Master thesis political science: Grand strategy in the 21th century

Who is ready to bleed for the ? - European support for US-led missions after the -

Willem de Grave 6015867 First reader: Dr. P.A van Hooft Second reader: Dr. S. Rezaeiejan Date: 30-01-2015 Word Count: 23954 Abstract Under the unipolar moment that emerged after the end of the Cold War the United States has on several occasions embarked on out-of-area operations to shape the international environment. The difference in the degree of support for these missions provided by its traditional Western European allies is remarkable. While some countries have showed extraordinary willingness to ‘fight and die’ next to the US, other states have stood on the side-line time and again. In the thesis the argument is developed that system level explanations cannot account for this. First, distinctions based on relative material capabilities, fail to account for differences between states holding the same capabilities. Second, explanations associated with alliance dependence and balance of threat fail to create differencing hypothesis because these pressures are to a large degree felt in the same way by the highly similar European states. To account for difference in contributions, on the domestic level Atlanticism as part of a country’s strategic culture is developed as the mechanism through which elites judge their alliance with the US, the level of threat coming from a region and the preferred method of dealing with this threat. Coupled with the promise of political influence, these moral and utility incentives have led to robust preferences of the elites in these countries in the period under investigation, hereby accounting for consistent differences in contributions. The strength of Atlanticism makes other domestic variables like public opinion and the domestic political structure of the country of subordinate importance.

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Contents 1.Introduction ...... 5 2. Literature review ...... 7 2.1 System level explanations ...... 7 2.2 Domestic level explanations ...... 9 2.3 Neoclassical explanations ...... 12 3. Theory section ...... 13 3.1 Dependent variable ...... 14 3.2 Independent variables ...... 14 3.3An integrated model of county contributions under unipolarity ...... 24 3.4 Hypothesis………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………...... 25 3.5 Research design…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………26

US-led interventions ...... 30

4. The first Gulf War (1991) ...... 31 4.1.Background conflict ...... 31 4.2 Troop contributions …………………………………………………………………………………………………….…………….32 4.3 System level explanations ...... 34 4.4 Domestic level explanations ...... 3739 4.5 Conclusion ...... 42 5 Operation Enduring Freedom (2001-) ...... 43 5.1 Background conflict ...... 43 5.2 Troop contributions……………………………………………………………………………………………………………… . ….44 5.3 System level explanations ...... 47 5.4 Domestic level explanations ...... 50 5.5 Conclusion ...... 55 6. Iraqi Freedom (2003-2009)...... Fout! Bladwijzer niet gedefinieerd. 6.1Background conflict ...... 57 6.2 Troop contributions ...... 57 6.3 System level incentives ...... 60 6.3 Domestic level explanations ...... 62 6.4 Conclusion ...... 68 7. Conclusion ...... 69 8. Literature review ...... 74

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1 Introduction In 1989 the bipolar system, that had marked international for decades, crumbled with the demise of the Soviet Union. After a short period of optimism in a peaceful ‘end of history’ however soon a new variety of threats required international attention. Enjoying unmatched military capabilities, from now on the world looked predominantly to the United States (US) to deal with these challenges. Whether fuelled by international pressures or a domestic drive to spread the ‘American way’ the US actively picked up this task and became actively involved in dozens of hazards over the last two and a half decades. Though the country hereby possessed the military capabilities to tackle these conflicts on its own, it preferred to build broad coalitions of states to provide them with international legitimacy and a share in the risks (Kreps, 2011:7). Consequently, coalition warfare has become one of the central features of warfare after the end of the Cold War (Ashraf, 2011:1). For its coalitions the United States looked for the support of those states that shared a similar worldview and had high value of their alliance with the country (Poulsen, 2012: VII). Traditionally, these had been the Western European states with which it was united through the NATO alliance since the 1940’s.1 It was explained that this ‘grand bargain’ between the two sides of the Atlantic, in which the US would keep safe and police the world in exchange for legitimacy and a share of the burden provided by its allies, explains the persistence of NATO after the Soviet threat had vanished (Sireci & Colleta, 2009:57). However, during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq the perceived reluctance of many of the traditional European states to uphold their share of the bargain hit an open nerve in US-EU relations. This led US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to label Western Europe as ‘old’ and reluctant (The Guardian, 2003a). Though this critique applied to states like Belgium, France and other states of the ‘Old Europe’ like the (UK), , and the had shown remarkable degrees of support for the US in their missions, hereby allowing for an interesting comparison. This thesis is therefore dedicated to the US-led military out-of-area operations that have emerged after the Cold War. And particularly the issue of over- and under-contribution to these missions by its traditional Western European allies. It seeks to answer the question what has motivated the Europeans to place boots on the ground and will formulate an answer the question why some states on have shown remarkable willingness to ‘fight and die’ next to the

1 List of Cold War Western European NATO members: Belgium ,Denmark, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, United Kingdom, Germany, Spain.

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US, while other states on different occasion stood watching on the side-line. The question the thesis seeks to answer therefore is:

How can differences between European states in their contributions to US-led out-of-area missions after the end of the Cold War be explained?

The large number of variables connected to burden-sharing behaviour, and the debt of analysis necessary to grasp their essence, make it that current leading works on the topic are highly detailed studies of county’s incentives during one single mission. Consequently, there is ample academic work which seeks to explain differences in mission contributions over multiple missions. The frequency of US-led missions over the last decades hereby widens the opportunity to fill this gap. Since these works allow for comparisons over time and space patterns in contributions during this period become identifiable. This sort of conclusions seem feasible in an era in which coalition burden-sharing between Europe and the United States has become of increasing interest due to changing power relations and growing instability around Europe’s frontiers (German Marshall Fund,2013). In the thesis a Neoclassical realist argument towards explaining contributions will be developed. It will be shown that explanations coming from the system level of international politics fail to provide an answer to the research question because the great similarity of states under investigation leads to a convergence in incentives from this level. To account for differences Atlanticism as part of a country’s strategic culture is developed as the domestic mechanism through which elites judge their incentives for contributing. It will be shown that the strength of this variable will ultimately determine actual troop contributions, making other domestic variables like public opinion and domestic political configurations largely irrelevant during the period. In the next section a short overview of the existing literature will be provided, followed by a theory section in which the thesis argument will be developed further. These theoretic claims will in the remainder of the thesis be tested against two pairs of two countries (the UK & France and Denmark & Belgium) which approach similar cases on many important dimensions but differ on their degree of ascribed Atlanticism. The contributions of these states will be compared during three high profile cases: The Persian Gulf war (1991), the Afghanistan war (2001) and the (2003). The thesis will end with a conclusion, in which the implications of the research will be discussed.

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2 Literature review Questions relating to burden-sharing behaviour between allies have been under scholarly attention since the Cold War. As a result of these academic debates, three broad categories of explanations have developed in literature. The first strand of literature is offered by structural realism which seeks to explain burden-sharing by looking at explanations stemming from the international system. The second strand of literature looks for variables at the domestic level and consists of ‘strategic culture’ and what will be called here ‘domestic political setting’ literature. The last strand of literature uses explanations from both the system and domestic level to explain burden-sharing behaviour. The main contributions off all three strands of literature will be discussed below.

2.1 System level explanations Structural realism or neorealism offers a system level theory of alliances, coalitions, and burden-sharing (Ashraf, 2011:37). Structural realism has two central premises: First, since there is no overarching international sovereign, that can make or enforce international laws and punish or reward state behaviour, the international system must be perceived as and anarchy of states. Second, under this anarchy a state can ultimately only rely on itself to safeguard its existence and interests. Power is therefore perceived as the currency of international politics, underlying in all state relations. It is however not the absolute quantity of capabilities of a state that determines its behaviour but its relative material capabilities towards other states in the system (Schweller, 1997:927). For all realists the interactions between states are dependent on the division of relative material capabilities (polarity) of the system (Rose, 1998:144). Within this given system, states are assumed to be undifferentiated, rational units whose aim at a minimum is to survive. But at the same time states will also try to maximize their utility versus other states because the anarchic tenants of the system forces them to act selfish (Zagare, 2004:108). Structural realists expect that the pressures described above can give a full account of state behaviour. Consequently, the theory assumes that similarly placed states in the international system respond in the same fashion to input from their external environment. Structural realism has developed three broad explanations of coalition burden-sharing which will be discussed below.

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2.1.2 Collective action Collective action theorists have indicated that coalition burden-sharing between allies in out- of-area operations should be perceived collective action problems. Assuming that the intensions of US missions are benign, and not imperialistic in nature, the output these missions produce are public goods. Because all states in the system benefit, but also because states who don’t contribute to the collective effort, to for example stabilize a region, cannot be excluded from the gains in terms of safety (Olsen & Zekhauser,1966:266-79). Assumed to be rational and out to maximize utility, states will therefore voluntarily not contribute more than the gain it would receive if the good were supplied to all (Bennet et al, 1994:41). With this as underlying assumption Olsen & Zeckhauser demonstrated that collective actions of alliances will therefore be plagued by free rider problems (Olsen & Zeckhauser, 1966:266). They showed that during these missions larger states will face a strong tendency to bear a disproportionate share of the burden, while less powerful states will only marginally contribute to the provision of public goods (Massie, 2014:3). The logic behind this is that larger members of alliances have higher stakes in the outcome and hereby have the resources to provide a significant amount of the collective good, while smaller members can only hope to make a very modest impact on the collective efforts (Olsen & Zekhauser, 1966: 279).

2.1.3 Alliance dependence In later work it was questioned whether the output produced by alliances satisfies the definition of a pure public good. It was argued that under certain circumstances countries will have private incentives to contribute to the collective provision of a mission (Massie, 2014:4). One of these private incentives indicated in literature is the concept of alliance dependence (Ashraf, 2001:45). Glenn Snyder indicated that states upholding alliances inherently face two fears: The first is abandonment: the fear that an ally may leave the alliance or fails to provide support when this is expected. The second is entrapment: the fear of becoming entangled by an ally in a conflict peripheral to a state’s interest (Snyder, 2007:187-188). Snyder’s showed that states fearing abandonment will show greater commitment to upholding an alliance, either voluntarily or because they are sensitive to requests and pressure from bigger allies (Snyder, 2007:187-188). Using Snyder’s model on burden-sharing it was argued that states that are dependent on the United States for the provision of important state functions are more likely to make considerable contributions to its out-of-area operations

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(Bennet et al, 1994:44). This alliance dependence can be of military as well as economic nature. With respect to the former scholars like Jens Ringmose indicated that this logic helps explaining why states who are highly dependent on the provision of American security like the Baltic states and disproportionally contributed to US missions after the End of the Cold War (Ringmose, 2010:331). Regarding the latter, Bennet et al showed that for this reason Egypt, which received massive amounts of economic aid from the US during the time, contributed heavily to the US-led intervention in the Gulf in the 1990’s (Bennet et al, 1994:45).

2.1.4 Balance of threat The second private incentive coming from the international system relates to the level of threat a state perceives coming from a region. Patricia Weitsman has shown that states facing a strong threat from an external enemy will contribute more toward a coalition than states facing less threat (Weitsman, 1997:156). Because such a state will have a higher stake in a good outcome, the logic of collective action is overcome at this point. Scholars hereafter used this idea to explain differences in contributions to US-led missions. Bennet et al used the idea to explain contributions of states like Saudi Arabia during the Gulf War (Bennet et al, 1994:43). Davidson recently used threats to a state’s psychical security as a variable determining significant amounts of countries contributions to multinational coalitions (Davidson, 2011:78).

2.1.5 Criticism Even though structural realism is strong on its assumptions the theory suffers from two major shortcomings. First, because states are assumed to fully rational respond to inputs from the international system, structural realism falls short of explaining a situation when two similarly placed states in the system respond in different ways to similar systemic inputs (Schweller,2004:161). Second, structural realism ignores the domestic level political and cultural constraints, through which systemic incentives and pressures are filtered to shape states’ decisions on burden-sharing (Ashraf, 2011:44).

2.2 Domestic level explanations In contrast to the system level explanations of Neorealism, proponents of domestic level explanations look for variables within the nation-state. In literature two broad categories can be distinguished. The first category looks at the domestic political setting of a state when

9 deciding on the use of force abroad. The second category of literature consists of strategic culture explanations.

2.2.1 Domestic political setting Work in the domestic political setting strand of literature generally includes research on the influence of public opinion and the autonomy of the executive to decide on the use of force abroad.

Public opinion Scholarly work regarding the use of force generally holds that that executives fear being electorally punished for their policy decisions. This idea was best captured by Thomas Risse- Kappen who in his 1991 work argued that “Policymakers in liberal democracies do not decide against an overwhelming public consensus” (Risse-Kappen, 1991:510). Working from this tradition three broad categories of literature can be distinguished regarding public opinion and troop contributions. First, the bottom-up approach which holds that policy positions on troop contributions affect a voters choose, both the executive and opposition will adopt a public strategy that appeals to the position of the mass public (Schultz,1998:831). Consequently, scholars working in the bottom-up tradition expects that an unfavourable public opinion environment will ultimately limit the support a country will provide for US- led missions (Larson & Savych 2005:xvii). Second, the top-down approach suggests that the public takes its opinion on complex issues like foreign intervention from elites (Ashraf, 2011:54). Elites can usually frame interventions using persuasive rhetoric and their access to mass media, hereby getting the public behind their preferred course of action (Kreps, 2010:199). Last in recent analysis of burden-sharing between the US and its European allies during the last decade the elite consensus thesis, which holds that public opinion doesn’t hold either top-down or bottom-up tenets has become of increasing dominance. Sarah Kreps for instance argued that systemic incentives towards international cooperation create consensus between both the executive and parliament about the course of action, hereby sheltering leadership from electoral punishment (Kreps, 2010: 192).

