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Censorship and Surveillance During Hong Kong's Umbrella Movement

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Censorship and Surveillance During Hong Kong's Umbrella Movement Illinois State University ISU ReD: Research and eData Theses and Dissertations 3-14-2016 In The Shadow Of The Great Firewall: Censorship And Surveillance During Hong Kong's Umbrella Movement Christine Andrelczyk Illinois State University, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.library.illinoisstate.edu/etd Part of the Asian Studies Commons, Political Science Commons, and the Quantitative, Qualitative, Comparative, and Historical Methodologies Commons Recommended Citation Andrelczyk, Christine, "In The Shadow Of The Great Firewall: Censorship And Surveillance During Hong Kong's Umbrella Movement" (2016). Theses and Dissertations. 488. https://ir.library.illinoisstate.edu/etd/488 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by ISU ReD: Research and eData. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ISU ReD: Research and eData. For more information, please contact [email protected]. IN THE SHADOW OF THE GREAT FIREWALL: CENSORSHIP AND SURVEILLANCE DURING HONG KONG’S UMBRELLA MOVEMENT Christine Andrelczyk 80 Pages Through a case-study analysis, this project investigates why the People’s Republic of China eschewed overtly repressive tactics and instead relied on subtle methods of coercion, such as surveillance and censorship, to mitigate activism during Hong Kong’s pro-democracy Umbrella Movement. Drawing on historical evidence, reports, and quantitative data, this research explores the significance of subtle repression and coercion as it relates to the process of authoritarian consolidation in China and Hong Kong. KEYWORDS: Censorship, Hong Kong, Informational Communication Technologies, Umbrella Movement IN THE SHADOW OF THE GREAT FIREWALL: CENSORSHIP AND SURVEILLANCE DURING HONG KONG’S UMBRELLA MOVEMENT CHRISTINE ANDRELCZYK A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of MASTER OF SCIENCE Department of Politics and Government ILLINOIS STATE UNIVERSITY 2016 Copyright 2016 Christine Andrelczyk IN THE SHADOW OF THE GREAT FIREWALL: CENSORSHIP AND SURVEILLANCE DURING HONG KONG’S UMBRELLA MOVEMENT CHRISTINE ANDRELCZYK COMMITTEE MEMBERS: Michaelene Cox, Chair Osaore Aideyan Noha Shawki CONTENTS Page CONTENTS i CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 1 II. REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 10 ICTs and autocracy 13 Empowering the government 13 A cautious take 20 ICTs: Destabilizing autocracy 23 III. THEORY 29 Authoritarian consolidation 29 Collective action 34 IV. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS 39 V. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT 42 Timeline of events 47 Role of ICTs in the Umbrella Movement 49 Censorship 49 Surveillance 52 VI. ANALYSIS 56 VII. CONCLUSION 67 REFERENCES 73 i CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION A group of university students quietly sat down in front of a government building in Hong Kong’s Admiralty district on September 26, 2014. A few weeks earlier, Hong Kong media outlets had announced that the dialogue between Mainland China and Hong Kong regarding electoral reforms had fallen through. The Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, China’s de facto legislature, ostensibly approved of Hong Kong’s bid for national elections with one major caveat: All candidates must be hand- selected by the communist authorities in Beijing. “This is a fake democratic proposal,” remarked Hong Kong lawmaker Albert Chan, echoing the sentiments of thousands of disgruntled and disappointed Hong Kong residents.1 The student sit-in at the Admiralty building was the culmination of a week-long boycott organized by student groups Scholarism and the Hong Kong Federation of Students. Scholarism’s teenage leader, Joshua Wong, explained in a call to action that: “Political reform is the core problem for every issue. Everyone knows that under the Chinese Communist party, there is a lack of possibility to fight [for] true universal suffrage in the end…but students should stand on the front line in every century.”2 Just 1 Tiffany Ap, “Can Hong Kong’s July 1 pro-democracy march energize political reform bid?” CNN, July 1, 2015, http://www.cnn.com/2015/07/01/asia/hong-kong-july-democracy-march/ 2 Demetri Sevastopulo, “Teenager Joshua Wong picks up democracy baton in Hong Kong,” Financial Times, September 22, 2014, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/9d52261c-421e-11e4-9818- 00144feabdc0.html#axzz3fDoGeZ4z 1 two days later, the students were joined by thousands of protestors as they marched through the streets of Hong Kong’s glittering, high-tech commercial district. Activists blocked key intersections, paralyzing traffic, as riot police launched canisters of tear gas into the peaceful crowd. In response to the noxious gas, activists raised umbrellas painted with pro-democracy messages, and thus the Umbrella Movement was born.3 To some, this scene might appear reminiscent of images of demonstrators in Egypt and Iran in the preceding years, where young people took to the streets amidst a storm of tweets, texts, and blog posts. The Arab Spring movement of 2011 ignited an ongoing discussion about the role of communication technology in social movements, causing journalists and scholars alike to examine how platforms like mobile phone technology and the internet could be harnessed by activists in order to disseminate pro- democratic messages and mobilize against authoritarian regimes. Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak was ousted in less than three weeks in a relatively bloodless revolution after millions of activists took to social media to express their discontent and organize mass protests. The 2009 election protest in Iran and the 2011 revolution in Tunisia were described as “Twitter revolutions,” a name referencing the primary instrument utilized by activists. When Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement burst onto the international stage in 2014, one might have assumed that, like in Egypt and Tunisia in the years prior, the collective fervor of youthful activists would flood the streets and social media in equal measure and ultimately lead to another major victory for democracy. But that never happened, largely based on China’s skillful handling of the movement. 3 “Hong Kong protests: Timeline of the occupation,” BBC News, December 11, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-30390820. 2 The Umbrella movement was in fact just the most recent of a series of protests stretching back to 2003 when pro-democracy activists first expressed their discontent with the encroaching authoritarian policies of Mainland China. These protests largely spark from the struggle between Hong Kong to exert a higher degree of democratic self- rule and China’s policy of centralized control. Specifically, the issues of free elections and freedom of expression have generated a high degree of public contention. Although the frequency of Hong Kong’s protests could lead observers to believe otherwise, Hong Kong is not administered by a regime that encourages free political discourse or permits government criticism. Restrictive policies imposed by the People’s Republic of China are geared towards limiting the transmission of information deemed controversial, politically sensitive, or anti-government. Individuals found participating in subversive communications could realistically face arrest and imprisonment.4 On a larger scale, the government has openly engineered mass internet blackouts in regions of China embroiled in social unrest where demonstrations are believed to have been organized using technology like the internet and mobile phones. Despite such restrictions, Hong Kong has experienced a number of mass protests since 1997. This raises questions regarding how communication can be used as a tool to either advance or limit democratic progress in social movements like the Umbrella protest. Additionally, one may ask why recent social movements in Egypt and Tunisia succeeded while Hong Kong’s did not, despite activists having very similar digital tools at their disposal. 4 Francis L. F. Lee and Joseph M. Chan, "Professionalism, Political Orientation, and Perceived Self- Censorship: A Survey Study of Hong Kong Journalists" (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Communication Association, TBA, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, May 21, 2008). 3 The relationship between communication technology and social movements is far from novel. Johannes Gutenberg’s invention of the printing press in 1450 demonstrates how technological change can facilitate social change. His invention is credited with playing a key developmental role in the Renaissance, Reformation, and Scientific Revolution. More recently, Radio Free Europe was nominated for a Nobel Peace Prize in 1991 for its role in bringing down the Iron Curtain.5 Within the last decade, information and communication technologies (ICTs) have been lauded by some as a voice piece of the oppressed and tool for liberation, prompting prominent figures like Egyptian activist and Google Entrepreneur Wael Ghonim to espouse, “if you want to liberate a society, just give them the internet.”6 Yet despite the rallying power of digital communication, Freedom House reported in 2015 that more countries experienced declines in freedom than gains for the ninth consecutive year despite global surges in internet and mobile phone connectivity.7 Freedom House additionally reported a major increase in surveillance and overall decline in internet freedom, despite more people than ever being connected to the web.8 5 Evgeny Morozov, The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom (New York: Public Affairs, 2012), 20. 6 Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative
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