruitment and MCU in 2006 – once it became clear to support. him that the unit was working closely with Experienced counter-terrorism police Muslim groups he regarded as a subversive offi cers and Muslim police offi cers, with threat. Instead of the MCU approach expert community knowledge the MCU he wanted to see a counter-insurgency combined purposefully, worked with approach adopted against the same groups: community partners who had credibility During the Cold War, organisations such to challenge al-Qaeda narratives. as the Information Research Department Moreover, the MCU’s purpose of reducing of the Foreign Offi ce would assert the the terrorist threat to London sat within superiority of the West over its totalitarian recognised objectives in other areas of rivals. And magazines such as Encounter police work, even though it was not an did hand-to-hand combat with Soviet fellow established approach to counter-terrorism. travellers. For any kind of truly moderate Indeed, it was an especially novel approach Islam to fl ourish, we need fi rst to recapture to counter-terrorism in January 2002 when our own self-confi dence. At the moment, the the wider ‘with us or with the terrorists’ extremists largely have the fi eld to themselves war on terror was dropping massive bombs (Godson 2006). on hundreds of civilians in its fi rst display of military might in Afghanistan in the As Tom Griffi n notes, Godson's approach aftermath of 9/11. to fi ghting radical Islam ‘has signifi cant While it was unsurprising that a parallels with a US Department of Defence severe terrorist threat to London, with proposal from 2002,’ which called for roots in one of the capital’s Muslim sub- ‘eff orts to discredit and undermine the cultures should have prompted counter infl uence of mosques and religious schools terrorism interest, it was unprecedented that have become breeding grounds for for a counter-terrorism police unit to Islamic militancy and anti-Americanism forge trusting, reciprocal partnerships across the Middle East, Asia and Europe’ within the very communities generally (Griffi n 2008). Th is is therefore not deemed most suspect. Indeed, it is the simply a procedural or management issue; issue of MCU partnerships with Salafi recurring challenges to the suitability of and Islamist Muslim community groups Salafi s and Islamists as police partners – as opposed to the more conventional needs to be addressed against the notion detective and police informant relationship of legitimacy and eff ectiveness as defi ned – that proved the most controversial. Th at by one of the UK’s most infl uential think- is to say, the notion that police should tanks. obtain intelligence from communities is Instead, major recent developments uncontested: rather, it is the practice of in policing theory concern the risk treating Salafi s and Islamists as partners management of intelligence gathering, instead of informants that was/is the issue. as opposed to political and ethical issues Dean Godson makes the point of this kind, concentrating instead on trenchantly when he acknowledges the information technology, data mining and need for police to meet such individuals in the concept of the police as ‘’knowledge volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 arches quarterly 45 workers’’ in a society measured by risk the ‘coercive dimension’ of policing is (Ericson and Haggarty 1997; Brodeur and otherwise innate to counter-terrorism, Dupoint 2006; de Lint 2000). Th e same especially in Europe. When French is true in police practitioner circles where counter-terrorism offi cials listened to the last ten years have been dominated accounts of MCU empowerment of Salafi by the development of risk management and Islamist communities, they were at procedures for intelligence models such a loss to understand its rationale. Given as the National Intelligence Model the extent to which the MCU rationale (ACPO 2005). Both approaches think of diff ers from counter-terrorism approaches intelligence in terms of risk management elsewhere in Europe, it is worth recalling rather than legitimacy and eff ectiveness. John Alderson’s observation about the In contrast, the issue of MCU partnership crucial separation of the police and the legitimacy and eff ectiveness raises ethical military in Britain: questions of the kind that have been Th e distinction between the military and raised in recent years by the judiciary, police functions, at least since the formation most notably Lord Scarman (Scarman of the modern police in 1829, has been 1981) and Lord Macpherson (Macpherson marked in Great Britain. Th e distinction 1999). Indeed the moral censure delivered is not so clear in France and other countries to police by Lord Macpherson has much infl uenced by the Napoleonic police contributed to a loss of their ‘symbolic systems where the gendarmerie are in fact aura’, a ‘capacity to command widespread under military command but have a normal implicit trust’, and an ‘ability to signify a policing function as well. common moral and political community’ (Loader and Mulcahy 2003). Moreover, It is only the absence of military as Nigel Fielding notes, policing has to thinking that allows British policing to ‘balance its function as servant of the build partnerships with minority and public with its function as coercer of the marginalized communities. William public’ and ‘the problem of balancing the Lyons argues that counter-terrorism must opposed functions is acute’: learn to police in ways ‘that build trusting [Policing is] constantly obliged to negotiate relationships with those communities least the space between the need to serve the whole likely to willingly assist the police: those society by enforcing general norms and the need often marginalized communities where to serve individuals demanding mobilisation criminals and terrorists can more easily of the law. Community policing aims to live lives insulated from observation’.1 overcome policing’s coercive dimension, but Th is point is re-enforced by M. C. de this dimension is acutely innate in political Guzman who argues that a ‘community- institutions (Fielding 2005). police relationship that is based on mutual trust is more likely to uncover matters that are helpful in identifying prospective The distinction between terrorists’: A more formal or authoritarian police- the military and police community relationship would distance functions, at least since police from the rest of the community and the formation of the only reports of actual law breaking are likely to be reported…Enlisting the community in modern police in 1829, its own defence encourages it to take control has been marked in of its own destiny.

Great Britain. All local partners – the MCU, Salafi and Islamist community groups – utilised Th is dilemma sits at the heart of high levels of what David Th omas and the MCU project, not least because Kerr Inkson call cultural intelligence to

46 arches quarterly volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 THE STRENGTH OF LOCAL PARTNERSHIPS: OVERCOMING OBSTACLES DURING THE WAR ON TERROR empathise and communicate eff ectively MCU sought to explain the community with each other in what is, essentially, leader’s value as a community partner a cross-cultural dialogue (Th omas and against al-Qaeda to US offi cials but with Inkson 2003). For Th omas and Inkson, limited success. Attempts to broker a cultural intelligence consists of ‘being meeting between US offi cials and the skilled and fl exible about understanding community leader were unsuccessful. In a culture, learning more about it from this case, as in so many others, the MCU your ongoing interactions with it, and partnership approach towards Muslim gradually reshaping your thinking to be fi gures with uncompromising religious and more sympathetic’ to it. Muslim police political beliefs, failed to instil confi dence offi cers deployed on the MCU are shown in the wider war on terror. Consequently, to have played a key role in developing and MCU offi cers became concerned that their nurturing this skill to the benefi t of police ability to win over suspicious community colleagues and community partners alike. leaders would be undermined. As one Th e same offi cers are also described as MCU offi cer notes, ‘it is hard to think of having made a signifi cant contribution to someone less likely to have a tattoo and trust building between MCU and Muslim less important in persuading local Muslim community partners. In addition, the youth that al-Qaeda is the wrong way to Muslim police offi cers are shown to have go.’ played a vital role in introducing non- Muslim police colleagues to the religious and cultural diff erences of diversely rich Government language and often competing Muslim community is always careful to groups in the capital. describe the al-Qaeda Th is approach is also signifi cant given the lack of cultural empathy and trust that threat as existing has characterised the wider engagement independently of British between Western offi cialdom and Muslim communities in the fi rst six years of the foreign policy. war on terror. Th roughout the period under review the partnership’s two-way At times MCU offi cers placed themselves cultural empathy and trust building stands at odds with government policy on counter- in marked contrast to prevailing attitudes terrorism by endorsing the concerns of the of confrontation and suspicion explicit and Muslim community that British foreign implicit in the wider war on terror (Jackson policy – most especially, but not exclusively 2005). One Muslim community leader with respect to the war in Iraq – has had in East London compares the courteous an adverse impact on the terrorist threat partnership approach of the MCU with level to the UK. Government language is his degrading treatment at the hands of always careful to describe the al-Qaeda immigration and security offi cials at a US threat as existing independently of British airport where he was detained overnight foreign policy and as having ideological in a cold cell pending further enquiries motivations that pre-date 9/11. Moreover, into his visit (both to lecture and to see Tony Blair, as British prime Minister, was his son at university). When he was asked at pains to describe 7/7 as an ‘attack on our at 2am whether he had any tattoos by a way of life’ when delivering high profi le security offi cial with a form to fi ll in it media messages that explicitly excluded struck him that he was unwittingly on the political grievance from an analysis of the wrong side of a war between ‘us and them’ root causes of terrorism: - a thought that has occurred to London But, coming to Britain is not a right. And Muslim community leaders on numerous even when people have come here, staying here occasions during the period under review. carries with it a duty. Th at duty is to share Subsequently, on his return to the UK, the and support the values that sustain the British volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 arches quarterly 47 way of life. Th ose that break that duty and try extraordinary rendition. In both instances to incite hatred or engage in violence against MCU offi cers challenged the notion that our country and its people, have no place UK counter-terrorism can be arbitrarily here. Over the coming months, in the courts, separated from the acts of its US partners in parliament, in debate and engagement in the war on terror, still less from the with all parts of our communities, we will actions of its own military partners in Iraq work to turn those sentiments into reality. and Afghanistan. Th roughout the fi rst six Th at is my duty as prime minister. years of its existence, London partnership initiatives appreciated the importance In a speech to the World Aff airs Council of acknowledging these concerns in an in Los Angeles on Monday, 1st August eff ort to reduce the risk of al-Qaeda 2005 he described it as a ‘struggle between propagandists mobilising community what I will call Reactionary Islam and disquiet as a vehicle for recruitment and Moderate, Mainstream Islam’. Rather, the support. In doing so, it aligned itself to MCU inclined to Peter Bergen’s analysis of stern critics of the war on terror. root causes having far more to do with a At this point the distance from violent political response to US [and after conventional counter-terrorism looms 9/11, UK backed] policies in the Middle large. So, too, the tension between a local East (Bergen 2002). As a result, whenever strategy, and national and international the MCU reported and endorsed the views policy. Rather than assuming that the of its community partners that directly local must always give way to the national contradicted the prime minister’s analysis, imperative, it may be helpful in future to it faced the prospect of marginalization accommodate both approaches, especially itself. when tackling a threat like the one Th e development of the London inspired by al-Qaeda, that adapts well partnership initiative relied on the to local conditions and skilfully exploits skills and experience of the MCU and inconsistencies in government domestic Muslim community partners who and foreign policies that stigmatise or challenged prevailing wisdom about the harm Muslim communities. way to tackle al-Qaeda at virtually every turn. If mainstream counter-terrorism Dr Robert Lambert MBE is a lecturer at the Centre for acknowledges the need for community the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV) at support, it is principally as a prerequisite the University of St. Andrews. He co-authored, with Dr for community intelligence that will allow Jonathan Githens Mazer, Islamophobia and Anti-Muslim terrorist activity to be identifi ed in time Hate Crime: A London Case Study (January 2010) and Islamophobia an Anti-Muslim Hate Crime: UK Case Studies for it to be disrupted. Th e MCU took this (November 2010). Lambert’s twin research interests objective a stage further and posited the are Islamophobia and community based approaches notion that counter-terrorism will fail to to counter-terrorism, both topics are refl ected in his win the support it needs if it is perceived to book, Countering Al-Qa’ida in Britain: Police and Muslim Communities in Partnership in London (Hurst). care more about intelligence than the fair and proportionate treatment of Muslim For the bulk of his police service (1977-2007) Lambert communities. Community concern here is worked in counter-terrorism, gaining operational shown to extend across all areas of counter- experience of tackling all forms of violent political threats to the UK, from Irish republican to the many terrorism, from approaches to recruit strands of international terrorism. Prior to retiring informants to the alleged mistreatment of from the Metropolitan Police in 2007 he was the head British Muslim terrorist suspects at home of the Muslim Contact Unit, which he helped set-up in and abroad. 2002 to help establish partnerships with the Muslim community. MCU offi cers examined the Muslim community’s concerns about the treatment of British Muslims at Guantanamo Bay BIBLIOGRAPHY and at multiple venues during the course Abbas, Tahir (2004). After 9/11: British South Asian Muslims, of what the US authorities have termed Islamophobia, Multiculturalism, and the State: American Journal

48 arches quarterly volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 THE STRENGTH OF LOCAL PARTNERSHIPS: OVERCOMING OBSTACLES DURING THE WAR ON TERROR of Social Sciences. 21(3), pp.26-38. -- (2008a). ‘Empowering Salafi s and Islamists Against Al-Qaeda: A London Counter-terrorism Case Study’, Political Science and Alderson, John (1979). Policing Freedom. Plymouth: Macdonald Politics, January 2008. 41(1), pp.31-35. & Evans. -- (2008b). ‘Salafi and Islamist Londoners: Stigmatised Minority Faith Communities Countering al-Qaida,’ Crime Law and Social Alderson, John (1998). Principled Policing: Protecting the Public Change. Special Issue, 50. pp.73-89. with Integrity. Winchester: Waterside Press. -- (2007). ‘Refl ections on Counter-terrorism Partnerships in Britain.’ Arches, Jan-Feb., London: The Cordoba Foundation, Allen, Chris (2004). ‘Justifying Islamophobia: A Post-9/11 pp.3-6. Consideration of the European Union and British Contexts’, American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences, 21(3), pp.1-25. Loader, Ian & Mulcahy, Aogan (2003). Policing and the Condition of England: Memory, Politics and Culture. Oxford: Oxford Association of Chief Police Offi cers (ACPO) (2005), ‘National University Press. Intelligence Model’, National Centre for Policing Excellence: Centrex. Lyons, William (2002). ‘Partnerships, information and public http://www.acpo.police.uk/asp/policies/Data/nim2005.pdf - safety: community policing in a time of terror’, Policing: an accessed 18 May, 2011. International Journal of Police Strategies & Management. 25(3), pp.530-542. Beckett, Andy (2008). ‘What can they be thinking?’ Guardian Online 26 September. Macpherson, Lord (1999). The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry: Report, http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2008/sep/26/thinktanks. Cm. 4262-1. London: Home Offi ce. conservatives - accessed 3 August 2011. O’Callaghan, Sean (1999). The Informer. London: Corgi Books. Brodeur, Jean-Paul & Dupoint, Benoit (2006). ‘Knowledge Workers or ‘’Knowledge’’ Workers?’ Policing & Society. 16(1), Phiilips, Melanie (2006). Londonistan: How Britain Is Creating a pp.7-26. Terror State Within. London: Gibson Square.

Cox, Caroline & Marks, John (2006). ‘The West, Islam and Scarman, Lord Justice (1981). The Brixton Disorders, 10-12 April Islamism: Is Ideological Islam Compatible with Liberal 1981. Cmnd 8247 London: Home Offi ce. Democracy?’ London: Civitas. Tilly, Charles (2004). ‘Trust and Rule’, Theory and Society. 33(1), De Lint, Willem (2000). ‘Autonomy, Regulation and the Police pp.1-30. Beat’, Social & Legal Studies. 9(1), pp.55-83. Thomas, David & Inkson, Kerr (2003). Cultural Intelligence, San Desai, Meghnad (2007). Rethinking Islamism: The Ideology of the Francisco: Berrett-Koehler. New Terror. London: I. B. Taurus.

Ericson, Richard V. & Kevin D. Haggerty (1997). Policing the Risk ENDNOTES Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1. Lyons, William (2002). Partnerships, information and Fielding, Nigel G. (2005). The Police and Social Confl ict.2 nd ed. public safety: community policing in a time of terror. Policing: London: Glass House Press. an International Journal of Police Strategies & Management. 25(3), pp.530-542. Fielding, Nigel G. (2005). ‘Concepts and Theory in Community Policing,’ The Howard Journal. 44(5), pp.460-472.

Godson, Dean (2007). ‘The Old Bill Should Choose its Friends Carefully: What on Earth are West Midlands Police up to?’ The Times, August 23.

Godson, Dean (2006). ‘The feeble helping the unspeakable.’ Times Online, 5 April. www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/guest_ contributors/article702053.ee - accessed 1 September 2011.

Gove, Michael (2006), Celsius 7/7. London: Weidenfi eld & Nicholson.

Griffi n, Tom (2008). Conrad Black’s favourite Commissar. Spinwatch, 15 May. http://www.spinwatch.org.uk/-articles-by-category- mainmenu-8/49-propaganda/4908-dean-godson--conrad- blacks-favourite-commissar - accessed 8 October,2011.

Hilliard, Paddy (1993), Suspect Community: People’s Experience of the Prevention of Terrorism Acts in Britain. London: Pluto Press.

Lambert, Robert (2011a). Countering al-Qaeda in London: Police and Muslims in Partnership, Hurst, London. -- (2011b). ‘Competing Counter-Radicalisation Models in the thecordobafoundation.com UK.’ In Rik Coolsaet, ed. Jihadi Terrorism and the Radicalisation [email protected] Challenge. European and American Experiences Ashgate, Aldershot. October. pp.215-225. volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 arches quarterly 49 The Use of Secret Evidence is a Threat to Human Rights

JEAN LAMBERT MEP

ecret evidence refers to evidence criticise the use of “secret evidence” and which is not fully disclosed in any eff ectively state that the controlee must Strial or hearing: or that it may be be given suffi cient information about the disclosed partially or in full under very allegations against him in order to be able limited circumstances. A summary version to instruct those defending him.1 (sometimes described as “gist”) may be We heard much personal testimony allowed or it may not be disclosed at all. during the meeting of the 19th December In all these circumstances, the accused is about the eff ect of Control Orders on the not allowed to have full knowledge of the lives of the individuals concerned and case against him or her. Th e Government’s their families. Th ese Orders provide for preferred term is “closed material considerable restrictions in order to prevent procedures” (CMP). people, believed on the basis of CMPs to In this paper, I seek to make the case constitute a risk to public safety, engaging that such secret evidence compromises the in activities likely to put the public at risk. right to a fair trial or hearing under Article As Lord Bingham said: 6 of the European Convention of Human Th e appellants suggested that conditions of Rights (ECHR) which declares that: this kind, strictly enforced, would eff ectively In the determination of his civil rights inhibit terrorist activity. It is hard to see why and obligations or of any criminal charge this would not be so. against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time However, what also becomes clear by an independent and impartial tribunal from the controlees’ accounts is that the established by law... authorities do not really believe that Control Orders work. If deprivation of contact with Article 6 goes on to state in paragraph others and access to phone and internet, 3 that: frequent searches of an individual’s Everyone charged with a criminal off ence property and family members can still has the following minimum rights: result in controlees being re-arrested and ...(b) to have adequate time and the detained on suspicion of terrorist activities facilities for the preparation of his defence; ... then, to me, this demonstrates a lack of (d) to examine or have examined witnesses confi dence in Control Orders being able against him and to obtain the attendance and to prevent such activities. We should also examination of witnesses on his behalf under remember that Control Orders are based the same conditions as witnesses against him. on untested evidence.

How is it possible to construct a WHAT IS THE BACKGROUND TO defence or adequately instruct your legal CONTROL ORDERS AND THE representative when you cannot a) see the INCREASING USE OF “SECRET evidence, b) examine it in detail, c) cross- EVIDENCE”? examine witnesses and d) test the evidence Cases concerning national security against you eff ectively? have often had areas of diffi culty in the Th ere are judgements from the disclosure of certain evidence when it has European Court of Human Rights, the been gathered by intelligence services, House of Lords and the High Court which but that has generally been in full 50 arches quarterly volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 THE USE OF SECRET EVIDENCE IS A THREAT TO HUMAN RIGHTS criminal trials rather than administrative In its report, the Joint Committee went procedures or issues concerning pre-charge on to call for the Government to review detention or detention in place of charges. the use of secret evidence, not least in Th e latest developments have their immigration cases concerning Special origins in anti-terrorism legislation: Immigration Appeals Commission legislation that is often passed in apparent (SIAC): haste but where the measures have been We recommend that the Government waiting in the wings for some time. CMPs urgently conduct a comprehensive review come cloaked in the language of “security of the use of secret evidence and special concerns” and public safety which prevents advocates, in all contexts in which they certain information being made public. are used, in light of the judgments of the Th is allows procedures to move outside European Court of Human Rights and the the normal legislative process. Th is was House of Lords, to ascertain how often they outlined in a speech by Dr Alex Conte of are used and whether their use is compatible the International Commission of Jurists with the minimum requirements of the right in a statement to an OSCE conference in to a fair hearing as interpreted in those September 2011: judgments, and to report to Parliament on ...Given the severe and fear-inducing the outcome of that review”6 nature of the threat of terrorism, many States have designed their counter-terrorism Th e Government’s review of Anti- laws and policies under a framework of terrorist legislation earlier this year, which exceptionalism rather than a framework of has led to the Terrorism Prevention and normalcy.2 Investigation Measures (TPIM) Act7, looked at Control Orders but not at “secret For the UK, this has meant: evidence” per se. Th at is examined in the the derogation from rights and freedoms Government’s Green Paper on Justice and and the undermining of the primacy of the Security8 out for consultation until 6th criminal justice system... Th e undermining January 2012. of rights and freedoms with a key role for the intelligence community.3 Control orders go Once such “exceptional” practices start, against the British they begin to spread. In January 2010 the traditions of justice and Rt. Hon David Hanson MP, Minister of liberty. They undermine State at the Home Offi ce, indicated that there were at least 21 diff erent contexts in the presumption of which the Government was ‘aware’ that innocence and the right special advocates and secret evidence have been or may be used. 4 Th e Joint Human to a fair trial. Rights Committee of Parliament has stated that: Th e so-called TPIM proposals from the ...It (secret evidence) can now be used in Government were heavily criticised by a a wide range of cases including deportation number of human rights organisations. hearings, control order proceedings, parole Liberty stated: board cases, asset-freezing applications, Control orders are unfair. Innocent people employment tribunals, and even claims for should not be subjected to years and years of d amages. We note that in Binyam Mohamed ’s punishment without trial. Control orders and others’ claim for compensation the High place dehumanizing sanctions on people Court has held that special advocates and based on suspicion rather than evidence. secret evidence may be used for the fi rst time Control orders go against the British in a civil action for damages” 5 traditions of justice and liberty. Th ey undermine the presumption of innocence and volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 arches quarterly 51 the right to a fair trial. 9 practise. Th ere is also concern about what is Among many criticisms from Amnesty happening via anti-terrorism legislation International, they raised an additional and the call for “public security” elsewhere. objection to a late amendment from the In December 2011, the European Home Secretary: Parliament (EP) called on Member States ...Th e appeals process for individuals placed to submit reports on the cost-effi ciency under a TPIMs order is deeply fl awed, as it of their counter-terrorism measures and allows the government to base its allegations their impact on civil liberties12, with the on secret material which the individual European Commission set to produce or their chosen lawyer are prevented from an EU-wide evaluation on the EU anti- seeing. Instead, material is considered in terrorism strategy. Th e majority of the closed session and a court-appointed “Special Parliament is concerned that Member Advocate” is supposed to represent the States should comply with Article 1.2 of interests of the accused - though they cannot the Framework Decision 2002 which communicate with them or their legal team states: over the accusations.10 Th is Framework Decision shall not have the eff ect of altering the obligation to respect As previously mentioned, the fundamental rights and fundamental legal Government is consulting on the use of principles as enshrined in Article 6 of the secret evidence in its Green Paper. In his Treaty on European Union. statement to MPs, introducing the Green Paper, Justice Secretary Kenneth Clarke Th e EP Resolution explicitly stated in set out the diffi culties when evidence Conclusion 6: concerned security issues that it was felt Recalls that counter-terrorism policies should not be openly disclosed: should meet the standards set with regard Th e Government is unable to defend to necessity, eff ectiveness, proportionality, its actions. Claimants are left without civil liberties, the rule of law and democratic clear judgments based on all the relevant scrutiny and accountability that the information. And the public are left with Union has committed itself to uphold and no independent judgment by the Court - develop, and that assessing whether these because it has not been able to consider all standards are met must be an integral part the evidence. of an evaluation of all EU counter-terrorism eff orts; considers that these policies must be Organisations, such as Reprieve which developed in accordance with the provisions was active in the Binyam Mohammed of EU primary law and, in particular, give case, have already raised concerns about priority to respecting the rights enshrined in certain proposals contained in the Green the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Paper: European Union.13 Clare Algar, director of Reprieve, said: Th e Government is seeking to close off In the framework of the European the very methods by which we fi rst found Council’s “Roadmap” of procedural out about UK complicity in torture and safeguards for defendants and suspects rendition.11 (a programme of reform to raise fair trial standards to an acceptable minimum across Material disclosure at inquests is also the EU) the European Commission has under consideration, which might have been consulting on pre-trial detention.14 implications for the procedure following Th e issues have been set fi rmly within the certain incidents involving police. Any context of Human Rights and international legislative proposals arising from this instruments such as the International consultation will need careful scrutiny if Covenant on Civil and Political Rights they are not to entrench or extend current (ICCPR). It has raised questions such as:

52 arches quarterly volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 THE USE OF SECRET EVIDENCE IS A THREAT TO HUMAN RIGHTS Question 4: Th ere is an obligation to release an accused person unless there are overriding If we want to tackle reasons for keeping them in custody. How is terrorism and its causes, this principle applied in your legal system? we cannot do that by Th e Consultation closed at the end of stepping back from a November 2011 and we are now awaiting commitment to the the publication of the responses and a possible White Paper (“Book” in EU universal application of parlance) or legislative proposals. Th is will human rights. give those concerned the possibility to raise and question the use of secret evidence detention without trial, extraordinary within the EU. rendition, telephone tapping, control orders Th ere are some, of course, who blame and all sort of barbarous things that we the judiciary and human rights legislation associate with countries where the rule of law for the very existence of measures, such does not prevail. as Control Orders and their dependence Our politicians justifi ed this by saying the on CMP, while recognising they are in security forces needed extraordinary powers contravention of the ECHR. to meet an extraordinary emergency. Second, would we really need control Th e ECtHR, on the other hand, has the orders at all, if the judiciary did not actively impartiality and distance to remind us that prevent the British state from deporting ‘laws should speak the same language in war foreign trouble-makers? Most of those against or peace’. whom control orders were fi rst made were not even British citizens. Prevented from If we want to tackle terrorism and its deporting them, and unable to detain them causes, we cannot do that by stepping in prison, the government seemed pushed into back from a commitment to the universal inventing control orders as an alternative. - application of human rights. In the Douglas Carswell M.P.15 European Parliament, I have the privilege of chairing the Delegation to South Asia But this is to miss the point. We should and I also meet human rights activists and welcome the fact that British judges diplomats from around the world. One of are complying with their international the duties I have as a Delegation Chair, is and legal obligations concerning non- to raise the issue of the implementation refoulement (not returning someone to of human rights norms. It is deeply a country where this entails a risk of the upsetting to me when I raise issues of long- individual being subjected to torture term detention without charge, trial or or inhuman or degrading treatment or presentation of any form of evidence that punishment). It is salutary to look at can be eff ectively questioned, to know that some of the countries where such return I have to make the same criticisms of my has been sought by British governments, own country’s government. I know there is on the basis of written assurances which an enormous diff erence of scale and eff ect have no legal force: they include Libya –we do not have the death penalty and and Algeria – before the so-called “Arab our legal professionals are not routinely Spring”. Th e idea of extending the range under threat of death or injury and our of such agreements is still on the table civil society and Parliamentarians are but those who advocate such measures free to voice their opposition. However, should consider the words of Sir Konrad it opens the way for accusations of double Schiemann, a judge at the European Court standards to be made. of Justice (ECJ).16 We should also remember that ...We condoned the torture of terror the UN’s Global Counter-Terrorism suspects, for instance, not to mention Strategy of 2006, reaffi rmed in 2008 volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 arches quarterly 53 THE USE OF SECRET EVIDENCE IS A THREAT TO HUMAN RIGHTS and 2010, recognises that human rights ENDNOTES compliance while countering terrorism 1. Cases cited by Justice Briefi ng for House of Lords Report Stage 2011, Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures is an indispensible part of a successful Bill, November 2011, p.4. medium- and long-term strategy to 2. Statement by Dr Alex Conte for Working session 5:Rule combat terrorism. Th e Strategy identifi es of Law, OSCE Human Dimension Implementation Meeting, respect for human rights for all, and the Warsaw 28 September 2011 3. Ibid rule of law, as one of its four pillars and as 4. See: Letter to the Chair of the Joint Committee on Human the fundamental basis of the fi ght against Rights from Rt Hon David Hanson MP. Minister of State, Home terrorism. To return to the words of Dr. Offi ce, dated 7 January 2010. Alex Conte of the ICJ: 5. The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR) report: Counter-Terrorism Policy and Human Rights: Th e Strategy represents a clear affi rmation Bringing It Back In 25 March 2010. by all UN Member States that eff ective 6. Ibid. 4 April 2010. counter-terrorism measures and the 7. This received Royal Assent on 14.12.2011. protection of human rights are not confl icting, 8. Justice and Security Government Green Paper, 19th October 2011 http://consultation.cabinetoffi ce.gov.uk/ but rather complementary and mutually justiceandsecurity/ 17 reinforcing goals. 9. Liberty, September 2011. 10. Amnesty International UK press release on the latest Our Government needs to remember version of the bill – 4 September 2011. 11. As quoted by BBC 10.10.2011. that. 12. European Parliament resolution of 14 December 2011 (This article is based on a speech by Jean Lambert MEP for on the EU Counter-Terrorism Policy: main achievements and Campaign Against Secret Evidence public meeting at the future challenges (2010/23/INI). London Muslim Centre, 19.12.2011) 13. Ibid. 14. Strengthening mutual trust in the European judicial area – A Green Paper on the application of EU criminal justice Jean Lambert is the Green Party MEP for London. legislation in the fi eld of detention (COM (2011) 327 fi nal She is a deputy member of the Parliament’s Civil Liberties Committee and particularly active on issues pub.14 6.2011. of asylum, immigration and social justice. She was a 15. blog: Talk Carswell 3.1.2011. substitute member of the EP’s Temporary Committee 16. Sir Konrad Schiemann , as quoted http://www. on the alleged use of European Countries by the lawgazette.co.uk/blogs/news-blog/what-happens-when- CIA for the Transportation, and Illegal Detention of politicians-clash-human-rights 4.3.2011. Prisoners. She is also a Council member of Liberty and Vice-President of Waltham Forest’s Race Equality 17. Statement by Dr. Alex Conte for Working session 5:Rule Council. This article represents her personal views. of Law, OSCE Human Dimension Implementation Meeting, Warsaw 28 September 2011.

54 arches quarterly volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 ORDER YOUR COPY TODAY! thecordobafoundation.com [email protected] volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 arches quarterly 55 The New Prevent: Will it Work? Can it Work?

THERESE O’TOOLE, STEPHEN H. JONES & DANIEL NILSSON DEHANAS INTRODUCTION of any kind’ as a way of challenging he Conservative–Liberal Democrat extremism. Yet just a few pages earlier it coalition formed following Britain’s talks insouciantly about how it is now a TMay 2010 election was quick to set criminal off ence to ‘wear clothing or carry aside the previous government’s strategy articles in public which arouse reasonable for preventing violent extremism (known suspicion that an individual is a member as PVE or, more commonly, Prevent). or supporter of a proscribed organisation’.4 Formulating a new strategy proved, Nevertheless, though it is far from though, to be a lengthy and fractious entirely coherent, the new strategy does process. Initially due to be released in mark out some important departures from January 2011, the successor policy to its predecessor. In this article our aim is to Prevent was delayed to June 2011, during explore the possible implications of these which time the Security Minister, Pauline departures. Drawing upon work from Neville-Jones, resigned. Journalists a national research project5 examining reported that the coalition was divided Muslim participation in processes of between hard-line ‘neo-conservatives’ like governance, we examine some of the Michael Gove and more moderate voices events that formed the background to the such as Nick Clegg and Sayeeda Warsi.1 As new strategy and how they shaped it. We late as April 2011, just two months before argue that, despite its rhetorical claim to the release of the new strategy, Neville- mark a new approach, there are a number Jones stated in a speech that the core of the of signifi cant continuities between the old new policy will be the three ’I’s: ideology, and new strategies, and that some of the institutions and individuals. However, the tensions which were evident in the old new strategy does not mention this triad strategy are likely to beset the new version. even once, indicating that the fi nal report Indeed, the key question we seek to ask was subject to all kinds of last-minute is whether Prevent, defi ned as a policy alterations and insertions.2 designed to make extremism less appealing Indeed, this is how the new strategy to British citizens, can actually succeed in comes across when read closely: some any form. statements seem to clash with, even directly contradict, others, as though they have CRITICISM OF PREVENT UNDER been shoehorned in during the fi nal draft.3 NEW LABOUR Whatever the accuracy of journalists’ Th ere was certainly no shortage of accounts of divisions in Whitehall, it is criticism of the Prevent strategy under certainly true that one can point to those New Labour, most of which can be traced passages in the published report that seem to the way it focused on the British Muslim to have been inserted by hard-liners and population. Despite the fact that it is those that seem to have been written by widely accepted that extremists are a tiny more moderate individuals. For example, minority in Britain, the strategy frequently midway through the report a passage appeared to be trying to eff ect a substantial emphasises the signifi cance of maintaining change in all Muslims’ attitudes. When free expression and ‘the rights of all men the fi rst ‘Pathfi nder’ funding for Prevent and women to live free from persecution was announced to local authorities by the Department for Communities and Local 56 arches quarterly volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 THE NEW PREVENT: WILL IT WORK? CAN IT WORK? Government (DCLG) it was requested Prevent funding was being used to gather that only authorities with a Muslim information on Muslim communities.13 population of more than fi ve per cent Th e suggestion that this was offi cial policy (the national average is three) bid for was always denied by the DCLG,14 but some the money. When the full strategy was youth workers and councillors who were rolled out, local authorities were funded involved with Prevent reported that they directly in proportion to the number of felt coerced into providing information Muslim residents.6 Money was injected about individuals,15 with some claiming into a bewildering variety of community that local government was under pressure initiatives aimed at Muslims, especially the to become ‘an agency of the intelligence young, including everything from theatre service’.16 Th ese perceptions were not projects and national ‘road shows’ of helped by cases of covert surveillance, religious scholars, to women’s organisations such as Project Champion in Birmingham, and helplines for Muslim youth. which had the eff ect of alienating whole Muslim communities. Project Champion There was widespread was a scheme led by West Midlands Police Authority which entailed the suspicion that Prevent installation of 216 closed circuit television funding was being used (CCTV) and Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) cameras in two areas to gather information on of Birmingham in which Muslims are Muslim communities. concentrated: Sparkbrook and Washwood Heath.17 Initially, the cameras were announced Unsurprisingly, this had the eff ect of as a general crime prevention initiative frustrating non-Muslims who felt that under the Safer Birmingham Partnership. they were being denied public money It gradually emerged, however, that when they had equal levels of need.7 Th e the scheme was funded by the Home strategy, which ignored far-right and other Offi ce via the Association of Chief Police forms of extremism entirely, also seemed Offi cers (Terrorism and Allied Matters) to imply that British Muslims in general (ACPO [TAM]), and its counter-terrorism were ‘fl awed citizens’ in need of alteration.8 surveillance purpose had been concealed. Th e varied uses to which Prevent funding Following a campaign by citizens and was put, meant that the policy goals of residents groups, the cameras were countering terrorism and promoting social covered over and then fi nally dismantled cohesion became blurred, with a number in 2011. Two public reports – one from of critics suggesting that the former had Birmingham City Council, the other undermined the latter.9 Government from Th ames Valley Police – condemned eff orts to promote a ‘mainstream’ form the way in which Project Champion had of Islam caused controversy, particularly been implemented and the ways in which among more liberal Muslims who found local communities had been misled over themselves accused of ‘parroting the the purpose of the cameras, with the latter government’s line’.10 Others found fault arguing that the initiative had ‘set back with the way the strategy was implemented community relations by a decade’.18 and its success evaluated.11 Numerous councils and other public bodies, many OUTLINE OF THE NEW PREVENT of which had been trying to avoid giving Given this widespread opposition, it is funds to specifi c ethnic or religious perhaps unsurprising that the new report – minorities, either rejected Prevent funding authored by a government keen to distance or rebranded it.12 itself from its predecessor – accepts In addition to these general problems, many of the criticisms of the strategy it there was widespread suspicion that replaces. One of the things it emphasises volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 arches quarterly 57 particularly strongly is the need to separate population percentage areas. Prevent-funded activities from community Nevertheless, the eff ect of this and other cohesion. It argues that targeting the changes is to give the impression – far whole British Muslim population is likely more clearly than Labour’s strategy did – to lead to resentment and wasted money.19 that the UK government is dealing with It accepts, in a way New Labour’s strategy political violence, not trying to reshape did not, that ‘well-integrated’ people have Muslim Britain. committed terrorist attacks – which also implies, of course, that belonging to a THE CONSERVATIVE CRITIQUE tight-knit religious community does not Th ough these changes undoubtedly necessarily make one a risk to national represent an improvement on the New security.20 Although still mainly concerned Labour strategy, in order to evaluate the with violence in the name of Islam, the new coalition’s approach it is important to report is also far clearer that it is interested understand how it has been infl uenced by in extremism per se, and discusses the critiques of Prevent made by politicians threat posed by far-right and inter-ethnic and organisations on the centre-right. terrorism at various points.21 Th ree themes can be identifi ed in these Th e rhetorical style is diff erent as well. critiques. Th e fi rst focuses on the perceived Gone is the New Labour rhetoric, with wastefulness of Prevent, contending that its frequent references to ‘faith’ and the monitoring and evaluation of projects ‘community’. In fact, ‘religion’ and ‘faith’ was not robust enough to justify the sums are mentioned relatively infrequently in the of public money spent on them. Th e new strategy. Th e coalition does not aim former Conservative MP Paul Goodman to shape gender relations among Muslims was prominent in calling New Labour as part of Prevent. New Labour’s policy to account on this, raising questions documents on Prevent contended that on the subject in parliament.25 Th e the government should ‘enable [Muslim Taxpayers’ Alliance made an argument women’s] voices to be heard and empower along similar lines, claiming that, ‘Skilled them to engage with disillusioned youths’ policing and robust intelligence are the by breaking down barriers to mosques.22 most eff ective ways of tackling violent Th ere is an argument for strengthening extremism. Funding projects carried out the role of British Muslim women (who by community groups is a method that is remain excluded from many places of doomed to failure.’26 worship and chronically underrepresented Given the wide reach of Prevent under in higher education and employment New Labour, it is easy to sympathise in the UK).23 Yet making this a part of with this theme (even if one suspects that counter-terror policy confused matters – groups such as the Taxpayers’ Alliance are not least because, as Katherine Brown has opposed not just to the use of social and observed, it cast British Muslim women community projects to prevent terrorism, only as ‘mothers’ whose role is primarily to but to the public funding of community act as a ‘correcting infl uence’ to ‘combative projects per se). Th e other two themes, masculinist’ varieties of Islam.24 however, are much harder to sympathise Finally, the rationale announced for with. One centres on the allegation – made choosing areas on which to focus Prevent by the Centre for Social Cohesion and the activity is a big improvement. Rather than Social Aff airs Unit, among others – that using the number of Muslims living in a not enough has been done to counter specifi c area as the basis for prioritising ‘radicalisation’ within public institutions.27 Prevent work, the new strategy is led by Th e new strategy aims to address this by intelligence on levels of extremist activity. moving away from a ‘community oriented’ Th e result of this shift is fairly small: 17 of towards a ‘sector oriented’ approach. the 25 new ‘priority areas’ for Prevent would Rather than being delivered through local feature in a list of the top 25 Muslim community organisations, the new strategy

58 arches quarterly volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 THE NEW PREVENT: WILL IT WORK? CAN IT WORK? will be focused on those areas of society where propagandists are thought to be [According to] Policy operating: prisons, hospitals, universities Exchange’s Choosing and so on. Th is may have some worrying Our Friends Wisely, any ramifi cations for British Muslims, as well as for an increasingly wide range of citizens person who has had in the identifi ed sectors (for instance, any association with the health service workers, academics) who could be incorporated into the delivery Muslim Council of Britain, of the government’s counter-terrorism the Islamic Foundation agenda. or STREET, among New Labour actually took a fairly hard line on this, encouraging UK universities others, is portrayed as to be vigilant in reporting terrorism.28 an ‘Islamist’ dedicated Th is approach had some disastrous consequences, such as the arrests of to undermining British Hicham Yezza and Rizwaan Sabir, a former democracy from within. administrator and former postgraduate student at the University of Nottingham. former New Labour government of Yezza and Sabir were detained in solitary associating with ‘non-violent extremists’ confi nement for, respectively, fi ve and six in order to combat ‘violent extremists’ – days after being reported for acquiring an a practice that, in a speech delivered in Al-Qaeda training manual for academic Munich in February 2011, he likened to research. Th e manual in question was ‘turning to a right-wing fascist party to fi ght downloaded from the US Department of a violent white supremacist movement’.31 Justice website and is freely available from Accordingly, in the new strategy one fi nds booksellers such as Amazon. Despite this, the concern expressed ‘that insuffi cient there seem to be some within the coalition attention has been paid to whether who are willing to go further. Indeed, at [funded] organisations comprehensively one point the strategy argues that ‘[t]here subscribe to what we would consider to should be no “ungoverned spaces” in which be mainstream British values’ and the extremism is allowed to fl ourish without assurance that Prevent funding or support fi rm challenge and, where appropriate, by will not ‘be given to organisations that legal intervention’.29 Th e suggestion seems hold extremist views or support terrorist- to be that every institution, public space related activity of any kind’.32 and place of worship needs to be regulated and monitored. Th is is a particularly WILL THE NEW STRATEGY striking argument given that it comes WORK? from the two parties which promote Unfortunately there is a serious fl aw ‘small government’. It also indicates that it in this third theme in the centre-right is not going to be simple to alleviate the critique of Prevent, namely, that it has widespread suspicion of Prevent among been based largely upon a caricature of Muslims. Muslim organisations within the UK. In Finally, it is clear that many texts such as Policy Exchange’s Choosing Conservatives sympathise with the Our Friends Wisely, any person who has argument articulated by think tanks had any association with the Muslim such as Quilliam and Policy Exchange Council of Britain, the Islamic Foundation that Prevent actually facilitated extremist or STREET, among others, is portrayed as views and radicalisation by sanctioning an ‘Islamist’ dedicated to undermining partnerships between government and British democracy from within. Even the Islamist organisations.30 Th is includes Radical Middle Way – a Prevent-funded David Cameron, who has accused the initiative which organised ‘scholars’ volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 arches quarterly 59 tours’ of the UK consistently and clearly many of its staff , including its founder, preaching a message of tolerance and Abdul Haqq Baker, identify themselves as engagement – is deemed to be a barrier to Salafi s. Th e term ‘Salafi ’ is often equated, national integration and the government’s even in scholarly publications, with goal of countering terrorism.33 scriptural literalism and extremism, but It is not, of course, the case that Muslim this is a simplifi cation.36 It certainly does organisations cannot be criticised justly not describe Baker accurately; his political or that they always play a positive role. opinions, interestingly, actually overlap Th ere are legitimate debates to be had with the Conservatives on some issues. He about whether some Muslim civil society claims, for example, to be opposed to any organisations are representative or eff ective kind of support for non-violent extremism, deliverers of services, and some have had and says the following about debates on links with radical Islamic parties. Yet the the subject of multiculturalism and British reality is far more complex than Policy values: Exchange’s report admits. Th e Islamic Th ere is a problem, I think, that as British, Foundation is a useful illustration. It was we’ve lost our way somewhat. I think ... founded by Khurshid Ahmad, the one- multiculturalism has pandered too much to time vice-president of Jamaat-e-Islami in all of the ethnicities that have come in, when Pakistan.34 One of its main roles early in it should be that multiculturalism invited its history was to translate the writings of diff erent faiths, diff erent cultures to come and Maulana Mawdudi, the party’s founder, subscribe to a set of values, bring conducive into English, and it played a decisive role in cultural values to the table, and [leave] those mobilising Muslims after the publication that [are] not conducive in the private spaces of Th e Satanic Verses in the late eighties. of their home. Th at’s what I believe in, and However, as research by Seán McLoughlin if the Conservatives or any other party talks has shown, since the 1990s the organisation about that, I will be one to stand up and say has altered its published output and taken ‘I agree with that’.... [Th e UK government on more British-born members of staff , a should only] work with individuals that ... number of whom have become prominent on the whole subscribe to [those] core values advocates for less oppositional forms of of Britishness and Western society.37 Islam.35 It is these individuals who tend to be invited onto government partnerships, Th e willingness of many Conservative though these partnerships too tend to MPs to accept the argument that New be characterised by Policy Exchange Labour knowingly or out of a misplaced and others as worrying concessions to sense of cultural sensitivity engaged with ‘Islamists’. Indeed, it is not unknown for ‘non-violent extremists’ – who diff er from think tanks to characterise conciliatory terrorists not in their ultimate political gestures by Muslim organisations as aims but only in the means that are seen as merely ‘Islamism by stealth’: only on acceptable – is likely to cause problems for gaining power, it is said, will their true Prevent. It leaves the government unable colours show. In the Islamic Foundation’s to engage with a wide variety of partners, case, however, sustained engagement many of whom actually agree with much by government actually appears to have of what the coalition is trying to do. With encouraged new stances to be adopted. so many labelled as ‘extremists’ or fronts Another more directly relevant case is for a variety of radical Islamic parties, the STREET, a Brixton-based scheme whose government is likely to struggle to fi nd aim is to help young Muslims who may be partners who can target initiatives in the susceptible to violent extremism. Although way the new strategy suggests. at one point the recipient of Prevent funding, STREET has been denounced CAN PREVENT EVER BE MADE repeatedly as an organisation run by ‘non- TO WORK? violent extremists’. Th is is largely because Beyond these fl aws, there are other

60 arches quarterly volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 THE NEW PREVENT: WILL IT WORK? CAN IT WORK? reasons to doubt the ability of the problem at the heart of Prevent. coalition’s Prevent strategy to avoid the Th is leaves an interesting question. Does pitfalls into which its predecessor fell. It Prevent actually need to exist? No one is important to stress that Prevent is not doubts that steps need to be taken to ensure the same as ‘Pursue’, the aspect of the UK’s that anyone planning political violence is counter-terror strategy dedicated to fi nding stopped and possibly jailed, but this is not and jailing criminals. Th e gathering of what Prevent is designed to do. Th at is the information on terrorist suspects has role of Pursue, which could and perhaps been and will remain beyond Prevent’s should have responsibility for, say, any remit. It still is a social project with the measures taken to ensure that extremists aim of shaping the opinions of ordinary are kept away from university campuses. people within the UK. Specifi cally, its Similarly, few would argue against the idea stated goal is still to reduce the appeal of of the government having some role in extreme ideas and opinions within Britain supporting vulnerable or disaff ected young by ‘countering extremist ideology’ and people or providing assistance to those who promoting integration. For that reason, it support integration and who argue against is hard to see how it can be separated from extremists seeking to turn social groups community cohesion policy, especially at against one another. However, that kind the local level, given that local authorities of support could easily be incorporated are unlikely to be able to separate their into community cohesion policy. If those activities into two. steps were taken, would there still be a role for Prevent? Few would argue against the idea of the Dr Therese O’Toole is a Senior Lecturer at the Centre for Ethnicity and Citizenship and School of Sociology, Politics and International Studies at the University government having of Bristol. She is currently Principal Investigator on the AHRC/ESRC funded project Muslim Participation some role in supporting in Contemporary Governance. Her previous work has focused on political activism among ethnic minority vulnerable or disaff ected and Muslim young people, models of local participatory young people. governance and inter-faith social justice movements. Dr Stephen Jones is a Research Assistant at the Centre for the Study of Ethnicity and Citizenship at the University of Bristol, where he works on the project Th is hints at what is really the most Muslim Participation in Contemporary Governance. striking thing about the new strategy: Previously he worked on the Hefce-funded project Religious Literacy Leadership in Higher Education. despite the new report’s acceptance of He completed his doctoral thesis, which examined debates among Muslim activists and scholars about the most of the criticisms of New Labour’s relationship between Islam and liberalism in Britain, at Prevent strategy, it suff ers from many of Goldsmiths, University of London, in 2010. the same tensions. For example, it tries to Dr Daniel Nilsson DeHanas is a Research Associate with distance itself from New Labour’s eff orts the Muslim Participation in Contemporary Governance project at the Centre for Ethnicity and Citizenship, to ‘promote a mainstream form of Islam’, University of Bristol. He has completed research but still promises to ‘support the eff orts’ of on Muslim Community Radio (in The Sociological 38 Review) and on the London ‘Olympics Mega-Mosque’ theologians in challenging extreme ideas. controversy (co-authored, in Sociology) and has It confi rms that Prevent should not be used publications forthcoming from his doctoral thesis on the role of religion in youth political participation in as a way of ‘spying’ on Muslims, and can be Brixton and Tower Hamlets, London. credited for calling for greater transparency in the way that local police forces act, but it still leaves open the possibility of gathering ENDNOTES information through Prevent.39 Th e new 1. Stratton, Allegra (2011). ‘Are we there yet? Nick Clegg and David Cameron agree to disagree’ in The Guardian, June 1. strategy accepts the criticisms of the old, http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2011/jun/01/nick-clegg- but treats them as minor fl aws which can david-cameron-disagree. Oborne, Peter (2011). ‘Where’s the be ironed out with small adjustments. divide?’ in The Spectator, January 29, http://www.spectator. Yet these continuing tensions suggest a co.uk/essays/6650288/whereandx2019s-the-divide.thtml. 2. HM Government (2011). Prevent Strategy. London: The volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 arches quarterly 61 THE NEW PREVENT: WILL IT WORK? CAN IT WORK?

