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Home , Drum major (military), Grenadier, Line regiment, Spanish Army

TheArmies of andPortugal 1809-1914

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By G.F.f-.latzigsr

lhlshded by M. Gifc€rt TheArmies of Spain and Portugaf 180B-1815

BY G. F. NAFZIGER

ILLUSTRATBD BY M. GILBERT

:.*-I" Third gAition

Text (C) 19gj c.F.|\tafziger Ittustrations 1993 (C) M. Gitbert

Privately published Copyrighr 1993 The SpanishArmy 1788-1808

Upcn :he Ceath of Carlos III of Spain, in t?88, the Spanisf. ;rir.! ccir-- sisted of twenty eight. Spanish infant.ry regimencs, twelve foreign , three Iight infantry regiments, twelve line .s, eight regiments, and two cazadore (light cavalry) regiments. The Spanish vras organized, drilled, and fought in the manner estabfished by Fr3derick the Great of Prussia. The Spanish, like the rest of , had irnitated the greatesE warrior of the l8th Century. In 1788 the consisted of:

Roval Guard cuardias de Corps (4 cos) (1704) (Royal Cavalry Escort) Espaflola Americana I t ali ana Flamenca crardias de Alabarderos (3 cos) (1707) (Palace cuards) Amari 11a Lanzilla Vie j a c.rardias Espanoles (6 battal ions) (1704) cijardias Walonas (6 batcal ions ) Ca:abinieros ReaIes (4 squadrons )

f:iiantry Infantry P.:siment Ba_1sed Reqiment Ra i sed F.ey Imm3morial Espana 1550 Calicia (Reina in 1789) 153? Toledo 1661 P:.incipe 1537 Mallorca I5B2 Saboya 1537 Burgos 1694 Ccr:ona 1537 Murcia 1694 Airica 1559 1,e6n 1694 zamor a 158 0 Cantabria 1703 Scria 15 91 Asturias 1703 CSrdoba 1550 Fijo de " 1?03 :P Guadafajara L657 Navarra 1705 S3vi11a f 65'1 Arag6n 1711 Granada f657 America 7'164 vitoria ( in 1791) 1658 Princesa 7765 Lrsboa (Zaragosa in 1791) 1660 Extremadura 1766 Fijo de Or6n" unknown** i Garrison Infantry Regiment -- Dj-sbanded during 1788

ir,rrei crn Rcoiments Raised r''.-randa (Irish) 1698 :-l:bernia (Irish) 17 09 Ultonia ( Irish) L709 l''itl-an (Italian) disbanded in ]-792 FlSndes (Flemish) disbanded in L792 3rabante (Flemish) disbanded in ]-192

1 I Foreiqn Reqiments Raised Bruselas (FLemish) disbanded in I7g2 Ndpoles (Neapoliran) 1572 Schwaller #r (Swiss) ]-734 " Y :: ' R'fctimann #2 (Swiss) 1742 N. Reding #3 (Swiss) 1-742 BetscharE #q (Swiss) :-742

LighL Infantrv Raised Strenqth o 1. oe Arag6n L762 1 battal-ion o 1. de Catalufla ]-762 2 bat.talions 2 -o de Cata1ufla 1762 2 battalions

Line Cavalrv Reqiments Raised Regiment Raised Dcrr 1538 AlcS.ntara 1555 Re ina 1703 Espafla r-b5y Prinr-i na 1703 Algarve r701 Infante 1542 Calatrava I /UJ Bcrb5n 1540 Santiago Farnes io 1540 Montesa 11nc

Dr agcon Beg.I[en! s Rai sed Reoiment f? crz - l-674 Villaviciosa tbSv R e i-:ia 1735 Sagunto 'l ?n? 7,'l-^-^^ I575 Numancia r7 07 1584 Lusitania 1?na

CazaCore or Light Cavalrv Reqiments Raised Olivencia I'735 Volunrarios de Espana I7 67

Roval ArLillerv Reqiment

Six Battalions, each with eight companies ' fn addition to the regular army, Chere were a nurnlf,er of provincial Militia Rsgiments (-Regfimentos ProvinciaTes de MiTicias). The 28 oldesc were raised in 1734 and Che 14 remaining were raised in 1?66- They were:

R.eoiments Raised in 1734 JaSn Logrofro Oviedo pontevedra Bada j oz Sigirenza Cdrdoba Tuy Sewilla Toro Murcia Betanzos Burgcs Soria Truj illo Mdlaga Lugo Laredo Jerez Guadix Granada Orense Eci j a R.onda Le5n Santiago Ciudad Rodrigo Bujal-ance Reqiments raised in 1?56 Cuenca Lorca Avi l- a Salamanca Val ladol id Plasencia ^.1c5 za: C: S::: -''i:: l4c:'.41;q,1" Qo-rrrpi a Mnnt- arr6\t Ch:nchi 1 ]a ToIedo r rv.rLUA ! vl/ Ciudad ReaI Compostel-a

In addition, there was an urban militia They served as garrisons for the various cities in which they were raised. They were:

Citv Strenqth Raised Cadiz 2A companies 1752 Puerto de Santa Maria 9 companies 1,762 Campo de Gibraltar 13 companies L762 Cart agena 9 companies 3-762 Ceut a 5 companies 7752 Badaj oz 14 compan:es unknown Albuquerque B companles 1762 A1 cdnt ara 5 compan'es 1752 'l r.rrmnr n- r Al- conche I + vvrrrfrqrr_/ Lt6Z '7 j pq Valencia de Alcdntara , r-rtmn,an- -..'-Y r /bb Corufla 1) ..a\mr1:n'l cq l- /bb -' CiuCad RoCrigo 6 r-nmrran ae l_/bu j rcr! _LLct 4 r-r'rmn:n cq 7769

The Urban Miltfia was the se:ond reserve of the army and consisted of trocps and equipme;rt of an infer-or quality. In addition to a number of invalid companies and other sma11 fornations, there were a number of fixed comcanies (Compania.s fijas) that ',.;:re srationed in various fortresses around Spain. The Escopeteros de cetar3s were founded in 1705 and served in the Can'po de Gibraltar. In Catalufra v/as the Compafiia de fnfanterfa de fa Plaza de -Rosas, in Valencia was the Compaff.:a Sue-Zta de Escopeteros, in Aragon was the Campartia Sue-lta de Fusi-Ieros, and in Ceuta was the Compafria de CabaTTeria de Lanzas de Ceuca, t"'hich was formed :n 1584. In the minor fortresses of Melil- 1a, PeR6n de V61ez de la comera a!--CAlhucemas there were three more fixed or starionary companies. Tn addition, along the coast. of Granada were stationed 3leven companies o: the Compaffjas de Granada - Ten of these companies were form-d in a762 as part of the Urba:: Militia, buL the Royal Order of 24 Febru- t, :i? ary 1780 renamed them the Infaa=eria Fija de -7a Costa de Granada. " The efewenth company was not raised un:il 1799. Not having engaged in any siErificant warfare i.n Che latter half of the l8th Century, t.he Spanish army had begun a steady slide into decay. The dates Lhat the various 1:ne regiments w::-e raised shons very ljttle activity after the l,lar of the Spanish Succession. In fact, only the Lwo cazadore regiments, three Iine infantry regimenls, and :our foreign infantry regiments were raised -.he in period from the end of the l;ar of the Spanish Succession and fhe beqin- ning of the - The and cavalry operated according to the art. of war as established Frederick the creat.. The infancry relied on voLleys of fire and the cavalry relied on shock. The jragoons, however, retained their orjginal role as mounted iniantry and had ::ot been absorbed into Lhe line cavalry as another shock formation - The and cavalrr/ found their origin in two sources. The first was Lhe increasing need for light troops as experience by Frederick in his Bohemian campa.ign. However, ::ie Spanish needed forces rhat were able Lo r'\nar.t-o i n rugged terrain and deal with the notorious bandits and smugglers that haunted the Pyrenees. They were also needed to deal with the Barbary pirates. In dealing with these two groups, the light forces assumed far more than.the nominal police role that occupied many nation's military in peace- trme. The Spanish artillery organization developed at the same pace as -.-he rnranEry..i-€--Fe' It found itself faced with significant developments in nor:hern Europe and in order to remain viable it had to keep pace. As a resul-t, ex- periments with horse artillery were held in Souch America, the numbers of guns provided to the army were increased, and an artillery academy was establ:shed in . As Spain was a Bourbon monarchy, France had passed on to ii the benefit.s of the Gribeauval system, which was adopted in its ent,irety in L792. The quality of the artillery's performance, however, was limited by che failure of the army to provide a permanent train. Civilian teamsters were hired to draw the guns into battle, and they were no more rel-iabl-e than those Frirorr ]-rrrE'-1nce r.ravs uJ l !9 and the German states prior to their establishment of mil:tary trains. This arrangement saved the costs of having to maintain such a force in r.\a'a1-aFi m' but there were handicaps, ds Spain had a shortage of sui=able horses. This all-owed the teamsters to collect outrageous fees and caused them to be quicker to desert the army if their precious horses were threatened. If horses !^rere not avail-able, mules and oxen would be hired, oeither of i;rich is noted for its speed. This caused the artillery to slow down the pace:r an already slow army. The Spanish army haC been raised principally from vol-unteers prior- to L710, with the deficiencies in the ranks filled by foreigners. Because o: the low esteem in which the army was held and the poor pdy, the numbers of suit- able.rolunteers was very Iour and the Spanish were obliged to enlisc the "vagabonds" of Europe. They were noted for drunkenness and, because the Spanish Inquisition continued until Napoleon's invasion ended it, the arm'.r was .1tarr/ , *-r -*-r--,-arlana-t- as a nest of Protestants . After I7'10, the foreign volunfeers were insufficient to make up a s19- nificant short fa}1, 72,000 men were drafted from the provincial miI:cia. Further forces were necessary, because of the squabble between Spair- and England over the Falklands, and a limited was established. The entire population of Spain was, for the first time, subject to the d:aft. Measures were taken to limit the discontent this caused, by minimizing the numbers and t)4)es of exemptions that were available. It was hoped that :hese reforms would bring properLy probity" into ranks. "J> "men of and the F:remnFi.ons were allocated to the various useful cl-asses, as wel-1 as to [he Church and the nobility. As a resu]-t, clerics, government of f ic'als, factory workers and artisans, educated professionals, stock breeders, =ma11 farmers owning their own land, merchants, master craftsmen, and busine=smen were granted exemptions. So, ds a resul-t, the drafC feII most heavily or Lhe poor and landless. Each province was assigned a quota and the provincial Intendant discrib- u[ed the quota through his province based on population. A]I single, healrhy men between L7 and 35 were obliged to register if they vrere over 5 feet tall and did not have an exempEion. A balloc was used to randomly select --hose who would serve and strict measures taken to ensure it was fair and hones:. Despite the best efforts of the government, service in the army remained very unpopular, and tire announcement of a draf t sent ttie young men ! -L=s -!rry into the hiIls to avoid conscription, or to the chapels, where they marrieC to obtain an exemption. Those who could not escape were dragged into the se=vice by armed guards.

A I Because so many evaded conscription as time progressed, the government found itseli obliged to take harsh measures to get the recruits iE needed. The " Leva " was inst.itut.ed whereby marriages that occurred less than 15 days prior to the announcement of t,he draft were annulLed and magistrates were authorized .c sweep the streets er all criminals, beggars and unempl-oyeC _that they might find for conscription.. This latter action had the advantage of clearing the streets of the major urban centers of the swarms of beggars that crowded t.heir streets. Once in the military the worst expectations of the were quickly met. Their l-ives were governed by a myriad of petty rules and regulations. They were required to remain out of polite society. They had to wear their fu11 unifor:a when in public and to keep their hair properly powdered ano dressed at al-I times. They were forbidden to sit or to smoke in public, which was must painful to the soldiers as the presence of the Spanish army could reputedly be detected by the l-itCer of cigarette and cigar butts. In addi- tion, they were subj ect.ed to discipline by their non-commissioned of f icers, who carried thick canes, the sole purpose of which was to ensure that the wayward sol-iier clearly understood the displeasure of hj-s sergeant. By a775, the draft had become so unworkable that it was abandoned, leaving popular enlistment and the "l-eva" as the only source of men. liowever, the "feva" aDpears to hawe seldon-, been employed, as in l-801 there were only 4,'7'71 men, ';hc had entered the arn.y through [hat process. The st:3am of vol-unteers feF.rdined low and the Spanish army began its tradirion 6: under strength units. The decline grew so high that the foreign roni mcnf . ^: I'IiL5.n, Ffand1s, Brabante, and Bruse-Zas vJere disbanded in 1792 , and their reirtaining men were distribut.ed through out the rest of the army. The shrrtage of men was less severe in the Swiss regiments, but they became less Swiss in nature, ds their ranks were opened to nearly anyone who carecl to vo-unteer, and more than an occasional individual who didn't care to vol-unteer - The fail-ure of the Spanish a:my to recn-rit. suff icient men became appar- ent in I792, when the army was able to field only abouc 35,000 men. As a result, whe:l a major war finally came to Spain's door, it found its army f looCed wit;: swarms of untrained, rarv recruits . In addi-tion to other def i - ciencies in its officer corps, this mass of untrained recruits was the princi- zr.aI raaq.,r1 -v* * ror its miserable show:ng and laughing stock reputation during the Rewolutionar-y and Napoleonic l4ars The second major handicap o. the Spanish army was its officer corps - They held an elevated position in sociecy for which they lacked any signifi- :iv cant claim- They were noted for :heir low level of technical skills and lack of prof ess icnal unity. When it came under artack for its miserabl-e showings , tJ-r,o Qrrarricl-r of f icer Corps provei incapable of def ending itself , and disin- 'i Fo^r:i-orlsuYr uuuu rttr-:o an endless stream of petty bickering and jockeying for position. A furtner problem facing the officer corps, was its surprisingly high percentage or foreign officers in very high positions. Of the 327 general-s in '77 the Spani sh arrny in I'/ 92 , a total of were f oreigners - Spain also had the practice 'cf severely limiting the numbers of common- ers urho coul d obtain commissions . Many who did so by forging patents of nobility or by bribing the ever willinq Spanish bureaucrat. In aCdition, those who did gain a commission, were further limited by a process which usually kepi them f.rom rising any higher tharr the rank of cap[ain. The pro- cess also resulted in babes, still in their mother's arms, being commissioned and men sucir as the Duque de Al-buquerque being promoted from captain to lieutenant g3neral in four years.

5 As nobles generally disliked the idea of service in the field, they avoided such service. They attempt.ed to spend as much of their time as possi- ble at courE. where they couLd gain promoEion much faster and without. the risk of combat- This had the result of.keeping the commissioned commoner servinq as a company off icer for extrernelv 10nq periods. rn the engineers and artillery, service was based entirely upon seniori- tY, sxcept where an officer may have commicted some faul-t that was observed by the King- Such petty act,s as carrying a parasol on parade could result in the rejection of a proposed promotion for an officer of 30 years service.

The French Revolution

In 1792, Spain was, in essence, ruled by Godoy, the of the Army and Duque de l-a Alcudf a. He was to rul-e Spain from 1792 to 1g0g, with only a short break from L798 to 1800, because of his contro] over the King and Queen of Spain. F\trrinn vsr f rrY the French Revolution Godoy's f irst ef forts were to conciliate bot!-t sioes anC an attempt t.o save the French royal family. However, when Louis XVI and Marie Ant.oinette were executed, Spain declared war. At this = t-in-,La,!!= rhaLrrs .,panishQr army consisted of 4I squadrons of cavalry and 3B battalions infantry. of That portion of the infantry which stood in permanent brigades, was crigaded as folLows:

1st 3riqaCe: Joaguin pal-afox Guardias Espafloles 2nd srioaCe: Pedro Fort de St. Maurin Guardias Walonas 3ri tsrioade: Eugenio Navarro Granaceros y cazadores ( & light infantry) 4th 3riqaCe: Pedro Rodrigues de la Burria Reina Burgcs I.lal lorca Md 1 aga 5th arioade: Francisco Xavier Neqrete Principe Granada Valencia 6th Briqade: R.afael Basco i"b Savoya Sevi I la Ext remadura 7th Briqade: Valentin Belvis de Moncada v pizam Soria Murcia Nawarra 8th 3riqade: Joaquin de Oquenco C6rdoba Iberia 9th 3riqade: Juan M. Vives 10 de Catalufla Tarragona Gerona Thac porcion of the cavalry, which was also formed into standing brigades, was organized as follows:

_1_s! -. B,flqad.? ' ,TosA Tt!rr:!' j a:raral, C"rabinierog rea 1es ?nd AridFda. .Ttt.h Didn-Fal i Principe Calatrava Montesa 3rd Briqade: Francisco M. de Velarde Infante Algarve 4th Briqade: Jose Zurbiria Borb6n Santiago srh pri.r,-dF. r-^nda rlp la lrava Sainr Hi laire Pavl a villaviciosa Sagunto 5th Briqade: Manual Betr6n Numanc].a Lusitania

It's actions were limiLed to the frontier area and, though some very blctrdy 3ngagements \^rere fought, the French revolutionary arnies were more than abl3 to keep th3 Spanish army trom making any inroads inro France. However, - .ior hp.a,rsp Sn"in e,r.ld-nlw f.\,rn.l r!rsr.ireFlf eL-:jevcFn.'^-^ F,,r^na:n pov/er it was onc3 again obliged tro raise a number of new military formations. \-r- cr''-n-i cin.r'lv l-ha raulrr rFiepd f.r.m^t i.ns in.-'l .led a \/prv hidh o'L lighl formations, both infantry and cavalry. This was probably because the French taught th3 Spanish some very sharp lessons about the worth and use of lighL L:oops- In addition, in an eifort to support Lhe army, fiefd depoc battal ions were added to every line regiment, The following regiments were raised by rhe Spanish after the beginning of the French Revolution:

Infantry Reqiment Raised Reqiment Raised .'E MAlaga L791" Voluntarios del Estado t'794 Ja6n I't93 Voluntarios de la Corona l.795 Ordenes Militares 1793 Borb6n 1796 Voluntarios de CasCilla 1,793

I ore 1gn n^': ^^r Tnfrrr!urlL! ant-rr; Y l\u\-...--.eRecrimsnt_ Kd.IbcLi Traxler (Swiss) L794 Preux (Swiss) :.794

Li-ght Infantrv Raised Reqi-ment Raised 'T1 -. r* l, c.r i- o.9\Jlrcr. 1792 2.o de Barcelona | /v { Ge rona I-/92 Cazadores de Barbastro L'794 1. o de Barcelona I792 Volunr,arios de Valencia l-794 z.- "O oeA^ Aragon7!'-^-;' I793 Navarra 1B02 F{uss ar R.ecimencs Raised Maria Luisa L793 Espafloles L793

Because of its recruitment problems, Spain was abLe to field only about. 55,000 men to the frontier. Recruies were more plentiful t.han usual, however, because of Ehe intervention of the , which preached that the French revolutionaries were heretics. Further men became available with the raising of a nurnber of irregular units known as ,'somantenes', and ',.rnique_letes". In addicion, bands of smugglers were formed into "freikorps', modeled after the Pxussian models of Ehe Seven years War. Despit.e these improvemenEs, tn 1793 a conscription was called and the streets were serept clean of vagrants again. :Che Spanish formed the Army of Rose116n (Ejercixo de Rose.ll.dn) and inwaded Perpignan wit.h it. That army consisted of:

.I!-:-e-E!.L]a: Independent Formations : Expeditionary Batralions (5 bns) (4,316 men) voluntary Expediticnary Battalions (3) (1,410) Provincial crenadier Br:r-qade: Division de Cast i.11a (1,449) Division de Andalucia (1,4?8) Dr: n.cr< Rri ^A.16. 2 i/Pri nc ipe Infanrry Regiment (658) cranada Infantry Regiment (1,518) 1/Extremadura Infantry RegimenC (622) Saboya Briqade: Saboya Infantry Regiment (1,436) Navarra Infantry R3giment (1,434) Malaga Infantry ReEiment (2) (763) So-ia Briqade: Soria Infantry Regimenc (1,644) valencia InfanLry Regiment. (I ,442\ C6rdoba Briqade: 1/C6rdoba Infantry Regiment (E9g) 7/Zaragosa Infantry Regiment (?69) 1p Murcia Infantry ReEiment (1,493) Ja6n lnfantry Regiment (732) cuadalaiara Brigade: cuadalajara Infanlry Regiment (1,206) Burgos Infantry Regiment (1,330) Sevilla Briqade: Sevifla Infantry Regiment (1,251) Espana Infanrry Regimene (1,48I) Light InfanLrv: 1o Caralufla (979) Tarragona (902) 3" Barcelona (794) 2o BarceLona (931) Other Infantrv: Legi6n de los pirineos (500) voluntarios de vatlespin (123 ) Dos de Cueta (51.) Irregular Forces {50)

B Ca:,ra I rrr. C"rabinieros reales (577) Principe (4n0) Espafa {530) Algarve (457 ) Vol-untarios de Espafra (15 0 ) Almansa (477) Parri a (432) Sagunro (469) Numancia (472) Lusitania (411)

The war went poorly because t.he Spanish generals attempted to run the war nn rl'ro Drrrollsss from . fnitially the Spanish were able to push past the raw French forces facing t.hem, but their success was limited by their ox drawn artillery and supply trains. The Spanish advanced to the walled city er Peroignan, won two minor battles at Trouialls and Boulou, and then settled ir::o their winter quarters expecting to fight a 17th Century war. Tne French sent reinforcements to the south and, once the 1'/94 campaign !-^--..t-)=y.7\r, +l-^..Lrrcv struck the Spanish, driving them back over the Pyrenees, occupied che prcvince of Guiprlzcoa and seized the fortress of Figueras. D=spite Godoy's efforts to reinforce the army, ics basic unpopularity gr3\v as did that of the war. The Spanish logistical system failed and Spain er--+ r-" 5c..'r LII3L D)' 1796 it had no hope of success. On 22 July 1-796 Godoy signed the Tr=aty of Basle, earning the much deserved title Prince of Peace, and Spain rel oic=d at j-ts return to peace. Though initially Godoy attempted to maintain an armed neutrality, neither th= British nor the French respected it Iong. Eventually events obliged Godoy trc nrak= a choice. The British only offered money, but Godoy had learned the

h=-rl ,rrr\/4,l r.,h3f just " the French armies sitting aCrosS the Pyrenees could do. He c::rse an alliance rvith France. On 18 August 7'/96 Godoy signed the Treaty of San Il:r=fonso, which was an offensive and defensive alliance against England. Though technically al1ies, Spain was little more than a satellite. Godoy n-nlra)^r.lrr rri v rvYrvusjsgd thiSurlru alliance aS a means to buV time until he could build the Spanish army into a force that could satisfactorily defend its borders from both the French and Ehe Eng1ish. Gcdoy quickly embarked on a program of military reform which earned him -',,* ri.- onm'i t-rz of those whose interests he threatened. He proposed the adoption of the French Dri11 Regulation of 179I and it was eventually adopted. He es:abl-rshed "camps of instruction" and military academies, while at the same t 1me e l-iminat ing such usel-ess f ormations as the Royal Guards and the provin- cial militias, whose costs far exceeded the service they rendered or their j mi I t-.a-rr -ntential. He addressed the miserabl-e Spanish logistical system, as t,;ei1 as providing support for improvements in the engineering and artillery services . Gcdoy even persuaded the King to al}ow him to establish the t'Junta de Const-r,cuci6n y Ordenanzas deL Ej6rcito" which consisted of 23 senior generals and i>ureaucrats charged with reviewing the composition, s ize, logistics, t:e3r'uit-.ment, training, tactics, etc. , etc. , of the army, the role of the p:ovincial militia, as well- as the conCition of the kingdom's armarnents and fortresses. Despite its potential for desirable reform, this panel foundered on the same shoals that had devastated the Spanish army for years - recruitment. 8..'3ntua1ly, despite its dislike of the draf t, a conscription was instituted.

9 unfortunately for spain, it had not. Learned from the French that massive armies could and wourd be formed by Tev€e er masse and they resorted to new, but ineffeceual methods. Seeking guidance in -..Spanish j-ck __ hist.ory, the decided that Freder - the r:ra^F,. --^^-.- ^e ' r!E< ------, ;,rovinces assigning specific quotas of recruit.s for specif- ic regiments was the best approach. They further divided the army into a ejercito permanente and a ejdrcito de campafi2 - The ejdrcito permanenxe was to be formed nith the warious foreign regiments, the third battalions of the line infanCry regiments, the Iight infantry, the cavalry and the arti.11ery. This force was to be recruited from foreigners, the usual collect.ion of drafted beggars, and volunteers who would remain under arms in a sEanding arrny. The ejdrciLo de campaita was to be formed wiEh the tst and 2nd Battalions of the Spanish line infantry regimenEs that would be formed from new con- scripts raised and trained according to Lhe Prussian system. Theoret.ically, Lhis would allow the Spanish army to expand significant.ly in time of war, but would be far smalLer and more economical in peacetime. It would not strip the farms of the manpower they needed to operate and the conscripts would not have been subjected to tshe undesirable life in peacetime barracks. It e/as feft that hostility to conscription woul-d be reduced because the soldiers woul.d not be shipped to distanL garrisons, but would be serving in their home provinces, amongst friends and famity. Furthermore, it was felt that their morale would be improved by their separation from the notorious undesirables or the ejercito permanente. As always t.here was a massive conservative lobby that fought against these proposed reforms and evenLually they were reiected. The commission was ordered to stop its meetings on 7 July 1796, and two months later it ceased to exist. Godoy then fell back on what tools he did have and began an extensive recruiting canpaign- He recruited. and apparentfy bought, large nurnlcers of Austr.ian pr j.soners the French captured in lLaly jn 1795, as well as deserters from the four 3m-igre regimenrs serving in Spain. So m:ny Austrians joined the Spanish army this way, that many regiments were reported to have one third of I hai r al-ran-t-h m:Aa ,,- rr rLLsus uP The polif,ics of the years before 1800 proved difficult for Spain. AL one point in 1798, Spanish relacions with France nearfy ruptured. codoy was forced from power and no one remained that even cared to try to hold the Spanish army together. The corruption of the Spanish court and of, the army's condicion decayed as never before. It was not until 1801, when Spain was ,j' persuaded to invade Portugal, that' ies condition became apparent. A number of Spanish generals refused to accept command of the Spanish army, on the grounds that it was not in a fif state to engage even so puny an enemy as portugal. This forced King Carlos VII co recall Godoy and give him command once again. The tlar of the Oranges (so named because Godoy sent Che eueen of Spain a t.rophy in the form of a branch of an orange t.ree he picked while under fire), lasced only three weeks. codoy successfufly obliged the portuguese to capiEulate and was given the rank of Generalissimo as a reward, Carlos VII also aut.horized hirn to undertake the reform of the army that he had attemDted ,t?oo hri^frvt F^ hi- ,^-^..- r f,^m h^,.,6f in Pr LU IIur" PU{c! Godoy's first accions related to Lhe manpower crisis, A new conscripcion was decreed, exemptions were greatly reduced, and a new provincial mi.litia was organized. The miligia was to receive many of the conscripts and became very popular becaus3 commoners could and did receive commissions in it. The com- moners delighced in the social prestige they had never before enjoyed, but the general public was not as enthusiastic. Regional right.s were trampled in the process of attempting to extend the provincial militia to Valencia and in

r0 1801, open revolt occurred in Ehat province. Fearing thaL it would spread to vurre!rrihor 1,!\Jvnrarrl j-nces, Godoy dispatched troops and a savage repression began to quell the riot.s. Despi te tha j ni.t i al setbacks., i.n Ju lr' 1 8Q2, Godoy issued a new sel. of - reEulacions 'cr the provincial miLj.tia. He cr.derrd- raisin3 of 13 :egirnents each consiscing of one battalion. Each battal-ion was to have one and four companies. The grenadiers were, like those of many other European nations, detached permanently to converged grenadier regiments formed with two battalions each. fn 1804 Godoy attempted once again to expand the provincial militia into exempE.ed prowinces and decided that province of Vizcaya would be the best rr'l.ar-o r.l t-r:y. Hgwever, here he was once again greeted with rioting and the project was dropped. Not being willing to give up he attempted again in 1805, but the project was dead. A11 Godoy's efforts failed and the Span:-sh army was forced back to its old recruitment methods. By 1808, out of a theoret.ical strength of 87 ,984 line infantry, there were on only 46,402 men under arms. The sfory of the outbreak of war between Spain and France and the Span- ish revclution against their absorption into the French empire is we]l known. Because the royal- government was in shambl-es, the King and Crown Prince were in French capti''zlty and [he bureaucracy was never strong, there was no sing]e L-/ryar-iLJ-zJ.),-rt,rt --* -i^ abl-e to assume control of the country. Godoy met his end at the hands of the brutal crowds and what remained of [he government f]apped in the breeze, accomplishing nothing and capable of l-ess. Initially, che military attempted to assume control, but the Spanish people were not prepared for that. Many of the generals were unwilling to resist the French, and in fact, most offereC their services to the French. Tire governn:ent of Spain devofved down to the provincial level and each prov- ince began to take its own actions. In Andalucia, Castafros, a senior military offrcer, beEan tc act. FIe began negotiatiors wich the British governor of Gibralcar anC secured promises of British sucporf. FIe then decided that he would Ceclare r.rar against the French on 30 ),Iay 1808. A f ew other generals also jo:-neci the patriot cause, but f ar f rom a majority t/ere wholeheartedly f or iE. InCeed, most hoped to avoid committing themselves and found themselves facing charges of Ereason and cowardice from :heir compatriots. Unrest continued to grow anC on 29 May 1B0B a revolt exploded in Cadiz. .t-!rn,,nh nnnnssj remained, the revolt Continued. "YLlV by what authority f igures The n--F^-:-- n^'^ ,vgvus*rr Ar,, ,, r, r-+rrefflf of Araqon could not. count on ",*he rank and f ile to support him. -l :',v \-./riry,-.^;-- F1^^ Lrrc.:wiss <-.. Regimen[s of Reding #flLl and^-^ PreuxT)*^,,.. were willing.,,.i 1 i to quietly pass into French service. The rest of the Spanish army eicher chose to disband or marched en rnasse to join the patriots. In fact, regiments that did not pass over to the patriots suffered massive desertions, and in a few instances r.r-,mnlot-=l rr - ""'.E/ disintegrated. Of f icers who atten-.pted to prevent this were either k i 1led or: ignored . Those generals who intervened were slaughtered and so passed the Marqu6s del Socorro, Conde del Torre del Fresno, Captain General of the Naval Depart- menL of Cartagena, and the military governors of Villafranca de Panades, -l'r-'rrt-nqa vvg, Mal-aga, and Ciudad Rodrigo. Others were imprisoned and the sweep was so clean that only those who joined the patriots survived the purge. The best elements of Ehe Spanish army had been drawn off to serve as a garrison of part of. the Danish coast. Other regiments had been stripped of horses and equipment in an effort to bring thcse units up to fu]l sLrength. Before the war began, ofl 15 December 1805, Napoleon dispatched his min- ister, Tdlleyrand, to Spain to negotiate for a corps of Spanish sol-diers to form a garrison for Hamburg and the northern coast of Germany, while Napol-eon

11 fought the Russians. Napoleon desired to obeain 4,000 cavalry, 10,000 infan- n try and 25 guns co form a corps d,observation du c6te du Hanovre" Eo oppose a potenEial English invasion and Eo enforce the blockade. The approximately .6,000 Spaniargs chen serving._in ltaly were.to form part of this corps. .These nesotiations :rdsr'lr.edl-in icii !, the division ce'nerat La Romana- b-eing dispatched norch, This newly formed division consisted of:

From Spain Line Infant.ry Princesa Regiment (3) (2,282) 3/Guadalajara Regimenr (1) (779) Asturias Regiment (3) (2,332) Light Infantry 2/Voluntarios de Barcelona (1) (I,240) Line Cawa1ry Rey Cavalry Regiment (540) fnfante Cavalry Regiment (540) Almansa Dragoon Regiment (540) Art i I lery Foot Art i I lery (270) Horse Artillery (89) Train (58)

From Etruria Line Infantry Zamora Regiment (3) (2,256) r/ & 2/Guadalajara (2)(1 ,504) Ir-]-grItt i ^1-> ].nIancfyT-:^'-. 1/Volunteers of Catalufla (1,200) L i ne Cava l- ry d'Algarve Cavalry Regiment (540) Dragoons Villaviciosa Dragoon Regiment (540) Art i 1 lery Foot company (100)