Autonomy of the executive Public decisions in democracies can at times also be constrained by parliament. Bennet et al argued that, in general, executives will be more willing to support international missions than legislatures because they will feel the pressure put on them by systemic pressures more

10 directly, while legislatives representing society on the other hand will worry more about short time issues like risks and costs (Bennet et al, 1994:46). When opinions between the executive and legislative differ the autonomy of the executive on questions relating to the use force becomes decisive (Bennet et al, 1994:46). Wagner has shown that as a result of particular historical trajectories and political configurations major differences exist between the European states on this parameter. Like Bennet et al, Wagner hereby held the assumption that the higher the degree of parliamentary control, the easier it is for parliament to put restrictions on the use of force abroad (Wagner, 2006:53). Strong bulwarks against the use force abroad have been identified as particularly strong in the Post- II political systems of Germany and Japan. But of the states under investigation this has also been observed for Denmark (Wagner, 2006:40).

2.2.2 Strategic culture Strategic culture theorists aim to explain differences in state behaviour by looking at an actor’s domestic identity in security and defence matters (Biehl et al, 2013:9). The concept was first coined by Jack Snyder. In his view historical processes that are particular to a country form a ‘perceptual lens’ through which strategic issues are processed, hereby affecting policy in such a way that similarly placed states can respond differently to inputs from the system (Longhurst 2000:302). Strategic culture literature can be categorized in three broad generations: The first generation conceptualized strategic culture as the context within which states form their security policies. Starting from the assumption that strategic culture produces tendencies and preferred working methods, while not ultimately determining behaviour (Biehl et al, 2013:10). Working in this tradition, Sedivy & Zaborowsky for instance stated that strategic culture lays out the repertoire of possible policy tools available for dealing with a situation (Sedivy&Zaborowski:2010:193). Kerry Longhurst hereby contended that strategic culture tends to outlast the era of its original inception, hereby influencing state behaviour over longer periods of time (Longhurst, 2004:6). The second generation of research hereafter focused on the differences between officially declared policy and the ‘real’ aims and motives of a security elite (Biehl et al, 2013:10). Last, the third generation, heavily influenced by social constructivism, conceptualized strategic culture as a variable that independently determined a specific actor’s behaviour. Al Johnston for instance described strategic culture as: “A limited and ranked set of grand strategic preferences that are constant across objects and persistent over time” (Johnston, 1998:38).

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Atlanticism With respect to strategic culture and Transatlantic burden-sharing the concept of Atlanticism has been indicated as holding particular explanatory value. Atlanticism hereby refers to the preferred international form of security and defence cooperation of a country, and is often put opposite towards Europeanism (Biehl et al, 2012:15).In general, Atlanticists are described as those countries that view the alliance with the United States as the most important institutional institution for the provision of security and the wellbeing of a state, and Europeanists those countries that want the to have greater autonomy on these matters (Biehl et al,2012:15). In a comprehensive qualitative work on strategic culture Biehl et al (2013) argued that the foreign policy preferences of all European states can be distinguish based on this categorization. Making use of the same academic concepts Becker & Malesky later on quantitatively showed that there is strong correlation between the extent to which a state’s strategic culture is Altanticist or Europeanist, and a state’s allocation of resources towards NATO or the EU (Becker & Malesky, 2012:7). John Ringmose in 2010 hereby found that allies of the US who perceived themselves as particularly strong Atlanticists contributed disproportionally more to the Afghanistan mission than other NATO states (Ringmose, 2010:331).

2.2.3 Criticism Recently the ascribed value of domestic level explanations as a counterweight to structural explanations has increased. Used as intervening variables cultural and political variables have proven to be helpful tools in explaining state behaviour. However, used as independent variables the theory suffers from a major shortcoming by ignoring the influence of systemic incentives and constraints on mission contributions (Ashraf, 2011:59). This is the reason why models that use both levels of analysis have become increasingly used as a tool to analyse troop contributions.

2.3 Neoclassical explanations Neoclassical realism offers a middle ground between structural and domestic level theories. Scholarly work in the Neoclassical tradition holds that systemic pressures and incentives shape the general direction of foreign policy, without being precise enough to determine the exact details of state behaviour, to do this the domestic level need to be analysed (Rose, 1998:146). Neoclassical realist therefore concurs with Neorealism that international systemic

12 incentives should be the starting point of analysis. However, strategic culture and domestic politics act as intervening variables in determining what specific foreign policy actions a state will pursue (Ashraf, 2011:62).

2.3.4 Criticism By incorporating both levels of analysis Neoclassical theories seem most promising in terms of outcome, but the field is far from complete. There are two leading theoretical models on coalition burden-sharing that use both systemic and domestic level variables to explain variation: Bennet et al’s account of coalition burden-sharing during the Persian Gulf (1994) and David Auerswald's model of coalition behaviour during NATO’s Kosovo air campaign in 1999. 2 These works, by focusing on the European middle powers, leave the small powers which form the bulk of European states undiscussed. By focussing on a single case they hereby lack the power to generalize findings over multiple missions. As a result current models lack the power to explain the research question.

3 Theory section In the section above it was indicated that in search of an answer to the question how different countries contribute to out-of-area operations scholars have pointed to explanations coming from the system and domestic level. The lack of an encompassing answer provided by any of these strands of literature has led to integrated models, which include explanations from both levels during a single mission, these models however generally exclude the small powers and lack generalizability by using models fit for a single mission. The aim of the thesis is therefore to build a framework which can explain the varying contributions of Western European states over multiple missions regardless of its size. The fact that in the last twenty five years several US-led missions in which European countries contributed have been conducted without major shifts in polarity hereby makes such a broader theory possible.3 In order to do so, in the section below first the independent variable will be described in more detail. Hereafter the feasibility of the variables which could the

2 Recent work in the Neoclassical tradition also include David Richardson’s American allies and War (2011) and Daniel Baltrusaitis account of coalition politics during the Iraq war (2010). For these works the same critique applies, with Davidson not discussing the small powers and Baltrusaitis only discussing the Iraq case. 3 The model described below operates under the current the current configuration of international power: unipolarity. This refers to an international system in which a single state (the US) controls a disproportionate share of the politically relevant resources of the system (Walt, 2009:92). In a future world in which the configuration of power differs, state incentives towards burden-sharing during US-led interventions will likely be different.

13 independent variable to vary will be discussed, ultimately leading to a set of testable hypothesis (Gerring, 2012:129-130). The section ends with a methodology section in which first the measurement of variables and later mission contributions is discussed. The section ends with a description of the case and mission selection.

3.1 Dependent variable The variable under investigation in the thesis is contributions to US – led out-of-area operations: Contributions refers to the actual provision of military forces on foreign soil by European states.4 Out-of-area operations refers to the fact that the military operations were conducted away from the home soil of the United States and Europe. US-led refers to the fact that it can reasonably assumed that the United States were the leading power behind the operation.

3.2 Independent variables In the section below the variables which could cause variations in contributions are discussed. The section will start by discussing system level variables followed by domestic level variables. If possible a distinction of the states under investigation based on the variable will hereby be provided.

3.2.1 System level variables In literature relative material capabilities, alliance dependence and balance of threat have been indicated, their feasibility will be discussed below.

Relative material capabilities It was indicated that, all other variables neglected, states facing an anarchy of states will have strong incentive to pass the buck of the provision of public goods to other states (Massie, 2014:4). However, large states cannot free ride as easy as small states during international missions for two reasons: First, their contributions make a big difference on the total contribution towards the mission

4 Financial contributions to US-led missions will be neglected, because this sort of ‘check book diplomacy’ is too closely associated with free-riding behaviour and unwillingness to share the actual burdens of military operations (Ringmose, 2010:328).

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(Massie, 2014:4). This is for the simple fact that the couple of large states in the international system are usually the states which possess the numbers and material to act in force outside their own region. Small states, which hold less capable armies, can hereby usually only hope to perform secondary or niche functions. Consequently, if the big states don’t deliver no-one will. Second, for the larger states the social recognition of their relative power, its prestige, is of increased importance (Davidson, 2011:18). In a system where power is the ultimate currency underlying state relations, the bigger states will have huge incentive to show just how capable they are on the world stage (Schweller, 1997:71). Weak responses on the other hand, may lead a state’s rivals to believe the country is neither willing nor capable to engage in military action, which will ultimately be translated in its behaviour towards the country (Davidson, 2011:18). Consequently, it is the assumption that the larger the relative material capabilities of a state the larger the share of the burden in out-of-area missions (Zeckhauser & Olsen, 268). Small states at this point will be tempted to free ride because their efforts cannot be expected to secure much of the public good than will already be supplied by the bigger states (Baltrusaitis, 2008:126).

Country selection Predictions associated with the size of a country seem promising in answering the research question since the states under investigation can be divided on this category. The widely accepted distinction between states in great, middle and small powers proves feasible in doing so. Based on indicators like the size of the population, military capabilities, and economic power most scholars would argue that the United Kingdom, Germany and France are the middle powers on the European continent.5 The bulk of other European states can be perceived as small powers due to their small capabilities. The Correlates of War index, which is a frequently used source to list countries based on their material capabilities shows support for this distinction, as shown in figure 1 (Wohlforth, 1999:103).

5 Middle powers lack the true power of great powers like the United States but still play a (considerable) role on the world stage (Huntington, 1999:36).

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Figure 1: Material capabilities Western-European states (1991-2003)

Country Score Score Aggreg 1991 2003 ated Score 6(100) United 0.136 0.142 13,85 States Germany 0.0328 0.027 3,0

United 0.0264 0.020 2,35 Kingdom France 0.0234 0.0203 2,19

Italy 0.0212 0.0185 1,98

Spain 0.0123 0.0110 1,17

Netherlands 0.0073 0.0062 0,68

Belgium 0.0062 0.0049 0,63

Norway 0.0019 0.0017 0,18

Portugal 0.0019 0.0016 0,18 Denmark 0.0016 0.0016 0,16 Luxemburg 0.0008 0.0005 0,07

Total 1 1 100 World (Correlates of War, 2013).

In the remainder of the thesis the feasibility of the relative material capacities thesis for answering the research question will be analysed. It will hereby be shown that domestic factors present in European states transform the logic of collective action to such a degree that the theory is unable to account for differences between similar states and in relative contributions.

Alliance dependence Scholars have shown that in particular circumstances security or economic dependence on the US has led to contributions to its military operations. However, in the section below it will be argued that it is impossible to distinguish the Western European states on this category, making the theory of little relevance for answering the research question.

6 Controlling for the aggregated scores for the entire period under investigation it is shown that the relative material capabilities of states have not fluctuated considerably in the period of investigation. Consequently, the classification in European small and middle powers can be perceived as being constant for the entire period under investigation.

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Security dependence By upholding the security alliance between both sides of the Atlantic, symbolized in the collective defence clause of the NATO treaty, the US protects Europe from external aggression (Pedersen, 2011:1-2). Scholars indicated that the fear of renewed Russian aggression has made the former Soviet democracies in highly dependent on American security, and this is the reason why these states were willing to contribute heavily to US-led military operations in the last decade (Ringmose, 2010:330). For the Western European states under investigation in the thesis however, it seems fair to assume that they are less threatened by .7 This makes security dependence against Russia less of a deal for these states than in the Eastern corners of Europe. However, given the anarchic tenants of the current international system, Western European states are likely to still value the American deterrence to some degree: First, to hedge against any future uncertainness. Second, because loss of American deterrence could invite renewed Russian aggression. Last, states are aware that the geopolitical battle against Russia is played on a multi-level board in which force is fungible, in the sense that it can be translated in other political domains other than the pure military (Art, 1996:3). To explain how this can situation can lead to differences in military contributions however, it somehow must be made clear that major differences between European states exist on the points previously stated. In other words, European states must be able to a priori assume that they would be more or less vulnerable for hypothetical renewed Russian assertiveness if the Americans left the continent. This would then translate in different levels of alliance dependence and corresponding contributions to US-led missions. No work on differences regarding different levels of threat from Russia for Western European states in the post-Cold War period exist. Given the interconnectedness of the European states and the high unpredictability of war it hereby seems unlikely that any major differences exist that would lead to different incentives for the Western European states on this variable.

Economic dependence States highly economic dependent on the United States may also be persuaded to contribute more to military missions. Western European states are by no means dependent on US aid however, so pure economic quid pro quo seems unlikely as a motive. It seems reasonable to

7 One could for instance point to the increased geographical distance between Russia and Western Europe and increased deterrence capabilities in both the conventional and nuclear domain.

17 assume however, that the European states under investigation are aware of the fact that they benefit from the current American coordinated economic system, and consequently value upholding this system. To make economic alliance dependence an explanatory variable for mission contributions based on this assumption however two conditions must be met: First, it must be assumed that European states are willing to send troops abroad for the pure fact that they fear that otherwise economic functions provided by the United States will in the future disappear. Second, even then it must be possible to find considerable differences between the way Western European states profit economically from the current US-led economic system. Given the fact that all states under investigation share the same economic tenets, being highly developed market economies, with open economies, it seems unlikely that economic dependence will lead to such major differences causes variation in incentives to contribute to US-led missions (CIA: 2014). To sum up, systemic alliance dependence cannot create independent hypothesis regarding burden-sharing behaviour for the states under investigation. Later on it will be argued however that the perception of the functions performed by the US can create variation between European states.