Stationery Offi ce. Anthony, and Pope, Chris (2005). When Students Turn to Terror: 3. This point is also made in Nawaz, Maajid (2011). ‘Confused, Terrorist and Extremist Activity on British Campuses. London: fl awed, but a step in the right direction’ in The Times, June 6. Social Aff airs Unit. 4. HM Government, Prevent Strategy, pp.44 and 26. 28. See Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills 5. For details of this project see: http://www.bristol.ac.uk/ (2007). Promoting Good Campus Relations, Fostering Shared ethnicity/projects/muslimparticipation/. Values and Preventing Violent Extremism in Universities and 6. Kundnani, Arun (2009). Spooked: How Not To Prevent Violent Higher Education Colleges. London: Department for Business Extremism. London: Institute of Race Relations, pp.13–14. Innovation and Skills. 7. Birt, Yahya (2009). ‘Promoting Virulent Envy? Reconsidering 29. HM Government. Prevent Strategy, p.9. the UK’s Terrorist Prevention Strategy’ in Royal United Services 30. Maher, Shiraz, and Frampton, Martyn (2009). Choosing Institute Journal 154, no. 4, pp. 52-58. our Friends Wisely: Criteria for Engagement with Muslim Groups. 8. Birt, Yahya (2011). ‘Governing Muslims After 9/11’ in Thinking London: Policy Exchange. Quilliam Foundation (2010). Through Islamophobia: Global Perspectives, S. Sayyid and Preventing Terrorism: Where Next for Britain? London: Quilliam Abdoolkarim Vakil (eds.). New York: C Hurst & Co, pp. 117-128. Foundation, http://www.scribd.com/doc/34834977/Secret- Mcghee, Derek (2008). The End of Multiculturalism? Terrorism, Quilliam-Memo-to-government. See also Bright, Martin (2006). Integration and Human Rights. Maidenhead: Open University When Progressives Treat with Reactionaries: The British State’s Press. Flirtation with Radical Islamism. London: Policy Exchange. 9. Husband, Charles, and Alam, Yunis (2011). Social Cohesion 31. Cameron, David (2011). ‘PM’s speech at Munich Security and Counter-Terrorism: A Policy Contradiction? Bristol: Policy Conference’ in The Offi cial Site of the British Prime Minister’s Press. Offi ce, http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/pms-speech-at- 10. Kazi, Tehmina (2010). ‘How Prevent undermined cohesion’ munich-security-conference/. in The Guardian: Comment is Free, July 16, http://www.guardian. 32. HM Government. Prevent Strategy, p.35. co.uk/commentisfree/belief/2010/jul/16/prevent-cohesion- 33. Maher and Frampton. Choosing our Friends Wisely, pp.32– communities-islam. Thomas, Paul (2010). ‘Failed and Friendless: 33. Anyone with doubts about the Radical Middle Way can The UK’s “Preventing Violent Extremism” Programme’ in The listen to the events and speeches hosted by the organisation, British Journal of Politics & International Relations 12, no. 3, almost all of which are recorded and put on their website: pp.442-458. http://www.radicalmiddleway.org/events. 11. Thomas, Paul. ‘Failed and Friendless’. 34. McLoughlin, Seán (2005). ‘The State, New Muslim 12. In Leicester, for example, Prevent was rebranded Leaderships and Islam as a Resource for Public Engagement ‘Mainstreaming Muslims’, while in Bristol Prevent work was in Britain’ in European Muslims and the Secular State, Jocelyne carried out under the heading ‘Building the Bridge’. Cesari and Seán McLoughlin (eds.). Aldershot: Ashgate, p.63. 13. Kundnani. Spooked, p.15. 35. Ibid. pp.62–65. 14. Communities and Local Government Committee (2010). 36. The Salafi movement actually emerged out of Egyptian Preventing Violent Extremism: Sixth Report of Session 2009–10. modernist Islam, and though there are certainly literalist and London: House of Commons, p.3. militant Salafi s, there are liberals too. See Abou El Fadl, Khaled 15. Kundnani. Spooked, pp.28–29. (2007). The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists. San 16. A councillor quoted in Husband and Alam. Social Cohesion Francisco: Harper. and Counter-Terrorism, p.146. 37. Interview conducted for the ‘Muslim Participation in 17. Birmingham City Council (2010). Project Champion: Scrutiny Contemporary Governance’ project, March 31, 2011. Review into ANPR and CCTV Cameras. Birmingham: Birmingham 38. HM Government. Prevent Strategy, p.52. City Council, p.7. 39. Ibid. p.32. 18. Thornton, Sara (2010). Project Champion Review. Kidlington: Thames Valley Police, p.47. 19. HM Government. Prevent Strategy, p.30. 20. Ibid. p.27. 21. Ibid. p.25. 22. Department for Communities and Local Government (2007). Preventing Violent Extremism: Winning Hearts and Minds. Wetherby: Communities and Local Government Publications, pp.9–10. 23. Lewis, Philip (2007). Young, British and Muslim. London: Continuum, p.27. 24. See Brown, Katherine E. (2008). ‘The Promise and Perils of Women’s Participation in UK Mosques: The Impact of Securitisation Agendas on Identity, Gender and Community’ in British Journal of Politics and International Relations 10, p.482. 25. See Parliament, (2009). House of Commons daily debates, February 26, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ cm200809/cmhansrd/cm090226/text/90226w0033.htm. 26. The Taxpayers’ Alliance, (2009). Council Spending Uncovered II: No. 5: The Prevent Strategy. London: The Taxpayers’ Alliance, p.2, http://www.taxpayersalliance.com/prevent.pdf. 27. The Centre for Social Cohesion (2010). Radical Islam on UK Campuses: A Comprehensive List of Extremist Speakers at UK Universities. London: The Centre for Social Cohesion. Glees,

62 arches quarterly volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 Prevent Agenda and the doctrine of fear in the Muslim community

IMRAN AWAN

he UK government’s review of controversy about how the UK monitors counter-terrorist legislation in and tackles extremism. His fears stem from T2010 included an examination of the belief that British Muslims are being the broader counter-terrorists policies, targeted by extremist groups and may namely, the Prevent Agenda. Enshrined be more vulnerable to being radicalised, in the counter-terrorist strategy, the posing a ‘unique’ threat to home grown Prevent has been the subject of a fi erce security. Blaming the doctrine of ‘state- legal and political debate. Prevent is seen multiculturalism’ Cameron called for a as the government’s “softer” approach of more ‘active muscular liberalism’ which community engagement which has led to would help tackle extremist ideology4. a number of local level initiatives aimed His remarks were reinforced by the at supporting mainstream voluntary and government’s reviewer for counter-terror statutory sectors. Th e design of Prevent policies, Lord Carlile who argued that rests centrally on the notion that the only Britain had become a safe haven for terrorist way to counter violent extremism is for the groups. Th is paranoia and hysteria about Muslim community to act as partners with Islam, Muslims, extremism and radicalisation the state. Th ere appears to be an ideological is further heightened by the way Britain campaign that is embedded within UK is increasingly being used by extremist government policy to increasingly viewing organisations to radicalise and promote many in the Muslim community as religious intolerance and indoctrination. vulnerable to extremism and terror. Inevitably, within this climate of fear Indeed, Wikileaks’ cables in 2010 British Muslims are becoming increasingly revealed a tense relationship between US suspicious of counter-terrorism policies, and British policy on how best to prevent Prevent for example. Th e government’s extremism within Muslim communities1. vision for Prevent was aimed at creating In a leaked cable, US Diplomats suggested an institution of law abiding Muslims who that; ‘since 7/7, HMG has invested would value British life and citizenship, considerable time and resources in and thereby at the same time reduce the engaging the British Muslim community. risk of home-grown terrorism. But has it Th e current tensions demonstrate just succeeded? how little progress has been made.’2 Th is sense of perpetual fear from the media, THE PREVENT AGENDA 2011 academics and politicians surrounding Th e Prevent Agenda (of 2011) contains extremism has become heightened, with three main objectives; fi r s t l y , to tackle incidents such as the Stockholm bomber, perceived ideological challenges of Taimour Abdulwahab al-Abdaly, an terrorism and the threat from extremist Iraqi-born Swede who lived in the UK groups. Secondly, to prevent people from and Umar Farouk Abdul Mutallab3; who being drawn into terrorist acts and fi n a l l y had planned to detonate a bomb on a US to promote the working of various sectors aircraft on Christmas day. and institutions where there are risks of Furthermore, the British Prime Minister, radicalisation5. However, both previous David Cameron’s speech at a Munich and present Prevent strategies have conference about multiculturalism, been criticised for the manner in which security and radicalisation sparked funding has been allocated to the public volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 arches quarterly 63 and private sectors in particular local focus groups with Muslim communities authorities, security agencies and the police examining views of British Muslims about who have all benefi ted from the perceived UK counter-terrorism policy. Th ey found danger that Muslims are dangerous Muslim communities and police relations extremists. Furthermore, the Prevent had been damaged by counter-terrorism Strategy 2011 has been driven by state- strategies such as Prevent. Th ey state led policies embedded within vague and that; “fi rst, the discussion of ‘mainstream unhelpful local initiatives that lack detail British values’ that runs throughout the and in eff ect get communities to provide new Prevent is both conceptually fl awed intelligence on each other and identify and potentially dangerous”.11 Below is an would-be extremists and terrorists.6 extract taken from Jarvis and Lister (2011) Although Prevent in principle covers research study from an Asian female all forms of far right extremism from participating in one of the focus groups: animal rights groups to anti-capitalists, it …look at September 11th, when that has by implication only targeted Muslim happened there was a high number of communities7. Counter-terror legislation women who were wearing the headscarf such as pre-charge detention, control who were being treated with discrimination, orders, and stop and search powers under headscarves were being pulled off , calling the Terrorism Act 2000 were too broad and names, being called terrorist, Ninja, had been used disproportionately against whatever, very negative name calling. Why?12 Muslim communities and revealed that British Muslims, and young British men Th is type of analysis has led to a in particular, feel a sense of victimization perception by Muslim communities and stigma.8 Indeed, one of the most that they have been unfairly targeted damaging views about Prevent is the means and treated as a ‘suspect’ community in which it has become an agenda for due to the nature in which counter- counter-terrorism surveillance on Muslim terrorism policy has disproportionately communities. For example, Operation focussed on identifying Muslim citizens Gamble which involved covert and overt as vulnerable to extremism13. According surveillance cameras in predominately to research, many Muslims feel they are Muslim areas of Birmingham,9 was heavily being discriminated against as a result of criticised for breaching human rights counter-terrorist strategies like Prevent, legislation.10 Th e independent Report into which often leads to an increase in hate Project Champion concluded that there crimes committed against them. Fenwick was a lack of transparency and a real risk and Choudhury’s (2010) study found that that the project would lead to a stigma British Muslims, and in particular young against the Muslim community. British men, feel a sense of victimization It seems that while Prevent, had an and stigma. Th ey found that counter- overall goal of engaging with Muslim terror legislation such as pre-charge communities to help defeat terrorism, it detention, control orders, the glorifi cation has instead alienated sections of Muslim off ence and stop and search powers under communities because the policy has been the Terrorism Act 2000 and Terrorism misdirected. Th is in eff ect has constructed Act 2006 were too broad, ill-defi ned and a ‘suspect’ community within a narrative had been used disproportionately against of discouraging people from becoming Muslim communities. terrorists. Th e Prevent Strategy 2011 has the potential of making Muslim SHORT CASE STUDY communities more suspicious of law Th e author conducted a short case study enforcement agencies leading into a which involved semi-structured interviews growing sense of fear and a lack of trust with members of the British Muslim in the British political system. Jarvis community who had been directly involved and Lister (2011) conducted a series of with Prevent programmes across diff erent

64 arches quarterly volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 PREVENT AGENDA AND THE DOCTRINE OF FEAR IN THE MUSLIM COMMUNITY areas of Birmingham. Th e interviews had covert police tactics infl uenced wider allowed the author to obtain an overview counter-terrorism strategies within local of some of the views and experiences of Muslim communities in Birmingham? those involved in this project. As the author had already established links with FINDINGS the Muslim community in Birmingham he Th e study found many interviewees felt was able to use a snowball methodological that the Prevent strategy failed to establish approach from within the community to community cohesion and this was based get unbiased access which meant visiting on the policing of Prevent which included families, community leaders and local the way funding had been allocated to mosques. Th e ethical considerations various groups and bodies without proper included all participants being able to consultation and due diligence. One withdraw their consent at any time and community member noted; ‘Prevent did all participants were given assurance about not clearly state where money was going confi dentiality and anonymity throughout to be given and to whom and so we were the study. quite surprised when we were being told As it was a small scale case study the that our area had been given lots of money author carried out a total of 5 semi- because we never actually saw how the structured interviews which were each money had been used?’(Anon 1: Interview 30 minutes long. Th e interviewees 1, 2011).14 Indeed, research carried out by consisted of: one community leader, one Basia Spalek et al. (2011) about preventing local councillor, two members of the extremism in the West Midlands found community, and 1 local Imam. Muslim communities felt there was a lack of understanding in relation to cultural awareness and community partnerships. The Prevent strategy Th is study also found that there are failed to establish strong reasons for arguing that Prevent, in community cohesion eff ect, had viewed the Muslim community as ‘suspect’, thus fostering social divisions and this was based within the community. Th ere were fears on the policing of of violation of data protection and human rights which in turn damages police Prevent which included and local community relations. One the way funding had Birmingham community leader observed been allocated to that ‘what [the] Prevent has done is to destroy all relations between the Muslim various groups and community and the police because they bodies without proper have unfairly arrested many people in consultation and due this community with little evidence and no-body ending up being charged’ (Anon diligence. 2: Interview 2, 2011).15 Similar studies have shown Muslim communities’ fear of counter-terrorism policing being misused, All of the interviews were conducted such as allowing the police greater powers face-to-face and questions were based on that may lead to the unfair targeting of the topic of the eff ectiveness of the Prevent minority communities in general (Innes et Agenda in Birmingham. Questions put al. 2011). to the respondents included, what their Th ere is also a perception that the perception of Prevent was in the city of Muslim community feels that it is also Birmingham? To what an extent trust was being targeted by counter-terror policies an important factor between the police because of the ethnic background of and Muslim community members? How Muslims (Forum Against Islamophobia volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 arches quarterly 65 and Racism 2004). Th is was also the police forces across the UK means a higher view of the majority of the respondents level of policing in mainly Muslim areas who perceived the police as targeting the which further fuels dissent and alienation Muslim community as a result of their amongst the community. If Prevent is too ethnicity. A local councillor remarked, succeed than it must begin to engage with ‘all terrorist suspects need to be brought Muslim communities and recognise the to justice, however that should be contribution they have made to society. proportionate and equality in treatment However the current debate surrounding and not just stopping and searching people extremism and radicalisation appears to from a single community because they fear be one which attempts to use Muslims they may be extremists or radicals’ (Anon as informants for the state as opposed to 4: Interview 5, 2011).16 partners.

If Prevent is too Imran Awan is a Senior Lecturer at the Centre for Police Sciences at the University of Glamorgan. He is co-editor succeed than it must of Policing Cyber Hate, Cyber Threats and Cyber-Terrorism (Ashgate). He has also authored Terror in the Eye of the begin to engage with Beholder: The ‘Spy cam’ Saga in Birmingham: Counter- Terrorism or Counter-Productive? (The Howard Journal Muslim communities of Criminal Justice). and recognise the Awan is currently researching the impact of counter contribution they have terrorism legislation on Muslim families in Cardiff , UK.

made to society. ENDNOTES 1. HM Government (2011). Prevent Strategy, presented to Parlia- ment by the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for the Echoing the above, an Imam in Home Department by Command of Her Majesty: http://www. homeoffi ce.gov.uk/publications/counter-terrorism/prevent/ Birmingham felt that the Prevent had prevent-strategy/prevent-strategy-review?view=Binary actually stigmatised local mosques and 2. The US Embassy Cables. (2010). US Embassy Cables: Britain Imams because they were viewed as not Making Little Progress in Engaging Muslim Community, Con- addressing and dealing with the challenge fi dential Section 01 OF 03 London 005958 EO 12958 Subject; Classifi ed By: PolMinCouns Maura Connelly, Reasons 1.4 (B, of extremism adequately. Th e Imam D). [Online]. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy- stated, ‘Muslims are being portrayed in cables-documents/74818 - accessed 1 July 2011. the media as would-be terrorists... and 3. BBC News (2010). Profi le: Umar Farouk Abdulmutallib., http:// the government really needs to look at www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-11545509 - accessed 1 July 2011. the role of all organisations because the 4. Cameron, D. (2010). PM’s speech at Munich Conference, problem is when you portray Muslims as No10.gov.uk http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/speeches- fanatics and jihadists what you actually do and-transcripts/2011/02/pms-speech-at-munich-security- is drive dissent underground’17 (Anon 5: conference-60293 - accessed 2 July 2011. 5. Op. cit. HM Government (2011). Prevent Strategy Interview 6, 2011). As noted above, all the 6. Spalek, B. & Lambert, R. (2008). Muslim Communities, Coun- interviewees had a lack of trust with the ter- Terrorism and De-Radicalisation: A Refl ective Approach to state and its counter-terrorism narrative. It Engagement, International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice. 36 appears that the overall feeling was a sense (4): 257-270. 7. Spalek, B. & McDonald, L. (2010). Anti-Social Behaviour of anger and disappointment amongst the Powers and the Policing of Security, Social Policy and Society, participants because of fears of Prevent 9 (1): 123-133. being used as an spying operation on 8. Githens-Mazer & Lambert, R. (2010). Islamophobia and Anti British Muslims. Muslim Hate Crimes: a London Case Study, European Muslim Research Centre. http://centres.exeter.ac.uk/emrc/publications/ IAMHC_revised_11Feb11.pdf - accessed 19 June 2011. CONCLUSION 9. Thornton, S. (2010). Project Champion Review. www.west- Th e Prevent Agenda risks stigmatising midlands.police.uk/ latest-news/docs/Champion_Review_FI- the Muslim community as the state has NAL_30_09_10.pdf - accessed 10 March 2010. 10. Awan, I. (2011). Terror in the Eye of the Beholder: The Spy begun a policy of treating this community cam Saga: Counter-terrorism or Counter-productive, The How- 18 as ‘suspect’. Political pressures on local ard Journal of Criminal Justice, Vol. 50. Issue 2:199-202.

66 arches quarterly volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 PREVENT AGENDA AND THE DOCTRINE OF FEAR IN THE MUSLIM COMMUNITY

11. Jarvis, L & Lister, M. (2011). Values and Stakeholders in the 14 Nov 2011. 2011 Prevent Strategy Responding to Prevent 2011, Muslim 16. Author interview (Anonymous 4: Local Councillor), Bir- Council of Britain. http://www.mcb.org.uk/comm_details. mingham, 19 Nov 2011. php?heading_id=121&com_id=2 - accessed 1 July 2011. 17. Author interview (Anonymous 5: Local Imam), Birmingham, 12. Ibid. 22 November 2011. 13. Spalek, B. (2011). A Top Down Approach Responding to 18. House of Commons Communities & Local Government Prevent 2011, Muslim Council of Britain. http://www.mcb.org. Committee (2010). Preventing Violent Extremism, Sixth Report of uk/comm_details.php?heading_id=121&com_id=2 - accessed Session 2009–10, London: The Stationery Offi ce. www.publica- 1 July 2011. tions.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmcomloc/65/65. 14. Author interview (Anonymous 1: Muslim Community pdf - accessed 10 March 2010. Member), Birmingham, 10 Nov 2011. 15. Author interview (Anonymous 2: Muslim Community Leader), Birmingham,

BOOK PROMOTION THE MISSING MARTYRS: WHY THERE ARE SO FEW MUSLIM TERRORISTS BY CHARLES KURZMAN

InI Th e Missing Martyrs, the author explores some very pertinent questions,q including: Why are there so few Muslim terrorists? WithW more than a billion Muslims in the world--many of whom supposedlys hate the West and ardently desire martyrdom--why don'td we see terrorist attacks every day? Where are the missing martyrs?m

KurzmanK demonstrates that terrorist groups are thoroughly marginalm in the Muslim world. He argues that it takes only a ssmall cadre of committed killers to wreak unspeakable havoc. BBut that very fact underscores his point. As easy as terrorism iis to commit, few Muslims turn to violence. Out of 140,000 murders in the United States since 9/11, terrorists from the Muslim community have killed at most three dozen people. Of the 150,000 people who die each day, worldwide, Islamist militants account for fewer than fi fty fatalities--and only ten per day outside of the hotspots of Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan. Th e real bulwark against Islamist violence, Kurzman fi nds, is Muslims themselves, who reject both the goals of the terrorists and their bloody means. With each bombing, the terrorists lose support among Muslims.

Th e Missing Martyrs provides much-needed corrective to deep-seated and destructive misconceptions about Muslims and the Islamic world.

The Missing Martyrs: Why There Are So Few Muslim Terrorists by Charles Kurzman. Published in 2011 by Oxford University Press (USA)

volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 arches quarterly 67 The Causes of Terrorism: Deconstructing the Myths

RICHARD JACKSON, LEE JARVIS, JEREON GUNNING & MARIE B. SMYTH

n the past, it was somewhat controversial US President George W. Bush told a UN to try and understand the political development summit that ‘poverty and Icauses of terrorism, because ‘to many hopelessness, lack of education and failed people, any focus on underlying causes, government... often allow conditions that motivating factors, and grievances, implies terrorists can seize’ (Th e Independent, 23 a kind of justifi cation’ (Lia and Skjolberg March 2002). 2005: 7). Instead, it was commonly argued that terrorism was a product of Quantitative research psychological illness or brainwashing, rather than political dynamics. Th is suggests that people served a very political purpose: ignoring living in poverty are less the possibility that it might have been likely to turn to terrorism caused by systemic problems, such as political exclusion or discrimination, and poorer countries are meant depoliticising those engaged in it, less likely to experience thus preventing any refl ection on how the status quo might have contributed to the terrorism. problem. Terrorism research has changed Th e causal link between poverty and drastically since those early days, and terrorism is far from clear. If anything, eff orts to understand the causes of quantitative research suggests that people terrorism are now one of the mainstays of living in poverty are less likely to turn to the fi eld. But the temptation to downplay terrorism and poorer countries are less the political causes of this type of violence likely to experience terrorism. Numerous and to absolve the status quo from any studies have found that those involved in responsibility is still with us. terrorism are more often well-educated Of course, understanding a phenomenon and middle class than poorly educated necessitates neither exoneration nor and poor. Studies of the Italian Red justifi cation, and a rich body of research Brigades, the Baader-Meinhof group, has emerged on the causes of terrorist Hamas, Hizballah and militant Israeli violence. […] settlers, all suggest that those responsible [A] good place to start is to identify for violence are usually better off than some prevalent myths about what is their compatriots (Krueger and Malečková popularly proclaimed to cause terrorism. 2003). Popular support for terrorist tactics Th ree myths are particularly dominant, in in the latter three cases was also found part, because they are persistently repeated to be particularly high among the better by the media, political leaders and some off and more highly educated (Krueger academics. Critical scholars are not alone 2007; Gunning 2007). Th is, in itself, is in questioning these myths; indeed, much not surprising since political activism in of the research they draw on has been general tends to attract members of the carried out by critically-minded traditional educated middle classes. scholars. Th e fi rst myth – that poverty However, dynamics are diff erent causes terrorism – has become particularly where larger movements are concerned, popular since the attacks of 9/11. In 2002, particularly if they are engaged in a civil 68 arches quarterly volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 THE CAUSES OF TERRORISM: DECONSTRUCTING THE MYTHS or guerrilla war. In this context, a group’s for politicians’ eff orts to reiterate a link ‘foot soldiers’ are often recruited from between poverty and terrorism. Yemen, the poorer sections of society. Lack of for instance, has benefi ted greatly job opportunities in particular can be a from an increase in development aid motivation for young men to join up, as can as a direct result of the war on terror. the status derived from group membership. Since Yemen has become a region of Th e Provisional Irish Republican Army concern over the presence of al-Qaeda (PIRA) in Northern Ireland and the supporters, development aid has grown LTTE in Sri Lanka, for example, both had exponentially, driven in part by the notion relatively high percentages of ‘foot soldiers’ that development can help stem terrorism from poorer backgrounds (Heiberg et (DFID 2010). Th is notion is not just al. 2007). But in these confl icts, we are about the presumed link between poverty moving away from ‘terrorist’ tactics to and terrorism. Th e UK’s Department for situations where a plethora of tactics is International Development, for example, used, many falling within the guerrilla is very clear that poverty per se does not warfare category. cause terrorism (DFID 2005: 11). Rather, Leaving aside the fact that activists are its decision to prioritise development aid more likely to come from middle class, to Yemen was motivated by a complex well-educated backgrounds, one could set of other reasons. If state failure, or argue that poverty provides a background the absence of strong state structures, is condition which either motivates terrorists a factor in facilitating terrorism, as many or which they can exploit. Th e argument argue, strengthening the state through here is not that those carrying out the development may help limit terrorism. violence are poor, but that they are Development can also strengthen motivated to turn to violence on behalf communities, which, in turn, is believed of their poorer brethren. However, this to help prevent terrorism. Th us, poverty argument is also unsupported in the can have an indirect eff ect on factors such research. as state strength or level of civil society Quantitative studies have found no activism, which aff ect the occurrence of statistically relevant link between a terrorism more directly. country’s poverty level and levels of …[A] second prevalent myth is that terrorism (see Krueger 2007; Piazza 2006), psychological deviance causes terrorism. although there is some evidence to suggest Th is myth has taken on various guises. that when economic inequality overlaps Some have argued that terrorists are with ethnic divisions, there is an increased irrational; others that terrorists are possibility of activists turning to violence psychopaths or suff er from psychological (Stewart 2008). In short, levels of poverty disorders. A variation is that terrorism is alone cannot explain why terrorism occurs, caused by brainwashing – echoes of which which is not to say that poverty should not are still present in some of the current be tackled in its own right. Poverty, as radicalisation literature. In all cases, the Yunus (2006) points out, ‘is the absence of intent, or at least the eff ect, is to locate the all human rights’, and according to World cause of the violence in the perpetrator’s Bank fi gures, 1.4 billion people, almost mental state or personality, while ignoring a quarter of the world’s population, lives the political and social context within below the so-called poverty line – less than which the act is perpetrated. US$1.25 a day (Shah 2010). Yet, these Th is myth is chillingly encapsulated statistics in themselves further support in the following quote from Jerrold Post the argument that poverty in itself is not a (1990: 25), one of the exponents of the primary cause of terrorism: if the majority notion of ‘psycho-logic’: ‘political terrorists of the world’s population lives in poverty, are driven to commit acts of violence as a why is there so little terrorism? consequence of psychological forces … their Th ere are of course political reasons special psycho-logic is constructed to volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 arches quarterly 69 rationalize acts they are psychologically what psychologists term ‘the fundamental compelled to commit. Th us … individuals attribution error’. According to this, we are drawn to the path of terrorism in order ‘tend to explain other people’s behaviour to commit acts of violence…’ (emphasis with reference to dispositional features added). By the 1990s, this rather crude (e.g. personality, what they are ‘like’), while explanation of terrorist psychopathy had we might attribute situational features to been replaced by explanations involving our own (e.g. it was the type of company more ‘subtle’ forms of ‘deviance’, such I was in that night that made me behave as narcissism, splitting and paranoia in that way)’ (Horgan 2005: 47-48). Th is (Horgan 2005: 48). However, as Horgan tendency is particularly strong when we and others have noted, ‘the evidence for are caught up in the emotions of an event. these arguments is fl imsy at best and Another reason for its prevalence is that it methodologically dubious. Th e data sets is easier to explain terrorism by reference on which the research is based tend to be to abnormality, thereby absolving us of small and idiosyncratic, and the inferences any moral or political responsibility for drawn are often speculative and not the occurrence of an attack (Zulaika and consistently supported of this [narcissistic] Douglass 1996). interrelationship’ (Horgan 2005: 59). In addition, studies are often based The literature on on interviews with those who have been imprisoned, thus making it diffi cult ‘religious terrorism’ is to establish whether any apparent part of a long – and psychological traits were a cause or a problematic – tradition consequence of engaging in violence. Th e consensus of more recent research within Western social – or rather, what Silke terms ‘most serious science linking religion researchers in the fi eld’ – is that those engaged in terror tactics ‘are essentially causally to violence. normal individuals’ (Silke 1998: 53). Like any population group they will be diverse A fi nal prevalent myth is that religion is a – which is why it is problematic to try to primary cause of terrorism, and that when arrive at a single psychological profi le. In people are inspired by religion, they are fact, there are strong strategic reasons for more violent, more radical and less willing not employing activists with psychological to compromise. From Laqueur (1999) problems. For example, while psychopaths to Juergensmeyer (2000) and Hoff man may be drawn to violence as ‘an outlet (2006), it is argued that we are currently for aggressive tendencies’ unburdened by experiencing a new form of religiously- remorse, Horgan (2005: 51) rightly points inspired terrorism, which is more lethal out that they lack ‘some of the required and more threatening to Western interests characteristics sought after by terrorist than anything that came before. Religion, leaders... high motivation, discipline and an in this view, is seen as a cause of violence, ability to remain reliable and task-focused rather than an intervening factor. Hoff man in the face of stress, possible capture and (2006: 88-89), for instance, explicitly imprisonment’. Acknowledging that those links the assumed tendency of ‘religious who engage in terrorism do so for tactical terrorists’ towards greater violence to their and strategic reasons, it soon becomes religious perspective, and in particular, clear that psychological deviance is the notion that God has both sanctioned usually a hindrance, rather than an asset, and commanded the violence. In this, the to any group seeking to employ terrorism literature on ‘religious terrorism’ is part of strategically. a long – and problematic – tradition within One of the reasons for the prevalence Western social science linking religion of the psychological deviance myth is causally to violence (see Cavanaugh 2004).

70 arches quarterly volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 THE CAUSES OF TERRORISM: DECONSTRUCTING THE MYTHS In addition, scholars have assigned a causal or radical views, are a primary cause of role to religion on the basis that, taken terrorism. Th e UK’s Prevent Strategy, together, ‘religious terrorists’ appear to for instance, accords radical religious have been more violent than their secular ideology a central place in the process of counterparts (Gurr and Cole 2000: 28-29; radicalisation and sees nurturing alternative Hoff man 2006: 85-88). religious voices as a key tactic in the fi ght … [A]lthough on aggregate those labelled against terrorism (HM Government ‘religious terrorists’ have caused more 2008). Radical religious beliefs, rather deaths than their secular counterparts, a than religion per se, are thus singled out closer look at individual cases identifi es as a core driver of terrorism, replicating numerous secular groups (mostly ethno- the logic of the ‘religion-inspires-violence’ nationalist) which have been far more thesis. Politically, such views are popular violent and uncompromising than many because they allow states to ignore the ‘religious’ groups. In addition, even in cases political grievances and demands of the where religiously-inspired militants have terrorists or the accusation that foreign been more brutal than secular militants, it policy is a key driver of violence. is far from clear that it is religion that was Extract from Richard Jackson, Lee Jarvis, Jereon Gunning and the causal factor, rather than the fact that Marie Breen Smyth, Terrorism: A Critical Introduction, Palgrave the violence was carried out in the context Macmillan, 2011. of a civil war, for example (Cavanaugh 2004: 13, 28-29). Richard Jackson is Professor of International Politics, More broadly, the relationship between Aberystwyth University, UK. He is the founding beliefs and behaviour is far from clear editor of the journal Critical Studies on Terrorism. (Gunning forthcoming). Beliefs, for Lee Jarvis is a Lecturer in Politics and instance, do not necessarily cause people International Relations, Swansea University, UK. to act, but can instead be the eff ect of Jeroen Gunning is a Reader in Middle East Politics activism which people may embark and Confl ict Studies, Durham University, UK. He was founder and deputy director of the Centre for the Study upon for non-ideological reasons (Ferree of 'Radicalisation' and Contemporary Political Violence and Miller 1985). Activists have been (CSRV) at Aberystwyth University from 2005-2010. found to join movements for a variety Marie Breen Smyth is Professor in International Politics, University of Surrey, UK. She was founder of reasons, including peer pressure, a and deputy director of the Centre for the Study of longing for social standing or a desperate 'Radicalisation' and Contemporary Political Violence search for protection from the violence of (CSRV) at Aberystwyth University from 2005-2010. states or rival groups (della Porta 1995; Bjørgo 2009). Groups, meanwhile, do REFERENCES not necessarily act out their ideological Bjorgo, T (2009). ‘Processes of Disengagement from Violent views, preferring at times compromise to Groups of the Extreme Right’, in J. Horgan and T. Bjørgo, eds., Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and collective disengage- marginalisation (Gunning forthcoming). ment, London: Routledge. Religion, or ideology more broadly, can act as a primary motivation – but it does Cavanaugh, W (2004). The Violence of ‘Religion’: Examining a Prevalent Myth, Kellogg Institute for International Studies, not do so automatically. In short, although Working Papers, no. 310, Notre Dame, IN: KI, available online religious identity, beliefs, networks and at: http://www.nd.edu/~kellogg/publications/workingpapers/ institutions can play an important role WPS/310.pdf, accessed 18 January 2008. in how confl icts are perceived and the Della Porta, D (1995b). Social Movements, Political Violence, resources available to protagonists, the and the State: A Comparative Analysis of Italy and Germany, notion that religion is a primary causal Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. factor is empirically dubious and should DFID (2005). Fighting poverty to build a safer world: A strategy for be approached with caution (Gunning and security and development. London: DFID. Jackson 2011). DFID (2010). ‘Alexander and Miliband on Yemen conference’, Nonetheless, governments and counter- DFID Media room, News stories, 27 January 2010, available online at: http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/, accessed terrorism practitioners often argue that 29 August 2010. religious beliefs, particularly extreme Ferree, M., and Miller, F. (1985). ‘Mobilization and Meaning: volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 arches quarterly 71 THE CAUSES OF TERRORISM: DECONSTRUCTING THE MYTHS

Toward an Integration of Social Psychological and Resource There a Causal Connection?’, Journal of Economic Perspectives Mobilization Perspectives on Social Movements’, Sociological 17 (4): 119–144. Inquiry, 55(1): 38–51. Laqueur, W. (1999). The New Terrorism, Fanaticism and the Arms Gunning, J., forthcoming. ‘It’s the Context, Stupid’, in J. Deol and of Mass Destruction, New York: Oxford University Press. Z. Kazmi, eds., Contextualizing Jihadi Ideologies, London: Hurst. Lia, B., & K, Skjolberg (2005). ‘Causes of Terrorism: An Expanded Gunning, J. (2007). Hamas in Politics: Democracy, Religion, and Updated Review of the Literature’, FFI-report 2004/04307. Violence, London: Hurst. Kjeller, Norway: Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI). Gunning, J., and Jackson, R. (2011). ‘What’s so Religious about Religious Terrorism?’, Critical Studies on Terrorism, 4(3). Piazza, J. (2006). ‘Rooted in Poverty?: Terrorism, Poor Economic Development, and Social Cleavages’, Terrorism and Political Gurr, N., and Cole. B. (2000). The New Faces of Terrorism: Threats Violence 18(1), 159-177. from Weapons of Mass Destruction, London: I.B. Tauris. Post, J. (1990). ‘Terrorist Psycho-logic: Terrorist Behavior as a Heiberg, M., B. O’Leary and Tirman, J., eds. (2007). Terror, Insur- Product of Psychological Forces’, in W. Reich, ed., Origins of gency and the State: Ending Protracted Confl icts, Philadelphia, Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, pp. 25-40.

HM Government (2008). The Prevent Strategy: A Guide for Local Shah, A. (2010). ‘Poverty around the World’, Global Issues. Avail- Partners in England, London: HM Government. able online at: http://www.globalissues.org/article/4/poverty- around-the-world, accessed 10 March 2010. Hoff man, B. (2006). Inside Terrorism, revised edition, New York: Columbia University Press. Silke, A. (1998). ‘Cheshire-cat Logic: The Recurring Theme of Terrorist Abnormality in Psychological Research’, Psychology, Horgan, J. (2005). The Psychology of Terrorism, London: Frank Crime and Law, 4: 51-69. Cass. Stewart, F. (2008). Horizontal Inequalities and Confl ict: Juergensmeyer, M. (2000). Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Understanding Group Violence in Multiethnic Societies, London: Rise of Religious Violence, Berkeley: University of California Press. Palgrave Macmillan.

Krueger, A. (2007). What Makes a Terrorist: Economics and the Yunus, M. (2006). Nobel Lecture, Oslo, December 10, 2006. Avail- Roots of Terrorism, Princeton: Princeton University Press. able online at: http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laure- ates/2006/yunus-lecture-en.html, accessed 10 March 2010. Krueger, A., and Malečková, J. (2003). ‘Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is Zulaika, J. & W, Douglass (1996). Terror and Taboo: The Follies, Fables, and Faces of Terrorism. London: Routledge.

BOOK PROMOTION CONTEMPORARYC DEBATES OON TERRORISM EDITED BY RICHARD JACKSON AND SAMUEL JUSTIN SINCLAIR

Th is new innovative textbook addresses a number of key issues in contemporary terrorism studies from both 'traditional' and 'critical' perspectives. Th e format of the volume involves a leading scholar taking a particular position on the controversy, followed by an opposing or alternative viewpoint written by another contributor.

Contemporary Debates on Terrorism, edited by Richard Jackson and Samuel Justin Sinclair. Published in 2012 by Routledge.

72 arches quarterly volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 The Complexity of Police-Muslim Community Relations in the Shadow of 9/11

P. DANIEL SILK

n January of 2009, US President Barack relationships between police and Muslim Obama proposed a refreshing era of communities in the United States and the Iopenness when he said, ‘to the Muslim United Kingdom have taken on a new and world, we seek a new way forward, based tangible importance (Ramirez, O’Connell, on mutual interest and mutual respect’ & Zafar 2004; Innes 2006; Spalek & (Obama 2009,). Th e President’s emphasis Lambert 2008). While astute government on improved relationships between and community leaders quickly dissociate his administration and Muslims was the acts of extremist criminals from the signifi cant, and not surprisingly, media faith of the world’s Muslims, the last outlets and leaders around the world took decade has obviously ushered in a new era of notice.1 When a naturalized American interest in the eff ectiveness of partnerships citizen was identifi ed as the perpetrator in a between Muslim communities and law suicide bombing in Somalia not long after enforcement in both the US and the UK. the inauguration, the US Federal Bureau of At the same time, however, discussions Investigations Director’s response (Mueller regarding outreach between Muslim 2009) echoed the President’s sentiments communities and police have become by suggesting that increased eff orts at extremely public and politicised, and outreach between law enforcement and individual eff orts to build relationships are Muslim communities within the United constantly overshadowed by the relentless States were needed -- albeit for a more acute pursuit for security. purpose -- echoing a philosophy shared in In a post-9/11 world, law enforcement the offi cial counter-terrorism strategy in personnel and communities are challenged the UK (HM Government 2009). by the call to support counter-terrorism endeavors while simultaneously striving to build dialogue, trust, and opportunities In a post-9/11 world, law for quality police services. Th is challenge, enforcement personnel it seems, has become a lasting legacy ten and communities are years after 9/11. One could argue that the need challenged by the call for collaboration between Muslim to support counter- communities and law enforcement is obvious, so therefore the recipe for terrorism endeavors success is itself straightforward: Muslims while simultaneously and police in the US and the UK have a striving to build dialogue. common foe in those who sow destruction in the name of Islam, so they simply must work together to defeat this criminal Indeed, since the events of September 11, threat. However attractive though this may 2001, a wide variety of infl uential voices seem, this one-dimensional view leaves out have specifi cally advocated a community- a complex collection of factors (historical, centered strategy to fi ght violent extremism political, personal and social) that may (e.g. Downing 2007; Al-Marayati 2007; seem outside of police-community HM Government 2009; Benjamin 2010), concerns, but may still make developing and in the current environment, healthy partnerships more diffi cult. For example, volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 arches quarterly 73 where do we add the eff ect of variables like (Spalek, El Awa, & McDonald 2009), and foreign policies concerning the West Bank numerous other authors have commented and Gaza, Afghanistan, and Iraq? Or the on the scrutiny that Muslim communities recent debates on immigration laws? Or feel (Cainkar 2002; 2004; Abbas 2007; calls for a Congressional inquiry into the Pew Research 2007; Khan 2009). Despite supposed lack of cooperation police get the consistent call for community-centered from Muslim communities in the US?2 It policing practices as a tool for preventing may be tempting to dismiss these issues extremist violence, certain Muslim groups as unrelated, but they do indeed matter, are seen as appropriate partners for police and the views of police personnel and outreach, while others are vilifi ed (Lambert Muslims in the US and the UK involved 2008a; 2008b) and Muslims in general in outreach stress that while partnerships are often viewed only through a lens that between police and Muslims are needed prioritises security (Githens-Mazer & and worthwhile, planning these eff orts Lambert 2010). But how do these concerns is not necessarily easy given the external play out at the local level, and do they aff ect contexts (Silk 2010). 9/11 may have police-community relations? Th e complex spurred communities and governments to historical background that sets the stage act, but a multitude of factors that have for police-Muslim relations in both the US emerged from those attacks and events and the UK must fi gure prominently in since make it more diffi cult to continue to plans to build partnerships, and a variety do so. of issues deserve close attention. For police or communities to fail to recognise and THE BACKGROUND MATTERS act to balance these challenges can be, to In the current securitised climate found borrow a phrase, ‘like walking across a in the US and the UK since 9/11, it is well busy intersection with one’s eyes closed’ documented that Muslims feel pressure (Forester 1989, p.7).3 from the constant attention. For example, more than half of the American Muslims MAINSTREAM POLICING, surveyed reported that being a Muslim in COUNTER-TERRORISM, OR the United States has been harder since the BOTH? terrorist attacks of 9/11 on Washington DC If we assume that safe communities are a and New York City, and similarly a number cornerstone of both good government and of respondents observed that Muslims community-police relations; recognising have also been singled out for Government that outreach is challenging and politicised surveillance (Pew Research 2007). for all involved is a key step for both law Muslims in the United Kingdom in recent enforcement and Muslims in making the years have also stressed the diffi culties important decisions needed to initiate they have experienced in this climate that the work called for by leaders in the US has developed there as a response to both and the UK. What does this mean? 9/11 and the attacks in London on July 7, Practically, it means that in the post- 2005 (Abbas 2007; Khan 2009; Spalek, 9/11 era, police personnel and Muslims El Awa, & McDonald 2009). In an age can expect that circumstances beyond in which thoughtful, robust and unifi ed their control often aff ect police-public counter-terrorism strategies incorporating relations even before an outreach program police and communities are integral to the begins. Counter-terrorism policies, media struggle against violent extremism, this coverage, international aff airs, a lack of pressure clearly presents problems. knowledge about Islam as well as proper Researchers on Muslim-police police procedure, and the past negative partnerships acknowledge the eff ect of experiences Muslims may have had with issues such as media attention, noting how police around the world all have ‘a say’ in the post 9/11 environment, communities in developing partnerships, and must be have felt the pressure of being suspected recognised and considered as important

74 arches quarterly volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 THE COMPLEXITY OF POLICE-MUSLIM COMMUNITY RELATIONS IN THE SHADOW OF 9/11 and infl uential variables.4 which hinders the quality of the service we While combining uniformed, street- can deliver. level policing with larger eff orts to improve national security may serve a practical In this vein, one can imagine the surprise purpose, the two, in application, can also a Muslim community member could only provide a contentious dichotomy for police reasonably be expected to express when and communities. As necessary as counter- approached by police counter-terrorism terrorism eff orts are in our world, this personnel: ‘I’m a physician, I have a work also comes with some heavy baggage. family, and I am a loyal American (or Numerous other outreach eff orts between British) citizen. Why are counter-terrorism Muslims and police exist outside of the personnel coming to talk to me? Is it just counter-terrorism arena, but this important because I am a Muslim? Is this the only fact -- that the outreach with Muslim way Muslims are viewed in our world?’ communities is often a facet of a larger His concerns may miss the true intent of counter-terrorism strategy -- underlines the offi cer involved, but we can see how the context in which these relationships an apparently straightforward opportunity are developed and collaborative work is for law enforcement and a community planned. member to meet is framed and politicized It is not diffi cult to imagine a by its very nature in our post-9/11 world. Muslim community leader expressing Perhaps the question is not why would understandable concern that the police a member of the community be taken interest in his community seemingly aback by a friendly contact from counter- comes only from counter-terrorism terrorism police? A more appropriate personnel, regardless of whether or not this inquiry is: How could he or she not be? is true. Indeed it is a concern I myself have Our theoretical physician might be asking often felt, as a researcher, law enforcement himself an array of questions: ‘Why aren’t veteran, and citizen, and it is one I have we talking about theft in my neighborhood also heard from other police personnel -- instead of terrorism? And are the police even those involved in counter-terrorism asking Italian Catholics about terrorism? policing. So when a prominent Muslim Is the Hindu community receiving the professional asked me several years ago if same attention?’ How could he not have I started studying Islam in graduate school these understandable concerns? before or after 9/11 I was not particularly Of course, this begs a question from surprised, and the real meaning of his another angle: Can Muslims and police question was not lost on me.5 It is a in the US and the UK aff ord not to sentiment certainly echoed by vast number use community outreach as a tool to of Muslims in the US and the UK. derail a common criminal threat? In my Indeed, as one British police offi cer I experience, law enforcement personnel interviewed recognised, this type of work often demonstrate substantial evidence of is diffi cult precisely because of the need to empathy and concern for the perceptions discuss terrorism: attention from counter-terrorism police So much of our engagement is skewed by causes (and at times may even be reluctant the necessity to discuss and manage counter- themselves because of it) -- but this must terrorism issues when we should be talking serve as a strong reminder of the way in about mainstream policing issues. We should which law enforcement relationships with be talking about the burglary that happened Muslim communities are so often currently up the road, the fact that there’s vandalism, framed. No doubt, the police offi cer there’s litter on the streets that people don’t involved on the other side of the same feel safe walking to the corner shop at night. hypothetical conversation has concerns But we’re necessarily getting drawn into as well, which, in all fairness, must not be these very diffi cult and sensitive discussions dismissed: ‘I hope he doesn’t think I am around a very peculiar security problem here because I am closed-minded about volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 arches quarterly 75 Islam and Muslims; I just really need his pervasive emphasis on security since 9/11. help’. Th is sentiment, however, may or It represents a bit of a ‘Catch-22’ for our may not allay the suspicions of community physician and police offi cer: ‘We know we members. At the same time, however, need to work together on terrorism, but these feelings are real, even if left unsaid, terrorism seems to make it harder for us to and they must be considered. work together’. It often seems that THE TERRAIN IS COMPLEX To add to the challenge of this all, it discussions of Islam is not just the one police offi cer and one have sadly devolved community member who are involved in their emergent relationship. It is those two almost exclusively into people, enveloped in a historically situated, discussions of terrorism. complex, and imperfect world, carrying with them their own pasts, concerns, and biases. And they are certainly not the only Police personnel and community leaders two people who have input in how police alike must recognise that these worries and Muslims regard one another and exist, and seek to ameliorate them. It interact. often seems that discussions of Islam A Muslim in the US pointed out to me have sadly devolved almost exclusively something of which I am well aware, and into discussions of terrorism (Esposito & fear is on the increase: ‘Islamophobes’ Mogahed 2007) and Muslims are seen who seek to undermine engagement. If almost exclusively through the prism we recognise on one hand that better of security concerns (Githens-Mazer & relationships are needed between law Lambert 2010). At the same time, the enforcement and Muslims, how do we distinction between the counter-terrorism simultaneously respond to the infl uence mission and Muslim community-police of fear-laced arguments which suggest relations becomes blurred, even if everyone that US citizens and their government involved attends to their responsibilities are apparently unaware of some vast in the spirit of service to a greater good. underground Islamist conspiracy to Th ough adroit individuals involved in subvert democratic systems and implement this type of work are accustomed to the Islamic law (e.g., Spencer 2008)? Th is diffi culties the counter-terrorism agenda is especially noteworthy as a similarly can cause -- however well intentioned or alarmist story line is suggested to the public necessary it may be -- the eff ects of 9/11, in the UK (see the overview in Spalek our insatiable concern for safety, and the & Lambert 2008). Th e same Muslim in polarizing eff ect it has on communities the US mentioned above off ered a useful cannot go unrecognised. warning to me when he described his I once spoke with one Muslim in the US concern regarding ‘this threat of people on who put it like this: ‘I think the main thing the outside that want disengagement, either is that the Muslim American community non-Muslims or Islamophobes if you will, is trying to overcome this notion of being who are exploiting 9/11 and the concern [a] suspect community after 9/11’ — a over 9/11 to continuously disengage sentiment surely felt by the hypothetical between Muslims and government agents’ Muslim physician we have considered (emphasis added). But we can’t just limit above, and perhaps also by the police offi cer. our recognition of the infl uence of outside Th is reality emphasises the importance of factors to those who are so explicit in their understanding that as police and Muslims goals. Instead, attention must also be paid are working on outreach initiatives for the to seemingly innocuous factors that can purpose of counter-terrorism, potential additionally aff ect engagement eff orts. relationships are already infl uenced by the Muslims and police personnel I have