The corps totaled 14,809 men, as shown above, and a company of thaE. was dispatched from :i,? Spain shortly afterwards, bringing the total to

nearlr.r 154J, O00.v\ fn 1808 the Spanish troops were dist.ributed through JuE1and and on Fionie rsland, ivhere they took up positions on the coast. They remained in those positions until they were spirited away by the Brirish. They were rve]1 isolated from news from their homeland, learning of t.he French invasion of Spain, etc., only through the French newspapers. They vrere, how3ver, contacted by the British and arrangements made for a nocturnal departure through the port of Nyborg, where the British and Spanish actions opened the port co their escape. In addition the ports of Langeland, Svend- borg and Faaborg were similarly opened. La Romana departed [hrough the por[ of Langeland on 23 August 180B and most of the Spanish division with him. They were transported back to Spain, where they began military operations aglarnsr-^-.i-^* cne!!-^ French. However, due to the usual administrative problems, a number of Spaniards failed to escape and approximately 185 officers and 5,131 soldiers were taken prisoners. These men were part of the Asturia and Guadalajara Infantry Regi-

L2 ments and Che ,A-lgarve Cavalry Regirnent. They were disarmed and returned to France, where Ehey were distributed bet.ween the various garrisons. As the patriotic revolt in Spain began to shake itself out, a network 'l.o-a1 of and prowinci.al. .juntas were formed. These juntas w::: :tr:ipcsci :: th3 :-:ig:ia1 l::,J";: cf the inai.:::e :::cn, pfus a mixtu(e Jf notables, ul:c r.':=e drawn from the local community, churchmen, and even a few generals. However, the nacure of chese political groups was almost. entirely civilian. I'government One exception was Ehe " established by carcla de Cuesta in Old Castile. H3 had almost no regular troops to support him, but he was able to, by virtue oi his personality, impose his will on the civilian mernbers of the Castilian junta. Another excepEion was Ehe dictatorship established by Palafox in zaragosa, where no civilian junLa was ever formed. In an effort to bring some order to the chaos of revolutionary Spain, in Septelrber 1808, a Junta Central was organized. This organization was to provide a general direction to the governing of Spain until January t810, when it collapsed. From the perspective of the Spanish army ehis governing body was as bad as th3 monarchy. The provincial juntas refused to cooperate, the Junta Central r3fused to appoint a -in-chief, the guerrillas defied all control, Lt'-3 army was being organized in a totally ad hoc manner, iL was flooded with ne'"r recruits, it officers r,r3re untrained, and the totallv inade- ^r':l-a crr^n11, clraram -^l l ^h.ad t-ho inerrnl- lF .'-- -"ts rL wo- PUL During 180t, the regular army was increased to 39 infantry regiments. The artillery lras slightly reorganized anC now, instead of six battalions with a total of 48 companies, it had four regiments, each wibh t.en companies, nineteen garriscn companies, five pioneer companies and a company of cadets. The engineers ncw had che RegjmjenLo de Zapadores -Minadores, in addition to 1-hF et^fF nt oncincprind ^ffi.are Thp nr6\tin.ial m;lili^ ha.l Fidhr- aran=diar batEalions organized inco four divisions. and 43 regiments oi militia, each containing one battalion. Tn additio:- to the regular army, there !,las a v/ild growth in the number oI formatjons rais3C by Lhe various juntas. Cataluffa ra-ised 2B regiments, Anda- lusia raised 34 regiments, Aragon rajsel 45 regiments, Lhe Levant e/Ba l eare s raised 26 regin-nr-s, Asturias raised 21 regiments, Extremadura raised 15, Old Castile raised 22 resiments, New Castile raised 10 reqiments, and ca]icia raised 6 regirnents. Because of the perennial shortage of horses the regular army's cavalry initially remained unchanged aL 12 line cavalry regiments, eight dragoon regimenLs, Lwo cazadore regirnents and two regimenLs. Hor.rever, after :;> rhe outbreak of war line cavalry was expanded by the raising of 9 regimenrs, I-hp dr:d^^n< h" ,-h> rri

13 had absolute sovereignty. They then required that all state organizat.ion take an oath of allegiance. When some of the RegenEs resisted, a new iRegency of Thre=" was esLablished- Its three members, General Blake and Adrnirals Ciscar - and -Agar, *were - €.eLec.t.ed...qg.ce_u.-ss _+I-ey .,rye-rg_.rlol' .-!noEed. .as -.being po_1irically

ft was this Cortes thaE was to rule Spain until afcer France's defeat in 1814. UnforlunateLy for the Spanish army, the Cortes was formed of parochial poli-L j-cians wit.h their own agendas Ehat came before fighting the French. For Ehe iirsE 18 monChs of its existence, the CorEes devoted its energies to wric:ng the Conscitution of 1812, and nothing else. This left the provinces to fend for t.hemselves, organizing what military formaEions they might, and denieC the Spanish armies a unified command chat mighc have given it some sEra:egic guidance . while the Corces argued over the rights of the people versus those of t.he monarchy, the French overran more and more of Spain. expanding thej.r cont:ol of the Spanish countryside Eo the maximum that they were to achieve duri:--g c.he war. EvenLualIy, when the CorEes did evenEually turn its aLtention to tne army, its efforts were ineffectual . In fact, this may have been delib- erar= as the liberals in che Cortes probably realized that the monarchy was supp:rLed by the , whose generals owed their power and position to t:-.at monarchy. Its only accomplishment of note was when they convinced the rest of the Cortes to appoint Wellington Che supreme commander of the Spanish

The lack of government resulted in much of the war being carried on by gucr:a11as- As the French were s1ow1y driven back and more Spanish territory was -liberated, many of these guerrillas reverted to their older trade of bani:try. othsrs, like Julian sanchez's guerilla army were incorporated into rhe Spanish army at the end of the war. The first efforC to control this occu::'ed in November 1813 when the Regency actempted to bring them under coni:ol by organizing a rural volunteer militia which was to maintain order. Hoere.-'er, the effort was a total failure. No further major actions were taken by the Spanish government vis-a-vis Ehe army. In 1814, Fernando VII assumed the throne and reestablished the absc:ute monarchy. Among his first act.ions was to put the liberal members of the :ortes under arrest and to begin a restroration of the o1d royal preroga- tives. In this effort he was supported by his old a11ies, the generals. Desp:te this and Napoleon's return to France in 1815. the Spanish rapidly retu:ned fo their oLd ways and t.he decay of t.he army began anew. t? By 1814 the Spanish army had grown, or probably more properly, changed sucLr that iE nolr contained 120 infantry regiments. This incl-uded the 39 prewar regular regiments, 25 prewar provincial militia regiments, and 54 regii:,3nts raised in or afLer 1808. The light infanLry had gro"n t.o 62 regi- ments; Lhe 9 prewar regiments and 53 raised in or afrer 1808. The cavafry consisted of 12 regiments of line cavalry, ten dragoon regiments, four ca- zadc:es regiments, and four hussar regimencs. The artillery had expanded and now :onsisted of five regiments of foot arLillery, six squadrons of horse art.illery, 21 garrison companies, five work shop companies, and six train battalions- As of 1 March 1814 it had a total strength of 8,246 officers and 184. 158 men.

1A Organization of the Spanish Infantry 1788-1814

In 1?98 each i::f;i:::l-..:rgi$crt 'vas cr:9.::li zeC ',rrth t'.r. :laLL;1icrrs. Each ; ba'::aiion had one grer:ad:i.e:l a:-tC f j'..rr iiiuske:acr conpanies. ;,luw.ver, Lire gre- -., nadier companj.es were drawn off from the regiments and organized into con- vergied grenadier battalions. The musketeer company had 160 men, whil-e the granaderos (grenadier) company had 120 men- This gave the battalion a strengLh of 760 company personne], including grenadiers, in addition to those assigned to the staff. The Toledo Regiment, raised by the act of 21 June 1?91, however varied from chis organizati.on. It was organized wiEh Ehree battations. The first two battalions had one grenadier and four fusilier companies. The third bahhalion had only four fusilier companies. The 1st Battalion's staff consist- ed of:

1 Coronel- () 1 Cabo de gastadores ( ) l Sargento mayor (Major-) 6 Gastadores (Sappers) I Ayudante mayor (Adjutant Major) f Maestro Armero (Mast.er Armorer) 1 Capell5n (Priest) 1 Tambor mayor (Drum Major) I Cirujano (Surgeon) 2 Pifanos (Fifers)

The staff of the 2nC Battalion consi-sted of :

1 Tenienie coronet (Lt. Colonel) 1 AyuCanle mayor (AdjutanL Vlajor) 1 Cape]15n (Priest) 1 Cirujano (Surgeon) 1 Cabc c'e gastadores (Corporal of Sappers) 6 Gastaocres (Sappers) 1 lvlaestrc armero (Master Armorer) 2 Pifanos (Fifers)

Tire s-raf f of the 3rd Battalion consisted of :

1 Teniente coronel (Lt Colonel) 1 Ayudance mayor (Adjutant l4ajor) 1 CapeIlSn (Priest) !.b 1 Cirujano (Surgeon) 1 l"laestrc armero (Master Armorer) 2 Pifancs (Fifers)

Th- crr.5nad i er ccrmnanuvrrrIJurlr9J i es haC :

1 rr-^ie<^ lr'^^*-.i-\ _L \-crl_r_LLo,rr \\-crllLcrr11,, 1 Segunoo Teniente (2nd Lieutenant) 1 Subteniente (Sub-Lieutenant) 1 Sargento primero clase (1sC Class Sergean[) 1 Sargento segundo clase (2nd Class Sergean[) 1 Drummer .3 Cabcs primeros (1st Class ) 3 Cabos segundos (2nd Class Corporals) 54 Grenadiers 66 Total

15 The fusilier companies had:

l Capirdn (Caprain) 1 Primer Tg5r;.gfiFe .(]st l,lgpgqnap!) _ I Segundo Tenience (2nd LieutenanE) 1 Subteniente (Sub-Lieutenant) 1 Sargento primero cLase (1st CIass Sergeant) 3 Sargent.os segnrndo clase (2nd C1ass Sergeants ) 3 Drummers 5 Cabos primeros (1st Class Corporals) 5 Cabos segundos (2nd CLass Corporals) l-03 ]-24 TotaL

The fusilier companies of the 3rd Bartalion consisted of:

1 Capitdn (Captain) 1 Primer Teniente (tst Lieutenant) 1 Segundo Tenien:e (2nd Lieutenanc) 1 Subteniente (Sub-Lieutenant) 1 Sargento prime:'o clase (1st Class Sergeant) 2 Sargentos segundo clase (2nd CIass Sergea:rt s ) a L Drummers A Cabos primeros ( rst Class Corporals) A Cabos segundos (2nd Class Corporals) r) _l- Fusiliers

r-TraF -'l ?B IL.'LCII

There were a nuntcer of foreign infantry regiments in the Spanish army. :jrong them was the Guardias l,talonas, which r.ras creaCed in 1704 h,ith six batta- lions. One of its baLtalions served as the permanent body guard to the King ei Spain, one battalion served in L"ganes, and the remaining four served in -'zarious garrisons in Cataluna. This regiment was formed from nat.ive Flems who -"rere drawn from the Spanish province that is now modern Belgium. When Belgium rras losh t.o Spain the recruiting grounds vanished and the percentage of true Flems dropped dramat ical ly. t:e Much the same process occurred lrich t.he lLalian and Neapolitan regiments. 1"hose two regiment.s were formed from citizens of Spain's now Iost provinces in

The Irish regiments, Ultonia (1709) and Hibernia (1698) were originally :ormed of Irishmen who were seeking the opportunity to praciice freely their religion and, not to a small degree, co fight the English who had fielded an army in Spain during the War of the Spanish Succession. As time wore on tne irish flavor of these units also dwrndted and t.he quality oi Lhese regimenLs ielf dramatically as the Spanish swept up the vagabonds and riffraff for s3rvice in the Spanish army. The onLy foreign regiments that retained a purely national flavor were ih3 Swiss who recruited intensively in their home provinces. However, they aoo had non-Swiss menilf,ersfrom various sources. On 21 June L79L, a regulation was published t.hat allowed a rapid dernobi- lization in peacetime. This effort in economical operations, was designed to :educe the srrengch of an infantry regiment from 18 to 14 companies. There were a nunicer of 1j-ghL infantry regiments raised on 2 June f792.

L6 'Plr=qa raa j ! e:J r nencsrrl were organized with a single battalion of four companies. Each company was to have:

i l:tr:,er capitdn (is C Captain) 1 Segundo capit.Sn (2nd Captain) 1 Primero Teniente (1sf Lieutenant) 1 Segrrndo Teniente (2nd Lieutenant 1 Primero Subteniente (rst Sub-Lieutenant) 1 Segundo Subteniente (2nd Sub-Lieutenant) 1 Sargento primero (1st Class Sergeant) 5 Sargentos segundos (2nd CIass Sergeants) 3 Drummers 8 Cabos Primeros (1st Class Corporals) 8 Cabos Segundos (2nd Class Corporals) ]-75 Soldiers 206 Total-

The regimental/battalion staff consisted of:

1 Comandante (Commandant) 1 Sargento mayor (Major) 1 Primero Ayudante (1sC ACjutant') 1 Segundo Ayudante (2nd Adjutant) 1 CapellSn (Priest) 1 Cirujano (Surgeon) 1 Maestro armero (Master Arrriorer) 1 Tambor mayor (Drum Major)

The regrllacion for the organization of the infantry, dateC 26 August Lga2, revis=o the organization again. The line infanIry was organized such that each regl-ment had three battalions. The lst Ba[[alion consisted of two 9r-=rr..r-r-LcL ^t.: ^- c.:ti tir'o fusilier companies. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions had f our comoanies cf iusiliers. The s[aff of the 1st Battalion consisted of:

1 Coronel (Colone1) 1 Sargento mayor (Major) 1 Ayudante mayor (Adjutant t4ajor) 1 CapellSn (Priest) :l'Y 1 Cirujano (Surgeon) 1 Armero (Armorer ) 1 Tambor mayor (Drum Major)

The staff of the 2nd Battalion consisted of:

1 Teniente coronel (Lt. Colonel) 'l /nrl-irri-A6l- r njA.rnrrj:nl-o quurruu rn-rrnrrrtclyU! \frLrJ LlLCrllL Mainr)L't(JJ\)L I 1 Abanderado (Standard Bearer) 1 Capell5n (Priest) 1 Cirujano (Surgeon) 1 Armero (Armorer)

L7 The staff oi Lhe 3rd BatLalion consisted of:

1 Commandante (Commandant) 1 Ayudante (Agjqqent jo.r,). 6- Sqygr ryl-a

J.T'! I Abanderado (St.andard Bearer) 1 Capelldn (priest) 1 Cirujano (Surgeon) 1 Armero (Armorer )

Each companv consisted of:

1 Capitdn 1 Teniente 1 Subt.eniente 1 Sargento primero (1st Class Sergeant) 4 Sargentos segundos (2nd Class Sergeants) 3 Drummers 8 Cabos primeros (1sr CIass Corporals) B Cabos segundos (2nd Class Corporals) 50 Soldiers 87 Total

This r3organization gave the regiment a total strength of 19 staff, 70 -^r'n:nl' ^tiicers, and 1,008 non-commj-ssioned of f icers and men- The liqht r.egiments !.;3re alsc restructured. Their staf f now consisted of :

l- Commandante 1 Sargento mayor (Major) 1 Primer ayudante (lst Adjutant) 1 Segundo ayudante (2nd Adjutant) I Abanderado (Standard Bearer) 1 CapellSn (Priest) I Cirujano (Surgeon) I Maestro armero (Master Armorer) 1 Tambor mayor (Drum Major)

Each of the six companies in the light regiment now had:

.:z 1 Primer capiten 1 Segundo CapitAn 2 Tenientes 2 Subtenientes 1 SargenLo primero (lst Class Sergeant) 5 Sargentos segundos (2nd Class Sergeants) 3 Drummers B Cabos primeros (1st Class Corporals) I cabos segundos (2nd Class Corporals) ro5 135 Total

The light regirnents had a total strength of 41 officers and 780 non- commissioned officers and men- The Regulation of 28 January 1803 established that each of the regiments was reorgani.zed with Cwo batt.alions. Each battalion consisied af one qrenadi- er company and four fusilier companies. A grenadier company had:

1B 1 Capitan 1 Teniente (Lieutenant) 1 Subteniente (2nd Lieutenant) 1 S.:.rgento prlr"r? ( 1st Se:geani ) : Sargeirtcs segundcs (2i-r,i Serge.:nts) 4 Cabos primeros (1st Corporals) 4 Cabos segundos (2nd Cor:porals) 2 Drummers 95 Granaderos (Grenadiers) J,I2 Total

Each f us i l-ier company had:

1 lst CapitSn 1 2nd Capitdn 2 Tenientes (Lieutenant) 2 Subtenientes (Sub-Lieutenants) I Sargento primero (1st Sergeant ) 5 Sargentos seglundos (2nd Sergeants) B Cabo primeros (tst Corp.crals ) B Cabo segundos (2nd Cor^oo:a1s) 4 Drummers l-'/4 Fusiliers 206 Total

I;-i adoition, each battaLion had a sEarf . The staf f of the 1st BaEtalion v/a.= 2L of f icers and men. The staf f of the 2nc Battal- ion was 16 of f icers and me:.. The staf f of the lst Battalion wds:

1 Coronel (Colonel) I Teniente Coronel (Lieutenant Col-onel ) 1 Major 1 CadeEe (Cadet) 2 Tenientes (Lieutenants) (Over Compliment) 1 Capell5n (Priest) 1 Spanish Clerk I Cirujano (Surgeon) 1 Tambor mayor (Drum Major) 1* 2 Musicians (Clarinets or fifes) I Cabo Zapadores (Sapper Corporal) 6 Zapadores (Sappers) 1 Armero (Armorer) 1 Provost

Th= staff of the 2nd Battalion was:

1 Teniente Coronel () I Ayudante (Ad j utant ) 1 Cadete (Cadet) 1 CapeIlSn (Priest) . I Cirujano (Surgeon) 2 Musicians (Clarinets or rifes) 1 Cal^rn 7Ay)Adorpq (R:nner Crrnoral )

6, T.a nadnrpq { sannarq ) \"*YYvLv' 1 Armero (Armorer) 1 Provost

LY The total strength of t.he regiment was 1,909 men. On 1 July 1810, in an efforE to remedy the problems that two years of warfare had wrought upon the infantry organization, a decree was issued that reorganized the infantry. The infantry was reorganized with 9 grqeadier:bat.tal ions, _(formed into four divi- *- sions) 121 line infantry regiments, 32 light infantry battalions, and rwo corps of Swiss infantry. The internal structure of the regiments and grenadi- er batEalions $rere also altered. The grenadier batcalions had 281 men organ- ized in a staff, five grenadier companies and one cazadore company. Each company had:

1 Capitdn 3 Tambores 2 Tenient.es 6 Cabos primeros 1 Subteniente 5 Cabos segundos 1 Sargento primero 111- Grenadiers or Cazadores 3 Sargent.os segundos I34 Total_

The staff consisfed of:

1 Teniente Coronel 1 Sargento Mayor 2 Ayudantes (Adjufant Lieut.enants) 1 Abanderado (Flag bearer 2nd Lieutenants) 1 Cape]l5n (Priest) I Cirujano (Surgeon) f -irrmero (Armorer ) 1 Tambor Mayor (Drum major)

Each infancry reglment now contained three battalions. Each battalion had one company of grenadr-ers, one of cazadores and four com.panies of fusiliers. The grenaCier cl: cazaiore company was organized with:

1 CapitSn 2 Tenientes (Lieutenant) 1 Subteniente (2nd Lieutenant) 1 SargenEo primero (1st SergeanE) 2 Drummers B Fifers 3 Sargentos segundos (2nd Sergeants)

/i? 5 Cabos primeros (1st Corporals) 6 Cabos segundos (2nd Corporals) 6 Sappers 85 Granaderos or Cazadores ]-20 Total

Each f us i l-i er cornoanv had :

r \-c1PJ_ LO.ll 2 Tenientes (Lieutenant) 2 Subtenientes (Sub-Lieutenants) 1 Sargento pr:imero (1st Sergeant ) 4. Sargentos segundos (2nd Sergeants) 3 Drummers B Cabo primeros (1st Corporals) B Cabo segundos (2nd Corporals) r.Jb t'uslI]-ers t65 Tota]

20 The regimental staff now had:

L Coronel ( Colonel ) l Tei::s:iie (:cl-Jii;i (:teu:e:tant Colonel.) ' 1 Major I Sargento mayor (Maj or) 3 Ayudante (Adj utants ) 3 Abanderados (Standard bearers ) 3 Capell6n (Priests) 3 Cirujanos {Surgeons ) 3 Mestro Armeros (Master gunsmiths) 1 Tarnlcor mayor (Drum major)

The ranking of these regiments was based on the dates of their organiza- Lio:r, ir:respective if it was a fine or miliCia regiment. The grenadier batta- lions were numlf,ered one through eight. Each one had five companies of grenad- jers and one of cazadores (light infantry) . The battalion had a fufl strength of 781 men and was organized as follows:

Sta:f: 1 Commandante (usually a Lt. Colonel) I Sargento mayor (Maj or ) 2 Ayudantes (Adjutants - Lieutenants) 1 Abanderado (Standard bearer - 2nd lJieutenant ) 1 Capellen (Priest ) l Cirujano (Slrrgeon) 1 Armero (Armorer) I Tambor mayor (Drum Major) 9 Total

Corr.roanv: 1 Capit.an 2 Tenientes (Lieutenant s ) 1 Subteniente {2nd Lieutenant) 1 SargenLo primero (1st Sergeant) 3 Sargentos segundos (2nd Sergeants) 3 Drummers 6 Cabos primeros (lst corporals) 5 Cabos segundos (2nd Corporals) it ILL Cranaderos /Ca z ador e s 134 Total

The line infantry regiments were organized with three battalions. Each batba- lion had a compa:ly of grenadiers, one of cazadores, and four of fusiliers. Its th3oretical fufl strength was 2,554 men. The regimental staff contained:

1st Batta l ion; 1 Coronel (Colonel. ) 1 Sargento mayor (Maj or) 1 A] rdante (Adjutant - Lieutenant) 1 Abanderado (Standard bearer - 2nd Lieutenant) . t Cape1l5n (Pr i est ) l Cirujano (Surgeon ) 1 Armero (Armorer) 1 Tambor mayor (Drum Major) 1 Maestro armero {Master Arrnorer) 9 Total

2L 2nd Battalion: 1 Teniente coronel (Lt. ColoneI) 1 AyudanEe (AdjuEant - Lieutenant.) 1 Abanderado (Standard bearer - 2nd Lieutenant) .,.. l Capelldn (priest) 1 Cirujano (Surgeon) 1 Armero (Armorer) 6 Total 3rd Battalion: 1 Commandante (Commander) 1 Aln-rdante (aaiutant - Lieutenant) 1 Abanderado (Srandard bearer - 2nd Lieutenant) 1 Capelldn (Priest) 1 Cirujano (Surgeon) 1 Armero (Armorer ) 6 TotaL

Grenadier Companv 1 Capitdn 3 Tenientes (Lieutenants) I Subteniente (2nd Lieutenant) 1 Sargento primero ? Qa raran t- a\e q oar rnrinq 2 Drummers 2 Fifers 5 Cabos primeros (rst Corporals) 6 Cabos segundos (2nd Corporals) 91 Grenadiers 1l-5 ToIaI

Cazadore Comoanrr

1 Capitdn 2 Drummers 3 Tenientes 5 Cabos primeros 1 Subteniente 5 Cabos segundos 1 Sargento primero 85 Cazadores 3 Sargentos segundos 105 Total :'* Fusilier Comoanv

1 Capitan 3 Drummers 3 Tenientes 8 Cabos primeros 1 Subteniente B Cabos segundos 1 Sargento primero 135 Fusiliers 3 Sargentos segundos I54 ToCal

The fifers and sappers in the grenadier companies had the same benefits as those in the battalion sEaffs. The sappers were not identified in the ccmpany structure as such, and may have been included in the grenadier numbers. Each grenadier battalion had a less ornate battalion standard. The 1st Battalion of each regiment carried the colonel's standard and the 2nd and 3rd Battalions carried the less ornate battal-ion colors. When formed in battle the battalions ranked themselves from the right to the left with the companies organized in the same order, with the cazadores on

22 the extreme right, then fhe grenadiers, and finally the four fusilier compa_ nres - In the line batsUalions, the grenadier and cazadore companies were main- t.ained by drawing men from Che fusilier companies. Those drawn for duty in the cazadore company were shorter, agile men who were better suited for skir- .--"r, mishing. Marksmanship was reputedly aLso a consideration- In the same man- ner, the officers of t.hese companies were theoretically selected by che regr.- mental because of their suitability for the funcEions of those two companies, It was normal practice for Che army commander to draw off the 3rd Batta_ lions of the regiments and organize them into a generar reserve for ttre army. fn addition, they were used as a pool of available manpower to keep the numbers of the 1st and 2nd Battalions up to strength, if they suffered too heavily in battle or lost. significant. nurnbers through any other cause. The lighC infantry regiments had a totaf strength of l-,245 and their single baita_ 1i-on '.ras organized as follows:

1 Commandante 1 Sargento mayor (Major) 1 Primer ayudante (tst Adjutant - 2nd Capitan) 1 Segundo ayudante (2nd Adjutant - Lieutenant) 1 Abanderado (Standard Bearer - 2nd Lieutenant) 1 Capel15n (priest) 1 Cirujano (Surgeon) 1 Maestro armero (Master Armorer) 1 Tambor mayor (Drum Major) 9 Tota}

Each of the six comoanies had:

1 Capitdn primero 1 Capitdn segunCc 2 Tenientes (Lieutenants) 2 Subtenientes (2nd Lieutenants) 1 Sargento primero 5 Sargentos segundos 4 Drummers 72 Cabos primeros (1st Corporals) 12 Cabos segundos (2nC Corporals) :p 170 Fusiliers 2IO Total

In an effort to placate the officer corps, in May IBL2, it was declare1i Lhat each regiment should be reduceci from three to one battalion each, rdther than reducing the number of existinE unirs. Though this created more bil-lets f cr colonels and other senior of f icers, it had the ef f ect of further cornpl_i - cating the Eraining and movement of ne!^r recruits to the fighting units in ih= freld. A simil-ar accommodation was made for fhe generals. In 1814 there rver:e 590 generals in the Spanish army and in order to qive eacl-r of them a ccri:- mand, brigades were limited to a strength of four battalions and divisicns were l imitecl to eight baEtal ions .

23 fnfantrv Drill

Between 1?89 and tBO3 rhe Spanish army was Little more than a spanish mimicry of prussian che army of Frederick the Great.. They had seen how hj-s of warfare *--FysLen had swept all before it, and in an efforE co ensure that they were up to the Lalest innovaLions, the Spanish copied it dogmacj-cally. Their forces were trained to attack. They were trained to make use of the bayonet, to rnarch rapidly (a relative concepc as they were to learn when they met the French armies) and to begin fire at a distance of 250 paces. In 1803, when Godoy began his reforms, the Spanish also adopred rhe French Regulation of 129r, and their basis for infant.ry drirl. Though they l-acked the subti.lty of execution that the French demonstrated, it is what guided their baLtalion tactics.

Uniforms of the Spanish Infantrv

The uniforms of the rine infant.ry in 1793 consisted of a rraditional Bourbon white coaL with whire turnbacks piped with the coror of rhe lapels. onl-y Ehe forei.gn regimenEs wore the light blue coaE. The regimental- distinc- tlves were uorn on the Swedish cuffs, the collars, the lapels and on Lhe buttons. Their vesis and belts were white- They wore high btack gaiters. grenadiers The wore an especially ta1l bearskj.n with no plate and long cloth -Adc h:n^i n^ LU Lrrc rear- These bags were usually in the same color as the uniform cuffs and intricately emlf,roidered vith designs in various conrra_ siing cofors. The musket3ers wore a bicorn with cockade and pompon- There :,'as no lace edging on the bicorn, as it had b3en abolished in 1293. On f5 ApriI .1805 the uniforms underwenc a major change. Rectangular cuff ilaps were adopced, that !,rere in the col,or oi the cuff and piped lrhite- The coat was also changed from white to blue- The regimentaL colors became as iol Lows: Shoulder Strap, Co1lar Cuffs & Flaos Laoels Buttons -'--r Vio 1et Violet Violet yel- l_ow P.eina Violet Violet Violet hlhire Jr I n/-'l na White Violet t./iolet ye I low Q.a l'rrrrr.a Black Black 3lack ye I ]ow Corona Black Bl-ack Black hlhite Africa Whi-te Black Black yel lorv Z amora White Bl-ack 3lack Whice :.i? 50rra White Violet Violer Whire C5rdoba Red Red P.ed ye llow ai,. ^,1 -'l - i uuaoa r al ara Red Red R.ed t^ti'ri r e Sewilla Black Black l.lhite llhrce Granada !r:J^ILt.t^nr Bl-ue Light Blue Light Blue ye i low Va lenc i a !r:JrIul.'r arhF Bl-ue Light Blue Light Blue tJhrre 7.ar;tararaA Green Green Green yellow iqnaffa Green Green Green !'lhr t e To I edo White Light Blue Lighr Blue yel-low l4a 1 l-orca White Red ReC ye l lovr Burgos White Green Green ye l_low l4urc i a White Light BIue Lighr Blue Whire | -5An f TII.L LC Red R.ed ye l 1orv Cantabria !_LYrtL BLue Light Blue l^lhite Whire As turi as WhiEe Green Green l^Jni t-e :-'l -lr^r fralr r _ rJv uurlo \_g|JLCl Groon Green ithite t.thite

1A z-a Shoulder SE.rap , Col- l-ar Cuffs & Flaps LapeLs Buttons Nawarra Dark BIue Dark Bl-ue Dark Blue Yellow Arag5n Red Red White White AmSrica Dark Blue Dark BIue Dark Bl-ue White Princesa Violet Viol et l{hi te White ExE:emadra Crimson Crimson Crimson Yellow Ordines Militares Dark Blue Dark Bl-ue Whice White Vol - de Castilla Crimson Crimson Crimson White Vol - de Estado White Crimson Crimson Yel-Iow VoI - de Corona White Crimson Crimson White Vol - de Borbon Crimson Crimson white I^Jh:-[e frl anda Yellow Yellow Yel1ow Yellow Hibernia Yellow Ye IIow Ye lIow I4hite Ultonia Light BLue Yellow Light Blue Yellow NapoJ-es Yel low Yellow Yellow blhite Schwall-er #r Red Red* Red l'Jhite Rrlti irnann hZ Red Red* Red White N. Reding #: Red R.ed* Red l^lhi t e Betschart #+ Red Red* Red l^lhite Traxler #5 Red Red* Red I^Ihite Freux #5 Blue Red** Red l^ihite

* Cuff flap was blue. *i Cluf flap was red.

If ihe coll-ar or lapels were white, they were pipei in Ehe color of in= cuf is. The cuf f f laps and shoulder straps were alrvavs piped white. The curnbacks and the turn back pocket were piped in ftre color of the cuffs as vreil - The regimental sappers wore the basic infantry uniforrr{, rvith two major j-nct iis: ions . They wore a leather apron to protect therr legs and theil- ha: consisted of a massive vrit.h the bag of the qrenadl-ers . In contr- as: to rhe g:-enadiers, however, this bearskin hai a large plate either of brass or lvhire metal with warious crests. Like sappers the rvcl lC over, beards anj mustaches were al-most mandatory. The cut of the coat was moCified in 1800. rt now closed at the waisf and had sf.raight lapels . However, the other aspects oi the unif orm rem.a:-nei uncnangeo - f n 1B :,v 05 Lhe skirts of the coat r.rere shor:tened, such that thei,' reached rnid-rLlmp. The turnbacks had a heart shaped patch on thej-r corner -Lta: I^/as the color of the lapeIs. The long gaii-ers v/ere also ::eplaced b1z sh3ra, mic-calf gaiters. In 18 12, in an ef f ort to support the Spanish vrar: ef rort, England pl:ovicei -t - -^, cr \,=ry rcrr93 number of uniforms. This uniform consist=d of a conical, stc:,'3- r-ri r-= ch: lrn with a red cockade and a metal- f i ont badge . It was trimmed ar:o,.-,r:d th= base and had a band that ran up boch sides and over: the top. Tnrs carj running over the top vras tied on top of the , bu[ could be uniiec. arj used as a chin strap. The grenadier's shako had a badge. varying soLlrces give it a:ej or a green tufL, and trim. green being the traditional color of most oale: Eurooean nations for. light inf antry. The J-igltt corncanies had a bugle baic=, rei tuf t and trim and the cenE.er companies had a ramoant l-ion badge, r.,,nice tuit and rvhite (or black) trim. The jacket was dark blue anC single breasted. IIs co]lar, poi-nteC cui;s, '?:21) Lur-nbacks , and piping v/ere red . The but tons were bras s . Each cciirc,an\{

25 dlstinctiwes. The grenadiers had blue rolI wings fringed with red, the light companies had blue roll wings fringed with green, and Che cenEer companies had plain blue shoulder seraps piped wit.h red. On Ehe sides of t.he collar were ye1low.lecters, of,the .initials.of the regiment ' s--name breeches were -b-tue . Their .shy or blue gray. They wore shor! while gaicers, whice cross belts, black pouch, white haversack, a barrel shaped canteen on a white sling, bror^rn, dark blue or black canvas knapsack with white straps, and a gray blanket ro11. This uniform, being so prevalenE, was also widely used by the various regiinent.s thaE were not part of fhe regular Line infantry escablishment.