Balance of Threat The claim that states are more willing to incur the costs in life and material when the target of intervention threatens the country’s national interest seems plausible (Davidson, 2011:16). It is for instance easy to imagine why a country on the verge of being invaded would be more keen to join an international coalition against the aggressor than a country on the other side of the ocean. The neutralization of systemic threat hereby forms the second systemic condition that can give countries different incentives to contribute to a military operation. Following earlier work on the topic it is assumed that states attribute different value to the preservation of different types of threats: - Security against external threats to guarantee the survival of the state is valued highest. - The physical wellbeing of a state’s citizens is valued second.8 - Threats to national prosperity which include economic interest and national resources are

8 After the Cold War these threats for the Western states especially came from security risks that originated elsewhere in the world. Most notably after 9-11, international and the threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by ‘rough states’ came to dominate the Transatlantic security discourse (Ashraf, 2011:43).

18 valued third (Davidson, 2011:9/ Massie, 2014:6). It is the assumption of the thesis that differences between countries on the indicators described above may lead to different assessments of threat. This translates in different stakes in the outcome of an intervention and therefore ultimately in differences in contribution. Though it is not possible to a priori assume this, it is however the contention of the thesis that systemic threat holds low explanatory value to answer the research question due to the their high similar nature of the states under investigation. As will be indicated below a state’s assessment of threat as part of its strategic narrative is however part of the explanation.

3.2.2 Domestic variables In the literature review it was indicated that both the domestic political setting as well as the dominant strategic believes in a country have been indicated as state-level variables influencing troop contributions to US-led missions. Their feasibility for answering the research question will be discussed below.

Domestic political setting It was stated that decision makers are influenced by particular domestic pressures when making policy-decisions. However it will be argued below that these limiting variables have held little explanatory during the missions under investigation: For a domestic structure to limit troop contributions two conditions must be met: First, the preference of the mass public and the executive must not coincide.9 Since if a majority of the public is in favour with the executive line it makes little sense for the opposition to try to politicalize the issue and decision makers will consequently fear no electoral consequences (Davidson, 2011:18). As will be shown in the thesis, this situation occurred in many countries throughout the missions. Second, if public opinion is against contributing to a mission however, the bottom-up approach would predict that opposition groups, attracted by the promise of electoral profit, would diverge from the government’s policy and would advocate troop reduction or immediate withdrawal (Kreps,2010:192). At this point the degree of autonomy of the executive from parliament to decide on the use of force becomes decisive. With executives in states confronted with the strongest control mechanisms facing the most severe pressure to

9 It is hereby assumed that executives will favour the use of force abroad more than mass publics, legislatures or constitutions since they feel the pressure of systemic incentives more directly (Bennet et al,1994:46).

19 limit their contribution (Bennet et al, 1994:47). The thesis will however hold that the bottom-up approach fails to appreciate the strength of systemic and strategic cultural pressures to support the hegemon in the era under investigation. Especially in the Altanticist states, decades of Transatlantic cooperation, an extended history of security and economic benefits and a promise of future cooperation, will make it that policy elites will go to great lengths to defend their contributions (Kreps,2010:192). At this point, neither, public opinion, parliamentary control or constitutional bulwarks will limit the sending of forces abroad. The thesis will hereby indicate that this commitment is made easier because pressures towards contributions are also on many occasions shared by (mainstream) opposition parties. Consequently, only the most unpopular of interventions will lead these parties to develop an electoral strategy towards contrary to executive preferences.

Country selection Public opinion differs per country and mission and therefore an a-priori categorization of states on this parameter is not possible. The degree of parliamentary control can be perceived as a parameter constant for the period under investigation. Wagner listed three categories of states, as illustrated in figure 2, the thesis will side with this categorization.10

Figure 2: Level of parliamentary control Western-European states

Low Medium High Country Belgium, France, Portugal, Italy, Luxembourg, Denmark, Germany United Kingdom, Netherlands, Norway, Spain (Wagner, 2006:5)

In the remainder of the thesis the assumption that domestic political variables hold little value will be tested. Given the fact that the bottom-up tradition would expect states with high levels of parliamentary control will face the most considerable challenges towards contribution this claim will be controlled in most detail.

10 Wagner listed the degree of parliamentary control as 'high' if the executive must seek prior parliamentary approval before it may send troops abroad. 'Medium' if parliament’s power of prior approval is undermined by significant exceptions, and 'low' if there is no obligatory parliamentary involvement in the executive decision-making on participation in military missions (Wagner,2006:4).

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Strategic culture of Atlanticism In the thesis strategic culture refers to: the set of shared beliefs, norms and ideas within a country’s elite that generate specific patterns of preferences in actions and policy (Biehl et al, 2013:12). Following earlier work in the first generation of strategic culture research it is hereby assumed that: - The carriers of strategic culture in a country are policy elites. - There is one dominant strand of elite strategic culture in discourse and practice in a country. - Strategic culture in a country is persistent over time, hereby tending to outlast the era of its original inception (Biehl et al, 2013:12). With respect to European strategic culture it has been indicated that ever since the 1980’s, but especially after the Cold War, states can be categorized as being Altanticist or Europeanist. Atlanticist hereby refers to the European states that view the alliance with the United States as the primary institutional structure to provide for its security and general wellbeing (Biehl et al, 2012:15). Europeanist hereby refers to the European states that value a more independent role for the European Union to provide for their security and general wellbeing (Biehl et al, 2012:15). It is the contention of the thesis that Atlanticist states contribute more than Europeanist states to US-led missions because of the following mechanism: In an anarchic world system states try to maximize utility, which simply means that executives in their policy choices try to create as much security and economic wellbeing as possible. Coming out of the bipolar system European states found two institutional pillars to provide this for them: the European and the Atlanticist framework. Both these pillars have their merits in terms of attraction, and are somewhat contradictorily, be it for the fact that the United States on many occasions have used its influence to withhold the strengthening of the European pillar (Nolan, 2011:77).11 Given the great unpredictability of the international environment, it is hereby extremely hard, not to say impossible, for European states to objectively determine which pillar it should support to receive a maximum result in utility in the long run. The choice between Europe and the US is important on a wide range of policy topics. To justify making such choices elites developed a strategic narrative based on their perception of US power and role on the world stage, the possibility of a fully independent European pole, and the role of the specific country wished to play on the international stage. As indicated by strategic culture scholars this narrative became dominant and persistent overtime within elite discourse, hereby

11It has been observed that the US is especially reluctant on the development of an independent European pole on security related matters (Nolan, 2011:77)

21 translating in developed habits of behaviour (Longhurst, 2004:6). This led consecutive elites to commit themselves to either one of the two institutional frameworks or to develop a more mixed strategy. With respect to contributions to US-led missions, the adherents of the Transatlantic pole hold two important tenets: First, their perception of alliance dependence. With Atlanticist states tending to share the vision of the importance of a stable, sustainable, US- led international order for their own wellbeing (Becker & Malesky, 2012:7-8). Second, their perception of levels of threat. With Atlanticist states tending to share the vision of the United States when it comes to the level of threat posed by a region, even when this threat level is ambiguous, and the best way to tackle this threat. However it is not just the moral obligation to contribute to an US-led public good that lead policy elites in Altanticist countries to contribute more than its Europeanist counterparts, there is also a more realpolitical incentive. The believe in the feasibility of an American dominated system lead these states to believe that being on good terms with the US is extremely important. Consequently, in Atlanticist countries the believe exist that showing a ‘willingness to bleed’ will translate in political leverage with the US, from which the county will ultimately benefit.12 States being less Atlanticist on the other hand hold face less of these moral and realpolitical incentives. Because these states hold the believe that their security and economic wellbeing does not depend on an international framework led by the United States their perception alliance dependence is lower. This gives Europeanist states less incentive to follow the US blindly in their assessment of the threat a region possess, especially if this is ambiguous, or solutions to the problem are multiple. Policy elites in these states hereby seem less attracted by the promise of leverage with the US, especially if contributing to US-led missions collides with other strategic national preferences or holds the prospect of electoral backlash. Consequently, the decision to provide troops to US-led missions under unipolarity comes as a trade-off between strategic narratives and the possible prospect for political influence. For Atlanticist states their pro US conception gives moral obligations to provide support an makes the prospect of influence more attractive. For the Europeanist states their strategic

12 Most notably, increased access to Washington officials to lobby a country’s preferences and quid-pro pro logic regarding the appointment of officials for important international functions. (Henriksen & Ringmose,2010:162).

22 narrative will collide more easily with US actions, hereby limiting contributions even if this means a loss in leverage with the unipole.

Country selection For the states under investigation recent work in both the qualitative and quantitative tradition points to the same direction when it comes to the degree of Atlanticism of the Western European states during the period under investigation. Qualitative strategic culture studies show convergence around the assumption that especially Denmark, Norway and the United Kingdom have shown strong versions of Atlanticism in their behaviour while the Netherlands has shown a more moderate version (Biehl et al,2013:1-385 / Stahl et al,2004:417-441 / Mouritzen,2007: 155-167/ Græger & Haugevik, 2009:1-58 /Dunne,2004:893-909). Of the states holding a more mixed policy preference between both institutional pillars both Spain and Germany have been labelled as holding a slightly more Atlanticist policy, followed by Italy. France, Belgium and Luxembourg were seen by all as the most Europeanists of the countries under investigation (Garcia & Pardo, 2014:77/ Croci, 2008:1-2/ Erb, 2004:1). This categorization is largely supported by the quantitative study of Becker and Malesky, their findings are presented in figure 3 (Becker & Malesky, 2013:37).13 Figure 3: Atlanticism Western European states

13 Becker & Malesky have excluded Luxembourg and Portugal from their analysis.

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3.3An integrated model of county contributions under unipolarity To sum up, executives responsible for the decision whether to join the US in their out of area operation or not face several pressures. At the system level, they are first concerned with their status on the world stage (relative capabilities) and the impact of this for their expected role in the conflict. Second, they consider their systemic dependence on the United States and the level of threat coming from the region. It was however indicated that these variables are unable to influence or divide the highly similar European states. What truly matters in the turbulent and uncertain times leading up to an intervention are executives developed habits of looking at the international system, the role of the US and how best to maximize utility under these circumstances. The moral and realpolitical incentives elites in Atlanticist states hereby face lead them to make big contributions. These incentives are so strong that, even when confronted with negative public opinion or parliamentary opposition, elites will stick to their commitments. The following is illustrated in figure 4. 14 Figure 4: Decision model European Elites towards US-led missions

System level

Relative material Alliance dependence Balance of Threat capabilities

Elite decision on troop contributions

Domestic level

Degree parliamentary Public Strategic culture control opinion

Alliance Threat Political dependence perception influence perception perception

14 In the figure the green lines correspond with what causes variation in troop contributions between the states under investigation.

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3.4 Hypothesis Based on the theoretic assumptions presented above several testable hypotheses can be created:

System level hypothesis: H1a: Small powers will free ride on the efforts of the bigger powers by contributing less in both absolute and relative terms to US-led out-of-area missions. H1b: States with similar relative material capabilities will contribute the same towards US- led out-of-area missions. H2a: States facing a high level of threat will contribute considerably to an US-led out-of- area mission to secure that region. H2b: States facing a high level of threat from a region will contribute more in relative terms to US-led out-of-area missions than states perceiving a low level of threat. Domestic level hypothesis: H3a: States with a strategic culture of Atlanticism will contribute more in relative terms to US-led out-of-area missions than states with no strategic culture of Atlanticism. H3b: States with a strategic culture of Atlanticism will be influenced in their contributions to US-led out-of-area operations by the prospect of political influence with the hegemon. H3c: States with a strategic culture of Atlanticism will justify their contributions to US-led out-of-area operations with an appeal on alliance dependence. H3d: States with a strategic culture of Atlanticism will show convergence in threat perception and the preferred method of dealing with the threat with the US, even if the level of threat is ambiguous and solutions multiple. H4a: Public opinion doesn’t influence executive decisions to contribute troops to US-led out- of-area operations. H4b: Parliament or constitutional bulwarks will not limit the contribution of a state to US- led out-of-area operations.

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3.5 Research design The section below will indicate how the hypotheses will be tested in the remainder of the thesis. The section will start with a discussion of how the variables used in the model will be analysed. Hereafter an assessment of how absolute and relative contributions of states will be measured and weighted will follow. In the last part of the chapter the case and mission selection will be discussed. It will be argued that four countries form the ‘ideal type’ of Western European states and three missions prove particularly feasible in measuring the European ‘willingness to bleed’ for the US.

3.5.1 Measurement variables In the section below the measurement of the assumptions associated with first system level and hereafter domestic level variables are discussed.

Relative material capabilities Underlying hypothesis 1a + 1b lay the assumption that states are utility maximizing and fully rational. Within this framework bigger states will contribute more because: - Bigger states military capabilities holds more valuable for warfighting. - Bigger states value international prestige more. The feasibility of the first claim will be tested by an assessment of the nature of the conflict. This includes the nature of US requests from its allies and the military means a state needed to participate in the conflict. The feasibility of the second claim will be tested by looking if prestige could be obtained from participating in the conflict and by assessing if this has influenced executive decisions.

Balance of Threat As indicated, states can face different levels of threat coming from a region, translating in different incentives to contribute. Even though the level of threat will be mostly a qualitative assessment, the first two levels of threat a state can face: security against external threat and threats to the wellbeing of its citizens will be assessed using: - The geographic distance from the conflict: which controls for possible spill over effects a European country might face from instability coming from a region of US-led intervention.