76 arches quarterly volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 THE COMPLEXITY OF POLICE-MUSLIM COMMUNITY RELATIONS IN THE SHADOW OF 9/11 interviewed have often commented on the my opinion) suggesting outreach to build infl uence of the media on police-Muslim safe neighborhoods, communities, and community relations. Indeed, even well- countries? Key to our discussion here is a intentioned media attention can have theme which is reinforced by Cervero and a very real and immediate eff ect on the Wilson (2006) who emphasise that as we ability of Muslims and police to work work to fi gure out what is needed when together. In both the US and the UK I developing a program (in our example, have had many opportunities to hear outreach programs between police and Muslims and police personnel give recent Muslim communities), we also engage in examples of this phenomenon. Far from work that is aff ected by both historical and hearing just theoretical suggestions that current social issues.6 Th e context in which media reports infl uence police-community police-community outreach planning takes relations, I was told during my research of place (in this instance a security-conscious, particular examples in which media stories political, and media-infl uenced world) and had negative consequences. must be a prime concern to those involved. In the UK a Muslim off ered a practical It may be tempting to portray the need for take on the issue overall, even while noting engagement as self-evident and therefore that good news (such as a recent police- simple, but to do that is to consider the Muslim community event at his mosque) issue with blinders on. Muslims and police fails to get nearly as much attention as bad: cannot be reasonably expected to ignore And as we know… controversy sells more or disassociate themselves from external than anything else. So generally when there’s forces. To do so would dangerously a controversial issue, it will sell in the papers. undermine the potential success of the very And when you have a good event like this outreach programs they hope to pursue. [event at a mosque], hardly any people will Policy makers and political commentators pick it up or, and even if they do pick it up, would be well served to keep this in mind. they might just put a few lines in here in the Several examples stand out in my end, that’s about it and move on. Because I experience of offi cers who have recognised think it, it’s not going to sell the paper, it’s the contextual, historical, and social not going to sell the article or whatever else. forces that may aff ect their potential relationships with Muslim communities Coverage of events such as the planned with whom they hoped to work in the (and then cancelled) Qur’an burning by a post-9/11 world. Th ese police personnel pastor in Florida can only be expected to strike me as empathetic, aware, curious, have a similar eff ect, as does other coverage. and concerned about the communities As I was told in the UK: ‘Something in which they work. Not surprisingly, happens and they bring somebody on successful community members I have met the television and they’ll [the media] just who work with police in the US and the choose the most extreme person from UK also exhibit these same qualities. Both within the Muslim community to come Muslims and police personnel have stressed and talk’ and therefore ‘A lot of the time to me the importance of infl uential factors it’s the media that’s responsible for negative such as international aff airs, foreign policy, portrayal and giving rise to tensions and national government counter-terrorism Islamophobia really’. agendas, and the experiences of immigrant Muslims with police in their native SEEKING BALANCE IN A countries. Th is attention is illustrative of POLITICISED ARENA the understanding they have of the world Outreach is politicised and diffi cult, around them and its tangible eff ect on but still needed in a post-9/11 world. relationships between communities and What do police personnel and Muslims police at the local level. Th is awareness is do, as they are on the ‘front lines’ of absolutely key to the potential success of any broad government policies (correctly, in outreach eff orts, especially as Muslims and volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 arches quarterly 77 police seek to navigate the eff ects 9/11 and media constantly highlight how Al- terrorism have had on police-community Qaeda is twisting Muslim community relations. Th is is not the simplifi ed world issues, I think Muslim community issues of sound bites and easy answers, but the also see the establishment as practically complex reality that police and Muslim doing as much damage as Al-Qaeda communities face daily. (emphasis added). In the current environment, keenly recognising the issues that are likely to Everyone involved in police-Muslim have an eff ect on outreach between police community outreach must acknowledge and Muslim communities is imperative, that similar feelings may exist. as is the ability to negotiate the hurdles Th is is not to suggest, however, that presented by these same issues. In other this type of sentiment cannot be changed. words, everyone involved must approach Indeed, I interviewed a Muslim in the UK outreach with an open mind and recognise who pointed out how his relationship with potential causes of reluctance and one specifi c police counter-terrorism offi cer suspicion on both ‘sides’, and at the same strongly aff ected his opinion of the unit’s time be fl exible and interpersonally skilled outreach work, and therefore also caused in a way that allows them to work together him to discuss it within his community in -- despite real or perceived challenges. diff erent terms. Th e interviewee stressed Police personnel and members of Muslim that he and the offi cer ‘talk about our communities must actively seek to families, [the offi cer]… tell[s] me about her identify and learn about these potentially children, and this is what our culture is, problematic issues, but then they must it’s that way we build relationships around also display the forethought and fl exibility human issues, and that’s how we gain required to work around the hurdles they confi dence [in] each other.’ Importantly, present. he compared this offi cer to previous police In the broadest terms, this may be personnel whom he referred to as ‘ignorant’ linked to the ability of all involved to because of their let’s get-down-to business simultaneously recognise the real threat and talk about terrorism approach to him posed by terrorism while emphatically in the past. Th is same interviewee candidly countering the pervasive stereotypes that admitted that his ideas about the counter- threaten the very relationships needed terrorism agenda in the UK were changed to open up a path for national security by what he learned from the police offi cer discussions when they are truly needed. with whom he had built a relationship, However, before we leap into this dialogue, and based on what he had learned, he we must recognise the real perils for all would ‘explain to people no [the counter- involved. As a police offi cer in the UK once terrorism agenda of these offi cers is] not told me: against Muslims’. While his previous I believe there’s been signifi cant failures opinion had been negative, the infl uence in communication which have tended to of one offi cer made the diff erence in his associate, unfairly, international Al-Qaeda views, and therefore had the potential to incidents of terrorism with mainstream possible infl uence the wider community. Muslim community issues. And this has Th is eff ect is real and extremely valuable, alienated Muslim communities and they feel and must be magnifi ed. it has contributed to the challenges they face day-to-day in achieving essentially health, WHERE DO WE GO NOW? wealth and happiness as British citizens… It is a shame that ‘with few exceptions, It’s particularly off ensive to them because when the Western media talks about Islam they actually see acts of terrorism as the and Muslim culture, discussion tends to fundamental opposite of all of the principles center on religious extremism and global of Islam that they hold so dear. And whereas terrorism’ (Esposito & Mogahed 2007, the state and other commentators and p.1), but it is also a refl ection of the real

78 arches quarterly volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 THE COMPLEXITY OF POLICE-MUSLIM COMMUNITY RELATIONS IN THE SHADOW OF 9/11 environment in which communities and through the planning and delivery of police in the US and the UK must operate. these eff orts; and (c) the need to identify As we have seen, one of the lasting legacies what can and should be learned about of 9/11 has been the constant scrutiny communities, police, and their histories, of Muslims in the ‘West’, perhaps most goals, needs and expectations. Th ese three especially refl ected in the media, and factors off er a place from which to start the this phenomenon also strongly aff ects the outreach process, but they may also off er ability of police to work in conjunction answers when existent programs struggle. with Muslim communities. Perhaps the question of greatest Th ere is evidence of extremely valuable importance is this: How can police agencies practices I have observed in communities and communities identify and develop in the US and the UK, echoing portions people with the needed interpersonal of what has been illustrated in other police skills, emotional intelligence, and forces found in previous research.7 Based on empathy necessary to plan and institute this, we can outline important overarching outreach work between Muslims and themes for police personnel and Muslim police?8 Clearly, it is not just about sound community members to consider when policies. For government and community they intend to work together to develop decision-makers, the potential for success outreach. in outreach may be directly connected to selecting the right people, and supporting those individuals with guidelines that For government and emphasise learning, fl exibility, and personal community decision- relationships between communities and makers, the potential for police. It is possible these skills were always needed in outreach work. But in the post- success in outreach may 9/11 environment, they are especially be directly connected important -- indeed, key -- if communities and police want to move forward with to selecting the right projects for the public good. Th is type of people, and supporting work requires fl exible, caring, individuals those individuals with exceptional interpersonal skills and a willingness to collaborate, a proven with guidelines that dedication to open-minded problem emphasise learning, solving, and a real thirst for learning and working in non-traditional police and fl exibility, and personal community roles. Government personnel relationships between and community members must be willing communities and police. to have ongoing and at times extremely challenging dialogue, planning what may often be unconventional opportunities for In our world ten years after the 9/11 outreach while also spending the required tragedy, everyone involved in outreach time to build strong personal relationships. between Muslim communities and police Let us not forget that outreach between should consider, at a minimum, three Muslim communities and police is at its persistent characteristics of outreach: most basic level just a relationship between (a) the need for eff orts designed to build two people. But this relationship is built strong, personal, mutually benefi cial and sustained on a complex organisational, relationships between Muslims and police international and public stage, and we personnel to support overall community therefore need to focus more attention welfare (and not just counter- terrorism on the human side of outreach as well initiatives); (b) the need to be fl exible in as on national policies. Th is refl ects the negotiating what is expected and delivered real-world process of working on joint volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 arches quarterly 79 community-police eff orts which facilitate Dr Phillip Daniel Silk is a Fulbright Police Research ‘informal moments where we build tighter Fellow, who studied outreach between Muslim communities and British police, and a similar topic more intimate bonds with one another,’ as was the focus of his doctorate dissertation, completed a US police interviewee suggested to me. at the University of Georgia’s Department of Lifelong Education, Administrations, and Policy. His bachelor’s Or, as another interviewee put it: ‘It’s less degree is in Religion, as is his master’s degree, with an systems and institutions and things than Islamic Studies emphasis. Silk has had the opportunity to study and work in a variety of Muslim communities it is personal relationships and interaction’. around the world, and has long been interested Th is is a view of relationships built between in studying how law enforcement and Muslim police and Muslims that are much more communities interact and work together. than rational, organisation- and results- Silk is also an 18-year veteran of campus, local and federal law enforcement in the United States. In 2002 driven mandates. Th e Director of the FBI he was part of the fi rst permanent staff at the newly or the Home Offi ce may (and should) call re-opened US Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan; he has also been a captain with the Athens-Clarke County for more organizational outreach between (Georgia) Police Department, where at various times law enforcement and Muslims, but it is he commanded a community policing unit, internal aff airs, training, and vice. Currently, Silk works individual relationships that will actually for the University of Georgia, where he manages communications for the Police Department and make it happen. teaches in the Criminal Justice Studies Program. Success, then, cannot be fully or easily captured through common measures, nor 9 can it be easily described. It may not align ENDNOTES with any simple metrics but instead sound 1. For a concise example, see Pennington’s ‘The Inauguration more like the opinion of a Muslim youth of Barack Hussein Obama’ on http://muslimvoices.org. 2. See Gruber, 2010. worker in the UK who colorfully described 3. See Bravin, 2010. a police offi cer he had once worked with: 4. See Dodd, 2009. He was a gem of a police offi cer… I’ve seen 5. See Condon, 2010. many… diff erent police offi cers, but he was 6. Cervero and Wilson (2006) use the Forester quote to describe planning adult educational opportunities. an absolute diamond of a police offi cer... 7. This conclusion represents one of those found in my He could sit down in here, have a cup of tea, research associated with a 2009 Fulbright Police Research have a laugh, have a joke with some of the Fellowship as well as my 2010 PhD dissertation work. I young people. He had a very, very good way conducted two case studies, relying on interviews with police personnel and Muslims in the US and the UK about him… I’m sure he was a youth worker to understand the goals of outreach between Muslim in his previous life. I’m sure that he had communities and police, and how those outreach eff orts something about him… you know, in terms are planned. Overall, 31 semi-structured interviews were of his skills, his interpersonal skills (emphasis conducted, and approximately half of the interviewees were police personnel, and half were members of Muslim added). communities. I also benefi ted from a great deal of informal time spent with Muslims and police personnel in the US and Do we really need a statistic plotted the UK, discussing related issues, and generally trying to on a graph to know that this is good? grasp the context behind the work of Muslims and police involved in outreach. The data and these experiences were No more so than we need charts to tell further contextualised by my graduate studies in Islam, as us good community-police relations are well as my experiences since 1999 studying, traveling, or important. Perhaps for community and working in communities largely built of Muslims around police organisations, therefore, one of the the world, including approximately 15 months spent in Afghanistan starting in early 2002. keys to eff ectively building relationships 8. Spalek and Lambert (2008) similarly emphasized refl ecting is taking the time to recognise potential on the importance of “wider social, cultural and political challenges, learn about them, and then contexts” (p.258). working to navigate around them. Th is 9. This is indeed pertinent; I began my graduate degree four years before 9/11, and fi nished in 2000. may be no diff erent than the equation for 10. While Cervero and Wilson were speaking specifi cally successful partnerships between police and to planning adult education activities, we can and should Muslim communities before 9/11, but in conceptualise outreach as a practice with a distinct the long shadow cast by those events, it is educational component, and therefore also recognise how true their observation is in the community policing arena. now imperative. 11. See examples such as: Spalek, El Awa, and McDonald (2009); Lambert (2008a; 2008b); Ramirez, O‘Connell, and Zafar (2004); Henderson, Ortiz, Sugie, and Miller, (2006).

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12. Here, I use the concept of interpersonal skills from Bar- bia and Anti-Muslim Hate Crime, Exeter, UK: The University of On, et al. (2000), and the understanding of emotional and Exeter. http://centres.exeter.ac.uk/emrc/publications/IAMHC_ social intelligence proposed by Goleman (1995; 2006). revised_11Feb11.pdf, accessed on February 26, 2011. 13. A question echoed by Spalek, Al-Awa, and McDonald Gruber, Ben (Sep. 9, 2010).‘Florida pastor cancels Koran- (2009). burning plan’, Reuters.com, http://www.reuters.com/ar- ticle/2010/09/09/us-usa-muslims-idUSTRE68709M20100909, REFERENCES accessed on February 19, 2011. Abbas, Tahir (2007). ‘Muslim minorities in Britain: Integra- tion, multiculturalism, and racism in the post-7/7 period’, Henderson, Nichole J., Ortiz, Christopher W., Sugie, Naomi F. & Journal of Intercultural Studies, vol. 28, no. 3, pp.287-300, Miller, Joel (2006). Law Enforcement & Arab American Commu- doi:10.1080/07256860701429717 nity Relations after September 11, 2001: Engagement in a Time of Uncertainty. New York, NY: Vera Institute of Justice, http://www. Bar-On, R., Brown, J. M., Kirkcaldy, B. D. & Thome, E. P. (2000). vera.org/publication_pdf/353_636.pdf, n.ac. ‘Emotional expression and implications for occupational stress; application of the Emotional Quotient Inventory (EQ-i)’, Person- HM GOVERNMENT 2009 Pursue Prevent Protect Prepare: The ality and Individual Diff erences, vol. 28, pp.1107-18, doi:10.1016/ United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism, S0191-8869(99)00160-9. Norwich, UK: TSO, http://www.offi cial-documents.gov.uk/docu- ment/cm75/7547/7547.pdf, n.ac. Benjamin, Daniel (March 10, 2010). ‘U.S. Government eff orts to counter violent extremism: Testimony before the Emerg- Innes, Martin (2006). ‘Policing uncertainty: Countering terror ing Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee of the Senate through community intelligence and democratic policing’ The Armed Services Committee’, http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/ ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, rm/2010/138175.htm vol. 605, pp. 222-41. doi:10.1177/0002716206287118.

Bravin, , Jess (Nov 5, 2010). ‘Oklamhoma is sued over shariah Khan, Khalida (2009). Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) and ban’, Wall Street Journal Online’, http://online.wsj.com/article/ PREVENT: A Response from the Muslim Community, London, SB10001424052748704805204575594793733847372.html, UK: An-Nisa Society, http://www.annisa.org/downloads/ accessed on February 19, 2011. PVE_&_Prevent_-_A_Muslim_response. pdf, accessed on February 19, 2011. Cainkar, Louise (2002). ‘No longer visible: Arab and Muslim exclusion after September 11’, Middle East Report, vol. 224, pp. Lambert, Robert (2008). ‘Empowering Salafi s and Islamists 22-9. against al-Qaeda: A London counterterrorism case study’, PS: Political Science & Politics, vol. 41, no.1, pp. 31-5, doi: 10.1017/ Cainkar, Louise (2004). ‘The impact of the September 11 attacks S1049096508080049. and their aftermath on Arab and Muslim communities in the United States’ GSC Quarterly, vol.13, http://programs.ssrc.org/ 2008b ‘Salafi and Islamist Londoners: Stigmatised minority gsc/publications/quarterly13/cainkar.pdf, n.ac. faith communities countering al-Qaida’, Crime, Law and Social Change, vol. 50 no. 1-2, pp. 73-89, doi: 10.1007/s10611-008- Cervero, Ronald M. & Wilson, Arthur L. (2006). Working the Plan- 9122-8. ning Table: Negotiating Democratically for Adult, Continuing, and Workplace Education. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass Al-Marayati, Salam (Jun 14, 2007). ‘Assessing and addressing the threat: Identifying the role of the National Commission Condon, Stephanie (Dec 17, 2010). ‘Rep. Peter King Planning on the Prevention of Violent Radicalization and Home- Hearings on Muslim "Radicalization"’, CBSNews online, http:// grown Terrorism. Testimony to the United States House of www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20026083-503544.html, Representatives House Committee on Homeland Security accessed on February 19, 2011. Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Ter- rorism Risk Assessment’, http://homeland.house.gov/SiteDocu- Dodd, Vikram (Oct 16, 2009). ‘Government anti-terrorism ments/20070614135307-44582.pdf, n.ac. strategy ‘spies’ on innocent: Data on politics, sexual activity and religion gathered by government’; The Guardian, http://www. Mueller, Robert S. (Feb. 23, 2009). ‘Speech delivered to the guardian.co.uk/uk/2009/oct/16/antiterrorism-strategy-spies- Council on Foreign Relations’, http://www.fbi.gov/news/ innocents, accessed on February 19, 2011. speeches /addressing-the-globalization-and-evolution, ac- cessed on February 19, 2011. Downing, Michael P. (Oct. 30, 2007). ‘Statement of Michael P. Downing before the Committee on Homeland Security’s and Obama, Barack Hussein (Jan. 20, 2009). ‘President Barack Government and Government Aff airs United States Senate’, Obama's Inaugural Address’, http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/ http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files. inaugural-address, accessed on February 19, 2011. View&FileStore_id=ac58750d-0a53-4deb-a19a-31344ba2f733-, accessed on February 26, 2011. Pennington, Rosemary (Jan. 20, 2009). ‘The inauguration of Barack Hussein Obama’, http://muslimvoices.org/inauguration- Esposito, John L. & Mogahed, Dalia (2007). Who Speaks for barack-hussein-obama/, accessed on February 19, 2011. Islam: What a Billion Muslims Really Think, New York, NY: Gallup Press. Pew Research Centre (2007). Muslim Americans: Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream, Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, Field, Clive D. (2007). ‘Islamophobia in contemporary Britain: http://pewresearch.org/assets/pdf/muslim-americans.pdf, n.ac. The evidence of the opinion polls, 1988-2006’, Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, vol. 18, no. 4, pp. 447-77 Pontuing, Scott & Mason, Victoria (2007). ‘The resistible rise of Islamophobia: Anti-Muslim racism in the UK and Australia Forester, John (1989). Planning in the Face of Power, Berkeley, before 11 September 2001’, Journal of Sociology, vol. 43, no. 1, CA: University of California Press. pp. 61-86, doi: 10.1177/1440783307073935.

Githens-Mazer, Jonathan & Lambert, Robert (2010). Islamopho- Ramirez, Deborah A., O’Connell, Sascha Cohen & Zafar, Rabina volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 arches quarterly 81 THE COMPLEXITY OF POLICE-MUSLIM COMMUNITY RELATIONS IN THE SHADOW OF 9/11

(2004). Developing Partnerships between Law Enforcement and Spalek, Basia & Lambert, Robert (2008). ‘Muslim communities, American Muslim, Arab, and Sikh communities: A Promising counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation: A critically refl ec- Practices Guide, Boston, MA: The Partnership for Prevention and tive approach to engagement’, International Journal of Law, Community Safety Initiative, http://www.spcs.neu.edu/pfp/ Crime and Justice, vol. 36, 257-70, doi:10.1016/j.ijlcj.2008.08.004. downloads/ Guide_Final5.4.04.pdf, n.ac. Spencer, Robert (2008). Stealth Jihad, Washington, DC: Regnery Silk, Phillip D. (2010). Planning Outreach between Muslim Publishing. Communities and Police in the USA and the UK, PhD dissertation, Department of Lifelong Education, Administration, and Policy, Weller, Paul (2006). ‘Addressing religious discrimination and University of Georgia, Athens, GA Islamophobia: Muslims and liberal democracies. The case of the United Kingdom’, Journal of Islamic Studies, vol. 17, no. 3, Spalek, Basia, El Awa, Salwa & McDonald, Laura Zahra (2009). pp. 295-325, doi:10.1093/jis/etl001. Police-Muslim Engagement for the Purpose of Counter-Terrorism: An Examination, Birmingham, UK: The University of Birmingham.

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82 arches quarterly volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 Beyond the Rhetoric – Setting a New Perspective for Partnerships

AMJAD MOHAMED-SALEEM

Everyone of us living on this planet is an world. Th e basic premise of this paper Other in the view of Others is that engaging with local grass roots - Ryszard Kapuściński communities has to consider the role of faith as it off ers a simple and easy access yszard Kapuściński’s quote to communities (strong in their spiritual symbolises the challenge that is and faith teachings) and a simple language Rincreasingly being faced in the to express the commonalities of existence world today, of confl ict though diff erent and create the prerequisites for forgiveness, in causes, that seems to unearth the most respect, understanding and acceptance. dramatic view of the ‘Other’. Th ey tend to Whilst dialogues are a beginning it is evoke forms of supremacist notions of the important that engagement goes beyond religious ‘self’ and negative images of the this; engaging practically with faith leaders religious ‘other’ which are deeply-rooted and communities to help resolve and avoid in dominant understandings of religion. confl ict, and achieve gains that make a Th ese are deeply divisive assumptions of diff erence to people’s lives. In particular, single exclusive identities by sectarian the paper highlights how diff erent faith activists, who want people to ignore all communities make natural allies for affi liation and loyalties in support of one the promotion of cross-border linking specifi c identity. Such exclusive identities initiatives to work across national and are negative, stressing diff erence rather religious boundaries, thereby providing a than belonging and ‘opposition to’ rather potential signifi cant anti-dote to confl ict than ‘support for’ something. and the perceptions that fuel it. It is against this framework of disagreement that there is a need to explore DEVELOPING A NEW PARADIGM new initiatives. Th is paper explores how Th e interaction of religion with the the concept of partnerships is essential to public sphere is also diluted by increasingly addressing some of the many challenges new challenges. In the face of globalisation, of the twenty fi rst century. Th is concept we see the transmogrifi cation of traditional is based on the fact that in reality no religions and belief systems as a result of individual / community / organisation the disintegration of traditional social can operate in isolation in today’s complex fabrics and shared norms by the invasion of consumerism, cyber culture, newfangled In the face of religions, social fads, and changing work globalisation, we see the ethics and work rhythms. Coupled with this, there is a generational confl ict which transmogrifi cation of starts to develop and exacerbates structural traditional religions and and/or socio-psychological discrimination leading to leadership vacuums and a gap in belief systems as a result terms of framing a proper understanding of the disintegration of of a world constructed by ‘others’. traditional social fabrics Eff orts are required at all levels within society to develop a new workable and and shared norms. principled political paradigm which can bridge the gaps of mistrust and suspicion volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 arches quarterly 83 between faiths, beliefs, cultures and respect and ultimately understanding and communities. acceptance. Firstly, we will need to confront our Th e third aspect is about rebuilding own relativisms by rethinking concepts of trust which in an age of mistrust and human nature (especially as regards the age- suspicion can be a challenge. As Corcoran old search for spiritual values and religious (2010) states, trust building involves, a) truths) and competing, confusing, or ill- value integration which emphases personal defi ned concepts of tolerance, diversity, responsibility to be part of the change; b) and freedom. i n c l u s i o n o f a l l t o e s t a b l i s h i n g o p e n d i a l o g u e Secondly we need to relook at the and engagement; c) acknowledging history concept of harmonious pluralism which in order to establish an agenda for healing; will include the interaction of religious and d) forgimg alliances and a networks of actors with one another, with society responsibility that embraces diversity. and the state around concrete cultural, To support the four steps outlined social, economic and political agendas. above for trust-building, there is a need to It denotes a politics that encourages inculcate intellectual empathy to ensure diverse communities with overlapping but that people who are in confl ict with distinctive ethics and interests. Whilst each other will have to acknowledge and such interaction can involve sharp confl ict, understand that everyone has justifi ed the politics should provide a space for grievances. Rationality and faith in one people to struggle openly with religious self and others will help us to intellectually and cultural diff erences. Provision of this disagree with someone’s view, analysis or space should consider: a) Common Values policy without doubting their sincerity where major faith traditions are united in and loyalty. Spirituality will be the glue the values which espouse the notion of a that binds the factors together in a spirit shared humanity, b) Social Responsibility of ethics, morals and basic humanity so where there is diversity and the reality of that at the very base of the argument, one its prevalence is reason enough for people agrees to disagree. Th ese factors and the to come together and dialogue, and c) steps outlined above will ensure that any articul ating Social Justice, Ethics and Values dialogue and trust building measure is which demonstrate endurance of a lived undertaken in a spirit of mutual tolerance, spirituality, mirroring a soul at peace. acknowledgement, forgiveness and non- Th e concept of harmonious pluralism retaliation so that people move towards is also about taking into account Nobel respecting, understanding and accepting Laureate Professor Amartya Sen’s (2006) one another's diff erences in an atmosphere premise in his book Identity and Violence, of justice and equality. that the key to good citizenship and social cohesion which are components in a CREATING A NEW cosmopolitan society is the encouragement ENVIRONMENT and retention of multiple identities. Developing these ideas has been helped People have several enriching identities: by several global initiatives. One such nationality, gender, age and parental initiative was the Commonwealth Peoples’ background, religious or professional Forum, held in Uganda, November 2007, affi liation. Th ey identify with diff erent where the communiqué1 that was issued to ethnic groups and races, towns or villages heads of governments called for programs they call home, sometimes football teams; to support intercultural and inter-, they speak diff erent languages, which intra-, and cross faith exchange to build they hope their children will retain, and understanding and cooperation for joint love diff erent parts of their countries. It working on development and governance. is the recognition of this plurality and Th e communiqué re-emphasised the focus the searching for commonalities within of the Commonwealth that was agreed in this pluralism that will lead to greater 2005 to focus on the promotion of mutual

84 arches quarterly volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 BEYOND THE RHETORIC – SETTING A NEW PERSPECTIVE FOR PARTNERSHIPS understanding and respect among all faiths question is how to go about this? and communities within it2. By issuing the One suggestion can be off ered by a report communiqué, the forum recognised the of the Brookings Doha Centre which in need to move away from just pure interfaith 20093 suggested that ‘ joint partnerships are dialogue and networking, to a more grass the key to successful initiatives of building roots centred partnership of practical support within civil society and non state action between and within communities actors across the international divide as a of faith, ethnicity and culture. way of strengthening international security In a conference held at the UN in 2008 through mutual understanding and open organised by King Abdullah of Saudi communication channels that can be used Arabia, appropriately called ‘Culture of to solve shared challenges’. Peace’ the very concept of creating a new environment by the promotion of Inter- CASE STUDY - THE IMAM AND Religious and Inter-Cultural Dialogue, THE PASTOR Understanding and Cooperation for Peace Emerging from the 1990s in Northern was examined. Th e conference examined Nigeria after being in the frontlines the need to build tolerant societies and of confrontations between Christians durable peace by restoring values of and Muslims which saw the killings of compassion and solidarity and encouraging thousands in inter-religious warfare, the promotion of dialogue amongst the Imam Muhammad Ashafa and Pastor diff erent forums available in all cultures. James Wuye are two of the most unlikely Th e conference noted that achieving a of allies, forging new grounds in mediating culture of peace required eff ort from “the peace between Christians and Muslims in forces that hold our societies together”, Nigeria's Kaduna state. which also included religious beliefs, Th ey both come out of the heart of the among other worldviews and focussing on religious teachings of their communities the shared values of these religions and not (Imam Ashafa was once committed to the on the diff erences. total Islamisation of Nigeria and Pastor In 2010, senior offi cials from the James to its total evangelization) and 118 member countries of the Non- were sucked into the religious confl ict, Aligned Movement (NAM) met in becoming bitter enemies, determined to Manila, Philippines where the heads of kill each other. delegations declared their support for Joining rival militias and fi ghting against the extraordinary theme chosen for their each other, the Pastor had his hand hacked conference: “Interfaith Dialogue and off while defending his church against Cooperation for Peace and Development” Muslims and the Imam had his spiritual – an implicit admission that the fault lines adviser and two of his brothers killed by threatening the world’s unity today may Christian extremists. no longer run across ideological lines, but In 1995, a chance meeting between more profoundly across religious lines. the two at a mediation conference So faith it seems matters. held under the auspices of the Kaduna It is obvious that while these conferences State Women’s Commission to tackle are evidence of a political resolve to the problem of drug abuse saw them establishing a ‘culture of peace’ and to discovering a lot of commonalities. Th is concentrate eff orts to develop a new started their journey towards healing and workable and principled paradigm forgiveness. Th ey each began to question which can bridge the gaps of mistrust the cost of violence, reverting back to and suspicion communities, there is their scriptures for guidance on common still disconnect between theory and the approaches. Th e culmination of this was practice. Th us eff orts are still required at the Interfaith Mediation Centre which all levels within society to ensure that the has been described as a prototype of global resolve goes beyond the rhetoric. So the confl ict-resolution. Th e journey has been a volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 arches quarterly 85 tough one. Th ey were labelled as betrayers State. Part of the follow-up to this has been by their own people and when they visited the development of a cadre of religious each other’s religious institutions, they leaders who can be rapidly deployed were met with suspicion. Th eir personal to defuse tension in times of crisis. In journey was equally tough. Moving away November 2002, for example, a newspaper from hating each other was a hard one. article about the Miss World beauty Th e turning point for Imam Ashafa came competition, due to be held in Nigeria, when he heard a jumu’a khutba (Friday caused off ence to many Muslims. Ashafa sermon) about forgiveness and the example and Wuye, with other religious leaders, of the Prophet Muhammad who forgave quickly visited aff ected neighbourhoods the Quraish tribe upon the conquest of and made united television appeals for Makkah. For Pastor James, it took him calm. Th is was seen as something that three years to really overcome his hatred. would not have been possible without the He says that sometimes when they would formal commitment earlier made in the be travelling together, even sharing a Kaduna Peace Declaration. When Pope room, he was sometimes tempted to try Benedict XVI made comments about and suff ocate Ashafa in retaliation for the Islam which many found off ensive in a loss of his hand. However it was with the speech made in September 2006, the lack sickness of his mother and the support of violent response by Muslims in the state shown by Imam Ashafa that Pastor James was attributed to the groundwork done by began to really embrace the concept of the Interfaith Mediation Centre. reconciliation. He was further helped Th eir work has since been applied to by the words of a fellow evangelist: ‘You contexts other than the strictly religious, can not preach to someone you hate. You such as ethnic contexts, with the skills must begin to forgive them for every hurt developed in Christian-Muslim peace against you.’ Th e main objectives of building used to bring together opposing their work are to re-establish relationships Fulani and Berom tribes. In 2008, they that have been damaged due to violence; were invited by the Kenyan Government to attempt to minimise the likelihood of the look at healing tribal rifts in the aftermath reoccurrence of violence; off er projects of election violence. which require the involvement of both Th e two men working together are Christians and Muslims, such as cultural helping to empower others to understand events and workshops; and help support and rejoice in the commonality in the faith the capacity development of partners of others and to speak of those faiths with involved in peace-building. Activities have the respect they deserve whilst remaining a particular focus on including women, faithful to their own religions. In fact it as the chief transmitters of and educators is this demonstration of the importance about values in the home, and young of staying faithful to one’s own religious people, who are vulnerable to religious principles whilst reaching out to others calls to violence. Work has also begun of a diff erent faith, is what has been the in schools to provide confl ict resolution appeal of their story over the last decade training to religious instructors and other educators, recognising that minor confl icts The story of the Imam can escalate if not tackled early. and the Pastor clearly A major landmark was the signing of the Kaduna Peace Declaration in August shows that the strength 2002. Th is was drafted to be inclusive of of the message of and acceptable to a broad range of religious leaders, who were encouraged to review perceived ‘enemies’ drafts with their constituents. Twenty working together cannot religious leaders signed the Declaration, and be underestimated. instituted an annual Peace Day in Kaduna

86 arches quarterly volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 BEYOND THE RHETORIC – SETTING A NEW PERSPECTIVE FOR PARTNERSHIPS or so. Th is and the fact that their solution starting point was a willingness to work is a home-grown solution (from when round initial hostility and suspicion and a they were at the heart of the problem to readiness to admit that an understanding becoming part of the solution) that has of another’s method might be faulty. Th e not had any external infl uences, means fi rst step was that they were prepared to they talk not only with credibility but have their own assumptions challenged, with a refreshing sense of uniqueness. Th is but in a safe, private and unpressured credibility is important especially for a space. Th e journey towards developing continent that has suff ered from being told partnerships is then about taking an how to solve its problems rather than being individual responsibility to create a safe provided with a space and facilitation in space for people to talk and share ideas. order to solve the problem for itself. Th is safe space entails not only moving beyond victimhood but also being LESSONS FROM THE IMAM AND cognizant of the past (accepting and facing THE PASTOR up to the past honestly). Th e story of the Imam and the Pastor Imam Ashafa and Pastor James are clearly shows that the strength of the hardly candidates for setting an example message of perceived ‘enemies’ working for their country or for peace-building or together cannot be underestimated. Th is unlikely to be described, as they are now, of course needs to be followed by action. by the Archbishop of Canterbury as ‘a Announcements of peace and reconciliation model for Christian Muslim relations’ yet must carry a visible, immediate and today their story is one about the power tangible benefi t to disadvantaged confl ict of the responsibility placed upon the communities to have an impact. shoulder of the individual to take the lead Th eir experience demonstrates the need in becoming a true citizen of the country for processes of reconciliation to start and of the world, where one can rise above from personal and apparently modest their narrow confi nes of individualistic roots. A process of personal acceptance concerns to face the broader concerns of all and understanding gradually broadened humanity and to redress the contradiction out into something that could reach and of society. Th is is not just something that engage with others. It also draws attention should be left to the politicians or the to the need for inspirational leadership and institutions but really no one can be ruled role models, and for the sharing of this out of having a part in contributing. experience through popular forms that can reach others. Further, while the Kaduna CONCLUSION Peace Declaration can be seen as a symbol Th e story of the Imam and the Pastor – and symbols are of course important – shows that while strong ethical commitment an opportunity to demonstrate its value in religious traditions can sharpen identity in practical application has to be quickly politics more importantly it can form the taken. basis of inter and intra faith collaboration. Th e story also highlights some signifi cant Th us religious pluralism can not only lead steps towards establishing partnerships. to an absence of violence mainly due to Th e fi rst is about moving from a point better understandings and interaction but of ‘clash’ to a point of ‘alliance’. Th is is can open a space for discussion, dialogue crucial in helping to set a cornerstone for and engagement. In short, we must learn understanding each other. In deciding to listen closely to one another, not simply to move towards alliance, there is an because it is polite, but because it is just element of acknowledging the other. possible that we might learn something Once there is acknowledgement, then important about ourselves, and build a there is an opportunity to develop respect, better global village in the process. understanding and eventually acceptance. Th e next step is about translating this Ultimately, for both Ashafa and Wuye, the into practice. Th is can only be done volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 arches quarterly 87 in partnership which is important as REFERENCES Amr, Hady (2009). The opportunity of the Obama Era: Can Civil an element of inter faith co-operation. Society help bridge divides between the United States and a It works! It should be encouraged and Diverse Muslim World?, Analysis Paper No. 1, Brookings Doha supported. It should be enhanced through Centre. a comprehensive education strategy, both Appiah, Kwame Anthony (2006). Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a formal and informal, that breaks down the World of Strangers, W.W. Norton. seemingly insurmountable divide of us and Banchoff , Thomas (2008). Religious Pluralism, Globalisation and them. World Politics, Oxford University Press. Addressing these challenges off ers Casanova, Jose (1994). Public Religions in the Modern World, an antidote to sectarianism and the University of Chicago Press. polarisation of diff erent faiths in multi- cultural societies. Th is will never be easy, Clarke, Gerard (2006). Faith Matters: Faith-Based Organisations, Civil Society and International Development, Journal of Interna- but remains vitally important as Faith tional Development, Vol. 18, No. 6, 835-848. identities will continue to be part of the -- (2008). Faith-Based Organisations and International Develop- picture, and faith-based organizations will ment: An Overview, in Gerard Clarke & Michael Jennings (eds.), continue to thrive as part of civil society. Development, Civil Society and Faith-Based Organisations: Th e story of Tau Sen, the master Bridging the Sacred and the Secular, Palgrave Macmillan. musician at the court of the Mogul -- (2010). Trans-Faith Humanitarianism: Muslim Aid and the Emperor, Akbar, sets an example of how United Methodist Committee on Relief, European Journal of listening can build understanding. He Development Research 22, 510-528. had some fi fteen musical instruments in Corcoran, Rob (2010). Trustbuilding: An Honest Conversation on the Emperor’s chamber, which he had Race, Reconciliation and Responsibility, University of Virginia tuned to one frequency. Upon playing Press. just one instrument’s musical note, the Eickelman, Dale & Salvatore, Armando (2002). The Public Sphere other fourteen started to resonate, to the and Muslim Identities, Arch.europ.sociol., XLIII, 92-115. astonishment and delight of the audience. Firmin, Andrew & Linden, Ian (2007). Engaging with Faith- Ideally this story serves a metaphor for Report of the Commonwealth Foundation Project on Improving Understanding and Cooperation between Diff erent Faith Com- how communities can work in harmony munities 2005-2007, Commonwealth Foundation. to achieve an enlightened result. Not everyone sees it that way. Certainly Henderson, Michael (2009). No Enemy to Conquer: Forgiveness in an Unforgiving World, Baylor University Press. not every faith community is tuned to the same frequency, indeed, not every Hovey, Guy & Saleem, Amjad (2008). Faith, Relief and Develop- ment: The Sri Lankan Experience, Forced Migration Review, Issue faith community has achieved harmony 30. within itself but an opportunity exists through the promotion of linking to Marshall, Katerine. & Van Saanen, Marissa (2007). Development and Faith: Where Heart, Mind and Soul Work Together, The World faith communities, to harness more cross- Bank. community collaboration, in the interest Non Aligned Movement, Aligning for Interfaith Dialogue. http:// of peace, tolerance, and wellbeing. lamdagcdo.blogspot.com/2010/07/aligning-for-interfaith- dialogue.html

Amjad Mohamed-Saleem was born in Nigeria and Sen, Amartya (2006). Identity and Violence: The Illusion of received his early education in Ethiopia and Britain, Destiny, W.W. Norton & Company Inc. later graduating from Imperial College, London, with a Masters in Civil and Environmental Engineering. In Shrader, Douglas (2006). Beyond Tolerance: Globalisation, Free- th 2009, he completed an MBA from Universitas21 Global dom and Religious Pluralism, 6 World Congress of the Interna- in Singapore. After the 2004 Tsunami and having lost tional Society for Universal Dialogue- Humanity at the Turning Point: Rethinking nature, Culture and Freedom, Finland. www. several family members to it in Sri Lanka, Saleem left the oneonta.edu/academics/philos/Shrader/Beyond-Tolerance.pdf engineering profession and joined the humanitarian and development fi eld working for British NGO Muslim UN, Adopting Consensus Resolution, General Assembly Affi rms Aid. In 2006, Saleem became Country Director of Mutual Understanding, Interreligious Dialogue as Important Muslim Aid’s Sri Lankan offi ce whilst also coordinating Dimensions of Culture of Peace. http://www.un.org/News/ projects in Bangladesh. Saleem joined The Cordoba Press/docs//2008/ga10784.doc.htm Foundation as Head of Communications in 2009. In 2010, he has commenced his doctorate at Exeter University, UK.

88 arches quarterly volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 BEYOND THE RHETORIC – SETTING A NEW PERSPECTIVE FOR PARTNERSHIPS

ENDNOTES 1. ‘Realising People’s Potential: The Kampala Civil Society Statement to the 2007 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting November 2007’ Commonwealth Foundation. 2. See ‘Civil Paths to Peace’ (Commonwealth Secretariat 2007) and ‘Engaging with Faith’ (Commonwealth Foundation 2007) for further details. 3. Report, ‘The Opportunity of the Obama Era’, November 2009.

MUSLIM PARTICIPATION IN CONTEMPORARY GOVERNANCE: NEW RESEARCH FROM UNIVERSITY OF BRISTOL

This major new research initiative is on British Muslim engagement with the UK state, from 1997 to present. The study focuses on how Muslims have been brought into partnerships, forums and governance networks through policy agendas such as Prevent, community cohesion, multiculturalism, interfaith work and urban regeneration.

The research is led by Dr Therese O’Toole and Professor Tariq Modood, with Dr Daniel Nilsson DeHanas, Dr Stephen Jones and Dr Nasar Meer, and is funded by the AHRC and ESRC.

The study involves interviews with signifi cant actors in UK politics and governance at national and local levels, with local-level research focusing on three areas: Birmingham, Leicester and Tower Hamlets, London. It will provide detailed, evidence-based analysis of state-Muslim engagement for policymakers, academics and the general public.

http://bris.ac.uk/ethnicity/projects/muslimparticipation Join the email list, or return regularly to see the project’s fi ndings as they are released

volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 arches quarterly 89 From Moulin Rouge to 9/11

ZUBEDA LIMBADA

was working at a call centre in Salford Friends and family no longer walked alone on 9/11. It was an ordinary day when a as harassment became a way of life. Our I colleague shouted, “You won’t believe fears were multiplied when we heard of this, but a plane has hit a building in British Muslims being attacked, spat at America.” A few minutes later “...and and abused. To that end, writing about they’re saying it’s a terrorist attack.” For the 9/11 a decade on, living in Birmingham, rest of the day, offi ce talk and radio news provided a perfect opportunity for me to centred around who might have carried examine closely the attitudes of a newer out the attack. generation of Muslims and the emotional legacy and impact of 9/11. The eff ect of 9/11 on METHODOLOGY me personally was For the purpose of this localised study immediate. In busy a total of ten structured interviews in two inner city call centres were held to seek the public places, I was called views of predominantly British Pakistani “Bin Laden’s wife” or a Mirpuri workers in Birmingham and, in Bolton, British Indian Gujerati workers “terrorist lover”. who form the signifi cant minorities in their areas. A semi-structured interview When the news changed from approach was taken in the form of snapshots “terrorists” to “Arabs” my private dread conducted between 25 December 2010 of Muslims being involved became a and 29 January 2011. Interviews were not reality. Uneasy eyes wanted to probe my recorded, but detailed notes of the sessions silence. I was glad to escape the offi ce and were made during the interview to capture meet friends to watch “Moulin Rouge”, a lived experiences. Ages ranged from 21-24 romantic musical fi lm adaptation based in years with a 6:4 male: female ratio. Ethnic late 19th century Paris. Buying tickets, my backgrounds were 6 Indians, 3 Pakistanis Muslim friends and I talked about events and 1 Yemeni; all were Muslims. unfolding in America and wondered what was happening. TV screens in the cinema RESEARCH FOCUS lobby confi rmed that the culprits were Th e interviews sought the participants’ Muslims. insights on themes including identities, Th e eff ect of 9/11 on me personally was realities, values and attitudes in relation to immediate. In busy public places, I was their community, cultures and family. called “Bin Laden’s wife” or a “terrorist More specifi cally, two particular strands lover”; I was abused verbally when of thought were examined: socialising with Muslim and non-Muslim 1. What does being Muslim mean, friends. Colleagues sought my opinion and and how does this diff er from how explanation for a terrible terrorist attack as society generally labels oneself though my faith and headscarf provided and others? Are defi nitions such a hotline to Bin Laden himself. At home as Islamophobia, racism, cultural in Bolton, my family and I watched Muslim, and so forth, too complex the news and shared our real concerns. and reductive as terms for local 90 arches quarterly volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 FROM MOULIN ROUGE TO 9/11 Muslims to navigate as an identity, in a controlled, compact environment. and are local realities detached Th ose interviewed lived within a short from a national problem? radius in tight-knit, predominantly inner-city, communities. Some of these 2. Th e interviews tried to explore if community networks replicate themselves there is a “public and private space” in the workplace. Experience suggests that which enables communities to deny the younger employees may be familiar immediate realities to stave off with colleagues who attended the same change and/or to deny the existence schools, mosques, colleges or universities. of a reality, which they seek to hide As such, shared social and religious from. What these reasons may be networks may already exist. were examined. Th e call centre microcosm provides access to a generation who grew up in the An understanding of the decade after shadow of 9/11 whose views will have been 9/11 and how individuals within a locality shaped by it. Generally, individuals are at a defi ne themselves is crucial in seeing how pivotal stage of early adulthood, with most far a community has understood its own still living with their parents. challenges, and whether a community’s As Muslims are sometimes viewed as a ideals are disconnected from its reality. homogeneous religious group, the snapshot Is the cultural norm of a public face interviews were designed to gauge local and a private persona a natural coping realities and diverse cultural diff erence. mechanism in a changing post-9/11 environment? A. WHO AM I? WHO IS A MUSLIM? WHY 9/11? Quiet, outgoing, funny, religious, British, Th e events of 9/11 are referred to as a Indian and Muslim. (Mansour) defi ning moment; the beginning of a war against an undefi ned, porous enemy, and a Post-9/11 Muslims remain imagined as a “war on terror” which has subsumed vast non-integrated community living uneasily sums of money. Looking beyond the global with the wider British society. Questions picture of Muslims, I have attempted about British Muslims’ loyalty to the state, to gain a local, more intimate view of a and whether Islamic values are at odds generation of British Muslims working with those in Britain are recurring topics in call centres in 2011 and accustomed of conversation. to a post-9/11 reality. Whilst 9/11 is a key Identity is a crucial variable; an evolving reference point, the paper refers also to the descriptor through which a person is best terrorist attacks in London on 7 July 2005 able to describe who they are, based on (“7/7”). factors like appearance, race and language. When asked how they would describe their WHY CALL CENTRES? identity most participants were emphatic A call centre is usually a small, in comfortably expressing their Britishness localised business within the service equally alongside their other identities. industry employing a high number of Many said that being Muslim means usually young individuals. Staff are being many complementary things. Th e expected to work around a more fl exible majority of interviewees used their British employment arrangement but matched nationality and religious faith to declare with competitive wages. Th ey include a who they are, with their ethnicity used to large number of students whose fl exibility defi ne their racial identity. Tara describes allows them to work longer and often herself as, “British Muslim or British-born unsocial hours. Indian Muslim. It depends on who I talk Th e rationale for interviewing Muslim to.” call centre workers was because they work Th ough Nafi sa does not wear a volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 arches quarterly 91 headscarf, she sees herself as “a young, approved of 9/11. It’s quite hurtful. (Gadil) British, Muslim girl. Not attached to culture. I follow religion.” 9/11 changed things... grew out of proportion. Now I’m used to it.. it probably Whilst communities can wasn’t utopia pre-9/11 but for Muslims it and do evolve, they are was OK. (Sara) aff ected by external, Whilst the participants’ communities seem to have maintained their day to socio-political events. day rhythms, the interviews confi rm a local impact on Muslim communities as Th e interviews give a general impression a direct result of 9/11; Muslims became that belonging to an assimilated fourth or a visible minority, not due to their racial fi fth migrant generation may mean that background but because of their faith. placing British identity with a religious identity is not regarded as contradictory for most participants who feel comfortable C. POST-9/11. WHO IS THE being part of a multicultural society. MUSLIM COMMUNITY? Living as a visible minority means that Having defi ned what being Muslim interviewees are confi dent about describing means and if it remains a distinct identity, their identity and accepting how others participants were asked to explore what may describe them. community means to them. If I’m wearing Asian garb then [I’m seen People from diff erent backgrounds who are as a] Muslim or Asian Bangladeshi. Clothing close to you: street, road, [within] walking has impact. Even wearing a topi [skull cap], distance; white, black. You see them every having a beard, has an impact. (Mansour) day and ask how they are… Your neighbours [are mycommunity]. (Mansour) B. HOW WOULD YOU DEFINE YOUR COMMUNITY? Most sought to defi ne “community” Communities provide a broader sense of as an extension of the family, with the collective identity; they are a lens through familiarity of growing up with individuals, which a person can sense the dynamics identifying with certain places and the of infl uences. Th e infl uence of family, written and unwritten rules that govern neighbours and neighbourhood bind this space. Most people did not make kinship to a specifi c place. Other variables, reference to religion solely and it seems like feelings and attachment to a local area, that the community is a place with a sense help to form individual identity. of familiar concepts that most people Whilst communities can and do evolve, would identify with readily. they are aff ected by external, socio-political Togetherness, or attachment to my area… events. Th e civil disturbances (“riots”) unity… A picture of faith, colour, people in working class black communities in coming together. I don’t know what my Brixton and Toxteth in 1981 and similar community is; it crosses over Sparkhill and disturbances in Oldham in May 2001 Moseley [Birmingham areas], because it’s involving mainly Asian working class mixed, but everyone is friendly [and I] love youths had an eff ect on local communities. it. [I feel it’s] secure and safe and other However, the interviews suggest that few communities don’t have it. (Sara) global events have had a direct impact on a cultural/religious group as 9/11: Whilst a majority of the participants live I didn’t personally get aff ected... but 9/11 in areas with a high number of Muslims, made Muslims conscious and victimised. only one individual sought to defi ne When walking down the street people his community narrowly. He only saw were scared. Others may have thought you Muslims as his community despite the fact