T::: Liqht Infant rv

The light infantry raised in 1293 wore a bicorn, green coats with red cuffs and 1ape1s- Their vests were whlte, They laore brown leather knee Ieng:h gaiters. Their belts were white and Ehey wore blue greatcoats. fn 1300 rheir coats o,ere changed to blue with red facings and Lhe great coat becar"= green. In 1802 their bicorns were eliminated and replaced with a black, low c=own=d leather Tarleton helmecs. The helmet had a red turban. The national cackaie was on the left side, under the green pIume. The h3lmet had a btack iu: crest and an oval brass plate bearing the royal Spanish coat of arms. l'he jacket was replaced by a green dolman which had red cuffs and colfar, y=1lcir lace and buttons, and a red sash. Their breech--s were now white and '"rcre t..:3y long black gaiters. The helmet was replaced in f8o5 by a shako with a gr:=n plume on the left side, surmounting the red co3kad3. The cords and glands were white and the front pfaque varied from brass ro erhite meta1. On 15 April 1805 the uniform was revised again, anci a

Cuffs Collar & Cuff Fl-aps Laoels But tons 3 tunf i \r,c arios de Aragon Red Red Red White l: Voiuntarios de Catalufla Dark BIue Ye I low Ye I low YeI low .ir-, - :A!C[e'JlIC1 Ye l-low Ye I low Dark Blue Ye I low i,'olultarios de Ge rona YeI low Ye I low Ye I 1ow White lo d= Barcel-ona Ye l-1ow Ye l- low Dark BIue White -,--2o d= Barcel-ona Dark Blue Red P.ed Ye I low Bar bas t ro Red Red llrrk H.lrro I^lhi t e Vclu-:_.-arios de Valencia Crimson Crimson Crimson White Yclu;:-,-arios de Campo Major Dark Blue Cr imson Crrmson Whit e Vol-ui:.iarios de Nava r ra Crimson Cr imsorr Cl imson llhi t e

In 1812 the Spanish began adopting British manufac:ured uniforms- At t:rat time Iight blu" uniforms like those of Lhe Line inlaniry were adopceci. They had white collars, cuffs, piping, and turnbacks. Th3 conpany distinc- tions on the shako were as those used by rhe tine. fn 1et5 ih3y adopted wide_ tcppeC , short dark green tunics wirh crimson co1.Ia::s, red cuffs, anC r=d _oiping, and their breeches were green-

ii:rifcrms of the Volunteer Units

It should be noted that there is very Iit.Lle readriy available data on the uniforms of these formations. They were raised by i'cl-ur.:eer subscriptior:.

'-'l zot/' and not well enough financed, in the general sense, to have always had formal or complet.e uniforms. As the war progressed whac litcre that they were issued was lost. desLroyed, or damaged without official repl.acement, but they were j.clas.,;e;e re.ei:-a^ l{ir-t a::1. i:laterial at ha::3. - lc:: :r: reg:ilar.11r r-onr4-^a 5r. -- 'the scawenging battle field. uniforms often con:isrel of f;.agnaiits of Lhe :-;" uniforms of many different regiments and armies, enemy and allied, that were salwaged from the warious bat.tlefields. lfnat few fragments of details of uniforms of these formations that have appeared are as follows:

Reqiment Jacket tacinqs Euttons Ereeches Headqear fernando Vtl 8tue, no Red Silver Etue Redtrim and tuft t apets La Huerte creen, no Etue Sitver B[ue Taperedstovepipe, gfeeh tuft tapets skutt & crossbonesplaque 2' Cadiz BroHn Orange Sitver yetloH Roundhat, Hhite tuft oh left Voluntarios de [a Victoria BaoHn Red SiLver Erorn Corsicanhat tufned up on teft Votuntarios de llurcia* Etue Yettow Sitve. Buff Trim unknorn cuardias llalonas Blue Red Sitver Hhite Uhite trim Totedo ** BroHn YeLtor{ Sitver thite lthite trim, red tuft liledinaSidonia + Bro{n Light Blue sitver t,tl", Hhite trim, tt. btue pompon . red strlpe cTan3deros de Hurcia + Btue Sky Etue unknoHn Blue Red p(ume 2' Hatlocca + Btue Red unknoNn Btue unknorn cazadoresde l'lattorca 6reen 8[ack unknorh 6ray Uniform like 95th Riftes veteranos de La Patria Dk Green Red unknown uhite Stack shakorith yettoH tace ano coros, Santa-Fe Dk Blue Greencufts unknornDk Btue Black shako, sitver lace & chinscates, Red piping red cockade and pompoh. Votuntarios teates Lt Btue Red unknoqo Lt B[ue Stack shako, red tace, pompon& de FernandoVII cockade,brass chihscates& ovat of aoue.

* Which of the six voluntarios de Murcia is not knor,/n. ** Source is not clear if this is the volunLarios de honor de la real uniwersidad de Toledo or the lmperial de Tol-edo + This formation is i.dentified only by Yaple and Haythornthwaite and was not among those ljsted in the various Spanish sources consufted. 'itb

27 Organization of the Spanish Cavalry 1788-1814

On 4 March 1-787 the cavalry was reformed such that. each regiment had three squadrons, " 'compahy .f6 each of t.hree compani,eq .' Each had two sargentos, four cabos (corporals), four carabinieros, seven trumpeters (disCributed between the 9 companies) , one timbalero (tympanisE) , and 22 troopers. This gave the Spanish cawalry establishment, not including dragoons, a force of 12 regiments of line, each with nine companies formed in 4 squadrons. 'Thc rrrv rrorri vy r,,,-^.8d1mon strength was set aE 27 0 horses . In addition there were two regiments with slightly different organizat,ions. The firsc was the Costa de GranaCa Regiment with twelve companies in four squadrons totaling 3G0. The second was the yolunEarios de Espafia, which had twelve companies in four squaCrons and a total of 480 men. The 40 man foot companies were mounted by the decrees of 14 March and 23 August 1?89. During the French Revolution the army was sent to the pyrenees by t.he Royal Order of 28 March 1?93. A1I of the twelve line cavalry regiments were dispaLched to the front, organized with Ehree squadrons, each with 3 companies and a total of 70 rnen, This included a special wartime augmentation of 20 men mounted per company. For the same reason, on 13 June 1?93, each company was augm3nted by the addition of a sergeant, two cabos and two carabinieros per company. In 1793 the Carabinieros de Maria I'uisa were raised. As the war con- tir.ued each company was augmented with another ten mounted men and a 1st Lieucenant (Primer teniente) who had the temporary grade of captain. The con_canies noi.r had a st.rength of 70, including three sergeants. The " guardias de corps" were formed on 21 June 1794 and consisted of four companiest EspafioLa, A/rlericana, ItaJ-iana, and F]amenca. They contained nobl,es and mernlcers of other privileged classes. The Royal Order of 24 June 1795 djrected the inspector general of dragoons, prince de Monforte, to bring his dragoons into conformance eith the Royal Order of 7 JrJIy 7794, and raise thei: squadron strengths to 70 men. Though each company was co have a lst Lieutenant and three sergeants, the company had fifty mounled and ten dis- mounted troopers. This gave each dragoon regiment the theoretical ability to field 500 sabers, plus cadre and staff. In 1795 the cavalry cortsisLed of 15 regiments organized with Lwelve companies, organized into 48 squadrons, or a total of 6,440 horses. The cavalry was to remain in this organization untit January 1803, when Godoy /e initiated his reforms. The Regulation of 28 January 1803 established that each of the twenty- four regiments was organized with five squadrons. Each squadron was to nave t!,ro companies. Each company was organized with:

1 Capitdn 1 Teniente (Lieutenant) 1 AIf6rez (Ensign) 1 Sargento primero (1st Sergeant) 2 Sargentos segundos (2nd Sergeants) 1 Trumpeter 4 Cabos primeros (tst Corporals) 4-Cabos segundos (2nd Corporals) 4 Carabinieros (Sharpshooters) 3B Mounted Cavaliers 13 Dismounted Cavaliers 1 Herrador (Blacksmith) 7I Men 54 Horses

2B The regimental staff consisted of:

1 Coronel ( Colone 1) 'I T":ri en!--e coran:l (!:. Cc1cn31) 1 .Sai'gento Mayor (nlajor) --r' 5 Atrudante (Adj ut ant ) 4 Porta-estandard (Standard Bearer) l CapelISn ( Priest ) l Cirujano (Surgeon) 1 Mariscal mayor (Sergeant Major) 1 Picador (Riding Master) 2 Domadores (Horse Breakers ) l Trumpeter l Saddlemaker l Gunsmith 1 Drummer (usually not present) 22 Total

Though the regiment. had a total manpower of 67O men, onfy 540 were nounted. Indications are that the dismounted men remained behind in the depot and did not accompany the regiment into the field. Much of this is also -r.hahlw .l,r- r/r rha difri^"i-" i- {-innin^ -',ir ?ble hOrSeS, AS hard aS it waS to find manpower for the armed forces, it was even harder to find horses. The carabinieros e/ere soldiers of exemplary conduct, vrho were agile, robust and had the best horses. During a campaign they were scouts and guides. The regulation of 1803 also disbanded aIl of Ehe dragoon regiments, :onverting them into cazadores or - The Spanish cavalry consisted of :he folfowinq reqiments in 1803:

T,i no (-.arr: I rrr Parri monr 1st - Rey 7th - Alcantara 2nd - Reina Bth - Espafla 3rd - Principe 9th - Algarve 4th - Infante 10th - Calatrava 5th - Borb6n 1lth - Santiago 6th - Farnesio 12th - Montesa

:ib Cazadores de Caballo (Chasseurs d Chewal Reqiments) 1st - Rey 4th - Pavia 2nd - Reina Sth - Vil-laviciosa 3rd - Almansa 6th - Saqunto

Hussar Reqiments 1st - Numancia 4th - Voluntarios de Espafla 2nd - Lusitania 5th - Maria Luisa 3rd - Olivencia 6fh - Esnafiofes

In 1805 Godoy real- ized that there v/as a valid use f or unit specif ically ".rained as dragoons and reestablished the dragoons:

Draooon Reqiments Reestablished in 1805 Rey Villaviciosa Reina Sagunto Almansa Numancia ?avia Lusitania

zy The cawalry underwent very few changes until the 1808 war broke out. r]nr-o it- *o^an !sYl the numbers of regiment.s were steadily increased. rn lgOg , 17 new reginents were raised, a further L6 were raised in LBO9, 7 were raised in 1810, 7 more were raised in 1811, and one was, r:aised .,in.LBL?. The regiments !clJ_>=uie^ i ^ ^.-J w=:tr:

Regimenf Commandinq Officer Date Raised Draqoons CS.ceres Augustin Sanchez 1 JuIy 1808 Cast illa Jos6 Taberner 1 Augrrst. 18 08 Madrid Manuel Freire 15 September 1BOB Granada Manuel de la Cruz 29 September 1808 20 de Lusitania Francisco chaperon 15 July 1909 Soria Antonio Camporedondo 22 February 1811

Line Cawalrv Voluntari os de Sevilla Marqu6s de Albentos 1 June 1808 Voluntarios de Ciudad-Rodrigo Antonio Reguilon 4 June 1808 Carabini=ros Reales de Estremadura Gregorio Laguan 7 September 1808 Perseguiccs de Andalucia Fernando de Ayala 14 September 1808 (forme:Iy Fuerzas unidas) 2nd de Al-centara Marsu6s de GeIo 28 October 1808

Cazadores Granada ee Llerena Jos6 pineda 28 Mav 1808 (forme:-}y Voluntarios de Alcdntara) Maestranza de valencia Antonio Barrios 1 June 18OB ( latet Cazadores de Val-encia ) Sevilla Juan Espinosa 11 July 1B0B Fuen-san:a Domingo vasallo 1 August 1B0B Q:ar:rin ''rc ge ToLedo Ger6nimo Puig Amig6 28 September 1B0B ( rorm.e:Iy Voluntarios de Tru j i l Io)

Hussars 10 de EsLremadura Agustin Sanchez 15 July 18Og 20 de Estremadura Rafael Mariano 15 July 1808. Granada Marqu6s de Campo-verde 18 July 1808 re Fernando VII Conde de Fernan Nuiez 12 Novendcer 18OB (laeer cranaderos de Fernando VII)

Lancers Utrera Dayetano Sanabria 25 May 1808

On 1 October 1808, it was decreed that alt regimencs should reorganize themselves from five squadrons of 2 companies each, to four squadrons of 3 companies each. Though the regimental staff and company organization remained relativeLy unchanged, this reorganization brought the theoretical fu11 strength of a regirnent to 869 men, and with 648 of them being mounted. However, the losses of the 1BO9 campaign obliged the regiments, almost across fhe boa=C, to eliminate one squadron so as to mainlain the stren.rrh .rr Fha others. The company was now to have:

30 1 Capitdn 1 Teniente l Alfdrez (Ensiqn) 3 Ca-:gci'-:.: "t ''rry. r-aF,- -. r r l- LrtttticLc! 4 Cabos (Corporals) 42 Soldiers (mounted) 11 Soldiers (dismounted) 1 Herrador (BlacksmiCh) 55 Total

The regimental staff now consisted of:

1 Coronel ( Colonel ) 1 TenienLe coronel (Lt. colonel) 1 Sargento Mayor (Maj or) 4 Ay'udante (Adjutant ) 4 Porta-estandard (Standard Bearer ) l Trumpeter l Drummer 1 Ivlari s ca 1 ( Farrier) 1 Picador montados (Mounted horsebreaker) I Drummer (usually not present) 16 ToLal

Despite this official reduction to three squadrons, it is highly unlike- 1y, based on reviews of field relurns, that many of the regiments could even iiefd two ful1 squadrons. The Spanish cavalry r^rasto remain in Lhis condiLion through the remainder of the Napofeonic wars. fn 1809 the follo\ring regiments were raised:

Regiment Commandinq officer Dat.e Raised Dragoons Crusada de Alburquerque Gabriel coralles 20 Apri] 1809 2o de Sanciago Manuel Sisternes 1 .lune 1809 Cuenca .Iuan de los Rios 14 'July 1809 2o de Alvarve Cdrlos Tassier 8 Novemlcer 1809 lP Cazadores Montaflas de c6rdoba Juan Blasco Negrillo 1 January 1809 Francos de Cast.ilIa (1sL sqn) Rafael Santisteban l April 1809 Francos de Castilla (2nd sqn) Francisco del Aguila 1 May 1809 Navarra Manuel Gurrea 1 August 1809

HUSSATS Ar.arrnn /f nrrrl31. DarOCa ) lOaquin NavarrO I AUgUSt 18 09 Catalufla Luis de Creef 5 December 1809 (formerly San Narciso) Rioja Bartolom6 Amor 15 November 1809 Iberia Manuel Armijo 29 November 1809 Navarra (former.ly Corso Francisco Javier Mina 18 March 1809 terrestre de blavarra) Francos de Castilla ViemonC Bernete 1 September 1809

31 Jer€z de FronEera Marqu6s de CampoReal 19 April 1gO9 Sevilla Vicente pLanchon 30 July 1909 'reorganized on 3O January"1809 c}.e cavalry was provisiorl.f Iy int'o regi- ments with four squadrons. Each squadron consisted of three companies. Each '7 company had B1 men and L horses . This gave the regiment a theoret ical st.rengt.h of 972 total men in the regiments with 852 in being mounted. On 23 April the companies were altered again and they now consisted of:

1 Capitdn 1 Teniente 1 Alfdrez (Ensign) 3 Sargentos 1 Trumpeter 8 Cabos (Corporals) 4B Soldiers, or Grenadiers (mounted) 11 Soldiers (dismounted) 1 Herrador (Blacksmith) 75 Total

The regimental staff now consisted of:

l Coronel- (Colonel) I Tenient.e coroneL (Lt. Colonel) 2 Commandantes (Squadron ) I Sargento Mayor (Major) 4 AyudanE e (Ad j utant ) 4 Porta-estandard (Standard Bearer) 1 CapellSn (Priest) 1 Cirujano (Surgeon) l Trurnpeter 1 Drummer 1 Mariscal (Farrier) I Armorer 1 Saddlemaker 1 Picador (Horsebreaker) 1 Drummer 22 Total ::p

On 15 July 1809 the regiments disbanded a squadron. This diminishment in rhe strengt.h of the cavalry, however, was made up by the raising of the following regiments in 1B1O:

Cazadore Regiments commandi-nq of f icer Date Rai-sed Mancha Francisco Abad Chaleco 30 March 1810 TIl-rri\rv.!-!LlLrs rrrro Gregorio Fernandez 22 May 1810

Granaderos Reqiments 40 Ej 6rc i to Juan l4anuel_ pererio 29 April 1810 (commonly Witingharn)

Cuirassiers: Espafloles Juan Malatz 24 May 1810

32 Hussars Galicia Francisco Mahi 1 January 1810 Lecn Nicholds Salvador 1 February l_810 G'-'ad?.1a; a:l ,'1"..^r: l.r:rl- i,- 22 February ibi0

Lancers 10 de Castilla Jos6 Martin 27 May 18 10

on 6 Aoril 1811 the greatly weakeneC Spanish cavalry was reorganized into 12 line cavalry regiments, 10 dragoon regiments, 4 cazadores, and 4 hussar regiments. The regiments were organized with three squadrons each- Two were mounted and one was dismounted. The dismounted forces were organized intc battalions that were to operate like infantry. They were to serve as grenadiers or be seconded to the artillery, until sufficient horses were obtained to mount them. Elite companies were also established of either grenadiers, in the dragoon regiments, or carabiniers in the line cavalry regiments. In addition to the reorganized senior formations, a small number of prowincial squadrons were retained. The reorganized Spanish cawalry con- sisted of the foll-owing:

Line Reqiments Rey f nf ante Alcdntara Cal_acrava Reina Borbon Espafla Santiago Principe Farnesio Algarve Montesa

Draqoon Reqiments Rey Almansa Numancia Granada Vitlaviciosa Reyna Pavia Lusitania MaCrid Saqunto

Cazadore s Oliwenza Sewil-la Valencia Voluntarios cie Espafra

I{us s ars Espafloles Granada Fernando VIII Estremadura

Prowincial- Forces Retained Cuenca Prowincial Cavalry Squadron Soria Prowincial Dragoon Squadron :rv Ubrique Prowinical Cazadore Sqr-radron Catalufr.a Provincial Hussar Squadron Aragon Provincial Hussar Squadron Galicia Prowincial Hussar Squadron Cantabria Provincial Flussar Squadron CastilIa Provincial Hussar Squadron

In as much as there were more men than suitable horses, a nurnber of foot regiments were organized that were to remaj-n afoot until receipt of suiEable mounts . Ear-h rprri mont- was organized with three squadrons . These f ormat ions were:

Hussar Reqiment commancinq officer Date Rai sed Burgos Julian Sanchez 6 April 1811 Nurnantinos Juan palarea 26 Aoril 1811

33 Cazadores Jaen Bernardo Marquez 15 April 1811 Provisional de Galicia Simon Manso 1 Septernber 1811 , -. - Madrid.--. Ignacio Palleja 1 Septernber 1811 .rF-. Lancers Est.remadura Joaquin Taberner 18 Sept.ember 1811 (or Legion Estremefla)

Granaderos (Horse Grenadiers) 40 Ej6rcito Francisco Ramonet 1 September L811 (or de Galicia)

The Provisional- Regulation of 1 December 1811 disbanded the Cdceres, Castil-Ia, Madrid and 20 de Lusitania Dragoon Regiments. The Tejas Line Regi- ment, the Maria Luisa Hussars and the 10 Husares de Estremadura had their forces distributed to other units or were returned to the depots.

Strengths and Disoositions of Forces Raised from June 1B0Bto December1811

Line Cavatry Numberof Original Date Date Regiment Squadrons Strength Raised Dissotved Unit(s) into which absorbed Sevi I ta I+ 761 6/1/08 6/1/'11 Absorbed into Montesa Ciudad Rodrigo 2 300 6/8/08 B/t /10 Absorbed into Reina Granaderos de Fernando VI I 3 540 9/15/08 5/1/11 Reformed (tater FernandoVil Hussars) 2' Atcantara 2 ?80 10/27/08 6/30/11 Absorbed into Atcintara Perseguidos de Andalucia /+ 480 5/1/09 5/1/11 Absorbed into Votuntarios de Espafra (formerty Fuerzas unidas) 2o Santiago t+ 5{+0 6/1/09 1/6/11 Absorbed into Rey cuenca 2 322 7/11/09 4/30/13 Absorbed into Atmansa & 0 |,i venza 2" Atgarve 4 600 10/8/09 6/1//15 Absorbed into Atgarve Granaderosdel IV ejercito 3 360 t+/15/10 6/1/12 Absorbed into Atmansa& Otivenza Coraceros Espafroles Z 360 5/24/10 6/l/$ Absorbed into Reina Granaderos del VI e jtirci to 3 t+BZ 10/20/11 6/1/13 Absorbed into Reina, :p Borbon, & Infante Lancers 1" Casti [ [a 5 800 5/10/10 6/1/18 Absorbed into Montesa 2' Castitta B 400 12/30/11 6/1/13 Absorbed into Infante

Hussars 1' Estremadura 5 1,91 6/11/08 6/1/18 Absorbed into Atcintara ( [ater Bai Ien) 2" Estremadura 5 491 6/14/08 6/1/18 Absorbed into Bai ten Francos de Vatencia 3 640 6/25/A8 6/30/1 1 Disbanded Granada 3 720 6/4/09 9/27/15 Absorbed into Numancia Castitta t+ 720 9/1/09 5/1/13 Absorbed into Rey Iberia /+ 180 9/1/09 6/1/18 Absorbed into Catatrava Catatufra (formerty San Narciso) 3 640 12/5/09 10/1/14 Absorbed into Numancia Aragon (formerty Daroca) 1 180 4/15/10 1/30/13 Absorbedinto Atmansa& Gaticia 4 4BA 1/1/11 9/22/15 Absorbedinto Lusitania Navarra t+ 480 1/1/11 9/27/15 Absorbedinto Catatrava

34 Cazadores Votuntarios de Atcintara tt56 5/28/08 6/1/15 Sent to depot at UI tramar ([ater Granada de LLerena) Maestranza l+ de Vatencia 7?O 6/1/08 6/1115 Absorbecl into Atmansa Dnagccnq Imperiat de sagrario-dc ToIedo .+ 6C0 6/30/08 6/1/15 Absorbed into I nfante Sevi [ [a I, 560 7/11 /oB 6/1/15 Send to depot at Uttramar Fuen-Santa J 300 B/1/08 6/1/15 Absorbed into various corps Montafras de C5rdoba ? 300 1/\s/09 6/1/15 Absorbed into I nfante Francos de Andatucia 2 333 1/1/0e 5/1/15 Absorbed into l''tadrid & Granada Provinciat de Gaticia ? 200 9/15/11 6/1/15 Absorbed into Lusitania Jaen 4 31t, 11/1/11 6/1/1s Absorbed into Santi ago Guadatajara 1 320 1?/24/11 6/ttlA Absorbed into Granada

Draqoons

1" Lusitania 9t+B 6/25/08 6/1/11 Absorbed into Reina & Vi [ [aviciosa Dragoons 2" Caceres t, 528 9/7 /08 6/1/15 Absorbed into Lusitania Casti [ [a 2 300 B/ 1/08 1/?s/09 Absorbed into Borbon Madri d 4 9tB e/15/08 1/23/09 Absorbed into Borbon Granada I+ 600 9/29 /09 9/1/13 Absorbed into Reina, Sagunto & NumanciaDragoons Soria 300 7/6/10 11/1/11 Absorbed into Pr^incipe, Lusitania & Numanci a Indeoendent Cornoanies Raised Between June 18OB and December 1811 Q |- ror,,-rt- h Line Cavalry u u ! v r rY u r r Carabinieros ReaIs de Est.remadur a r50 La C5rEes 100 Guardias de honor de Sevilla 100 Leales de Fernando VII r-00

a /'- Crusada de Al-burquerque :oz Legion Estremefla :52

F{uss ars Bu rgo s 150 Asturias L2A Leon r_Lb Va I enc ia L20

:rv f)rarrr-rr-rnq Qcrnian uvds \y'eguas 200

Lancers E s Eremadura i00 Sevilla r50 Utrera 140 Jer€z de l-a Frontera 200 Alemanes L)>

Cazadores : Canfabria 150 Castill-a 150 Ubrique r-80 Cuenca BO

Mancha 1t-o Madr id i00

35 Uniforms of the Spanish Cavalrv:

Between 1788 and 1795 the uniforms of the line cawalry regiments were as follows:

The cavalry work a black square_rigged hat (bicorn) with edging, Ioop and button- The coats were long taired and high rvaisted . Their lapeIs were straighc edged and extended to the waist. The coats had gauntleE cuffs. The regimencal colors were worn on the cuffs and corlar. Those uniic:ms for the forlowing regiments were modified in 1795 to the iol-1or..'inq:

Dress Turnbacks Frock Coat Coat & Ctoak Lapets Cottar & Pipinq Breeches& Buttons Lininq Rey Ye[ [ow YetIow Mutberry tJhi te Carnat i on Reina Ye[[ow Yel.low Sky Etue llhite Carnation A Imansa YetIow Ye[[ow Turquoise LJhi te Carnat i on Pavfa Yettow YetIow Mutberry Whi te unknown Vittaviciosa Yet tow Ye[[ow Carnation Carnat i on Carnat i on Sagunto YeItow Yetlow Green tlhi te Carnat i on Numanci a Ye[ [ow Bl.ack B[ack Whi te Carnat i on Lusitania Ye[[ow Yettow Btack tJhi te Carnat i on

These urits substituted their dragoons (sword belts) for black ban_ dcleers arlr ,3el-ts. The schabraques and holster ccvers of every unit became yellow - Tire schabraque border was single lvoolen stripe of the regirn=i:taI color f :i the troops, in siLver for the of f icers anC serc1rtanf s, vritfr the only differerce becrveen the Ia[ter two being the officer's stripe was doubleo in vridth. In 18Cg the uniforms of the line cavalry were dark blue. Their l^cels '.'.'3re and co1:al:q of the regimental colors. On f herr lapels they wore a rion rampant in ih= color of Eheir buttons. On thej-r cuffs they had a ffeur c'e fys of the saii,e colol . Their turnbacks were red ano their breeches wer3 can. 'T'hsrr lrrcy r^r-w\-.r- r3= kn=e Iength boots, white crossed belcs, black leatherwork, and bicorns v,'itn ',rhite l_ace.

Coll-ar & Lape1 Turnback Lace & Col1ar T,anol q Pipinq Pocket Pipinq But Eons Pcrr Dod / r\99 Red Ye 1 1ow Red Yel Iow " "v Re ina B l-ue Blue Red Red i.Jhit e Pr incip= Red Red irihite Red ,rl I I L g Infante i^thite White Ye l-low I^lhite Ye I Iow Borbcn Red Red i^lhite Red l,lhite** Farnesic Red R.ed Ye 1 low Ye ] low l^Jhite**

Alcdnta:a Red \-]l- CClL flraon r//P r\uu c'd,* flr=orr Yel low* * Espana yellow Red Red/Ye 1 1ow* Red l,lhite** yel]ow Algarve Ye 1 low Red v=^ t.lhite** Calatra:-'a Red Blue Red Red ['Jhite-* Santiag: Red Red Red Red l.lhite** Montesa Red hlhi t e Red lJhrte**

Col-lar was piped in first coror, the lapels were piped in t.he seccni ** No lace on lapel button holes.

35 The schabraque were dark blue with a ye]low band. The pistol holster covers matched the schabraque. Both had rounded corners for the first four regiments aod squared corners for the remainder. In 1905, !,rhen the dragoons !re:'a ::eesL3blished Lheir u::rfcrn colors lvere as fcll3:!.s:

LapeIs, Cuffs, 4 Button Cuff FIaps Collar A Pocket Fl-ap Pipinq Rey Carmine (Crimson) Reina Carnat ion (Light Red) Almans a Sky BLue Pawia Carnation (Red) Vi]lavi ciosa Light Green Sag-unto Light Green Numancia Black Lus itania Black

Their lapeIs, collars, cuff flaps and button holes were piped with white- On their collars they wore the syrnbol of a feather crossed by a srvord in white- Their turnbacks were red, but the turnback pockets were pip3d nith the color of the lapels. Their bicorns were edged in white, iriLh white loops, !,rhiLe button, and red cockade. Their coats were lemon yel1ow and cut 1ak€] those oi the infant.ry- 1'he coat lining, thejr vests, breeches and cloarcs we:e also lernon yelfow- The facings were piped with white. The button holes on Lhe lapels had white lace. The uniform was cut such that the turnbacks all haC flaps ari four buflons. The collars had strjpes and white turks head oulcons. Their: b-lts rere white. They wor3 high cuffed boots. Th3 dragoon's saber scabbards were brown. Their schabraques were velloii, edged r.rrth white. Their horses' harnesses were black. Th" cazadores wore a black shako with a white band on the top and bottc:-r of the shako- The shako cords werre i,.,hite and the oval front olate was brass. The shako had a red cockade and a red plume on Lhe left side. The cazadcr::s wore green dclmans and breeches lrith white Iace, buttons and trim. The faci;g colcrs e,'3re erorn on the col1ar. The dolman had Polish cuffs. The breeches h1l stripes Colvn the outside seam and thigh knoLs. The schabraque ivas brc',nn w-l..-:.r i.rhite lace and trim. The regimenial colors were:

Regimental Colors Cummerbun .,,? Ol-ivenza Red Dcd and I.'i al-rg SIUe

l-r-nrHlrt5 Voluntarios de Espafra urYrru hlhite and Lighi tslue

The hussars wore uniforms identical to those of the cazadores, !u,aLh a Iew exceptions, They i,/ore rhe Lr-adicional pellsse. The dolnan's cu::s rv::3 point3d and their frogging r.raswhite. Their shako had a brass plaLe r,,irir i;" Spanish ar:ms. They afso r,rore a mirliton shako, like those worn by Revoiutic::, ary and Royal French hussar regiments. The pelisse was lighi blue vriir trla:{ Iur and lrhite lace. The bre:ches, the schabraque, the colla: and cuFis cf i:-: dolman were also light blue. The pelisse fur on the pelisse rvas black and i::= lace was vrhite. The regimental variations were:

.Pelisse Col}ar & Cuffs Dolman Cumrnerbund l"lir-l iton I^Jinc Maria Luisa Red Red Sky Blue & Scarle: Scarl-e t Espafloles Ligi-rt Green Green Skv Blue & Green Sliy BIu=

37 In 1808 the Espaf,ofes Hussars wore a black helmet with black fur crest, brass place and fitLings, and red plume and cockade. The uniforms worn by some of the units raised afEer 1B0g were varied- The Fernando vII Hussars wore a bright green dolman with yellow facings,ani -*silver buttons - The dolman and pelisse braid was white. Their breeches ws=e yellow. They eore a black busby with a red bag and pl-ume. The schabraque r.]as blue-gree:r and edged with white. The sheepskin was white. The Navarra Hussars raised by Mina appear Eo nave worn a green dolman with scarlet r-acings- Their breeches were blue with a red stripe- The Espafroles Cuirassier Reginent was not a large unit and it was equipped almosc enrirely with captured French equipment. That being the case, Lhe uni.forms consisted of a blue "habit-surt.out, " a 1ong tai.led jacket. Th3 tunic had a ro, of 10 but.Eons down the front and mid-thigh lengt.h tails r"rith- out pockets or turnbacks- They also wore a white waistcoat with two buttons. The collar was straighc after 1?91 and the breeches were of white cloth, bua leather coveralls were worn. The breastplate was steel l.,ith copper scale hinges and a red lining. The helmet was also steel. rt. had a flowing horse hair crest on a brass comb. A horse hair houppe sLood on the peak of the hefmet. The turban was of black fur- The chin strap was of copper scales. What, if any regimental distinctives i^/ere worn by the Spanish cuirassi- ers, is unknoan- There were, no doubt, variations from this "French,' uniforr,r, as it is doubiful that enough equipment was captured to fulty equip the uni- form with more than helmets and breast Dlates.

