A Case Study of Hong Kong SAR and Its Implications to Chinese Foreign Policy
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Paradiplomacy and its Constraints in a Quasi-Federal System – A Case Study of Hong Kong SAR and its Implications to Chinese Foreign Policy Wai-shun Wilson CHAN ([email protected]) Introduction Thank for the Umbrella Movement in 2014, Hong Kong has once again become the focal point of international media. Apart from focusing the tensions built among the government, the pro-Beijing camp and the protestors on the pathway and the pace for local democratization, some media reports have linked the movement with the Tiananmen Incident, and serves as a testing case whether “One Country, Two Systems” could be uphold under the new Xin Jinping leadership.1 While academics and commentators in Hong Kong and overseas tend to evaluate the proposition from increasing presence of Beijing in domestic politics and the decline of freedoms and rights enjoyed by civil society,2 little evaluation is conducted from the perspective of the external autonomy enjoyed by Hong Kong under “One Country, Two Systems”. In fact, the Sino-British Joint Declaration and the subsequent Basic Law have defined and elaborated the scope of Hong Kong’s autonomy in conducting external relations ‘with states, regions and relevant international organizations.’ 3 It is therefore tempted to suggest that the external autonomy enjoyed by Hong Kong SAR Government serves as the other pillar of “One Country, Two Systems”, giving an unique identity of Hong Kong in global politics which may be different from that possessed by mainland China. Though officially “One Country, Two Systems” practiced in Hong Kong (and Macao) is not recognized by Beijing as a federal arrangement between the Central People’s Government and Hong Kong SAR Government, the internal and external autonomy stipulated in the Basic Law gives Hong Kong similar, to some extent even more, power as a typical federated unit. By reviewing the institutional framework of “One Country, Two Systems” and matching it with the actual practices of the external relations of Hong Kong, this paper aims to reveal the tensions of such quasi-federal arrangement between mainland China and Hong Kong. The paper suggests that the increasing incompatibility of Chinese realist agenda and Hong Kong 1 [1] ‘Hong Kong Protests: Echoes of Tiananmenm’ BBC News, 2 October 2014. [2] Gideon Rachman, ‘China’s Biggest Political Challenge since Tiananmen in 1989,’ Financial Times, 29 September 2014. [3] Samson Yuen, ‘Hong Kong After the Umbrella Movement: An Uncertain Future for “One Country, Two Systems”,’ China Perspectives, No. 2015/1 (2015), pp.49 – 53. [4] Joshua Keating, ‘Do the Protests in Hong Kong Mean the “One Country, Two Systems” System Is on the Ropes?,” Slate, 29 September 2014. 2 [1] Brian Fong, “The Partnership between Chinese Government and Hong Kong Capitalist Class: Implications for HKSAR Governance, 1997-2012,” The China Quartely, Vol. 217 (March 2014), pp.195 – 220. [2] Wai-man Lam and Kay Chi-yan Lam, “China’s United Front Work in Civil Society: The Case of Hong Kong,” International Journal of China Studies, Vol. 4:3 (December 2013), pp.301 – 325. [3] Hong Kong Journalists Association, “Press Freedom Under Siege: Grave Threats to Freedom of Expression in Hong Kong,” 2014 Annual Report – Report of the Hong Kong Journalists Association (July 2014). Accessed at http://www.hkja.org.hk/site/Host/hkja/UserFiles/file/annual_report_2014_Final.pdf, on 4 May 2015. [4] Hong Kong Transparency Report 2014 (Hong Kong: Journalism and Media Studies Centre, the University of Hong Kong, 2014). Accessed at http://transparency.jmsc.hku.hk/wp- content/uploads/2014/09/HKTR2014_201410171.pdf, on 4 May 2015. 3 [1] Article 3(10) of the Sino-British Joint Declaration. Full text accessed at http://www.cmab.gov.hk/en/issues/jd2.htm, on 1 May 2015. [2] Chapter 7 of the Basic Law. Full text accessed at http://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/basiclawtext/, on 1 May 2015. liberal identity limits the potential of Hong Kong in contributing the rise of China and her international status. The remaining of the paper will be structured in three parts. It will first review the academic literature in understanding the role of Hong Kong in Chinese foreign policy, and the related institutional arrangement on Hong Kong external relations. Followed by that, the paper, through reviewing three coupling cases, will discuss how Hong Kong independent international status is constrained by Chinese foreign policy. Such constraints will be addressed again in the concluding section, with the especial focus on how these potentials and constraints are related to the changing perception of Beijing about the international order and the international identity of Hong Kong. Quasi-federalism/Devolution-Max in Chinese Characteristics: The Institutional Characteristics of the Status of Hong Kong The status and the autonomy enjoyed by Hong Kong as a Special Administrative Region under “One Country, Two Systems” are always in dispute between the pro-democratic camp and the pro-establishment