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- The intentions of the actor: which controls if an actor against which intervention is aimed threatened the particular European state. - Offensive capabilities: which controls if the actor at which intervention directed is able to strike at a European state (Bennet et al, 1994: 43). The third, economic level, will be assessed by looking if instability in a region could in any way disrupt either high levels of trade or an open flow of natural resources (oil) of which a country is dependent.

Domestic political setting Controlling for the influence of the domestic setting of a country ultimately comes down to answering the question if domestic pressures led to a situation in which executives were no longer able to act in preference with their systemic and strategic incentives. To control for the thesis contention that this situation did not occur two control mechanisms are developed: First, it will be shown that domestic structure on many occasions could not have limited contributions because public opinion was in favour of intervention. This will be assessed by consulting public opinion polls prior to, and during important times in the mission.15 Second, at the point when public opinion becomes unfavourable towards intervention it will be first looked at if this led to parliamentary opposition which made hindered the executive in their preferences. But also if executives were sensitive for this public pressure, and consequently withdraw or limited their contributions in the short to medium term Strategic culture The effect of strategic culture on troop contributions will be tested by an assessment of the degree to which morality and the prospect of political leverage influenced a country’s executive to make a contribution. In order to do so historical and academic works, biographies, and executive statements will be consulted and weighted for each country during the missions.

3.5.2 Measurements of mission contributions The thesis will use several control mechanisms to test country’s contributions. Most notably quantitative mechanisms will be used, these are however supplemented by a qualitative assessment. Taken together they form an overall assessment of these indicators provides a

15 Most attention will be given to public opinion during the initial decision to provide support for an US- led mission or not. It is the assumption that this executive decision is more severe than maintaining or reducing forces in later instances of the intervention (Davidson,2011: 22). during the first decision to provide support. It is the assumption that this decision is the hardest.

27 picture of the actual ‘willingness to bleed’ during a mission, with ultimately exposure to risk weighted highest for reasons discussed below.

3.5.2.1 Quantitative measurements The quantitative measurements used in the thesis can be divided in absolute and relative contributions, and exposure to risk.

Absolute troop contributions Absolute troop contributions are measured by either the total number of troops contributed by a country during short missions or by the peak contribution of a country during longer missions. This indicator consequently allows for comparisons about the commitment states

Relative troop contributions Given the great difference in material capabilities between the states under investigation, more important in burden-sharing debates is the contribution a country made in relation to its material capabilities (Ringmose, 2010:332). To account for this, two measurements will be used in the thesis: - Total number troops contributed / total number of inhabitants (100,000 inhabitants) -Total number troops contributed / total number of military personnel This indicator consequently allows for comparisons about the commitment states were willing to make in relation to its size.

Exposure to risk: relative number of combatant deaths Though hinting at the weight of a commitment, absolute and relative contributions don’t provide the full picture of a country’s willingness to bleed for the US. This because they don’t account for the way forces were actually used during missions. To fill this gap the thesis will use the relative number of combatant deaths a country suffered during a mission as the indicator of a country’s willingness to expose its forces to risk (Ringmose, 2010:333). This indicator relates to the actual willingness of a country to ‘bleed’ for the US because: - The number of combatant deaths reflects a countries choice to deploy troops in regions that are dangerous in opposition to regions that are being considered safe. - The number of combatant deaths is an indicator of the formal restrictions put on the use of military force (caveats) by governments during an out-of-area operation.

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The thesis hereby holds the assumption that the US, given its huge military power, has enough manpower on its own and will consequently favour small operations with high levels of risk more from its allies than huge military contributions with low levels of risk. To measure the relative number of combatant deaths the thesis will use: - Total number of combatant deaths - Total number of Combatant deaths / share population - Total number of combatant deaths / share total national troops deployed

5.3.2.2 Qualitative measurements To complete the picture the quantitative analysis provides a qualitative assessment of the country’s role during the mission is provided. This will be done by looking at the time when troops began operating in the area, the level of risk countries took during the mission as observed by later commentators, and the date of withdrawal. The level of diplomatic support for the US during the mission will also be discussed since the legitimacy associated with this

3.5.3 Case and mission selection In the operationalization of the variables above both relative material capabilities and the degree of Atlanticism take the form of variables constant for a country in the period under investigation. It was hereby indicated that these two variables will hold predictive value in the ultimate decision to commit troops to US-led out-of-area operations. Based on these indicators four ideal types of states can be distinguished, as indicated in figure 5.

Figure 5: ideal types of Western European States

Type of state Small power Middle Power

Low A B Atlanticism High C D

To create as much variation as possible first two pairs of states who approximate each other on their relative material capabilities but differ in their degree of Atlanticism are needed. Second, two pairs of states are needed who approximate each other on their degree of Atlanticism but differ on their relative material capabilities.

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Based on the country operationalization’s Belgium (A), France (B), Denmark (C) and the United Kingdom (D) will be used as the Western European ideal type states. With the UK and France presenting two states on the European continent with high material capabilities, but considerable differences in their degree of Atlanticism. Belgium and Denmark approximate each other on their relative material capabilities, and hereby form the ‘typical’ European small state. Both states however differ considerably on their degree of Atlanticism, with Denmark scoring among the highest and Belgium among the lowest on these parameters. Because Denmark holds strong parliamentary control mechanisms and the other states weak levels, this also allows verifying for the feasibility of this variable. 16 17

Mission selection The US and its allies have on several occasions fought together in the last two decades. From the cases suitable for investigation the First Gulf War (1991), Operation Enduring Freedom (2001- ) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003-2007) are being chosen for analysis. These missions are chosen for two main reasons: First, during these missions the US asked for the provision of actual boots on the ground of its European allies. The risks associated with this type of missions prove a better indicator of the actual ‘willingness to bleed’ for the US than for instance air campaigns. Second, the selected missions hereby hold different timespans, levels of threat, and public opposition, hereby allowing for the control of the importance of these effects on contributions.

16 The other variables controlled for in the thesis ( balance of threat and public opinion) fluctuate per mission and country, therefore counties can not a-priori be categorized on this variable. Consequently, hypothesis regarding this variables will be ‘ad -hoc’ tested during the thesis. 17 The Danish constitution states: “Except for purposes of defence against an armed attack upon the Realm or Danish forces the King shall not use military force against any foreign state without the consent of the Parliaments” (Danish Constitution: Section 19, para 2).

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US-led missions after the Cold War

The chapters below will seek to explain differences in troop contributions during three high profile US-led missions in the unipolar era. First, the 1991 Gulf War will be discussed, followed by operation Enduring Freedom (2001- ), and operation Iraqi Freedom (2003-2009). The cases will be discussed in similar structure: after a short background of the conflict, a quantitative and qualitative assessment of troop contributions is provided. Hereafter the feasibility of first the structural hypothesis, followed by domestic hypothesis to explain the cases will be discussed. The cases end with a short recapitulation of the arguments presented.

4 The first Gulf War (1991) Only two years into the unipolar moment the international community looked to the United States for severe military action when Saddam Hussein invaded the rich, but military weak, oil state of Kuwait (USDSOH: 2014). In the aftermath of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 678 that authorized member states to use ‘all means necessary’ to enforce Iraqi withdrawal, the US assembled the widest, most geopolitically disparate, military coalition in history to restore the ruling family of Kuwait (Bennet et al, 1997: 4). 18

4.1 Background conflict Coming out of the 1980-1988 war with Iran, Iraq emerged with its state intact, but laden with massive debts. Iraqi President Saddam Hussein called on the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Kuwait to cancel the Iraqi debt they held, arguing that the loans should be considered payments for protecting the Arabian Peninsula against Iranian aggression. After Kuwait rejected this, Saddam threatened to flare up the long standing conflict between the countries about ownership of two small but strategically important islands in the Persian Gulf (USDSOH: 2014). In July 1991 Saddam accused Kuwait and the UAE of intentionally overproducing oil for export, hereby depriving Iraq of critical oil revenues. And almost a month later, on August 2, 1990, a force of 100.000 Iraqi troops invaded Kuwait and overran the country in a matter of hours. International condemnation of the Iraqi violation of the territorial integrity of Kuwait was widespread and virtually unanimous. Within days the United Nations (UN) passed several

18 The international coalition consisted of troops of 41 countries, including several Arab states, and encompassed a force of almost 800.000 soldiers.

31 resolutions demanding immediate and unconditional withdrawal. When Saddam did not respond to the posed deadlines a military coalition led by the United States attacked Iraq by air, soon followed by a massive ground campaign driving Iraqi forces from Kuwait in a matter of days (USDSOH: 2014).

4.2 Troop Contributions The peak contribution of the countries under investigation in the war and the number of fatalities are shown in figures 6 and 7.

Figure 6: Troop contributions Gulf war

Country Peak contribution Contribution/ Contribution / Tot. 100.000 population military personnel

United States 541,400 214,00 0,24 United Kingdom 45,400 79,07 0,14 France 14,600 24,93 0,03 Belgium 400 4,00 0,00 Denmark 100 1,94 0,00 Total contribution = 801,000 (RACGWVI, 2014: appendix A).

Figure 7: Fatalities Gulf War

Country Fatalities Fatalities / 100.000 Fatalities per troops population deployed (x100) United States 146 0,058 0,03 United Kingdom 47 0,086 0,10 France 9 0,015 0,06 Belgium 0 0 0 Denmark 0 0 0 (RACGWVI, 2014: appendix A).

4.2.1 Time, size, mix and diplomatic support United States: The US contributed more than twice as much soldiers as all the other countries of the coalition combined (Bennet et al, 1994:48). American troops were first on the ground to protect Saudi Arabia, and when the war started it was the US who launched the first series of air attacks (Encyclopedia Britannica: 2014 When the air stage of the war was won, the country together with French, British and Arab forces conducted the more risky land operation, crushing the Iraqi army at the expanse of 146 fatalities.

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United Kingdom: Contributing over 45,000 troops, the UK made a massive contribution to the war efforts in the Gulf (Bennet et al, 1994:53). Beside large in size, the UK was hereby on the forefront of both the air and ground offensive. Because of this commitment it suffered relatively heavy losses compared to its coalition partners. British support to the US hereby materialized in strong diplomatic support. A week after the invasion of Kuwait, Great Britain was the first country to pledge troops to demonstrate support for Washington’s stand (Washington Post, 1991). Faith in the American cause was hereby shown by the country’s decision to allow its troops to fall under direct US command (Richardson, 2011:52). France: With a contribution of 15,000 soldiers, involved in both the air and ground campaign, France also made a considerable contribution to the war effort (Bennet et al, 1994:59). The tasks assigned to the French forces, and the risks associated with it, however were lower than that of the UK and US. Providing the left flank of the invasion force France, as expected, quickly overran Iraq's 45th Infantry Division, suffering little casualties. France hereby resisted formal integration of its forces into the coalition, and its response to Iraqi aggression was therefore only partly coordinated with the other allied efforts (Bennet et al, 1994:59). The symbolic value of the French contribution to the US is mixed. One the one hand, it was of great importance for the legitimacy of the mission because France could not be accused of being an American puppet and had enjoyed close links with Iraq in the past (Davidson, 2011:56). On the other hand, France unilateral diplomatic efforts to solve the crisis in the months leading up to the invasion were not welcomed by American decision makers (Richardson, 2011:56). Most notably, the French initiative to offer an active settlement of several of the Middle Eastern problems, in return for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, was not appreciated (New York Times, 1991). 19 Denmark: Denmark’s contribution to the war was limited to the sending of a single mine sweeper supported by 100 sailors to the Persian Gulf. Despite the fact that the ship was not allowed to deploy offensive operations, and consequently had almost zero value to the war effort, the symbolic value of the contribution was high. The decision was in line with American requests, and hereby entailed the first Danish military out-of-area operation ever. Danish presence in the Gulf hereby formed a massive watershed with the country’s foreign policy during the Cold War years (Pedersen, 2012: 455). Denmark hereby strongly declared its diplomatic support for US action against Saddam. It

19 Of this offer for settlement of regional problems especially the French proposals to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestinian case caused controversy in Washington ( New York Times,1991).

33 was one of the first countries to express that it was ready to take part in any efforts to maintain the Gulf peace and never showed any dissent on the American course of action (Pedersen, 2012: 456). Belgium: Belgium’s contribution to the Gulf War consisted of two mine sweepers and a frigate, supported by 400 base engineers (Tucker, 1993:157). 20 The size of the Belgian contribution was not welcomed in the American press, with comments ranging between ‘waveringly ambiguous’ and a ‘clear of sign of detachment’ (New York Times, 1991). And even though, Belgium provided some legitimacy by signing the list of countries contributing to the war time efforts, diplomatically it expressed its preferences for a peaceful solution to the very end (Tucker, 1993:157). Attempts of liberal politicians to rally support for the American war effort aside, the rhetoric of antiwar socialists in Parliament and in the executive did Belgium’s reputation with the allies little good. Tensions were hereby increased by wide media coverage of incidents like the refusal of Belgium to sell bullets to its allies doing the actual fighting in the Gulf (NRC Handelsblad, 1991).

4.3 System level explanations In the section below the feasibility of system level variables to explain differences in contributions will be discussed.