92 arches quarterly volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 FROM MOULIN ROUGE TO 9/11 that his immediate neighbours are Hindus. loyalty to, and compatibility with British My Hindu neighbours are not my values was questioned. Some interviewees community... [White people just want to get suggested that the need to hide, to behave pissed, [they have a] diff erent background, ‘appropriately’, to withdraw from debate, no shared interests… I’ve not been exposed were just some of the emotional responses to other communities. I’ve never interacted they sensed and have displayed since with white, middle class professions and I feel 9/11. Some said that this placed them in that might aff ect me adversely [in the future]. an uncomfortable space with the need to Work is [fi lled with] white working class act in a particular way at odds with sound [people] and interaction is fairly limited. community values, or even in a manner I’ve not made.. eff ort to interact outside my seen as being hypocritical. community as [I have] not felt the need. Not had the opportunity. (Malik) Social problems in the Communities can govern behaviour and Muslim community most people can say who belongs rather are being talked about than who doesn’t. Th is is often based on in private but denied notions of personal safety and an element of ‘looking out’ for someone for unselfi sh in public, despite the reasons. Salma explained community evidence of prison through a subjective experience which, she said, was not about racial discrimination statistics. but racial familiarity: “It’s about people who help if they fi nd out you’re in trouble. Take for instance - the rise in criminal We’re quite selective about our community and social problems (not unique to any [i.e. Asian community] but a white person inner-city community) was pointed out as is not close [enough] to leave your house evidence of a kind of denial occurring in keys with them.” communities. Gang issue is a big problem ‘cos of violence D. THE PUBLIC AND THE – people going to prisons. Everyone knows it’s PRIVATE MUSLIM a problem ‘cos of violence … I’m familiar Th is notional romanticism of what drugs exists as a problem – but none of my a community is does not tally with the friends do it. (Suleman) undercurrents of social change. Where personal belief and community identity Whilst the above quote bears no direct refl ect a growing divide, the decade since link to 9/11, there is a feeling that social 9/11 has provided time for retrospective problems in the Muslim community are analysis. It could be said that prior to being talked about in private but denied 9/11 Muslim communities were, generally, in public, despite the evidence of prison integrating into British society. Th at statistics.2 To acknowledge a problem changed with 9/11; sections of wider publicly would seem to invite media-led society started to question minorities, links of Muslims with criminality as well specifi cally Muslims, about integration as terrorism. and their compatibility with society. For some participants the problem Britain’s minority ethnic seems to lie not so much in an acceptance communities, including Muslims, suff er of what is happening but the frustration disproportionately from poor socio- of not knowing what to do about it. economic conditions1 and inequality. Post- One participant said they did not want 9/11, where once minorities were described to lend credence to the negativity about in racial terms, suddenly there emerged a Muslims which is often Islamophobic, nor religious identity and label. Soon, Muslims the minority voice which questions the were the “problem” community whose compatibility of Muslims with a Western, volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 arches quarterly 93 secular society. full answers. Can’t know for sure – it’s just Th e following quotation from Mahmoud, another event of history. Just get on with who has been in prison, provides an insight it.” into his Bolton community which he feels Whether that is because 9/11 is now seen is refl ective of the national picture: as “an event that should not have occurred [Our problem is] Drugs, coke, weed [which but did” (Mohsin) or by one 23 year old then] brings fi ghts to the area… usually gang- saying that she was 12 in 2001; not even related; 10-15 lads go for other lads, and then a teenager. Her way of making sense of come back with weapons. Not always about the events illustrates the confusion: “I’m drugs but could be about girls. Th e drug still learning about my religion. One problem is not hidden any more. Everyone person doesn’t make a whole community knows the dealers. It’s hidden 'cos the Asian bad. Th e littlest things in our religion are community knows you’re not allowed to do it. highlighted when seen [by the media and Nowt is being done ‘cos dealers will continue society] as bad.” ‘cos we don’t know what to do, parents don’t One participant was uneasy about want to do anything. even mentioning 9/11 in a public space: “I’d never use the word 9/11 publicly; it According to Salma, “Lots of [Muslim] might hurt someone, so I would be careful girls have abortions by 17. Marriage is seen where I would use it. I don’t want to cause as the only cure. Th e view is still that our trouble.” (Mansour) lot wouldn’t do terrorism but people like Tara’s reasoning was logically explained: us do do it.” when discussing 9/11 with friends she Naima claims that there is constant drug “wouldn’t talk on the ‘phone ‘cos it could be dealing, gang warfare and gun crime issues tapped, MSN too...wouldn’t risk it… look in her Birmingham community but she at Guantanamo...some innocent people. “would only talk about certain issues with I’d whisper, and see who could hear. If I Muslims because non-Muslims may feel was a white person it may freak me out. I they understand but don’t… [for example] don’t like them getting worried. What if religion says no to sex before marriage so they rang the police? My parents would be it’s not religion’s fault - but it happens.” worried. People could get arrested.” What was telling about this discussion Most participants did not subscribe to a was the realisation that Muslims are not conspiracy theory per se, but were careful immune to social problems, and having an about the surroundings when discussing Asian or Arab heritage which subscribes 9/11. Tara’s response is worrying, to cultural notions of respect can be displaying the burden carried by ordinary somewhat romanticised. Th e question individuals. Th ere is a fear about how they remains about how the frustrations of will be perceived in public; their identity Muslim communities since 9/11 have led may then dictate how they behave in to a continued reluctance to deal with public and in private. It is apparent that social problems within communities. many of these young people feel pressure to negate the burden of being a watched E. POST-9/11: SUSPICIOUS community and this is then exhibited in CONSPIRACY OR MEDIA- their behaviour. ENFORCED CONSPIRACY? A With regards to behaviour, another BUNDLE OF WORRIES question explored the emergence of A consistent fi nding of this research conspiracy theories of which the media is is how 9/11 has made some Muslim seen as being at the heart. Th e question participants feel more visible and observed of whether Muslims are being unfairly in society leading to paranoia, further targeted or the focus of a wider agenda insecurity and suspicion. Gadil’s response by the Government is a discussion point. was to say, “9/11 conspiracy? I’m not in People felt anger and resentment at the a position to say anything. Th ere are no media’s lazy links between Muslims,

94 arches quarterly volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 FROM MOULIN ROUGE TO 9/11 extremism and terrorism, leading to insults are trying to address issues through trusted to their faith and identity. community or religious institutions Sara is a media studies graduate; she said beyond the gaze of the media. Whether that she no longer listened to the news or this was because mosques, for example, read newspapers as “we get brainwashed are seen as an authoritative voice, or subliminally”; she felt empowered by her because they off er guidance on Islamically decision. “forbidden topics” is inconclusive. Th e sense of taking personal Since 9/11 my community has tried to responsibility to do something about address issues like pregnancy, drugs, etc., media bias since 9/11 was refl ected by one using broadcasts into people’s homes. I know participant’s altered TV viewing patterns some people are not very exposed to what’s and use of social network sites to fi lter happening in the world so at least some people news and limit her interaction: are aware. (Tara) On Facebook, even if one of my friends adds something [to the wall] about 5 people Although there was an acceptance that will view it. (Salma) mosques are aware of social problems, there remains an underlying sense that Such news “management” allows the communities themselves do not know individual to regain an element of control what to do, itself lending to a culture of over media infl uences. denial. Malik says, “Asians have done Sara believes that the mainstream well. Lots of money. But problems. Drugs. Western media has let her down: “News is Minor issue. Terrorism is not an issue. tailor made. Al-Jazeera English, I believe My community [in inner-city Bolton] [in more]. I didn’t believe everything [else] is not underprivileged. Statistics lie. It I hear in the media. Nor is government is acceptable to lie ‘cos everyone lies, accurate. Al-Jazeera is accurate, it doesn’t including politicians and bankers.” conceal the truth. Some of my friends Some believe that social problems are think I’m a bit extreme but I don’t care.” used by the media for “Muslim bashing”. Although Muslims are just one of Denial is followed by conspiracy theories many minorities, the “Muslimisation” of and weak arguments to try explain away the background of criminals frustrates known problems. participants; they link this media shift Naima sees the media focus on Muslims directly to 9/11. For instance: “Use of the in a positive light. Instead of feeling word Muslim grates ... usually bad things victimised she sees a legitimate opportunity associated with Muslims: Muslim rapists, and social “permission” to talk positively Muslim burglars, but nothing positive said about religion (not culture) to non-Muslim about a Muslim man getting the MBE .” colleagues and friends. “Th ere’s a lot (Tara) And, “Muslims are seen negatively. of confusion about my religion. I’m not Muslim equates to terrorism. IRA are ashamed but proud. At the moment less terrorists not [but are not referred to as] bad since 9/11 ‘cos of the person I am. I Catholic terrorists.” (Malik) speak out. I can direct them to read but then it’s up to them. I don’t feel I’ve done Some participants think that post-9/11 anything wrong so why can’t I talk about media language and hysteria over Muslim it? Why should I be ashamed? Why isn’t visibility is contributing to additional every criminal labelled, like ‘Christian pressure to behave in a certain way. paedophile’?” (Naima) Suleman adds, “the British population don’t have the nous to link a criminal’s Overall, the media focus on Muslims actions as bad, but the Muslim name has led to an increased consciousness in means they’re equated with Islam; why?” terms of how they behave publicly and Another response was that communities a politically-heightened understanding are not in a permanent state of denial and about how others may judge them. volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 arches quarterly 95 F. POST-9/11: RACISM? Muslim specifi c: “Ninja, bin liner. I know ISLAMOPHOBIA? OR lots of women who have experienced this SOMETHING ELSE? [Salma’s mother in Bolton wears a burkha.] Th e above point about perceptions and had burkhas pulled off … or called of Muslims reinforced one of the few terrorist, Bin Laden’s wife; but I feel it’s surprising things to emerge from the decreasing at the moment.” interviews relating to the sudden transition Tara added that whilst such negative since 9/11 of acts of racism and racist incidents continue to occur the case of behaviour to Islamophobia. Whilst the a Muslim female teaching assistant in word itself has been in use only since 20065 who did not wear her burqa in a job 1997,3most participants’ defi nition of interview and later decided to wear it in the word matched the language used to school made her refl ect diff erently on the describe it. issue. As someone who wore the headscarf, Islamophobia is very specifi c racism. It Tara expressed her disapproval with the aff ects specifi c group. (Gadil) teaching assistant whom she felt had “put back the cause” through her subsequent Hatred of Islam. Th e word indicates a legal action as it seemed the assistant’s worry or that they’re scared. (Tara) actions were almost deceptive. Mahmoud felt that the majority of white [Racism can be] Islamophobia and linked. people he had encountered in prison were Ultimately it’s discrimination. It’s about racists. Whilst he was nonchalant about colour and race. Racism is big picture to racism he felt that prison banter such as Islamophobia. (Suleman) “when are your [Muslim] lot going to bomb this place [so we can escape]?” was Within a call centre environment, local typical. accents can be discerned on the phone, Interestingly, the diff erence between with some Asian boys being recognised Birmingham and Bolton came up when as such “when they say ting, yeah, innit, discussing personal safety. Bolton dey.” (Salma) A person’s identity cannot participants were familiar with everyday, otherwise be discerned over the telephone. casual racism and feeling unsafe. “Remember people can’t see you, so less Most Birmingham participants, whilst racism.” (Salma) visible Muslims in terms of their dress have received very little vocal abuse Simple racism cannot explain a rise in in what is a very diverse wider society. Islamophobia: “Before, the word Paki was Sam’s personal experience of being on the used; (now) all Asians are called Muslim or London Underground with a rucksack led extremists.” (Tara) to “funny looks... it’s annoying... you’re tarnished; I feel angry.” On the whole, Naima said it was “fear of Islam and Birmingham residents feel safe as Muslims what it teaches - (you) see it in America. in their city. [She referred to the American pastor Terry In Bolton, the blur between racism and Jones4 Qur’an burning provocation in anti-Muslim sentiments is an ongoing Sept 2010.] Th e Qur’an doesn’t disappear factor. One participant pointed out angrily as it’s in people’s hearts. I can’t defi ne it that he saw a demonstration by the English [Islamophobia]. Islamophobia is very Defence League (EDL) in March 2010 specifi c racism – directly aff ecting one in the town centre as a demonstration of race. I dunno. Not just based on skin hostility against his Muslim and racial colour, but it aff ects a specifi c group.” identity. Th is experience was refl ective Salma, made links in the shift in of his childhood which was littered with language from racism to anti-Islamic racist experiences, references since 9/11. Her reasoning was I see white people as racists, behind that the racist terminology became very our backs it’s all the same, based on school

96 arches quarterly volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 FROM MOULIN ROUGE TO 9/11 experience. One way or the other they’re their identities. From a sociological going to take us out of this country… we viewpoint, 9/11 may have disturbed the would have stopped EDL from coming to our natural rhythm of integration for former [Asian dominated] area... they had coaches Commonwealth migrants, and where once [coming from other areas]. (Mahmoud) migrants were identifi ed by their race; in 2011 the media and political discourse Tara added that her friends wanted to go have made a Muslim’s faith the primary to the EDL demonstration and “show what identifi er. we’re made of… to defend our community, Th e interviews confi rm that the post- but overwhelmingly to say that we’re not 9/11environment has strengthened staying at home and taking it.” Muslim identity. Th ough British Muslims Th e boundaries of racism and constitute around 2-3%, of the population, discrimination have blurred and derogatory media interest about Muslims since 9/11 comments against Muslims now seem to is disproportionately high.7 For some have some social acceptance; it is almost participants this is worrying as it reinforces certain that reactions to 9/11 have led to the opinion that Muslims are “problem this. Such acceptance is at the heart of citizens”; they feel “unjustifi ed” pressure the problem of linking personal faith with to answer for the whole community terrorism. “Th ey may see an imam in when asked if Muslims want to integrate. the mosque and see him as a terrorist and Participants feel that this constant (think) he may kill...” (Salma) media questioning diverts communities Many of the participants feel some from addressing social problems, with helplessness, because Islamophobia itself is integration related issues being defi ned as not a crime and is hard to prove. Being the big problem for the host community. called a Paki has a clearer racist sentiment Th e interviews emphasise frustration than being called a “Muslim terrorist”. at such an approach, resulting in greater Salma reasoned that, “if you ask a non- political awareness nationally and Muslim about defi ning Islamophobia internationally. then they could say the basics without the subtleties one is exposed to on a personal A decade on from level.” Th is is refl ected in how the far-right groups such as the BNP and EDL use 9/11 for many people slogans such as “Stop the Islamifi cation of a guarded, pragmatic Britain” with impunity.6 defensive position may Th e pressure to blend in, to be accepted, remains a challenge; integration implies turn out to be the best society’s acceptance of diff erence or negotiated space to have society’s acceptance of Muslim integration as a natural part of the fabric of society. emerged. Whilst many of the participants wore religious clothing and were comfortable Whilst most people, Muslim and about asking for spaces to pray at work non-Muslims, have moved on from the they appear to accept that their insecurity political climate of 9/11, most participants arising from attacks on Islam compounded feel that the Muslim community is still by the 9/11 attacks looks set to continue for being watched.8 Th e shift in the language some time. of everyday racism language, to a casual association of Islam with terrorism and CONCLUDING REMARKS extremism in the media, refl ects the A decade on from 9/11 the Muslim powerful impact of 9/11. participants in this small survey remain A concern expressed by some people confi dent British citizens who are relating to the post 9/11 and 7/7 climate is comfortable with the multiplicity of that that the smaller a community becomes volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 arches quarterly 97 FROM MOULIN ROUGE TO 9/11 for the individual (i.e. who they think 2. The Muslim population estimates vary from 2-5%, and disproportionately the Muslim prison population is currently belongs and who doesn’t) the greater the estimated to be 12%. risk of insularity. Others believe that by 3. Available at: http://www.runnymedetrust.org/ not acknowledging community problems publications/17/32.html it may appear that the Muslims are under 4. Available at: http://articles.cnn.com/2010-07-29/us/fl orida. burn.quran.day_1_quran-burning-fl orida-church-terry- attack and a way will be found to link this jones-american-muslims-religion?_s=PM:US to wider conspiracy theories. It seems 5. Available at: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/ then, that a decade on from 9/11 for many article606478.ece people a guarded, pragmatic defensive 6. (English Defence League manifesto) Available at: http:// englishdefenceleague.org/content.php?136 position may turn out to be the best 7. Oborne, P. (2008). Muslims Under Siege. University of negotiated space to have emerged. Th is Essex: London UK. Available at: http://www.channel4.com/ allows the community to acknowledge news/media/pdfs/Muslims_under_siege_LR.pdf problems which can no longer be denied 8. Anderson, Bennedict (1991). Imagined Communities: Refl ections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism Verso (e.g. drugs, alcohol, a rising Muslim prison Press. population) and that a community-based approach to is needed, along with an acceptance that what is happening is not due to a 9/11 conspiracy. Finally, the interviews suggest that there is a natural, defensive reaction when an interviewer asks whether Muslims have suff ered from negative media reaction. A decade on from 9/11, whilst there remain suspicions of media coverage, individuals are more refl ective in their responses. Certain cases highlighted in the media such as burkha/hijab issues, refl ect the various nuances of debate, especially where those cases tap into the wider public fear within the public space.

Zubeda Limbada works in local government and has extensive experience around policy and community activism. She has been a member of the BBC West Midlands Regional Audience Council; is an alumni of the Wilton Park British-German Forum, and part of Oxford University Young Muslim Leadership Programme as well as the British Council (Africa) Interaction programme. She graduated from the University of Manchester with a BA in Politics and Modern History and an MA in Middle Eastern Studies.

BIBLIOGRAPHY Allen, C. (2010). ‘Islamophobia’ London: Ashgate. Lambert, R & Githens-Mazer (2010). ‘Islamophobia and Anti- Interested Muslim Hate Crime’ London: EMRC: University of Exeter. in writing Casari, J. (2004). ‘When Islam and Democracy meet: Muslims in Europe’ Palgrave Macmillan. for Arches? Oborne, P & Jones, J. (2004). ‘Muslims Under Siege: Alienating Vulnerable Communities’, Democratic Audit, Human Rights E-mail your interests and ideas to Centre, University of Essex with Channel 4. [email protected] ENDNOTES 1. Suleiman, Y. (2009). Contextualising Islam in Britain, Centre of Islamic Studies, Cambridge: UK - http://www.cis.cam. thecordobafoundation.com ac.uk/CIBPReportWeb.pdf

98 arches quarterly volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 thecordobafoundation.com volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 arches quarterly 99 Informing Continuity: Domestic Surveillance from the Cold War to the War on Terror

STEVE HEWITT

hese are familiar stories. Young the individual was dominant in this state British men, against the wishes of discourse by initiating or encouraging the Ttheir government and despite the radicalisation of others where it otherwise surveillance of the Security Service (MI5), would not have existed to the same extent travel overseas to fi ght, and in some cases if at all. Essentially, impersonal social die, in a foreign confl ict. Other young forces were being downplayed in favour British men become radicalised while at of what might be crudely labelled a ‘great university and engage in activities that man theory of history’ in which prominent lead to the deaths of others. Yes, these individiuals alone determine the course of details are well known, but they apply to major events or societal developments. the 1930s. Th en over 2000 young British men travelled to Spain to fi ght with other Subversion is largely working-class men from around the world against fascism.1 And the men radicalised a forgotten concept while at university were the “Cambridge since the end of the Five” who betrayed their country by spying for the Soviet Union and in the process Cold War although revealing secrets that led to deaths. some have argued for If the issue of radicalisation isn’t a new its resurrection in the one, neither is the response of the state to radicalism. In the 1930s, many in the context of a fi ght against general public clearly saw the support for terrorism. radical causes and general radicalism to be a consequence of the wider societal environment such as the economic Although the post-Cold War discourse malaise brought on because of the Great has emphasized the signifi cance of Depression and the “crisis of capitalism” counter-espionage as the focus of domestic or the destructive Great War that had led intelligence practices during the Cold to the deaths of millions while spawning War, in reality greater emphasis was on societal upheaval such as the Russian countering perceived subversion on the Revolution (when the real Cold War began part of radicalised individuals.3 Subversion for domestic security agencies in western is largely a forgotten concept since the end nations). of t he C old Wa r a lt houg h some have a rg ued Western states and their security for its resurrection in the context of a fi ght agencies, however, interpreted against terrorism.4 It is at best a nebulous radicalisation diff erently in echoes of the concept. Elizabeth Grace and Colin Leys present approach in the United Kingdom defi ne subversion as ‘legal activities and and elsewhere. Th eir interpretation was ideas directed against the existing social, what the late Frank Donner, who wrote economic and political order (and very extensively about the American domestic seldom against “democracy”, as liberal- security state, labelled as ‘the agitator- democratic states are wont to claim).’5 subversion thesis, which’, he noted, ‘denies In some ways it parallels terrorism in the the relevance of social and economic present whereby eff orts to produce a single factors as the cause of unrest.’2 Instead, defi nition continually fail. Even within the 100 arches quarterly volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 INFORMING CONTINUITY: DOMESTIC SURVEILLANCE FROM THE COLD WAR TO THE WAR ON TERROR government of the United States there exist CCTV cameras are the perfect example several diff erent defi nitions.6 of this type of information gathering. In If some similarities exist between the the United Kingdom, CCTV cameras are Cold War and the War on Terror in terms a permanent and generally overt fi xture of of domestic perceptions of the threat to the urban landscape that impact on the the state with the emphasis on individuals, privacy of all although not always equally radicalism, and, at times, concepts lacking as Project Champion in Birmingham in clarity, the parallels are stronger in terms proved.8 of how the security state has responded In contrast, informing and informers is to the real and imagined threats. Th is a secretive activity that is not fl agged up response to radicalisation has refl ected for all to see. Nor is informing ever, except some or all of the elements of the pattern in undemocratic ‘informer states’ of the described by Donner in his important type that the former German Democratic study of Cold War domestic intelligence Republic represented, experienced equally practices in the United States: or even at all by all parts of the population. 1) physical surveillance of a `subject,’ Instead, certain groups, individuals, and usually conducted in secret and communities, usually deemed a threat by frequently termed `information the state and in some way marginalized gathering’ or `data collection,’ benign (although possibly for legitimate reasons usages characteristic of a system of as in the case of the Ku Klux Klan in the repression; 1960s), disproportionately or exclusively 2) a body of techniques that, in experience the practice of informing.9 addition to informer infi ltration, ranged from observation and Essentially, the more mail opening to wiretapping and photography; diff erent the targets 3) the compilation and dissemination are from those tasked of fi les and dossiers about individuals and organizational `subjects’; with spying on them, 4) the assessment of fi le data; and the greater the need for 5) the aggressive use of such data to informers. do injury to the subject.7

It is Donner’s second point that I wish Th e reasons why informers were crucial to focus on in the remainder of this piece for counter-subversion investigations in the because it demonstrates clear continuity Cold War and remain critical for counter- between the past and present. Specifi cally, terrorism investigations in the War on I am referring to the collection of Terror can be summarized through the information through the use of informers. acronym N.E.R.D. Informers generally receive less attention `N’ represents the nature of the target. when it comes to spying than does the Essentially, the more diff erent the targets use of technology to achieve the same are from those tasked with spying on them, end. Th ere are a number of reasons for the greater the need for informers. Th is was this inequality. Technology, particularly true during the Cold War when members as portrayed in popular culture (see, for of certain Eastern European ethnic groups example, Hollywood movies Enemy of the were targeted because of their involvement State or Minority Report), can be exciting in far-left radicalism. Intelligence agencies, and sexy. Spying through technology lacking linguistic skills, had to recruit is also frequently more overt and informers from within the targeted omnipresent and thus seemingly imperils communities. Th e lack of diversity within the privacy of wide swaths of the general security agencies has also applied to gender public in addition to specialized targets. in the past. Into the early 1970s, the two volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 arches quarterly 101 main domestic intelligence agencies in by the government’s interest in obtaining Canada and the United States, in part information. Th ere is nothing that requires refl ecting that policing and intelligence that a determination be made of whether work has been historically gendered male, less intrusive means will adequately serve still did not have female agents or offi cers. the government’s interest. Th ere is also no Despite this limitation, they still requirement that the decisions of FBI offi cials managed to conduct detailed espionage to use informants be reviewed by anyone against women’s liberation groups, outside the Bureau. In short, intelligence including all-female gatherings. Th is informant coverage has not been subject to could not have occurred without the the standards which govern the use of other utilization of informers.10 Th is point is intrusive techniques such as wiretapping or even more relevant in the increasingly other forms of electronic surveillance.15 multicultural world of today. Government agencies simply cannot always be diverse At the time the only loosely enforced enough to have expertise in every language restrictions on intelligence informers were and/or culture present in many countries internal ones included in the FBI’s ‘Manual today- think of cities like London, New of Instructions’ that it did not publicize, York and Toronto that literally have added the Church Committee.16 Currently, representatives of every corner of the globe. the Canadian government requires its It is for this reason that the Federal Bureau main intelligence agency, the Canadian of Investigation is becoming increasingly Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), to reliant on informers for intelligence-related get special political permission, including investigations, more so than for normal retroactively, if necessary, when informers criminal work, particularly as a starting are utilized against sensitive targets, such point into terrorism investigations.11 as university campuses and churches and In the United Kingdom, there has been mosques, but these uses still do not involve a drive to recruit more informers from the obtaining of a warrant.17 Since 2000, among Muslim communities because of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers the diffi culties the police and MI5 have Act (RIPA) in the United Kingdom has had in penetrating them from within governed the deployment of informers, their own ranks which is in part down to or Covert Human Intelligence Source their own failures to refl ect the makeup (CHIS) in MI5 parlance, in investigations, of the communities they are targeting for including who has authority to authorize surveillance.12 their use, but there still is no requirement `E’ stands for ease and eff ectiveness to obtain a warrant.18 An informer then is which is why informers are deployed. In a type of state surveillance that does not democratic societies, it is often easier to require the same legal hoops to be jumped employ informers than forms of shadowing through as does surveillance through involving technology. A scandal erupted technology. in December 2005, when the New York Th en there is the eff ectiveness that goes Times revealed that the administration with informers. Informers represent a of President George W. Bush had been precise type of surveillance that in some conducting warrantless communications ways is more diffi cult, although not, of interceptions.13 No similar requirements course, impossible, to counteract as it can exist for the deployment of informers.14 Th e come in the form of a friend, colleague, committee of Senator Frank Church which or even family member. Some targets in the 1970s investigated wrongdoings by did and do attempt to employ methods American intelligence agencies noted this to counter informers. Moving to smaller anomaly: cells, with each having little knowledge Th ere is no specifi c determination made of the activities of the others, is one such as to whether the substantial intrusion method. Questioning members about their represented by informant coverage is justifi ed backgrounds and political convictions is

102 arches quarterly volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 INFORMING CONTINUITY: DOMESTIC SURVEILLANCE FROM THE COLD WAR TO THE WAR ON TERROR another. In the 1960s, it might involve on, participate or even take a lead role in having to partake in drugs as proof of one’s the activities that they are spying on.23 Th is counterculture credentials.19 An additional is the most controversial aspect of all when technique is to require serious criminal it comes to this type of spying as it can activity as a test of the commitment to the lead to allegations of entrapment through group and out of the belief that an informer manipulation of events by informer s. would not engage in such actions. Still, it Th is has particularly been the case in the is a style of information collecting that is United States where since the attacks of 11 active instead of passive as technological September, informers have played a lead surveillance can be and which brings a role in counter-terrorism investigations. precision often missing when technology Indeed, the number of informers on the is deployed. FBI payroll has risen from 1500 in 1975 to `R’ represents resources. Professional over 15000 in 2011, the growth of which technological surveillance in whatever since 9-11 has been driven by terrorism form it takes is expensive. Th ere’s a investigations. With informers repeatedly reason that the American National playing key roles in plots or as witnesses Security Agency (NSA) and the National in court cases, allegations of entrapment Reconnaissance Offi ce (NRO), the have abounded although they have yet to agencies that handle technological prevent convictions in counter-terrorism surveillance including satellites for the cases.24 American government, combine together to represent approximately a third of the One of the main U.S. intelligence budget compared to roughly ten percent for the CIA, which grievances of Muslim specializes in human intelligence. In a communities against the direct comparison, the NSA’s budget is double that of the CIA’s and it has three police is the recruitment times as many employees.20 Technology is and use of informers. costly and its use is complicated -- even in the present basic technological surveillance of a subject, which still on occasion Whether during the Cold War or the involves physical access to the targeted War on Terror, the surveillance activities group or individual’s property or body, can of domestic security agencies in democratic involve up to a dozen people performing a societies against real and imagined variety of tasks.21 All of these factors make radicalism have proven to be controversial. this type of spying by the state in most Th e lack of transparency over the same democratic nations expensive, complicated period is equally problematic. While a and unwieldy and the incentive to use case could be made that during the Cold informers that much greater. War communism, backed by the military Finally, `D’ is for destructiveness, might of the Soviet Union, represented an which is the impact that informers and essential threat to western democracies, informing have. It is not a coincidence that this is clearly not the case in the present most of the names applied to informers with the small number of individuals who are negative and why those who employ choose to engage in terrorism. Informers them use neutral or positive terminology are one aspect of the surveillance such as `source’ or `asset.’ 22 Some of methods against this terrorist threat that this negativity emanates from the nature are disproportionately experienced by of informing which at its heart involves marginalized communities in liberal- betrayal, potentially at a fundamental level. democratic countries. Not surprisingly, But it also relates to the active role that these communities are not happy about informers can take as agents provocateurs being targets. Academic studies in both who, far from passively observing goings the United States and the United Kingdom volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 arches quarterly 103 INFORMING CONTINUITY: DOMESTIC SURVEILLANCE FROM THE COLD WAR TO THE WAR ON TERROR have found that one of the main grievances 9. Hewitt, Steve (2010). Snitch: A History of the Modern Intel- ligence Informer (London & New York: Continuum). of Muslim communities against the police 10. Rosen, Rush (2001). The World Split Open: How the Modern 25 is the recruitment and use of informers. Women's Movement Changed America (New York: Penguin In 2006, the president of Arab-Muslim Books), pp.240-60. American Federation, Wael Mousfar, 11. Romney, Lee (2006). ‘The Trouble with Informants,’ Houston Chronicle, 12 August. lamented the impact of such spying: 12. Johnston, Phillip (2005). ‘MI5 Seeks “Older, Wiser Women”,’ We feel that we’ve been violated and being Daily Telegraph, 10 May; Evans, Michael (2006). ‘More Britons spied on is not an easy thing. When you sit Are Turning to Terror, Says MI5 Director,’ Times, 10 November; and pray, you’re not worried about only Calman, Barney (2006). ‘Policing with Passion; Is the Met Police Still Prejudiced against Ethnic Minorities and Women?,’ Evening paying attention to a prayer, concentrating Standard, 10 July. on your prayer, you’re worried about whether 13. Risen, James & Lichtblau, Eric (2005). ‘Bush Lets U.S. Spy on the person next to you is spying on you, is Callers Without Courts,’ New York Times, 16 December. working for the Government, working for the 14. Civil liberties groups have campaigned for tighter rules. See, for example, a campaign by the American Civil Liberties FBI, whoever, and this is not an easy feeling-- Union (ACLU): ‘Unnecessary Evil: Blind Trust and Unchecked not only to take news or listen to what’s going Abuse in America’s Informant System,’ American Civil Liberties on, but also to twist around what is said.26 Union, http://www.aclu.org/drugpolicy/search/informanta- buse.html (accessed 23 April 2009). 15. Church Committee, ‘Final Report of the Select Committee Th ere is a crucial need for greater to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intel- cooperation between security agencies ligence Activities,’ (Washington, D.C.: Congress, 1976), and Muslim communities in the pursuit http://www.icdc.com/~paulwolf/cointelpro/churchfi nalreportI- of common counter-terrorism goals. IIj.htm (accessed 13 May 2009). 16. FBI ‘Manual of Instructions,’ as quoted in Church Commit- However, Cold War surveillance through tee, ‘Final Report.’ informing in democratic societies still 17. Steve Hewitt, Spying 101: The RCMP’s Secret Activities at lacks transparency and proper legal Canadian Universities, 1917-1997 (Toronto: University of Toronto accountability which undermines trust Press, 2002), 208-11. 18. ‘Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000,’ Offi ce of Pub- and makes us all less safe. lic Sector Information, http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2000/ ukpga_20000023_en_5#pt2 (accessed 21 March 2009); `Covert Steve Hewitt is a Senior Lecturer in the Department Human Intelligence Sources,’ MI5, no date, https://www.mi5. of American and Canadian Studies at the University gov.uk/output/covert-human-intelligence-sources.html (ac- of Birmingham. He has written extensively on matters related to security and intelligence. His cessed 28 November 2011). publications include The British War on Terror: Terrorism 19. Grathwohl, Larry & Reagan, Frank (1976). Bringing Down and Counterterrorism on the Home Front since 9-11 America: An FBI Informer with the Weathermen (New Rochelle, (Continuum, 2008) and Snitch!: A History of the Modern New York: Arlington House Publishers), p.122. Intelligence Informer (Continuum, 2010). 20. Woodward, Bob (2004). Plan of Attack (New York: Simon and Shuster, 2004), p.213; Keefe, Patrick Radden (2005). Chatter: ENDNOTES Dispatches from the Secret World of Global Eavesdropping (New 1. Buchanan, Tom (2011). ‘The secret history of Britain's Span- York: Random House), p.xiv. ish civil war volunteers,’ Guardian, 28 June. 21. Sallot, Jeff (2006). ‘Canada Could Escape Attack, CSIS Says,’ 2. Donner, Frank (1990). Protectors of Privilege: Red Squads and Globe and Mail, 20 June; Hewitt, Spying 101, 32. Police Repression in Urban America (Berkeley: University of 22. Donner,Frank J.(1980). The Age of Surveillance: The Aims California), p.76. and Methods of America’s Political Intelligence System (New 3. For a study of counter-subversion eff orts in the United York), p.464. States during the Cold War, see Theoharis, Athan (1978). Spying 23. Nor is it just informers who can play this role. As recent on Americans: Political Surveillance from Hoover to the Huston media coverage in the UK has shown, undercover police offi c- Plan (Philadelphia: Temple University Press). ers can also play role of agents provocateurs. 4. Banoutsos, Andreas (2008). ‘The West and the Threat from 24. Aaronson, Trevor (2011). `The Informants,’ Mother Jones, Islamist Subversion,’ Research Instintte for European and September/October 2011, http://motherjones.com/poli- American Studies, http://www.rieas.gr/research-areas/global- tics/2011/08/fbi-terrorist-informants (accessed 25 November issues/islamic-studies/802.html 2 November (last accessed 18 2011). November 2011). 25. Spalek, Basia, El Awa, Salwa & McDonald, Laura Zahra 5. Grace, Elizabeth & Leys, Colin (1989) ‘The Concept of Subver- (2009). `Police-Muslim Engagement and Partnerships for the sion and its Implications,’ in C.E.S. Franks, ed., Dissent and the Purposes of Counter-Terrorism: An Examination,’ 2009, http:// State (Toronto), p.62. www.scribd.com/doc/26514450/Police-Muslim- Enld (accessed 6. `What is Terrorism?’ Terrorism Research, no date, http://www. 1 February 2011); Schanzer, David, Kurzman, Charles & Moosa, terrorism-research.com/ (last accessed 30 November 2011). Ebrahim (2010). `Anti-Terror Lessons of Muslim-Americans,’ 6 7. Donner, Protectors of Privilege, 3. January, http://fds.duke.edu/db/attachment/1255 (accessed 1 8. Lewis, Paul (2010). `Birmingham stops camera surveillance December 2011). in Muslim areas,’ Guardian, 17 June. 26. Wael Mousfar, as quoted in ‘File on 4- U.S. Muslims,’ BBC Radio Transcript, 4 July 2006. 104 arches quarterly volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 BOOK PROMOTION

THE BRITISH WAR ON TERROR: TERRORISM AND COUNTERTERRORISM ON THE HOME FRONT SINCE 9-11 BY STEVE HEWITT

InI Th e British War on Terror, Steve Hewitt provides a concise but comprehensivec examination of over a hundred years of experience of counterc terrorism in the UK. Th e author explains the workings of the BritishB legal, political and intelligence strands of policy. Highlighting thet complexities of the terrorist threat and the challenges of counteringc it, he argues that since 9/11, policy has been inadequate and inconsistent. Th e British War on Terror is a balanced and informed examination of recent events, off ering a historical and contemporary context to this new threat.

The British War on Terror: Terrorism and Counterterrorism on the Home Front since 9-11 by Steve Hewitt. Published in 2008 by Continuum International Publishing Group Ltd.

BOOK PROMOTION SNITCH!:S A HISTORY OF THE MODERN INTELLIGENCE INFORMER BY STEVE HEWITT Snitch!: A History of the Modern Intelligence Informer is a very informative and engagingly written survey of source operations in intelligence and law enforcement. Author Steve Hewitt attempts to make the book relevant to 21st Century operations, by exploiting engaging case studies to highlight modern practices.

Snitch!: A History of the Modern Intelligence Informer by Steve Hewitt. Published in 2010 by Continuum International Publishing Group Ltd.

volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 arches quarterly 105 Time for Change After 10 Years of Detention Without Trial

PAUL DONOVAN

man known only as G1 has just see all the material relating to why they are marked the 10th anniversary of being held. Th e accused have never been A being detained without trial by the told of what they are accused. British state. Th e government has been prevented “I’ve been here 10 years now, no trial, no from deporting the individuals concerned charge, no evidence produced to challenge. due to the danger that they may face torture Me, my wife and children don’t know or worse in the countries from which they how long it will take to attain justice and fl ed. Some, however, have returned due freedom,” said G. to the mental torture being imposed by G and another man are the only two indefi nite detention in the UK. who remain of the 13 originally picked up Two men, Benaissa Taleb and Rida in December 2001, following the passing Dendani, who agreed to return to Algeria into law of the Anti-terror Crime and voluntarily, believed they would not be Security Act (ATCSA). detained for more than a few hours on Th e men, mainly Algerian, were taken arrival. Th e British diplomat who arranged to Belmarsh Prison, where they were their deportations had promised that there detained. “I was put together with the was no risk they would be held by the other detainees. We were kept a minimum Algerian secret police. “Th ey were both of 22 hours in the cell and never saw the interrogated for 12 days, during which they sky. I did not see my wife for six months,” were threatened and subjected to serious recalled G. physical ill-treatment,” said solicitor In 2004 there was the House of Lords Gareth Peirce. “Th ey were then charged, ruling that the ATCSA was unlawful under tried, and, some months later convicted, the Human Rights Act. Th is resulted in on the basis of the “confessions forced the regime, known as control orders, being from them during this time. Dendani was developed. Detainees were restricted to a sentenced to eight years imprisonment; house or fl at, with stipulations about where Taleb to three.” they could move in the local geographical Another Algerian man, Mustafa Taleb, location and at what times. Access to was originally one of eight people accused phones and the internet were banned. Th ey of involvement in what became known had to ring the tagging company regularly. as the ricin trial, where no ricin was ever People who visit have to be vetted. G found. Arrested in 2003, the case came to recalled it taking three months to get a court in 2005 when all eight accused were plummer in to fi x the family’s washing cleared. machine. Th en came the London bombings. A Th e process that has kept G and others number of the acquitted men were picked incarcerated over recent years has been up, including Mustafa Taleb, as well as G. overseen by the Special Immigration Th ey were served with deportation notices Appeals Commission (SIAC). Th is body on the basis of being national security operates under immigration law, dealing threats. Since that time these men have with cases where national security is in been held either in prison or under the question. It operates with special advocates house arrest style conditions. representing the detainee. Mustafa Taleb now lives alone, allowed Lawyers for the detainees are not able to out at set times and only able to move 106 arches quarterly volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 TIME FOR CHANGE AFTER 10 YEARS OF DETENTION WITHOUT TRIAL within a restricted area. One person who men, known as AS and DD, came before has regularly visited him over recent the SIAC in 2007 with the government years has been Bruce Kent, who has been seeking to send them back to Libya on the appalled at what he has seen. “He has the basis of an MOU. marks on his body to this day from the Th e SIAC did not agree. Th is no doubt torture and the British government want was partly due to the fact that the body to send him back to the torturers,” said Mr allocated to monitor the safety of the Kent. “It is disgraceful and against British individuals concerned was the Gaddafi law to go on detaining people without Foundation, headed by the Colonel’s son knowing of what they are accused.” Saif. Th e government has been prevented Another factor pointed out by the men’s from deporting the individuals concerned law yer Ga ret h Pei rc e c a me f rom some of t he due to the danger that they may face expert evidence off ered. “Th e deportations torture or worse in the countries from would almost certainly have been ordered which they fl ed. In order to get around on the basis of the MOU had not the this problem, the British government has government’s expert witness ventured one sought Memorandums of Understanding observation too many: when asked whether (MOU) from those governments. Th ese are the men would enjoy a fair trial in Libya, written guarantees from the governments the witness replied of course, Gaddafi concerned regarding the safety of the would personally intervene to ensure that individuals returning. Human rights the judges delivered just that,” said Peirce, organisations like Amnesty International who has also suggested the reason behind argue that the very need to have such the Libyans being picked up in the fi rst a guarantee makes any such document place was to do with negotiations between worthless. “Memoranda of understanding’ the British and Libyan governments over and ‘diplomatic assurances’ do not protect oil. “In 2005 Libyan oilfi elds were made people from torture. Th ey are legally available for public auction. Might there unenforceable and monitoring by local have been a two-way accommodation? You organisations is not enough to ensure give us oil, we give you your dissidents?” they are honoured. Th e countries that said Peirce. they are signed with are already defying international law by torturing people, Wherever there were so there’s no reason to believe they will honour a paper promise to the UK dissidents that could be government,” said Tim Hancock, director branded Islamist by the of Campaigns at Amnesty International UK. “What’s more, these assurances British government it undermine the global ban on returning was then the case that people to countries where they could face the British government torture.” Th e government has so far obtained joined in on the side of MOUs from Libya, Jordan, Ethiopia the oppressive state. and Lebanon. Th ere was “an exchange of letters” between the governments of Algeria and the UK guaranteeing the safety More recently the British government of returning citizens.2 Th e weakness of the played a leading role in the overthrow of MOU, which the present government has the Gadaffi regime, claiming his brutality continued to try to establish with other against his own people as one of the reasons countries, was best demonstrated by the for its actions in helping the rebels.3 Peirce case of Libya. believes the narrative that has been used Back in 2005, a number of Libyans were to justify detention without trial, torture picked up and detained. Th e cases of two and war was established by Tony Blair’s volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 arches quarterly 107 government when it decided political Secretary Roy Jenkins, the PTA brought Islam was the enemy. Wherever there were in seven day detention without charge. dissidents that could be branded Islamist by Th is was renewed annually.Th en as the the British government it was then the case peace process took hold at the close of the that the British government joined in on century and prior to 9/11, the Terrorism the side of the oppressive state. So this was Act 2000 was introduced bringing in 14 seen with the British government siding day pre-charge detention. with the Algerian, Russian, Egyptian and After 9/11, the ATCSA was brought in Libyan regimes against rebel groups. “Here bringing about the regime of internment we are 10 years on in a state of perpetual with few limits. Since then, this has been war, no concept of talking to each other, refi ned, with control orders and their understanding each other,” said Peirce, successor the Terrorism, Prevention and who pointed out how the dissidents that Investigation Measures (Tpims). Th e level the British helped oppress over the past of pre-charge detention went up to 28 days decade in places like Tunisia and Libya in 2005 after the Labour Government now make up the government. was defeated over its eff orts to get 90 days Peirce described Britain as the land of passed. the hunted, where the enemy within is So the plight of those individuals who sort out everywhere. “So our prisons are remain detained without trial after ten full of young men and women who don’t years remains part of a work in progress. Th e know why they are there,” said Peirce. last decade has simply been an extension Th e lawyer believes the Muslim men held of what went before in the Irish context, in detention have been treated as guinea with the gradual extension of a security pigs by the British government to see how state that is accountable to no one. It has far it can push things. “Th e continuing grown up in the shadows, and Mrs Peirce experiment is dangerous and insidious in is right, those unfortunate individuals like more than one way. It has become very G, Mustafa Taleb and others have become clear that when one challenge is overcome the guinea pigs for this process. And with the goalposts are moved and a new system the threat of civil unrest on the horizon, comes in,” said Peirce. with the worsening economic situation, A look to the Troubles in the north there can be little doubt that the security of Ireland provides an important link, state will fi nd more willing accomplices in suggesting that the whole process of government prepared to extend its powers cutting rights at the behest of maintaining still further. Th e big question for the rest security under the aegis of anti-terror law of us is when will we say enough and has been a work in process for the past 40 insist that the rule of law is restored for all years. citizens of this country and that there will be no further detention without trial? The plight of those Paul Donovan is a freelance journalist who has been individuals who remain writing on the issue of detention without trial for more than a decade. He has contributed pieces to detained without trial the Guardian, Independent, New Statesman, Irish Post, after ten years remains Big Issue, Church Times and Universe on the subject. part of a work in

progress. ENDNOTES 1. G has been detained without trial by the British state, fi rstly, under the ACTSA when he was imprisoned in Belmarsh Th e Prevention of Terrorism Act Prison, secondly following his release on receiving a control was introduced in 1974 following the order. Birmingham pub bombings. Described 2. Letter of 11 July 2006 Tony Blair to President of as “draconian” by its author, then Home Algeria Abdelaziz Boutefl ika – see: www.webarchive. nationalarchives.gov.uk/20091222080256

108 arches quarterly volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 TIME FOR CHANGE AFTER 10 YEARS OF DETENTION WITHOUT TRIAL

3. MPs voted on the following motion: “That this House taking of all necessary measures to protect civilians and welcomes United Nations Security Council (UNSC) civilian-populated areas under threat of attack in Libya Resolution 1973; deplores the ongoing use of violence and to enforce the No Fly Zone, including the use of UK by the Libyan regime; acknowledges the demonstrable armed forces and military assets in accordance with UNSC need, regional support and clear legal basis for urgent Resolution 1973; and off ers its wholehearted support to the action to protect the people of Libya; accordingly supports men and women of Her Majesty’s armed forces.” 557 MPs Her Majesty’s Government, working with others, in the voted for the motion while only 13 voted against.

• Everyone has the right to a fair trial under national and international law.

• Secret evidence restricts that right and the proper functioning of our legal system.

• The European Court of Human Rights recognised that this goes against the right to a fair trial and ruled against the British government.

The Coalition Against Secret Evidence (CASE) was set up in February 2009 and is made up of individuals and organisations working on the issue of the use of secret evidence in the UK courts. Secret evidence is an aff ront to the rights and freedoms guaranteed by our legal system for more than 800 years. CASE campaigns for an end to the use of secret evidence in British courts, the restoration of everyone’s right to know the reason why they are detained and an end to a system based on secrecy and unfairness.