camp and, needless to mention, between local community and Beijing authority. In addition, the legal foundation of “One Country, Two Systems” has its domestic and international source which further complicates the status of Hong Kong in international politics. The “domestic” source of “One Country, Two Systems” could always refer to the Chinese constitution revised in 1982, followed by Deng’s announcement of the “One Country, Two Systems” initiative in 1978. According to Article 31, Beijing could ‘establish Special Administrative Region when necessary’ which to be ‘prescribed by law enacted by the National People’s Congress in the light of the specific conditions.’4 In fact, devolving power to regional and local level of government is not new to Beijing. Since her first constitution the concept of ethnic minority autonomous regions was stipulated under Article 3 of the 1954 Constitution (Article 4 of the 1982 Constitution) which stated that ‘regional autonomy applies in areas where a minority nationality live in a compact community’ and ‘all national autonomous areas are inseparable parts of the People’s Republic of China.’ 5 Subsequently, five autonomous regions were established at Inner Mongolia (Mongols), Xinjiang (Uyghur), Guangxi (Zhuang), Ningxia (Hui) and Tibet (Tibetan). According to Haiting Zhuang, there are 155 ethnic autonomous areas among the regional, prefectural and county levels, which allow 44 ethnic minorities in China enjoy a certain degree of self-governing and autonomy.6 Nonetheless, the implementation of self- governing in Hong Kong is not based on ethnic equality, as most of the Hong Kong population are ethnic Han, but rather a strategic move for future unification between mainland China and Taiwan. Indeed, the innovation of “One Country, Two Systems” suggested by 4 ‘Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (full text after amendment on March 14, 2004)’, Zhongguo Rendawang (www.npc.gov.cn), Accessed at http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Constitution/node_2825.htm, on 3 May 2015. 5 ‘Constitution of the People’s Republic of China: adopted on September 20, 1954 by the First National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China, at its first session’ (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1954), pp.9 – 10. Document assessed at http://www.hkpolitics.net/database/chicon/1954/1954ae.pdf, on 3 May 2015. 6 Haiting Zhang, ‘The Law on the Ethnic Minority Autonomous Regions in China: Legal Norms and Practices,’ Loyola University Chicago International Law Review. Vol. 9, Issue 2 (Spring/Summer 2012), pp.249 – 264. Deng was targeted to Taiwan’s population and the Kuomingtang government in Taiwan.7 The subsequent implementation in Hong Kong and Macao is merely the showcase for Taiwan people, which was also an important mission for Hong Kong in contributing Chinese “foreign” policy. Apart from the political and legal source of legitimacy, the status of Hong Kong is different from the rest of autonomous regions because the “One Country, Two Systems” in Hong Kong is endorsed, thus partially monitored, by the international community. As a former British Crown Colony, the transferral of sovereignty of Hong Kong requires the consent from both China and United Kingdom. The 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration has laid down the fundamental principles in the future governance of Hong Kong after 1997.8 Such guaranteed features were later translated to various articles in the Basic Law (BL), the so-called “mini- constitution” of Hong Kong. 9 Though Beijing and Hong Kong official suggest that the obligation of British government ends on 1 July 1997 thus Britain had no rights to intervene Hong Kong affairs10, the local and international community, to some extent, construe the Joint Declaration as bilateral agreement between Beijing and London registered under the international law framework, thus assuming certain moral obligations about the successful implementation of “One Country, Two Systems” in Hong Kong.11 The current-ceased-to- function Hong Kong Policy Act initiated by the United States, the half-year reports prepared by the Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Office to the UK Parliament, the annual reports prepared by the European External Action Service, together with occasional hearings from the U.S. Congress and European Parliament at special events like the Umbrella Movement last year, show the presence of international community in monitoring the implementation of “One Country, Two Systems”. In his early assessment of the implementation of “One Country, Two Systems”, Jean-Philippe Béja suggested the dilemma faced by Beijing which on one hand wished the “One Country, Two Systems” formula would be well-recognized by the international community, on the other hand Beijing always preserved her absolute sovereignty over domestic affairs thus avoiding “over-internationalization” of Hong Kong affairs.12 From his analysis we could see that the international identity of Hong Kong is both the asset and liability of Beijing, which will be revisited in the later section of the paper.