4.3.1 Relative material capabilities The relative material capabilities thesis shines some light on differences in contributions, but as will discussed below, fails to provide a full picture of burden-sharing in the Gulf. A big difference between the absolute contributions of the middle and small powers can be observed. This can be explained by looking of the nature of the conflict, which gave rise to two tenets that led middle powers to contribute considerably: First, given the fact that the war was of conventional nature, in a distant desert country, and against a regional power which held a large army with experience in warfighting only the bigger, better equipped, European states were up for the task of fighting under this conditions (Global Security, n.d). 21 Second, the nature of the conflict allowed reasons of prestige to influence the contribution.

20 The Belgian government made clear that these units could not be involved in hostilities, and were consequently used to control cargo ships in order to monitor the international embargo against Iraq ( The Times,1991). 21 The United States had hereby already joined forces with several Arab for their invasion, the country therefore did not ask the small European states to contribute to the actual warfighting, since this would only increase the logistics of the operations.

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For both middle powers, after being overshadowed by decades of bipolar rivalry, the Gulf War provided a unique opportunity to show themselves once again on the world stage in a short instance of modern conventional warfare.22 For the UK it has been observed that the Thatcher administration was particularly concerned about the country’s international standing during this period (Davidson, 2011:52). The firm response to the Argentinian seizure of the Falklands a couple of years earlier has for instance been given as additional evidence of this assertiveness (Cradock, 1997:27). But especially France seems to have been influenced by the prospect of prestige. It was later observed that in the years first years after the Gulf War, France was searching for any field where it could engage itself militarily in order to recall itself as a permanent member of the Security Council (Davidson,2011:52)

“France’s prestige, the reaffirmation of its rank among the great powers, demanded that it distinguished itself” French historian Dennis Lacorne on the Gulf War (Lacorne, 1998:331).

Several aspects support the idea of the France claim for prestige in the Gulf. Most notably its decision not to integrate French troops into the American command structure was explained as to better distinguish the French contribution (Davidson, 2011:56).

Analysis As a result of the nature of the conflict both France and Britain contributed considerably more forces in both absolute and relative terms than the small powers. Their forces hereby took considerable more risk than those of the small powers, hereby Hypothesis 1a seems justified. However, Hypothesis 1b, which would predict similar contributions between similar categories of states, is falsified based on the data presented above: First, even though the relative contributions of small states Denmark and Belgium can be considered as similar, differences exist in the diplomatic support the countries provided for the US. Given the fact that these states were only considered to support the US by providing legitimacy and a small commitment this difference is noteworthy. Second, and more striking, the data show major differences in the contributions between the middle powers. The UK hereby outweighs France in both absolute and relative numbers and its full diplomatic support for the US. But most importantly by accepting a role on the fore

22 The prospect of prestige for the UK and France by showing their power and willingness to fight was strengthened by the fact that states of greater economic wealth like Germany and Japan refused to actively participate in the war (Davidson,2011:56).

35 front of the fighting, ultimately resulting in a relative higher number of fatalities than even that of the US. Consequently, H1a is falsified, and to account for this difference other variables need to be taken into account.

4.3.2 Balance of threat For the Western states the vast geographic distance with Iraq made a direct conventional threat to its territorial integrity, or the safety of its citizens, absent during the Gulf War. With all states under investigation more than 5000 miles away from the conflict, spill over effects of regional instability to their own territories hereby seem unlikely to have influenced Western thinking. However several other direct and indirect threats needed to be countered in the Gulf, which will be discussed below. Behind the rhetoric of liberating Kuwait to protect international law lay a more realpolitical incentive for military action. Since the end of the Second World War the rulers of the Arab Gulf states, holding over 30% of total world reserves, had provided the oil-dependent Western states with access to reasonably priced oil. Moreover, the Gulf Sheiks hereby held the practise of reinvesting their oil profits in the West. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE had combined investments in the West totalling between $200 and $300 billion during the period, hereby being vital for the economic wellbeing of these countries (Cleveland & Bunton, 2009:483).23 Conscious of Iraq's recent history of aggression, Western policymakers hereby feared that Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait was but a prelude to an attack on Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Gulf.24 With a shift of balance of power in the Gulf Region the possibility emerged that large flows of investments and oil would be withheld from the Western markets. Iraqi seizure of oilfields would hereby give Saddam severe political leverage (Davidson, 2011:55). Consequently, the Western states could not allow Iraq to disrupt the favourable status quo in the region, hereby giving them strong incentive to defend the Gulf states (Cleveland & Bunton, 2009:483). Though this makes a strong case for intervention, it seems unlikely that different levels of threat on this indicator prove feasible in explaining differences in contributions. As stated, all states profited considerably from the financial flows from the region. The only major difference between the European states was their dependence on Gulf oil. As shown in figure

23 The Gulf states hereby accounted for 4,7% of total European export at the time (MEDEA Institute, n.d). 24 States which, despite having spent billions of dollars on weapons, would be match for the larger and more experienced Iraqi army (Cleveland & Bunton,2009:483).

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8, both Belgium and France were almost fully important on oil exports, with Denmark being only weak importer and the UK fully oil independent (Kellner, 1997:58).

Figure 8: crude oil import dependency 1991

Country Oil dependency (%) United Kingdom -9,2 France 96,1 Denmark 36,8 Belgium 100 (IEA, 1991).

Analysis The data above show that the balance of threat thesis holds little explanatory power for the Gulf War. The fact that the stability of the region was favoured by all states to more or less the same degree makes H2a irrelevant in explaining differences in contributions. As far as there were differences in systemic threat this would relate to dependency on oil. Consequently, H2b would predict that France and Belgium would have the most incentive to secure the flow of oil from the region and would contribute in accordance with this incentive. This claim doesn’t correspond with the assessment of contributions during the period.

4.4 Domestic level explanations In the section below the feasibility of domestic level variables to explain differences in contributions will be discussed, starting with public opinion and followed by strategic culture

4.4.1 Domestic political setting United Kingdom: Public opinion in Britain overwhelmingly supported military action throughout the entire campaign.25 With a clear majority of opposition supporting the executive stance little political turmoil was hereby observed with respect to the mission (Bennet et al, 1994:55). In the first public debate in Parliament on the issue, a motion calling for support of British troops in the Gulf was almost unanimous adopted, with 563 against 34 votes (Bennet et al, 1994:55). Hereby paving the road for British involvement in the conflict.

25 Before the start of the ground offensive as much as 86% of the British electorate approved the governments pre-war strategies. This high level of approval was held during the height of the ground war (Daily Telegraph,1990).

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France: The French public was largely supportive of the country’s involvement in the conflict (Conklin et al, 2011:364).26 Consequently, parliamentary opposition emerged only on the far right, where Front National leader Jean Marie Le Pen opposed French involvement (New York Times, 1991). In January 1991, the National Assembly did, symbolically, vote to grant President Mitterrand the power to use forces in the Gulf with a strong 523 to 43 majority. This was seen as a strong sign of domestic support for France participation in the conflict (Bennet et al, 1994:61). Denmark: Still very much used to Denmark’s Cold War tradition of non-interference, Danish public was more divided on the issue of involvement in the Gulf.27 This public divide however did not cause the issue to be used for electoral gain. Danish scholars indicated that the political decision was ultimately a compromise between the ruling political elites (Olesen, 2012:27).28 The decision to send troops abroad, be it with significant caveats, was perceived as the frontier of what was considered constitutionally, but did pass parliament without trouble (Jakobsen, 2006:86). Consequently, Denmark could live up to US-requests during the mission. Belgium: Belgium played a marginal role during the conflict, consequently little independent data exist on Belgian public preferences during the period. 29 More importantly, documentation of the Belgian political decision-making process however show that major elements in the executive demonstrated great uncertainty as to the American intentions in the Gulf. This led to a clear preference within the Belgian elite for a diplomatic solution to the conflict, preferably with as much European coordination as possible (Coolsaet, 1999:37). When the diplomatic initiative failed and the coalition started to engage Iraq through military action, the five parties which together formed the Belgian executive however each developed a different stance on the situation. The political pandemonium that followed was later described by a Dutch newspaper as: “An unremitting effort to create as much political support as possible from the public” (NRC, 1991).30 This political deadlock eventually led to a slow and

26 French newspaper Le Figaro reported in August that a 60% majority of those polled wanted strong support for the American and British war effort in the Gulf (Bennet et al,1994:61). 27 Support for Danish participation in the war ranged between 44% and 47%. The exact same numbers as the range of Danish opposition against the war (Jakobsen,2006:88). 28 With on the one end Social Democrats sceptical about the deployment of forces abroad and on the other end a new generation of most notably Liberals, who saw the war as an opportunity to rebuild Denmark’s reputation as a reliable ally (Jakobsen,2006:86). 29 In a more general sense it was observed that in the non-war fighting European countries, like Belgium, public opinion towards the War was more mixed (Tucker,1993:141). 30 Most illustrating of the division within the Belgian executive at this point were the open confrontations between the Christian- democrat Minister of Foreign Affairs Marc Eyskens, who adopted a fierce pro

38 limited response to US request for help. The eventual compromise was in line with Belgian constitutional configuration, not discussed in Parliament (NRC, 1991).

Analysis In all four states under investigation the domestic political setting did not seem to have limited the executive to act in line with their strategic preferences. In both the UK and France public opinion was largely in favour of intervention, consequently no major opposition emerged in parliament. In Denmark, despite public scepticism, the issue was not politicized because elites stroke a deal which allowed Denmark to come to American aid. The situation in these countries consequently is in full line with H4a and H4b. In Belgium the executive showed a clear preference for a diplomatic settlement. Only when the option preferred by the strategic elite was put off the table the public division in the country was used for electoral gain by the five party ruling coalition. This can be seen as contradicting the theoretical claims of the thesis, but at the same time, this would also contradict the bottom up or top down approach, since all theories would expect at least the executive to adopt a unitary standing regarding troop contributions. The Belgian situation can therefore best be explained by pointing at the fact that the shared strategic narrative of the executive (diplomatic settlement) failed. After this point the development of second-best strategies led to a situation in which strategic and systemic pressures were not similarly perceived by all parties making up the executive.

4.4.2 Strategic culture United Kingdom: It was observed that British executives without exception believed that contributing troops to the US-led war was likely to strengthen Britain’s role as the United States closest, most dependable ally. In the biography of it was later written that: “With regard to the Persian Gulf War Thatcher was delighted to have the chance to demonstrate once again that Britain was still America’s best friend in a crisis" (Campbell, 2007:665).

“British policymakers believed that their country’s military contribution had demonstrated to the United States that it was an “indispensable ally” Percy Cradock in his work on British foreign policy during the Thatcher administration (Cradock, 1997:180).

American point of view, and its socialist counterpart on Defence Frank Vandenbroucke who was outspoken anti-war(NRC Handelsblad,1991)

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Richard Davidson stated that the Thatcher government knew that it had influence with the United States and that if it made a significant contribution in the Gulf it would have more, hereby indicating the importance of the possible return in leverage for the country’s contribution (Davidson, 2011:52). British search for influence was accompanied by strong appreciations of value for the Transatlantic alliance and the role the US played at the world stage. Margaret Thatcher’s Foreign Policy Adviser Percy Cradock stated: “The United States provides the fundamental guarantee of British security… over wide areas British and American policies naturally coincide” (Cradock, 1997:180).31 Last Britain and the United States shared their assumptions on the level of threat coming from the region and the preferred way of dealing with this. Margaret Thatcher wrote: “If Saddam Hussein were to cross the border down the Gulf ... He would then control 65% of the world’s oil reserves and could blackmail us all” (Thatcher, 1993:817). Both countries consequently adopted a stance that military action against Iraq was necessary if diplomatic initiatives failed (Davidson, 2011:52). France: Even though it was indicated that in France reasons of prestige influenced the country to contribute Mitterrand also showed signs of Atlanticism during the Gulf crises. In exchange for the country’s support Bush consulted Mitterrand frequently prior to and during the Iraq crisis, giving the country influence in Washington’s policies on the Gulf (Davidson, 2011:56). France hereby also showed signs of appreciation for the Transatlantic alliance. Mitterrand explained that France offered a military contribution to the Gulf War because:

“[W]e are content to have the Americans in certain circumstances. We are their allies . . . in the present case one needs clarity and solidarity’’. I believe we must fight against Saddam Hussein, whatever the consequences may be. If we do not do so, we will be the false brother of the West ". Francois Mitterrand in his biography (Lacorne, 1998:331).

Mitterrand hereby agreed with the US on the level of threat coming from Iraq by stating: "In annexing Kuwait, Hussein’s Iraq had become more powerful: what was to stop it from continuing?” (Davidson, 2011:57). France however was not willing to follow the American line of action blindly. Its strategic preferences in the Middle East led to unilateral diplomatic efforts which angered the US. Coupled with its decision not to integrate French forces this shows there were limits to the length France was willing to go to maximize its influence with the US.

31 This British appreciation of the role the US played as world pacifier, materialized in condemnation of other NATO members holding back assistance in the Gulf. Thatcher stated that “The United States cannot police the world without help” (London Times1990).