[email protected] www.coalitionagainstsecretevidence.com volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 arches quarterly 109 Shifting Paradigms: De-Radicalisation

AHMAD HASSAN

here remain many assumptions fi eldwork, including over three years as about the methods adopted by an intervention provider, and 15 years of Tgovernments to tackle violent experience regarding Takfi ri networks and extremism. On the one hand, those that their objectives. exist within the policy-world of State For the purpose of this paper, masculine agencies are based on three key assumptions: pronouns will be used for gender-neutral fi rstly, that governments can tackle violent or unidentifi ed nouns. extremism through ‘community cohesion’ and ‘shared values’; secondly, communities PREVENTATIVE CT WORK want cohesion and shared values; and We start at the true precipice of current thirdly, if communities do not want these debate within policy circles: should features, they ‘could’ be convinced of their Preventative CT work remain? Based on the value. On the other hand, the neurotic policy’s development and implementation but nuanced reality of Western Muslim over the past fi ve years, it can be confi dently life houses its own assumptions. As a result argued that preventative strands were ‘over’ of persistent denial and apologies, Western before they began for two key reasons: Muslim communities assumed they could fi rstly, due to the controversy surrounding avoid owning up to their role in resolving Preventative CT work’s primary focus the problem of violent extremism. In being on Muslim communities; and part, this was due to the belief that the secondly, owing to preventative work’s underlying rationale behind Counter relationship with actual police led CT Terrorism (CT) strategies of governments operations. Th e former has lived under served intelligence gathering and spying. It the dark - somewhat cloak and dagger - was also derived from the conviction that existence of the latter.1 foreign policy was the main driver behind acts of violence. VULNERABILITIES AND Despite eff orts to dispel these RADICALISATION assumptions, these perceptions continue to If an individual journeys from ‘relative cloud the overall CT Strategy, wherever it obscurity’ to ‘perfect clarity’ through what may be relevant. If the strategy is to continue we have come to term ‘radicalisation’, it is or, more importantly, be eff ective, we can crucial to recognise that this process is as no longer ignore diametrically opposed lucid and dynamic as the secondary factors perceptions of the policy by governments that propel the individual into the depths and communities. of vulnerability that worry government Th e purpose of this article is to weigh agencies. To this day in Prevent, we remain up the governmental expectations of CT unclear about which of an individual’s aims against the reality. Th e points made vulnerabilities need tackling. At times, aim to openly address, contextualise and public sector bodies have assumed the need clarify the issues of Takfi ri belief and the to support issues such as mental health plausibility of ‘de-radicalisation’ – topics or socio-economic milieus in order to that have long been avoided despite their reduce the risk of an individual’s potential centrality to CT Objectives. criminality. Before continuing, it is important to Very quickly, this mainstream note that this paper is based on 5 years’ vulnerability approach gave way to the 110 arches quarterly volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 SHIFTING PARADIGMS: DE-RADICALISATION ‘specialist’ intervention provider who based on beliefs, views and perspectives. more often than not would be attempting By contrast, Takfi rism is based solely a theologically driven intervention to on one belief: takfi r is the practice of ‘safeguard’ the vulnerable individual. declaring judgement (ex-communication) Examples of this would projects like the on other people or groups considered to South London based ‘STREET’ and be theologically inferior of misguided and ‘SIRRAT’, both of whom rely on Saudi thus kafi r (non-believers in God). Salafi sm as the basis for reducing the Th ere are three key characteristics of extremist narrative from the individual. Takfi ri belief that have implications on From here on in, the pursuit of eff ectiveness Preventative intervention work. was underway. However, this objective and its aims have been a failure given that there Characteristic One are still no obvious metrics to measure if Th e fi rst characteristic of Takfi ri belief one intervention is any better than another is the unequivocal acceptance that the and that the most recent refreshing of the individual, regardless of his intellectual Prevent strategy now appears to exclude or scholarly standing, is capable of casting ‘Salafi st’ organisations as they do ‘share’ judgement on fellow Muslims. As such, the same values as the government. Th is Takfi ris act on this belief, trying to ‘correct’ creates obvious doubt as to whether the others’ deviance by convincing them to policy is truly informed by best practice or adopt Takfi ri creed. For Takfi ris this is best guessing. essential, as if it is not possible to agree on creed, a Takfi ri has no basis upon which The people most at risk to develop a relationship with another individual. Consequently, in line with the of violent extremism are aims of preventative work, any attempt those on the Takfi ri point to intervene with a Takfi ri or sway such fervent sentiment is met with unequivocal of the Salafi st spectrum. negativity. Essentially, a Takfi ri will only listen to another Takfi ri, as he perceives all Contributing to this was the failure to others to be non-believers. involve those individuals who are most Th e outcomes of the author’s work ‘at risk’ of violent extremism in targeted with Takfi ris indicate that the resulting intervention support. Th ough the failure of best case scenario of such an intervention this work has not aff ected national security, is to successfully convince the Takfi ri the threat from acts of Al-Qaeda inspired individual that the conditions of physical terrorism has gradually diminished since jihad are not yet at their zenith. Other 2006, due to the changing nature of the interventions, be they focussed on threat combined with the success of Pursue doctrine, emotion, society or culture, (arrests), as opposed to Preventative eff orts. will not be able to permeate the Takfi ri mindset. Th erefore at best, interventions TAKFIRI BELIEF may result in a ‘ceasefi re’ (hudnah),3 or Th e people most at risk of violent at worst, they may further radicalise the extremism are those on the Takfi ri point individual. of the Salafi st spectrum.2 Th ough other doctrines have proved to be as vulnerable Characteristic Two if conditions favourable to radicalisation Th e second characteristic of Takfi ri exist, Takfi ri belief will always form the belief is the acceptance that the world is basis of violent action and its rationale. A defi nitively and decisively split in to two classic error has been to label the threat camps; the Abode of Islam/Peace (Dar of violent extremism as the Al Qaeda or al-Islam) and the Abode of War (Dar al- Takfi ri ideology rather than Takfi ri belief. Harb). Th e two sides are in perpetual Ideologies are organised sets of ideas confl ict until one prevails over the other. volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 arches quarterly 111 If a Takfi ri believes he is living in an vulnerable individuals via a multi-agency abode of war, he is likely to claim that panel including police, local government, the conditions and restrictions applicable social services and other statutory agencies to times of peace are nullifi ed. As such, a or partners. Takfi ri may believe this allows him to act in any manner he deems appropriate. Hence, POLITICISATION illegal activity becomes legal, actions Although this journey is not linear, it contrary to Shari’a Law are permissible, is a process of deduction and falsifi cation. and most importantly, the ends justify the An individual may start from a broad means. Until the abode of war becomes the Salafi st perspective, which restrains an abode of Islam, the mission to spread the individual’s right to wage physical jihad latter continues. In this context, as with the through a series of rules and stipulations issue of defensive jihad, the key concept of relating to behaviour, action and authority. takkiyah (subversion) is misused to protect According to this approach, the authority the individual’s personal, collective and to permit jihad lays within the hands of the ideological interests. state and its leaders - not individuals. Th is According to Takfi ri history, the abode is the basis for both the Saudi and Yemeni of war has been in eff ect since at least de-radicalisation and the ‘STREET’ 1928. Although it is commonly believed project form South London. that the threat of militant Islamic violence If this doctrinal position cannot contain we currently face is Al-Qaeda inspired, the mind of the individual, the next they can only be credited with exploiting - port of call is often the political version, rather than conceiving - the concept of dar commonly referred to as ‘Islamism’ but al-harb. Th is thus highlights the need to better defi ned as ‘political Salafi sm’. Th is not only tackle Al-Qaeda inspired ideology perspective provides a pair of politically but also its roots, Takfi ri belief. tainted glasses through which to view the Quran and hadith. Salafi s are by no Characteristic Three means the only ones vulnerable to this Th e third characteristic is to apply political interpretation, but their literalist literalist meanings from the Quran and alignment renders them generally more Sunna (hadith) to current geo-political open to it. events as the barometers of any legal rulings. Takfi ri beliefs state that the AUTONOMOUS INDIVIDUAL actions, as opposed to intentions, of states ACTION or their leaders constitute the basis for their However others, namely Takfi ris, feel judgement. Takfi ris cannot agree with this gradualist cultivation of theological these actions if they are not in line with crops to be a futile pursuit. Instead, they the true teachings of Takfi ri Islam. As an favour a more direct, individual and violent extension of this, Takfi ris class anyone they approach. In doing so, the individual starts perceive to be too closely allied to western to believe that his immediate action is governments as murtaddoon (apostates) essential to the global imposition of Islam. and a fl ag bearer of the taghut (liars). Subsequently, he realises that the ability Accordingly, if an intervention is led by to justify his actions through - a distorted a government-linked provider or from reading of - sacred text allows individual anything other than a Takfi ri perspective, actions to contribute to a global struggle in the eyes of the targeted individual, it to impose Islam as the world’s dominant will be coming from a position of falseness. force. Th is illustrates the need to increase the Regardless of the modus operandi Muslim community’s role and leadership through which the individual arrives at in the Channel Project if it is to become this conclusion, the eff ects are potentially more credible. Th e Channel project is part very dangerous. If one believes he can of the Prevent strategy and aims to support act as an autonomous individual for

112 arches quarterly volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 SHIFTING PARADIGMS: DE-RADICALISATION the benefi t of the global Muslim Umma majority of believers. (community) he is able to reason and rationalise anything he does - no matter how extreme. Ultimately, the ‘Takfi r’ has Takfi ris should be become a thorough process of irrational regarded as intentional theological consumerism. In essence, this actors, not the passive is akin to believing illegal activity from credit card fraud to mass murder pleases pawns of extremist God if it is in pursuit and context of dar clerics, manipulative al-harb (state of war). As long as the ‘state of war’ exists in the Takfi ri mind-set, then masterminds or there is very little that is not ‘permissible’ social, economic and to pursue. psychological forces. THE 73RD SAVED SECT - GROUP OF THE MAJORITY? Particularly since 2005, hardcore Takfi ri As a Takfi ri, one is taught how to recognise groups have tried to circumvent this fact deviant thinking, both internally and by adopting the name ‘Ahle-Sunna Wal externally. You are methodically trained in Jammah’, which has traditionally been the diff erences between pure and impure applied to the mainstream Sunni Orthodox theology. It is proved to you that forming version of Islam, also known as Bharelvi’s. part of a small group is actually fulfi lling In doing this, Takfi ri groups not only ancient prophecies of the tiny number of attempt to blend into communities and true believers left standing from among confuse Muslims but also try to justify the hoards of ‘heretical’ and ‘misguided’ their actions in light of the scripture. Muslims. Put simply, you are trained to spot those who may seek to challenge your INTENTIONAL ACTORS beliefs. Th is feat has taken over thirty years Th e theological discussion thus far has to become entrenched into the community aimed to demonstrate one critical point; fabric. It is embedded to the extent that you become a Takfi ri, you are not made literalist groups hold great enmity towards into one. Takfi ris should be regarded each other due to diff erences in opinion as intentional actors, not the passive regarding such issues as the state and direct pawns of extremist clerics, manipulative action. masterminds or social, economic and Literalist groups are more wary of each psychological forces. To be Takfi ri you other than other ‘non-believing’ Muslims. must actively accept that Takfi rism is the Th is is the result of self-extracting Ijtihad true, undiluted Islam as practised by the (ruling) and literalist doctrine’s provision Prophet Muhammad, and his companions. for multiple ‘pure’ groups to coexist. Th e Regardless of whether you are born into or notion of plurality – and subsequent convert to Islam, the transition to Takfi ri competition – derives from the Islamic thinking is the fi nal resting point of a understanding that there will be 73 sects, journey to become a ‘pure Muslim’. By 72 of which are misguided. Th is means accepting this, you clearly state that all the 73rd sect will be the only saved one other forms of Islamic understanding are capable of achieving the ultimate form of deviant and you are able only to agree with salvation. What these fringe groups ignore others who share the same literalist creed. however is that the complete narration of In short, you cannot agree with others’ the Hadith (found in Trimidhi’s corpus actions if they are not in line with the true of hadiths) states that the 73rd saved sect teachings of Takfi ri Islam. will be one of the majority (Ahlus-Sunna- Th erefore, a Takfi ri can demonstrate wal-Jama’a). Th e complete ‘hadith’ alludes some theological empathy with a Salafi , but to the ‘saved group’ being the party of the will not yield to him. Th e Takfi ri will not volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 arches quarterly 113 suddenly accept that Muslim leaders and Plurality is, and always has been, a lands need ‘schooling’ or ‘transforming’. characteristic of Islam. Th e individual sees the removal - by Accepting this plurality and freedom of force - of these ‘Western puppet’ or ‘kafi r’ choice means you accept you have the same Muslim leaders as a natural response to right. their alleged hypocrisies. • Accepting that the killing of THEOLOGICAL REALIGNMENT non-combatants is completely – DE-RADICALISATION VS. forbidden. SHIFTING PARADIGMS • Th e only form of physical jihad an Is it possible to de-radicalise someone by individual may wage is defensive, off ering him the same ‘status quo’ Islam namely, for the purpose of self- he consciously rejected in the fi rst place? defence in life-or-death situations. Diamond cutters need specialist skills to • Off ensive jihad is the domain of create well balanced or rounded stones. the executive authority (state) in From the original stone, this type of which the individual resides and its professional is able to form a new one. performance is the responsibility of We call this a paradigm shift. New the state’s paid or conscripted army. paradigms invariably replace older ones. In • Accepting that the conditions of dar the context of Prevent, we should be seeking al-harb only come into eff ect if and the creation of not only new emotional when your immediate geographical paradigms but new theological ones too. surroundings are in a state of For without theological realignment, the armed confl ict that threatens your emotional responses an individual may life in a physical sense; that is, if be subject to are potentially as hazardous your neighbours (next door or a as the vulnerability that initially caused neighbouring state) are trying to concern and warranted the intervention. attack or kill you. Th is new paradigm requires a number • Only a scholar granted ijaza of elements for it to constitute an eff ective (permission) from an Islamically attempt at reducing vulnerability to violent recognised authority can make extremism. It could include the following legal rulings or judgements using matters and contexts that have been the available parameters according collated from the primary data of over fi fty to Shari’a law. ‘interventions’ under the Prevent strand • Muslims do not need to live under and based on their outcomes: Shari’a rule to practice their faith. • Muslims do not need to live under Plurality is, and always an Islamic state to perform their duties. has been, a characteristic • Citizenship or a visa from a certain of Islam. state equate to a Muslim having accepted a covenant of security with said state. Accepting that highly conservative or • Th is covenant is binding upon the literalist views are one part of a diverse individual as it is built on trust and spectrum that comprises Islamic thought the implication that he will honour in contemporary Muslim diasporas. its terms. Acknowledging that this spectrum is • Th is equally applies to Muslim and based on the free will and choice of each non-Muslim lands. Muslim to practice his faith in a manner • Th e individual may only express appropriate to his personal understanding opposition to the state through and context. legal means. • Accepting that if the individual

114 arches quarterly volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 SHIFTING PARADIGMS: DE-RADICALISATION opposes the above condition, he and shifting paradigms and why we should will be considered anti-state, also pursue the latter. known as al-khawarij (rebels). Such a shift would mean creating a • If the land in which the individual paradigm of beliefs and ideological views lives becomes a threat to his daily that would still fall short of a ‘western life as a Muslim, he must consider values’ test or pro-democracy test, but migration. would essentially and crucially house the • Non-Muslims have rights under extreme view within a non-violent context. Islamic law. Muslims living under Currently, the closest such policy is to non-Muslim rule must respect and ‘proscribe’ Takfi ri groups and force them obey the law of the land so long as to go further underground, without any it does not contravene a majority or attempt to address the beliefs creating the consensus based view of the tenets potential vulnerability to violence or its of Islam. glorifi cation.

Each of these elements opposes Takfi ri Ahmad Hassan has been involved in the Prevent belief in its original form. Moreover, they strategy since 2006, delivering and developing are diffi cult to impose given the adeptness intervention based support for vulnerable individuals across the UK. He is currently completing a Masters with which some Takfi ris use Islamic degree in Terrorism Studies in London and provides concepts to conceal their true beliefs and training/ capacity building skills to community and statutory organisations of how to eff ectively engage hence evade suspicion or detection. Th e vulnerable individuals and the communities they theory that an individual can be funnelled reside in. into adopting a new perspective through what we call ‘de-radicalisation’ is fl awed. To assume an intervention might be able ENDNOTES to reverse the adoption of Takfi ri beliefs 1. The failure to separate the pre-criminal ‘Prevent’ strand and replace vulnerability with resilience from the intelligence led CT ‘Pursue’ strand, within the ‘CONTEST’ strategy, meant that British Muslim communities is denying a fundamental aspect of the applied the intelligence and police-led nature of Pursue human condition. People adopt and change to Prevent, resulting in suspicion and distrust of the latter their ideas based on their personal, social, policy. moral and ethical realisations. Th ough we 2. Takfi r is the practice of declaring (ex-communicating) an individual or group, previously considered Muslim, to be may be able to demonstrate and explain non-believers in God (kafi r(s)) due to supposed theological some of our ideas to the ‘vulnerable’ inferiority and misguidance. individual, this does not mean he will 3. ‘Ceasefi re’ concept when used in the context of a Terrorist accept them. Moreover, de-radicalisation ideology merely replaces one ‘vulnerability’ with another. We can however, enter into a robust and challenging series of dialogues that may potentially provide the individual with a substantial foundation from which to transfer old or existing Takfi ri belief into a new paradigm in line with the aforementioned ‘outcome based’ points. Trying to adapt rather than dismantle Takfi ri beliefs serves three advantages: 1) it maximises the likelihood of the individual personally accepting ideological adjustment; 2) it allows the individual to ARCHES ONLINE be public; and 3) it enables the individual FREE DOWNLOAD to maintain ideological stability. Th is is the diff erence between de-radicalisation thecordobafoundation.com volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 arches quarterly 115 Fundamentalists vs. Moderates: The War Within Judaism

RABBI MARK L. WINER

he world’s most threatening the possibility of “value-free” behavioural “clash of civilisations” pits science. My analysis of the confl ict Tfundamentalists against moderates between fundamentalists and moderates within every religion. Although political within Judaism should not be considered scientist Samuel Huntington1 coined the non-partisan. I am a congenital and phrase “clash of civilisations” to stimulate unequivocal religious moderate. Indeed, debate about the pernicious divisions I became a rabbi and later a sociologist to among world regions and cultures, my “heal the world” of its interfaith bigotry. experience is that the most destructive Th roughout my life as a Jew, throughout division lies between fundamentalists and my career as a rabbi, I have combated moderates in every religion, and between Jewish fundamentalists and I have always fundamentalists and moderates among rejoiced in my kinship with religious humanity as a whole. Within the half of moderates of all traditions. We have humanity which identifi es with Judaism, studied together, and “exchanged notes”, Christianity and Islam – the Abrahamic in our common cause. religious family – what affl icts one sibling Within every population, roughly often infects the others, just as in a 15-20% display deeply ingrained biological family. fundamentalist, authoritarian attitudes. In accepting the challenge from Arches Behavioural science studies fi nd to write this article, I initially intended fundamentalists exhibiting prejudice and to do a comparative sociological study of articulating stereotypes even for fi ctional fundamentalism and moderate responses groups, like Lilliputians. On the other end to fundamentalism within all three of the of the spectrum, a similar percentage of Abrahamic faiths. As I am a born Jew and every population display moderate, liberal rabbi, I began my research within Judaism. attitudes. Th ose between the poles of I quickly realised that I could not, within fundamentalism and moderation within the reasonable word limitations of this every population, tend to conform to article, accomplish more than provide what they perceive as socially acceptable a review of this confl ict within Judaism positions and mores. Th is tripartite division alone. of every population explains the presence My Muslim and Christian cousins of fundamentalists within each group. within our Abrahamic family will fi nd, It also helps us understand how social I hope, in my analysis of the “clash of change can occur in positive as well as in civilisations” within Judaism instructive negative directions. Moderation triumphs parallels in their own traditions. Th e over fundamentalism, mutual respect over future of humanity may well depend bigotry, when the moderates manage to on the ability of moderates within each persuade the “conformist” middle to give religion to overcome their fundamentalist up their bigoted mores. Examples include co-religionists. Even more, moderates the American South over the last half across the religious boundaries need to join century, the unifi cation of Europe, and in “sacred coalition” against the scourge the transformation of South Africa. So, of fundamentalism which threatens despite widespread fundamentalism and humanity. prejudice, there is reason for hope among As a sociologist, I have never believed in moderates. 116 arches quarterly volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 FUNDAMENTALISTS VS. MODERATES: THE WAR WITHIN JUDAISM Fundamentalists possess an ability to spawns interfaith bigotry and sanctions attract media attention disproportionate violence, war and terrorism. Within the to their numbers or percentage of any Twentieth Century, more people died given population. Because they are so in the name of religion than in all of certain of the correctness of their cause, history before. I fear that the Twenty First they both focus clearly and project an Century may even eclipse the grisly record unequivocal vision. By virtue of their for interfaith bigotry and terrorism of the moderation, progressives see nuance and previous century. So much depends upon our understanding of the eternal confl ict When religious between fundamentalism and moderation, and upon the strategies we religious moderates, across moderates devise together to combat our religious boundaries, common scourge. Th ere are four types of Jewish work together in fundamentalism in our day:4 interfaith coalitions 1. Some secular Zionists turn the against fundamentalists state and people into transcendent objects. Th ey rely mostly on the of all faiths, we labour to Hebrew Bible to justify their claims, save humanity. ignoring rabbinic development.5 2. Extreme national chauvinism, most clearly represented by Meir Kahane are rarely certain of either their goals or and his followers, include racists of their programmes. Fundamentalists, who have the least precedence precisely because they are so single- in Jewish tradition. Israel has minded, easily “hijack” groups, nations, outlawed them, and blocked their or entire populations. Within the Jewish representation in the Knesset, the world, the West Bank settler movement Israeli parliament. Despite their has never attracted more than a minority. illegal status, the racist extreme But their single-mindedness and focus national chauvinist element is a have enabled them to “hijack” Israeli growing element in Israeli society. society into acquiescing or at least 3. Ultra-Orthodoxy projects itself as tolerating their programme. Although a quietist form of fundamentalism cursory reading of popular media suggests that believes it is necessary to do that fundamentalists comprise a major whatever it can to protect its way of segment among Jews, the fundamentalist life. Despite their outward displays fringe is less than 10% of worldwide of piety, Ultra-Orthodox elements Jewish population.2 Every religious and often exhibit extreme violence. ethnic group has experienced similar kinds 4. Mystical messianism is an activist of “hijacking” by tiny fundamentalist form of Zionism in which it is a minorities. sacred mission to bring the messiah Th e future of each of our faith traditions into the world using utopian- depends upon how the confl ict between political action. fundamentalists and moderates resolves. So when we confront our co-religionist What unifi es these diverse groups is a fundamentalists, we do so to preserve what single truth model of the world in which a we view as the integrity of our own faith. transcendent utopian response to modern When religious moderates, across religious circumstances expresses itself in a certainty boundaries, work together in interfaith that translates into intolerant forms of coalitions against fundamentalists of all political action. Th ough they may be able faiths, we labour to save humanity.3 to trace an unbroken line of transmission Fundamentalism, it would appear, that emphasizes a tradition of exclusivity, volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 arches quarterly 117 they ignore a counter-tradition that refutes community.10 Hence a tradition of intra- exclusivity and a single truth model of the religious intolerance has developed. world. Within the community, prohibitions In this article, some of the socio- against independent thinking were historical reasons and the textual common in post-talmudic times.11 justifi cations for Jewish fundamentalism Maimonides (1135-1204), one of the will be presented. Th en counter texts and greatest scholars of Judaism, writing in traditions will be considered. However, it Hebrew, provided a clear foundation for should be noted that fundamentalist anti- these prohibitions in his Mishneh Torah.12 rationalism makes it impossible to alter the Writing in Arabic for a more acculturated thinking of these individuals. Th erefore audience, Maimonides in his Guide to the other strategies need to be developed to Perplexed, teaches a much more pluralistic address the problem of fundamentalism. and rationalist philosophy.13 Fundamentalism is defi ned as a response However, the exclusivist trend can be to modern secular society even though it seen as early as the Mishnah (circa 200 may have roots in the past.6 In Judaism, CE), a central text of Judaism used to there are two recent historical events that generate law. Th e classic example appears serve to shape Jewish fundamentalism: in Mishnah Bava Qamma 4:3, in which one is the Holocaust; the second one is the one can see a double standard applied to existence of the State of Israel. the Jew and the non-Jew.14 Th ough the With respect to the Holocaust that led to specifi c example is narrow, the application the death of six million Jews, a substantial is broader. proportion came from the more orthodox Th is exclusivist trend is even more communities, because the rabbis of many pronounced in certain forms of mystical of these communities encouraged their Judaism. In contrast to the Talmud where congregants to stay in Europe until it was the “righteous of all nations have a share in too late to escape.7 As a result of such the world to come,”15 Kabbalah, the texts choices, “going by the book” replaced for mystical Judaism, suggest that only “living on the street.”8 Th at is, customs Jews will merit salvation.16 and traditional practices that had existed As problematic as these exclusivist trends before the Holocaust either ceased, or were are for the quietist form of fundamentalism, no longer trusted. Th e traditional texts of they are even more problematic for activist Hebrew Bible, Talmud, and the literature forms of Jewish fundamentalism.17 Activist of the code books became a more certain fundamentalism focuses on the size of the foundation for tradition, particularly in a State of Israel and how to act towards dramatically changing world. the non-Jews who live on the land.18 Th e Naturally those people who were best defi nition of what land is Jewish can be as positioned to interpret these texts gained in expansive as Deuteronomy 11:24 which power. In Orthodoxy, these individuals are indicates that Israel goes from the Euphrates the rabbis. Th eir increased power had its to the Western Sea (Mediterranean). own historical roots in rabbinic authority, Some activist fundamentalists use the which could be either open-minded or Book of Joshua in the Hebrew Bible to intolerant.9 Th e intolerant forms based justify their desire to conquer the land. themselves on exclusivist texts, which As a result, fundamentalists use biblical exist in the Hebrew Bible, the Talmud, texts about the seven Canaanite nations and the law codes. Th is is as true for all to govern their responses to the non-Jews forms of fundamentalism today as it was who live in the land.19 Other biblical in the past. Furthermore, there is historical justifi cations for taking action against evidence to suggest that the more isolated non-Jews who live in the land are based on and autonomous a Jewish community their classifi cation as Midianites (Numbers was in the past, the more likely violence 25:1-18) and Amalek or his descendants would be used against members of its own (Deuteronomy 25:17 and 19).20

118 arches quarterly volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 FUNDAMENTALISTS VS. MODERATES: THE WAR WITHIN JUDAISM However, nationalist fundamentalists are equally dangerous to Jews who do Within Judaism, there is not agree with them. Two talmudic laws just as long a tradition are used as a justifi cation for violence of universality and against fellow Jews. Th e fi rst is the law of the pursuer (din rodef ) which permits inclusiveness as there is one to kill or harm a Jew if that Jew is of exclusivity. going to kill another Jew. Th e second is the law of the informer (din mosar), For this reason knowledge of counter- which permits one to kill or harm a Jew texts and ideas becomes critically who provides information to non-Jews important. In fact, within Judaism, there about Jewish aff airs. In this case, granting is just as long a tradition of universality Palestinian authority over any territory of and inclusiveness as there is of exclusivity. Israel is considered informing. Th e Israeli In discussing the complexity of this issue fundamentalist Yigal Amir assassinated in early rabbinic history, Steven Fraade has Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin specifi cally developed three categories that intersect justifying himself by that fundamentalist and sometimes contradict each other based interpretation. on a number of rabbinic sources: Messianic beliefs also are used as 1. Non-Jews have no legal status in justifi cation for activist fundamentalist the tradition actions. Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook 2. Non-Jewish claims must be (1865-1935), the fi rst Ashkenazi Chief acknowledged because of social and Rabbi of Palestine was a Zionist mystic political realities. who based his work on Lurianic Kabbalah. 3. Non-Jews are subjects of the same He proposed that the individual person God, and therefore deserve to have of the messiah could be interpreted as some of the same benefi ts. 24 a collective being.21 Everything that I have read leads me to believe that Kook Th is last category is the most inclusive would have been shocked and dismayed and has its own interpretive history. As Jews by what his son and others have done to were included in the non-Jewish world, his teachings -- teachings that allowed this inclusiveness increased. In Torah, all Orthodox Jews wiggle room to cooperate humans are made in God’s image, tselem with the Zionist state. His followers elohim (Genesis 1:26). Th rough Abraham became that collective being, and thereby all the families of the earth are to be took on messianic pretensions. One of his blessed (Genesis 12:3). God is the God of contemporary followers, Rabbi Shlomo all fl esh (Numbers 27:16). Aviner, is reported to have said that Jews When we begin to explore the prophets, should “be holy, not moral, and the general they too, recognise the universal nature principles of morality, customary for all of all humankind. Isaiah says (56:7), “For mankind, do not bind the people of Israel, my house will be called a house of prayer because it has been chosen to be above for all people.” And Malachi asks (2:10), them.”22 “Have we not all one father? Did not one Th is truly appalling statement not God create us all?” only demonstrates how dangerous Jewish Th e rabbis of the Talmud also generate fundamentalists are, but how corrupt their a number of ideas to support the unity ideology can become. Th ere is no doubt of all humankind. Th e Noahide laws that there is no precedence to separate proclaim that anyone can be righteous the holy from the moral in Judaism. Th e as long as they follow seven basic laws.25 last time it happened it was considered Th e following legal concepts also promote heresy.23 However, both the mysticism and peace and well-being. the messianism of Jewish fundamentalism 1. Darkei shalom, “the ways of do have precedence in the tradition. peace,” fosters peace and prevents volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 arches quarterly 119 controversy within and between A multiplicity of valid ideas became a way diff erent communities. to reduce sectarianism and sustain their 2. Darkei noam, “the ways of existence. pleasantness,” refers to the ways In fact, the Babylonian Talmud is of Torah. When the intention of considered a rather unique set of books, Jewish law is unclear, interpretation because argumentation that is not resolved should not confl ict with ways of makes up so much of the text.26 Not only pleasantness and peace. does argument help in the development 3. Rodef shalom, “pursuing peace,” of ideas, but multiplicity allows for encourages one to help an enemy contradictory ideas to remain a part of the even before one helps a friend. tradition. Th is is famously summarized in 4. Pikuach Nefesh, “saving a soul,” a talmudic story about two famous rabbis, means saving a life supersedes all Hillel and Shammai. other commands with the exception For three years there was a dispute of prohibitions against murder, between the School of Hillel and the School idolatry, and sexual immorality. of Shammai, the former asserting, “Th e law 5. Tikkun olam, “repair of the world,” is in agreement with our views,” and the was initially a very narrow way of latter contending, “Th e law is in agreement repairing a judicial injustice. In with our views.” Th en a voice from heaven, Lurianic mystical Judaism, it refers announced, “Th ese and those are the words of to an individual’s capacity to repair the Living God…” the cosmos with his or her acts. Th at both legal traditions are the word of Th e signifi cance of the inclusive, God suggests that both have validity. Th is universal strand of rabbinic thought is not only refl ects the acknowledgement not only a refl ection of a counter-tradition of multiple valid perspectives, but it in Judaism, but just as importantly, a acknowledges the validity of each rabbi’s refl ection of the validity of pluralistic ideas. reasoning process in developing their Th e importance placed on multiplicity tradition. In fact, the resolution of the has its own signifi cant place in rabbinic dispute between Hillel and Shammai does history. Th e early rabbis were concerned not concern a system of beliefs, but moral about the survival of the Jewish people. action.27 We follow the School of Hillel Th is was particularly true once the Temple because they are kindly and modest, and in Jerusalem was destroyed by the Romans teach their opponent’s views before their in 70 CE, and it became clear that it was own. 28 not going to be rebuilt any time soon. Th e Th is text suggests that morality is the Jewish way of life had been organized ultimate determinate of Jewish law.29 around the Temple. Th e question for the In fact, other talmudic texts connect rabbis was could the Jewish people survive holiness and morality. One text blames the without a Temple or a land in which they destruction of the Temple on immorality. could govern themselves? Why was the First Temple destroyed? Th eir answer was to generate an halakhic Because of three evils in it: idolatry, (legal and social-religious) system that immorality, and bloodshed. But why was the could be enacted anywhere. Th ey were Second Temple destroyed, seeing that during particularly fearful of the development the time it stood people occupied themselves of sectarian divisions, not only because with Torah, with observance of precepts, and there were so many such divisions when with the practice of charity: Because during the rabbinic tradition started (before the time it stood, hatred without rightful the destruction of the Temple), but also cause prevailed. Th is is to teach you that because Jews were such a small population hatred without rightful cause is deemed as that sectarianism would threaten the grave as all three sins of idolatry, immorality, existence of the Jewish people altogether. and bloodshed together.30

120 arches quarterly volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 FUNDAMENTALISTS VS. MODERATES: THE WAR WITHIN JUDAISM to the fundamentalist ability to determine Another text says that Jerusalem was the rules of the game. Th ere are three basic destroyed because the people only acted tools that moderates can use: according to the letter of the law, and did 1. Knowledge – we must be not go beyond the measure of the law to knowledgeable about our tradition. morality.31 Th is includes k nowledge of counter- Medieval commentators add their voice texts and commentaries to the ones to this chorus. Nachmanides (1194-1256) fundamentalism uses. was not only a noted commentator on 2. Counter values – Our the Hebrew Bible, and a rational debater understanding of what is valuable with Christians about Judaism, but also is not the same. a mystic. In one of his commentaries, he 3. Cooperation with moderates of all says one should do “the right and the good traditions. We are stronger together (Deuteronomy 6:18)” in every matter. than individually. Th is command occurs because one could technically fulfi ll all of the Torah’s rules and still lead an immoral life.32 Fundamentalism often Mysticism, too, connects the holy and the moral. Moses Cordovero (1522-1570) triumphs because shows how mystical ideas can be used to of the weakness of promote morality.33 Lurianic Kabbalah also frames Jewish ritual as a way of moderates, not because repairing God and the cosmos, a repair of the strength of that is certainly moral.34 fundamentalists. Th e separation of morality from holiness that appears in Jewish fundamentalism is a modern phenomenon that occurs precisely Across religious boundaries, religious because the secular world has separated moderates need to study texts with religion from morality. Th e fact that each other, learning together to push Jewish fundamentalism does, only shows beyond literal meaning. A hallmark of how much it is infl uenced by the very fundamentalism is a worship of sacred text, modernity that it rejects. as if the text is God. Responding to the In fact, the attempt of many Jewish modern world, religious moderates must fundamentalists to stop time and deny search for the compelling moral and ethical modernity and the interconnectedness insights revealed in sacred texts. Religious of the world seems to be its own kind of moderates tend to take text less seriously idolatry. In Judaism, it is possible to turn than fundamentalists. My undergraduate the tradition, the land, or the people into New Testament professor Krister Stendahl, an idol. In Th e Book of Exodus (3:14), God in the most important lesson I learned in a is reported to have said to Moses when year of New Testament textual study with Moses asks for God’s name: I will be that him, stressed the necessity of religious I will be. Th is is an answer that refl ects moderates like me learning to study texts action, future possibility, and ambiguity. as seriously as fundamentalists do, if only To turn God into anything else is idolatry, to do battle with them. and such idolatry is capable of destroying Fundamentalism often triumphs the religion. because of the weakness of moderates, It is not easy to fi ght fundamentalism. not because of the strength of It has a black and white view of the world fundamentalists. I personally learned this that creates certainty in an uncertain insight forty years ago from a political world. Th at is part of its appeal. But the science professor of mine, Juan Linz. In either/or world fundamentalisms inhabit a course on “Crisis and Breakdown in is about the use of power. It contributes Democracy,” Linz taught that the triumph volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 arches quarterly 121 of authoritarianism comes about more Religious moderates need to stand in the through the weakness of democrats than forefront of eff orts to create a passion for by the strength of authoritarians. From peace within civil society and to elevate the Weimar Republic to Republican moderation to a civic virtue. It is often the Spain and similar failed democracies, Linz lack of such passion, often a by-product of buttressed this hypothesis through a full- a society’s focusing on other “existential” year course. Religious moderates similarly matters, which allows fundamentalism to need to learn to make moderation robust enlarge its infl uence. and compelling, if we are to vanquish We must build a world where people of fundamentalism. all diff erent traditions can live together Th e single most important focus for in peace. Th e best possibility we have of interfaith conferences should be the role creating peace is to develop partnerships and status of women in our religious with others who also seek peace regardless traditions. Th e role and status of women of their religious traditions. Mutual respect in all religions – such as women’s access to and the celebration of diff erence should education, including study of sacred texts be the goals of our joint eff ort. Although - is the single most important barometric infl uencing fundamentalists often seems a measure in the fundamentalist-moderate daunting task for religious moderates, we war within every religion. Listening believe that it is a sacred task and one which and hearkening to the voices of women unites large segments of humanity. Jewish enhances every religious tradition in tradition tells us that it is not incumbent indispensible ways. Focussing on women’s upon us to complete the task, but we are issues, religious moderates confront the not allowed to desist from it either.35 full range of issues in the confl ict between moderates and fundamentalists within > Many contributed ideas and suggestions for this article. The every tradition. author indebted for much of the research and insight in the article to Catherine Lasser, Ph.D., the Director of Research for Th e interfaith encounter is in and of FAITH. itself an expression of modernity and moderation. Fundamentalists within every religion resist and oppose interfaith Rabbi Dr Mark L. Winer is President of FAITH: the activity. It is the relative moderates Foundation to Advance Interfaith Trust and Harmony, two sibling foundations of the same name in the UK who attend the interfaith dialogues and and US, www.faithinterfaith.com. He is also Chairman participate in interfaith partnerships. It is of the International Interfaith Task Force of the World sometimes diffi cult to read the moderation Union for Progressive Judaism and Senior Scholar at the in interfaith dialogue, since so often a West London Synagogue of British Jews, where he was Senior Rabbi between 1998-2010. measure of posturing takes place in the enunciation of positions. Nonetheless, all need to recognise the essential moderation ENDNOTES of their partners in dialogue. Attending 1. Huntington, Samuel. (1996). The Clash of Civilizations, New interfaith dialogue implies an acceptance York, Simon and Schuster. of the possibility of the validity of more 2. See footnote 15. 3. This language may seem extreme. However, fundamental- than one path to truth. We need these ists adhere to a single truth model of the world (see below), encounters, however awkward they appear which creates a black-and-white, either/or understanding of sometimes, to nurture moderation in the world. Using this perspective, fundamentalists have cre- others, and cross-pollinate our interfaith ated a win-lose zero sum game, which creates confl ict and is oriented to power. Moderates, who are more oriented toward endeavours. creating win-win, cooperative situations, will fi nd themselves Th e eternal war between fundamentalists ‘losing’ in situations that fundamentalists have defi ned unless and moderates, within each religion and they recognize this dynamic. across religious boundaries, refl ects the 4. Mittleman, Alan L. (1993). “Fundamentalism and Political Development,” in Jewish Fundamentalism in Comparative never-ending confl ict in every civil society. Perspective, NY: New York University Press. Too often moderation, compromise, 5. Most scholars do not address this particular form of and peace-building become demonised. fundamentalism. 6. J. Silberstein, Laurence J. (1993). “Religion, Ideology, Moder-

122 arches quarterly volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 FUNDAMENTALISTS VS. MODERATES: THE WAR WITHIN JUDAISM nity: Theoretical Issues in the Study of Jewish Fundamentalism, reasons: against the seven (Canaanite) nations, against Amalek in Jewish Fundamentalism in Comparative Perspective, NY, NY: and to deliver Israel from an enemy who has attacked them. New York University Press, pp. 3-26. An authorized war is one to enlarge the borders of Israel and 7. Heilman, Samuel C. (2005). “Orthodoxy in America after the to increase greatness and prestige. Hence how one designates Holocaust,” in Sliding to the Right, Los Angeles, CA: University of the inhabitants of the land is critical to what one is permit- California Press, pp.15-62. ted to do and how one treats the combatants.See Michael 8. Ibid, pp.127. J. Broyde, The Bounds of Wartime Military Conduct in Jewish 9. It is true that since the time of Saadia Gaon rabbinic author- Law, Flushing, NY: Center for Jewish Studies, 2006, for a more ity has characterized Judaism. However, it is problematic complete discussion. to make the case that the only way to determine authentic 21. Another interpretation was based on Zechariah 9:9 “your Judaism is to rely on this characteristic. A 400 year tradition king will come to you, righteous and victorious is he, a humble has been established in the United States that does not rely on man riding upon a donkey…” Secular Jews were the ‘donkey’ rabbinic authority. Moderate Jews are more likely to accept the that messianic Zionism would use to fulfi ll their goals. Shahak halakhic expertise of rabbis than their authority to determine and Mezvinsky, op.cit. an individual’s actions. As such the role of halakhah has 22. Hirst, David. (2003). The Guns and the Olive Branch: Roots changed. It can be a communal practice and/or a Jewish way of Violence in the Middle East, NY, NY: Avalon Publishing Group, to connect with God. Therefore it provides a way to develop Inc, p.84. one’s spiritual being. In addition, it is true that though Jews 23. This refers to the Frankist heresy after Jacob Frank, an 18th worry about assimilation and intermarriage, the strong use of century Jewish religious leader who proclaimed himself the rabbinic authority is not considered the only, or even the best messiah and believed in “purifi cation through transgression.” solution. 24. Fraade, Steven D. (1994). “Navigating the Anomalous: Non- 10. Shahak, Israel & Mezvinsky, Norton. (1999). Jewish Funda- Jews at the Intersection of Early Rabbinic Law and Narrative,” in mentalism in Israel, www.members.tripod.com/alabasters_ar- Lawrence J. Silberstein and Robert L. Cohn, The Other in Jewish chive/jewish_fundamentalism.html. Thought and History, NY: New York University Press, pp.145-165. 11. Ibid. 25. BT Sanhedrin 56a-b. The laws are 1) having a judicial 12. In his laws of idolatry (2.3) he says that it is forbidden to system, 2) no idolatry, 3) no blasphemy, 4) no murder, 5) no think about idolatry or anything that may cause a Jew to doubt sexual immorality, 6) no theft, and 7) no eating a limb taken one principle of Jewish religion. Further (2.5), he says that from a live animal. idolatrous Jews are to be treated like non-Jews. This particular 26. Kraemer, David.(1990). Mind of the Talmud: An Intellectual point shows that not only were ideas a basis for expressing History, NY: Oxford University Press. Lightstone, Jack. (1994). exclusivity, but exclusivity between Jews and non-Jews was a The Rhetoric of the Babylonian Talmud: It Sociological Meaning trend in Jewish thought as well. This Jew/non-Jew exclusivity and Context, Waterloo, ON: Wilfred Laurier University Press. is more clearly stated in Maimonides’ Laws of Murders and 27. What is even more fascinating is that this text is followed Preservation of Life (4.10-11) where he cites Leviticus 19:16 by a story in which it turns out that we follow the tradition of that says one should not stand by the blood of your fellow, Shammai. Thus showing that the precedence given to Hillel is and then goes on to say that the non-Jew is not your fellow. not an exclusive one. He further states that one is forbidden to cause the death of a 28. BT Erubin 13b, “but the law is in agreement with the rulings non-Jew, but one is also forbidden to rescue a non-Jew. of School of Hillel.” Since both are the words of the Living God,” 13. Fox, Marvin. (1990). Interpreting Maimonides. University of what entitled [the members of] the School of Hillel to have the Chicago Press. law fi xed according to their rulings? Because they were kindly 14. The example concerns a double standard applied to the and modest, they studied their own rulings and those of the Jew and the non-Jew with reference to their culpability when School of Shammai, and were even so humble to mention the an ox of one does damage to an ox of the other. words of School of Shammai before their own. 15. BT. Sanhedrin 105a. Other texts and ideas will be presented 29. In fact the Hebrew Bible makes little sense unless it can be below. comprehended that morality matters to God. 16. Shahak and Mezvinsky, op.cit., Mysticism was a particularly 30. BT Yoma 9b. important trend in Judaism from approximately 1550 when 31. BT Bava Metzia 30b. Luria democratized the elitism of Jewish mysticism to 1750 at 32. See Wurzburger, Walter. (1994). Ethics of Responsibility: the beginning of modernity when Jews began to be accepted Pluralistic Approaches to Covenantal Ethics, Philadelphia, PA: into the broader non-Jewish society and rejected mysticism Jewish Publications Society, p.32. for rationality 33. Cordovero, Moses. (1994). The Palm Tree of Devorah, South- 17. In Israel they are more of a problem because they control fi eld, MI: Targum Press. how certain rituals are observed in Israel, and even defi ne who 34. Luria lived from 1534-1572. His student Hayim Vital wrote is a Jew. down and transmitted his teachings. 18. Hunter, James Davison. (1993). “Fundamentalism: 35. Pirkei Avot 2:21. Introduction to a General Theory,” in Jewish Fundamentalism in Comparative Perspective, NY, NY: New York University Press, pp. 27-41. 19. This is the case even though Rabbi Joshua ben Hananiah, a respected second century rabbi, has said that the seven na- tions that lived in ancient Canaan can no longer be identifi ed. 20. These classifi cations are important because they defi ne how one responds to inhabitants in the land. Specifi cally, the Talmud makes a distinction between obligatory wars and authorized wars. An obligatory war can occur for three volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 arches quarterly 123 Counter-Terrorism Post 9/11 and the Erosion of Human Rights and Civil Liberties

SAALIK HALEEM

iscussions surrounding human BUSH ADMINISTRATION rights and civil liberties have RESPONSE TO 9/11, DECLARING Daccelerated considerably in the A ‘WAR ON TERROR’ AND THE years since 9/11. Th e subsequent policies SUCCESSION BY OBAMA implemented by governments in the West 9/11 was an event of calamitous to tackle terrorism have led to much debate proportion. Few are under any illusion about their eff ectiveness, and whether in of its importance in the modern era. It fact these policies have been counter- shook the world and ushered in a new era productive leading to both an increase in of international relations. It was an event the threat of terrorism and a subsequent which redefi ned how people looked at the decrease in civil liberties and human rights. world as a whole; a paradigm shift which gave rise to new schools of thought with 9/11 was an event of regard to terrorism, non-state actors and new contours of a globalised world. calamitous proportion. As a response, the Bush Administration Few are under any declared ‘War on Terrorism’ itself, not just on the specifi c aggressors. Th is has since illusion of its importance been seen as an error because the word in the modern era. ‘war’ prepares us for mass mobilisation, casualties on a large scale, and also possible attacks on our political liberties.1 As millions around the world take to It also meant that a victory could not be the streets demanding freedom, we watch declared until all terrorism was defeated, from afar and admire the seriousness and which was, and still is, impossible. In fact, bravery of those facing down dictatorship by defi ning the attacks as an act of war and oppression in the streets, without on the US, instead of a crime,2 the Bush thinking of questioning our own state of administration created “implications for freedom. Th is is the very freedom these the presidency as well as for the nation, people are fi ghting for, which we take for opening up some policy avenues and granted in our societies. However, there foreclosing others”.3 It meant also that a has been a steady erosion of civil liberties number of powers, not previously available and freedoms in our own society and a lack to the president alone, were handed over of moral insight into many of the policies to him. Th is increased executive power implemented to curb the so-called terrorist momentously, making citizens open to threat. Th is paper looks at human rights almost continuous, and often unwarranted and civil liberties after 9/11 in the West, interference by the federal government, in primarily the US and Britain, and will the name of security. focus on the extent to which they have Th e latter legislation meant also that eroded due to counter terrorism policies, those questioning certain policies and and what impact this has had on our their legality could be brushed aside as freedoms. unpatriotic. Th e administration wanted a response that went beyond the specifi c attacks4 so that they could “respond with