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J6 SpanishInfantry & Cavalry Dragoons

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Infantry1793 Grenadier1800 Infantry1812 Shakos GrenadierBonnet SpanishCAvalry ahd Artillery

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-- Artillerist Cuirassier Cazadorede Caballo Dragoon r8o5 tSrr Shakos

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LightDragoon LineInfantry Portu$ueseInfantry

LineInfantry Officer's LineOfficer Epaulets

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LineNCO Cacadore SpanishArtillery 1788-1814

'' rn i7u1 a cie fusrL-r.ers rea-7.es" was orgarl j-ze(J. to serve tir'e artillery of :he Spanish army. It was organized Iike a battalion of arque- bus iers and the General de Artill-eria was its tiLular colonel . In L7 Og this formation abandoned the trappings of the infantry and adopted those of the :rt-illcrrr o! Lrrrs!y . On 2 May 1710 a general staff was established to supervise the operations ani administraEion of the artillery. At this time the regiment consisted of three battal-ions. An artillery battalion was established with 12 companies, one of arti]Ierists, one of miners, and eight of fusil-iers. Each artillery company had 101 gunners, each miner company had 43 miners, and the fusilier companies had 53 men each. In ]-748 each battal-ion aclded a second artillerist ccrnpany and in I762 a fourth battalion with seven companies was raised. rn th.s new battalion each company had 100 men. In L-177, in Segovia, four volunteer artillery companies were raised and in 1781, they lvere organized inLo a 5th Battalion. In 1785 the 6th Battalion was raised witn seven companies. The firqt horse artillery company was raised by Vincente Maturana in Buenos -Aires. Hovrever, in Spain proper no horse ar[i]lery was organized until after peace lvas negotiated by Godoy with the RevoluLionary French government. By 180;, dil a:tillery "brigada de division. was raised for service with the Guard - This civision consisted of three foot companies, a horse company, and d- .p.1'^.^-*l- Luirrpd.t.i):. Eachr^^l^ company hadL-J six guns.' hit The Royal Decree of 2 JuJ"y 1802 , Ordenanza de Artiff eria or Artill_ery ordrnance, cor:.cletely reorganized the Spanish artillery st-ationed in Europe. It v/as to be reorganized wich five regiments, five companies of laborers, three fixed cfmpanies, and four companies of veteran artilterists. Each regirnenc was:-crmed with fhree brigades, two of vrhich were formed with field arti11el1, (br:-gada de divislon) and one of park (brigacla de pargue) Each nar'. hri n:rr: had four companies of foot artillery, while the freld artilLery orrgaosst--j^-^^- nadl^-; t:rreeF'^.^^^ footc^^! and^-J one horseL^-^^ company. ThemL- strengtir of the companles in time of war was 105 men. During peacetime this was reduced by 30 gunners. The number of Jraft horses to draw the six guns per baEtery remained theoreri- ca1l1r constant at 68 , with a further 17 horses al1ocated f or other purposes, be it time of Deace or war. The officer cadre of the Spanish artillery estab- .'? Iishment consisteC of:

1 Director General (a ) 5 Generals 5 Departmental Sub-Inspectors 5 Brigadier Generals, School Commandants I7 Colonels 26 Lieutenant Colonels 15 Gefes de brigada (Brigade Commanders) 6R Canit-aneq nr-imarnq 1'1. rsr^F uapcalns/'ar^r-.i-^ ) 70 Capitanes segundos (2nd Captains) 7I Tenientes (Lieutenants) 133 Subtenientes (2nd Lieutenants) 4]-6 Total-

1 . I am great J_y indebted to Dr. C. Eisdale, University of Liverpool, who most graciously prcwided me rvith much of the information you see in this chapter on the post-1808 Spanish arEiIlery establishment.

39 The staff and administrarion of the artillery was modified by CapiEan GeneraL don .Jose de urrutia as a result of three further decrees dated 17 March 1803, l May 1803 and 31 May 1go3- These esrabrished war commissioners, --- provincial commissioners and other'-staff .that. were.felt necessarv to admin- .* ister the Spanish artillery. on 1 January 1904, don Manue1 Godoy, the prince of peace, and Dj.rector of Lhe Spanish Artillery ordered the forming of an artillery coI1ege. A school company was formed r,\,iEh lOO Gentlemen Cadets. The Royal Order of 18 March 1805 reorganized the artillery. Three of the four regiments were reorganized with two battalions. Each battalion was to have five companies, four of foot artillery and one of horse artillery- However, in the 4th Regiment, all five companies of each battalion were foot artillery. Each horse company had 93 soldiers and each fooE company had 113 men - On paper, this provided the Spanish with 40 artillery batteries, includ- ing six horse batteries and 34 field batteries The c'arri s.n areillery was organized separaeel,y. The four regiments were garrisoned in Barcelona, Valencia, Sevilla and Coruia. A detachment of three foot companies and a horse company was sent to Segovia. In wartime the foot companies were to be augmented by the addit j-on of 50 militia in the first three regiments and by only 40 in rhe 4ch Regimenr- At t.his time the Ceuta and Mallorca brigades were organized- Fifteen sLaeionary or garrison companies (fijas) were formed in this perjod. This brought Che total to 17 garrison companies- In addition, the ranks of gefe de brigada and capiLane segundo were eliminaled. The capj tanes prjmeros lrere rpnl accd -rhrr -..-y--.-ose: -r-- r mayors - In March 1808 Godoy was replaced by Teniente ceneral Don Gonzalo O,Far- rif as Director of the Spanish Artitlery. At this Lime Spain had a divisjon serving in Denrnark in supporr of Napoleons continencal system. It had both foot and horse artillery, as well as a company of Sapper-Minels. The horse battery contained:

1 Capitan 1o (1st CIass Captain) 1 Teniente (Lieutenant) 2 Subtenienfes (2nd Lieutenants) 1 TrombeEa (Trumpet ) 1 Sargento Primero (1st Sergeant) 3 Sargentos Segundos (2nd SergeanLs) liv 4 Cabos Primeros (lst Corporals ) 4 Cabos Segundos (2nd Corporals) 30 1st Class Gunners 42 2nd Cl-ass Gunners B9 Toral

The two foot batteries contained:

1 Capitan 20 (2nd CIass Captain) 1 Teniente (Lieutenant) 1 Subteniente (2nd Lieutenant) 2 Tambores (Drummers) . 1 Sargento Primero (fst Sergean[) 5 Sargentos Segundos (2nd Sergeants) B Cabos Primeros (rst Corporals) B Cabos Segundos (2nd Corporals) 34 1st Class Gunners 50 2nd Class Gunners 111 Total

An '1 \J The company of Zapadores-Minadores (Sapper-Miners) was formed with:

1 Capiran 1" (tsr Class Captain) i Capita:t 2" i2r,d Ciass CaF,Eain) - 1 Tenienie (Lieutenarrt) .- .-,.! 2 Subtenientes (2nd LieuLenants ) 2 Tambores (Drummers ) 1 Sargento Primero (lst Sergeant) 4 Sargencos Segundos (2nd Sergeants) 8 Cabos Primeros (l-st Corporals) 8 cabos segundos (2nd Corporals) 32 1st Class Soldiers J2 2r'd Class Soldiers 132 Total

On 27 October 1B0B t.he Junta Suprema y 7a Regencia raised a brigade of horse artillery consisti.ng of three mounted batteries. The batteries known as the compaiia de artilLeria de voTunEarios de Madrid, compafi.ia de artilleros volunrarios urbaros nacurafes de GaTacia, and the Arti-zleros voTuncarros Cistinguidas de Cddiz were, after the battLe of Baylen, reorganized into horse batteries. Two of these new horse batteries were attached to the Army ot La Mancha. Shortly later two companies of volunteer artillery were formed for the defense of Cadiz and an artillery academy was established in Seville. The Royal Decree of 27 February tB09 ordered the formation of a brigade of horse artillery and two companies of train in the Army of Sierra-Morena. This brigade had two companies. Each company consisted of:

1 Capitan (Captain) 1 Teniente (Lieutenant) 2 Subtenientes (2nd Lieutenants) 1 Trornbeta (Trumpet ) 1 Sargento Primero (1st SergeanL) 5 Sargentos Segundos (2nd Sergeants) B Cabos Primeros (fst Corporals) 12 Cabos SegunCos (2nd Corporals) B5 Artillerists .,e II"7 Total

In addition, the brigaCe had a brigade commander and an adjutant, bring the total- strengf h of Ehe brig-,rde to 236 of f icers and men. The train companies had: 1 Capitan (Captain) I Teniente (Lieutenant) 2 Subtenientes (2nd Lieutenants) 1 SargenEo Primero (1st Sergeant) 6 Sargentos Segundos (2nd Sergeants) 2 Trombeta (Trumpet) B Cabos Primeros (fsc Corporals) 16 Cabos Segundos (2nd Corporals) 100 Artillerists L31 Total

In wartime the t-rain companies v/ere ass igned to the command of the commanCer of the army's general park.

A1 =I There were reputedly several "new" arLiIlery companies formed during this period, but they were actually composed of refugees, separated from their units, that found themselves in the areas occupied by the . An example is Ehe garrison artilJ-ery formed by t.he governor of Tortosa from :- gunners that had escaped from Barcelona. New regui-ations were issued in 1810 and 1811, which ordered the forma- tion of new artillerv units. The Royal Decree of 2 March 1810 formed =r1-i'l'l orrr -egiment in Cadiz and on 24 March 1810 an artillerrr school for Genrlemen Cadets was formed in the Balleric islands. The varicus detached art,illerists in Barcelona and Tarragona were reor- ganized into a garrison company by the garrison commander and this was ap- proved by the Royal Decree of 11 June 1810. This company consisted of:

1 Capitan (Captain) l- Teniente (Lieutenant ) 2 SubEenientes (2nd Lieutenants ) 1 Sargento Primero (1st Sergeant) 5 Sargencos Segundos (2nd Sergeants) 2 Tamores (Drummers ) 7 Cabos Primeros (lst Corporals) 10 Cabos Segundos (2nd Corporals) 34 1st Class Artillerists Arrirlerisrs # i::"ir"="

The Royal Decree of 22 January 1B1O named Mariscal de canpo y coronel Don MarLin carcia y Loygorri the Director General of Artilfery. The Royal Decree of 18 August 1810 reorganized the Mallorca Artillery 3rigade's gar:ison companies and set the force at 100 men per company and 3OO ior the brigaC3. On 22 November 1810 two squadrons ot horse artillery vJere formed, one in the Alicantina Division and the other in the Mallorquina Division. On l3 Ma::ch 1811 the Regency ordered the formation of four more squa- drons of horse artillery, They vrere given the same organization as the Ali- cantina and Mallorquina Divisions' horse artillery batteries. This set Spanish artil lery establishment. at six ,'squadrons" of horse arritlery, each of which had three companies, and five regiments of foot artjllery, each with ten companies. The fifth regiment was formed on 20 Decemlcer 1811. rj> The Royal Decree of 2 June 1811 ordered Lhe augmentation of the force of each oI the Ceuta artillery brigades by the addition to each company of a lieuLenant, a 2nd Sergeant, 3 1st Corporals, 2 2nd Corporals, 14 1st CIass Artillerists and 5 2nd Ctass ArLitlerists. The Decree of 10 August 181.2 ordered the augmentation of the garrison companies of Badajoz and Ciudad-Rodrigo by five officers and 150 soldiers each. The expansion on paper continued and on 16 SepEember 1813 'I five batta- inrc ar ar-i1r--.' Frain were created. Prior to Ehis date th" art.i:l I prr,r rrain had been handled by contracted private citizens, but with the formation oi these five batralions it finally became ful1y mitirarized. The official organization of the Spanish artitlery was, at this time, as foLlows;

.-\ +zA Artillery Branch Staff l- Subinspector, mariscal de campo 6 Brigadiers s Cllcnels I7 Lieut.enan: C.,^;t:31s 37 Captains 70 Toral

officers assiqned to the veteran and Militia Artil]erv 43 Captains 12 Adjutants 79 Tenientes (Lieutenants) 93 Subtenientes (2nd Lieutenants) 227 ToLal

Field Troops: Veterans Miliria Sargentos Primeros (fst Sergeants) 43 Sargentos Segundos (2nd Sergeants) z.+z TronLbetas (Trumoeters ) 9 Tarnitores (Drummers ) IL7 Cabcs Primeros (1st Corporals) .1Ut]- a z6u Cabos SegunCos (2nd Corporals) 332 iz+ Vet erans Miliria ? ?q? 1st Cl-ass Gunners J J'L ' 2no Class Gunners 1sL Cl-ass Drivers 1

2no Cl-ass Drivers L-)

On 15 Septenber 1813 the Spanish army formed five battalions of arti-l- lery train. Each battalion had tilree companies, two of train soldiers and one of cargo frain soldiers. Each conDany consisted of a teniente, a subteniente ani I02 soldiers, rvith I32 mul-es and 40 horses. The staff of the battalion consisted of a capitan, a senior adjutant and a junior adjutant. Though the Spanish army apparently had an impressive arLillery force this force was mostly on paper. The Spanish had tremendous problems with lack of guns, draft animals and mone)/, which consistently resulted in far fewer guns being deployed than tvere "authorized" by the Junta. :.v Spanish Guns

The guns the Spanish useC v/ere produced in Seville until 1810. They were of the Gribeauval design, i-e.4pCrs, Bpdrs, and 12pdrs. In 1811, when the internal supply of new cannon vanished with the capture of SebilIe, porli- er received a 12pdr carronade and two Bpdrs. In 1811 his artillery consisged of 40 field guns, composed of gpCrs and 5pdrs, ofl newer, lighter carriages. 'rl-rc Q.rlrc tvere probably of British manuf acture, where the 6pdrs could be either gritish, or captured French material. When the horse arLillery was organized in 1809 it appears to have been equipped with short Bpdr guns Ehat were Gribeauval- 4pdr cannons reamed out in Sewille to handle an Bpdr shot. When Sevi]1e fetl in 1810, the source of tneseFl-^^^ guns stopped and there were probably no further such weapons produceC. fndications are that the Spanish painted their gun carriages Iight gray. There is no clear indication of how rnany guns were to be in a battery and this cannot be derived from an analysis of the strength of the companies. What is

43 certain is that the nlmber of weapons in a battery was never consistent in the 'Ihe iield- cost. of the weapons, the frequency of which Ehey were captured, and Lhe mix of w3apcns used Late in the war guaranteed no consistency in eOuiDment. Another serious problem the Spanish faced was their lack of_ horses to draw the guns. As much as lhis afflicted the cavalry, it struck the artillery iar worse. Ttre n3t :3su1t was that the Spanish artj.llery was often drawn into battle by mules or oxen. This rendered it slow and highty wulnerable to the far more maneuverable and fase moving French army. Once engaged, the Spanish artillery tended to r-ighc from a fixed Locatj.on and seldom was able Lo rede- ploy during the cou:se of a battle.

Battle History of the Spanish Army

There are many things that have been wriEeen about the Spanish army and its rroops in this period: nost of them are not particularly flattering. Because of this, it is best to begin a discussion of t.heir battLe history with a nucrber of quoEaiions from period sources. The firsC and foremost observer of the performance of the Spanish on the batclefield was the Duke of Wellington. In a letter to the Marquis of Well.es- ley dated 24 Augusi, 1809, WeLlington relates he follovring:

"In the battle of Talavera, in which the Spanish army, with very trifling except:-ons, was not engaged, whole corps threw away their arms, and ran o=f in my presence, when they were neither attackeC nor threateneC with an at.tack, but frightened, I believe, by their ov/n f ire. "

+-h=r,r nl r rnrlor przor'rrl-h i nr-r " When these oa.:ardIy sol_diers I Llll C1wCly , LrI=y IJJ-L-rllllc! u vu!y Lrrrrr:, they meet; ano in their flight from Talavera, they plundered the baggage of the 3ritish army, rvhich was at the moment bravely engaged in their cause"

" I cannot easiil- conceive the unwillingness of of f icers in com- mand, or acting with troops, to report their misbehavior in pres- ence of the enerny, for where the troops misbehave no honor can be 'i Ara'''r i ro6l; and n this way I account f or the numerous histories we have of the brawery of the Spanish Troops. " :';v "I have found, upon inquiry and from experience, the instances of the misbehawior- of the Spanish troops Eo be so numerous, and those of their good behavior so few, that I must conclude that they are troops by no means to be depended upon; and then the question again arises, whether, being at Iiberty to join in co-operation with those troccs or not, I ought again to risk the King's army?"

"At the same time f see the difficulty in which the Government may be placed. Tireir army may be seized with one of those panic terrors to which they are ]iable, and may run off and leave every- thing exposed to instant loss. "

In a letter to the Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State, dated 25 August f809, Wellington says:

==AA "Bassecourt.'s corps, which was supposed to be the besE in Cuesta's army, and was engaged on our left in the mountains, at the battle of Talavera, was kept in check throughouc the day by one French i;:;rai ron : :.r, > corps has s ince runaway t rom the bridge ol r.Lzo- oispo, leaving its guns; and many of che men, accordrng to the usual Spanish custom, throwing away their arms, accouterments, and clothing. It is a curious circumstance respecting this affair at Arzobispo, (in which Soulc writes that the French took thirty pieces of canncn, ) that the Spanish ran off in such a hurry, that t-harr loft- rheir cannon loaded and unspiked; and that the French, alchough they drove the Spaniards from the bridge, did not think themselves st.rong enough to push after them... "

"This practice of running away, and throwing off arms, accouter- -^.^!^ ^--r tttgllLJ, cllrLl rclothing, is fatal to everything, excepting a re-assem- l'rlrr n€ t-ha vLl V! UrlV inen in a stat.e of nature, who as regularly perform the same maneuver the next time an occasion offers. Nearly 2,000 ran off on the evening of the 27th from the battle of Talavera, (not 100 yards +rom the place where I was standi.g, ) who were neither ^!s^^r-^r OLLCILJ('gL-l , ::c: threatened with an attack, and who were frightenecr only by th= noise of their own fire: they left their arms and accouterme::s on the ground, their officers went with them; and

rhorr :nri rhe LL , urru frroi t-ir,'e caval rw.f t yr*^nlrrn:lered f he haooaoe Of t_he British arirlz which had been sent to the rear. "

"Nothing ca;l be worse than the of f icers of the Spanish Army; and it is extraordinariJ-y that when a nat ion has devoted itself to !.rar, as this nat ion has , by the measures it has adopted in the 'r^^F F"^ -'3ars, -LO-L LwL/ yi so little progress has been made in any one branch of the mi l-rtary prof ess ion by any individual , and that the bus i - ness of an ar.my should be so littl-e unCerstood. They are reall-y children i:t che art of war, and I cannot say chat they do anyLhing as it oughr to be done, with the exceotion of running away anC assembling again in a state of nature. "

"I really believe that much of this deficiency of numbers,. compo- sition, discipline, and efficiency, is to be attributed to the ov i ct- i nn ^Cvernment Y of Spain. Tirey ha.;e attempted tO govern the ::* kingdom in a state of revolution, by an adherence old rules and arraFnmn -nd by5Lcril.>, ct, with the aid of what is called enthusiasm; and this l-ast is, i p f act, flo aid to accornplish anythi.g, and i-s only an excuse for the irregularity with which ewerything is done, and for the want oi discipline and subordination of the armies.r'

In another letter to the Marquis of Wellesley, from Bada1oz, dated 16 Septem- ber 1B 0 9 , lrlel l ington states :

"As long as the Spanish armies are suffered to continue the state 6r indiscio]ine and disorder in which they are at present , ii wi l1 be impossiole to continue in their neighborhood; as Ehey not only consume the provi s ions of the count ry , but wi I I not al- low the willagers to supply the British troops those provisions which thel' require, anc which the Spanish troops do not want. "

=_)AT rn another letter to Don Josef de carvajal, the Spanish Minister at War, in Cadiz, daced 4 December 1912, werlingcon poincs to two of t.he major causes of the spanish army's problems - no logisticaL supporc and a miserable officer corps. 1 (::

"Not only are your armies undisciplined and inefficient, and both off icers and sol-diers insubordinate from want, of pay, provisions, clothing, and necessities, and the consequent, endurance of misery for a long period of time, but the habits of indiscipline and insubordinat.ion are such, that even those corps which have been welL clothed and regularly paid by my direcLions, and have, to my knowledge, sol-dom, if ever, felt any privations for more t.han a year, are in as bad a state, and as litt.le to be depended upon as soldiers, ds the others. The desertion is immense, even from the troops last adverted to. I can assure your Excellency, Lhat the officers of the army in general (with some exceptions of officers, General and on the Staff, as well as attached to the regiments) take but little pains to appry a remedy to these evirs; and, upon the whole, I arn sorry to acknowledge to your Excellency, that I consider that I have undertaken a task of which the result is as little pronising as that which was ever und.ertaken by any indivi-d- ual- . "

"r certainly rras not aware, til very lateIy, of the real state of the Spanisr armv, or I should have hesitated before I should have charged myself rvith such an Herculean labor as its command; but having accepteci ihe command, I will not relinquish the task, because it is laborious and the success unpromising; but wil] exercise as long as I shall possess the confidence of the authori- ties who have conferred it upon me. It will be necessary, howev- €r, that ti-I3 Government should arm me wich powers to enable me to perform this task. Tt is my opinion,

"First; that ofircers should be promoted, and shculd be appoint.ed to commands, solely at my recommendation.

rrQor-^nril r' ' rurJ , that I shoul-d have the power of dismissing f rom the service those whom I should think deserving of such punishment.

,rb "Third1y; Ehat those resources of the state which are applica- ble to the payment, or equipment, or supply of t.he troops, shoul-d be applied in such a manner as I might recommend.....

During the Al-buera Campaign the Spanish troops under Gabriel Mendizebal r-^a^!^^ ^nd y r_lo,cLd5 c,J Don Pedro Caro y Sureda, the Marquis of Romana, found themselves engaged in the battle of Gebora on 19 February 1811. Their performance was observed by George Madden who wrote [he following to Wel- i insfon:

"The deed is done ! What I have all along prognosticated has taken place ! Nor could it be oEherwise thought a miracle; the Spanish Generals, the Spanish armies, are as I have all along said, ful-I of sound and fury siqnifyinq nothinq.',

46 " -. - at daylight this morning I was woke by an ord.er to mount the brigade on horseback, and it $ras done immediately, I repaired to General Mendizebal to learn the news (He, as) ewer prov(d) to deceive himself. "It was nothing," a few French only had passed the..GeLrora. Soon this.auoment--ecl .int-o a few ca.-,al.r:.,, but as it became more clear it proved [.o be the whole French r':rr='l rrr -- r . General Mendizebal soon af ter discovered that thev had placed a few riflemen behind their horsemen, but not many, .ri "rt was nothing!" The attack atong the whole front and left became, however, so serious in a few minutes, thac I was returned forward to inspect what was going oD, and sorry am I to observe t:at everything except regularity was the resul-t of my observa- tion."

In his famous study on the , the French General Foy provides us wirh the foll-owing comments on the nature of the Spanish .

")'iature has endowed the Spaniard with the greatest part of the (rral-.-'l .i + -i ^^ .. lt les which are requisite to f orm a good soldier: he is -^"r .:^j ^..^ - r=rrgrous, and religion, by elevating the thoughts of man, r:nders him more capable of that forgetfulness of se1f, that moral e::thusiasm, that promptness to make sacrifices, for which war furnishes daily occassions. Ca1m, and thoroughly imbued with the p:incipals of justice, he is naturally disposed to subordination, i. the orders given to him are not absurd; he is susceptible of l.ial:m attachment to an able and inte I l igent leader . His sobriety is extreme; his patience is ine>:haustiable; he lrves upon a n i I nh = rrr ^n a bit of bread rubbed vri th garl ic; a bed is a super- €1,'-i F'' Fa L.:- - l-^ -:^ -L^-^J -r - - ! i lur-ty to nim he is accustomed to sleep on the ground and in the clen air. |trext to the French, the Spaniards are the best for long narches and climbing mountains. The Spanish soldier is neither f-rrt^r.arrl! J: wG! Lr, rl-l.fnAa a prater, nor quarrelsome, nor a ] rbert ine, and he is v3r-y sel-dorn seen intoxicated. He has l-ess capacity than the F:ench, he has more than the Germans anC Engl-ish; he loves his ccuntry, and talks of it with rapture; he has but one anti-mili- tary fault, it is dirtiness and indolent habits, which generare Cisease, and spread among the sick a disorganizing ]owness of spirits. " :!:* "There was not much discipline in the Spanish armies;1 the non- ccmmissioned officers were but little respected; ooe third of the oif icers were taken from among them: the remaining tv/o thirds were fi]led Llp from the cadets. According to the ancient regulations the cadet.s were to prove their noble descent. This was no dif f i- c'-ilt matter in a country of which a twentieth of the population is noble- rt was, however, Do longer reqired, except in a part of tne cavalry. In the same proportion that a numerous preferment of ncn-commissioned officers is gooc and usefu] in an armv entirefv

1 - The oenal laws are exceedingly mild: soldiers are not amenable to military tribunals for all kinds of crime; the penalty of death is rare, and cannoE be infiicted without rhe annrnharion*Y.v* of the king or of the captain-general of the prowince.

+/ recruited by military conscripEion, it is improper in an army raised from the dregs of the population. The Spanish non-commis- sioned officers were not. men whose abilit.ies gave them a claim to promot ion . 'l

5)iFCr)'a,. - -was"-iequired "No iCirav, oo previoris' iir!'tructibh, to become an officer of infanry or cavalry. The schools which had formerly been inst.ituted at Puerto de Santa Maria, for the first of these rJr-d.r.rurrcb,l----^l^^^ aod at Ocana for the second, had been suppressed within the lasc twent.y years. "

The Battle of Baylen - 19 Julv 1808

BayIen is the one bright spot in the history of the Spanish armies ouring the Peni-nsuLar War. The French General DuponE,, commanding 13, 000 Lroo:DS, vJas moving towards Cordova on 6 June . In Cordova, masses of armed Spanish :oeasants were gathering. In addit.ion there rvere 12,000 volunteers and i,400 regular troops. Ducont encountered the Spanish at the Alcolia Bridge, oo the Guadalqui- -r'ir River. Though his troops were green conscripts, they smashed Don Pedro's -v:inr,-= vv, ---6111- vs*rrr..1 i nn rL.i r. -1,.r.i ^ c,. matter of minutes and sending it f leeing pasE Cordova. Dupcri chen occupied Cordova. Du-.>cnt soon founC himself cut off in a region rilled with hostile peo- ple. His couriers could not get past the guerrillas and bands of Spanish In addition, General CasEaflos had an drF,r/ of 34,000 men in the -,'ici:IiL-,,. DuponL seems co have not had any idea $rhat to do and remained siai:on::y. The Spanish took advantage of this to strike at the stationary

Ge:-r3ra1 Castaf,os formed his army into three cclumns- The first, L2,000 nan, whlch he commanded himself, was to move on Andujar. The second column ',;as unda:j Coupigny and conLained 8,000 men. Jt r{as Lo move against Vilfa lieu:"':.. The third column, 10,000 men under the Swiss General Reding, had orders ao move to Mengibar. Whei the Spanish offensive began on 14 July, Dupont did noc concentrate nj.s iorces. He only made minor adjustments to his iispositions. The Spanish soon ciiscovered that rhey had underestimated Dupont's strength and they e " (rnnp.i rhei - :eearrlt. Despite that, Reding succeeded in scattering the small French force ,_ before :lim and crossed the Cuadatquivir. Generaf Gccert attempted to stop the ''':> Frenah rout, but was mortally wounded and his own command fell back, The French leftr flank had been turned. The French acced badly and evacuaEed Baylen. T'heir officer force pan- ickeC anC Dupont failed to take any action to d3re:mine the location or size of t.he Spanish armies. Finally, on 17 July Dupont's troops began to move. Reding pulled up 14,000 men and 20 guns in a strong position in the hills Co the left of Bay- fen. Dupont's vanguard commander, Chaberc, underestimated the strength of rhe Spanish belore him. He opened fire with his single battery and sent his 3,000 :nen io=vrard. Hopelessly out numbered and swept ',vith converging fire, the French vr3re repulsed with heawy }osses. Duoont arrived and took command of the situafion. His trooDs were

f ar i cue:l brz theirurrur! lenot-hrrruIrYurtI marr-harrq!vrr sl.and laUnched twO more UnSuCCeSsful attackS. Duponc iound himself commandingexhausted conscripts, with 14,000 Spaniards in strcng pos it ions bef ore him, and General Castailos closing on his rear with !2 , ACj rrore men.

+t1AA Around 12:30 p.m., Dupont launched one more attack. rt made progress, but Dupont had no reserves with which to exploi-t his success. The French army coll-apsed. Dupont's morale failed and he capitulated to the Spanish army. rn acdit-ion fo sur:renderi.ns fhnse iroops i-,r''edi-are-'l_)r,,.ri.th hirn, Dtrp:;.ti fo;l-ishi_7 or-rier^ed. Vedel. tc . sr.trrencier i::s d.i -ri s icn, e\-.a thcugh it couli. lla.,c cs:apcj with ease.

The Battle of Cardadeau 16 December1808

General Vives formed his small force, of some 8,500 inf antry G0O cava1- rv anrl 1.1 LI t art\-. r t-dIloODS, on a Steep, wooded ridge in the BesOs Val]ey, near Carda- deu - The French general St. Cyr formed his 13,000 men into a massiwe column anC organized a single massive blow. Though a crude tactic, it proved effective against a force of raw Span- ish recruits who were susceptible to shatter under such hammer blows. Despite this, General Pino, commanding the head of the French column, sought. to deploy his units and engage the Spanish in a fire fight. To his surprise, pino suifered a repulse. A furious St. Cyr rode forward and took personal commancl.

Irc !rs^r^=ni796l uvr I Yqrrr his force into a single, narrow column and l-aunched hi_s arrow at the heart of the Spanish Army. The Spanish line mel-ted away and the French broke through. The French cavalry svrept in to complete the victory and the terrified Spanish fled the field, leaving over 2,500 casualties and most of tir=ir cannon. They had, however, inflictecl about 500 casualties on the Fr ench, mostly as a result of pino' s actions .

'I'he Battle of Ocar-ia - 19 Novenrber 1809

Ccafla was the largest cavalry engagement of the Peninsular war. The French vang,uard, 3,500 men under Milhaud and Paris, encountered Freire's ma=sed cavalry. Freire commandeC abcut 4,000 men organized into three diwi- sr.3ns under Don Juan Bernuy, Don Jos6 Rivas and Don Miguel March. The Spanish ca..'alr',r tvas f ormed in col-umns, whicl'i was noL a good formation in which to receive a cawalry attack - Paris' light division charged the first line of Spanish cavalry and cut 'i aLt- tr'\Lv 1,'---J,vli or.o< only to falter before Fr:eire's main lirie. Milhaud then lead his rlv';nnnno r^rward in a furious charge t-hat carved a blooCy hole in the middle of the Spanish cavalry. A wild melee soon erupted. Despite their numbers, Ehe Spanish could not resist the French attack ','f? anc l-ost 400 casualties. The French pursued them, only to stop as they en- countered Areizaga's main body. The French now founC themsel-wes faced by the Army of the Mancha, which contained 45,000 infantry and 5,500 cavalry The French moved 3O cannon opposite Ocafla to contain the Spanish teft and deployecl two infantry brigades anC KinE Joseph's reserve. At the same time Werl6's Poles and Leva1's Ger- Ir:a:]s, supported by Girarcl's division, marched against the Spanish right wing, rvhrle the French cavalry swung behinC the olive groves and enveloped the Spanish flank. The battle was a slovr , grinding baIt]-e until the 3,500 French cawa]ry suCdenly appeared on the Spanish f tank. Freire's cavalry stood on the f j-ank to Droiect it, but were driven from the field in disorder. After detaching a f e''.' troops to pursue the beaten Spanish caval_ry, Milhaud swung his cavalry against the exposed flank of Lacy's infantry. The cavalry attack was catastrophic to the Spanish, vrho found thernselwes qIr:tnk rLlLaLA LJyl-rrr ',tfantryir to the front and cavalry in the flank and rear. The -l French rrr r i nk rr rn'l vLra\-r\ry ..,'Ied up the entire Spanish wing, capturing and killing thousands.

49 Areizaga's infantry met the same faEe. Unable to deploy, Lhey threw down their arms and surrendered, exposing the rest of the spanish line Eo che French attack. The second line also collapsed and the spanish army began to , flow from the field. -:- OnIy zayas' division deployed and performed with any military skili' Ic formed the rearguard and held the French at bay. This tiny force marched for five miles, holding the Spanish rear until it was swept away in Lhe herd of terrified fugitives from the crushed and rouEed Spanish divisions. After ttte battle Areizaga evenEually rallied 21,OOO infantry and 3,000 cavalry' The d.ivisions of Lacy, Zerain and Jacom6 were, becween them, able to muster only 3,500 men. Spanish sources indicate that the French kiIled 4,000 spaniards and captured another 12, 000.