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Denmark: The Danish decision to participate in the Gulf can be seen as a turning point in the country’s foreign policy orientation away from neutrality and towards Atlanticism. Danish scholars later wrote that at this point a new perception of alliance dependence became dominant in the strategic narrative of Danish elites. This narrative converged around the idea that the US-led international order had brought a way more advantageous security situation for Denmark than the Cold War years. In such a world it would be favourable for Denmark to present itself as a reliable and predictable state towards its allies, most importantly of which the US (Petersen, 2012: 321-322). At this point in time the Danish contribution was still limited, but the combination of morality and utility to support the US that later became dominant throughout the entire strategic narrative of the country’s elite was born. To justify this course of action it was required that Denmark publicly shared the perception of threat with the US, and it did as symbolized by two quotes by Minister of Foreign affairs of Denmark Ellemann-Jensen. First, defending the US in parliament he stated on the Gulf that: “There are threats to Denmark’s wellbeing that lay beyond the borders of Europe" (Doeser, 2013:9). Later he showed support for the US by stating that "The US -led intervention was in full line with the resolutions of the UN security council and necessary to force Iraq to carry them out” (Petersen, 2012: 455). Belgium: Belgium clearly did not share the perception of threat with the US. Belgian executives consistently insisted upon a diplomatic solution to the conflict, tried to create a common European response, which was explained as an attempt to downplay the military option preferred by the US, and supported French diplomatic initiatives, which were not in the American line (Manners & Whitman, 2000:137). The fact that the American led international order and its course of action in the Gulf was openly contested by parts of the executives show the clear lack of alliance dependence and convergence of the level of threat with the US. Under this circumstances Belgian executives could consequently never send troops abroad in order to achieve political leverage with the hegemon.

Analysis The strategic culture hypothesis would predict that the UK and Denmark would have contributed more in relative terms than France and Belgium. While the hypothesis fails to explain the differences in relative contributions between Atlanticist Denmark and France, the predictive value of the hypothesis holds value for explaining contributions during the mission for two reasons: First, when it comes to diplomatic support for the United States, both Denmark and the

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United Kingdom were the country’s most firm in their support for the US and their method of dealing with the problem posed by Saddam. Second, the hypothesis is able to explain differences in contributions within the categories of states. British support overrode that of France both in both absolute and relative terms but also in its diplomatic support. While the Belgian and Danish support was similar, the support of the latter was considered as a huge sign of goodwill and backed up with strong diplomatic support for the US. The Belgian contribution on the other end was perceived as a huge sign of reluctance to support the US and was hereby backed with little diplomatic support. Consequently, Atlanticism fills in the important gaps left by the relative material capabilities thesis.

4.5 Conclusion During the Gulf War systemic levels of threat and domestic political pressures proved little helpful in accounting for differences in contributions. The relative material capabilities shine a first light on the difference. It has been indicated in this respect that, because of the nature of the mission was perfect for bigger states especially France and the UK provided a big share of the burden. Atlanticism however is needed to fill in important gaps left by the thesis. For France presenting itself on the world stage was key, as observed by its rather unitary campaign in the Gulf. Given the clear level of threat coming from the region it to a large degree shared its perception of threat with the US and held some value for alliance dependence and political influence with the hegemon. As part of its strategic narrative it however, refused to blindly follow the American line in order to achieve full leverage with the country. Consequently, its burden-sharing strategy was limited compared to the UK, who adopted a strategy in the Gulf intend on achieving as much political leverage as possible. This strategy was substantiated by strong rhetoric appreciation for the Transatlantic alliance and a shared perception of threat, but more important by a major contribution to the wartime effort. For the small states, the lack of Atlanticism explains Belgium’s reluctance to support the US in either material or legitimacy. The country did not share the urgency of military intervention in the Gulf with the United States and showed limited value for the Transatlantic alliance and leverage strategies by insisting on a European coordinated effort. In Denmark however, the executive strategic narrative led the country to adopt a position in support of the US, moral and utility maximizing strategies seem to have been the driving factor behind this.

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This time Danish Atlanticism did not capitalize in a strong relative contribution, mostly because the nature of the mission did not allow for small states active involvement. On later occasions however the importance of this shift in the country’s strategic narrative became crucial for its burden-sharing with the US.

5 Operation Enduring Freedom (2001- ) On the 11th of September 2001 the world was shocked by brutal terrorist plots which hit the United States in the heart. In the aftermath of these attacks the US ushered in the start of the ‘War on Terrorism’ which came to dominate foreign policy on both sides of the Atlantic in the decade afterwards (Samakkeenit, 2006:1). The American search for vengeance brought the US and its allies first to Afghanistan by the end of 2001.

5.1 Background conflict In the decades before the turn of the century Afghanistan was devastated by civil conflict and outside intervention. In 1979 Soviet forces occupied the country, and in the chaos that was left after their withdrawal in 1989 a new militant Islamist movement known as the Taliban, seized power and effectively ruled most of Afghanistan until 2001. During this period the country became a safe haven for fundamentalist Islamic groups like Al-Qaeda. It was consequently from Afghanistan that Bin Laden organized its attacks against Western targets in the years leading up to 9-11 (Saylor Academy, 2011). After the attacks, Bin Laden and Al- Qaeda were quickly identified as those responsible. On September 20th President George Bush Jr. made an ultimatum to the Taliban to hand over Bin Laden. American impatience with Taliban responses however led to the start of operation ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’ (OEF) in October 2001.32 Due to the clear connection between Osama Bin Laden Al-Qaeda and the Taliban the invasion of Afghanistan had overwhelming international support at the start (Saylor Library, 2011). NATO, for the first time in history, invoked their collective defense clause, and the UNSC unanimously condemned the attack (Kreps, 2008:532). OEF was soon accompanied by the, NATO led, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission which aimed to rebuild state structure in the country and prepare the country

32 The officially stated goals of this part of Operation Enduring Freedom were to find Osama bin Laden, destroy Al-Qaeda, and remove the Taliban regime which supported and protected terrorists (Website USDS: The ).

43 for a peaceful democratic transition (Saylor Library, 2011).33 This massive peacebuilding operation started in 2001 and is still ongoing today. Between 2001 and 2005 Enduring Freedom gained little attention due to the American invasion of Iraq in 2003. This led commentators to label Afghanistan as ‘the forgotten war’ (Ricchiardi, 2006:1). However after 2006, when the Afghan insurgency flared up, the coalition was put under increasing pressure to step up its commitment to the country. This led to an increase of US and allied forces in the region as part of the ‘surge’ campaign to defeat the Taliban in 2009 (Katzman, 2014:18).

5.2 Troop contributions The total number of troops contributed in the 2001-2014 period, and the number of fatalities are shown in figures 7 and 8.

Figure 7 Relative troop contributions Afghanistan

Country Total contribution Contribution/ Contribution / Tot. 100,000 population military personnel United States 62,415 21,90 0,41 United Kingdom 9,500 16,07 0,49 France 3,750 6,11 0,12

Denmark 750 14,0 0,35 Belgium 590 5.68 0,16 Total= 99.249 (ISAF, 2014)

Figure 8: Fatalities Enduring Freedom

Country Fatalities Fatalities per 100.000 Fatalities per troops population deployed (x100) United States 2350 0,825 3,765 United Kingdom 453 0,766 4,768 France 86 0,140 2,393 Denmark 43 0,802 5,733 Belgium 1 0,010 0,169 (I casualties, 2015).

33 Between 2001 and 2014 nearly 50 countries participated in Enduring Freedom, contributing over 40,00 soldiers . Almost all European allies where present and the US received support from important regional powers like China and India (Ashraf,2011:2).

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5.2.1 Time, size, mix and diplomatic support United States: The contribution of the US to Afghanistan can be caught in the phrase ‘first in, last out’. The fighting in the early stages of Enduring Freedom was mainly conducted by the US (Mastoor, 2010:4). And when the insurgency flared up the United States, also fighting a full scale insurgency in Iraq, took the main burden of securing the most dangerous Southern region of Afghanistan. American fatalities suffered during operations are massive, outnumbering all other coalition-fatalities four times. The current level of troops in the country, with all other allies having cancelled their major operations, substantiated with a long term commitment show the strength of the relative American contribution to Afghanistan (Al Jazeera, 2014). United Kingdom: British commandos and airpower played an important role in defeating Al- Qaeda, and overthrowing the Taliban regime in the early phases of the Afghanistan campaign (Ashraf, 2011: 174). Between 2002 and 2006, similar to its coalition partners, attention was focused on Iraq. British commitment to Afghanistan at this point was relatively low. After 2006 however, Britain’s deployment of troops in the dangerous Southern Helmand province rose from 3,100 to nearly 8,000 by 2008 (Ashraf, 2011:176). This increased commitment came at a great price, with 453 fatalities and more than 2000 seriously injured troops (Icasualties.org: Afghanistan). The UK withdrew its forces officially at October 27 2014, making the UK one of the last countries to stop combat operations in the country (The Mirror, 2014). Beside the commitment in troops, successive British political leaders hereby backed the US war in Afghanistan in diplomatic terms. British commitment towards the US during the entire campaign led observers to label the country as the most enthusiastic ‘junior partner’ of the United States in the War on Terror (Ashraf, 2011:88). France: France willingness to commit special forces, mountain infantry and airpower played a big role in the swift defeat of the Taliban at the early stages of the operation (Shapiro, 2014:2). Under the ISAF flag, France afterwards committed a contingent of 1600 forces, used to stabilize Kabul and train the National army (CRS, 2008:23). Responding to American calls for support, French troop levels rose to a peak contribution of nearly 4000 troops in 2008 (Radio Liberty, 2008). At this point French troops were also stationed in the Southern and Eastern regions around Kabul where, according to NATO sources, Taliban operations were at a high level (CRS, 2008:23). As a result of this increased commitment French casualties increased exponentially between 2008 and 2011 (I casualties, 2015). French forces left Afghanistan on December 8th 2012. The degree to which this ‘early withdrawal’ caused

45 friction with the other allies differ (World Politics Review, 2012). However, all in all observers concluded that the French army has won great respect for its record in Afghanistan (France24, 2012). The degree of French diplomatic support for the US and its Afghanistan tactics changed over the years. At first, France vigorously supported the invocation of NATO’s mutual defense guarantee and US proposals in the UNSC to legitimate a military strike (Shapiro: 2014:2). Mainly because of the US decision to invade Iraq, French solidarity however faded away quickly in later years. The country’s critique on the War on Terror became more open as a result. French frustration was especially directed at what it saw as American unilateralism and lack of respect of international norms under the Bush Jr. admiration. This created practical problems in Afghanistan, where according to French decision makers, the US dependence on excessive force to fight the insurgency was working counterproductive (Shapiro, 2014:3). 34 Despite this issues France provided legitimacy for the mission by keeping its forces in the country for over 10 years. Denmark: Denmark was another early contributor to Enduring Freedom, sending a limited number of special forces to the country (Børgesen & Ringmose, 2011: 521). This force was later supplemented with a contingent of 100 soldiers located in Kabul. Denmark’s main contribution however came during the surge when Denmark contributed 750 troops to Helmand province, where it suffered heavy losses as a result (Børgesen & Ringmose, 2011: 522).35 Denmark’s involvement in Afghanistan officially ended in July 2013; it hereby was one of the last to leave the country (Copenhagen Post, 2013). Throughout the entire period Denmark showed unconditional diplomatic support for the United States on its Afghanistan policies. This Danish willingness to follow the American lead was later reported as being highly valued in Washington:

“Denmark was a friend when it was most difficult for Denmark…That was noticed” White house official on Denmark’s involvement in Afghanistan (Henriksen & Ringmose, 2012:160).

Belgium: Belgium did not contribute to the first stage of Enduring Freedom. It later on did contribute to ISAF by sending four fighter jets and 100 ground troops to Afghanistan in 2002.

34 Illustrating of the tension between France and the US where reports that French officers reportedly refused certain targets assigned by US planners because, they presented too great a risk to the civilian population in the French view (Shapiro,2014:3). 35 It was observed that Denmark’s total death toll of 43 hereby exceeded the total suffered in all other international operations Denmark had conducted since World War Two (Ringmose & Jacobsen:2014:2).

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Between 2003 and 2007 successive US request for additional military involvement were turned down (Auerswald et al, 2014:171). In 2007 the total number of Belgian troops was increased to 590, with the majority of troops responsible for providing security at the Kabul airport.36 All Belgian land troops were however limited by caveats which didn’t allow them to engage in any offensive operations throughout the entire operation (Auerswald et al, 2014:171). Belgian troops were withdrawn from Afghanistan in September 2012, when in large parts of the country fighting was still going on between coalition forces and insurgents (Knack, 2012). Belgian diplomatic support for the US at first was high.37 Despite the fact that Belgium became more critical against the War on Terror in later years, the country kept providing legitimacy for the mission by keeping its forces in the country for over nine years (De Brabander, 2010:1).

5.3 System level explanations In the section below the feasibility of system level variables to explain differences in contributions will be discussed.

5.3.1 Relative material capabilities The contributions during the first stage of the campaign, in which the big states launched a relatively risk free ‘shock and awe’ campaign to drive out the Taliban, largely correspond with the relative material capabilities thesis. This because especially the air power and special forces of the bigger nations were needed to defeat the Taliban at this point. The second part of the operation however is of more relevance. During the more than a decade long peacebuilding campaign executives had to defy public opinion and parliaments by maintaining their commitments to the region in the face of rising casualties. Consequently, this provided the allies with a true chance to show their ‘willingness to bleed’ for the US. It is when looking at this part of the operation that the data show little support for the relative material capabilities thesis. A closer look at the nature of the mission helps explaining this: Throughout the entire mission the US showed a large determination to carry out the campaign

36 Other Belgian troops were used to support the Belgian F-16’s who provided air support to the coalition troops or worked as instructors for the training and mentoring members of the Afghan national army (Diplomatie Belgie,n.d). 37 ‘’We must show our full solidarity with those who fight terrorism on our own territory and outside of it” stated Minister of Foreign Affairs Louis Michel in October 2001, hereby defending the American invasion of Afghanistan (De Standaard,2001).