124 arches quarterly volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 COUNTER-TERRORISM POST 9/11 AND THE EROSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES the full panoply of the US national security and ethical questions regarding treatment establishment.”5 Th ereafter followed a swift of prisoners of war have also been raised, centralization of power within the Oval and there have been numerous scandals Offi ce, where presidents historically have regarding the employment of torture and so been able to exercise greater authority in called ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’. international rather than domestic matters, Th e legal lines have been “pushed back” to and also in wartime than peacetime.6 a point where many can no longer discern Th ere needs to be fundamental checks on what is still legal, and what is not. executive power, and by declaring a ‘War Th e two main pieces of legislation passed on Terror’, the administration increased in the aftermath of 9/11 however, were its power exponentially, curtailing some of the Patriot Act and the mandate for the the checks and balances already in place. creation of the Department of Homeland Dick Cheney, the Vice President at the Security,11 which created thousands of time seemed to envision a larger executive jobs in the counter terrorism industry, role than ever before for the presidency and and increased the fi nancial value of it his offi ce. remarkably. Many stakeholders benefi ted For the American people who suff ered greatly from it, and continue to do so even a great shock at the tragic events of 9/11, now. a specifi c narrative was required; an Th e Bush Administration perpetuated a explanation to cushion the shock of these notion that those who attacked the United events. Th us, the construction of a ‘War on States hated the freedoms that those Terror’ was a concept far easier to accept in the US and other Western societies domestically than the notion that the US enjoyed, and that this hatred was a key faced an ideologically motivated enemy motivating factor in the attacks. Of course with signifi cant sympathy in many parts at the time, this notion was labelled as of the world.7 So instead of referring to a simplistic and misguided by some, and specifi c group or movement, the defi nition has since been proved incorrect with the of the enemy was widened8 which led to wave of pro-freedom uprisings across the the impossibility to declare victory of any Arab region. Such poor understanding of sort, as ‘terrorism’ is not something that the motivations for the 9/11 attacks stem can be defeated in totality, thus making from a misunderstanding of some of the the task of the administration that much (often legitimate) grievances many have harder. with certain policies of the US and other In relation to specifi c policy, the Bush Western States, particularly with regard to Administration embarked on a series of the Muslim world. Th is in turn has led to antiterrorism policies and legal initiatives ineff ective and counterproductive policies designed to disrupt Al-Qaeda and to in the arena of counter terrorism. prevent future terror attacks against the Unfortunately, with the coming to homeland,9 employing “a combination of power of President Obama and his traditional law enforcement tools with a administration, those hoping for a more more muscular use of military force applied pragmatic and ethical approach to counter under the law of war.”10 While some terrorism policy were to be disappointed. applauded this seemingly no nonsense Th ere was no clear policy shift (except approach, critics argued that these policies rhetorically) to replace the reactionary one were not well thought out, and that these of the Bush Administration. In reality, what reactionary policy moves were part of an has happened is that President Obama has ill planned short term response rather retained many key Bush Administration than part of a feasible long term strategy. policies,12 and occasionally has even Th e quagmire that resulted from the wars gone further. Th e recent legislation that in Afghanistan and Iraq (despite recent Obama has signed, the National Defence pullout of combat troops from Iraq) are Authorization Act (NDAA), which is an testimony to a lack of planning. Legal indefi nite detention bill, is a very worrying volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 arches quarterly 125 development, showing that Obama has of freedom one is prepared to sacrifi ce. Of not only continued but surpassed the course, civil libertarians will not agree, motives of the Bush Administration. Th is, as this goes against the core premise of a along with the increase in drone attacks, free society. Is it not the so-called enemy particularly in Afghanistan and Pakistan who are trying to disrupt our freedom? If (repeatedly breaching their sovereignty), so, then why are we doing it to ourselves? has shown that even with a President Th ere is an intellectual dishonesty present of seemingly opposing ideology, the when holding our so-called enemies to counter terrorism industry, which we will a diff erent standard to ourselves, which explore further later, can appear to wield means that we in fact do more damage to disproportional power in dictating counter ourselves and erode our own freedoms. terror policy. In summary, the Bush Administration’s As protectors of freedom, reaction to 9/11 can be characterised as being focussed on direct use of military the defender of civil action against an enemy which was never liberties must insist that clearly defi ned internationally, alongside an aggressive domestic program intended no elected leader can to disrupt terror networks, including have the authority to increased surveillance on civilians and act as he or she wishes harsh interrogation techniques, both which have long since entered legal grey in the name of national areas. Th e Obama administration has security. continued much of this policy, and the executive powers which were strengthened after 9/11 after the declaration of a In reality, it is because of the state’s general ‘War on Terror’ are detrimental to preoccupation with terrorism that civil American liberty as they aff ord powers to liberties have been facing their greatest the executive branch which should have challenge in the democratic era,14 and more thorough checks and balances. if people do not step up to challenge the erosion of these liberties, we may soon fi nd NATIONAL SECURITY VS CIVIL ourselves in a restricted society, all under LIBERTY the guise of safety and security. It was Th ese two points, one of maintaining noted that under Bush, the administration national security, the other maintaining seemed to see civil liberties as security civil liberties, do not seem necessarily at problems that require strong executive odds, but the line is thin and it is true that action,15 and this attempt to justify undue “when there is a signifi cant increase in a erosion of freedoms appeared typical of a threat to our life, most of us are prepared government trying to increase executive to sacrifi ce some liberty and property to power. counter this threat.”13 Th e question is, As protectors of freedom, the defender how much are we willing to sacrifi ce and of civil liberties must insist that no elected who decides how much of our freedom can leader can have the authority to act as be eroded in the name of maintaining this he or she wishes in the name of national security? Certainly, by declaring a ‘war’ on security.16 Democratic legitimacy is not terror, the Bush Administration managed suffi cient to warrant the seizure of such to create in the mind of the American power.17 In fact, it is clear that judgements populace, the national psyche, if you will, to ensure national survival must be shared an idea of wartime freedoms being diff erent with the legislature, and especially with to peacetime freedom. Th e fact that a ‘War the judicial branch.18 Th is conversation on Terror’ is being waged means that, for must be had across all sectors of a society. the foreseeable future, there must be a level Th is would provide the required checks

126 arches quarterly volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 COUNTER-TERRORISM POST 9/11 AND THE EROSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES and balances to ensure that power is not copies of the bill were available to members abused. of Congress, naming the fi nal bill the USA As a free society, we must have this Patriot Act; the bill passed the Senate debate. Our freedoms should not be put with only one dissenting vote”.22 Also, it on hold just because a government can was renewed after “Congress reviewed declare an endless ‘War on Terror’ with the Patriot Act in July 2005, under the such vague parameters that it in fact gives threat of a Bush veto if they did not the executive branch unequalled powers. renew the entire act. Moreover, the Senate Th e competing issues in the civil liberties Intelligence Committee had proposed vs. security trade-off are thus fundamental to add a number of new investigative to the very idea of democracy19 and a free tools to gain access to anyone’s fi nancial, society. Th is means that so called enemies medical, employment, and even library are treated by the same standards and records without the approval of a judge.23 values that we hold dear, otherwise, what Th e above is only a brief mention of some claim do we have for moral legitimacy? of the powers aff orded by the passing of Th ose who argue in favour of restrictions the Act and many of the privacy concerns of some civil liberties and personal triggered by the war against terrorism can freedoms say that “the trade-off between be traced directly back to the Patriot Act.24 civil liberties and personal security rests Added to that, issues with the on the notion that the very openness implementation of Habeas Corpus of American society contributed to the and wiretapping have meant that civil planning and execution of the terrorist libertarians were, and still are, in uproar attacks, the desire to live in a peaceful over these huge invasions to individual and orderly society should favour greater privacy. acceptance of limitations on personal Surely a benchmark of freedom and freedom and civil liberties.”20 Yet, at the human rights should be that you apply the same time, these measures are not even same standard to all citizens, non-citizens foolproof. One can see how this is a very and prisoners. When the law is seemingly slippery slope. When we start to restrict suspended in the light of a ‘war’ on terror, it some freedoms and civil liberties in the is a damning indictment against a society’s name of security, where is the line? And application of justice, and this hypocrisy who gets to decide this? No doubt those in can be justifi ably used against it. government who do end up deciding are We do not need more counterproductive not impartial and it certainly is a cause of counter terrorism policies, which instead great concern. of decreasing the threat, increase the Let us now look at a few examples of how risk of terrorism. Th is, therefore, leads human rights and civil liberties have been to acts which diminish our civil liberties eroded in the post 9/11 world, and how and freedoms. Ironically, our policies, this has led to a decrease in our freedoms. rather than addressing policy positions which cause grievances, seem to aggravate PATRIOT ACT the sense of injustice and grievance Th e most controversial policies of felt by many, emboldening rather than counter-terrorism legislation since the 9/11 minimising the peripheral elements of attacks has been under the Patriot Act. society hoping to cause harm to it. Th is act authorizes a collection of powers that the government had wanted for some ACTUAL THREAT VS time but was approved as a package only EXAGGERATED THREAT because of widespread anxiety about While there is little doubt that terrorism terrorism.21 It was passed without public is a real threat, we must also ask how much deliberation, where “the congressional of it is a real threat, and how much of what leadership cooperated by holding closed we are told is in fact exaggerated, and if hearings and scheduling a fi nal vote before so, for what purpose? As we can see from volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 arches quarterly 127 our study above, the exaggeration of the counterproductive, and in fact may help threat and the consequent policies confl ate further fuel radicalisation and in essence the antiterrorism industry and lead to helps fuel the anti-terror industry. From the increased threat and increased erosion of structuralist perspective, it again sees the freedom. complexity of interest groups involved and John Mueller is somebody who speaks with a stake in the upkeep of the current about the anti-terrorism industry and its order. Sparks believes that “chronic fear fi nancial worth, where millions of dollars is a response to an enduring and persistent are used to fi nance counter-terrorism or growing threat,”29 and thus looks at a policies and related activities. Mueller certain ‘necessity’ in exaggerating a threat speaks from a structuralist perspective and or worry, to get actors to behave in a describes how a climate of fear is often specifi c manner. When there is common maintained to continue this funding and agreement that there is indeed a threat, or fi nancing. Many defence companies and belief in a perceived threat, there is much other varied stakeholders all benefi t from to be gained. Th is is particularly true for the infl ating of this industry. It is in their those in the counterterrorism industry, interests to keep the terror threat alive whose livelihoods depend on the growth so to speak, and to continue to bankroll of it. Th ere are many stakeholders that themselves from it. benefi t from the counterterrorism polices He notes that, “perhaps the most enacted. Th ese thinkers are amongst many common reaction to terrorism is the costly who believe a change is needed in policy. stoking of fear and the often even more We can say that if civil liberties and costly encouragement of overreaction human rights were returned to peace time by members of what we might call the levels, we would already see an increase in “terrorism industry.”25 In his book, the moral authority of the US, and Britain, Mueller’s thesis is “that our reaction amongst others, as they will be seen to be against terrorism has caused more harm practicing what they preach. A review than the threat warrants- not just to civil of foreign policy will also help to fi x the liberties, not just to the economy, but even reasons of discontent and many of the to human lives. And our reaction has often points for which terrorists and extremists helped the terrorists more than it has hurt fi nd fodder for their narratives, and thus them.”26 Th us the counterproductive will help substantially reduce the threat of policies have ironically emboldened those terrorism. they have sought to defeat. Similarly, another notable thinker CONCLUSION argues that, “by stoking these public Th ere is an urgent need to increase fears and attracting vast political and engagement with community and economic resources in response to them, religious leaders to help glean an authentic the War on Terror encourages, indeed and orthodox scholarship regarding virtually compels, every interest group in these issues, as to collectively gain better the country to advance its own agenda as crucial for winning the war. As a result, The key to a successful widening circles of Americans are drawn into spirals of exaggeration, waste, and change in counter terror fear.”27 policy is to develop Chris Sparks also discusses terrorism, and examines the strategic use of terror eff ective policies which to produce a politics of fear through an deal directly with and exploration of current Western reactions identify the root of the to terrorism,28 and also feels that current counterterrorism measures are not merely anger of those who are ineff ective, but rather they are intentionally intent on causing havoc.

128 arches quarterly volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 COUNTER-TERRORISM POST 9/11 AND THE EROSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES understandings of various related issues 4. Dunn (2005). “Bush, 11 September and the Confl icting Strate- gies of the ‘War on Terrorism”, Irish Studies in International Aff airs, which positively aff ect policy making. 16, p.14. Indeed, it is a desire for security, which 5. Ibid. p. 14. has motivated these antiterrorism policies, 6. Baker, N. (2003).“National Security…” op. cit. p.548 and some of these measures may in fact 7. Dunn (2005). “Bush..” op. cit., p.18. 8. Ibid. p.18. undermine the government’s ability to 9. Addicott F, J, (2010), “Effi cacy of the Obama Policies to Combat address the terrorist threat in the long Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and Associated Forces--The First Year”, Pace run30 as they prove to often embolden the Law Review, p.342. threat of terrorism. 10. Ibid. p.343. 11. Ibid. p.342. Th e key to a successful change in counter 12. Ibid.p.341. terror policy is to develop eff ective policies 13. Niskanen, W. (2006). “The Several Costs of Responding to the which deal directly with and identify the Threat of Terrorism” (Public Choice, Vol. 128, No. 1/2, The Political root of the anger of those who are intent on Economy of Terrorism, p.351: Springer). 14. Gearty, C. (2007).“Rethinking…” op. cit. p.135. causing havoc on society, and to understand 15. Baker, N. (2003).“National Security…” op. cit. p.563. the legitimate grievances many have with 16. Ibid. p.130. aspects of Western (imperial) policy. Th is 17. Gearty, C. (2007).“Rethinking…” op. cit. p.130. will help not only in understanding the 18. Ibid. p.130. 19. Davis, D & Silver, B. (2004). “Civil Liberties vs. Security: Public causes of terrorism, but also in developing Opinion in the Context of the Terrorist Attacks on America”, Ameri- eff ective policies to foster more stable can Journal of Political Science, Vol. 48, No. 1, p.29, Midwest societies. It can also be the beginning of Political Science Association. addressing the confl ated and exaggerated 20. Ibid. p.28. 21. Niskanen, W. (2006). “The Several Costs…” op. cit. p.353. threats we face and will allow us to reign 22. Ibid. p.353. in the counter terror industry, which is 23. Ibid. p.353. benefi ting few at the expense of many, 24. Baker, N. (2003).“National Security…” op. cit. p.560. reducing collective welfare in society. We 25. Mueller, J. (2006).“Overblown: How Politicians and the Terror- ism Industry Infl ate National Security Threats”,p.33, Free Press. need a bold leadership which wishes to 26. Ibid. p.2. deal eff ectively with civil society and which 27. Lustick et al. (2006). “Are We Trapped in the War on Terror?“ must be adamant not to decrease civil (pg, ix, Middle East Policy Council). liberties and human rights. Th is will help 28. Sparks, C (2003).“Liberalism, Terrorism and the Politics of Fear”, London Metropolitan University Politics, Vol 23, p.200. prevent the false importance of terrorists 29. Sparks, C, (2003)“Liberalism, Terrorism and the Politics of and extremists, which can exacerbate Fear” (London Metropolitan University Politics Vol 23, p204) the problem. Th e human rights and civil 30. Baker, N. (2003).“National Security…” op. cit. p563. liberties we cherish should be maintained and protected in all circumstances where legal maxims should be respected in times of peace, and more importantly, in times of war.

Saalik Haleem is a research assistant at The Cordoba Foundation. He has recently completed Occasional Papers is a publication of his master’s degree from the University of Warwick, reading International Political Economy The Cordoba Foundation that provides (IPE). This followed his undergraduate studies at a medium for diverse opinions, Queen Mary, University of London. His areas of presenting a comprehensive view of interest include Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism the myriad perspectives pertaining to strategies in the UK/US, Islamic fi nance, as well as Political Islam and models of Islamic governance. dialogue and cross-cultural exchange. This is done by publishing important contributions by experts and world leaders. ENDNOTES 1. Gearty, C. (2007).“Rethinking Civil Liberties in a Counter-Terror- ism World”. Field Day Review, Vol. 3, p.125, Field Day Publications 2. Baker, N. (2003).“National Security versus Civil Liberties”, FREE DOWNLOAD Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 3, The Permanent War, p.548,Center for the Study of the Presidency and Congress. thecordobafoundation.com 3. Baker, N. (2003).“National Security… op. cit. p.548 volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 arches quarterly 129 BOOK PROMOTION COUNTER-TERRORISM: COMMUNITY-BASED APPROACHES TO PREVENTING TERROR CRIME EDITEDE BY DR BASIA SPALEK

Th is new book examines community-based approaches to counter- tterrorism through an analysis of the notions of community, ppartnership, engagement, gender and religion in order to shed new llight on the potential of, and drawbacks to these approaches. Spalek stresses the need for policy makers and practitioners to refl ect on the eff ectiveness of the initiatives that they are engaged with, particularly in relation to how community-targeted or community- focused they are.

Counter-Terrorism: Community-Based Approaches to Preventing Terror Crime, edited by Dr Basia Spalek. Published in 2012 by Palgrave Macmillan.

BOOK PROMOTION FROM BEIRUT TO JERUSALEM BBY DR SWEE CHAI ANG Th is is a fi rst person account of medical work in Beirut's camps by Dr AAng who has been described as "the unsung heroine of Beirut." Dr Ang is an orthopaedic surgeon who was brought up in Singapore and came to England as a political refugee in 1977. In 1982 she went to Beirut to help civilian war victims. Almost by chance, she ended up working in a hospital run by the Palestinian Red Crescent, a hospital inside one of Beirut's refugee camps. She was the surgeon on duty during the Sabra-Shatila massacres and then went to Jerusalem to testify before the Karan commission of enquiry into the massacres. On her return to Britain, she organized Medical Aid for Palestinians, the charity which sent Pauline Cutting to Beirut and herself relieved Pauline after the siege was partially lifted. Since then she has repeatedly returned to Beirut to work in the refugee camps.

From Beirut to Jerusalem by Dr Swee Chai Ang. Published in 1989 by Grafton.

130 arches quarterly volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 ‘From Beirut to Jerusalem’ 2009 - The Wounds of Gaza

SWEE CHAI ANG

returned to Gaza in January 2009 camp was named after the tiny strip of when it sustained the worst attack since land in Palestine. I the Six Day War in 1967. Th e Christmas In September 1982, thousands of week of 2008 saw shocking scenes of Gaza unarmed men, women and children were being bombed by land, air and sea. In just massacred in Sabra and Shatilla. Th e three short weeks 1,400 Palestinians were massacre confi rmed to me that Palestinians killed, one-third of them children. In this existed and their story of exile was true. tiny part of Occupied Palestine, there were I dedicate From Beirut to Jerusalem to all 5,450 casualties severe enough to require those who were killed and to all survivors operations; many remain in a critical state. who remained determined to return to Th e scale of the Israeli assault matched Palestine. that meted out to the Lebanese in 1982, or I was in Beirut in 1987 when news of indeed, in 2006, with similar ferocity and the Intifada emerged. Palestinians rose breaches of international law. up in civil disobedience against the Israeli My book, From Beirut to Jerusalem, was occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. written during the six months I had to Th e Israeli army responded brutally. Many spend waiting for the Israelis to grant my of my friends in Lebanon were anxious for fi rst visa for Gaza during the First Intifada; their families in Palestine but they were I had volunteered as a surgeon to treat also proud that the uprising had fi nally Palestinians. happened after decades of occupation. Th e wait was productive, enabling me to Th e Intifada was a declaration to the produce these memoirs and then head for whole world of the refusal of Palestinians the Gaza Strip when the visa fi nally came in the West Bank and Gaza to live under through in 1988. I spent six months as the Israeli occupation. TV coverage showed only foreign orthopaedic surgeon in Al- Palestinian children confronting Israeli Ahli Anglican Hospital in Gaza City. tanks with stones. Women and old folk were I fi rst met Palestinians in 1982 when not afraid any more. Occupied Palestine I responded to an international appeal was saying, “We will die standing; we will for help following Israel’s invasion of not live on our knees”. Lebanon. I was warned by my Church that Th e Israelis fi red tear gas at unarmed Palestinians were ‘terrorists’. In the refugee demonstrators, into homes, schools and camps of Beirut, however, I found warm hospitals. ‘Plastic’ and ‘rubber’ bullets were and generous people who kept telling me fi red at very close range, causing blindness of a home their children had never seen; and death. Israeli soldiers were fi lmed of a place called Palestine from which beating captured Palestinians to break they were forced to fl ee in 1948; and of their bones. Th e then Prime Minister their determination to return one day. boasted that when Israel was through with Th eir wish to exercise their right of return the Palestinians, they will be a nation of remained undimmed through the passing cripples. years; those in the diaspora were as one Because of the large numbers of casualties, with those under Israel’s occupation. the UN called for an orthopaedic surgeon. Akka Hospital in Shatilla refugee camp I volunteered but despite UN sponsorship, was named after the coastal city many Israel took six months to allow me in. came from. And Gaza Hospital in Sabra When I fi rst heard about the Intifada volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 arches quarterly 131 I was on a routine morning round with hospital was searched to no avail. Th e man ‘Mamma’ Rita, an 80 year-old retired was hidden in the room of my foreign German ambulance driver and paramedic anaesthetist; he escaped. Undeterred by volunteer with our charity Medical Aid further IDF harassment, the staff ploughed for Palestinians. We provided milk, basic on, treating and operating on more and medical care and advice for the refugees in more wounded. Beirut. Th e intervening years had given no Th e entire Gaza Strip was regularly put respite to the suff ering of the people of the under prolonged curfew, often lasting for camps who survived the 1982 massacre. weeks. Children were not even allowed to Indeed, their conditions deteriorated look out of the window; they risked being and morale was at a new low. Th ese were shot if they did. people who had little to look forward to. When Israel was celebrating its But that December morning, something Foundation Day in May 1989 it placed was diff erent. I saw a sparkle in their eyes the whole of Gaza under curfew. I was in as they spoke of the Intifada in broken Jerusalem to buy medical supplies and, as English. Th eir smiles returned, along with a UN offi cial, was exempt. Th ere was an their dignity. atmosphere of gaiety in Israel but as I went In the course of that fi rst Intifada, back, my heart was heavy. Gaza was silent, hundreds of Palestinians died, thousands like a ghost town. Th ere was a curfew; no more were injured and tens of thousands music was allowed, no one was allowed were imprisoned. out. My ambulance was the only thing Al-Ahli was a small hospital founded in moving as I drove through Gaza City. It 1891 by Christian missionaries and was was eerie. the only independent medical centre not Eidul Fitr, the day after the Muslim under Israeli control at that time. In all fasting month of Ramadan is a time for the other hospitals, wounded Palestinians visiting and showering gifts on family and were subject to scrutiny and arrest. Doctors friends. As worshippers emerged from the had to report stone throwers shot by the mosques on Eidul Fitr, 6 May 1989, Israeli Israeli soldiers. Understandably, wounded helicopters fi red at them. Children and demonstrators preferred Al-Ahli. young men responded angrily by stoning As we refused the Israel Defence Forces Israeli ground troops. Th ey shotback. (IDF) automatic access to our hospital, Within minutes, 343 injured Palestinians we were treated with hostility. When the were brought into our hospital; 6 died IDF wished to arrest one of our patients, while awaiting treatment. We operated it would surround the hospital with all day, throughout the night and into the armoured vehicles. Soldiers would take up next morning. As I emerged at dawn, I was positions on rooftops ready to snipe into told to go for a shower and something to the hospital. Commandos stormed the eat. hospital, even while women were in labour. I had a distinct sense of déjà vu. At Once, I was fi nishing an operation 7am, 18 September, 1982, I was ordered on a patient who had been shot in the out of the basement operating theatre of shoulder. Soldiers marched straight into Gaza Hospital in Beirut’s Shatilla camp. I my operating theatre – guns and all – walked into the bright sunlight and learnt and demanded that I surrender him for the truth and scale of what happened over interrogation. I refused. Th ey promised the previous three days. I was a witness and to return to take him. Th ey had probably survivor of the Sabra-Shatilla massacre. never faced aggressive Chinese women But on that May morning in 1989, before! something was diff erent. As I left the Th e soldiers did return that night but hospital operating theatre I saw that the could not fi nd the patient. Apart from tree in the hospital courtyard had beautiful the foreign doctors’ rooms, the whole pink blossoms. In my hospital quarters I

132 arches quarterly volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 ‘FROM BEIRUT TO JERUSALEM’ 2009 - THE WOUNDS OF GAZA knelt down and sobbed. Memories of the remain rubble. massacre in Beirut and the experience of Th e British Embassy in Cairo warned the night before in Gaza overwhelmed me. us that it was reckless to go to Gaza and Th e tear gas and the shootings, the that we were going against the advice of humiliation, the cess-pools, the realities of our government. Everyone was nervous as life under occupation; “God, are you still dozens of medical doctors had been turned there?” I asked. Th e tree in full blossom away. However, three hours of frustration told me that He had not forgotten Gaza. was ended and we were waved on to the When Israel withdrew its settlers from bus taking us into Palestine. Gaza in 2005, it turned the territory into a A Palestinian Ministry of Health large prison for the 1.5 million Palestinians liaison offi cer met us. We told him that there; Gaza was put under a military, we wanted to assess the medical needs of economic and fi nancial blockade. No one Gaza for a medical charity. Th at evening, was allowed to enter or leave Gaza without Gaza radio announced that the fi rst Israel’s permission. British medical team had arrived. Ghassan Visitors to the Holy Land, especially thought it very funny, what with him those from the West, usually visit the West being a Palestinian from Gaza and I being Bank, bypassing Gaza. Not only was it a Chinese. Fortunately, we were joined by logistical nightmare to get into Gaza in the Dr Sonia Robbins, a British plastic and fi rst place, it was also very diffi cult to get hand surgeon, the next day. With her, we out again. Many westerners also believed had a rainbow coalition. Gaza was poor, uninteresting and teeming I had been on the road leading from with Islamic zealots and suicide bombers. Rafah to Gaza City many times during the Th is is untrue. fi rst Intifada. I remember it being crowded When the assault on Gaza started in with buildings and shops on either side. December 2008, Dr Ghassan Abu-Sita, But this time, it was apparent that many a Palestinian colleague in London, was buildings had been destroyed by Israeli concerned about the destruction and the military action. As Gaza is under siege, fate of his family. He was desperate to go rebuilding was not possible, so these clear there to assess the medical needs and plan spaces have become fi elds again. Further for long-term medical help. We realised north I saw evidence of the “Operation our role was not to perform operations – Cast Lead” destruction: bombed-out Gaza has superb local Palestinian surgeons. buildings, heaps of rubble, collapsed What they needed were medical supplies and training. We wanted to know how best I looked at northern to support them. Th roughout the 22 day bombardment, Gaza where once there Gaza was sealed-off by Israeli troops. We were citrus orchards, fi gured that we had a narrow window of opportunity to get into Gaza through farms and houses with Egypt although the Egyptians could not beautiful gardens. Now open the Rafah crossing without Israeli laid waste by Israeli permission. Our hunch was correct; the Israelis declared a temporary ceasefi re on explosives, northern the eve of President Obama’s inauguration. Gaza 2009 resembled We fl ew to Egypt. It took more than fi ve hours to reach the nuclear devastation Rafah from Cairo. Many trucks heading of Hiroshima after the for Gaza were turned back; one was Second World War. loaded with cement but building material was not allowed for Gaza. Th e bombed- The entire area was out hospitals, schools and homes had to obliterated. volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 arches quarterly 133 concrete, and mangled cables. Th is was fi rst well here.” very much like Beirut in 1982. When we fi nally reached Abdel Daim’s I looked at northern Gaza where once home in Khan Younis, fl anked by palm there were citrus orchards, farms and trees, bougainvillea fl owers, hibiscus, houses with beautiful gardens. Now laid waste by Israeli explosives, northern Gaza “Anything that moves 2009 resembled the nuclear devastation of Hiroshima after the Second World War. could be shot at.” I Th e entire area was obliterated. needed no second Ghassan’s father-in-law, Abdel Daim had picked us up at Rafah. “Look at our telling. petrol stations!” he said, pointing to a man squatting on the roadside surrounded by jasmine and honeysuckle, it was hard to several jerry cans fi lled with petrol. “From believe that such beauty existed amidst such the tunnels”, remarked Daim. Th e tunnels destruction. Th e house is a bungalow with under the border with Egypt had been a fl at roof top. When I started to climb to described as Gaza’s “lifeline” during the the roof I was stopped by Ghassan’s father- years of the Israeli siege. in-law; Israeli pilotless drones survey the Abdel Daim was defi ant: “Th ey pound area. “Anything that moves could be shot us from the sea, shell us from their tanks, at.” I needed no second telling. bomb us with F16s and helicopters; they Abdel Daim is tall and dignifi ed, have killed and wounded so many. But about 60 years old with silver-grey hair, a they have not recaptured one inch of our moustache and long eyebrows to match. territory. Welcome to Free Gaza!” Beneath the stern appearance, was a kind How could I forget such spirit? In the fi rst man with a great sense of humour. He Intifada, I spent six months with them and had been arrested and imprisoned by the found the same steadfastness and courage. Israelis four times; although tortured, he I had completed From Beirut to Jerusalem never betrayed his friends. He comes from and wanted to share with them the story a Bedouin family in Beersheba renowned of their Palestinian relatives in Lebanon. for strength and loyalty. Th e family was I had brought along six copies but the driven out and are refugees in Gaza. Aida, nurses in the hospital spliced the book into his wife, is a young-looking, attractive sections and shared them out. While the lady, who decorated their home with Beirut hospitals were named after places beautiful Palestinian embroidery. I fi rst in Palestine, those in Gaza, in turn, were came across such embroidery in Beirut in named after places like Tel El-Za’ter and 1982, in Shatilla camp. Each village has its Shatilla, in honour of the refugee camps. distinct motif. Despite the demolition of Th ere is no better example than this to their villages, memory and heritage lived illustrate that the Palestinian people are on through these colourful silk threads one;there is no distinction between those sewn on black cloth. Th e beauty of the under occupation and those in exile. embroidery and the garden brought to We turned off the main road past a life the beauty of Palestine. Diaspora cemetery. Th is is where young Muhammad Palestinians always told me that their land A l-Dura, the 12 year-old shot by the Israelis was beautiful. I used to dismiss this as at the beginning of the second Intifada in sentimentality; not any more. full view of the media, is buried. Khan Younis has a dark history. In 1956 Abdel Daim’s land has not been spared Israeli soldiers under the command of Ariel by the Israelis. He pointed to a large fi eld: Sharon killed nearly all of the Palestinian “Th e Israelis came one night and destroyed men in the town. Th eir graves were dug all the olive and apricot trees on 15 acres of by the women and children. Almost three land. Most of those trees were over 50 years hundred were killed. old and planted by my mother; she dug the Every morning, before we went to the

134 arches quarterly volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 ‘FROM BEIRUT TO JERUSALEM’ 2009 - THE WOUNDS OF GAZA ho spit a l s , we h a d A r a bic c off ee, home baked pastries, cheese and bread; in the evening, unconventional weapons could be a cooked dinner. One day, we found that identifi ed – the family had killed some fowls for us. As if it were not enough, Abdel Daim i) White Phosphorus shells and bought us fresh fi sh. He could not allow bombs - eyewitnesses speak of bombs us to leave Gaza, he said, without tasting exploding at high altitude scattering their fi sh. It was extremely delicious, but a large canopy of white phosphorus Gaza’s fi shermen are often shot at or even bomblets which cover a large area. killed by gunboats if they stray beyond the Israeli-imposed three-mile limit. During the land invasion, eyewitnesses We visited all the hospitals in Gaza describe the tanks shelling homes fi rst and saw the extent of damage to schools, with a conventional shell [followed clinics and UN buildings. We introduced by] a phosphorus shellfi red. Used in ourselves as the ‘British’ medical team, this manner the phosphorus explodes speaking to the medical personnel and and burns the families and the homes. administrators who were extremely Many charred bodies were found disciplined and dedicated. among burning phosphorus particles. We wrote a quick report of our fi ndings as Israeli bombs fell hard and fast in One area of concern is that the southern Gaza. We put the facts down and phosphorus seems to be in a special issued it immediately. It was our witness stabilising agent, resulting in and was published in the medical journal, the phosphorus not burning out the Lancet Global Health Network. It completely. Residue still covers the attracted a great deal of attention. fi elds, playground and compounds. It ignites when picked up by curious Excerpts read: kids, or produce fumes when farmers return to water their fi elds. One “THE WOUNDS OF GAZA - returning family returning to water Over the period of 27 December their fi eld met with clouds of fumes 2008 to the ceasefi re of 18 January producing epitasis. Th is makes 2009, it was estimated that a million the phosphorus an anti-personnel and a half tons of explosives were weapon. dropped on the Gaza Strip. Gaza is 25 miles by 5 miles and home to 1.5 Surgeons from hospitals are also million people. Prior to this, Gaza reporting cases where after primary had been completely blockaded and laparotomy for relatively small starved for 50 days. In fact, since wounds with minimal contamination the Palestinian election [in 2006], fi nd on second look laparotomy Gaza has been under total or partial increasing areas of tissue necrosis at blockade for several years... about 3 days. Patients then become On the fi rst day of the invasion, 250 gravely ill and by about 10 days people were killed. Every single those patients needing a third relook police station in Gaza was bombed encounter massive liver necrosis. Th is killing large numbers of police may or may not be accompanied by offi cers. Having wiped out the police generalised bleeding, kidney failure force, attention was turned to non- and heart failure and death. Although government targets. acidosis, liver necrosis and sudden cardiac arrest due to hypocalcaemia A) Israeli weapons – In addition are known to be complications of to conventional weapons and white phosphorus it is not possible to high explosives, four categories of attribute these complications as being due to phosphorus alone. volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 arches quarterly 135 Th ere is an urgent need to analyse they were lined up they were fi red and identify the real nature of this upon and killed. Families have lost modifi ed phosphorus for its long term tens of their members through such eff ect on the people of Gaza. Th ere executions. Th e deliberate targeting of is also urgency in collecting and unarmed children and women is well disposing of the phosphorus residues documented by human rights groups littering the entire Gaza Strip. As they in the Gaza Strip over the past month. give off toxic fumes when coming into contact with water, once the rain falls C) Targeting of ambulances – 13 the whole area will be polluted with ambulances have been fi red upon, acid phosphorus fumes. Children killing drivers and fi rst aid personnel should be warned not to handle and in the process of rescue and evacuation play with these phosphorus residues. of the wounded.

ii) Heavy Bombs – the use of DIME D) Cluster Bombs – Dropped on (dense inert material explosives) was the Rafah border crossing with evident though it is unsure whether Egypt. Th e fi rst patients wounded by depleted uranium was used in the cluster bombs were brought into the south. In the civilian areas, surviving Abu Yusef Najjar Hospital after the patients were found to have limbs ceasefi re. Since more than half the truncated by DIME, since the stumps tunnels in the border with Egypt have apart from being characteristically cut been destroyed, Gaza has lost part of off in guillotine fashion also fail to her life-line. Th ese tunnels, contrary bleed. Bomb casing and shrapnel are to popular belief, are not for weapons, extremely heavy. though light weapons could have been smuggled through them. Th ey are the iii) Fuel air explosives – Bunker busters mainstay of food and fuel for Gaza. and implosions bombs have been Palestinians are beginning to tunnel used. Th ere are buildings, especially again. However it became clear that the 8 storey Science and Technology cluster bombs were dropped on to Building of the Islamic University the Rafah border and the fi rst was of Gaza, which had been reduced to accidentally set off by tunnelling. Five rubble no higher than 5-6 feet high. burn patients were brought in after setting off a booby trap kind of device. iv) Silent Bombs – People in Gaza described a silent bomb which is E) Death toll – as of 25 January, extremely destructive. Th e bomb 2009, it is estimated 1,350 were killed arrives as a silent projectile at most with the numbers increasing daily. with a whistling sound and creates a Th is is due to the severely wounded large area where all objects and living continuing to die in hospitals. About things are vaporised with minimal 40 per cent killed were children. trace. We are unable to fi t this into conventional weapons but the F) Severe Injuries - Th e severely possibility of new particle weapons injured numbered 5,450 with 40 being tested should be suspected. per cent children. Th ese are mainly large burns and poly-trauma patients. B) Executions – Survivors describe Single limb fractures and walking Israeli tanks arriving in front of wounded are not included in these homes demanding that residents fi gures. come out. Children, old people and women would come forward and as Th rough our conversations with

136 arches quarterly volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 ‘FROM BEIRUT TO JERUSALEM’ 2009 - THE WOUNDS OF GAZA

doctors and nurses the word bomb would destroy multiple families. holocaust and catastrophe were used Th e pattern of consistent targeting of repeatedly. Th e medical staff bears civilians make one suspect that the the psychological trauma of the past military are but collateral damage, month living through the situation while civilians are the primary targets. and dealing with mass casualties which swamped their department Quantity and quality of the and operation rooms. Many patients ammunition - as described above. died in the Accident and Emergency Department while awaiting Gaza’s lack of defence - against the treatment. In a district hospital, the modern weapons of Israel. Gaza has orthopaedic surgeon carried out 13 no tanks, no planes, no anti-aircraft external fi xations in less than a day. missiles against an invading army. We experienced that fi rst hand in a minor It is estimated that of the severely clash of Israeli tank shells versus injured, 1,600 will suff er permanent Palestinians AK47 return fi re. Th e disabilities. Th ese include forces were simply unmatched. amputations, spinal cord injuries, head injuries, large burns with Absence of well constructed bomb crippling contractures. Th ere are 400 shelters for civilians – Unfortunately amputees of which 88 are bilateral. even if these were present they would be no match for bunker busters SPECIAL FACTORS TO possessed by the Israeli army. CONSIDER- the high death and injury toll is due to several factors CONCLUSION Th e next assault on Gaza would be just No escape - Gaza is sealed off by as disastrous. Th e people of Gaza are Israeli troops. No one can escape the extremely vulnerable and defenceless bombardment and the land invasion. in the event of another attack. If the Th ere is simply no escape. Even international community is serious within the strip itself, movement from about preventing such a large scale north to south is impossible as tanks of deaths and injuries in the future, have cut off both halves. By contrast, it will have to develop some sort of it was possible for people in Lebanon defence force for Gaza. Otherwise in 1982 and 2006 to escape from an many more vulnerable civilians will area of heavy bombardment to an area continue to die.” of relative calm. Gaza does not have this option. Th e report stayed on the Lancet Global Gaza is densely populated – Th e Health Network for 28 days – from 2 bombs used by Israel have been February to 2 March 2009. It was taken off precision bombs, they have a hundred the website following a massive pro-Israel per cent hit rate on buildings which protest accusing it of factual inaccuracies. are crowded with people, such as However, in those 28 days, it had found its the central market, police stations, way into many other publications and as schools, the UN compound used as a of March 2009, has been translated into shelter from bombardment, mosques 10 languages. (40 of them destroyed) and the homes of families who thought they were safe Dr Swee Chai Ang is a consultant trauma and orthopaedic. as there were no combatants in them. She is the author of From Beirut to Jerusalem, from which In high rise fl ats, a single implosion this abridged account is taken, and co-founder of British Charity Medical Aid for Palestinians. volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 arches quarterly 137 FREE ARCHES ONLINE DOWNLOAD

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138 arches quarterly volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 Youth De-Radicalisation: the Wolverhampton Experience

REVD. MASON WEST

istory reveals that confl icts Th ose who wish to eradicate such between societies rarely occur heinous acts against the innocent should Hdue solely because of ideological concentrate their eff orts on more than the clashes. Ideology, philosophy and religion tool used to justify them. Th e underlying are usually the justifi cation for the use of cause that makes people vulnerable to the most primitive and violent means to accepting extremist ideas and engaging bring an enemy into submission. However, in acts of terror should be the focus. Th at the true source of confl ict is usually the cause is the unequal distribution of basic scarcity of resources. resources and the struggle for survival it Th roughout history people of diff erent creates. If scarcity can be dealt with before cultures, ethnicities and religions have fear leads to a primitive survival instinct had periods of peaceful coexistence until kicking-in and subsequent inhumanity, the balance of economic resources was then ideology as a justifi cation for heinous disrupted. Because of this disruption the acts will lose its power. urge and need to survive motivated one Hence, scarcity rather than ideology group to seek the elimination of another. should be the issue. If societies can enable Often this process of elimination was all of their members to have a purpose, contrary to the morality of the group, so have access and have the freedom to reach some principle was needed to justify what their full potential, then they will have would otherwise have been considered fewer frustrated citizens seeking extremist homicidal or genocidal. Th is principle, and violent means to restore a semblance whether religious or philosophical, served of balance. as a type of absolution for a group’s means In the British city of Wolverhampton of restoring social balance. there is an organisation which seeks Th e idea posited by the Nazis that to engage young people and empower they were a genetically superior race them with the ability to infl uence their in comparison to the Jews whom they government and participate in the local defi ned as subhuman served as their economy before they become victims of reason and justifi cation for attempting to antisocial or extremist ideologies. It is the wipe an entire race of people off the face belief of the leadership of this organisation of the earth. Th e Darwinian survival of that if those who feel rejected by society can the fi ttest provided western nations with be given the tools to reconnect then it will the justifi cation for enslaving the people of not be possible for them to be radicalised Africa and looting the natural resources of or recruited into gangs or other groups the entire continent. Th e Hutu of Rwanda which thrive on antisocial behaviour. saw the Tutsi as no more than cockroaches, enabling them to slaughter one million EYES people without much thought. Th ese acts Th e restoration of balance is the of terror along with the slaughter in Sudan, basis for the model being developed Bosnia-Herzegovina, Laos and many other by Wolverhampton’s Engage Youth places throughout history are all examples Empowerment Services (EYES). Th e of the use of ideology or religion to justify purpose of EYES is to empower youth unimaginable acts of intolerance and to infl uence their peers, government and genocide. economy a s a gents of positive socia l cha nge. volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 arches quarterly 139 EYES believes that if it can empower those who will one day serve as society’s leaders EYES has targeted in a way that promotes balance in society, specifi c areas in scarcity of resources will not force people Wolverhampton into committing inhumane acts. Since 2004 EYES has helped hundreds identifi ed as hot spots for of youth identify their talents and develop crime and unwelcome them into marketable skills to be celebrated by their community. activities. Initially, the organisation targeted Afro- Caribbean youth between the ages of 8 and In partnership with the police, EYES has 25 who were on the fringes of society as a targeted specifi c areas in Wolverhampton result of exclusion from school, problems identifi ed as hot spots for crime and in the courts and a history of antisocial unwelcome activities. Th rough funding behaviour. Presently, EYES serves youth initiatives like TKAP and Building Blocks from a range of racial, religious, educational the police service supports the application and economic backgrounds. It has become of the EYES model in the most diffi cult apparent that the need to discover purpose parts of the city. EYES has also received exists in all segments of society. funding from the British government’s counter-terrorism Prevent strategy. Th is METHODOLOGY OF EYES funding allowed the organisation to reach out to young Asian men and empower EYES does not exist in a vacuum. It them to become advocates for their own has participated in capacity building and communities. It also sought to dissuade collaboration with other organisations them from becoming victims of extremist locally and nationally. Capacity ideologies. Th e fi rst phase of the EYES building is the juxtaposition of divergent model is engagement; it developed the organizations’ strengths and weaknesses to Street Team Strategy in 2008. Th is calls maximize their ability to have an impact on for specially trained mentors to meet society. Where EYES is weak in its ability young people where they are, rather to serve the interests of Wolverhampton’s than expecting them to come to the youth the management seeks to partner organisation for services. It is a fact that with an organisation stronger in that most young men surviving on the streets, particular area. Th e reverse is done with participating in gangs or involved in the organisation’s strengths. Collaboration some form of extremism do not approach is the strategic assignment of tasks to youth service bodies for help. Many are so organisations working together to solve a marginalised that they believe that the life specifi c societal problem. they are leading is the only way for them to As far as capacity building is concerned, go. Hence, EYES street team members go EYES partners with organisations which out to them on the street or in their hang- can provide training for qualifi cations it is outs known as “cotch houses”. unable to provide. In 2009 EYES received Once engaged, the young people funding from the Tackling Knives Action are invited to a safe place like a local Plan (TKAP) to engage youth on the restaurant where street team members fringes in Wolverhampton; it set up a elicit what services they need to pull them partnership with the Trinity programme out of a particular situation or lifestyle. to help young men to secure their SIA After several of these meetings and qualifi cation so that they could fi nd work research conducted by the street team, an as security guards. EYES has also partnered engagement strategy is designed for that with organisations like JML Training to group and they begin to enter the second provide apprenticeships for service users phase at the EYES building. and Ground Works to secure volunteers to Th e EYES model challenges participants help carry out EYES programmes. to identify those abilities which seem to

140 arches quarterly volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 YOUTH DE-RADICALISATION: THE WOLVERHAMPTON EXPERIENCE come naturally to them. Th ese are defi ned useful in an illicit economy. as talents. Most people reached by the Th e third phase of the EYES model programme have never really engaged empowers participants to transform in meta-cognitive activities that result in their talents into marketable skills. A self-defi nition or self-determination. Th e skill is defi ned as any ability or activity young people taking part often reveal that that is learned. It is occasionally hard for they have never really thought about what participants to distinguish skill from talent. natural abilities they possess and usually Participants who are asked to identify their engage in activities and lifestyles which talents will often name a skill such as being their families, peers or the prevalent pop good at football or cricket. Facilitators culture push them towards. remind them that these are sports, with Th ough it is a diffi cult process, rules which they were taught. If they are programme participants are encouraged allowed to regard a skill as a talent they to think about themselves and their lives. will ultimately limit themselves. A person Th is process not only helps them to begin may be able to play football as well as the process of defi ning themselves, it also rugby or cricket or volleyball. However, gives them a sense of purpose, a reason for if they believe they only have the natural being. inclination to play one of the sports they Th is is a very important aspect of the become limited. Th e goal of this phase is EYES model because most of the young to eradicate all limitations and help the people with whom the programme engages participants visualise their full potential. join antisocial organizations to gain a Facilitators would, therefore, help such sense of purpose and belonging. Th ey participants to identify their talent as are frequently so overcome by trauma in athleticism and help them to realise that their lives that they fi rst try to numb the athleticism can have many applications. psychological pain and then try to fi nd Participants will seek to uncover all the a reason for it. Th e initial acceptance by applications of just one talent. For example, gangs and extremist groups provides the a person with a talent for communication pain relief these youth are seeking .When could fi nd that this one talent can be their pain is numbed by the stimulating applied to motivational speaking, teaching, activities of these groups, young minds preaching, speech writing, story-telling become fertile ground for extremist and many other skills that can be learned. dogma, which appears to provide the Once the participants have identifi ed reason for their pain and the ‘enemy’ the skills that can be developed from their responsible for it. talents, they are guided through the process EYES seeks to neutralise the attraction of determining the marketability of each of such groups by empowering youth to skill. Marketability refers to the demand defi ne themselves by identifying their a particular skill has in the local, regional talents and then use that defi nition to and national economy. Participants are begin the discovery of purpose in this able to see not only how their talent can world. become a skill, but also how they can make Th ough diffi cult, this is only the second a living with each of the skills. phase. Th e model also accommodates those Jenny Taylor, the CEO of the who are quite familiar with their talents programme, notes that many of the young but do not know how to apply them in the people who join while they are engaged in societies in which they live. Many of the antisocial behaviour don’t want to engage programme participants become involved in illegal activities; they feel that they have in antisocial activities and groups because no choice. Th ey have been deceived into they believe that such involvement is the believing that the path they are on is the only way that they can support themselves only option. Even though the path may and their families. Th ey have developed have an undesirable end, they accept it and prolifi c skills, but those skills are only usually embrace it. Th is phase of the EYES volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 arches quarterly 141 model gives participants the opportunity Th is type of training is intentional to see that they do have a choice; that there because the EYES model calls for them to is a diff erent path. In fact, that there are participate in the economy and infl uence many. it. Th ey are trained to be creative, meaning It is at this point that participants they can bring something new to the experience a revelation and a new reality world by force of their imagination. Th ey begins to take shape. Young people are are trained to be innovative, meaning they encouraged to choose a skill that is not can fi nd new applications for existing only valuable to them but also enables products. Ultimately, they are motivated them to support themselves and their to have an entrepreneurial spirit. families. Th ey are encouraged to choose a Entrepreneurship is a key component skill which gives them a sense of purpose, because in a free market it is the one one for which they feel passion and one element that expands an economy. Th e basic that can be defi ned by the market as their elements of any economy are land (natural profession. Th e skill that will serve them resources), labour (skilled workers), capital best is the one that gives a strong sense of (produced goods used to make other purpose, passion and profession. Once the goods) and entrepreneurship. Of these four participants have chosen their skill, they basic resources entrepreneurship discovers are ready for the fourth phase; training. new uses for land, applies capital properly EYES is divided into fi ve departments: to these new uses and creates new jobs as intervention, training, creative, marketing a result of creation and innovation for the and administrative. Th e intervention labour force. Motivating the participants department is where most of the in EYES to be entrepreneurs creates a organisation’s participants enter, usually multiplier eff ect. If these youth become through the work of the street team. creative and innovative developing new Others are referred to EYES by schools, products and services, they will in turn the police service, the courts or concerned create a place for others to use their skills parents. in a productive way. In the training department, facilitators take the youth through the journey of self-discovery. Once the participants have One can only imagine decided what skill they will pursue they the sense of achievement are assigned to a training programme that a young person designed by EYES. If EYES does not have a curriculum for a specifi c skill or qualifi ed who was once a gang trainers, the participants are referred to member or dealer on another organisation which does. Many of the youth who come to EYES the street must feel after want to develop a creative skill in music, identifying a talent that drama, fashion or writing. Th ey complete gives him a sense of a twelve-week training programme which helps them to become profi cient in their purpose. chosen area. Th ose who want to be rappers are not only trained in the development of Most of the programming conducted lyrical expressions structured in diff erent by EYES is a direct result of the creativity confi gurations of rhyme and metre. Th ey and innovation of those youth who take are also trained in the music studio as part. Th is is the power of the fourth phase they create their own tracks and CDs, and of the EYES model. Once youth have then trained how to market their music transformed their talents into marketable and engage in advertising. Participants are skills they are then challenged by the taught not only the art of music, but also organisation to showcase those skills on the business of music. the biggest stage that can be created. EYES

142 arches quarterly volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 YOUTH DE-RADICALISATION: THE WOLVERHAMPTON EXPERIENCE is known in Wolverhampton for musical WORKING IN PARTNERSHIP productions involving forty to sixty young Th is grassroots approach worked and people. All of these youth are service users continues to work, but it is contrary to who have developed their skills in EYES the mainstream approach of marketing training workshops. Th ey help write the one’s services widely and waiting for plays; they compose the music; they market potential users to come to the organisation and advertise the play; they build the sets, for help. Th e grassroots approach does design the costumes, plan the lighting and not off er the chance to sit on boards, organise the rehearsals. advisory committees and steering groups. One can only imagine the sense of Grassroots organisations are never really achievement that a young person who was seen because their operations are deep in once a gang member or dealer on the street the eponymous grass. It is their impact must feel after identifying a talent that that rises to be recognised. gives him a sense of purpose, developing a When the likes of the police service and skill he loves and then being celebrated for local authority began to see changes in something new he brought to the world. parts of Wolverhampton they started to However, this is not the last phase of the ask questions about the cause. When riots EYES model. took place in the city, and a cadre of young Th e fi nal phase is the multiplier eff ect. people led fearlessly by Jenny and Helen Th ose who have gone through the previous were in the midst of the chaos persuading phases have the opportunity to become their friends to go home, the city took note. mentors, trainers and project leaders in Recently, the leadership of EYES was the organisation. Th ese youth are taken engaged by the British Counter-terrorism through a training programme that unit to develop a project for Asian youth exposes them to leadership theory, civic in the city of Wolverhampton. When a engagement, economics and motivational group of Asian young men came together and training methods. Once they have and announced a mission to encourage completed this training they are challenged young Muslim men to fi nd peaceful and to have an impact on the lives of other productive means of advocating for their youths who are where they once were. community, people took note. At fi rst it One of the powerful aspects of the seemed that this organisation, with a focus EYES programme is the fact that the on Black youth, was out of its element. only staff members over the age of thirty However, the founders of EYES insist that are the organisation’s three founders and the issues facing Black youth who engage the programme coordinator. Th is is not in antisocial behaviour are similar, if not down to a commitment to ageism, but identical, to the issues faced by the young because all of the directors of the fi ve people in other segments of society. departments, the leaders of the 12 sections Disenfranchised Black youth may be and other staff are young people who were attracted to gangs which have a negative once service users. Th ey came through the impact on society through drug dealing EYES model and then helped to build the and gun crime. Disenfranchised White organisation through their own creativity youth may be attracted to far-right and innovation. organisations which have a negative impact For the past eight years this model has on society through racist rhetoric and hate been employed to reach youth on the crimes. Disenfranchised Asian youth may fringes of Wolverhampton society. Th e be attracted to radicalised groups intent programme has been amazingly successful on making their mark on western society. as a grassroots initiative. Now the challenge Th ese may be diff erent outlets for their for EYES is to join the mainstream as a anger, frustration and pain, but those professional organisation on a par with feelings usually have the same source: other youth service agencies which have the social and economic oppression. respect of private and public sector entities. volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 arches quarterly 143 YOUTH DE-RADICALISATION: THE WOLVERHAMPTON EXPERIENCE CONCLUSION risen above the blades of grass from the Engage Youth Empowerment Services roots. has now been invited into the mainstream. Th e question that lies before On 12 December, 2011 twenty members Wolverhampton now is this: “Can what of the EYES organisation stood before thrived at the grassroots level thrive above the Wolverhampton City Council and the blades?” If you ask the leadership of told their story. Listening were the city’s EYES and the youth they serve they will Chief Executive Offi cer, the Director tell you that the model has passed the test of Education, elected city councillors, of reaching those whom others could not managers from the city’s public health fi nd and empowering them to discover agency, the Director of Youth Services and their purpose, passion and profession. others. Th ey will tell you that even above the Young people who were once on the grass, EYES will thrive as it empowers the street selling drugs, excluded from school, youth of Wolverhampton, the youth of the convicted of crime or on the verge of United Kingdom and beyond to infl uence extremist behaviour stood before the most their peers, their governments and their powerful people in the city. Th ese young economies. people were no longer on the fringes. Th ree were the designers and members of the street team; one is now the marketing Revd. Mason West III is the director of operations and department manager; another is the IT one of the co-founders of Engage Youth Empowerment manager; yet another is the manager of the Services (EYES) in Wolverhampton, UK. He has a bachelor of arts degree in Theology; a masters degree creative department. Th ese young people in Urban and Regional Planning with a focus in community development and is currently completing were once service users who now help a doctorate in Leadership and Learning from the run the organisation. Th ey are a powerful University of Tennessee.

testimony to the history and work of EYES. West has worked with young people throughout the No member of Wolverhampton City United States, the UK and Bermuda. His experience includes, but is not limited to, working with and Council left the meeting unimpressed. developing strategic initiatives to decrease crime in Th is organisation started by two mothers communities; dissuading youth from participating in extremist and terrorist activities; and fostering creative seeking to save their children and a youth leadership. minister seeking to fulfi l his purpose had

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144 arches quarterly volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 Why an European network? The increasing importance of matters of Religion and Belief in public life across Europe has been recognised in Article 17 of the Treaty of Lisbon: that the European Union:

“Respects and does not prejudice the status under national law of churches and religious associations or communities in the Member States.