Battle of Albuera - 16 May L811

At. the battle of Albuera, or L5 May 1811-, the allied southern flank was formed by Blake's Spanish army. It was deployed in two lines facing two streams when the French atLack commenced. Wat.ching the battle dewelop, Beresford assumed his center was to be attacked. However, the mass of French n:rretrr,z Fn.eAred |-o the south followed by a column of infantry. The French cavafry rouEed the Spanish cavafry as 19 battalions of French iniantry emerged from the woods. Beresford ordered Blake to form a new front facing to the south and there was adequate time for them to do this as they were not yet engaged' Blake, however, did not obey th3 orders, believing that the attack would come from the east. OnIy the four battalions of Zayas' Division turned to face in the proper direction. It then advanced to the crest of a low hill to await the French attack. This tiny force of Spanish itas to soon be struck by the most massave single at.tack of the Peninsular War. Tlto fulI infantry divisions $'ith more than 8,400 men advanced in what appeared to be a single column with only a light skirmish screen in front of them. They struck zayasr troops, who were probably in three deep lines - The Spanish troops behaved unusually well and brought the leading French diwision !o a stand. Blake's only batcery went into action on their left, firing at close range on both the French and the Spanish infantry' The spanish held until the second French division closed on their right flank and broke their resolve. The Spanish were pushed back' 'rhan -t.. .>ma |-ha famous French cavalry attack Lhat sent the French cavafry into che spanish rear. At this time part of zaya's infantry finally broke. They had Iost nearly 30? of their inicial stlengch in killed and wounded. This was cert.ainly the finest spanish momen! of the war and Lheir brave action no doubt saved Beresford's army. It is somewhat difficutt to summarize the preceding discussion of the bartle history of the spanish army. The British t.hought little of them, no matter how they looked at them, and they made particular point of the fow quality of the spanish officer corps. wellington wanted to be able tro dis- charge any officer he dj.d not feel was satisfactory. The various account.s of the battles supports that one of the major faults with Lhe spanish was their officer corps. only two appear to have had any milicary qualities of note: zayas and Reding. In the other battles the spanish generals betrayed their men with poor dispositions, bad milj-tary decisions, and. their almost totat lack of formal mj.litary training' on the oiher hand, the quality of the spanish soldier is more difficult to descri-be. General Foy spoke highly of cheir virtues and praised them as a

50 martial people - However, he aLso pointed out that they were often recruited from t.he dregs of society. And yet, at Talavera they were frightened by the sound of tfreir own musketry. The later, however, can be ascribed to the lc,:rurlc c-li- tnelr orLtCerS tO train them in the uSe Of their weapons anCi Co cortrol- them during baCCle. It is simpl-est to say that, despite their ardor to ]iberate their coun- t:ry, they erere poorly trained, Riserably supported by their nacions logistical_ sysc.em^!,-!^n ano-}-l commanded^--l^J byL--- the!1-^ l-east1^^-L knowledgeable!--^--1 ^l--^La - off- -c: icers in the wor1d. They i{ere totaliy outclassed by the French and ic is often argued thaL their only v:-:tory, Baylen, was an accident spawned by a chain of evenrs more controlled by their aiversary than any skill on their part.

::?

51 Strengthof the SpanishInfantry March L808 Nrmber of TotaI Numberof Tota I . --Begieg$_ Battat ions St renoth Liqht In.fantrv gatta!!_q6 Ltr_erg$ ., -*,"guardias espafrotes 3 3,192 1.o de A.rag6n 1,3h6 Guardias watonas 3 2,681 2.o de Arag6n 1,266 Rey 3 1,425 1.o de Catatuia 1,211 Reina 3 1,400 2.o de Catatuffa 726 Principe 3 1,377 Tar ragona 1,183 Saboya 3 1,005 Gerona 1,240 Corona 3 972 1." de Barcetona 1,170 Africa 3 968 2." de Barcetona 1,31+1 Zamora 3 1,166 Cazadores de Barbastro 1,102 Sori a 3 1,381 Votuntarios de Vatencia 1,283 C6rdoba 3 865 (Votuntarios de) Navarra 1,004 Guadatajara 3 1,977 CampoMayor 1,194 Sevi [ [a 3 1,238 Granada 3 1,183 Cazadores Vatencia 3 993 Ja6n 618 3 1,631 Badaj oz 623 Espaia 3 1,107 Sevi[ [a 581 Totedo 3 1,128 Bfrgos 611 l.la[lorca 3 1, B'19 Badaj oz 623 Burgos 3 1,331 Sevi[ [a 581 l'lurc i a 3 1,832 Lugo 623 Leon 3 1,265 Granada 587 Cantjbr i a 3 1,094 Leon 635 Astur i as 3 2,173 0vi edo 577 Fijo de Ceuta 3 1,305 Cordoba 618 Navarra 3 892 Murci a 598 Arag6n 3 1,291 Truj i l.Io oul Am6rica 3 958 Jerez 608 Princesa 3 2,039 Ecija 623 Extremadra 3 840 Ciudad Rodrigo 619 l'|5t aga 3 9?1 Logrofro 592 Ja6n 3 1,755 Si grienza 615 Ordenes Mi I i tares 3 708 Toro 578 Votuntarios de Casti t ta 3 1,557 Sor^i a 616 .-.:F Votuntarios det Estado 3 742 Laredo 615 Voluntarios de ta Corona 3 1,536 0rense 618 Borbon 3 1, 61t+ Sant i ago Pontevedra 602 Foreiqn Infantr I ments Tuy 702 Irtanda (lrish) 3 583 Betanzos 633 Hibernia (lrish) 3 924 M5t aga 435 Uttonia (lrish) 3 {+21 Guadi x 622 NSpotes (Neapoti tan) 3 358 Ronda 608 tJimpffen #1 (Swiss) ? 2,079 Buj a I ance 628 Reding #2 (Swiss) 2 1,573 Cuenca 510 Reding #3 (Swiss) 2 1,809 SaI amanca 630 Betschart #4 (Swiss) ? 2,051 Atc5zar de San Juan otv

Traxter (Swiss) ? Irt)l Chinchit La 592 Preux (Swiss) 2 1,708 Lorca 596 Vattadotid 596 Hondofredo 6?5

52 Nwrber of Totat Cazadores Battations St rength To I edo 613 Ci r.rrJa,:JR ea I 609

; I ^ t. ^o n. UVU Ptasencia 537 Segovia 625 Monterrey 639 Composte I a 633

Tota t s Line Infantry 119 52,205 Light Infantry 1Z 14,066 Swiss Infantry 12 10,877 ProvinciaI Infantry 50 31,638

ProvinciaI Mititia Grenad i ers 1st Battation of the 1st Division 1 BB3 Znd Battation of the 1st Division 1 846 Znd Division 2 1,536 1st Battation of the 4th Division 1 623 Znd Battal ion of the 4th Division 1 762 3rd Division 2 1,519

108,786

:'"v

53 Spanish Infantry March 1814

...-Req i ment .*g- St renqth Rey 837 Toro 263 Reina (became Gaticia) ? II Soria 1,213 Pr fnc i pe 1,011 Laredo 926 Saboya ? Orense 621 Corona 1,140 Sant i ago 1,172 Afr i ca 806 Pontevedra 1,033 Zamora 886 Tuy 713 Soria 881 Betanzos 836 C6rdoba 928 I I Guadix 750 Guadat aj ara 848 Ronda 883 Sevi t Ia 857 Cuenca 1,203 Granada ?94 AtcSzar de San Juan 1,217 Vatencia 1,1t3 Chinchil.ta 1,oB1 Zaragoza 26!, Ptasencia 865 Espaha 756 Monteray 1,115

Totedo l, luq Composteta 286 HaI t orca 827 Mondofredo 785 BIrgos 1,?38 l4urc i a 971 Newty Raised Regiments: Leon vu) PaIma 1,O?1 Cant5bri a 1,048 Baza 652 Astur i as 1,116 Almeria 880 Fijo de Ceuta 1,200 I Guadix 716 Navarra 983 Atpujarras 91t, Aragon 1,183 Urget (cuadro) 548 Am6ri ca 1,179 Badajoz 1,062 Princesa 1,218 Benaven t e 1,125 Extremadra I I Votuntarios de Madrid 8lr5 M5[ a9a 725 BaiIen 1,109 Ja6n FernandoVII (1st Bn) 766 0rdenes Mititares 282 Lena B86 Votuntarios de Casti t Ia Pravi a 902 Votuntarios deI Estado I nf i esto 997 -,y.- Votuntarios de Ia Corona 1,014 Castropo I 866 Borbon 1,069 Veteranos de Ia Patria 700 Gaticia (ex-Reina) 914 Cangasde Tineo 981 Irtanda 939 Leates Manresanos 977 Hi berni a 1,226 BarceI ona 986 Uttonia 854 I I Princesa 902 I Votuntarios de Navarra 1,342 ProvinciaI Re i ments: II Votuntarios de Navarra 1,282 Ja6n 7lr4 III Votuntarios de Navarra 1,?59 I I Badajoz 1,259 A Imansa 197 II Sevitla 755 Canarias 1,001 I I Burgos 789 Union 1,200 Lugo 203 San Fernando(ist Bn) 978 0vi edo 1,095 Ampurdan I+51 Truj i t Lo 861 CSdiz 924 Ci udad- ReaI 938 Cansadosde GaIicia 83B Si gr.ienza 943 I I Guadatajara 1,600

54 (cuadro) Reunion ? Votuntarios de Jaen 1,214 Ar I anza 1,200 Tiradores de Catatufra 848 Mata15 733 Cazadores de Catatufra 1,181 Granaderos Ce Casti I l a 800 Votrrntarios de Carclona B!r5 I Votuntarios .de..J.:turias 1.173 .Cazadoree.Ce l'la[[orcal. 972 V Granaderos 670 Votuntarios de Madrid 1,065 I I Asturias 1,091 Cazadores Estranjeros 816 Legion estranjera 824 Tiradores de Doyte 971 Constitucion 1,442 1" C5ntabro 1,034 Granaderos de[ 3"t ujercito 91t, 1" Iberia 90t+ I Atava 1,257 2" Iberia 511 I I Atava 346 3" Iberia 873 I I I Atava 718 t+" Iberia 827 Generat de ta reserva de Andalucia 883 1" Tiradores de Castit ta 87? Generat det 1er ejercito 1,161 2" Tiradores de CastiI ta 569 I I Principe 888 3" Tiradores de CastiI ta 1,127 I Aragon 1,oBB 1" Tiradores de Cantiibri a 941 I I Arag5n 1,507 2" Tiradores de Cant5bri a 1,101 'l I I I Ara96n , 185 3' Tiradores de Cant5bri a 925 IV Votuntar-ios de Navarra 1,259 1' Vi zcaya 1.069 Ri vagorza 100 2" Vi zcaya 1,052 ProvisionaI de Mahon 816 3' Vi zcaya 975 i" Guiptjzcoa 928 Liqht Infantry 2" Guiprizcoa 928 1" Votuntarios de Arag5n 971 3o Guiprizcoa 850 2" Yotuntarios de Arag6n 1,392 1" Votuntarios de CataIufra 999 2o Votuntarios de CataIufra 897 Ta r ragona 9Bt+ Gerona 257 Votuntarios de Vatencia (cuadro) ? Cazadores VoIuntarios de Ia Corona1,10{* Campo-mayor t+07

Votuntarios de Navarra YVl

New Liqht Infantry Regiments Cazadores de Vatencia 1,455 Tiradores de Cadiz 1,197 :!v Votuntarios de ta Victoria 7t+2 Tiradores de M6rida 890 Votuntarios de Santiago lr54 Cazadores de Carmona 822 Tiradores de Busa 572 Votuntarios de Leon 1,111 Votuntarios deI Rivero 1,117 Cazadores det Rey 160 Votuntarios de Guadatajara 9lrs Tiradores de [a Bureva 1,054 Votuntarios de Soria 1,081 Votuntarios de Motina 1,103 Votuntarios de Rioja 1,289 Votuntarios de Numantinos 1,284 Legion Estremafra 1,200 T i radores de Siglienza 801 Votuntarios de AI icante 1,31*5

55 Spanish Regiments Raised May 1808to March f814 Line Infantrv .,.J:. ,, ' ' r,No 6f blrength Date 0",.

1' Tarragona, prenier tercio hiquetetes f y:O etcho. Rovira ,11/7lBg 2" p.emier 5/15/08 L6dria, tercio niquetetes 1 ga7 pabto l-ago Sl15lo8 ,11/7f09 1" Gerona, prenier te.cio miqueletes .l 1,028 Ramonde cdrles Hanresa, premie. S/15/Oa nn'log tercio niquetetes 1 7A1 Be.na.do Ti.rett 5/15/OB 11/7/Og 1' cervera, prenie. tercio miquetetes 1 a74 Antonio Vi ladonar Tortosa. p.emier 5/1t,/08 11/7/Og tercio niqiretetes 1 1,080 Jos6 llontg.6s 5/15/08 11/l/Og l" vich, prenier tercio miqueletes 1 696 Jos6 ]larcos de sais j/1SlOA Hataro, prehier 1Zl1O/Og tercio miqueletes 1 256 pont lta.iano y Ramis SllitOB 11/7/Og seo de lrrgel, premier tercio miquetetes 1 sZt Thom6sGarcia 8erga, premier Sl1SrcA f/7/Og tercio miquetetes 1 213 pabto Andreu ,/15rca 11/l/Og 1" Tata.n, premier tercio niqueletes 1 511 fitipe de Fteries p/n/09 ce.daffa, premier Sl1|,na tercio niquetetes 1 8OO Francisco Gener y pons 5/15/oB vaf t de Aran, premier 1117/Og tercio miquetetes 1 727 Juan Dueros Barcetona, premier 5l1l|oa 11/Z/Og tercio miquetetes I 806 Jos6 liateu 5/15rca l/Z/09 2' vich, segundotercio miquetetes .l 581 Diego o,Reytti 5/15/Oa etrclog 2' Ldrida, segundote.cio .l niqueletes 981 Antonio vidat 2o 5/15rca f/Z/09 Tarragona. sesundo tercio niquetetes 1 S43 Vicente Amat S/15/OB 11/7/Og 2" Gerona, segundo tercio miquetetes 1 111 Francisco llaria l.titii 5/,li/g8 Ampurdan, segundo 1Z/10/Og tercio niquetetes 1 1,174 Manuetl{ontesinos S/15/0a f/Zlog Iguatada, segundo tercio niquetetes I 53, Antonio Soto 3' 5/1rOA 11/7/Og Ldrida, tercer tercio mique(etes 1 pedro 8OO Ltavanera Slllrca 5,B11OB 3" vich, tercer tercio miquetetes 1 8OO Vehtu.a Dezcatlar 3o cerona, 5/15/OB 11/Z/Og tercer tercio miquetetes I 1,000 FranciscoFerrer y pons 5/15/Og 11/Z/Og 2" Cervera, segundotercio niquetetes 1 8OO AndreasBacigatupi p/fi/09 2" Tatarn S/15 |OA , segundotercio miquetetes 1 ZSO Jos6 Maria A.ce 5/15/08 1Z/Io/Og Figu:ras, segundotercio miqueletes I IrO Juan carl6s cranctters, ,,15/OB 12/10/09 segundotercio miquetetes 1 7gO FranciscoBarcet6 SlISloS 5/3tna 1'" L6fida, cuarto tercio miquetetes j 620 Juan Baxet osuna 5/15/08 5/31/08 3 2,000 Juan FranciscoGarcia S/$/OA Peias de San pedro 3/rc/11 I l'uuu Pedro [a trlota r- Fernando 5l2o/08 t/3t/og vlr 1 840 Pedro Dejui 5/27/08 6/12/09 l" tnfante Don cart6s I A40 Remisio Orltara 5/27/08 cangas de Tineo 6/12/09 ip 1 840 FfanciscoBattesteros Navia 5|27/08 8/31t11 1 840 F.anciscoSierra Lansreo SIZZ/OB S/B/12 1 840 sacho Valdds Ltanes 5/27/oa 4111/11 1 840 Jos6 Junco q$/11 castropot 5/27/oa 1 840 Antonio fiaim6 siero S/27/oB afil/14 I 840 fienendode L(anes satas S/ZZ/08 S,/B/jz 1 840 c.esorio Caiedo Viltaviciosa S/27/OS slalp I s4O pedro peoh Grado 5\Z7/OB S/a/12 I 840 Dieso ctarck 5lZ7/oB Candjs y Luanco 1/14/,11 1 840 Juan cohzatez Cienfuegos Infiesto 5/22108 1/11/11 I 840 Juan Gatdiano g/3t/11 Covadonga S/27/os 1 840 pedro Mendezde Vigo Pravia S/27/Oa 5/8/12 1 840 Francisco iloreda 5/27toa cangas de onis 8l3l/11 1 840 salvador Escanton 5/27lol Rivad Esetta 5/8/12 1 A4O Juan de Dios euiros 5/27/08 ljote: The date trreiortned'r 5/8/12 is the date the unit ,,as absorbed into another formation of disbahded, i,e. the date it ceasedto exist.

56 No. of Strength Date Date Reqirnent Battal ions llhen Raised ConmandinqOf f icer Rai sed Reformed Gijon 1 840 l'lanueI Rato 5/27/08 5/B/1? avi 1 < ta t1) [ 6s 8aQ RamonMirada Sotis 5/27/oB - rt vt r\ .!-c.:rl 1 . -3./00 Jair."e Dr i::gct;tt 5 /?.7/08 R ;71 t't l. CoI unga 1 840 Jos6 Argdet les 5/27 /08 4/ 14/11 1' Votuntarios de Aragon defensores de ta Patria 1,000 FlanuelViana 5/?B/08 11/26/08 2" Votuntarios de AragSn defensores de ta Patria 1,000 Pedro Hernandez 5/28/08 3/2/15 3" Votuntarios de Arag6n defensores de ta Patria 1,000 FernandoPascuat s/28/08 3/2/15 4" Vo[untarios de Aragon defensores de Ia Patria 1,000 SanchoSa t azar 5/28/08 11/26/08 5" Votuntarios de Aragon defensores de ta Patria 1 1,000 Vincente Jimenez 5/28/oB 11/?6/08 Votuntarios de Bonja 1 700 Diego Navarro 5/28/08 11/26/A8 Votuntarios de Jaca 1 1,000 Geronimo Rocatat I ada 5/28/08 11/28/08 a VoIuntarios de Daroca I 700 Manual Carbon 5/28/08 1/9/12

4 1" Votuntarios de Catatayud I 800 J.Gard6sde Marcit [a 5/28/08 2/ 19/09

2" Votuntarios de Catatayud I 800 P.Gonzalezde Ag0ero 5/28/08 11/26/08 1o Votuntarios rebajados de TerueI 1 1,000 Antonio Cuadros 5/29 /08 11/26/AB 4 2" Votuntarios rebajados de Teruet t 1,000 Ambrosi o Assi n 5/29 /08 11/26/08 Votuntarios de Caspe I 300 Antonio Benavides 5/29 /08 11/26/oB Votuntarios de Atbarracin 1 300 Manuel Escobedo 5/29 /08 11/26/08

Votuntarios de AIcafriz I 700 Pedro Etota 5/29 /08 11/26/08 Votuntanios de Tauste 1 30/+ Joaquin Urrut i a 5/?9/08 11/26/08

1" Votuntarios de de Huesca I 1,000 Fetipe Perena 5/29 /08 2/ 19/09 1 2" Votuntarios de de Huesca t 1,000 HanuetVil.taha 5/29 /08 5/1t+/10 3'Votuntarios de de Huesca 1 1,000 AmbrosioVittaba 5/29 /oB 11/26/08 Nuestra Sefiora de Pitar ? 1,500 Loronzo Zerezo 5/?9 /08 11/26/08 Reserva de Arag6n 1 1, 000 Josri Cuca[ 6n 5/29 /08 7/1/10 1" Fusi I i eros de Arag6n

a ( or Fusi t i eros de PaI afox) I 1,000 Antonio de Torres 5/29/AB 2/19/09 2" Fusitieros de Aragon I 1,000 Geronimode Torres 5/29 /08 11/26/08 1" Votuntarios de Barbastro I 1,000 Jos6 de Sangenis 5/?9 /08 11/26/08 2o Votuntarios de Earbastro

I (or Pardos de Arag5n) I 1,000 Pedro Pedrosa 5/29 /08 11/26/08 :p 3o Votuntarios de Barbastro 1 1,000 Marqu6sde Ayerve 5/2e /oB 11/26/08 Votuntarios de Cartagena 3 1,500 Joaquin OvatIe 5/30/08 11/26/08 Votuntarios de Chetva 1 800 Francisco Martinez 5/30/08 2/ 19/09

1" Votuntarios de Sevitta I 840 Joaquin Ctarobout 5/30/oB 3/10/11

2" Votuntarios de Sevitta I 840 l'larqu6s Dos-Hermanas 5/30/08 3/2/15

3' Votuntarios de Sevitta I 840 Juan Maria Maestre 5/30 /08 3/1/10 4" Votuntarios de Sevitta 1 840 Gonzato Ramirez 5/30/oB 5/1/14 5" Votuntarios de Sevitta 1 840 e Hedina Verdes y Cabafras5/30/08 11/15/10 1" Votuntanios de Granada 1 1,000 Francisco de Cordova 5/31/08 9/1/08 2" Votuntarios de Granada 1 1,000 Miguel de Haro 5/31/oB 9/ 1/OB 3" Votuntarios de Granada 1 1,000 Josti Gonzatez 5/31/08 9/1/08

4" Votuntarios de Granada I 1,000 Isidro Uriate 5/31/08 9/1/08

5" Votuntarios de Granada. I 1,000 GonzatoEnriquez 5/3t/08 9/1/AB 6" Votuntarios de Gnanada 1 1,000 Juan Enriquez 5/31/08 9/1/08 7" Votuntarios de Gnanada 1,000 Vincente Abe[[o 5/31/08 9/1/OB 1" Votuntarios de Murcia 1 800 l'lanueIMetgarejo 5/31/08 2/ 19/09

4 2' Votuntarios de Murcia I 800 F.Trujitto de Satas 5/31/08 2/19/09

57 No. of Strength Date Date Regiment Eattations tJhen Raised ConmandinqOfficer Raised Reformed 3" Votuntarios de Murcia 1 800 Juan de Peffafiel 5t3r/08 2/19/09 4' lotuntarios de_.Hprcia _-,., .- _ - , 1 800 Viscondede Huertas 5/3t/08 9/28/08 **u"5o_ Voluntarios {e Murcia 1 800 Lino Trujitto 5/3t/08 2/19/09- LaF6 2 1,?18 MarianoUse[ [ 5/31/08 6/21/08 Votuntarios del Turia 3 1,800 VincenteGonzatez Moreno 5/3tlOB ?/19/09 2o Vatencia 2 1,200 AntonioPini t Ios 5/31/A8 ?/19/09 2" Saboya 2 1,200 J. Gonzatezde Castro 5/31/08 11/1/ 11 Votuntarios de Harchena 1 400 Jos6 Satmage 5/31/08 9/?6/09 Bajadoz 3 2,115 R. Garcia de Linares 6/?/08 3/2/15 1o Votuntarios escorates de Leon 1 600 Vincente Bernat 6/5/08 1/?0/11 1" Votuntarios de Leon 3 ?,500 Jos6 Antonio Zappino 6/5/08 7/14/08 2" Votuntarios de Leon 3 2,500 FeI ipe Zamora 6/5/08 7/11/08 3" Votuntarios de Leon 3 2,500 Fernando Capaccie 6/5/08 7/14/08 Votuntarios de ta Canat de Berchin 1 530 Antonio Sarsa 6/6/08 12/30/08 Vetez l.lataga 2 2,400 Jos6 de Estrada 6/7/08 3/1/1A Benavente (escorates) 1 800 F. de Mur y Verdejo 6/B/08 3/2/15 Votuntarios de Borb6n 1 800 Mariano Bianchoni 6/10/08 2/19/09 Votuntarios Castettanos de FernandoVIII 2 1,600 Juan Vauti sta 6/11/08 10/10/11 1o Votuntarios de Ciudad-Rodrigo 1 1,000 Juan Martinez 6/12/08 7/10/10 2' Votuntarios de Ciudad-Rodrigo 1 1,000 ManueI Barranco 6/ 1?/08 7/10/10 3o Votuntarios de Ciudad-Rodrigo 1 1,000 Jos6e Quintani[ [a 6/12/08 7/10/10 Votuntarios titerarios de Vattadoid 1 500 Juan Satcedo 6/13/08 7/1t,/08 Atpujarras 2 2,400 Jose Moreno 6/14/08 3/2/ 15 Votuntarios de Patma 1 733 Harqu6s de Vivot 6/15/08 3/2/ 15 Gastadores de Arag5n 1 300 Antonio Sangenis 6/15/08 1/9/12 Puerta-Quemada 1 300 Miguet Abad 6/ 15/08 11/26/08 Puerta de Santa Engracia 1 300 Jos6 Zamora 6/15/08 11/26/08 2o Fernando VI | 2 i,000 Pabto Casans 6/18/08 3/20/25 Suizos de Arag6n 1 500 Adr i an lJaI ker 6/21/08 2/19/09 Votuntarios de honor de [a real universidad de Totedo 1 500 Barthotom6 obeso 6/30/08 12/11/ 09 Rea[ Haestranza de Rondo 1 800 Francisco Aygnaviva 7/11/08 1/20/10 2' Princesa 2 1,500 RamonAtvear 7/15/08 3/?/1s 1' Votuntarios de Madrid 3 3,700 Antoni o Comas 7/15 /08 3/ 1/09 2' Votuntarios de Madrid 2 1,600 Maguet Armengol 7/17/08 3/2/ 15 Reunion de Arag6n 3 1,500 Juan Loarte 7/70/08 3/2/1s Legion de Votuntarios Frederico Moretti ::-v estranjeros 1 406 Bl1/08 7/1/10 Votuntarios de Ptasencia 1 608 Harqu6s det Reino Bl1/08 1/2?/11 4" Batatton de Guardias Espafrotes 1 850 Jose Maria de Atos 8/7/08 6/1/18 4o Batatton de Guardias Watonas 1 850 HonoratoDubtaisseI B/7/08 6/1/18 1" Guadix 1 1,200 Francisco Chacon 8/ 10/08 3/2/ 15 1" Votuntarios de Leon 2 1,300 Jos6 Antonio Zappino Bl 10/oB 11/B/08 2' Votuntarios de Leon 2 1,300 Jos6 Baca B/10/08 11/B/oB 3" Votuntarios de Leon z 1,300 ThomasSanchez B/10/08 11/B/08 4' Votuntarios de Leon z 1,300 Freder i co Castafron 8/ 10/08 11/8/oB 5' Votuntarios de Leon z 1,300 LeandroOsorio 8/ 10/08 11/8/08 Generat det ej6rcito de ta inzquierda z 1,200 Luis Manuet de Zamora B/30/08 4/23/11 Votuntarios de Ativa 2 1,500 ManueI Vincente Fernandez9/1/A8 7/10/10 Eaza ? ?,400 A. Begines de tos Rios 9/ 1/08 3/2/ 15 Loja 2 2,400 Miguel de los Rios 9/1lOB 1/20/10 Campode Ujijar z 1,600 Jose Moreno 9/1/08 3/ 1/09 Santa-Fe 2 ?,1+00 A. Garcesde Marcitta 9/ 1/08 6/28/ 11 I I iberia z ?,/+00 Francisco de Cordova 9/1/08 5/?9/ 11

5B No. of Strength Date Date Reqiment Battalions tJhenRaised ConmandingOfficer Raised Reformed A Inrer i a ? 2,1+00 Juan Creagh de Lacy 9/1/08 3/2/15 't ImperiaI de Totedo 1,500 P. DavatosSanta Mari4 9/5/oa /9 /1? . VoIuntarios Ieales de FernancloVI I 3 .11500 Genaro Rezabal e/5 !08 9i19!11 Bai Ien 3 2,500 Duque de Osuna 9/14/AB 6/1/18 Votuntarios de ta Patria 3 2,256 Francisco Mazarredo 9/ 14/OB 1/9/12 Alcata ta Reat 2 1,200 Joaquin Tentor 9/21/08 9/?o/ 10 (or Cazadores de Granada) A Imansa 3 1,800 Joauin Atav6s 9/28/08 3/?/15 Granaderos Reats aragonesses de Fernando VI I (or Granaderos de Patafox) 2 1,500 Francisco Manc5del Pont 10/18/08 2/19/09 2" Infante D.Cart6s 1 1,014 Vicente Amat 10/30/08 ?/19/0e Granaderos det General. det ej6rcito de Centro 1 679 unknown 10/s1/oB 7/1/10 FieIes Zaragozanos (or Votuntarios de Zaragoza) 3 2,100 Manuel de Enna 1?/30/08 6/15/11 Lobera 2 ?,190 J.J.MarquezDonatto 3/22/09 B/22/22

Granaderos de Ia Gran-Canaria I 500 Juan Maria de Leon 4/5/09 5/B/ 1?

Mourentan I 1,000 Joaquin Aguirre 4/1/+/09 7/1/10 Uni on 3 2,000 Pablo Mori[ [o t,/14/09 9/7 /23 La Huente I 1,000 Francisco Cotombo 4/23/Oq 7/1/10 Morrazo 3 1,200 Juaquin Guijarro 4/23/09 7/1/10

Monforte I 1,000 Antonio Ponce 5/7/09 1/22/11 1" Votuntarios de Navarra 1 500 Francisco Javier de Mina 7/20/09 3/2/ 15 2o Votuntarios de Navarra I 960 Gregorio Curuchaga 7/20/09 3/2/15 3" VoIuntarios de Navarra 1 960 Lucas Gorri z 7/20/09 3/2/15 Maceda 3 1,600 J. Camafro,Conde de Maceda7/20/09 5/B/ 12

Lemos I 1,000 unknown 7/20/09 7/1/10 Ausons 4 785 Vincente Amat B/B/11 11/23/13 Castet -Leon 1 500 unknown 9/7 / 11 5/B/ 12 Leates Manresanos 3 1,947 Gabrie[ Lessene 9/7/11 s/2/15

5" Votuntarios de Navarra I 2l+0 Sebastian Fernandez 9/?B/11 s/2/ 15 ProvisionaI de Cansadosde Gaticia 1 800 Josti Nufrezde Haro 10/ 1/ 11 3/2/ 15

2" Americano I 510 ThomasOtConetti 10/4/11 3/2/ 15 Barce I ona 3 1,500 Andr6sBacigalupi 11/1/11 s/2/ 15

3o Americano I 1,?A0 AmbrosiodetGatto 11/1/11 10/1/15

AngI o- Catat an I 386 Edwin Green 11/11/11 B/12/ 12 r,- Votuntarios de Ayata I 500 unknown 1?/1/ 11 5/Bl 12 " Consti tuc i on I 800 Francisco Kaysser 4/15/12 3/2/ 15 (formetry Reunion de Andatucia) 1" Austri as 1 1,200 Pedro Dejui 5/8/12 3/2/15 2" Austrias 1 1,200 Jaime Maria Carvajal 5/8/12 3/2/15 3" Austrias 1 1,200 Juan GonzatezCienfuegos 5/B/1? 7/1/22 2" Cadiz 1 1,?00 Francisco de Hano 5/8/12 3/2/15 D6posito de San Fernanco 1 1,200 Jos6 Maria Torrijos 5/8/12 3/2/15 Mata16 ? 960 Thom5sGarcia 6/1/12 3/2/15 1" Atava 1 1,200 Fermin Satcedo 7/20/12 3/1/14 2" Atava 1 1,200 BuenaventuraTomasa 7/20/12 3/1/14 GeneraLde ta reserva de AndaIucia 1 600 Fermin de Mendiaktua 2/24/13 3/2/15 6" Votuntarios de Navarra* . 1 1,088 Sebastian Fernandez 2/25/13 3/?/15 7" Votuntarios de Navarra* 1 1,507 Joaquin de Pab[os 2/25/13 3/1/11 B" Votuntarios de Navarra* 1 1,185 Fermin Escandi 2/25/13 3/2/15 9" Voluntarios de Navarra* 1 1,259 Pedro Antonio Barrena 2/25/13 3/2/15 * The 6", 7", 8", and 9" Navvara were originatty raised as the 1", 2", 3o and 4" Votuntarios de Aragon, but in the reorganization of February 1814 they were renamedas the Votuntarios de Navarra.