47 without European interference.38 As a result, the US allowed its allies almost zero influence in the planning and implementation of OEF, and was very reluctant to accept contributions from its European allies (except for the UK) to the actual warfighting (Pedersen, 2011:53). The contributions it did require however were for the peacebuilding mission. This situation gave rise to two dynamics: First, unlike the situation in the Gulf, all European states were military able to conduct military operations in Afghanistan, even in the more challenging regions. The bigger powers therefore did not per se, have to pull the cart of the Afghanistan invasion. Second, prestige incentives seem to have been more limited in Afghanistan. Not only is fighting insurgents less promising for the ‘grandeur’ of a nation as conventional warfare against an ‘evil’ dictator. But more importantly the campaign was an American affair from the start, consequently, allies could only play a subordinate role during OIF. For the United Kingdom who, as will be discussed later, saw Afghanistan as an opportunity to show their loyalty to the US, this lack of promised prestige seems not to have been perceived as a problem. For France however it was indicated that even tough, it felt it had to make a contribution to have their power being recognized as being on par with the UK, its systemic incentive to contribute stopped here (Davidson, 2011:116).

Analysis The data show that, even tough, the middle powers contributed more forces in absolute terms, the relative contributions of states show a clear division between the UK, and Denmark and Belgium and France. Denmark and the United Kingdom hereby not only outweigh France and Belgium in the relative numbers of troops contributed, but, more importantly, also in the willingness to share risks, as shown in their higher rate of relative casualties. As a result, H1a and H1b are falsified.39

5.3.2. Balance of threat Distant Afghanistan and its conventionally weak Taliban forces did not form a direct threat to the territorial integrity of the European states. Any real economic incentive to invade the country hereby seem unlikely because, besides some gas and mineral reserves, the country

38 The American desire to go it alone in Afghanistan was later ascribed to its previous experiences with coalition warfare during the Balkan wars and its deep distrust of European favoured international institutions (Peteresen,2011: 53). 39 The fact that the relative contributions and relative fatalities of Denmark and the United Kingdom converge with that of the US shows just how big their share of the actual burden during OIF was.

48 did not held any natural resources worthy of intervention.40 However, the 9-11 attacks had strikingly shown that in the 21th century the citizens of Western democracies were far from safe from security risks that originated elsewhere in the world. The global battle against terrorism and the regimes that supported them to prevent new terrorist attacks therefore formed the threat to be balanced in Afghanistan. As discussed below, all states under investigation could hereby not a priori be certain that it would not fall victim to Al-Qaeda’s terror, since they all were both target of its rhetoric and not immune to its attacks. In 1998 al-Qaeda issued a fatwa which was later perceived as holding the organizations founding principles. Under the banner of "The World Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and Crusaders" the document stated that: “[It is] the duty of all Muslims to kill US citizens-civilian or military-and their allies everywhere… And it is the duty of any Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it” (The Guardian, 2011). At the time the implications of these threats for Europe were not picked up. After 9-11 however, European intelligence services alarmed that Al-Qaeda was not only pointing its arrows at the US, but posed a direct threat to secular values and lifestyle all around the world (Ashraf,2011:214). This fear became even more imminent when it became clear that an Al-Qaeda cell on the European mainland had played a major role in executing the 9-11 attacks.41 As indicated in figure 9, Western European countries all had considerable Muslim minorities living in their communities. With no full picture on the size and danger of the cells, and facing a heated public climate, executives all around Europe to a great extend feared terrorist attacks. Consequently, they held strong incentive to tackle these security risks at the source in Afghanistan.42

40 European states hereby did not maintain any noteworthy levels of trade to the poor country (CIA, 2014). 41 This cell was based in Hamburg, and consisted of persons who were nearly all born on the continent, highly Westernized, and had travelled freely up and down to Afghanistan for training over the years (Ashraf,2011:216). Intelligence services hereby feared that dozens of this terrorist cells were active around Europe (LA Times,2001). 42 As the threat was high at the beginning of Enduring Freedom, fear became even higher when Al-Qaeda showed it was able to hit the European mainland in 2004 and 2005. In terrorist attacks on public transport in London and Madrid more than 250 European citizens lost their live.

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Figure 9 Percentage of Muslim population in 2001

Country Percentage of Muslim population United Kingdom 2,7% France 8,0% Denmark 2,1% Belgium 5,8% (Kettana, 2010:154-164).

Analysis As stated above, all states were more or less to the same degree both target of Al-Qaeda’s threats and vulnerable to its capabilities. At a minimum, all European states could not a priori be certain that their country would be spared from terrorist attacks coordinated from safe havens in Afghanistan, making a distinction based on H2b unlikely. Given the shared level of threat H2a would predict a convergence in European contributions; the data show no support for this assumption. As a result the thesis holds little independent explanation power.

5.4 Domestic level explanations In the section below the feasibility of domestic level variables to explain differences in contributions will be discussed, starting with public opinion and followed by strategic culture.

5.4.1 Domestic political setting United Kingdom: Electoral politics did not seem to have influenced Britain’s decision to contribute to OEF. In the beginning stages of the war an overwhelming majority of the public, and the two major opposition parties, supported the executive (Davidson, 2011:110).43 Between 2002 and 2005 there is a paucity of opinion data on Afghanistan, because attention was mainly focused in Iraq. Documented public opposition to the war however increased after 2006 when more forces were committed to the country and casualties increased as a result.44 With no sign of a decisive victory this trend of declining support continued in later years.45 At this point however, consecutive executives showed their great commitment to the

43 Between September and October 2001 public support for American and British military action in Afghanistan ranged between 74% and 69% percent (Ipsos Mori,2001). 44 Public opinion polls in 2006 indicate that 53% Britons opposed the war while only 31% supported it (The Guardian,2009). 45 In polls conducted in 2009 and 2010 only 27% of the British supported maintaining the current troop levels (German Marshall Fund, 2009:34).

50 cause by increasing their commitments to coalition operations between 2005 and 2010, hereby willingly accepting electoral risks (Ashraf, 2011:103). Last, opposition calls for withdrawal only became loud at a point during the campaign when much of the security tasks had already been transferred to Afghan security forces. At this point the threat was more or less secured, and the US consequently allowed for withdrawal without much backlash. France: Public opinion backed the French government’s decision so send troops to Afghanistan in the initial stages of the war.46 Like the UK, France in later years kept increasing its presence in Afghanistan despite growing public opposition (Davidson, 2011:115).47 The country’s decision to withdraw forces in the end of 2012 was part of election promises by President Francois Hollande. Withdrawal however only became an issue when France had already shared a considerable part of the burden in Afghanistan. Last, Parliament did not seem to have played a limiting role. In the early stages both the executive and major parts of the opposition were in favor of the war (Davidson, 2011:155). In 2008, despite major public opposition against the war, Parliament still voted in large majority in accordance with executive preferences in both the Lower house and Senate. This vote was at the time seen as a strong signal of political support for French operations (Kreps, 2010:206). Denmark: It has been indicated that the Danish executive throughout the entire campaign faced relatively little opposition from the domestic front (Kreps, 2010:1). With respect to public opinion, Danish scholars later indicated that no public opinion polls were conducted on Afghanistan in Denmark between December 2001 and 2005 (Ringmose & Jakobsen, 2014:3).48 Between 2006 and 2011, when the Danish commitment was largely expanded, public opinion polls hereby show that the military mission remained support from roughly 50% of the electorate (Børgesen & Ringmose, 2011:522). The political arena of Denmark during the first years of the 21th century hereby formed the cornerstone of the later developed elite consensus thesis. In the country parties on all ends of the political spectrum showed a great convergence towards their countries commitment to

46 International polls showed that 75% of the French population supported military action in 2001 (Ipsos Mori,2001). 47 Pew Global Attitudes polls of 2008 and 2009 found that majorities of the French population wanted to remove their troops as soon as possible from Afghanistan (Pew Research,2008:29 / Pew Research, 2009:5). 48 Hereby arguing that public opinion was neither relevant, nor necessary for the sending of Danish forces to Afghanistan during the period (Ringmose & Jakobsen,2014:3)

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Afghanistan (Kreps, 2010:1).49 This can be observed by the fact that in 2002, 2005 and 2007 all parties unanimously agreed on sending forces to Afghanistan, hereby even largely justifying this decision by making use of the same narrative (Børgesen & Ringmose, 2011: 522). As a result, neither parliament nor the constitutional structure of the country limited Denmark in its contribution. Last, Danish withdrawal from Afghanistan came at a time when systemic incentives were weaker because the threat from the region had largely been controlled. Belgium: International polls showed that just after 9-11 the Belgian public supported US action in Afghanistan, be it with a small margin.50 Data on Belgian public opinion is limited in the period afterwards, but in general points to majority of the public being against Belgian interference in Afghanistan (Auerswald et al,2014:171). Despite this negative public opinion Belgian commitments were upheld over a long period of time, and under differing governing coalitions. Strikingly, caveats put on the use of force by a left leaning coalition early 2003 were not lifted under a more right wing coalition in 2007. Consequently politics shifts did not lead to major differences in the Belgian approach towards Afghanistan.51 The strong executive preference for a long period of limited US support was also shown by the fact that the executive bypassed Parliament on many occasions, hereby limiting the risk of potential damage (Vredesactie België, 2008).

Analysis European support during the Afghanistan mission provides clear support for the assumption of the thesis that domestic political configurations did not have influenced executive decisions.H4a seems justified by the fact that public opposition largely supported the war during the initial stages, but more importantly by the fact that despite growing public opposition all countries maintained, and on several instances even increased, their commitment to Afghanistan in later years. H4b holds because opposition in Parliament hereby in no country formed a real challenge to the executive, since on many instances it voted in accordance with executive preferences or

49 Hereby giving Danish executives a free ticket to act in preference with their strategic and systemic incentive without the prospect of electoral loss (Kreps,2010:1). 50 On the question: Do you agree with American military action in Afghanistan, 52% of Belgian respondents answered yes, against 34% no. On the question if Belgium should participate in the war the response was mixed with, 50% in favor and 42% against Belgian military involvement (Everts & Isernia,2002: 29) 51 The fact that elite discourse shows remarkable stability throughout the years despite changes in the political configuration of the executive hereby provides support for the thesis assumption that there is one strategic narrative dominant in a country’s elite.

52 was bypassed without too much trouble. The Danish commitment toward Afghanistan, despite its strong control mechanisms, hereby shows that this factor is not a limiting factor when other incentives to contribute are strong.

5.4.2 Strategic culture United Kingdom: Atlanticism provides a convincing story to account for the British contribution during OEF. First, it was stated that British executives held a strong belief for the country’s dependence on the US. The UK Foreign Affairs committee report on Afghanistan in 2001 stated:

“The importance of the United States is unequivocal: There is no more important relationship for the United Kingdom... The US is our foremost political and military ally, our biggest trading partner, and our largest source of investment and the worlds remaining superpower” (UK Foreign Affairs committee, 2001:6)

More importantly however, this idea was accompanied with the strong belief that contributing to Afghanistan would strengthen the ‘’ between both countries from which the UK would benefit. Is the prospect of influence, usually a rather opaque motivation to go to war, the same report bluntly stated that: “Influence on important decisions is the main consequence for the United Kingdom of its decision to identify its interest with those of its ally” (UK Foreign Affairs Committee 2001:6). It was written that British officials during the time were certain that the UK could not only influence the US decisions in Afghanistan but one a wider range of topics by showing their support. Given the tendency of the Bush administration towards unilateralism in the heated climate after 9-11, it was hereby believed that it was wise not to publicly take issue with the more controversial aspects of the US Afghanistan policies, as to maximize influence on issues of greater importance (Davidson, 2011:107). The UK strife for influence was, as expected, accompanied by a great deal of rhetorical solidarity. Foreign Secretary Jack Straw defended British contributions to Afghanistan by stating: “Twice during the last century, the United States came to Britain’s aid; today, we have to come to the United States’ aid” (Speech Jack Straw at House of Commons, 2001). The UK hereby showed convergence in the level of threat coming from the region. defended British contribution to OEF by stating: “ [W]e know the Al-Qaeda network threaten Europe, including Britain . . . [s]o we have a direct interest in acting in our own self-defence to protect British lives” ( Speech Tony Blair,2001).

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France: France publicly showed signs of value for its alliance with the United States during the Afghanistan campaign. Most notably by showing strong rhetorical solidarity after the 9- 11 attacks. France hereby shared the perception with the US that Afghanistan was a threat that needed to be dealt with. In a speech on September 24th 2001 Prime Minister Lionel Jospin stated that: “[C]onfronted with the terrorist threat, no country can comfort itself with the belief that it can protect itself in isolation. The struggle must, therefore, be taken beyond our borders” (Jospin, 2002:161). However, behind the surface France discounted its alliance with the US in the early years of the War on Terror, mostly because the country felt that it was unable to influence policies in Washington (Davidson, 2011:115). As indicated, Bush only allowed allies in full support of the US some voice in decision-making. France was however not willing too blindly to accept all aspects of the US campaign. On October 3, the Financial Times quoted Prime Minister Jospin as saying:

“[I]f France is asked to be directly involved in military operations, this would imply our country is fully associated with defining the political objectives and planning of these action’s” Prime Minister Lionel Jospin (Financial Times, 2001).