Equally respects the status under national law of philosophical and non-confessional organisations.

Recognising their identity and their specifi c contribution, the Union shall maintain an open, transparent and regular dialogue with these churches and organisations.”

In addition, Article 19, especially through the implementation of the Religion and Belief strand of Equalities and Fundamental Rights, is leading to greater awareness across Europe of the need to take action to promote harmony and mutual understanding, and to combat discrimination and prejudice on issues of Religion and Belief across Europe.

The European Network on Religion and Belief (ENORB) seeks to work with others to develop a long-term network, within the framework of EU policies on equalities and fundamental rights, to combat discrimination and promote mutual understanding in the fi eld of Religion and Belief. ENORB will facilitate dialogue between Religion and Belief traditions of all kinds and support the development of similar networks in all member-states.

What we hope to be A European Network for mutual understanding and common action between religious and non-religious groups, based on the shared European values which bind diverse groups and communities together in a strong and sustainable Europe: social cohesion and inclusion, freedom of belief and discussion, respect for the rule of law, democracy, human rights, and equality of treatment for all, which seeks to:

1. Build on the common heritage and the modern diversity of Europe’s historical faiths: Christian – Catholic, Orthodox and Protestant – and Jewish and Muslim; 2. Draw on the long European traditions of free thinking, secular humanism and non- religious social action; 3. Affi rm Europe’s modern diversity: Buddhist, Hindu, Sikh, Jain and other religions from across the world; 4. Defi ne common ground and promote collaboration between secular institutions and religious and non-religious organisations.

volumevolumetel: 5 0044 eeditiondit 207ion 359 9 7145springspri ng| 00322 20122012 374 7733 | [email protected] | www.enorb.euheshe qquarterlyu arterly 145 Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: Young People’s Perspectives

HUSSAIN AL-JABIR

n the aftermath of the September any age group, as an eff ect of publicising 11 attacks in New York, and July 7 this survey through a single student forum Iin London, a fresh wave of counter- site1, only eight per cent of respondents terrorism legislation was unleashed upon identifi ed themselves as being older than Europe and the US, starting with the USA 23 years of age, with the majority aged PATRIOT Act and US Homeland Security between 17 to 19. However, the data is not Act. Both of these were introduced by the necessarily representative of all types of Bush administration as a direct response student in the UK, and generally focuses to mounting criticism of their handling of on those more academically inclined. the attacks; the UK Anti-Terrorism, Crime Additionally, being an anonymous online and Security Act; and the Prevention of survey, some respondents chose not to Terrorism Act, which was catalysed by answer in-depth questions, resulting in less the detention of nine men whose grounds comprehensive qualitative data. for imprisonment were based upon secret Generally, the survey was answered well, evidence which meant that they could not with evidence of reasoned thought into the be prosecuted. answers that respondents gave, allowing In the wake of such legislation, our for greater confi dence in the results. A civil liberties appear to have changed copy of the survey questions may be found irrevocably, as these legislation begin to in Appendix I. infringe increasingly upon our rights as enshrined in the Human Rights Act HOW THREATENED DO (HRA), and European Convention on YOUNG PEOPLE FEEL FROM Human Rights (ECHR). However, an TERRORISM? unintended phenomenon has begun to One of the more startling conclusions emerge as a result; an increasing sense of which can be drawn from the data is young threat among young people of terrorism, people’s sense of threat from terrorism, in desire for greater discussion of terrorism relation to themselves, their community and suspicion levied towards Islamic and their country. Th irty-fi ve per cent groups as well as student organisations. of the respondents felt their country was either ‘Most Th reatened’ or ‘Th reatened’ METHODOLOGY from terrorism. By comparison, only 8% Th is study examines the results of a felt the same when asked about the threat study, undertaken during October 2011 of terrorism to them, and even fewer felt which involved sixty-one respondents so about their local community. Th is clear completed over a three-day period. disparity between the sense of threat to Organised online by the author, the study the country and to the self highlights the was initiated in order to surmise the infl uence of the media in shaping young opinions of young people from a variety of people’s perceptions of terrorism. ethnic backgrounds on terrorism, counter- Azad Ali, chair of the Muslim Safety terrorism, and discussion within schools Forum, a key advisory body to the about such issues. Th e study presented Metropolitan police on counter-terrorism both qualitative and quantitative research, policy remarked “the threat of terrorism… with thirty-six questions asked in an online is quite high because the media has survey. Although the survey was open to propagated it to that level.” Th e media, 146 arches quarterly volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 TERRORISM AND COUNTER-TERRORISM: YOUNG PEOPLE’S PERSPECTIVES consisting of both traditional outlets such will never happen to them (a phenomena as press and television, as well as newer known as ‘unrealistic optimism’5), a major distribution methods such as the internet constituent of this lack of concern is the and social-media, has enough infl uence to prevailing of rational thinking over the change people’s perceptions of terrorism irrational risks propagated by the media. through both explicit and implicit Th is is because the media has infl uence methods. over perceived risk to the self to a far For instance, a report found that “that smaller extent than perceived risk to the respondents who relied on television news country as a whole. experienced more positive and negative emotions toward the terrorist attacks. Young people have a In contrast, newspaper use was not a signifi cant factor in explaining people’s greater fear of terrorism emotional responses to the attacks.”2 Th is, in relation to their when taken in the context that 64% of young adults in the US were “non-users” country as opposed to of Newspapers3, gives rise to a clear themselves, as a result discrepancy between public opinion and of media infl uences media reports. Television reports (which had the highest penetration among which create emotionally young adults) are far more emotionally charged responses to charged than actual public opinion, yet, when faced with constant media reports terrorism. exaggerating the emotional aspects, young people become more emotionally charged. A Swedish study produced an alternative Th ese emotional feelings are often explanation for the lower perceived expressed in news reports covering personal risk as opposed to general risk, in terrorist acts such as September 11 and that “ [personal risk] is seen as one over July 7, and are also refl ected in reporting of which the respondents have some degree foiled terrorist attempts or police counter- of control and possibility of protection”.6 terrorist arrests, and even coverage of wars Th is would be a particularly acute problem in Afghanistan and, Iraq. Th erefore, they with regard to young people, due to their begin to exhibit more emotional, and inherent susceptibility to unrealistic commensurately, more irrational response optimism. to the threat of terrorism. One report Th us it is clear that young people have found that in the US, the probability a greater fear of terrorism in relation to of “simple acts of terror occurring” was their country as opposed to themselves, only 0.07%.4 Consequently, although as a result of media infl uences which the actual risk of terrorist incidents create emotionally charged responses to occurring is infi nitesimally small, the terrorism. It can also be seen in the context irrational perceived risk as a result of media of ‘unrealistic optimism’, where the media infl uences is far higher, which explains the propagate irrational, emotional thinking discrepancies that the survey sheds light over rational thought. on. If the perceived threat of terrorism to WHY DO YOUNG PEOPLE the country can be explained by media DESIRE GREATER DISCUSSION infl uences, accordingly the lack of a sense OF TERRORISM? of threat to the self, exhibited by the A key fi nding from the study was the respondents, can be explained by a lack desire among young people for greater of media infl uence in this area. Although discussion of terrorism in their places of this little concern can be explained by learning. When asked, 46% of respondents general idiocentric beliefs that such events either ‘Agreed’ or ‘Strongly Agreed’ volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 arches quarterly 147 that they wanted greater discussion, the topic, which restricts its usefulness with 54% responding that they either to teachers and pupils.”10 Th is provides ‘Never’ or ‘Rarely’ discuss terrorism in an explanation for the desire of greater their places of learning. Th is highlights discussion, because current government inadequacies in the government’s policies initiatives do not engage suffi ciently with with regard to education about terrorism, young people as a result of poor planning known as the Prevent strategy. Prevent, and advice on how schools can implement a key constituent of the government’s this into the curriculum. overarching CONTEST counter- A secondary issue that arises from this terrorism strategy, was launched in 2007 is how education pertaining to extremism to “seek to stop people becoming terrorists is broached by schools, and whether such or supporting terrorism,”7 mainly through education focuses upon the criminality of means of funding projects in key sectors terrorism and relative legislation, or the such as “education, the internet, faith extremist ideologies behind terrorism. Th e organisations and institutions, health, the Prevent strategy as of present focuses on criminal justice system and the charitable the latter, with specifi c regard to Islamist sector” to halt the development of extremist terrorism.11 Th is is in accordance with ideologies from the source. the survey results, showing that 27% of In 2008, 54% of the projects delivered in respondents did not know about any of England as a result of funding from Prevent the current terrorism legislation, with 73% were classed as “Debates, discussions and recognising ‘Detention without Trial’12, forums”, such as “‘Safe space’ debates to yet numbers smaller than 40% recognising discuss current aff airs or grievances”.8 specifi c acts or more obscure areas of Th is would appear to be a wise investment, legislation (respondents may select more since greater discussion and thus, greater than one checkbox, therefore percentages awareness of the issues surrounding add up to more than 100%). terrorism allows for the dispelling of myths In addition, many respondents did not and conjecture in addition to encouraging answer questions pertaining to counter- potential extremists to listen to discussion terrorism policy, claiming “I don’t know”.13 of key issues from ‘both sides’. However, Th is is a clear eff ect of the lack of education this investment has not had the impact about the ideas of counter-terrorism; what that was desired. Indeed, as the survey it is, what the police are currently doing, pointed out, 54% of respondents said they and the relevant legislation. As a result, ‘never’ or ‘rarely’ discussed terrorism in young people may feel alienated from their place of learning, which is indicative the police, as they do not understand of key failures in this policy. their rights and thus, do not understand One study found that the Prevent strategy police motives behind actions such as was vague and uninformative with regard Section 44 Stop and Search. Ironically, to how schools can encourage free debate this leads to a situation where extremism on terrorism, as well as how to implement is being promoted as a means of protest this successfully in the curriculum.9 against police actions. Th erefore, in order Additionally, disparities in how funding for to remedy this situation, a clear and Prevent is allocated to local councils gives distinct focus in the curriculum has to be rise to diffi culties in providing the Prevent attributed to why the police use certain agenda. Quartermaine cites the example powers for counter-terrorism, as well as a of Warwickshire, an area with low Prevent clear explanation of young people’s rights funding, that is only able to “engage with under the legislation. Th is would help teachers through police initiatives such to endear the police to young people, a as a free website and training courses, crucial objective in order to gain their co- so this region focuses on the criminality operation in counter-terrorist initiatives. of terrorism rather than answering the Th us, it is clear that young people desire questions that the pupils have about greater discussion of terrorism, due to the

148 arches quarterly volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 TERRORISM AND COUNTER-TERRORISM: YOUNG PEOPLE’S PERSPECTIVES inadequacies of the current advice given counter-terrorism legislation currently to schools, and hence, the poor quality in force. Of the current laws in force of education and discussion delivered to (Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act students as a result. Hence, in order to 2001; Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005; alleviate this concern, more structured Counter-Terrorism Act 2008), there is no and comprehensive strategies need to mention of Islam or Islamist terrorism. be deployed so that young people have Th e respondent however, was alluding opportunities to discuss terrorism in a to the Prevent strategy, discussed earlier, ‘safe’ environment. which has a pronounced focus on Islamist Terrorism. In fact, Prevent itself mentions IS IT FAIR TO TARGET ISLAMIC that it relies upon both counter-terrorism GROUPS? legislation and other laws and executive A frequently debated aspect of orders. It deliberately shies away from government counter-terrorism policy further legislation as “research suggests is the greater emphasis on preventing that counter-terrorism legislation and Islamist terrorism, as opposed to far-right wider policing powers can contribute to extremism or Irish nationalist terrorism. the radicalisation process.”16 Th erefore, Th e government’s Prevent strategy Prevent tries to work within a community outwardly explains that the “majority model, by funding projects that aid the of our resources and eff orts will… be ‘counter-radicalisation’ process. devoted to preventing people from joining Th e second response is more accurate or supporting Al Qa’ida, its affi liates than the former, arguing that Muslims or related groups”, as they remain “the are watched more closely than other most serious… threat”.14 However, as the community and ethnic groups. Again, shootings in July 2011 on Utøya Island, the Prevent strategy corroborates this by Anders Behring Breivik, a right-wing argument, through its focus on Islamist extremist and xenophobe have shown terrorism. One report that compared other forms of extremism exist and pose a counter-terrorism strategies during threat to countries. ‘Th e Troubles’ of the 1970s and today’s When asked specifi cally about Islamic counter-terrorism climate highlights a groups, 56% of respondents said they ‘Agree key grievance with the counter-terrorism or ‘Strongly Agree’ that Islamic groups policies in place at the moment, in that are being aff ected by counter-terrorism law-abiding Muslims are being victimised approaches. Th is is in accordance with and becoming objects of suspicion, where earlier discussion of the Prevent strategy, as only a small minority exhibit ‘radical’ tackling Islamist ideologies are a key part behaviour. For example, it found that of the government’s counter-terrorist plan. “Irish or Muslim spaces (mosques, Catholic When asked for more details, respondents churches, Irish pubs) were felt to be under wrote: surveillance… Muslim respondents Th e current legislation allows them to be recounted several instances of ‘stop and scrutinised far more than any other group; search’ including one case involving young Th ey are watched more carefully than other children”. Additionally, it found that as a ethnic groups in Britain with [sic] relation result “a state of fearfulness” was created, to potential terrorist activities.” (respondent “which in turn resulted in behaviour such 15) and “Various charity groups have been as lying low, keeping quiet, and avoiding told that they are on a terrorist databases [sic] certain places or areas of the city. Th is – charities that support Muslim countries provoked diverging reactions ranging from that are directly at confl ict with US allies, feelings of alienation, with implications for constant sense of scrutiny”.15 sense of belonging and trust in institutions to various forms of politicisation”.17 Th e argument made by respondent 15 Such a state of existence within the appears to be a misinterpretation of the Muslim community would be calamitous, volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 arches quarterly 149 since it would catalyse further separation and isolation of diff erent communities The survey highlighted within the UK, which would promote a distinct lack of both xenophobia and racist attacks. Th e knowledge by today’s authors cite these eff ects of counter- terrorism policy to conclude that: young people about Th e current government has stated that the Muslim world, it seeks to separate the community cohesion agenda from the counter-terrorism agenda. which could be a key Th is is useful but their location of the contributing factor to problem of political violence and the focus of the sense of threat from counter-terrorism remains fi xed on Muslim communities and a strategy of rooting out Islamist terrorism. extreme ideas. Th is is a classic counter- insurgency strategy of the type that was It can be concluded that counter- unsuccessful in Northern Ireland. It is only terrorism measures which target Muslim likely to further reinforce the negative impacts communities and groups are inevitable on Muslims in Britain of counter-terrorism on the part of the government, since the policies. It is also likely to further encourage ‘pain’ felt by necessary surveillance should the public at large, on this evidence, both to eventually result in increased safety from be more fearful (as it is rarely linked to any terrorist threats for the greater public. transparent assessment of risk) and therefore Nevertheless, care needs to be taken when to treat Muslims as potential ‘suspects’ or using such measures, since alienation and legitimate objects of abuse.18 in turn, isolation and separation can result in mistakes, such as when dealing with Th is conclusion indicates the failure to Irish nationalist threats in the 1970, are take into account former counter-terrorism repeated with the Muslim community. strategies when formulating newer ones, and hence the feeling of victimisation that DO YOUNG PEOPLE KNOW was experienced by the Irish and is now ENOUGH ABOUT THE MUSLIM being felt by Muslims today. Th erefore, the WORLD? authors recommend that: One particular response that arose from Policies that foster the practices of the survey highlighted a distinct lack of multiculturalism based on less bounded knowledge by today’s young people about notions of communities may be more the Muslim world, which could be a key successful in promoting social cohesion contributing factor to the sense of threat within an increasingly ethnically, religiously from Islamist terrorism in particular. and culturally diverse society, than the Respondent 17 wrote: focus on suspect communities as a source of I know it’s the media portraying them and responsible for a solution to political as such, but you never hear of any other violence.19 religious group or demographic committing acts of terrorism. Th e world seems to be run Th is suggestion would certainly counter by the media nowadays and for most of us the feeling expressed by respondent 15, it’s our only insight into the Islamic world since greater emphasis should be placed and way of life - I wish I didn’t feel some on countering the political ideology, rather unease around Muslims (or even people who than the communities that it may originate appear to be from the Middle East), but I feel 20 from. However, it could be argued that as though I can’t help it. taking such a step would be ineff ective, since in an era of terrorist threat, it is Th e respondent referred to three key unavoidable that whole swathes of the factors: 1) power of the media in infl uencing population must be put under surveillance. public opinion; 2) lack of knowledge by young people of the Muslim world; and 3) 150 arches quarterly volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 TERRORISM AND COUNTER-TERRORISM: YOUNG PEOPLE’S PERSPECTIVES exploitation of this lack of knowledge by to incidents. Th is, coupled with selective the media to further fears of terrorism. reporting of Islam and the Muslim world, In relation to the former factor, creates a situation where the media are able as discussed earlier, the media has a to exploit ignorance of Islam to advance the disproportionate infl uence upon young sense of threat to the country (the fact that people’s fears of terrorism. When in this threat has not aff ected personal sense comparison with Irish Nationalist terrorism of risk is commensurate with that which in the 1970s, it was found that there was was discussed earlier). Th is could provide “20% less coverage of Irish-related events, a situation where the media is capitalised despite the far greater incidence of actual upon for political communication,23 with physical violence perpetrated by the IRA relation to counter-terrorism policy. (approximately 500 attacks in Britain over the years)”.21 Th is provides further evidence CONCLUSIONS in emphasising the media’s infl uence, as Th is survey, discussion and analysis there is a marked diff erence in the sense of presented in this study clearly highlighted fear towards Islamist terrorism as opposed an apparent interest among young people to Irish nationalist terrorism, caused by the of terrorism, and its impacts upon their greater media coverage. communities. It has been highlighted Th e second factor is far more noteworthy that the media have a disproportionate in the way that it aff ects perceptions of infl uence among the general public, as risk among young people. Islam and a result of both selective reporting, and the Muslim world is not a great area of the addition of emotionally charged discussion within both the curriculum news stories, shown by the eff ect of and in the wider media. Th is fact is clearly ‘unrealistic optimism’ among respondents. highlighted by the author not having been Young people desire greater discussion of able to locate any reference to education terrorism, which has not been provided pertaining to Islam in schools except for to them owing to ineff ective government religious studies lessons, which are often curriculum strategies and failures of the optional and not covered by schools Prevent strategy in education pertaining following age 14, an age range covered to the actions the police are taking in by the survey. One study found that the name of counter-terrorism (which, many schools often abandon curriculum if implemented successfully, would go schemes, as “schools… look at what the a way towards mitigating the sense of local syllabus says and say ‘we don’t want threat to the country). Moreover, Young that, thank you very much, we’ll go and do people agree that Islamic groups are being something else”.22 aff ected by counter-terrorism approaches, Hence, schools often do not cover or focus which shows an understanding of the on Islam, leading to a lack of education eff ects of counter-terrorism upon factions and mention of the Muslim world except of society (though the limitations of the in conjunction with terrorism, which in survey mean that their opinions cannot turn leads to the situation that respondent be deduced). Finally, the results of one 17 alluded to: a situation where the public respondent show a lack of knowledge feels obliged to suspect Muslims purely relating to the Islamic world without the due to ignorance of the Islamic world and context of Islamist terrorism, which can be pressure from the media. inferred to highlight the media’s selective Th e media often utilises this lack of reporting. knowledge pertaining to the Islamic world From these fi ndings, a series of in order to further a sense of threat from recommendations can be obtained. Firstly, terrorism. As discussed earlier, the media a limitation upon the media’s eff ect upon has the ability to polarise the public in creating irrational and disproportionate relation to the threat of terrorism, by fear of terrorist attacks should be imparting emotionally charged responses implemented. Th is can be executed volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 arches quarterly 151 TERRORISM AND COUNTER-TERRORISM: YOUNG PEOPLE’S PERSPECTIVES through either voluntary or legislative agreements upon the amount of opinion Hussain Al-Jabir is a student, with a keen interest in politics and academic research. He works as an intern and emotionally charged responses for The Cordoba Foundation, where he undertakes contained in factual reports in both print research into current and historic counter-terrorism policies in the UK. He has also attended various events and televised media. Th is may appear and conferences, as well as working with other young people to ascertain their views on counter-terrorism A greater emphasis approaches and policy. needs to be given to ENDNOTES discussion of terrorism 1. www.thestudentroom.com in schools, in a ‘safe’ 2. Cho, J., Boyle, M. P., Keum, H., Shevy, M. D., McLeod, D. M., Shah, D. V. and Pan, Z. (2003). ‘Media, Terrorism, and environment. Emotionality: Emotional Diff erences in Media Content and Public Reactions to the September 11th Terrorist Attacks’, Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 47(3), 309-327. 3. Patterson, T. E. (2007). Young people and news. an impossible undertaking; however it 4. Beitel, G., Gertman, D. and Plum, M. (2004). ‘Balanced can be achieved through a change in scorecard method for predicting the probability of a terrorist culture and society with relation to the attack’, Risk Analysis, 24(4), 12. 5. Sjoberg, L. (2003). ‘The Diff erent Dynamics of Personal and media. Secondly, current government General Risk’, Risk Manag (Bas), 5(3), 19-34. curricula need to be amended in order 6. Sjöberg, L. (2005). ‘The perceived risk of terrorism’, Risk to provide clearer direction to schools Management, 43-61. on how to implement the provisions of 7. Great Britain. Home Offi ce. (2011b) ‘The Prevent strategy’, [online]. the Prevent strategy, which should make 8. Great Britain. Home Offi ce. (2011a) Prevent strategy, Cm, it more comprehensive than at present. London: Stationery Offi ce. Additionally, a greater emphasis needs 9. Quartermaine, A. (2010). ‘A Study of Pupil Understandings to be given to discussion of terrorism in of ‘Terrorism’ in Pupil Conversations (aged 16-18) and Questionnaires from a Sample of Warwickshire Secondary schools, in a ‘safe’ environment. Schools’, Discourse, 10(1), 101-130. Finally, there needs to be greater 10. Ibid. education about Islam and the Muslim 11. Great Britain. Home Offi ce. (2011a) Prevent strategy, Cm, world, to mitigate the impact of ignorance London: Stationery Offi ce. 12. It is expected that many respondents would have in relation to perceived risk from awareness of detention without trial due to widespread terrorism, and in addition lessen impacts media coverage from the passing of the Terrorism Act 2005 of xenophobia and racism towards the and henceforth. Muslim community. 13. Respondent 33 14. Ibid. Th e views and grievances of young 15. Respondent 21 people are crucial to providing a more 16. Ibid. cohesive and unifi ed society. If young 17. Hickman, M., Thomas, L., Silvestri, S. and Nickels, H. (2011). people feel a certain way towards certain ‘Suspect communities’?: Counter-terrorism policy, the press, and the impact on Irish and Muslim communities in Britain policies, then they are liable to thwart London: London Metropolitan University. and question them. Young people have a 18. Ibid. distinct opinion upon counter-terrorism 19. Ibid. measures, and yet are not given safe 20. Respondent 17 21. Ibid. opportunities to discuss them. Th is must 22. Lundie, D. (2010). ‘‘Does RE work?’ An analysis of the be an utmost priority for the government, aims, practices and models of eff ectiveness of religious for as the August 2011 riots have shown, if education in the UK’, British Journal of Religious Education, continually sidelined, it is only a matter of 32(2), 163-170. time before young people take matters into 23. Op. cit. Cho, J. et. al. (2003). their own hands.

Appendix I– Survey Questions A full set of survey results can be found here: http://bit.ly/tcf-survey-pdf

152 arches quarterly volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 A publication of The Cordoba Foundation that provides a medium for diverse opinions, presenting a comprehensive view of the myriad perspectives pertaining to dialogue and cross-cultural exchange. This is done by publishing important contributions by experts and world leaders Download for free thecordobafoundation.com volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 arches quarterly 153 Developing Community Partnerships - A Practical Solution for Peace, Prosperity & Justice

NICK MAURICE

Together with my colleagues I believe that Africa? Questions were raised not simply the nations of this world not only have to about the very strong moral arguments but are able to live in peace. We think that for addressing this imbalance, but just as the task is to free mankind from oppression, importantly the argument of self interest. from hunger and distress. New links must be It was clear that we were moving into an developed which substantially increase the era of globalisation. It was also clear that chances of achieving freedom, justice and there was beginning to be a geo-political solidarity for all. Th is is a great task for both shift from the focus on East-West relations the present generation and the next. (with the fi nal fall of the Berlin Wall in Th e shaping of our common future is much 1989) to North-South relations. Th ere was too important to be left to Governments and the beginning of an understanding that if experts alone. Th erefore our appeal goes to we were to allow the huge global disparity youth, to women’s and labour movements; to between the very rich and the very poor to political, intellectual and religious leaders; continue, if the imbalance between those to scientists and educators; to technicians holding the power and those suff ering and managers; to members of the rural and as a result of political decisions made business communities. May they all try to by the powerful were to continue we understand and to conduct their aff airs in would be providing fertile ground for the the light of this new challenge! development of extremism and ultimately Willy Brandt, 20th December 1979 confl ict. As the one-time Deputy Secretary General of the UN Mark Malloch-Brown hus wrote the one time Chancellor wrote: of what was then West Germany Democracy can only be built from the Tand Nobel Peace Prize winner bottom up, by the patient building up of the (1971) in his introduction to the Brandt tolerance and respect for minorities that are Report “North South – A Programme for its prerequisites. It cannot be imposed or Survival”, a seminal document produced achieved overnight. by a Commission of 18 political leaders of diff erent persuasions, from the North THE MARLBOROUGH BRANDT and the South, chaired by the charismatic GROUP leader Willy Brandt. A group in the small market town of Th e document looked for the fi rst time Marlborough in Wiltshire who had had at the imbalance between the so-called international experience as returned rich North (the industrialised countries) VSO volunteers, as teachers, doctors, and the so-called poor South (the faith leaders and others who had worked developing countries) and the underlying in Africa and Asia, met together in 1981 causes of that imbalance. Fundamental provoked to action by the Brandt Report, to the report was the whole question of and founded the Marlborough Brandt power and who holds it - a question as Group. We shared the idealism of the relevant today as it was 30 years ago. Why political theorist John Schaar “Th e future was it, at that time that on the one hand is not some place we are going to, but one men were travelling to the moon from the we are creating. Th e paths are not to be US at inconceivable expense and people found, but made. Th e making of those were simultaneously dying of starvation in pathways changes both the maker and the 154 arches quarterly volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 DEVELOPING COMMUNITY PARTNERSHIPS - A PRACTICAL SOLUTION FOR PEACE, PROSPERITY AND JUSTICE destination”. Marlborough would have as much to learn Members of the group were struck by from people in that community as those the sense of responsibility on all of us people would have to learn from people in that the report conveyed, inspired by the Marlborough. Dalai Lama - “Responsibility does not Th e High Commissioner for Th e only lie with the leaders of our countries Gambia, Abdoulai Bojang, replied to the … it lies with each of us individually”. letter with the greatest enthusiasm and However they were also struck by the suggested that Marlborough (population common understanding they shared of the 7,000) should form a partnership with his extraordinary benefi ts they had personally home community of Gunjur, a Muslim gained from living and working in totally fi shing community of 12,500 inhabitants. diff erent environments, with people of And thus was born a relationship diff erent faiths, cultures, living in diff erent between two communities of hugely social and economic circumstances. Th ey contrasting cultures (8 predominant agreed that the experience had given tribal groups in Gunjur – an almost them an opportunity to refl ect on and in exclusively white, middle class population many cases question their own culture, in Marlborough), faiths (95% Muslim in practices and lifestyles and “disturb” their Gunjur, a recognised centre of Islam in prejudices and assumptions. Th ey agreed West Africa – no Muslims but an active that the experience of living in a diff erent Christian population in Marlborough), culture had made a major contribution material wealth (no access to clean water, to their own personal and professional electricity or public sanitation system development. Th ey felt that the experience in Gunjur – a comparatively wealthy had given them the self confi dence to bring community in Marlborough with a large about change. 800 pupil, fee-paying school at one end of Th e Marlborough Brandt Group was the town and a comprehensive school with founded with four aims: 1) the group felt a strong reputation at the other). the need to educate themselves about the Since its inception in 1981 some 1200 fundamental issues which keep people people have travelled between the two poor; 2) they wanted to bring those issues communities, living in each other’s homes, to a wider public through work with the arguably a fundamental pre-requisite for media, a series of public lectures, work with understanding each other at a profound teachers in schools etc; 3) they saw a role for level. As the Zimbabwean politician the group in working with local, national Sithembiso Nyoni delared “Let us share and international politicians to understand who we are before we share what we have”. that some of their constituents had real With the words of President Abdou concerns about vast global inequalities (if Diouf of Senegal as a central policy platform you studied the manifestos of the main “development will not be sustainable political parties in the 1980s, international unless it originates from the concept of development hardly featured); and 4) in local development … and is based on the order to be able to speak with authority eff orts of the local population who respect based on current experience, to politicians, priorities that they themselves defi ne”, teachers and the wider public, they should partners in the Gambia in collaboration form a partnership with a community in with the Marlborough Brandt Group have the Global South. addressed problems facing people in that A letter was sent to ten1 High community; lack of access to clean water Commissioners in London of African, (capping and inserting hand pumps on Asian and Caribbean countries. It was the open wells); lack of early childhood clearly stated in the letter that the members education (3,000 children between the of the group saw that in developing a ages of three and seven have now received partnership with a community in the High pre-school education); low levels of Commissioner’s country, the people of literacy amongst women (women say that volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 arches quarterly 155 they have been empowered by a literacy meeting took place in Hull whose MP programme run by women for women William Wilberforce, had been the driving in the eight kabilos (wards) in the town); force behind the abolition of slavery in few opportunities for income generation 1807 and the setting up of the free colony (business and skills training), and high of Sierra Leone. Hull City Council is infant mortality rates (a health education linked to Freetown in Sierra Leone. and malaria prevention programme). UKOWLA became the umbrella Inspired by the words of President Julius organisation for communities of all kinds, Nyerere of Tanzania,“take every penny towns and villages, schools and hospitals, you have set aside for aid for Tanzania and faith, youth and cultural groups that were spend it in the UK explaining to people the beginning to form partnerships with facts and causes of poverty”, the Wiltshire counterparts in the South and perhaps its Global Education Centre based at the greatest achievement was to formulate an Marlborough Brandt Group’s offi ces, has ethos behind these links based on many brought all the learning of the link with a conversations with Southern partners. Muslim fi shing community in West Africa At a UKOWLA conference in into the education of children in schools Leamington Spa, linked to Bo in Sierra throughout the county. Since 1994 some Leone entitled, “North South Links – A 450 teachers and teacher trainees have Southern Perspective”, participants from been on study visits to Gunjur, living with Africa and Asia set the agenda. Th ey families there and learning about the role challenged participants vehemently: “fi rst of Islam, the strong sense of community you came to us as missionaries, then you and family, the impact of climate change, came as colonists and now you are coming and the diff erent teaching methods. As a to us as linkers! What’s this all about?” result, 27 schools in Wiltshire now have Th ey went on to say “If you are interested partnerships with schools in Gambia, in accompanying us on our road to providing opportunities for young people development set to our agenda and provided to essentially understand the global you have the humility to understand that context in which they are living and we might have a contribution to make to building relationships with young people your development then let us link!” As of diff erent cultures and faiths across the Barbara Bond of Oxfam, one of the earliest globe. pioneers of community linking declared “to give lower priority to education and UKOWLA action at home in preference to funding In the early 1980s this example of a and organising work overseas would be community partnership link was only to undermine one of the most important one of a growing movement of North- long term objectives of linking – changing South partnerships between communities attitudes, views and behaviour in the of all kinds in the UK and in the Global North”. South which fi rst developed, in many UKOWLA led the way nationally in cases, in response to the publication of the promoting and supporting linking until Brandt Report and the growing feeling of 2002 when an ambitious dream was frustration amongst people that “the rich formulated that “no one in the UK should were getting richer and the poor poorer”. escape life in the UK without at some Here was a fundamental social injustice point being touched by a partnership that must be addressed if we were to build with a community in the Global South a safer, more prosperous and just world and whether that be through their school, local clearly it could not be left to politicians. authority, hospital, faith, youth, cultural, Th e UK One World Linking Association sports, women’s group …..whatever!” (UKOWLA) was founded in 1985 Th e dream was explored by following a meeting of new activists in representatives of leading INGOs, in UK, the linking movement. Signifi cantly the Africa, Asia, and Caribbean, politicians,

156 arches quarterly volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 DEVELOPING COMMUNITY PARTNERSHIPS - A PRACTICAL SOLUTION FOR PEACE, PROSPERITY AND JUSTICE representatives of the private sector and can't exist as a human being in isolation. others at a two day meeting in Windsor It speaks about our interconnectedness. Great Park. Th e outcome of that meeting You can't be human all by yourself, and was the birth of BUILD (Building when you have this quality – Ubuntu – Understanding through International you are known for your generosity. We Links for Development) a coalition of think of ourselves far too frequently as just INGOs committed to the development individuals, separated from one another, of partnerships between communities of whereas you are connected and what you all kinds in the UK with counterparts do aff ects the whole World. When you do in the South for Peace, Prosperity and well, it spreads out; it is for the whole of Justice! humanity”. While UKOWLA is the support agency A person with Ubuntu is open and for these communities, BUILD has available to others, affi rming of others, does worked since 2002 at a more strategic level, not feel threatened that others are able and not least through the Westminster all- good, based from a proper self-assurance that party parliamentary group “Connecting comes from knowing that he or she belongs Communities” which has provided access in a greater whole and is diminished when to Secretaries of State, Ministers and others are humiliated or diminished, when civil servants and has contributed to an others are tortured or oppressed. understanding of the role that these school, Nelson Mandela explained Ubuntu as health care and community partnerships follows: can play both in terms of raising awareness A traveller through a country would stop of development issues in the UK and at a village and he didn't have to ask for food building support for the Government’s or for water. Once he stops, the people give international development agenda, but him food, entertain him. Th at is one aspect also in terms of the contribution that the of Ubuntu, but it will have various aspects. links themselves can make to development Ubuntu does not mean that people should not in the South. enrich themselves. Th e question therefore is: As a result of discussions with Are you going to do so in order to enable the Government, considerable funding and community around you to be able to improve? policy change in favour of community based partnerships has taken place to LESSONS FOR THE UK the extent that there are now some 4000 Th us, just as importantly, has been the schools, 450 communities and 120 recognition of the role that partnerships hospitals in the UK with partners in the with communities in the South can Global South, in many cases supported play in social cohesion across the diverse fi nancially through programmes initiated communities in UK. Th ere are many levels by the Department for International at which this can happen. Development. Th ey can provide opportunities for personal development and the self THE SPIRIT OF UBUNTU confi dence to recognise and relish Archbishop Desmond Tutu who diff erence. To have experienced and lived- launched BUILD’s publication, “A with ‘diff erence’ in communities in other Toolkit for Linking - Opportunities parts of the world encourages a confi dence and Challenges” affi rmed our mission by and an attitude of acceptance of and indeed saying “You, BUILD, are saying that we are enthusiasm for engaging with diff erence in family. If we don’t learn that lesson pretty one’s own society; an understanding of the quickly we are destined for extinction!” faiths and cultures of communities in the He went on to talk about the African UK through having lived in communities philosophy of Ubuntu. “I am because you in the South where that faith and culture is are – the essence of being human. Ubuntu practised. As was highlighted by an Asian speaks particularly about the fact that you colleague recently “Why do you want to volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 arches quarterly 157 link with an Indian community several thousand miles away, when you never A Malawian nurse say more than ‘A Guardian please’ to the working in the NHS in Indian family who run the shop at the end Bristol or a Jamaican of the road?” teacher working in LINKS FOR UNDERSTANDING Brixton, London could ONE’S IDENTITY An important aspect of community forge a link between links can be the opportunities they their hospital or school present for the introduction of young here with counterparts people in the UK to their countries and communities of heritage and giving them in Lilongwe or Kingston, that personal identity that is essential for thus bringing a global personal development. In 2008 the Bristol Legacy Commission supported a group understanding and a of 88 young black British people to visit contribution to peace, the Gambia on the basis that “You need prosperity and justice to know your history before you know where you are going to”. People of African across the world. descent should be proud of who they are and their connections to Africa, a visit present for building partnerships with to Jeff ery and James Island will enable schools, hospitals and communities young people to explore their heritage and here in UK with counterparts in their how the enslavement of African people communities of heritage. A Malawian contributed to the wealth of Bristol” nurse working in the NHS in Bristol or (Clive Smith 2009). Th e trip highlighted a Jamaican teacher working in Brixton, the need for young people and adults to London could forge a link between their learn about their history (not specifi cally hospital or school here with counterparts taught in schools), be proud of who they in Lilongwe or Kingston, thus bringing a are, where they’re from and realising their global understanding and a contribution own cultural identity. Some young adults to peace, prosperity and justice across the decided after the trip that they needed to world. make signifi cant changes to their lives, and At an institutional level for example, changes they could be proud of. the development of partnerships between hospitals in the UK and Africa, not only BUILDING ON UK DIASPORA have been shown to provide opportunities INTERNATIONAL PARTNERSHIPS for improving health services in the South Recognising the close ties that but also bring important benefi ts to the representatives of the diaspora have with hospital in the UK in terms of professional their communities of heritage and the development of staff ; greater team building opportunities that those ties present to and collaborative working between diverse broaden them out to engage with the disciplines and the many diff erent ethnic wider community both here and in cultures within the NHS, and refl ections on the countries of heritage, BUILD has wastage from having worked in a resource embarked on a programme of consultation poor institution. Another example is the with diaspora groups in several centres in development of partnerships between the the UK, including Bristol, Edinburgh, police in the UK and Pakistan around Wolverhampton, Cardiff and Sheffi eld. immigration issues which have brought Th e purpose of these consultations is to opportunities for greater understanding encourage the diaspora to recognise the and collaboration between the police and opportunities that their links to home Pakistani communities in the UK.