59 No. of Strength Date Date Reglqeot BattaIions WhenRaised ConmandinqOfficer Rai sed Reformed

Provisionat de l'lahon I 700 Francisco Javier Aymerich 1/1/13 3/1/11 . ImperiaL."Atejandro- .. . 5 5,000. Atejandro O'Donnett 5/2/13 9/27/?3

I Veteranos de I .4*i;. [a Patria 800 Ignacio Batanzat 8/10/13 3/2/ 15 2" Principe 1 500 Francisco Javier de Ltamas B/28/13 3/2/ 15 Generat det premier ej6rcito 1 600 Lorenzo Catvo 8/28/13 3/2/'t5 Cuadro de Urget 1 217 Jos6e de Catva 9/1/13 B/31/ 1rl Tat avera 1 1,000 Rafaet Maroto 10/30/13 11/29 /2? Granaderos det 4" ej6rcito, 1 600 Manuel Benedicto 3/1/13 3/2/ 15 (Formerty GeneraLde[ 4" ej6rcito)

Light Infantrv

1" Cazadores de Orihueta 1 504 Francisco Berg6s 5/15/08 10/26/10 1o Cazadores de Vatencia 1 504 C6rtos Liberatti 5/17 /08 3/2/ 15 ,l Tiradores de Cadiz 900 Juan de ta Cruz Mourgeont 5/28/08 3/2/ 15 1' Tiradores de Hurcia 2 1,2oo Francisco Nufrez 5/30/08 2/19/49 (or de FLoridabtanca) 2" Tiradores de Murcia 2 1,2oo l'lanuaI de Leyva 5/30/08 2/1e/09

3" Tiradores de Murcia I 600 Joaquin OvatIe 5/30/08 5/14/ 10

Cazadores de Ll.erena I 850 Lorenzo Cebrian 5/31/oB 3/1/09 Voluntarios de AI icante ? 1,800 Antonio Camp 6/ 1/08 3/2/ 15 Tiradores de Ledesma 1 600 Luis Lacy 6/ 1/08 1/15/09

1 1" Ligero de Zaragoza I 800 Fernando PascuaI 6/ 1/08 5/B/ 1?

I Z' Ligero de Zaragoza I 800 Nichot5s Matdonado 6/ 1/08 2/19/09

3'Ligero de Zaragoza I 800 Rafaet Estrada 6/ 1/08 2/19/09

Cdrrnen I 800 Joaquin Garcia 6/ 1/08 2/19/09

'l Votuntarios numantinos I 750 RamonAtenta 6/2/08 3/2/ 15

4 Votuntarios de Vitanueva de tos Infantes I 550 Luis Ultoa 6/2/08 12/27/oB

1" Tiradores de CastiLta I 1,000 C5rtos de Espafra 6/3/oB 3/2/ 15 Port i I Io 1 800 Augustin DubtaisseI 6/1/08 2/19/09

a Torrero I 800 Jos6 de Sangenis 6/1/AB 2/19/09 Puerta det Sot 1 800 Atberto Langt6s 6/1/08 11/26/08

Tiradores de Catatayud I 800 Hariano Zerezo 6/7/08 2/19/09 Cazadores de Segorbe 2 1,o0o Frey Virmio Va[ [6s 6/9/08 2/19/09 1" Cazadores de Fernando VII Z 1,200 Jos6 Armisen 6/9/08 7/1/10

2" Cazadores de Fernando VI I I 504 Manuet Cervero 6/10/08 2/19/09 -:p 2o Cazadores de Vatencia 2 1,200 Conde de Romre 6/ 10/08 1/9/12 2o Cazadores de Orihueta 2 1,200 Condede Pino-hermoso 6/ 10/08 1/2/11

Votuntarios t iterarios de Santiago 1 ) Ut{ Marqu6s de Santa Cruz 6/11/08 3/2/ 15 ( [ater Votuntarios de Santiago) de Rivadutta

Cazadores de Carmona I BOB Jos6 de Aymerich 6/ 11/08 3/2/ 15 Tiradores de M6rida 1,159 Franciscode Pauta Pavia 6/ 11/08 3/2/ 15 Votuntarios de ta Victoria 2 1,2oo HanueIMi raI tas 6/ 11/AB 12/15 / 18 ,| Cazadores de Patafox I 500 Jorje Imbort 6/13/08 1/9/1? 3" Cazadores de Fernando VI I ? 2,000 Jos6 Legarda 6/ 13/08 7/1/1O Votuntarios de Vatencia y Atburquerque 1 560 Juan Antonio Barutett 6/24/08 5/B/ 12 Cazadores estranjeros 1 560 Pedro de Satas 6/?4/oB 3/2/ 15 4 Cazadores de Al.cantara I 400 Josri Pineda 6/?4/08 5/B/12

Cazadores de Zafra I 500 Andr6s Atvarez Guerra B/1/08 3/10/11

Cazadores de Ia Serena I 1,000 Juan Campos B/1lAB 3/10/11

Tiradores de Doyte I 300 Antonio Maria Guerrero B/10/08 2/17/ls (formerly Reunion de Osera)

50 No. of Strength Date Date Regiment Eattations lJhenRaised Conmandinqofficer Raised Reformed Cazadores deI generat det ej6rcito de [a izquierda 1,008 l-uis Manrto! 1" Guipuzcoa 500 Gaspar de Jauregui 8/20/10 3/2/ 15 2" Guipuzcoa 1,2oo Fermin lriarte 9/1/10 3/2/15 Votuntarios de Rioja 800 Juan Antonio Tabuenca 9/6/1C 3/2/ 15 Cazadoi-esvotuntarios de Arnourdan 132 BandiI to Morates 9/8/10 t+/26/11 Votuntarios de Asturias 1,201 Fernando Mi randa 4/14/11 3/2/ 15 Votuntarios de Madrid 1,065 Rafaet Paredes 5/15/11 3/7/ 15 Tiradores de Sigcienza 800 Hip6ti to Angueto 5/18/11 3/2/15 Cazadores de Ia coasta de Levante 367 None 7/9/11 11/1t*/1tr Voluntarios de Jaen 800 Loronzo Zenezo 7/11/11 3/2/ 15 Legion Estremafra 1,200 MarianoRicafort 8/11/11 12/9/ztt Tiradores de Cuenca 800 Joaquin Garcia 8/15/11 3/2/ 15 Cazadores de Casti t ta 800 Pascual ReaL B/30/11 2/17/15 3" Tiradores de Castitta 1,280 Matias Narro 9/1/11 3/2/ 15 2" Tiradores de Cantabria 1,200 Juan Lopez Campitto 9/1/11 3/?/ 15 1" Iberia 1.000 Martin Esuituz 9/15/11 6/20/ 1t, 2" Iberia 1,200 Andr6s Garcia Diego 9/15/11 3/2/15 3" Iberia 1,539 Jos6 Ramirez Aburruza 9/15/11 3/2/ 15

a1 o_L No. of Strength Date Date Regiment Battations Uhen Raised Conmandingofficer Raised Reformed Cazadores de Catatufra 1 585 Jos6 Manso 9/2s/11 3/2/15 Cazadores de Ma[ [orca 1 600 Patrico Campbe[[ 10/Bl11 7t.?t.tt--.-,. T i racJores de Busa 150 Jos6 Maria Cotubi 11/1/11 3/?/15 Votuntarios de Cardona 1,021 Miguel de Cordova 11/2/11 3/2/15 Tiradores de Catatuffa 971 Jos6 Casas 11/7/ 11 3/2/15 2" Guadatajara (formerty Generat det 6" ej6rcito 950 Francisco AtbanetI 12/?7/ 11 3/2/15 2' vi zcaya 1,2oo Antonio Artota 3/1/12 3/2/15 3" Vi zcaya 1,200 Jos6 Maria auintana 3/1/12 3/2/15 AIbtr]rera 800 Onofre Gutierrez y Rosas t,/30/12 6/23/14 1" Iberia 1,200 Pedro Atbeniz 5/1/12 3/2/15 3' Tiradores de Cant5bria 1,200 Lorenzo Herrero 5/B/12 3/Z/15 Hoya de Miitaga 400 Constancio l'lartinez 5/1?/12 7/1/1? 3" Guipuzcoa 1,20o Manuat Maria Aranguren 7/20/12 s/2/15 Cazadores Estranjeros 720 Manuat Miramon 10/B/12 3/2/15

Hiscet Ianeous Infantrv Formations In the foflowing smatL units there were a total. of 41 companiesand 3,800 men

Conpanias Suettas de Patriotas Other Formations Heneses 1 Co Compafriade honor de Catatufra Cerezo 1 Co Companiadel Buen orden del. ej6rcito del Centro Benavente 1 Compania de Obreros Arzu l, Cos CompaniaGranaderos de Andatucia Guijarro 1 Co Compania Granaderos de Estremadura Casti l.Lejo (Archidona) 1 Compafria Vot teadores de Cast i t Ia ComoafriaTiradores de Estremadura Conpanias Suettas de Deser tores

Forei gners I Co

I Portuguese I Co

Germans I Co

Coopafrias Suettas de Provinciates

_ Honzon 1Co San Pabto 2 Cos Sam Fet ipe 1Co CataIufra 2 Cos Vatencia 1Co AndaIucia 2 Cos Astur i as 2 Cos Car t agena 1Co Ta r ragona 1Co

Conpanias Suettas de Guias Det 1ut 1 Co "j6rcito Det 2" ejrirci to 2 Cos Det 3" ejtircito 1 Co Det 4" ejercito 1 Co DeL 5" ej6rcito .1 Co Det 6" ej6rcito 1 Co Det 7" ej6rcito 1 Co De ta reserva de Andatucia 1 Co

52 The PortugueseArmy 1808-1814 General Overwiew

fn 1797 rhe theoretically consisted of 24 infantry regiments (38,400 men) , L2 cavalry regiments (5,540 men) and 5 artillery regiments (6,000 men). In addition, there were forty-three regiments of militia, 1,500 light troops, and an invalid arti11ery force of 1,300 troops. This formation would have provided Portugal with a respectable army q.uite suitable for garrison and Local- duties, but very unequal to active can'lpaigning. It appears that the Portuguese government had become aware of this prior to 1805, with writings by various officers al-so addressed ,'the best method of reforming an army for the defense of Portugal.' However, the Portuguese had notorious problems with recruitment and retention, and the actuaL strength was far below this. By 1801, when war erupted with Spain, the Portuguese army mobilized and, in theory, formed a second battalion for each regiment. Each battalion was to hawe 20 officers and 750 men formed in seven comn^ni pq rhis was to give each regiment a sErength of 1,550 men. The cavalry regiments were to have a >L:crryL-rra * *anaF Lr \J!^F 470 men and the four artillery regiments were to have 989 men each. One of the artill-ery regiments had been disbanded between I797 and 1E01 - fndications are, however, that two artillery regiments were disbanded shcrtly after L797 and one was later reorganized in about 1801. Prior to 1806 the Fcrtuguese named each regiment for the city or dis- trict in which it was p:i

First (Central) Divisionl :p 1st Briqade 1st "Lippe" (Lisbon) Regiment 13th "Peniche" Reqiment 2nd Briqade 4th "Freire" (Lisbon) Regiment 15th "Viera Te11es" (Almecastre) Regiment 3rd Briqade: 7th "Setubal" R.egiment 19th "Cascaes" Reqiment 4th Briqade: 10th "2nd Lisbcn" Regiment 22nd "Serpa" Regiment

Formed of unit.s stationed in the provinces of Estremadura and Beira Baixa.

C1 Cava 1!-\,/: 1st nAlcanEara lragoons" (Lisbon) iMecklenbur 4ch -r Dragoons,, (Lisbon) 7l-h n T.i

3rd " 1st Of iver---a" Regiment 15th "2nd Olive:-?a" Regiment tnd Pri ^:.1a. 5th "1st Porto" Regimenc 18th r'2nd Portc Regiment 3rd Briqade: trViana' _: 9th Reg:inent 2Ist "Va1enga" :-egiment 4th Briqade : ;? 12th "Chaves" F.=giment 24th "Braganqa" Regiment Cavalrv: 3rd "Olivenqa" :egimenE 5th t'BraganEa" ?-egiment 9th dchawes" Re;iment 12th "Miranda" :.egimenL Art-i I I an'- 4th nPorLo, Rec:ment

1. Provinces of Algarve, -a-]entejo and Beira Alta.

2. Provinces of Tras-os-f,: lntes and Entre-Douro-e-Minho.

64 The 1801 campaign showed the weaknesses of the portuguese army. In 1807, when the French invaded, the war was a disaster for portugal . The army was badly equipped, terribty under strength, short. of horses and its general officers were marked by their.total. incompetence. .The naf ion2-.1.arrN' wanished__. "in. No:.renh.er' l-8 0 7.-.-, -, What'-xenaired..,rras t_emFor:ari1y_.organ-i zed L\y th3 _::3rcb -i+rtc ]- a legi.on that. proved to be a near total waste. Only a smaLl nurnber of offic_ ers and men, sufficient to organize 8 battalions and six cavalry squadrons were salvaged by the French- It suffered massiwe desertion from t.he very start- They were converted into the portuguese -Legion Ehat served with the French army into 1813. The bulk of Ehese were lost during the Russl-an cam_ paa9n.

The Portuquese Armv is Reborn

Portugal eras liberaied, by the British, by the Convention of Cintra on 30 August 1808. This infamous treaty provided vessels to ship the defeated French army and its loot back to France, for which the British generals sign_ ing it were later cashiered. However, it did free portugal and gave the Regency t.he opporiunity to reorganize iEs army with British arms and exper_ tise- The first goal !.,ras Lo restore the 24 infantry regiments and bring them to fufl strengt h. Hoe,,ever, the perennial problem of insufficieot recrufrs never disappeared and Lhe t.heoretical strengths of the regiments were never reached. In addition, it was hoped fo reslore the cavalry regiments and pro- vide a fifCh squadron for each regiment. The reorganization, however, was beyond the ability ol the Regency and when Soult invaded northern Portugal, it surrendered to the inevitabfe and requested that the British take over the effort. T'he position was offered t'o llellington (then tlellesley) , buc he refused the position. The position of Commander- in - Chi ef then fetl to the fairly junior Williarn Carr Beresford, almost entirely because he spoke a litt1e of the language, as a result of serving lwefwe months as the Governor of Madeira. In March 1809, he took command, with the title "Marecha1 do Campo", and began to clean out the lazy, criminal and inefficient. He LranslaLed Brjtish drill books into portuguese and brought British junior officers int.o the Portuguese army on a wholesale basis, raising each one rank. Eventually all- the regimenhs were either commanded by British officers or the second in command was British, and 25? of the other officers were British. Hovrever, Lhe portuguese "";l movemene of British officers into service was not an Llncontrolled rush of opportunists. Wellington, in a leLter dated ? June 1809 reported to Sir David Dundas, Lhat "few officers have applied to serve with the portu- guese, even wiLh the advantage of receiving one step of British promotion, I should have doubted whether any would be willing to serve in this manner, upon the advantage now held out to them, of receiving one step of portuguese rank, erhich can be but loca1 and temporary, together $rittr the pay of the porcuguese rank in which they should be employed, if you had not transmitted me a list of the names of thirty officers who are willing to be so emptoyed, upon the terms n held oul to them- He goes on to say, 'tI am convinced that no Officers in this country (Portugal) will offer their services upon the terms which I now understand are to be held out to them.'l Wel-l-ington expressed considerable concern over junior. British officers finding themsel-ves superior to their nominal British superiors because of the Portuguese rank. This, Wellington felt, would cause considerable dissension in his ranks. As Dundas' response co wellingtonts questions about how the precedence of ranks was to work is not available upon the preparation of this study, the resolution will unforrunate-

65 1y remain unknown - The t.hrear of the French in the field was sti11 very real . 1809 Beresford on 9 July gachered CogeLher all che available portuguese Almeida. sol-diers at By rhe end of .ruly he had rB, qop..ttrg+,_ '' - rj,af a:lt r.-egimenr _qgqlpriSed..-mainly- of f ifteen !r d;''u.iiilet'',ni-s irimei&ia! e.. iirpervls -rsiict io.n.. Beresford enen uegan I program of trairiing and discipriib i., un effort to whip the portuguese army rnto condition t.o meet the French. Beresford arso began removing incompet.enE officers. He had at his disposal 55 British officers and, rather lhan spreading chem Ehroughout his army' he concenErated Ehem in specific regiments. He concentraEed hrs Bricish officers in those regiments whj.ch could be brought to a stage of readiness Ehe most quickly. On 1 July 1909, the 3rd, 4rh, 11th, 15Eh and l6th Line RegimenEs contained 40? of rhe Briri.sh portuguese officers in the Army. Holding ranks from colonel to captain, most of these 22 men had served in the Lusitanian Legion since April 1809. Except for ''lieutenant the 3rd Line, at1 had British colonels or col.nels- Two of the regiment.s were actually commanded by officers. British The 3rd, 4th, 13th and 15th contained very fee, recruits, which permit.ted the officers to concentrate on drilring thear veterans back into condition. Only the 16th Line was an exception to this. BeE!,reenMay and June cne 16th had received 600 recruits. rt was their lack of traininj that prevenLed the regiment from taking to the field immediately. It was not until the Dundas compromise on 29 July 1g09, that Beresford was able to draw enough Brj-tish portuguese officers into the army that he coul-d truly begin turning it int.o an effective field force. However, until that occurred he was forced to work with what he had. This resufted in the 6th Line Regiment taking to the field !,rithour a srngre British officer. Beresford sti11 faced the problem of v/hat to do witlt older porcuguese officers whose incompetency prevented the effective inst.itution of his re_ forms- Hovrever. a trip to Lisbon convinced him that the Regency dia not hawe the prestige or influence to prevent any wj-de sweeping uatio.r, so he began a deliberate process of cashiering those officers during April and May. within the ranks of porcuguese the army Beresford found numerous offic- ers over the age of sixty. Among them, Captain Jos6 Joaquim de Souza Forvas of the 1st Line Regiment, had served 3z years and was sti1l marching wrth his company at the age of ZO. Between 15 March and 4 July 1g09, Beresford re_ moved 108 officers, of whom 7g were captains or lieuienants. In .luly he identified another 107 .fficers to be reiired. These men had an of 57.7 years average age and had served 39.3 years in Ehe army, The youngest ::> l- he ^l.laai ?c was 47 and Further complicating portuguese the process was the process of commis_ sioning officers known as aggregados,, (added). " They were entitled to all the privileges of a regutar appointment, but were always subordinate to a regrular officer of equal rank. As most of the British officers serving in the porcu_ guese Army wete aggregados they often had difficulties performiig Lheir duties when faced with militarily uneducated portuguese officers of equar rank wr.thin their regiments. Jealousy and difficulti-es flourished between British and Portuguese officers- fndeed, it was not unknown for violence to erupt, even between British officers' Alexander Dickson observed that Ehe commander of the Portuguese arLillery was so prejudiced against the English thac he au_ tomatically rejected any advice or suggestion Dickson nade out of hand. Further complicating the issue, the portuguese army was nearly The bankrupt. Regency was unable Lo support iE financiarly and by mid-June, in order to feed his troops, Beresford directed t.hat alr bills ior provisions be sent directly to the BriLish ambassad.or portugal to . His ability to proviae uni-

66 forms and eguipment for his army was equally limited. The Brj-tish government had promised to outfit 20,000 Portuguese soldiers. Between June and July he worked tirelessly to ensure that His Majesty's government met its obligations. By R Jltly 1.809 ennrrgrh rnaf"crj al 411i-'r.rsd i.n the Ro-rr6.l l,:senaf in L.rsbcn tc .-pernii -.ths.-infanlry- -tc Jae*qrrpplied..:"'::h -shoes. .,.Unfortunatel_y, the- port.uguese- administration was incapable of meeting the administrative requirements placed c;rl at,i c ano^-l despite the presence of equipment in Lisbon, the portuguese troops were forced to t.ake to the field without having benefit of the materials gathered in the depots. The problems with the commissariat and finances was to Cog the Portuguese army throughout the campaign. The commissariat had succeeded in issuing uniforms to the caqadores, but it was tot.aI1y incapable of providing great coats to the troops prior to the arrival- of cold weather. Pay was another disaster. without regular pay the soldiers found them- selves faced, in village after villdge, with refusals to provide them wich focC- The city's mayors also refused to accept the authority of the military conr;nanders. Before too long the soldiers began to take matters into their own hands and the discipline that Beresford had so lovingl-y instil]ed into his new arnry began breaking down. Ber-esford responded by revising the trial procedure anC reforming the cooe of military justice used by the Portuguese. However, the initial efforts were delayed until word from Dom Joao arrived from Brazil- on 14 November l-809 that gave Beresford the needed authority. This authority, however, was not unlimited and permitted Beresford this authority only when the army was on cdtr.:DE.ign. On other occasions, the traditional format was to be fol1owed. Hcwever, ds the Regency was so far away in Brazil, Beresford soon founcl hirr,self in a position to act according to his own concepts. He would directly int.ervene in the trial process, increasing or decreasing punishments for crirnes as he saw fit. He made a point of reestablishing executions for deser- ticn and after several such executicns were well published, he resumed such executions in public to foresta]1 ouLbreaks of desertion, Iooting and insubor- dination. fn October 1809 a soldier of the 2lst Line, found guilty of deser- tion, !'/as sentenced to death. Instead of executing him in front of the regi- men-L, he was executed in the town square of Oporto. The maximum ef f ect of the execution was sought and the timing was establ-ished so as to assure the maxi- mum audience of civil-ians and soldiers. The September returns show that the Portuguese army not in'Spain had 3I ,4.23 r,rren,but only 1-9,476 were f it for duty. A further 4,000 were shown as :'.;> sick and 630 had deserted. Of the ten regiments that had participated in the - ..i -- .: .. L-o*f,Jo.-Lyrrrrr Spain , 502 were sick anC desertion was on the rise. In the rest of the army, totaling 47,439 men, only 36,372 were fit for duty. The problem of British officers continued. The question of rank was one that was not to be solved. Officers who did not receive their anticipated re'';ards of promot ion were soon di s i 1 lus ioned and res igned . Beresford was able to stem the flow of resignations, but he found himself being used as a ^,,-^ i -^ uutir!r-rrg ground for the incompetent officers of the . He found alcohol-ics, well- connected incompecents and i1I-tempered mal-contents being recommended to him in a never ending stream. He kept most of them out of the Portuguese army, but despite his efforts, several slipped through. Because the British officers did not recognize Portuguese authority, Beresford found himself constantly being called upon to adjudicate disputes between British officers. However, in order to reestablish the portuguese arrriv Beresford needed more British oificers and was willinq to deal with these proclems in order to geL them.

/- -, Problems with ]anguage, rank and quality among the officer corps con- tsinued, but soon Beresford found himself getcing the nurnlcers of officers he soughL. By Septenber he established the fevels of British officers to be - .assigmed to ewery regiment. The 'infantry-regiments vrould be assigned five .-€ff icers, the cavalry squadrons and caqadore battalions- would have three. This broughE Beresford's requirements for British officers to 179. By the end of October, 1809, he had 84 British officers on duty. By May Ehis grew to IO7. Unfortunalely, many of these officers did noE speak Portuguese, which resulted in numerous problems. The British staff communicated r'rith their PorEuguese counterparts in French, but the regimental officers spoke 1j.ttl-e or no Portugr-rese and their soldiers spoke nothing eLse. This also lead to many resignations, but lhe more competent British officers quickly began learning PorEuguese. Though many developed a reading competency, few achieved verbal fluency- Most limited their knowledge of PorEuguese to the words of command. Beresford was, needLess to say, bo(barded wittr requests for Lranslators and translaEions of Portuguese documents. Despite the problems Beresford was to provide Ehe British tfith 30,000 Portuguese Troops to resist Massena's 1810 inwasion of Portugal. The French attack on Ciudad Rodrigo forced wellington to act and between June and July 1810 he integrated the Portuguese into his army. John Hamilton's Portuguese Division, consisring of the 2nd, 4th, 1oth and 14ch Line, totaling 4,581 rnen, was assigned co Major General Hill's British division. williarn Harvey's brigade, 9th and 3lst Line, 2,031 troops, were assigned to Major General PicEon's division. A brigade of 2,536 Portuguese (llth and 23rd Line) was assigned to coLe's division. The 3rd and 15th Line, under Brigadier william Sprye, and three battalions of the Lusitanian Legion and the Bth Line under colonel Douglas formed the 4,175 Portuguese force assigned to Leith's 5th Dlwision- And the famous Light division was joined by the lst and 3rd Ca- cadores, a total of 1,022 men. By September 1810 well-ington had incorporated 14,238 PorLuguese rank and file into the Brltish army. fn addition, a further ' 11? rhrpcLr-! cc ir.:-ranan.ronrrLLJsPr hr:-^r^^ r9duss, LULdffrry nen, were formed. The first bri- gade vras under Brj.gadier Pack and consisted of the lst and 16th Line and the 4rh caqadores- The 5th Brigade, under Brigadier campbell, contained the 6th caqadores and 5th and 16th Line. The 5th Brigade was formed from the 7th and loth Line and the 2nd Caqadores under the command of Brigadier Coleman. The oificial records for this period indicate the Porcuguese regiments had the followi.nq strenqths for rank and file:

';> 2nd Line r, roo 14th Line r ,22L 3rd Line qa7 15th Line 759 't 4th Line 16,4 21st Line 928 Bth Line L,075 23rA Llne r ,253 9th Line 1, 085 Lusitanian Legion 1 dnq 10th Line 931 1st Caqadores 455 11th Line L ,283 3rd Caqadores 567

The first reorganization was carried out with the troops that Beresford inherited from the existing army. In October 1809, however, he was ready to begin absorbing new recruits. In December a revised system eras established for the absorption of new recruits. A depoE was established in each province and its runction was.the training anC equipping of new soldiers. Those depots were as follows:

5B Prow i nc e Depot Assicned Reqiments Estremadura Peniche Inf : !,4 ,7 , 13, !6 ,19 ,22 Art: 1 E s t remadura Lisbon Carr: 1.4,7,-.o Alemtej o Elvas .Inf | 2,5,14,I7 Art: 2,3, A'l r-rr rrrc Evora Cav: 2 ,5 Tras -os -Montes Chaves Inf : 12,24 Cac: 3,5 Cav: 6,9,12 Beira Viseu Inf: 8,11 ,30,23, & Loyal Lus i t.anian Legion Cav: 8,11 Cac: I,2,4 Minho Vianna Inf: 9 ,15,2I Art: 4 Cac: 6 Partido de Porto Porto fnf : 3 ,5 ,10,18 Cav: 3

Each military formation was to maintain a minimum number of recruits in r-l-ro-ir rronnt-s. LlIUMv}JvuL The line regiments were required to maintain a depOt of 155 men, Fl-^Lr.rc .-a9cr.-A^-.'.,.r-csr depots were to contain 63 men, each cavalry squadron depot had 60 men and the four artillery depots had 155 men. The fu}1 complement of the depots was to be 5,474 men. Initially the numbers of new recruits was not a problem under the new ^"^F^n --'r >y > L grrr o.r rL,a c? total of 4,489 had been recruited by April 1810. Unfortunately, in order to fulfilI the quotas any available male was subject to being dra- gooned - A very large number of men entered the service in this manner and it is estimated that half of the men taken into the Portuguese army deserted I'recruitment before reaching their regirnents . The actual process of " will- be discussed later. Later efforts at obtaining sufficj-ent quaJ-ified recruits did become a 'rhe nrnJ-rl om minimum height requirement was 5 f eet 3 inches, but this was reduced to 4 feet 10 7/2 inches by December, 1809. Finally, on 9 July 1810, '/ it was reduced to 4 feet inches, with the stipul-ation that they be healthy and of good moral character. The 22nd Line Regiment prowides a good example of how recruiting process vrent. The regiment had been destroyed in 1807 during Junotrs invasion. In September 1809 it had 53 men, and by January 1810 it had declined to 4I. It was selected to serve as an example of how the reconstruction process was to occur, but the civil service in Lisbon was so corrupt that no qualified re- cruits could be obtained. On 26 July 46 recruits were rejected for the fol- lowing reasons: 15 too short ; 23 Spaniards from Galicia; 2 weak chested; 1 'lon. hr^lron -vJ, 1 too old; 1 very weak; 1 lame right 1"gr 2 already throrvn out of another regiment. Eventually 1,729 recruits were sent to the 22nd Line, but only I94 were from Lisbon. Beresford informed Forjaz that unti] the abuses of the civilian government were corrected it would be impossible to reform the regiment. This was not a problem unique to the 22nd Line Regiment. Similar stories abound throuqhout the entire army. To correct this, Beresford began to exercise his muscle and authority over the civilian government. He threatened punishment of civil authorities who did not cooperate and soon large numbers of qualified trainees began :rri rri rrrr i n the various depots . Though the quality had risen, many recruits

69 were the dregs of socieEy. In addiEion, in order t.o keep cont.rol of them and to prevent desertion, the new inducEees were kept in jail until they were delivered to the depot. They were, ds a result of their incarceration, usual- --lv,.under.nourished,. and -.i-11 .- -

'lne urt 1r 5vs cem

In order to standardize the method of dril1 in the Portuguese army Beresford adopted the Dundas Dri1l Book. It was Lransfated ineo Porcuguese and widely distributed, Beresford also simplified the !,,ords of command so that they were compatible with the Portuguese language and even introduced some English words into the command system. T'he key Co Beresford's system was repetition. During the fal1 of 1809 h3 worked on curing the veterans of their bad habits and began a program of breaking the regiments down into squads and enforced daily drills. tnitially the Portuguese r,rere unable to perform even the simplest maneuvers. Beresford - obliged the Portuguese soldiers to repeat the maneuvers endless hours on the drili square until the lessons were fearned. To support this, Wellington lent enough British sergeants to Beresford :p that he was able to assign two to each regiment of infantry and cagadore baLCaIion. The British system was taught in all phases and the ',Eighteen Maneuvers" of Dundas' system guided the maneuvers of the line infantry. The caqadores learned and worked from the British army's Iight infantry regula- t r,ons - The cavalry and artillery also adopted the regulations and drill pro- cedures of their counterparts in the Bricish army.