158 arches quarterly volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 DEVELOPING COMMUNITY PARTNERSHIPS - A PRACTICAL SOLUTION FOR PEACE, PROSPERITY AND JUSTICE IMPACTS FOR THE to look at poverty as a lack of any need that is PARTNERSHIPS essential to life. Today we have material and But what is it about, these community psychological poverty, spiritual poverty, social links between people of diff erent faiths, poverty and cultural poverty. I have been in cultures and social circumstances that communities in the North where people are so appears to be so personally enriching? lonely. I wish they would come to our villages Th ere are at least four areas where the for us to embrace them. impact seems to be greatest. Self-Confi dence Refl ection Th e opportunities that these community By living together in each other’s partnerships provide for the development communities and seeing diff erence in all of self confi dence are boundless. “I have its forms (clothes, climate, attitudes, social lived as one of you. I have benefi ted from structures, relationships, fl ora, fauna, seeing my own culture in the beam of a faith, food) one is forced to refl ect, to diff erent light”. “I understand my identity hold a mirror to one’s own life and ask the better by refl ecting on your identity”. question “have we got it right?” “You have shown me the opportunities When Gambians from Gunjur come that exist for involvement in social justice to Marlborough they are shocked by the programmes”. “As a woman in a traditional treatment of the elderly. “How can you put Muslim society you have given me the elderly relatives in homes? Why do you not self confi dence to question and challenge do as we do and look after them within traditional practices and attitudes”. the family?” When teachers from Wiltshire visit Development Gunjur, as they climb the steps of the Th e increasing self confi dence has led aircraft to return home, they are often in to personal, professional and community tears. If asked what is causing the tears, development. Young volunteers from the it is clear that it is grief. Not simply grief UK who have spent time in Gunjur have at saying farewell to the friends made used that experience to further their own and with whom they have stayed in their development and many are now working compounds, but grief that our Western in the fi eld of international development. society has lost something that is clearly Many young people who have trained in the still present in Gunjur society. A common, UK under the auspices of the Marlborough maybe simplistic response to the fi rst Brandt Group now hold senior positions time spent in Gunjur by people from in Th e Gambia and in other countries. Marlborough is “they are so poor but seem But many problems facing the Gunjur so happy!” community have been tackled as a result of Is it the strong sense of community; the the community confi dence, resilience and strong bonds within the extended family; solidarity that has developed with people the warmth of the human relationships in Marlborough. Childhood illness has as experienced through all the social fallen through the provision of clean water; intercourse taking place in the evenings wealth has been created through training and on the streets? Is it the opportunity and income generating programmes. for divesting oneself of all the trappings of Women have been empowered through class and the prejudices that surround one’s literacy programmes. Children aged appearance and tone of voice – all quite between 3 and 7 have been given a head meaningless in such a diff erent society? start in education through a pre-school You are taken for who you are and not for education programme. Th e incidence of what you represent. As the Zimbabwean malaria has dramatically reduced through politician Sithembiso Nyoni states: health education, street cleaning and bed- Th ere are some people who only look at net programmes. poverty as material poverty. I think we need volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 arches quarterly 159 The Role of Islam in the Returning to Marlborough, the group relationship. presented the book in its draft form to the Until the link started, people in Imam of Swindon who not only agreed Marlborough would never have visited the that it was good but then and there on the Mosque in nearby Swindon, but because fl oor of the Mosque, got out his pen and they have taken our Gunjur visitors to paper and wrote in magnifi cent calligraphy Friday prayers they now have a relationship the Shahada to be reproduced on the front with the Muslim population of Swindon. cover of the booklet. In Gunjur, Nabani Darboe stated “Until Th is publication is given to all visitors to the link started I would never have eaten in Gunjur so that they understand the quite a Christian compound in Gunjur” complex but fundamental role that Islam At a time in 1996 when people in plays in the lives of the people and the Marlborough realised that there was, community. despite the exchanges of and close A telephone call to the Marlborough relationship between people, a high Brandt Group in 2001 from the Christian level of ignorance of the central role of Bishop of Salisbury, in whose diocese Islam in the Gunjur community, it was Marlborough is situated, suggested that decided that a booklet should be published because the group had ‘one foot in the “Exploring Islam in Gunjur”. With the Muslim camp in Gambia and one foot in chapter headings agreed “Th e History the Christian camp in Marlborough’, they of Islam in Gunjur”; “What do Muslims shou ld be bringing Christia ns a nd Mu slims Believe?”; “How is Islam practised in in Wiltshire together. Th is provoked a series Gunjur?”; “Relationships”; “Festivals and of meetings with leaders of the Muslim Ceremonies”, and “How do Muslims see community in Swindon and the Christian non Muslims?”, a small group of four from community in Marlborough. At an early Marlborough spent two weeks working meeting, Muslim friends suggested that with Islamic scholars and others to produce while it was interesting spending time the booklet. with Christians, from their point of view Each evening sitting by candlelight for they would really like the opportunity to two to three hours, a single chapter was meet with the Directors of Education and discussed with one person interpreting Social Services and the Chief of Police from Mandinka into English and another to discuss the social issues that they were taking notes on a typewriter. Th e following confronting in Wiltshire. Th is started a day the note taker distilled what he had series of productive meetings which led recorded into a form that might make to a number of issues involving exclusion up that chapter. In the evening the group of the minority Muslim population being gathered together again and the chapter in addressed by civic leaders. And yet it was its draft form was read out and interpreted the relationship between a white market from English back into Mandinka to town in rural Wiltshire and a Muslim interruptions of “No! we didn’t quite say community 3500 miles away in West that!” “You must rephrase the sentence Africa that had led to this change! this way” or “Yes! Th at is fi ne – it’s a good refl ection of what we said”. At the CONCLUSION – end of ten days of discussions, argument, THE MANGO TREE laughter, but never anger as the central Th e Community Partnership relationship importance of the task was understood, is not seen as being primarily based on the the fi nal document was presented to transfer of resources from “us the rich to the Imam of Gunjur for his affi rmation them the poor”. Rather, the relationship and his imprimatur. He listened for four is seen in terms of “sitting under a mango hours as the booklet was read to him and tree with partners” recognising that translated. At the end of that time he people in the North have strengths and smiled and simply said “Th at is good!” weaknesses and our partners have strengths

160 arches quarterly volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 DEVELOPING COMMUNITY PARTNERSHIPS - A PRACTICAL SOLUTION FOR PEACE, PROSPERITY AND JUSTICE and introducing new visions); providing The mango tree has shelter and solidarity, for those sitting become the metaphor under the dense foliage of the mango for community based tree, (what is the relationship if it is not providing that solidarity between people of partnerships across the diff erent cultures and faiths); long-lasting, world. the mango tree will live for 200 years (what is the relationship if it is not to be sustained and weaknesses. Let’s listen, learn in over a long period of time); an area in the humility, collaborate and contribute to shelter of the tree where children will play the development of people at both ends. (what is the relationship if it is not FUN!) Development – etymology - French “De- It has been that quite unique, and envelopper = “opening the envelope”, accidental (thanks to the response from i.e. removing the constraints of poverty, High Commissioner Abdoulai Bojang) ignorance, and enabling people to reach relationship between a predominantly their full potential”. Christian community, with a Muslim Th e mango tree has become the metaphor community in West Africa that has given for community based partnerships across the Marlborough-Gunjur link such an the world. Deeply rooted, the rain in many important dimension. parts of Africa only falls for four months in the year (what is the relationship if it is not Nick Maurice is President of the Marlborough Brandt deeply rooted in the communities involved Group and Founder of BUILD (Building Understanding and inclusive of as many people within through International Links for Development). that community as possible); fruitful, and what fruit the mango tree produces ! (what is the relationship worth if it does not ENDNOTE 1. The 10 were chosen on the basis of their country’s bear fruit?); evergreen, shedding old leaves proximity to the UK and thus the cost of travel to that and producing new growth (what is the country, political stability in those countries, and whether relationship if it is not regularly assessing English was spoken. itself and shedding old ideas and practices

ANALYSIS OF ISSUES AND DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ARENA OF DIALOGUE AND CIVILIZATIONS volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 arches quarterly 161 The Muslim “Demand Curve” for U.S. Foreign Policy

CHARLES KURZMAN

n the weeks after September 11, 2001, approaches and many others as well, singly even before the rubble had been and in combination -- it does not make Iremoved from Lower Manhattan, a much diff erence. debate emerged about whether U.S. foreign policy was responsible for the attacks. Th is While the threat of debate was not limited to crackpots and conspiracy theorists, although there were Islamist violence looms plenty of them to be heard. No, this debate large in the Western occupied the center of American politics, consciousness, it remains and the side that won was: Yes. American foreign policy had indeed contributed to fairly rare outside of a the tragedy of 9/11. A survey conducted handful of dreadfully at the end of 2001 estimated that three quarters of Americans considered the U.S. bloody civil war zones. partly responsible. Even the White House, led by President George W. Bush, agreed. Islamist revolutionaries -- militants who At the same time, there was no believe that it is their duty to establish an agreement about how the U.S. was Islamic state, and their right to do so by responsible, and what changes in foreign force -- have never been very numerous, policy would prevent attacks in the future. regardless of shifts in U.S. actions around President Bush insisted that the United the world. Of the world’s billion and States needed to adopt a stronger, more a half Muslims, Islamist revolutionary aggressive stance than it had in the past, movements have managed to recruit fewer so that Muslim terrorists would respect than 1 in 10,000 over the past generation, American power rather than view it and most of these recruits have been as a vulnerable “paper tiger,” a phrase engaged in local causes with no strategic that the Bush administration used to ambitions outside of their own territories. characterize its opponents’ approach. Th e While the threat of Islamist violence administration’s opponents, including looms large in the Western consciousness, almost every academic expert on Muslim it remains fairly rare outside of a handful societies, insisted that the United States of dreadfully bloody civil war zones -- needed to adopt more conciliatory and globally, Islamist terrorism accounts for multilateral policies than it had in the past, less than 3 percent of the world’s fatal so that Muslims would respect America as violence, according to data from the U.S. a fair broker, rather than an imperialist National Counterterrorism Center, and far meddler in world aff airs. less than 1 percent of murders in the West. Both sides in this debate were probably In economic terms, the “demand” for wrong. It turns out that Islamist U.S. foreign policy is “inelastic.” Elasticity revolutionaries are hardly aff ected at all by refers to people’s willingness to change U.S. foreign policy. Whether the United their behavior in response to a change States military bombs Muslim civilians in their surroundings -- if the price of or hands them emergency relief packages Acme Widgets goes up, for example, or stays in its bases -- over the past two elasticity means that people buy fewer decades, the U.S. has tried all of these Acme Widgets. If the price goes down, 162 arches quarterly volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 THE MUSLIM “DEMAND CURVE” FOR U.S. FOREIGN POLICY elasticity means that people buy more Acme Widgets. But if demand is inelastic, America’s surreptitious people keep on buying the same amount of role in re-arming Bosnian Acme Widgets, no matter how high or low Muslims became public the price. Why would they do that? Well, instead of widgets, think of polio vaccines. knowledge almost Imagine that the price of polio vaccines immediately. doubled overnight, maybe because of some malfunction at the vaccine factory. Bosnian side, but the council’s European Would you let your child go unvaccinated members vetoed the suggestion out of fear and risk being crippled or killed by polio, that their soldiers in the Balkans would just because the price went up? Probably become targets of Serbian forces. Unable not. Th e demand for polio vaccine is to help the Bosnians legally, President Bill relatively inelastic. Most people will pay Clinton opted to help them surreptitiously. whatever they can aff ord to keep their Flying back to the White House from children healthy. Th at’s why the world’s the funeral of former President Richard governments strictly regulate the price of Nixon, Clinton ordered the military not polio vaccines. to enforce the embargo on the Bosnians. Let’s examine attitudes toward Plane-loads of weapons and supplies began government policies through the same to arrive in Bosnia the following week, lens as attitudes toward prices. When a under the watchful gaze of American policy shifts in one direction or another, military surveillance. how many people will change their views America’s surreptitious role in re- of the government? If demand is inelastic, arming Bosnian Muslims became public very few people will change their views. knowledge almost immediately. Th e Th at seems to be the case with Muslims’ Washington Post and other newspapers views of U.S. foreign policy. Th at is, most reported on the arms pipeline one week Muslims’ views of the U.S. government after it started, and Bosnian Serbs are so entrenched that they do not change protested loudly. Non-enforcement of the much in response to shifts in American embargo became offi cial U.S. policy in the policies. As a result, Islamist revolutionaries fall of 1994, thanks to a Congressional have not been able to capitalize as much resolution. And in 1995, the U.S. and its as they expected on what they view as an allies intervened openly on the side of the American assault on Islam. Muslims, bombing Serbian positions in In April 1994, an American ambassador Bosnia and helping to bring the Serbians to approached the imam of a small Balkan the negotiating table to end the civil war. mosque and proposed an illegal gun- Muslims around the world desperately running scheme. At the time, Bosnian sympathized with the Bosnians, whose Muslims were being slaughtered by plight was front-page news for more Serbian militias. Tens of thousands had than four years in almost every Muslim perished, and Sarajevo, the capital of newly community. Yet few Muslims gave the independent Bosnia and Herzegovina, United States much credit for its support had been under siege for two years, with of the Muslims of Bosnia. Sure, the nearly constant sniper fi re and shelling United States could have done much more into civilian neighborhoods from the to help the Bosnians -- if it had allowed surrounding hillsides. A United Nations them to acquire weapons two years arms embargo, which the Serbian forces earlier, thousands of lives might have been were able to evade, prevented the Bosnians saved. But there is little evidence that the from defending themselves, and many United States was in cahoots with Serbia Americans wanted to help. Th e United to wage a genocidal war on Balkan Islam States government lobbied the Security -- and that is the sort of accusation that Council to lift the embargo on the was common at the time. “Th e West’s volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 arches quarterly 163 role as co-conspirators with the Serbian set of policies might win them over. Very war criminals becomes clearer with every few Islamist terrorists come from these passing day,” wrote Crescent International, countries -- approximately one per million an Islamist magazine. Bin Ladin called residents. this an example of America “killing the In many Muslim societies, by contrast, weaker men, women, and children in the anti-Americanism may be so entrenched Muslim world and elsewhere” through the that changes in U.S. foreign policy do not “withholding of arms from the Muslims make much diff erence. In Pakistan, for of Bosnia-Herzegovina, leaving them prey example, only 23 percent of respondents to the Christian Serbians who massacred expressed a favorable view of America and raped in a manner not seen in in 2000. At this low level there wasn’t contemporary history.” much room for decline during the Bush Th is kind of anti-American sentiment administration. So even though favorable was not limited to Islamists. In Turkey, responses dropped by more than half surveys by the U.S. Information Agency in 2002, this change only amounted to found that favorable opinions of the 13 percent of the sample -- a far smaller United States dropped from 57 percent proportion than the 50 percent of Turks in 1991, before the civil war in Bosnia, and 60 percent of Indonesians who to 31 percent in 1994, when the U.S. had changed their minds about the United begun to allow weapons for the Bosnians. States during the same period. It is diffi cult It recovered partially the following year, to to know how many societies exhibited a 48 percent favorable, after the U.S. and its pattern similar to Pakistan’s, because we allies stepped into the Bosnian confl ict and don’t have comparable pre-9/11 public forced the Serbs into truce negotiations. opinion data from many other Muslim But Turkey has long been a “swing state” societies -- authoritarian governments such for U.S. foreign policy -- attitudes toward as Egypt and Saudi Arabia only began to America shift dramatically in Turkey from allow extensive survey research after 9/11. year to year, depending on the issues of However, the consistently low levels of the day. In the years before 9/11, favorable support for the United States that emerged opinion about America had climbed over in surveys of these and many Muslim 60 percent in Turkey -- and then dropped societies since 9/11 suggests that this to 30 percent in 2002, after the U.S.- pattern is fairly widespread. A signifi cant led invasion of Afghanistan. It dropped portion of the world’s Muslim population further, as low as 9 percent favorable, after consistently opposes the United States, the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. regardless of American foreign policy. A Turkish views of the United States are small portion consistently supports the deeply aff ected by what America does, not U.S., regardless of American foreign policy. what America is -- a distinction made by And only a small portion -- perhaps as political scientists Peter Katzenstein and little as 20 percent of the world’s Muslims Robert Keohane in their recent book on -- is aff ected by shifts in American foreign global anti-Americanism. A similar shift policy. is visible in Indonesia, where favorable Anti-Americanism in Muslim societies views of America plummeted from 75 is not associated with hatred of American percent in 2000 to 15 percent in 2003. freedoms, as President Bush used to Th is evaporation of support for the United claim. Surveys show that large majorities States is, ironically, a promising sign for of Muslims support American freedoms U.S. foreign policy. It suggests that Turkish such as democracy and free speech, and and Indonesian attitudes toward America the mass movements of the “Arab Spring” are infl uenced by changes in U.S. policies confi rmed the popularity of these ideals. -- large portions of the populations in these Freedom of religion is a diff erent matter. countries may not have agreed with Bush Many Muslims believe that apostasy administration policies, but a diff erent should be illegal -- but only in their

164 arches quarterly volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 THE MUSLIM “DEMAND CURVE” FOR U.S. FOREIGN POLICY own societies. Islamist revolutionaries, Islam. No amount of goodwill gestures or who consider democratic institutions to civilizational dialogue has changed these be an illegitimate usurpation of divine people’s minds – yet many of them still sovereignty, remain marginal on freedoms. desire democratic institutions of the sort Th ey can only watch in frustration as that America has promoted, and many Muslim public opinion cheers the advance of them are avid consumers of American of their rivals in the Islamist movement movies and other cultural exports. -- pro-democracy Islamists who seek to Suspicion of U.S. foreign policy motives create an Islamic state through democratic swamped the Bush administration’s elections, and who have made common “public diplomacy” project to convince cause with secular movements in order Muslims that America is their friend. to topple autocracies and compete at the Islamists mocked these eff orts as cover for ballot box. the American “war on Islam.” Mainstream media in Muslim societies focused far Many Muslims who like more on Bush’s single unscripted remark that the United States was engaged in American cultural and a “crusade” against terrorism than on political institutions his repeated insistence that the U.S. was oppose U.S. foreign not engaged in a religious war. Muslims are also well aware of the occasional policy. This combination derogatory comments about Islam made of pro-Americanism by other American offi cials and religious leaders, such as the prominent Christian and anti-Americanism evangelist, Franklin Graham, who called may seem paradoxical Islam “evil.” Fortunately, there was only to Americans, but it fl eeting media coverage of the outrageous suggestion by failed presidential candidate is common in Muslim Tom Tancredo that the United States societies, and it is should deter terrorist attacks by threatening to bomb Mecca. persistent. Few Muslims thought Barack Obama’s election as president of the U.S. would shift In recent surveys of six Arab countries, the direction of American foreign policy political scientist Shibley Telhami asked -- approximately one third, according to respondents directly: “Would you say surveys by Telhami and the Pew Global your attitudes toward the U.S. are based Attitudes Project. After Obama’s election, more on American values or American some Muslims expressed optimism, most policy in the Middle East?” Th ree quarters notably in Saudi Arabia, where 79 percent picked policy. Th e bottom line is this: of respondents said they viewed Obama Many Muslims who like American positively and were hopeful about American cultural and political institutions oppose foreign policy -- but favorable attitudes U.S. foreign policy. Th is combination of toward the United States throughout the pro-Americanism and anti-Americanism Middle East rose by only 3 percent, within may seem paradoxical to Americans, the survey’s margin of error. By 2010, Arab but it is common in Muslim societies, opinion of Obama had turned upside- and it is persistent. Many millions of down, with positive ratings dropping by Muslims believe that the American war more than half, but favorable attitudes on terrorism, its promotion of democracy, toward the United States dropped only its advocacy of human rights and civil by 6 percent. “Obama is a duplicate copy liberties are little more than window of Bush,” al-Qaida editorialized after the dressing for imperialism, at best. At worst, American presidential election. Many this activity is part of a plot to destroy Muslims seem to agree. volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 arches quarterly 165 THE MUSLIM “DEMAND CURVE” FOR U.S. FOREIGN POLICY Only a bold policy change might instant results, or at least measurable conceivably make a diff erence in Muslim progress by the next election cycle. Th is opinion of the United States. According mismatch in timing between the frenetic to Muslim survey respondents, one such activity of the U.S. government and the step would be an Israeli-Palestinian peace suspicious, wait-and-see attitude of the agreement -- but it is not politically feasible rest of the world, can lead to frustration in American politics to pressure Israel into and misunderstandings. Americans tend such an agreement. Indeed, the Obama to think that U.S. foreign policy matters administration has maintained many a great deal in the battle for the hearts and of the signature elements of the Bush minds of Muslim societies. Many Muslims, administration’s Global War on Terror, for their part, believe that American plots even as it has abandoned the GWOT label lie behind every development around the and much of the blustery rhetoric. Th e world. But some of the most important Obama administration has continued to trends of recent history, from the challenge engage in drone attacks and Special Forces of Islamist revolutionaries to the drama of operations; it continues to detain “enemy the Arab Spring, are not about America. combatants” and try them in military Th ey involve Muslims making their own tribunals. Th e United States government history, regardless of the position of the stuck with its authoritarian allies in the United States government. Th at may take Middle East even as the Arab Spring began some getting used to. to engulf them. In the absence of a major shift in American foreign policy, Muslim public opinion toward the United States Charles Kurzman is the author of The Missing Martyrs: will likely remain inelastic. Why There Are So Few Muslim Terrorists (Oxford Americans and their presidents can be University Press, 2011) and a Professor of Sociology at impatient with foreign policy. We want the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

The Center for Understanding Islam seeks to present an enlightened understanding of Islam in America. Our focus is education. We emphasize the common humanity of people of all faiths, rather than taking sides on political issues. We urge everyone to distinguishh between the true teachings of Islam as a faith and thee diverse cultural traditions of Muslim societies. Actions of a tiny minority of extremist Muslims cannot be used too defi ne the faith tradition itself. Serious Muslims have ann obligation to take back their faith from those who trieded to hijack it for their political purposes. CUI repudiates aallll hateful messages regardless of the source.

WHAT WE DO • Organise leadership conferences, workshops and seminars on Islam and Muslims. • Publish discussion guides, articles, and books on FAQs • Build a research library. • Provide commentators for radio, TV, and the print media. • Marshal expertise of scholars on issues of conscience. • Retreats for Muslim and non-Muslim youth and community leaders. • Speakers Bureau on Islam. WWW.CUII.ORG

166 arches quarterly volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 Behind Closed Doors - Ten Years of Secret Evidence and Human Suff ering

AISHA MANIAR & ADRIENNE BURROWS

ince 9/11, the UK government or the assessment of the “security risk” they has enforced a regime of detention pose. Th e government is now planning to Swithout charge or trial to impose expand the use of such secret evidence or restrictions on the lives of individuals “closed material procedures” in all civil it deems as terrorist suspects; it cannot court cases. prosecute these individuals for various We begin at the end of 2001, when the legal reasons. In the case of foreign Kafkaesque journey started for eight men, nationals, it is seeking to deport them to subject to these measures, with no means their countries of origin on the ground that of challenging it. For some, still subject to they pose a threat to national security, or to a form of house arrest ten years later, the exclude them on that basis, as in the cases journey has not ended; this is the case of we consider here. G. In ZZ’s case, a few years later, secret evidence is used to exclude a father of eight Not only have several from this country, separating him from his wife and children. Th ey are just two dozen individuals (and examples of a far wider issue. by extension their BACKGROUND TO MR G’S CASE families, subject to Th e eight men detained under a new this same regime of anti-terrorism law in 2001 were already collective punishment) in a vulnerable situation, having fl ed their countries of origin (Algeria, Libya, Jordan,) been subject to these to seek sanctuary in the United Kingdom; measures but they several had suff ered imprisonment and torture at home. Th ey had all lived in the have never been given UK for many years, with resident status a reason for their in many cases, becoming settled and detention. establishing roots with families and friends in the community. Th ese men were interned from December For British nationals and individuals 2001 to March 2005 under the ATCSA who cannot be deported, the government (Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act) has instead preferred to use control orders, 2001. Th is enabled the British government recently replaced (on 25 January 2012) by to lock up foreign nationals who it deemed Terrorism Prevention and Investigation to be “terrorism” suspects without charge Measures (T-PIMs). or trial and on the basis of largely secret Most strikingly, not only have several evidence. Th e detentions were to be dozen individuals (and by extension their indefi nite and potentially forever. Th e families, subject to this same regime government accepted that the men could of collective punishment) been subject not be deported to their countries of origin to these measures but they have never due to the risk of torture or other inhuman been given a reason for their detention treatment on their return there. None of and consequently any viable means of the men were interviewed by the police challenging the restrictions to their liberty about the claimed allegations against them volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 arches quarterly 167 as would be expected if they were truly Offi ce had changed its mind and now believed to have been involved in unlawful claimed that they could be deported to the activity. Th ere were no prosecutions. very countries – Jordan, Algeria, Libya – to Instead the men were ‘certifi ed’ by the which previously, until 10th August 2005, Home Secretary on the basis of ‘suspicion’ the British government had accepted that and incarcerated in high security prisons. deportation was not possible because of Neither they nor their lawyers were allowed the risks of torture and other serious ill- to see the evidence against them, so they treatment. But after 7/7 ‘tough action’ was were prevented from being able properly called for – so the government picked on to defend themselves so as to assert their and used these vulnerable people who it innocence. is known were not involved, and against Th e eff ects of this indefi nite detention whom no allegations of involvement in have been catastrophic on their mental such attacks have ever or could ever be health. Four of the men had to be moved made. out of Belmarsh Prison after suff ering In the years since then they have been mental breakdowns. Th ree were transferred fi ghting through the courts these attempts to Broadmoor high security psychiatric to deport them. Some remain in prison hospital by agreement with psychiatrists whilst others live under strict deportation instructed by the Home Secretary. A bail, alone or with their families. Some fourth, again on the recommendation have returned home where some of them of psychiatrists including two acting on have been imprisoned (for details of this the government’s instructions, had to be imprisonment see: Gareth Peirce “Was it released and moved to a small one bedroom like this for the Irish” in Dispatches from fl at with his wife and child on the strict the Dark Side). Th e politics continues and condition of total house arrest. Indefi nite the waiting still seems endless. detention at Belmarsh caused his mental breakdown to become life-threatening. Statement by Mr G. Th is man (Mr G.) and his wife, tell their 19/12/2011 story below. I am Mr G, 42 years old and disabled In December 2004 the Law Lords ruled from childhood polio, a wheelchair user. that the indefi nite detention of these men I am Algerian, a father of three children: was unlawful. In March 2005 the highly daughters of twelve and three years, a boy restrictive regime of Control Orders of fi ve. ‘released’ the men to a form of house I have been in this country for nearly arrest within their own homes. Th is meant sixteen years. I came to this country as an that their families were also living under asylum seeker, running from the dictator’s severe restrictions. Th e fear and intrusion regime which is Algeria, where I’d been involved has caused great damage to the imprisoned and tortured. I thought at that mental health of wives and children caught time I would fi nd a good and peaceful life up in this new form of indefi nite detention. in Britain. I thought: ’I am in a country More information about the damage done where they respect and believe in human to the wives and children in families living rights and justice – and that you are under control orders can be found on-line innocent until found guilty.’ in the Joint Committee on Human Rights After September 11th 2001, the 12th Report published 13th February 2006. Government passed a law - the 2001 Anti- Control Orders seemed to be a step in terrorism Crime & Security Act, allowing the right direction which could lead to the detention of foreigners without charge freedom. But following the terrible 7/7 or trial indefi nitely. Th e police came that London bombings, ten of the men were time, the 19th December like today, ten re-arrested in violent dawn raids by armed years ago, to kidnap me from my house, police in their homes on 11th August 2005. from my wife and my children – going Th e men were re-arrested as the Home straight away to Belmarsh high security

168 arches quarterly volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 BEHIND CLOSED DOORS - TEN YEARS OF SECRET EVIDENCE AND HUMAN SUFFERING unit. I left my wife and child crying nearly three months. and screaming and frightened. I had no Th en after 7/7 happened in London, interview with the police – no-one tells the Government tried to show the public me anything about what off ence I’ve that they were doing something and they committed. tried to play a political game at our expense I spent nearly four years thinking “I will by destroying our lives. Many policemen spend the rest of my life in prison”. It was came again to arrest me. Th ey handcuff ed the most horrible and diffi cult time of my me and kidnapped me again, without me life. After this my mental and physical knowing any charge against me or even states deteriorated and I tried to end my where they were taking me. I left again life by hanging myself in my cell. my wife and the children screaming “My Th e Judge granted me a very restricted dad! My dad! Leave my dad alone!” Th is bail – full house-arrest, twenty four hours time they took me to Long Lartin prison. in my fl at. I was not allowed to talk to Th is time they wanted to deport me to the anyone, no-one could approach me, no brutal regime I had run from. I’d prefer phone was allowed, no visitors, not even to hang myself and fi nish my life here the doctor, no Friday prayers, and I had to in Britain, rather than go there and face call the tagging company fi ve times during torture. Again my health deteriorated and the day and late at night. I spent nearly 9 prison staff took me to health-care because months under these conditions. It was a I could not cope with this situation, neither nightmare. I remember when my wife was physically nor mentally. Once again I tried pregnant, she was in hospital for delivering to fi nish my life. and they did not allow me to visit her in Th en the judge granted me bail – 22 the hospital. Instead they kept me at home hours’ curfew with restricted conditions. with my daughter and we could not even Th at was in 2005. fi nd anyone to buy milk or bread at that Since then I’ve been under bail – me and time. my family suff ering together for no purpose I also remember, my daughter was in or clear case. We are still frightened that school and she was sick and because we the police will come any time, day or had no phone the school could not contact night, to arrest me again – because they’ve us to tell us about her condition. We were done it twice so who can stop them from lucky that the school gave her fi rst aid and doing it again and again. we just found out at the end of the day. I am still fi ghting deportation to a brutal Th en the House of Lords withdrew regime which commits massacres and has the legislation and said it is inhuman killed innocents for many years and where and unjust to hold us with no trial, no I could be imprisoned for ever, or killed charge and indefi nitely. like many others. Th en the Government put me under a So this time, the Government wants to restricted Control Order for nearly fi ve separate me from my family and is risking months, where the police came many times my life for political desires. I am still at night, searching my fl at, frightening me, suff ering physically and mentally and I am my wife and our children and banning us still under treatment. I don’t know how from many basic things. long this drama will go on for – it is now I remember when fi fteen policemen ten years of suff ering going from prison to came early one morning, searching the control order and then to deportation bail. fl at, turning everything upside down and Until now both I and my solicitor, Ms even searching the bedroom where we Gareth Peirce, have not been allowed to see sleep and the drawers where we put our the evidence against me, or to challenge it private clothes. It was very humiliating. in a proper court. I cannot forget when we applied for Finally I would like to thank fi rst Allah permission for a plumber to fi x our washing Ta’ala, Th e Highest, and then be very machine and they rejected our request for thankful to my solicitor and to my friends volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 arches quarterly 169 BEHIND CLOSED DOORS - TEN YEARS OF SECRET EVIDENCE AND HUMAN SUFFERING at Peace & Justice in East London and members or doctors. No phone or internet. all the organisations and individuals who Once I went to hospital for four days stand by our side. because I wasn’t well. He wasn’t allowed to I would ask them from my deep heart, visit me, or bring my daughter to school, to carry on protesting for our freedom or go shopping. Th ank God we had a close and for the freedom of the many people friend who could bring her to school and who are still behind bars after many, many do shopping for them. We live in a one years without charge or any trial. bedroom fl at and the conditions were just Th ank you so much, too diffi cult for us, too much – the Home Mr G. Offi ce coming all the time and searching the house, coming at night and invading Statement by Mrs G. our life, it was too much. And the complete Nineteenth December 2001 – the day isolation totally destroyed my husband. that our life changed dramatically. My After nine months of house arrest, the husband was snatched away from us for 2001 Act was withdrawn. My husband something unknown – and to this day we was put under a Control Order and was never saw any evidence against him, nor able to go out. We still had the restrictions has there been any trial in a court. about people visiting and other things, but Th e fi rst time he went to prison he it felt like complete freedom was coming. stayed there for almost four years. It was so But this didn’t last for long. After the 7/7 diffi cult because the Home Offi ce locked bombings happened my husband was him up indefi nitely without trial. He was taken back to prison facing deportation to going to spend the rest of his life in prison Algeria where he will be tortured or even and I was so devastated. My daughter killed because of the “terrorist stamp” the at this time was only two years old. She Home Offi ce has given him. witnessed when her dad was taken away My husband was completely destroyed and asked me “Why did they take daddy?” and couldn’t cope any more. He tried to I didn’t know what to reply. end his life. Once when she was playing, she came to He was then given bail and he is still me putting her wrists pressed together and facing deportation to Algeria. told me “they hurt daddy” (referring to the All this suff ering is still going on. We handcuff s). Th is broke my heart. I wished still don’t know the evidence against him, that this had been erased from her mind nor has he had a trial. If at least we could but it wasn’t. have a trial one day, or know when this will My husband missed the most important end…. But no, we must stay like this. time of her childhood. She was asking We are now marking the ten years, when her dad will come back, crying every but the never ending suff ering is still time we went to visit him and begging him going on. to come back with us when the visit was fi nished. After almost four years he was released under very strict conditions. We were so happy he was back, but this didn’t last long as the conditions were so strict. It was the most stressful time of my life. My husband was not allowed to go out Aisha Maniar is a human rights activist who works with at all – he was locked up under home-arrest Coalition Against Secret Evidence (CASE), the London 24/7. Guantanamo Campaign and others. He had to call the tagging company fi ve Adrienne Burrows is a member of Peace & Justice in times a day to let them know he was still East London and Coalition Against Secret Evidence (CASE). Since 2005 Burrows has been Home Offi ce- in our fl at. We were not allowed to have vetted to visit some of the individuals and families held any visitors at home, including family under house-arrest in their homes.

170 arches quarterly volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 Conviction of Thought: How Islamic Concepts are Ruled on in UK Courts

ASIM QURESHI

hrough discussing the case of R v Th ey further add, Faraz, I attempt to argue in this Some of these publications have previously Tpaper that the case has shaped, been cited by convicted terrorists as infl uencing and may establish a precedent, in the their actions. Other items contained explicit discussion of Islamic concepts in British instructions on how to make explosive devices law courts. While the Faraz case is not and how to kidnap people.2 alone in a new wave of terrorism trials, it highlights points relating to Islamic Within this case, prosecution was based theology and jurisprudence that should be in Faraz’s alleged involvement in activity understood in greater depth by UK judges, related to terrorism. Th e main charges before rulings are made. against him included the possession and dissemination of books and videos related The landscape of to terrorism, regarded as an off ence under section 58 of the Terrorism Act 2006. terrorism prosecutions Th e Faraz case is not the fi rst to have has changed led to convictions where no evidence of an actual terrorist plot is presented. As part dramatically over the of the UK government’s Prevent strategy, last two years, given the it appears that the criminalisation of increasing emphasis on ideas has been prosecuted by the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) who are keen perceived ideologies of to test cases before the courts. In February the defendants. 2011, Mohammed Gul, a 19 year old law student, was convicted of the dissemination Previously, convictions were related to of terrorism publications. In his judgment, actual terror plots. Th us, the outcomes of Judge David Paget is recorded as saying; terrorism related trials in the UK, such “I am in no doubt that you have become as ‘Operation Crevice Trail’, the ‘Ricin thoroughly radicalised.” Padget also went Plot’, and ‘Old Traff ord Plot’1, have been on to say that Gul was, “pouring petrol infl uenced by the amounts of evidence on the fi re” for those who may be inclined available. Th e landscape of terrorism towards terrorism. prosecutions has changed dramatically Th e reality of the Gul case is that over the last two years, given the increasing there was no plot, nor was there was any emphasis on perceived ideologies of the evidence linking him directly to the actual defendants. or planned acts of terrorism. Gul created In response to the conviction of and uploaded videos to anti-imperialist Ahmad Faraz on 12 December 2011, the websites. Th e case spoke more of the Crown Prosecution Service expressed the alienation of a confl icted young man. The following: fi ve years sentence given to Gul, according Th is trial was not about censoring books to Kimberley Trapp, was completely but about the defendant’s role in the mass disproportionate to his activities.3 distribution of material, which had been A further case demonstrating attacks added to and manipulated, in order to prime on ideologies, is that of Munir Farooqi. would-be terrorists to commit violent acts. Farooqi was given four life sentences volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 arches quarterly 171 despite the fact that there was no evidence off ence of possession of terrorist material of a terrorist plot. Th e government on his computer hard-drive, however it is admitted that Farooqi had not been important to understand the context under planning to commit acts of terrorism, but which the possession took place. Th e fi les rather he was expressing sentiments against in question were found on Faraz’s hard- the Western invasion of Afghanistan. drive in a folder entitled “PhD”. For those At the conclusion of the trial, Detective Faraz, the prospect of a PhD following Chief Superintendent Tony Porter, head of his Masters was a matter of when and not the North West Counter Terrorism Unit, if. Th e prosecution had access to detailed commented on the case, communication between Faraz and his Th is was an extremely challenging case, former Masters dissertation advisor, both to investigate and successfully prosecute in relation to potential PhD projects. at court, because we did not recover any Faraz explained through his lawyers in blueprint, attack plan or endgame for these court that the data in question had been men. However, what we were able to prove collected as source material for a possible was their ideology.4 PhD level comparative study of Al-Qaeda and Hamas. Th e Farooqi case further causes concern, given the possibility of entrapment in the With little factual basis, case. Th e undercover police in the case, were actively encouraging the Farooqis the Faraz trial very much to help them join the jihad abroad. After hinged on proving months of investigation though, it was not due to any tangible plot that Munir the ideology of the Farooqi was convicted, but rather, it was defendant. due to his opinions in relation to foreign policy and confl icts abroad. In a similar vein prior to the Farooqi and Faraz was also found to be in possession Gul cases, in 2007, Faraz was arrested and of an Al-Qaeda training manual. Similarly detained by the police in connection with Rizwaan Sabir,was arrested (and held ‘Operation Gamble’5. He was released in solitary confi nement) for having without charge, but at the time the police downloaded the training manual as part of gathered evidence from the Maktabah his PhD. Th e manual was available for free bookshop. At the time, Detective Inspector download from a US Department of State Haddon of West Midlands Police claimed website. Sabir was released after a week that while the material they had seized and was subsequently awarded £20,000 promoted anti-Western sentiments, it was compensation for his mistreatment. not illegal. With little factual basis, the Faraz trial Part of the evidence that was only very much hinged on proving the ideology partially presented in the trial (due to the of the defendant. Th e CPS was keen to defence not actually presenting a case) rebut the arguments defence lawyers Karen proved that Faraz had gone to great eff orts Armstrong and Alistair Crooke. Th eir to speak with his team, lawyers and indeed arguments were based on assessments of the police about the content of the material the case prior to the trial. In order to do the Maktabah bookshop sold. Emails and so, the CPS requested Dr Matthew Tariq notes recovered by the police demonstrated Wilkinson to provide expert testimony in that Faraz was particularly concerned with order to understand the charges through any legal liability that might arise from an Islamic framework. the publications. Th us the ambiguity of Wilkinson suggests the following as key the 2006 Terrorism Act is apparent in the in the formation of his Islamic expertise: confusion surrounding legal responsibility. I memorised two juz (parts) of the Koran in Faraz was also charged with a section 58 the traditional way of sitting with a scholar,

172 arches quarterly volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 CONVICTION OF THOUGHT: HOW ISLAMIC CONCEPTS ARE RULED ON IN UK COURTS memorising it with a board, rubbing it off the a signifi cant number of those who read it.8 board, learning the next section off by heart, through about 1/15th part of the Koran, Both the prosecution and the judge which is quite a lot in fact, and a number of claimed that the Faraz case was not other major chapters of the Koran... concerned with the banning of books, ideas or Islamic thought. I contend below Alongside that I studied some of the that the aforementioned concepts were traditional Tafsirs some of the commentaries being analysed and judged throughout of the Koran, which are needed to understand the case. My argument will be based on the context of the Koran. I also memorised Wilkinson’s testimony and the decision of and learned one of the most important the judge. Hadith collections, one of the important After presenting a general overview of collections of the sayings of the Prophet Islamic thought and belief, the prosecution Mohammed (peace be upon him), by a man took Wilkinson through the concept of called Imam an-Nawawi, I memorised jihad, in order to clarify the concept to the those in Arabic, and studied their meanings judge and jury. In Wilkinson’s opinion, in Arabic through memorisation of a poem there are only very strict conditions under called “Al-’Ajrumiyyah” by a man called which jihad, as an armed struggle, can be Shaykh Al-’Ajrum.6 fought: 1. When jihad has been declared Th e majority of Wilkinson’s experience and fought, it is under recognised has been acquired through working Muslim leadership, such as under in Muslim schools, and subsequently an Imam/Amir/Caliph. through his role as a member of a 2. Th e armed confl ict must be openly prominent organisation, representing declared to the enemy, it cannot be a British Muslims. cover in any way. As a precondition What must be considered, in light of to jihad is to invite the enemy to Wilkinson’s role in the trial is the reason Islam fi rst, or off ering them to pay why he had been commissioned by the a compulsory tax. CPS. His position was clarifi ed early 3. Once the confl ict begins, non- on by the prosecution QC, Mr Hill, combatants may not be harmed. who explained, “we have asked for Mr 4. Agriculture and architecture may Wilkinson’s assistance as to the meaning not be harmed in any way.9 of the religion. Th erefore, we will come on to it, the context in which religiously and Wilkinson’s presentation of jihad is socially the indicted publications may be singularly literal, in the sense that it does understood.”7 Th e response by the judge, not describe any of the eff orts relating to Justice Calvert-Smith, was equally telling, varying circumstances and jurisprudence I was concerned, members of the jury, that over a 1400 year history. Th is formulation in learning a bit, those of us who don’t know is then used as the lens through which the much about the core tenets of Islam, we should prosecution and the judge then understood not forget that what we are actually dealing further arguments relating to confl ict with the encouragement, or not, of criminal around the world. off ences. So that if a particular religion, Further, when pressed about the word think of another one altogether, had as one shaheed (witness/martyr), he claims, of its key tenets, the commission of criminal It is not a word that appears in the Koran, off ences, that would be no justifi cation. it is a word that appears in the early Hadeeth Whatever the religion says, what we material, and the idea is that someone that are concerned about in the end is whether sacrifi ces their life to uphold properly the criminal off ences were being encouraged religion is somebody that most directly witnesses directly or indirectly by any of these to their faith; it is not a Koranic word.10 publications, and would be so understood by Th e above statement is incorrect as volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 arches quarterly 173 the word shaheed appears on numerous Muslim group in that, it is simplistic in that occasions in the Qur’an in various it provides a vision of the world that is broken permutations and circumstances. Th e down into -- has an absurdly simple analyst suggested lack of presence in the Qur’an of the relationship, for example, between the implies a lack of religious signifi cance. From Muslim world and the non-Muslim world, it a theological perspective, this becomes is excessively political so it trots out the cliché particularly important when juxtaposed to which has actually been absorbed almost the discussions that took place immediately in the main stream of thinking that Islam after, as Mr Hill attempted to clarify the is just a sort of political faith, that it can’t concept of martyrdom in Islam during a exist without its sort of politics, it is violent confl ict. Wilkinson reiterated: “Th at is beyond what is authorised in the Koran and not an Islamic concept.”11 the Sunnah, that it is historically inaccurate, Wilkinson’s testimony remains it uses analysis of history that is wrong in a problematic, largely due to his lack number of quite simple ways, both Islamic of expertise in Islamic theory and history and non-Islamic history, that it is jurisprudence, and confl ict studies. An unrepresentative of an authentically Koranic important part of his testimony focussed world view...12 on his assessment of the modern day Islamic validity of confl icts around Wilkinson also commented on texts by the world. Wilkinson discussed the Abdullah Azzam, amongst others, and confl icts in Afghanistan, Chechnya, Iraq, he does not accept their views as being Bosnia, Palestine and Kashmir, with an Islamically authentic. I would argue that oversimplifi ed assessment of whether the conclusions that Wilkinson reaches are or not the confl icts had Islamic validity based on his personal opinion. in terms of jihad. For the most part, he I am saying that the style of Milestones is refused to accept any Islamic validity in what you might call in the style of the Khariji the aforementioned cases. theology, because it specifi cally says that the Using the above analysis of both the sovereignty of a Muslim state resides with the theology of the jihad, and its application Godhead, and not with the person deputising on the modern circumstances of confl ict for it, which was the very typical Khariji in the Muslim world, Wilkinson set out theology.13 his views on the publications that were distributed by Faraz. A major point of It is during the defence rebuttal of discussion for the prosecution was the Wilkinson that much of his Islamic role of the widely used book Milestones by credibility is damaged. Defence QC Mr Sayyid Qutb. Wilkinson sets out a view of Joel Bennathan cross-examined Wilkinson the book and its author’s opinion: on various comments, statements and Sir, my contention is that this Milestones arguments made during the course of his itself, in particular this edition, militate testimony. What Bennathan was able to both against the spirit and the letter of the prove, was that much of the Wilkinson Koran and the Sunnah, the primary sources evidence, was open to interpretation. of Islam, and this is because in my opinion Bennathan cited the example of they establish a mindset in the reader, in Martyrs Square in Tripoli, used during the audience, that I have described in the the Libyan uprising in order to discuss following way: that is Manichean, in other the issue of martyrdom and how it was words it sets up a vision of the world that being understood by those fi ghting for is entirely divided into black and white, their freedom. On pushing Wilkinson as right or wrong, good and bad, true or false, to the status of the ‘martyrdom’ of those without any shades of grey whatsoever, it is who had died fi ghting against Ghaddafi , separatist, so it encourages the reader to split the witness initially denied they could off into the Muslim group and away from any be called martyrs, but when pressed was other sort of group, and into a very particular forced to accept that he could not give a

174 arches quarterly volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 CONVICTION OF THOUGHT: HOW ISLAMIC CONCEPTS ARE RULED ON IN UK COURTS defi nitive answer. BENNATHAN: Th e only point I am Bennathan went on to cite the example making is on whether this was a Jihad, of the war in Afghanistan, explaining there is obviously a very signifi cant that there were a number of varying division of opinion with people on both opinions about the confl ict. Using the sides? fatwa (religious edict) written by Abdullah Azzam and acquiesced by Shaykh Abdul WILKINSON: No, that is why I said, Aziz bin Baz regarding the jihad in if you turned to my table, I ticked Afghanistan, the witness was forced to what I thought was a pretty consensual concede diff erences of opinion: view I ticked both boxes. Although, I BENNATHAN: Who was, or is indeed, think strictly speaking it doesn’t fulfi l Abdul Aziz ibn Baz? all the conditions of an Islamic Jihad, nevertheless I think it is a just struggle. I WILKINSON: He was the leading would not argue with people that would establishment Mufti of the Saudi call it a Jihad. regime. BENNATHAN: Th at is a perfectly good BENNATHAN: Mr Wilkinson, you point, most people tick the box, most are a learned man who has been 20 people think it is a Jihad? years in the religion, but you are not on the same page as him are you in terms of WILKINSON: Yes. Islamic authority? BENNATHAN: You are in a minority WILKINSON: Here I express my on that one? opinion about this matter. WILKINSON: Possibly.14 BENNATHAN: Forgive me, could you answer the question fi rst. You are not on Th e arguments set forth by the defence the same page as the Grand -- underline the diff ering opinions in Islamic jurisprudence. Th e defence team presented WILKINSON: What do you mean that a classical Maliki jurisprudential text I am not on the same page, I am not in which rebutted Wilkinson’s statements any way such an authoritive voice in the that jihad could never be Fard al-‘Ayn - an Muslim world, is that what you mean? obligation on the individual. By proving to the court that a town under attack must BENNATHAN: Yes. be defended without the requirement of authorisation, the defence was able to show WILKINSON: Yes, I would certainly that there was enough confl icting evidence agree with that, but nevertheless I think within classical Islamic interpretations. great authorities in the Islam have in Th us disproving the analyses set out by the last 50 at least years had to grapple Wilkinson. with very complicated problems. Often Despite the strength of the defence they have changed their minds rebuttal, the judge and jury were convinced about situations quite a lot. For example by the ideological analysis put forward by Yusuf al-Qaradawi, having initially Wilkinson. In the words of Justice Calvert- supported suicide bombing condemned Smith: it thoroughly. Even Sayyid Imam, who Milestones, described by the expert was initially a Jihadi ideologue of Matthew Wilkinson as Manichean, separatist quite some pedigree, recanted entirely and excessively violent. Th e original author of upon his ideology on a diff erent legal the book made the case that any regime which setting. Very respected Islamic fi gures does not apply Islam, should be removed by have, throughout the last 30 years, force, ties of family etc were unimportant, changed their mind on very important this is the view put forward by Qutb.15 matters. volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 arches quarterly 175 CONVICTION OF THOUGHT: HOW ISLAMIC CONCEPTS ARE RULED ON IN UK COURTS Th e starting point of the judge was to He is also the author of Rules of the Game: Detention, accept Wilkinson’s fl awed analysis of Deportation, Disappearance published by Hurst and Columbia University Press. The work analyses Islamic theology and its jurisprudential global detention policies in the ‘War on Terror’ post implementation. Without using his 11th September 2001 and the impact on those most testimony as a basis, the conviction and aff ected, the victims. the resulting judgment would have been diffi cult to adduce. ENDNOTES Th e confl ation made by Wilkinson 1. ‘The Operation Crevice Trial’ in 2006 resulted in the between traditional jurisprudence and conviction of 5 out of the 7 men alleged to have been involved in a plot to use ammonium nitrate fertilizer to blow up targets in London. Conversely, the ‘Ricin Plot’ in 2005 The reality is that resulted in acquittals as it was revealed that there no plots to begin with. The ‘Old Traff ord Plot’ in 2004 was dismissed precedents were being early into the investigation as police admitted that there was no tangible evidence of such a plot. set in the way that Islam 2. BBC News, Bookseller Ahmed Faraz found guilty of terror off ences, 12/12/2011 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk- and Islamic jurisprudence england-16149299 is understood by the 3. Trapp K, R v Mohammed Gul: Are You a Terrorist if You Support the Syrian Insurgency?, Blog of the European Journal courts. of International Law, 14/03/2012. 4. BBC News, Munir Farooqi given four life sentences for terror charges, 09/09/2011 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk- modern confl ict scenarios, presented a england-manchester-14851811 somewhat false understanding of the 5. The Maktabah bookshop was raided on 31 January 2007 under section 41 of the Terrorism Act 2000 for the alleged way in which Islamic argumentation has association and involvement in a ‘plot’ to kidnap a soldier developed over a 1400 year history. While from the British army. The manager and a volunteer from the prosecution and the judge claimed the bookshop were amongst nine individuals arrested in that this case was only about whether or ‘Operation Gamble’. After seven days, the men were released without charge. not the dissemination of these materials 6. R v Ahmed Faraz, Kingston Crown Court, 07/11/2011 could amount to an off ence, the reality http://www.cageprisoners.com/learn-more/legal-issues/ is that precedents were being set in the item/2922-r-v-faraz-testimony-of-matthew-tariq-wilkinson- way that Islam and Islamic jurisprudence for-the-prosecution-day-1 7. Ibid. is understood by the courts. Th is is an 8. Ibid. extremely dangerous precedent, as it will 9. Ibid. only serve to restrict the space of legitimate 10. Ibid. and necessary Islamic discourse. 11. Ibid. 12. Ibid. While I may not disagree with everything 13. R v Ahmed Faraz, Kingston Crown Court, 08/11/2011 that Wilkinson said, the very notion that a http://www.cageprisoners.com/learn-more/legal-issues/ pseudo-expert on Islam could be relied on item/2923-r-v-faraz-testimony-of-matthew-tariq-wilkinson- to secure convictions over areas of Islam for-the-prosecution-day-2 14. Ibid. which are highly contended, serves to have 15. Ibid. a negative impact on the manner in which Muslims engage with their religion and how they go about debating concepts. Th e criminalisation of certain types of Islamic thought will not make ideas disappear, rather it will force discussion on such matters underground.

Asim Qureshi is the Executive Director at CagePrisoners where he has led investigations into Pakistan, Bosnia, Kenya, Sudan, Sweden, USA and around the UK. With his team of researchers, he has written and published many reports exposing the use of unlawful detention, rendition, and torture in the ‘war on terror’.

176 arches quarterly volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 BOOK REVIEW MUSLIMS IN POLAND AND EASTERN EUROPE: WIDENING THE EUROPEAN DISCOURSE ON ISLAM EDITED BY KATARZYNA GÓRAK-SOSNOWSKA, WARSAW: UNIVERSITY OF WARSAW FACULTY OF ORIENTAL STUDIES, 2011. BOOK REVIEW BY MAŁGORZATA WRÓBLEWSKA

their experiences in Central and Eastern Europe. Th e book is uniqueu because it deals withw a wide range of strandss of thought. NotN only is the book usefulu for those who are keenke on the topic, but it is also an interesting read forfor the novices. Th e book is divided into twotwo main parts: Muslims in Poland and Muslims in thet wider Central and EasternEast Europe. Each part containscont several chapters whichwhic widely explore thethe issue. Th ere is both historicalhisto background as well as modern points of views,views such as the history slam has become a prominent topic and culture of Polish Tatars, in global media discourse since generational changes among young Polish I9/11, and it has recently featured Tatars and mosques in Poland. Also, past prominently on the political agenda in and present, formation of new Muslim Europe too. However, little has been communities in new member states: the done to explain the complex topic which case of Hungary. is Muslims in Europe. Th e book Muslims Among the contributors in the book in Poland and Eastern Europe: Widening are philosophers, sociologists, historians the European Discourse on Islam, edited by and orientalists. Whilst most of the Katarzyna Górak-Sosnowska fi lls the gap authors originate from Poland, there are in knowledge of Muslim communities and some researchers from abroad too. Th e

volume 5 edition 9 spring 2012 arches quarterly 177 book is written well, and contains rich more general and briefl y shows the picture information and points of views that helps of Muslims in countries like Lithuania, to build a complete picture of the situation Hungary, Slovakia, Ukraine, Romania, of Muslims in Poland and Eastern Europe. Bulgaria, Slovenia and last but not least, Literature, gender, gastronomy, religion, Serbia. Th ere is clear evidence that the history, network, language, culture and choice of these countries was not random behavior, are among some of the subjects because all of them have something in covered in the book. common -- a Communist past. Due to the vast nature of the topic the In brief, Muslims in Poland and Eastern book fi lls the gap in academic literature Europe fi lls the gap in knowledge of on Islam and Muslims in Europe. Today, Muslim communities and their experiences depending on sex, race, education, age, or in Central and Eastern Europe. Th is is even nationality people take a variety of the fi rst book in the vast body of Polish approaches to Muslims. Unfortunately, academic literature that places Poland the lack of even basic knowledge is visible. inside the realm of vivid discourse about Such levels of unawareness raises a sharp Islam. contrast between Muslims and others as well as a stiff opposition “we – they?” Małgorzata Wróblewska has an M.A. in Iranian Moreover, people are very often afraid of Studies from the University of Warsaw, Poland. She is Islam because of the lack of information currently completing a PhD at the University of Warsaw where she is researching Modern Iranian Women’s about this faith and its growing adherents. Prose. Her interests include post-modern theory and Recently there has been a hot debate about literary practice; feminism; Islam and social issues in the building of a new mosque in Warsaw, contemporary Iran. the capital of Poland. Th is discussion has shown that this is a burning issue because a majority of Poles have little knowledge about Muslims. Poland has a long history and tradition of Muslim presence, dating back to the 14th century, which seems to have been forgotten today. What is interesting is that there is a signifi cant Muslim minority, proportionally even larger than in France, in Bulgaria, according to this book. Muslims in Poland and Eastern Europe is written by a number of authors; however it was edited by the sociologist, Katarzyna Górak-Sosnowska. Like a good editor, she picked up a great deal about the concerns and problems that prompt research of the Islamic faith. Th e book is well-organised and includes convincing arguments, statistics, maps and a wide range of information. Among others there is a picture which shows a number of Muslims in European counties, a chart showing Arabic TV stations and a table with information about phases of relations between Islam and Europe. Th e fi rst part of the book is extensive, while the latter is

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