1'he Infantrv is Reformed

The organization of the Portuguese Army and its regiments was estab- l-ished by Count Schaumburg-Lippe in 1762. Each regiment had seven companies forming a single battalion. The first. company, commanded by the coIonel, had 116 men. The second company was commanded by the Iieutenant -col-onel- , the third by the major and the rernaining four by capLains. The last six compa- nies had 114 men each, so the effective strength of the regiment, including a staff of one adju[ant, one quar[ermaster, one chaplain, one auditor,, one

/U surgeon, six assistanE surgeons, a drum major, an armorer and a hangman, lras 805 men, or 23 regimental officers, 15 sEaff officers, and ?69 non_commls_ sioned officers and men. This was t.he formal structure, but the regiment could have anv number of agqradadop-s atiached to the regirnent. These men, F|i FhFr .|f;i.Frc n^n-.^mrnieci-nad ^ffi^ara __, . rnen,-.r:eceivj.ng .ha1f the Fal,.3.:rC all0wances of the regular troop, but. did the same duty as the effeccives of the corps to which they were aEcached. They were also the junior of their respectiwe ranks. This practice effectivery doubled Ehe st.rength of the regiment in many cases. However, this was very open to abuse. The first regimenC of line infantry was formed under the personal in_ spection of count schaumburg-Lippe in l.762. rt was named after him and vras raised in Lisbon. rt vras Ehe senior regiment and served as guards of the court and household troops for the sovereign. j-n The 2nd Regiment was raised Algarve and endcodied in Lagos. The 3rd Regiment, Olivenqa, was formed princi.pally by men from the district of Lamego. They were not as hardy as the croops forming the other regimenLs and reputedly had a problem with sickness. The 4th Regiment was commanded by comes Freyre, one of the most distin_ guished officers in portuguese service, prior to the 190? inwasion by Lhe French. General Freyre e/as, after the French invasion, persuaded to join French service and the greater part of his regimenL joined him in Decomlng parr of rhe Portuguese Legion, in French service. The 5Lh Regiment disLin_ guished itsel.f against the French at cuadiana- The 6th Regiment was known as the Oporto Regirnent, frorn whence it was raised- The 7th Regianent was a so-Ijd body of men formed from Lhe region around St. Ubes. The gth RegimenL, on the other hand, was in a wretched condition- Likewise, the 9th Regiment had a reputaLjon as being very inefficient. The oiher regiments were of varying efiecLiveness. The 11th Regiment, was nor particularly efficienl, the 12th was not able to take t.o the field in 1807, and the 13hh Regiment was noted only for its labors on various fortifications. The 14t.h regimenb, holrever, was probably the best in th: portuguese Army- The 15th Regiment iras noted for its sickness. The 21st was in good order, but of a noted lower efficiency, as was the 22nd. When Lhe French invaded, however, al1 this was swept a!,ray- The portu- guese Army was no match for the French army. After it. was destroved, and Portugal liberated by the British, the remnants were gathered back together and the reorganization began. However, it v7as progressing so inefficiently, that the British were inviLed to assume control of t.his process and Beresford ::'v was assigned to the task. Beresford began his work on the line infantry by disbanding the gLh and 22nd Regiments, because Lhey were so under strength. They were, however, eventual-ly reformed. By Septernlf,er 1809, alt the regiments, but the 3rd, 5th, 15th, 21st and 24th Regiments, had organized their second battalions. The o1d structure was retained, except for the formal addibion of a second battalion. It was intended that both battafions of each regiment serve together, but during che early stages the first. battalions were often found serving in the field e/ithout the second battalions- The brigade formations established in 1801 were retained until the General order of 29 sept.eTnlf,er1go9 was issued, which reorganized the brigade structure. This formation was to remain fairly constant throughout bhe rest of the war in the Pe_ninsula, though t.here were some smal1 changes. Each brigade had Cwo line infantry regiments, each with two battalj-ons, and a single "caeadore', battalion, giving them an average strength of beLween 2,500 and 3,000 men. In practice, the independence of the portuguese army was not long lived and it. was absorbed into the Britj.sh field army, with the

7I brigades being distribut.ed intact to the various British divisions. Under the new establishment set by Beresford, rhe infantry regiment.s were organized wit.h two battalions. Each batealion had one grenadier and four fusilier companies. The companies were numbered lst and 2nd Grenadier Compa- -j,-lies and Lst through 8t'h Fusilier Companies. Which f,rsitier companies werg- assigned to which battalion, hoerever, is not clear. This made a Portuguese . Regiment, wiLh both batEalions, the tactical equivelant of a British ten company baCtaLion and permitted Che Portuguese Eo maneuver their regiment exactly like a British battalion. The sEaff of an infantry regiment was organized as fol lows :

l Coronel- (ColoneI) 1 Tenente Coronel (Lieutnant colonel) 2 Majores (uaiors) 2 Adjutants 1 Thesoureiro or Pagador (Treasurer or paymaster) 2 Quartel-mestro (Quartermaster) 2 Sargentos de Brigada or Ajudantes Sargentos (Brigade Sargeants or Adjucant Sargeants) 2 Porta Bandeiras (SLandard bearers) 1 Capelldo (Chaplin) 1 Cirurgido M6r (Surgeon major) 4 Ajudanres do M6r (Assistant surgeon) 1 Coronheiro (Gunstockmaker) 1 Espingardeiro (Gunsmith) 1 Mestre de Musica (Music master) B Musicos (Musicians) 1 Tambor-Mor (Drum major) 1 Cabo de Tombores (Cirief of drummers,/drum corporal) 2 Pifanos (Fifers)

An infantry company appears to have been organizeC with:

1 Capitdo (Captain) 1 1 Tenente (Lieutenant) 1 Alferes (Second Iieutenants) 1 Primeiro Sargento (tst sergeant) 2 Segundos SargenLos (2nd sergeants) :'* 1 Furriel (Quartermaster corporal) 4 Cabos de Esquadra (Squad corporals) 4 Anspeqadas (Lance corporal) 1 Tambore (Drummer) 82 So]dados (Soldiers ) 9B Total

A rewiew of orders of battle and combat histories indicates that the Pnrf ,,.n,oea regiment was the principal taCtical element. This meant that the battal-ion was little more than the half portion of the regiment and not the tactical element it was in other naLional armies. This may well also have occurred because of the need to create more officer billets for the Portuguese grandees who had a social- need to be officers. This would be much along the

1. "Capitao" in Portuguese is pronounced "Capitan" .

72 lines of the reason for the Spanish army's having reorganized into single battalion regiments so as to create more positions for regimental commanders and colonels.

The Ca.Cadol:_gs_

Prior to the French invasion the Marquis of ALorna had a sma]l corps or "Legion" of light troops. When the French invaded, this force vanished. With the liberation of the country from the French, the gritish encouraged the establ-ishment of a force of light infantry, the Caqadoresl. The Decree of 19 I\iay 1805 had ordered the organization the f irst caqadore regiments. A second rlar-t^ao rl:rscl \Jev- vv t L4 August 1808, again ordered the formation of the f irst six caqadore bat.talions, but it wasnrt until 14 October 1808 that the 1st Caqadore Battalion was ful1y organized and its colonel, ,Jorge d'Avil-ez, was appointed as of L2 January 1809. The six battalions were raised as foll-ows:

Battal-ion Raised at Commandinq Officer 1st Castel-1o de Vide Colone1 Jorge de Villas 2nd Moura Colonel Bilston 3rd Vi1la ReaI Colonel Silveria 4rh Viseu Col-onel Leuis de Rigo ra^-^^ xr-.,^- 5rh \-cr'uIIJL) -r'rayLJr Colonel Mozinho

a *l^ O LII Porto unknown

Once formed, it woul-d appear that the 2nd Battalion was the best liqht uni-t in the Portuguese Army. The next light force raised by the Portuguese was the famous "Loya1 Lusitanian Legion" formed by General Robert l.lilson. Initially the Lusitanian r.=n'i nn fr.arl about 2 , 000 men - It would have expanded f urther, but the portu - €-:--'- :ju-bc r-rrrcrrrce s would not all-ow it . The Legicn had three battalions of light i nf anl-rrrIvL eome (battery) 'J , caval-ry2 and a "brigade" of artillery with four 6pdrs ani 2 . the first elements of the iegion were operational in Decem- ber 1B 0B . T'iiey vrere eventual ly absorbed into the regular Portuguese army as the 7Lh, Bth and 9th Caqadores in 1811. The 1Oth, 11th and 12th Caqadores vrere newly formed in 1811. On 20 February 1810 the Caqadore 3attalions were organi zed vrith six companies, The battalion staff consisted of:

1 Tentente Coronel (i,t . Colonel ) I tvtat or 'l Airrr:l .ant-o {7\-l+rrFrnF\ J nJ uuutrLC \.H'LrJLlLattL/ 1 Thesoureiro or Pagador (Paymaster) 1 QuarLel Mestre (Quartermaster) 1 Sargento de Brigada or Ajudante Sargento (Sergeant major or adjutant sergeant) 'r orrarr-ol Mestre 4 Xsu! evf sargento (euartermaster Sergeant) 1 Capel]5o (Chaplin)

1. "Caqadores" is Portuguese for hunter, same as "Chasseur" in French and " JAger " in German..

2 - The cavalry was of at least squadron strength, but its precise size has not been determined.

.1 -.' l- Cirurgido M6r (Surgeon Major) 2 Ajudantes do M6r (AssisEant Surgeon) l- Coronheiro (Gunstockmaker) 1 Espingardeiro (Gunsmirh) 1 Mestre de musica (Music Master) B Mus icos (Musicians ) 1 Corneta M6r (Trumpet Major) 23 Toral

Sach of the six companies had:

1 Capicdo (Caprain) 1 Tenente (Lieutenant) 2 Alferes (Second lieutenants) 1 Primeiro Sargento (fst sergeant) 4 Segundos Sargentos (2nd sergeants) 1 Furriel- (Quartermaster corporal-) 6 Cabos de Esquadra (Squad corporals) 6 Anspeqadas (Lance corporal) 2 Cornetas (Buglers) 8B Soldados (Soldiers) LL2 Total

f]re--egra-l-iy:

Theo:,etical.l,y, in 1762 each troop consisted of chree officers, five non- commissioned officers, a trumpeter, a farrier and 30 men. This gave each regiment, vrith eight troops, a strengch of 30 officers and non- commiss ioned officers and 240 men. This strength was increased at different periods, but 'cy 1808 the effective strength had declined to 470 mer, per regiment- The PorLuguese were not good horsemen. The m3n were reputedly too indofent :o attend to their horses and the country did not provide good forage :or any large number of cavalry. Gomes Freyre de Andrade, whose book ad- Cressed the defense of Porlugal, admits the necessity of a considerable caval- ry force, but did not propose forming more than 11 regiments of native troops. ri'i-th about 500 men each. One of the principal problems Beresford encountered in reforming the Portugues= cavalry arm was the almosf total lack of horses in Portugal, The ,J' French and British had stripped the countryside of horses and an outbreak of glanders had decimated the remaining horses The 1st Regiment, formerly the AlcanLara Dragoons, was formed in Lisbon. It was, as Portuguese cavalry wenL, very effective. The 2nd or Moura Regi- ment, lacked horses. The 3rd, or Olivenqa Regiment, was noted for its ineffi- ciency- The 4th "Mecklenburg" Regiment was, in contrast, very efficient. The 5th, Evora, Regiment was formed quickly and able Lo cake to the field, as was rhe 5th, Braganqa, Regiment. The 7th Regiment was formed in Lisbon, the 8th, S1vas, Regiment was very complete, e,hile the 9th "Chaves" Regiment was suited only for garrison duty. The loth "Santarem" Regim3nt was newly raised in 1808. The 11th Regiment was not completed and lacked horses and the 12th 'lranda" Regiment was not particularly effective. Though Lermed 'dragoons", the Porfuguese cavalry !,ras a fighL cavalry iormation much like the AusLrian Chevauxleger and the French Chasseurs a Cheval. :cheir performance in battle was mixed, aL best, and they were re- slricted to what few horses che British would spare chem. As a resull, they sefdom exceeded two field squadrons in strength. In 1813 tlro squadrons of the

74 5th Regiment anJ one of the Bth were serving as infantry wich the Ammunition Depot of the Artillery Reserve, while the 2nd and 3rd Regiments serwed as garrisons throughout the course of the war, and never were mounteC. The caval- ry reqiment's sr.af f eonsisted of :

Number Number of Men Horses Coronel ( Colonel ) 1 3 t Tenente Coronel (f,t . Colonel ) l- 2 Majores (Majors) 1 2 Adj ut ant 1 1

Thesoureiro or tragador L 1 (Treasurer or palrmaster) Sargento de Brigada 1 1 ( Sergeant t.'laj or ) Number Number of Men Horses -mesf C)rtarf el rrl SarcrenfoVIIUL 1 1 (Quart ermas r er ) A Porta Estandarte (Standard bearer) a =

CapellSo (Chapli:i) 1 l_ 1 Ci-rurgido M6r (Surgeon major) I t AjuCantes dc M5r ) 2 (Assistant surgeon) Picador (Riding l.laster) 1 1 Trombeta-Mor (Trumpet maj or) 1 1 Seleiro (SadCler..,aker) I 0 Coronhe i ro ( Guns .-ockmaker ) 1 n Espingardeiro (G::nsmith) 1 tt

,-;-inF ^ i IUL,A- ZL 20

Each squadron had two companies. The companies each had:

- CapitSo (Captain) I Tenente (Lieutenant) i Alferes (Second lieutenants) 2 Segundos Sargentos (2nd sergeants) - Furriel (Quartermaster corporal)

;.b 4 Cabos de Esquadra (Squad corporals) I Anspeqadas (Lance corporal) i Trombeta (Trumpeter) i Ferrador (Blacksmith) 4E Soldados montados (mounted Soldiers) E Soldados a p6 (dismounted Soldiers) 72 Total Men 54 Total Horses

This gave tne squadrons a total strength of 575 men, of whom SI2 tvere mounted. The staff added a further 21 men bringing Ehe tota] reqimental strengttr to 597 iren, of whom 533 were mounted.

The Artillerv:

Count Schaumburg-Lippe, considering the def ense of Portuga] in I'/62, chose to place mcre effort on hj-s fortifications and its artillery, than upon

75 the maneuwering army. He formed four regimencs and several fixed independenE arti11ery companies. The 1st Artillery Regiment, was the regiment of the courE, and formed Ehe garrisons of the caseles and fortresses of the province of Estrema-dura. - I-ES headquarters qere .-i_rll,iFb-o.n! and its duty, was conf ined to ...{.5he- -c-ap}E.ql, and ti're ad j acent sea coas-ts . The 2nd Regir,ent was formed in Algarve, wiEh its headquarters in Faro. It was entirely occupied in the defense of casEles and forts in that decached . kingdom. The 3rd Regiment iras headquartered in Estremos, and provided garri- sons on the fronEiers of Alentejo and Beira Baixa. :fhe 4th Regiment occupied the forlresses on the northern frontiers and had j.ts headquarters in Oporto. The independ=nt., or invaLid, arti1lery companies were assigned to spe- - cific fortresses, and seldom moved from their districts. . When t.he Por-luguese artj-Ilery arm was organized, it. would appear that che Bricish ordinance department was used as a modef. The artilLery and .. engineers were und3r the same syst.em and were comrnanded by a general officer, holding the rank similar to the British Master-General of lhe Ordinance. In 1809 t.he Port.uguese artillery consisled of four regiments. They were: No. 1 R.=giment do Corte (of the royal court) No. 2 R3giment do Algarve No. 3 P,3giment do Estremos No. 4 R.egiment do Oporlo

Each arLil.fery regiment was organized with ten companies and had a theoreticaf strength of 1,148 :nen. The regiment was commandedby a colonel, who had under him in his staff. The Decree of 20 October 1809 est.ablished the staff with:

1 coronel (ccronel) 1 cirurgido M6r (surgeon Major) 1 Tenente (t t. Colone1) 3 Ajudantes do M6r (Assistant Surgeon) 1 Major 1 Mestre de Musica (Music Master) 1 Adjudante ,Adjutant) B Musicos (Musicians) 1 Quartel -mes: r'e (Quartermaster) 1 Tambor-Mor (Drum tt4ajor) 1 Capelldo (Craplin) 2 Pifanos (Fifers) ZZ fotut

Each of the ten ccnoanies consisCed of:

l Capitdo (Captain) -,'? 1 1o Tenente (First Lieutenant) 2 2o Tentes (Second Lieutenant) 1 Primeiro Sargento (fst Sergeant) 4 Segundos Sargentos (2nd Sergeants) 1 Furriel (Quartermaster Corporal) 6 Artifices de fogo (PyroLechnicians) 1 B Cabos de Esquadra (Squad Corporals) 2 Cornetas (Buglers) or Tambores (Drummers) 91 Artillerists 118 Total in a howiLzer company II2 Total in an arLillery battery

1. Only fcund in a company.

76 The artillery regiment was esrablished with one howitzer company (rrg men) , one miner company (ttz men), one pontooneer company (:-tz men) and seven artillery companies (ttZ men each). The reforminq of the Portuquese artill-erv was the easiesL task Beresford --faced. It ..hac1 onlv 947 rank and f i 1e and 150 cannon. During Novemher^ ancj, December 1809 the British officers assigned to the artillery began a program of constant drilling of the Portuguese artillerists. In 1809, the artillery in the field were formed by detachments combined t-.-"st-hor t-9 e^^v!, e form a viabl-e unit., So complete artillery batteries of cen con- tained men from several regiments. As the war progressed, however, they were slow1y sorted out and organized according to their regiments. Nonetheless, until- 1813, there were still mixed artillery batteries. Beresford l-eft the control of the artillery to the Portuguese Commandant of Artillery, Marechal- do CampoJ.A. da Rosa and his staff . In May 1809 there existed only two field batteries, one with 5pdr guns and one with 3pdr guns. Borh were commanded by Captain Viktor von Arentschil-dL., formerly of the Hano- verian Army. The guns had no limbers and the double trail- served as the shafts for the doubLe draughL jury rigged with an outrigger. The pieces were pulled !-,, -,,'l ^^ Dy ..urEb / which also carried the ammunition and served as mounts for the officers. This situation with mules was to continue throughout the war, even though British pattern l-imbers were in use by the end of 1809. Two batteries, serving togeLher, were organized into what was cal_Ied a "division" and this term remained in use until 1813. The portuguese batter- l-es were, for the most part, €euipped with British 5pdr and gpdr guns. There tvere, howewer, two mountain batteries f ormed in l-ate 1B 13 with 3pdr guns and inLended for combat in the mountains.

PorLuqlrese Artif lery lBlO Campaiqn: lst Regiment - Major A. Dickson Battery of Cpt de Rozierres (5pdrs) Battery of Cpt da Cunha Preto (6pdrs) Bat.tery of Cpt Braun (9pdrs) Battery of Cpt Pinto (9pdrs) 2nd Regirnent - Major von Arentschildt Bactery of Cpt da Silva (3pdrs) Battery of Cpt Freire (3pdrs) Battery (3pdrs) Barrery (9pdrs) :'"* 4th Regirnent Battery of Cpt de Sousa Passos (5pdrs) Portuquese Artillerv 1812 Batterrz Commander Assiqned Weapons Cpt. da Cunha Preto - 6pdrs Cpt. Braun - 9pdrs Major Arriaga - 24pdr howitzers Cpt. Pereira Cpt. Miron Cpt. Cox Cpt. Holocombe Cpt. Thompson Cnt- tr'e "H-. rre r i Cpt. Penedo Lt. Costa e Silva Cpt. Barrei_ros Cpt. Delgado

77 The Militia and Ordenanza

,-..,+-. .:-Portuga l:rhad Jtwo {orces-,of =irregxrlar- infantry: -. . The'. f-irsE--was a more -5't6orma I ,militia and che second was the.,ordeBanza . -.lThare-.-!rer.e .4 8 regiments of militia, which were organized into three grand divisions. The organization of .these divisions was as follows:

1st Division 2nd Division 3rd Division "The South: The Center The North Guarda Regiment. 1st Lisbon Regiment Miranda Regiment Lagos Regiment 2nd Lisbon Regiment Feira Regiment, Tavira Regiment 3rd Lisbon Regiment Oporto Regiment Bej a Regiment. 4th Lisbon Regiment Guimaraens Regiment Evora Regiment Coimbra Regiment Baltar Regiment Villaviciosa Regiment Santarem Regiment Mayo Regiment DnrFal ocrrp Porri mant- Lrrullu Thomar Regiment Penafiel Regiment Castello Branco Regiment Leyria Regiment Braga Regiment Idanha Regiment Soure Regiment Villa de Conde Regiment Covj- thao Regiment Lousao Regiment Barca Regiment Argani 1- Regiment Setubal Regiment BarceIlos Regiment Viseu Regiment Al-cazar do SuI Regiment Arcos Regiment Lamego Regiment Aveiro Regiment Viana Regimenc Tonde]1a Regiment Oliveira de Azemis Regiment Chaves Regiment

Arouca Regiment F'ir aY rvrrpri uv! rq a r\9YPeqiment Villa Rea] Regiment Trancoso Regiment Braganqa Regiment

Three further regiments appear to have been raised beLween 1810 and 1811 and ass igned to tl-re 2nd Divis ion . They were the Estremadura Regiment , the Beira Baixa Regimen: and the Torres Vedras Regiment. 1'l-rr.^- orr r, .t i .l -.^gageon rn combat and were invclved in the recapture of Coimbra under Brigadier General Trant , The Ordenanza was formed of farmers and inhabitants of the country, capabfe of bearing arms in the field, and who could be removed from cheir districts with the t3ast disruption to agriculture. Normally, ic consisted of .every adul,t male that i^,as not a mernber of t.he church, the regular army or Lhe militia. It was governed by laws that were cenEuries oId. The faw directed that in every city, town or village, the lord of the ./-.;zmanor was, by virtue of his rank in 1ife, the captain-major of the armed inhabitants or ordenanza, of the ciEy, town or viIlage. Should the lord of the manor noL reside on his property, he is obliged to act as captain-major until rhe king appoint.ed some person to serve as such, His first duty was Lo numlcer the male inhabitants of his district, and to divide the whole into companies of 250 men each- As soon as the companies were nurnbered, the chief magistrates of the district were obliged to meet wit.h Lhe capcain-major in the public hall of the city, town or vilIage, which formed the disLrict, and there elect the captains, who were to command the companies, as welL as the officers ranking as majors and known as "sargento mort'- The duties oi the sargento nor was to oversee the organization of the .liffpren- c^mnani pe and t.o commandthe district in the absence of tho .ent-ain- major. The capEains ,of the companies appointed their subalterns, subject Lo the approval of the captain-major. Before any capiain-major could act as such, he was obliged to take an oath before the corregidor of the commarca (a civil magist.rate simi.l-ar to the high sheriff of a ccunLy in England) that as he has been elected by his sover-

7B eign captain-major of the districL, and of the people which been armed by his majesty for the defense of that district, that he would always have the inhab- itants of that district ready for the service of his majesty and stand pre- pared to defend the cli str,ict, eity, r-own or rzj__l 1a?e. r-te l*e ebli ged tc swcar jnes that he wor,rld .clt:.dIl. - r- oh'ei.'*f.he , crCers -of ,}.tis -prlnce, .-t:espect. the f atvs . ef, his country, and assist in their execution, and that, with the people of his district, he would defend it, or make war in whatever manner the sovereign may rlironF' -'d 9:!vv9, that he would never employ the inhabitants of thaL district, either together or any part of them, in any particuLar service of his own, nor in the service of any of his relations, and that they woul-d only be commanded l-.- l-{- €nr py lrrrrr !v! the service of the king, and to guard, fulfit, and obey, whatever instructions or orders he may receive from the king. The captains of the companies, on being elecLed, had also to take an oath before the captain-major, that they would always have the company under their command ready for the service of the king and for the defense of the -it-rr tnr'rn , ev"rr or village to which it belonged. They also swore that. they wou1d obey the laws and that they would not employ their troops in their own serv- ice. The men over age sixty were excused from the ordenanza, providing the -^^F-.i- *^-:, capcal-n-malor determined that they were unable to carry arms. Every company !'ras diwided into squads of 25 men, each squad being commanded by a corporal, vrho was welI acquainted with every inCividual of the 2s he commanded. The corps or brigade, dS it was caIled, consisted of as many companies as the dj-strict could form, but the effective strength of every company was as fol- l-or.rs : 1 Captain l Ensi-gn 1 Sergeant 1 Meirinho (Bailiff) 1 Clerk 1 Drummer 10 Corporals 250 Men 256 Total

Every captain had his own colors, which were carried by the ensign. The drummer was generally one of the capEain's servants trained in thht function. There were, in fact, mounted ordenanza, which were formed from the higher elements of Portuguese society. They had the same organization. The croops anC companies were trained to arms by r-heir respective captains once or twice a month, and twice in every year the whole force of the district was assembled by the cap[ain-major and inspecLed by him. Ewery man in the kingdom was a soldier of some kind or another. He was, obliged to have arms in his possession, either for the defense of his home or his state. The peasants who did not have fire arms, had pikes or poles with l''r:rzr-rnci-q^rfixed on them. The ordenanza was formed into six qrand divisions or provinces -

Portuouese Recruitment :

The process of recruitment was tied into the captain-majors of the ordenanza. The men were not l-evied bv bribes or recruiting parties. The King simply ordered that a regiment should consist of 2,000. The colonef, f inding that he had 1,300 rnen, prowided a list of his requirements to the general of the province, who then issued a notice to the captain-major of the

79 distr.ict chat 700 men were needed. The captain-major or his deputy, passed a rewiew of the district and picked ouE 700 young men. The men would then be sent to prison for a few days to I'Eame" them and as soon as enough are col- ...1e-qged, chey -were marched off under...'escorL-,tso !, the - regimertE . . - - They- were . then ..crd.i€€r-ibuced -between the companies, so as to dj-lute tsheir numbers with veteran troops. They were Chen sworn in and had no option but t.o take the oath- ff they should chance to leave the corps for 24 hours, without authorization, .after being sworn in, they were declared to be desert.ers and shot. of course, there were many abuses of Ehis system. The wealthier escaped entirely, Ehe productive and socially necessary individuals, be they artisans or farm hands, generally escaped as much as the government could permit and the "draft" 'expendable!' :tended to fal1 on those idenEified by the government as or "undesirabl-e.' Vagrants, unemployed and foreigners were swept up by the Portuguese equivalenc of press gangs and were submitt.ed for service in the

Performance of the Portuquese Armv

The Battle of Bussaco

Shortly after Massena invaded Portugal, Wellington began to receive reporLs of the performance of the reformed Portuguese army. The first report related to rhe 3rd Caqadores engaged the French advanced guard on the Azaba, sranding their ground and skirmishing we11. Shortly later, when ciudad Rodri- go f311, the Portuguese !,,ere not engaged. Wellington had instructed Craufurd to make sure that the Light Division was not caught in front of Almeida. It was nol unt i1 24 July that che first true -,est of the Portuguese was to occur. Neyrs VT Corps crossed the Coa near Almeida and caught Craufurd's Lighc Division on the east bank of the river. Craufurd ordered a withdrawal and t.he 1s[ and 3rd Caqadores, with the 95th Ri:les, were ordered to cover the bridge so the rest. of the division could cross over it. The French attacked the llriCge, SUfrering 520 killed and wounded anC inflicting 333 casualties on the allies, of which 45 were Portuguese. Th= official dispatches reported --here that the lst Caqadores held their ground, buc were reports that the 3rd \-dvaL.rLrrc>/-a^^^l^-^- rrddl-. broken and f led in panic. Both B=resford and Wel-lington ordered an immediate investigation. The results of the inquiry revealed that, though the battalion had crossed the COa at an "accelerated pace" it had been the result of confused orders, rather than panic amcngst the t.roops . .,F Many positive reports were received about the performance of the Portu- guc>= sclvcr,Lry.^----1 On 2 August 30 French cavalry were captured in an ambush by i-lrcurrv !Drrrl-rr-rr6oa v! uuyJese cavalrynr-tr"lvtr contingenL^^nFi-^^^F ofn€ de.la Sil.zeira'sQi l:rc'i r= I o army,armlI underttnAar FranciscoIJr Teixeira Lobo, near Simatria. Twenty-four hcurs later the Ist Portuguse \-o.//a--.^vo.! *"1.. ry '.cyimenEn^^ kilIed 19 French in a discipl rned charge at AtaIaya, On 22 August the 4th Cavalry Regiment, part of Henry's Fane's brigaie, took part in a charge near Escalhas de Cima. A total of 5 0 French cavalry were captured and not a single Portuguese soldier was wounded. On the other hand, after the fall of Almeida, there were reports of large scale treason by the 24th Line Regiment, part of the city's garrison. The French arrny that captured the cicy containeC a number of Portuguese nobles who had been brought along to provide political support for their move into D.rrt-ttrr.al One, Dom Pedro de Almeida, Marquis d'Al-orna, apparently convinced ttr:: 24tln Line to join the French. It was placed under the command of Manual- rrr:ri-i ^ Mrrf ips Pamplona, Conde de Subserra, and sent to Aldea del Obispo where it, and three regiments of Portuguese l'1i1itia, took an oath of alle- 11rqr^ueni:ncc FnLv .,apoleon.Tr] After four days of drill they were given their weapons.

BO Witrhin a few days the desertions began and within a week half the regiment had deserted back to the aIlies. It would appear that the defection was little more than a ploy to escape the prospect of a prisoner of war camp. In fact, Beresford was soon ahle to reform Lhe. reginent-- . ...".*S-bCr5-.Jrr..I af-e.r, -af !--he baCCIe 3lf BuSS?.C.*, th-e. P::ltrg'iese ',.,'ere to ShOw-- their metal again. In the early stages of the battLe of Bussaco the French ?1cF r'6naro Regiment, with 1,700 men, advanced along the road that crossed the Serra de Bussaco at the Pass of San Antonio de Contaro. As it. reached the crest. of t.he mountain, it was met by fire from the 21st Portuguese Line and cannister from Arentschildt's Portuguese battery. The French were stopped. The 74th Brit.ish Foot and 9th Portuguse Line began a cross fire against the French. After a half hour exchange the 21st Line, 74th Foot, dssisted by the light companies of the 5/60Lh Foot, counter attacked and drove the French down rhe hi-]I. El-sewhere t.he French 35th Line and 2nd L6gdre Regiments attacked the position held by the British 45th and BBth Foot. The 8th Portuguese Line joined them at the critical moment and assisted in breaking the French attack. There was a dispute, which suggested the Bth Line fired on the British troops, but it was generally agreed thaL their performance was "ga]lanL. t' The performance of the Portuguese was not so happy elsewhere during the battl-e. The Bth and 9th Portruguese Line, supported by the ?4th British Foot and Arentschil-dt's Portuguse artillery were struck by a major French force under General- Foy- The French outnumbered them three to one and eventually broke them. However, the Portuguese had held their porLion of the fine long cr-r^trrrh t-^ ^ermit the 9th Foot, 38th Foot, and 1st Royals to arrive and repulse Foy's assault. fn the repulse of Loison's at[ack the 1st and 3rd Caqadores were noted r.\ h:rrc norr61s136] t,vlr extremely wel-I, while losing II2 of the total 177 casualties suffered in the allied charge. Around 9 : 00 a . m. , the 19th Portuguse Line, unCer Lieutenant Col-onel Wm. McBean, found itself facing the 32nd L6gdre Regimen[. The 19th attacked with bayonets and chased the French back until they were engaged by a French bat- tery. They suffered 37 casualties, vrhile inflicting 113 on the French. At the battle of Bussaco the Portuguse suffered half of the I,252 ca- sualties suffered by the allies. fn his after action report, tr,Iellington singled out for praise the performance of the Bth, 9th, 19th and 21st Line and 3rd Caqadores. The battle of Bussaco changed the worl-d's irnpression of the Portuguese €-i ^'t^r.i -- r'\ramosos :'';4 as rl-gnttng men. Previously they had been knoln as the (runavrays or "bug outs") by the gritish, but they were now vievred as equals. Even the Frcnnl-r rrrlrn rv^^, had previously been contemptuous of the Portuguese, changed their ^nininnc pelet observed "the Portuguese were interspersed among the British; they acEed perfectly." Officia] British recognirion for the portuguese contribution came when Beresford was made a Knight of the Bath for their perrormance Curing the campaign.

The Battle of Albuera

The battl-e of Albuera occurrred on 15 May 1811. Sou1t faced the Anglo- Portuguese-Spanish army with his army. He faced the British frontally rvith a force 4,4'/4 men and visibly rnaneuvered a further 5,621 on their l-eft f1ank. Howewer, unseen, he maneuvered his 1st and 2nd Divisions, about 12,000 men unCer G6rard and Gazan, unseen against their flank. At B:30 a.m., the French assaulted the allied center and the four regiments of French cavalry attacked the a11ied right f Iank. The Spanisl-r

B1 stood facing the village of Albuera, despite Beresford,s orders for Chem to face to che flank. The Spanish Commander, 81ake, apparently believed Lhe French attack would be against the cenEer. Shortly later Soule's maneuver was - -4Rtr-9.5€nL:-and..rBeresford and Blake f ranEica-l1y l actempEed -to: turri Lhe.ir:forces - to ee-€he- pending.French -four .brigade .under "*..iF attack,, The s Zayas,.were -in- t.he proper posit.ion and Blake ordered his remaining regiments to turn and face the French. Soult ordered his false aEtack on the left to turn and march in feserve of c6rard and Gazan. lnvol,ved in their maneuver, Ehe spanish suffered heavy casualties. The French would have enveloped the altied flank if action had not been prompe and decisive, for t.he position occupied by Ehe French raked and dominated the entire allied pos ition. The Spanish wing began to collapse and British ceneral William Stewart ordered his 2nd Division forward to hold the flank. The 3rd, 31st, 48th and -66th Foot reached the crest, deployed in line and stretched out across the extreme righc fl-ank of the French positj.on. Noticing this, ceneral de dj-wision Latour-Maubourg ordered the polish VisEul-a Lancers, the 2nd and 1oth Hussars and the 20th Dragoons to attack them. As Lhe British were engaged frontally with c6rard's infantry, they did not notice the 1,424 French cavalry pressing do$rn on them. In a few moments Che four British regiments were destroyed and t.he British lost 1,413 of their original strength of 2,06G men. The French cavalry then turned to strike che British center. Stewart brought forward his t.wo remaining brigades under Houghton and Alb3rcronilcy. These brigades contained the 3,248 men of the 31st, 29th, 57th, 48th, 28th, 39th and 34th Foot. They stood in a two deep line and were soon engaged Gazan's and G6rard's infantry. Meanwhile the Vistula Lancers and the French Hussars continued to sweep around behind the AIlied 1ines. They overran Beresford's general staff and cne Polisfr nearly killed Beresford himself. The situation was only changed by the arrival of Lumley's dragoons. The Vistula Legion Lancers herded their prisoners back to the rear and reformed. They came forward again and their next attack was broken as they charged againsC Harvey's four Portuguese battafions. The Portuguese met them v/ith careful, disciplined volleys that ended the Poles' actions in the bat.tle- ,. The bat.tle was out of Beresford's control and his subordinates took what action they thought necessary to save the batcle. One, Henry Hardinge, Deputy QuarLermaster ceneral of the Portuguese Army, direcLed Campbell to support the i> KGL with his 2,000 Portuguese. Meanwhile, Cole began co deploy his forces, 2,015 British and 2,927 Portuguese soldiers of the l-1th and 23rd Line and Lhe Loyal Lusitanian Legion. Because of the French cavalry threat, Cole placed a column on either end of his line. In response to this advance, Soult sent forward the 26th, 14th, 1?th and 27th Dragoons to strike the Portuguese on the alIied right f]ank. The portu- guese were set and waiting for the French cavalry attack. Their st.eady wol- lies stoppsd che cavalry attack and prevented their reaching the advancing Brit ish infantry. As the British reserve moved up the hil1, Soult was sending forward the 5,521 men of his reserve - 12th LegAre, 55th and 58th Line - in a charge to take the posieion- Cole responded by ordering his troops to counter charge. The British were to prevail, despite the disparity in nunilf,ers. If it. had not been for the sLalwart fight by the Portuguese infantry, th3 French cavalry would have swept down upon and crushed the British 1ine, or forced it to form square and become easy prey for the French infantry- Their actions were pivotal in the British success at Albuera,

6Z The Battle of Salamanca

At dawn on 22 June LB]-2 the French and British armies found themselves .fa.:i-r-.g.off e3ain.neat^ lhe vi.J"1-ageef C.?l"arra.a de Arriba. The :'egion bet.r'?3n the., B-:-i..ti .h an.i. '9r:.ei:ch .wes marl:eJ . bi' t'r.'o -r crge rncunds, L3t Arapif es, -:Ll,- Greater Arapile and the Lesser Arapile. In an effort to seize these signifi- cant terrain features, the French made a rush before B:00 a.m., to seize the Greater Arapile. They found themseLves faced by the 7th Caqadores of Cole's 4th Division. Though the 7th Caqadores fought bravely, they were severely outnumbered by the four French battalions that opposed them and driven back after a bloody fight. In the course of the battle D'Urban obserwed a battal-ion of the French 101st Line Regiment marching forward without any scouts. He wheeled his leading regimenL, the 1st Portuguese Dragoons, which consisted of about 200 'i 'y,anrrrvrr, nt- ^ 1i-ne and ordered t.hem to att.ack the French. The 1lth Portug-uese Dragoons and two squadrons of the British 14th Lighc Dragoons, which had just arrived, were sent forward in suppor[. The French attempt.ed to c]-ose their battalion into a mass, but they were unsuccessful. Two Portuguese squadrons attacked frontaIly, while the third struck the flank of the French. The French batfal-ion was obliterated and scattered to Lhe hilIs. As the batfle developed, Packenham ani the 3rd Division strttck the French. Their advanced in three columns, each column formed from one of his l-rri cracles. The 12th Caqadores and severa] companies of the 5/50th Rif ]es adwanced before them ac[ing as a skirmish screen. D'Urban's Portuguese caval- Ty advanced on the exposed southern flank of Lhe British attack. The Blitish attack broke the French attack and Wellington, who was to the rear, sent forward Bradford and Leith vrith Eheir brigades. Again they r..rere cowered by a ]ine of skirmishers formed of 9th Caqadores and Brirish iight infantry. The first line was formed of British troops and the second l-i-ne conta.i ned tlvo British battalions and the 3rd and 15th Portuguese Line. The next Brif ish attack, supported by Le li,larchant's cavalry, destroyed =he French. Three French divis j-ons v/ere destroyed and the survivors f el l back lo the Greater Arapile. Cole launched his attack on the Greater Arapile. The main body rncluded Stubb's Portuguese Brigade, formed vrith the lfth and 23rd Portuguese Line Regiments and the 7th Caqadores. Cole sent forward the ?th Caqadores anC iour British lighr companies in skirmish formalion to lead the attack. They pushed back the French skirmishers thaE they encountered. Shortly later Cole :,:t, noticed several French battalions on his left that were chrown back by four Portuguese line battalions. The French retreated east, rather than south, so Cole deLached the 7th Caqadores and sent Lhem to pursue the retreating French. Near the creater ArapiLe Pack advanced forces !tith the 4th caqadores leading his attack in skirmish order. The 4th Caqadores pushed up the Greater: Aranilc In r' ceiwp A \,^l la\./ fr^m fhF Fra.lch Fr F dislan-p o'an paces. Thl French then fol lowed up with a bayonet attack. The 4th Caqadores and Lheir supporting B.jtish grenadier companies were thrown back. only Lhe appearance of the 1/4oth Foot prevented a total disaster. Because the Portuguese were so thoroughly integrated into che Britr,sh ^rmv fheir B.-f ionq arF diffi.nlf r-.\ qF.a-;Fe :rom those of the Britisrr rr.r.nq -{owever; of the 912 Portuguese officers and 1?,105 m?n engaged in the ba:tle, 22 officers and 484 men were killed, 59 officers and 976 men were i,,ounded and 85 were listed as missing. The total losses were 86 officers and 1,527 men, or 9.5e of alf the PorLuguese engaged. The British losses were 3.129 men out 'I ^f 1n ri4t m5n an^r^6/t ^r n9 .Fhara u'^rrl.l n^t- :nnpar r^ h:rza.- _-enl-'a an), st g_ nificant difference in the valor or effort of the Portuguese in the bartle, nor does iL appear r.hat the British were in any way hesilant to employ rl:"fir -: ih3y would their own men in the thick of battle.

B3 PortugueseUnifornrs

The 1805 pattern or Barrentina shako was 'l of black felt, witn a black rssLrts!a.a t- hor 1r=ok11s.a and edging. It had a red and blue cockade unCer the plume on Ehe left and brass plate with the regimental number on rhe front. The Line regimencs had whice plumes and cords of blue mixed wirh the regimenfal piping color - The battalion companies' badge was a small brass oval bearinq t.he Portuguese arms. The grenadiers' badge had a brass grenade. The new 1811 mode] shako was authorized on 30 JuIy 1811. It was black felt and similar in most details to the 1805 shako. The cockade was now red with a blue center. It had a smal-I tuft in t,he 1805 col-ors. The line infan- try 1805 pattern place and ovar or grenade was still worn. The line infantry wore a dark b1ue, single breasted jacket with dark bl-ue shoulder-straps, brass or pewter buttons, and. dark blue -l turnbacks. The rsai mcnF = -L.^ rvYr co]-orvvrv! waswq- wornwul_Il. (Jll LllC colvvrrs!, I ar. crtfeu!_v, f s . anri 6'i 1-.i-- An on the f *PIn9 On Cne r-nl I ar cuf f s, shoul-der-straps, Iape1s, turnbacks and f rom the hip buttons . Some docur.ients show cross pockets, while others show sloping pockets. The grenadi- ers shoulder-straDs had fringed ends of bl-ue mixed with the piping color. A]l -i-€-FFei rnrantry wore rvhrte cross -be1ts with no plate, a black buI let pcuch with a Frr: c c ron i 'nental number, brown knapsack with gray blanket rol I and white stracs, haversack, and carried a with a white sling. They wore combi- --r.i ^- ^-hF natlorl palcal-oons-gaifers in the summer, and dark blue pant.al-oons and black gaiters in the winter. They carried a brass hilted irif antry s'.vord. The NCOs, betv.'een 1806 and 1810, had a white sword knot. The same sword knot -ras used by the infantry from 1810 to 1814. The oioneers were dressed like the line infantry, but hai the grenadier scyle fringed shoulder-sLraps. They wore an apron ano carried an axe ano carbi-ne- They al-so wore the tradit.ional full beard- Their shako nad crossed axes on them belcrv the oval badge. The Crummeis were dressed like the infantry, bui hac regime;,:al lace, the piping color with blue f ringes, on the f ront and back seari-:s of their sleeves and, instead of piping, oo the front, bottom and turnbacks" They wore white shculder-bel-ts, brass oval plates, and the inf anrry sr.rord in a black scabbard with a brass tip. Their drums were bl-ue, with the Portuguese coat of arms on the front. The collar, cuf fs and piping liv colors were cyclical and accordr-nE to the c\tqrarn af JyDLc-ttr \rL Count\-(JUIIL Scharrmhrrro-T,i5CfIdL,,-ury nne lr1,uu, . whcrcirtrre!e!^r n nri marvJ --*Jl:Sr-r-rlr- COffSSpOnded tO - ordinal- numbers rvhite I, red 2, yeIlow 3, blue 4 . The regimencal colors rvere: ReqimentalName Collar Cuffs Pipinq ReoimentalName Co lla r Cuffs Pipinq 1st'1stof Lisbon or La Lippe' DarkBlue White White 14th"Tavira" v/hite lvhite Red "Lagos 2nd orAlgarve" DarkBlue White Red 15th"2nd of 0livenca U/hite \'/hite Yellow 'l " 3rd st of 0livenga DarkBlue White Yellow 16th"Viera Telles" Red Red V/hite "Freire" 4th DarkBlue Red White I7th"2nd Elvas" Red Red Red 5th"1st Elvas" Dark Blue Red Red "2nd0porto" -lst lBth Red Red Yellour 6th 0porto" DarkBlue Red Yellow 19th "Cascaes" Yellow Yellow White "Setubal" 7th Dark Blue Yellow White 20th"Campo-Mayor" Yellow Yellow Red Bth'Evora" DarkBlue Yellow Red 2lst"Valenca" Yellow Yellow Yellorv "Viana" 9th Dark Blue Yellow Yellow 22nd"Serpa" LiqhtBlue LightBlue V/hite 10th"2nd of Lisbon" DarkBlue tight "Znd 'l Blue White 23rd Almeida" LightBlue LiqhtBlue Red lth'lst ofAlmeida" DarkBlue LightBlue Red "Braganca" -Chaves" 24th LightBlue LightBlue Yellow 12th 0arkBlue LiqhtBlue Yellow -Peniche" 13th White White V/hite

B4 Uniforms of the Cagadore

In 1808 the Caqadores wore the same 1806 shako as the infantry, but its plume and cords we,re J.igl".L cTreen. The nl'tne anC cor:ds nf r-he aiiradcres:,,'ere h-lack- Thei: had -a .brass bugle.hcrn =:rinEe,l. badge. In l-Bl-i, tl-rey adopted Llie new shako- IC. had a brass "French" horn badge wj-thout strings and bore the regimental number in brass. The other detail-s were unchanged. The Caqadores wore brown jackets similar to that of the line infantry. It had brass buttons, pointed ye1)-ow lace Ioops, green piping and its co]1ar and cuffs were in the regimental colors. The atiradores' had green fringed shioulder-straps. Their drummers had green and white lace. The buglers wore green and yellow lace. Apparently this was worn only on their col-Iars and cuffs. They wore black waist and pouch belts. Their pantaloons were brown, but white breeches were worn in the summer. They wore black gaiters. The officers were dressed like the line, but their sword belts were probably black and their swords may have been curved. Between 1B0B and 1810 Lhe regimental colors were as folLows:

Reqiment Collar Cuffs ].st Castel-]o de Vide Brown Light Blue 2nd Moura Brovrn |(eo 3rd Villa Real Brown Ye l- lor.v

tr^nrHtl16 uf uf su 4th Viseu Yrru Light Blue 5th Campo-Mayor Red Red 5th Porto Ye I low Ye ] low

Though it remained brown, in fB11 the cut of the jacket changed. Only the 7th, Bth and 9th Caqadores, formerly of the Loya1 Lusitanian Legion, wore bott Ie green j ackets - They no'rr vrore black braid f rogging and edging on the collar and cuffs - the shoulder-sfraps were either black fringed or black ' '':-^- -nl-^ wl-I.t95. J.rrg coI lar and poin[ed cuf f s vrere in the regimen[a] colors , either 'n-nt,rn v-vnrr v!nr .,!csrr^ro5n 1-,o.rrLcrru;Ji-ISn:nFr'I^r or overall-s (vrhite in the Summer) vlere worn. Short 'n'l =alr a.='irols were al-so worn. The belting waS aS bef Ore, but the knapSacks had bl-ack straps. The officers wore a jacket like the men, but with a black braid trefil knot above each cuff and a stripe of braid down the sides of the breeches. They had black sword bel-ts, a gold gilded saber and the sfandard tank distinc- tioiis - The reqimental col-ors chanqed and were norv as follotvs: . ::">

Reqiment Collar Cuffs r\uYfrrrurruDoai mont- Col lar Cuffs l qt- BIack t,'rafnr H, lllF 7rh BIack Yel loi^;

I f ^nr q | 1r5 2nd Black Scar] e t Brh !r\-rlrL urLle Black 3rd Black Ye l-low 9tir Scarl et Black 4rh I.'r atnr R llla l.'raYnr Rlll0 10rh Ye l- lovr 3l-ack 5rh Scar] et Scar I et I rtn l.r-nr Htrls Scarl e t 5rh Ye 1 ]ow Ye 11or^r 12rh ScarI et Lrght BIue

Officers' Uniforms:

By 1805, with the f ormation of the grand divisions, the of f icers vror3 the same basic uniform as the ]ine and militia. The ensigns wore epaulets witir a f ringe on their lef t shouf der, l ieutenants vrore it on the right should- €r, captains wore two fringed epaulets. The major wore a bullion (golCen) epaulet on his left shoulder and a fringed one on his right. The lieutenant cofonel- wore a bullion (golden) epaulet on his right shoulder ar::r a frinceo one on his lefc, reversing the order of the major Th= co.t-on: 1 wore f t..rc

B5 bullion epaulets. Alt officers, from colonel downwards, wore scale epaulets. The Brigadier ceneral wore two wrought bullion epaulets, with one scar, his uniform was plain blue cloth, wigh broad goLd Lace on the collar and cuffs- The tlajor ce_neraI. -wore-- -t_he same ulifgffrL- bue. the f s of Ehe-r"atii. coar '-'wer'e' -e j.broid6red.' -collar.-and _quf -r"1r-ii3t'h-r'iii The tiel,r.r,u.tc g;nlr.r n"a."t--.r-o*"- oit- ihe whole or'ni".oiiii.;lt*ri"-";;J;.J";r.-n;t;*."dl;.,y "--,rrb;oia..v and wore ernlf,roidered epaulets. The disEincEions of the militia officers were identi- cal, buc the troops of the line had gold mountings and those of the militia ,' were sil-wer. Afcer 1809, this changed. and capEains and above couLd wear either the traiitional PorLuguese shourder-sEraps, ends fringed or unfringed according t.o Lheir rank, or Brit.ish-scyle epaulet.s with a lace strap and crescent end, with unfringed "counter-epaulets". The subalterns and sergeants wore girt. or brass scales. The officers wore the standard shako, but had a coat with a longer tail, double turnbacks in the regirnental piping coror, girt but.Eons, verticaL 3- poinied pocket flaps, piped with the regimenLal color and rrimmed with three butLons- They wore a crimson sash (like the British) with silver Cassels Cied on Ehe right - Their straight swords had gold hilts and a brack and gilt scaailar:d- The sword knot was crimson and goLd- Their shoul-der-be1ts r^rere whi:= vrj-th an oblong gilt plate. They wore black hessians.

Artillerl' Uniforrns

Tne precise nature of the uniforms, when the portuguese army reformed it'ar-fj-11ery, is not certain. It would appear- that it foll-or.red the style of inrantry. the rn 1808, they wore the 1805 style shako, with mixed red anC blu= cords and a black plume. They wore dark blue jackets and pantaloons 1ik= the l ine inf antry with red. piping and brass buttons . A11 rnay have worn th= saine f acing colors - black col-Iars and dark blue cuf f s, buc this is not cer--ai n- hlhite cross belLs and short black gaiters f inished the uniform. In 1813, they wore the 1811 pattern shako with a btack t.uft'. The jacket vtas dark blue and the pantaloons were as belore. The uniform had yellow ni n i -'- qrrvrnrr Y-y---= brass buttons. The collar and cuf f s were black, ds were the shcul-oer-straps, except in the lsE Artillery Regiment, where chey were blue. It aaC wings like Lhose worn by the caqadores. They had white shoul-der-belts witlr brass hilted infantry swords. They did nc)t wear gait.ers. The artillery dri-.zei-s wore the artillery uniform with some limited modif icatioas: brass shculCer-scales, white pouch belt, white waist belt with no plate, :'x brass and a car,-al rlr saber . Their breeches were buf f leather and they had black i ack bocrs.

Cavalrv IJnifornrs

Between 1805 and 1814 the Portuguese cavalry wore a black lear--her hel-me[ with brass trim, black f ur crest , the nat-ional- cockade, a reC plume and f he regiinental number on a small oval brass front plate. There are inCications that a bl-ack belltop shako with a recl plume, odtional cockade, and brass *^-:-^-.r-'l rec;nental number and chin scales was worn later in the war, but there is not- encugh evidence to indicate a general, widespread use. rt is certaj-n that on disr:icunted duty, i. e. garrison duty, some type of garrison cap v/as worn in lieu of the helmet. They wore dark blue jackets piped like that of ttre infantry. They wore bra=s shoulder-scales and buttons. Their breeches were dark blue. They vrore rail b1ack boots. Their gaunclecs were buf f . Their bullet couch v,as buf f

B6 with a oblong brass p1aLe. The belt, waist sword belt (also wiLh oblong brass plaEe) and slings were also buff. They carried a steel hilLed light cavalry saber griEh a steel scabbard and white sword knoE. They also .b.r.asJ c3r'-':ied a sabretacl':e witl-^ a sr.all ovai piate. T'he plate w.is like che -shako.l:aiige. -?he-s.abi:€t.ache .was ,suspended -froi. .three - 1...fail*-ry.. -buif sl1ng straps. The officers, sashes, rank dist.inctions, etc., were like that of the infant.ry. They used a black sheepskin saddle and had a dark blue rotl, behind 'fhe the saddle- holster cover was buff- The regimental colors were:

Col lar Regiment and Cuffs Pioinq 1st Alcantara White White 2nd Moura White Red 3rd Olivenqa wn]-te Yel low 4th Principe Keo White or Duke of Mecklenburg 5th Evora Red Red 6th Brago Red Ye] Iow 7th Li-sbon Ye I low !^,ln1 c e Bth El-was Ye I low Red 9th Chawes Ye] low Ye 1 ]ow 10th Santarem l.raYnr Rlrro Ithite 11th Almeida LiEht Blue Red 12th Miranda t.raYnr H.trla Ye I low

Uniforrns of the Lusitanian Legion

From its formation, Lhe infanLry wcre a shako identical- to ihe porfu- guese l-B11 pattern shako. It had a green tuf t , the national cockade, and an r' armcrj-al oval plate bearinq the cipher "L.L.L. The jackets and o.rerall-s tdere boct ]e green. The col-Iar, cuf f s, poinLed cuf f s, shoul-der-straps and turnbacks were bot--tle green, piped white . yJhite braid f rogging anC piprng was rvorn dovrn the f ront . The j acket had 24 pewter buttons on the f ront in thl ee co]umns , and tr,vo buttons on the back of each cuff, one above and one belorv the ]ine of pipi-ng. The cross pockets were piped and had three buttons. There rvere tvrc more buttons on the hips and each had a line of piping. The waist and por-rch belts were black. f t is probabl-e t.hat they wore r,vhite overalls in the summer. The of f icers had silver brard. Ttieir -:v sashes and rank distinctions probably followed the British systen pricr to their transfer- to Portuguese service. 'fhe artillery of the legion was dressed like the infantr:y, but with L-t ^^r- :--,.: -^ oracK raclngs and probably black shako tufts. Details of th= caval-ry are very l imiLed - Their unif orm was green with white f acings . It (r/ds probably cut like that of the British light dragoons and it is likell'rhat the Tarleton he lmet v/as worn.

Uniforrns of the Militia ancl Ordenanza

Tirere was l itt Ie standardi zed about their uniform. rni 1i t ia wore a blue, gi-een or brown coat and a shako or a Corsican hat Oro=nAnzA vnrob- ably !.,,or-etheir normirl cIoLhinq.

B7 Orqanization of the Port,uquese Arrty 15 September 1809

1/ ,Z/tsc " lst Lisbon or La Lippe,, Infantry Regiment (1,330) "Lagos or Algarve" InfanLry Regiment (1,-?0L) -i*=o1/,2/2nd- 1 / ,2 /3rd t'1st Olivenqa" Inf anE.ry Regiment. (679) r/,2/+cn "Freire" Infantry Regiment (l,477) a/ ,2/Scn "1st E1vas" Infant.ry Regiment (759) l/,2/5th "1st Oporco" Infantry Regimenc (1,082) L/ ,2 /7 th " Setubal-" Inf antry Regiment (1 , 312 ) I/,2/gtn "Evora" fnfantry Regiment (359) I/ ,2/gcn I'Viana" Infantry Regiment (1,511) I/ ,2/10th " 2nd Lisbon" Inf ant.ry Regiment ( 1 , 3?0 ) t/ ,2/f f tfr " 1sL Al-meida,,Inf antry Regiment ( 1,498 ) I/,2/L2thr "Chaves" fnfantry Regiment (1,491) I/ ,2/f:tn "Peniche" Infantry Regiment (1,351) L/ ,2/tqLn "Tavira,' Inf antry Regiment (I ,239) I/,2/rSt.fr "2nd Olivenqa" Infantry Regiment (577) I/,2/tecn "Viera TeIles" Infantry Regiment (595) I/ ,2/L7tln "2nd Elvas" Infantry Regiment (1,218) I/,2/1Bth "2nd Oporto" Infantry Regimenc (1,371) L/,2/19th "Cascaes" Infantry Regiment (1, 519) \/ ,2/ZOcn "Campo-Mayor"Inf antry Regiment (1,218) I/,2/2Lst "Valenqa" fnfantry Regiment (193) I/,2/22nd "Serpa" Infantry Regiment (L,479) I/ ,2/23rd "2nd Almeida" Inf antry Regiment (1,521) I/,2/21Lh "Braganqa" Infantry Regiment (505)

1sL Caqadore (Castello de Vide) (620) 2nd Caeadore (Moura) (425) 3rd Cagadore (vil la Real) (607) 4rh Caqadore (viseu) (619) 5rh Caqadore (Canpo-Mayor) (321-) 6th Caqadore (Oporto) (560)

7th, Bth, & 9th Caqadores were formed formed from the Lusit.anian Legion in 1811-

;p 10th, I1th & 12th Cagadores were formed later.

Cavalrv:

lst (Alcantara Dragoon) Regiment (559) 2nd (Moura) Regiment (400) 3rd (ol ivenga) Regiment (394) 4th (Duke of Mecklenburg, Lisbon) Regirnent (559) 5th (Evora) ReginenE (581) 6th (Braganqa) Regiment (578) 7Lh (Lisbon) Regimenc (564) 8th (Elvds) Regiment (28?) 9rh (Chaves) RegimenL (5?2) 10th (Santarem) Regiment (4?5) 1l th (Almeida) Regiment (482) 12rh (Mj randa) Regimenr (589)

BB Brigadingof thePortuguese Armv 1809-1814

....g!-B-t-:.ecC3 ' L/,2/tst Portuguese Infantry Regiment I/,2/tetn Portuguese Infantry Regiment 4th Caqadores 2nd Briqade: l/,2/2nd Portuguese Infantry Regiment 1/,2/t+tn Portuguese Infantry Regiment

1f^ Hrr ^-d6 - JlVU!MUU- \/,2/3rd Portuguese Infantry Regiment I/,2/15th Portuguese Infantry Regiment Bth Caqadoresl 4t- h Rri rr.arlo. I/,2/Aaln Portuguese fnfantry Regiment \/,2/fOttr Portuguese Infantry Regiment

\r n Hr1 ^-d5 -

1 / 2 /cth L/ r L/ JwL r IPorttlcnreqF v! uuYuLJL rrrLqrrur)/Tnf antrrr r\CY-LlttgfPecri monf lL

-/1 /,2t u/ /1'/fhL t vLL rPnrtrr.nroqo v! Lu:Juuo9 Tnf:nFrr.rrrr!srlutJ/ r\LyrrrtLtrLPorrimpnl- ( f h Rri rr.arlc . I/,2/6th Portuguese fnfantry Regiment I/,2/lBth Portrrguese Infantry Regiment 5th Cacadores

i/f n H,r1aY,ad3.

1/ 2 /'/fh L/ , L/ t LLr Lv!LUyUCDt-Pnrl-ll.ntFqF rrr!qlru!)/Tnfantrrr r\g:JItttc;IlLPecrimenf I/,2/tgtn Portuguese Infantry Regiment 2nd Caqadores

!{fn L.irf-1^5. v srr u! rYqL{g.

1 / ) /Rfh Pr-rrt- rr.yrlpqc Tnfant-rrr Poc'im.rnt- t / | L/ awt r I v! LuvuuJL f t1!uIrLIy ]\C:yrlttcllL I/,2/T2th Poltr-rguese Infantry Regiment 9th Caqadores 9th Briqade: I/,2/gcn Portuguese fnfantry RegimenI L/ ,2/27st Portuguese Inf antry Regiment 11th Caqadores

lllf n Rrlfr:altr. '."> l/,2/L1-tln Portuguese Infantry Regiment I/,2/23rd Portuguese Infantry Regimen[ 7th Caqadores I I t_h Rri rr:rda. I/,2/I3Lhr Portuguese fnfanLry Regiment I/,2/23rd Portuguese Infantry Regiment

1. A1] of the Caqadores numbered 7 and above were not all-ocated to the brigacies until they were raised. Once raised, their assiqnments were as indicat ed .

B9 GeneralBibliography

Foy, Gen., History of t.he War in the Peninsula. under Napoteon -.and . to ..which--Foui is,..pref ixed a, view of . E,he .PotiE ical : Military Statse. LIre Be-Ilicibient -bndJOi- Ppwers , Lqg\rt E-eI and WdrEz, L'ruLE.e1, , Jul -- Richter, Lbndon l-827. 'GaEes, D., The Spanish ULcer. A HisE.orv of the Peninsular War, W.W.NorEon& Co. New York, 1985.

Glower, M.,Wellinqt.on's Peninsular Victories, B.T.Batssford Ltsd., London, 1953.

Glover, M.,The Peninsul"ar War, 1808-1-814, David & Charl-es, London, 1974.

Glover, M.,Wellinqton's Armv in E.he Peninsula L808-l-8L4, Hippocrene Books Inc., New york, L977.

' Gurwood, the Dispat.ches of Field Marshal the Duke of Welf inqt.on Durinq His Various Campaiqns from 1799 E.o 1815, John Murry, LOnOOn, -LaaA- '' Lopez, E.M..f.P., cuerra de fa Independiencia 1808-1814, Librairia Edicorial San Martin, Madrid, 1972.

Saint-Maurice Cabany, E., Etude Historique de l-a Campaqne de Bayfen, Revue Generale Biographique et Necrologique, Paris, 1846.

WelIer, J. , Wellinqton in the Peninsufa, Kaye & Ward, London,

Spanish Bibliograhy

.'- AIb1, J., & Scampa, L-, Campafrasde la Cabafleria Espaffolas en el Siqlo XIX, Servicio Historico Mi1it.ar, Madird, 1985

:P.* Boppe, P., Les Espaqnols dans fa Grande Arm6e; Le Division Romana rr-s-oe-reoil g-rer: t , C.Terna, Paris, 1986

Bueno, J.M., Uniformes Mifitaires Espaflofes: El- Ejercito v fa Armada en l-808, J.M.Bueno Carrera, Malaga, Spain, l-982.

Carrera, J.M.B., La Expedici6n Espaffola a Dinamarca l-807-1808, Aldaba Ediciones, Madrid, 1990.

Cascante, A.T., Historia de Eres laureadas, El- 5o Reqimento de Artifleria a Pie , Servicio Historico Militar, Madrid, 1984.

Cevaflos, Don P., editor, Conf6d6ration des Royaumes et prov1nces d'Espaqne contre BounaparE6 ou Recueil des Pidces Officiales, Tmn7.imari a ---,p.r1r^ ,-J, l a rvld.urJ-u,M-/lri/l udce^-F^ ,,nu'ulrrtnown,

90 de Clonard, Historia orq6nica d.e las armas de infanteria v caballeria espaffoles, Vol IX, Madrid, 1851-1852

De1or, J.B., ,_81.--ejercito Fsnafro:I.de :t8O8_g .estado rniliter de .--.F-sga-fra.-a-1*Cornenzar la .GLterra de .13_-Tndependj-enca

Esdail-e , C. J . , The Spanish Army in the Peninsular War, ManchesEer Univers i ty Pres s , Manchest,er England, 19 BB .

Lopez, J.P., Guerra de l-a fndependencia 1B0B-181-4 Liberia Edit.o- rial San Martin, Madrid, daLe unknown.

Maag, Dr: A., GeschichEe der Schweizer truppen im Kriegre Napole- ons f ., in Spainen und Por[uqal (]-807-1814), Verlag Ernst kuhn, Basel, ]-892 -

von Pivka, O., Armies of the Napoleonic Era, Taplinger Publishing Co - , New York , 7-979 rro Qr I : q gv vt44\4u, Ramon, Memorial Historical de Ia Artilleria Espaffola, Garcia, Madrid, 183 1 .

Yap1e, R . L . , The Reqimen[s and Uniforms of the British, Portu- guese , Spanish, Brunswick and Netherlandish Armies 1802 - 1815, Der Kreibspeilers, Dayton, OH, L975

PortugueseBibliographl'

Arthur, R.ibiero, Os Caqadores Portugueses na Guerra Peninsula (1808-1814), Seccao Editorial de companhia Nacional- Editora, Li sboa , dat e unknor,vn .

Beresford, W.C. , Collecqao das Ordenes Do Dia do Illustrissimo e Excellenti-ssimo Senhor Guilherme Carr Beresf ord, Year 1809, 1810, 1811 & 1814, Antonio Nunes dos Santos Printer to the Gener- al Headquarters, Lisbon, date unknown.

A History of Ehe Campaiqns of Ehe British Forces in Spain and Portuqal, Undertaken to relieve those Countries from the French Usurpation; Comprehendinq Memoirs of the Operations of this Interest ing War, Characteristic Reports of the Spanish and Port,u- quese Troops. and fllustrative AnecdoLes of DisEinguished Mili- tarlr Conduct in f ndividual s , Whatever their Rank in the Army, VoI II First British Campaiqn (1808 ) , The Convention of Cintra. Restorat ion of the Kingdom of Portuqal . on its evacuation by t.he French Troop s , T . Goddard, London, 1-8L2.

Gurwood, Lt . Co1 . The Dispatches of FieId Marshal the Duke of InIellinqton Durinq His Various Campaiqns in India, Denmark, portu- 9aI, Spain, the . Lovr Countries and France from 1799 to 1818, J - Murry, Londofl, 1837.

Horvard, R.A., The PorLuguese Regular Army, 1806-1814, R.A.Howard., L97 9 .

91 Leslie, Major J.H. , The Dickson Manuscripts. beinq Diaries, Let- ters . Maps . Account. Books , with Various Other Papers of t.he Late Maior-General Sir _ Ale-xander DiqkFgB, _lG.C.B.,_li. C. H., .K.T. S ., RcyaI Artillery, Series .'tCrf 1809 t.o 181-8, P.o1'a1 Arti l-lery Illsl.i- tution Printing House, Woo1wich, 1905

Mayne, Lt. Col. Wm. & Lil1e, Cpt., A Narrative of Campaiqns o t,he Loyal Lusit.anian Legion During the Years 1809, 1810. & 1811, T. Egert.on, London , L81-2 .

Oman, A Historv of the Peninsular War, At the Cl-arendon Pre s s , Oxford, England, L902.

Papers Presented t,o ParliamenL in 1809 Re1at.ing t.o America, Spain and Port.uqal, A. Strahan, London, 1810 .

Vichness , S . E . Marshal of Portugal : The Mil[ary Career of Wi]- - liam Carr Beresford 1785-1814, Doctoral Dissertation, Florida State University , L97 6 .

Yaple, R .L. , The Regiments and Uniforms of the British, Portu- quese, Spanish, Brunswick and Netherlandish Armies, 1802 - 1815, Der Kriegspeilers, Dayton, OH L975 .

liY

92 Index

Portuguese Army 180B-1814, 63 Artillery Uniforms, 85 Battle of Albuera, 81 Battl-e of Bussaco, B0 Battl-e of Salamanca, 83 Caqadore, Uniforms, 85 Cavalry Uniforms, B5 Infantry, Uniforms, 84 Lusitanian Legion, Uniforms, 87 Militia Uniforms, 87 Officers' Uniforms, 85 Ordenanza, Uniforms, 87

Spain Army 1788-1808, 1 Artillery 17BB-tBL4, 39 Battle History of the Spanish Army, 44 BattIe of Albuera, 50 Battle of Baylen, 4B Battle of Cardadeau, 49 Battle of Ocafla, 49 Caval.y, Organt-zation, 17BB-1814, 28 Guns, 43 Spanish Infantry, OrgantzaLion, 17BB-1814, 15

l*

93