Consequently, in France the strategic narrative of its elite collided with the course of action necessary to obtain influence from the US at the time. The fact that France however did contribute shows that not only utility but also morality plays a role when deciding on the use of force. Denmark: Arguments based on Atlanticism underlying the strong Danish contribution can be observed by pointing at several aspects. First, a high convergence of the strategic narrative between the US and Denmark. Most reiterated hereby became the Danish statement: “Denmark must confront the terrorists in Helmand in order not to encounter Al-Qaeda in Copenhagen” (Ringmose & Borgensen, 2011:521). Executives hereby converged around their view of alliance dependence with the US. Later commentators indicated that, like during the Gulf War, Danish executives accepted that the country was part of a broader global US-led consensus that offered new and greater opportunities to act internationally. In this world Denmark could gain leverage by showing full support to the US, to maximize utility this however required to keep criticism of US

54 policies at a low key (Pedersen, 2012:340). 52 Belgium: Belgium showed signs of support for the US.53 However the Belgian line was clearly different than that of its Atlanticist counterparts for the fact its executives refused to blindly follow the American line of dealing with the situation. In the build-up to the war the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs for instance criticized the American and British reactions after 9-11 by arguing that they were purposely overstating the danger coming from Afghanistan to pave the way for excessive action in the country (Het Parool, 2001).

“Blair’s speeches have left a bitter taste. [Given the current events] there are limits to Belgian solidarity” Public statement by Belgian Minister of foreign affairs Luis Michel (Het Parool, 2001).

The caveats put on the use of Belgian force during the entire mission and the refusal to meet American demands for increases in troops hereby show the Belgium never was willing to show the type of support that would have given the country leverage with the US.

Analysis The data on Afghanistan show great support for the strategic culture hypothesis. The strategies chosen by Atlanticist Denmark and Great Brittan show a striking similarity, with both countries willing to show full solidarity with the US in order to maximize leverage even if this meant that the country must turn a blind eye towards issues it did not agree on. In both countries this policy line was justified by pointing at the feasibility of the Transatlantic alliance and a shared perception of threat. On the other end, the strategic narrative of France and Belgium led them to adopt a more critical position on American interference in Afghanistan. This position withheld both countries from adopting a strategy which could have given them influence in Washington during the period.

5.5 Conclusion During OEF all European states shared their interest in defeating Al- Qaeda, a distinction on levels of threat therefore is unable to account for differences. Domestic political settings

52 The dominance of this strategic narrative ushered in the start of was later described as Denmark’s foreign policy of ‘super Atlanticism’ which later on was shown during the invasion of Iraq. As a result of this stance, relations with the US reached a historical high in the first decade of the new millennium (Pedersen, 2012:340). 53 Most notably by supporting the invocation of article V despite its strategic preference to limit the use of NATO, and by providing legitimacy to the mission by sending troops to Afghanistan (Coolsaet, 2009:40).

55 hereby seemed not to have limited contributions in any country under investigation. The relative material capabilities thesis can account for the differences in absolute contributions between the bigger and small states but fails to explain differences in relative contributions and contributions between similarly capable states. It was indicated that the nature of the mission, in which all states could participate and little prestige was to be obtained helps explain this. Atlanticism on the other hand explains why the UK and Britain were so eager to make a significant relative contribution. To achieve influence only strategies in full line with the US were sufficient, strong perceptions of alliance dependence and a convergence in the level of threat dominant elite discourse allowed for this. For non-Atlanticist France solidarity for the United States had its limits. France did show a convergence of threat perception with the US, but their strong frustration with American unilateralism ultimately limited its contribution. Last, in Belgium the country’s strategic narrative only allowed for the deployment of a mostly symbolic contribution to Afghanistan.

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6 Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003-2009) After the overthrow of the Taliban regime the US turned its attention to Iraq. Claiming that the country had developed weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and was supporting Al- Qaeda, the US-led a ‘coalition of the willing’ to topple the Saddam regime in March 2003 (AFHSO: 2014).

6.1Background conflict The second confrontation with Iraq was ultimately a consequence of the decision not to remove Saddam during the Gulf War (Bluth, 2004:872). Even though Iraq faced UN sanctions that made the elimination of WMD’s part of the ceasefire, there was still a lot of uncertainty regarding the country’s possession of these weapons in the following years.54 Was Saddam tolerated by the United States during this period, after 9-11 the country’s attitudes towards Iraq changed. At this point neoconservatives in control of the White House started believing that Saddam formed a threat necessary of dealing with in the short term. The American drum of war started banging on November 2002, when President Bush Jr. stated that Iraq must disarm, or would face the consequences at the hands of a US–led coalition of the willing (Bluth, 2004:880). And in February 2003, US secretary of state Collin Powell, during its infamous UN speech, showed American intelligence material ‘proving’ that Iraq retained proscribed weapons (CNN, 2003). While world leaders were still seeking a diplomatic solution to the conflict, the US ushered in the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) on March 17 2003. 55 The intervention was highly controversial because no prior UN mandate was given, resultantly important European allies withheld their support. The war itself, similar to Afghanistan, consisted of two phases: The first phase consisted of a brief conventional war between March and April 2003, intend on driving out Saddam, which led to a swift victory for coalition forces. The second phase was a longer peacebuilding mission in which the coalition tried to rebuild state structure and train Iraqi security forces, while facing a civil war and massive insurgency (Encyclopaedia Britannia, 2013).

54 When Saddam hereby kept frustrating international inspections, this led to an increase in sanctions and a swift US air campaign against several Iraqi military installations in 1998 (Encyclopaedia Britannia, 2013). 55 Over thirty nations contributed during OIF. The coalition however by no standard resembled the earlier coalitions in the Gulf and Afghanistan. Several important European allies like Germany and France and none of the Arab states were present in Iraq. Their role was filled by minor powers, and even microstates like Mongolia and Fiji. Almost all states hereby refused to allow their forces to take on a fighting role in the conflict. The legitimacy the coalition therefore provided for the US was seriously doubted (BBC, 2003).

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6.2 Relative troop contributions The peak contribution of the countries during the Iraq war and the number of fatalities are shown in figures 10 and 11

Figure 10: Troop contributions Operation Iraqi Freedom

Country Contribution Contribution/ Contribution / tot. Peak 100.000 pop military personnel United States 165,000 56,87 0,11 United Kingdom 46,000 72,12 0,22 France x x x Denmark 570 10,11 0,026 Belgium x x x Total = 235.317 (Carney, 2011: 34- 119).

Figure 11: Coalition fatalities Iraq war

Country Fatalities Fatalities per Fatalities per troops 100.000 population deployed (x100) US 4488 1,55 2,72 UK 179 0,30 0,39 France x x x Denmark 7 0,13 1,23 Belgium x x x (Icasualties, 2015).

6.2.1 Time, size, mix and diplomatic support United States: During the first stage of the Iraq war an American invasion force of around 150,000 troops supported by 45,000 British and some Australian and Polish forces quickly drove out Saddam (Carney, 2011: 6-12). By 2005 the coalition however faced a massive Islamist insurgency in the midst of a civil war. American determination at this point was shown, by the ‘surge’ strategy, in which US troop levels were increased by an additional 30,000 in the period between 2006 to 2008 (Belasco,2009:34-40).This determination came at a very high price, with the US suffering huge troop fatalities during this period. American forces were the last to leave Iraq in 2011. United Kingdom: The UK was the only American ally to provide a significant contribution of ground forces in the first phase of the operation (Davidson, 2011: 134). Afterwards the UK took the lead of the coalition’s peacebuilding operations in the in the Southern provinces of

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Iraq, which it governed as responsible occupation power (Mockaitis, 2013:202). However, unlike its major fighting effort in Afghanistan, the UK this time relied heavily on the Iraqi security forces to do the actual fighting in Iraq (Heritage Foundation, 2008). British troop levels in Iraq hereby dropped on a yearly basis after its invasion peak.56 Commentators however indicated that, fighting two wars, and having 40% of its total forces oversees, the British army was heavily overstretched at the time, which can only be explained as prove of the massive commitment Great Britain made to the US-led war efforts (Heritage Foundation,2008). British combat forces were withdrawn in May 2009. The UK however remained with a presence in Iraq to train forces until 2011, making it one of the last countries to leave the country. The UK was hereby in full diplomatic support of the United States. The country signed the ‘Letter of Eight’ which expressed support for the US ambition of regime change. Prime Minister Tony Blair hereby frequently joined Bush in public statements to justify the Iraq intervention. As a result of these efforts the White House enthusiastically mentioned the United Kingdom as a key member of the coalition (Hummel, 2007:38). France: France made no military contribution to the coalition of the willing. French diplomatic opposition to the intervention was hereby harsh from the start. The country publicly rejected the evidence presented by the US of Iraqi WMD’s, and President Chirac hereby made clear that his government would veto any UNSC resolution that allowed the US to determine whether military action was appropriate (Davidson, 2011:148). French opposition to the war materialized when France, together with Germany and Belgium opposed extending NATO’s protection to Turkey in the event of an Iraqi attack. Hereby arguing that accepting this request would implicitly endorse the planned intervention in Iraq (Copson 2003:27). After the invasion President Chirac condemned the military attack on Iraq as a violation of international law. France however did allow the US and UK to make use of their airspace, indicating that such cooperation was normal between allies (Hummel, 2007:17). Denmark: Official Danish involvement in Iraq began after the initial combat operations ended with a 380 military personal contribution mid-2003.57 By February 2005 Danish presence had increased to 545 soldiers, around which it remained until its withdrawal by the

56 The country hereby did not follow the American surge example, despite the fact that military assistance in its provinces were needed. 57 Though it was widely assumed that Denmark deployed special forces to assist in the attack on Iraq, the country has never publicly acknowledged this (Carney,2011:3).

59 end of 2007 (Carney, 2011:53 / BBC, 2007). 58 Denmark at first avoided taking a stance on the Iraq issue, but later on showed unconditional support. Minister Rasmussen, too great bewilderment of its European colleagues, spoke on behalf of the EU that the current UN resolutions legitimized an US-led intervention (Stahl, 2005:11). Later on the country signed the Letter of eight and officially declared war against Iraq (Stahl, 2005:14).59 Observers consequently concluded that neither missing Nordic consent, nor the lack of an UN mandate, prevented the Danish government from clearly taking the Anglo-American side (Stahl et al, 2004:428). Belgium: Belgium made no military contribution to the coalition of the willing. Diplomatically, Belgium first insisted on the need of a decisive UNSC resolution before taking military action. When the US pushed on without a mandate it openly opposed the war (Hummel, 2007:9). Consequently, the White House did not include Belgium on its list of coalition members. The country however did allow the movement of coalition troops and material over its territory as part of alliance commitments (Hummel, 2007:10).

6.3 System level incentives In the section below the feasibility of system level variables to explain differences in contributions will be discussed.

6.3.1 Relative material capabilities Like Afghanistan two years earlier the real challenge for the coalition came during the peacebuilding efforts. This time in even more extreme form because most states were already engaged in Afghanistan and the insurgency in Iraq was fierce. The relative material capabilities thesis clearly falls short of explaining the contributions states made during this peacebuilding effort. Most notably, by the fact that middle powers France and Germany were absent in Iraq there where smaller states did contribute. The military nature of the mission hereby resembled Enduring Freedom on many aspects. The Bush administration again showed little interest to provide its allies (expect for again the UK) with any real influence in the central decision-making (Pedersen, 2011:63). It however was still keen on states sharing the burden of the peacebuilding operation under American

58 Danish forces were not directly involved in combat operations but performed secondary functions like transport and mission support. Denmark hereby deployed teams to search for biological weapons, monitor prisoners, and complete civilian reconstructing projects (Carney, 2011:53). 59 Declaring war was an unprecedented move in Danish history and hadn’t happened since the war against Prussia in 1864 (Stahl,2005:14).

60 command. This led to two tenets: First, despite the hostile environment, minor states were able to make considerable contributions.60 Consequently, the bigger European states were not pushed to make a big contribution (Carney, 2011:39-105). Second, Iraqi Freedom was an American adventure, from which the allies could gain little prestige. Despite these circumstances, the UK was again willing to commit considerably to Iraq. Was keeping up with British ambition a reason to participate for France in Afghan, in Iraq it was not. It was observed that the broad international opposition against the war led the country to believe that it would not lose prestige relative to its peers (Davidson, 2011:152).61 Consequently, the relative material capabilities thesis fails to explain differences in both absolute, as well as relative contributions for the states under investigation in Iraq. Given the high similar nature of the mission with that in Afghanistan were Belgium and France did participate, explanations on another level must account this difference.

6.3.2. Balance of threat The US gave two official reasons for the intervention in Iraq: First, Saddam Hussein's alleged programs of WMD in combination with its long-range missiles posed a threat for regional and global stability. Second, Saddam supported Al-Qaeda, and the possibility existed that he would provide WMD’s to this terrorist group (Davidson, 2011:133). These reasons were on many occasions accompanied by pointing at Saddam’s track record of large scale human rights violations (IPS, 2008).62

“The people of the United States and our friends and allies will not live at the mercy of an outlaw regime that threatens the peace with weapons of mass murder. We will meet that threat now, with our army…. so that we do not have to meet it later with armies of fire fighters and police and doctors on the streets of our cities” President Bush, addressing the nation after the bombing of Baghdad had begun on March 19 2003 (Speech Bush, 2003).

60 This was shown during the mission by minor powers like Poland and Australia but more importantly by a small states like 61 It was also suggested that by leading the international opposition to the war France believed it would gain prestige(Davidson,2011:152). 62 Later on a more opaque reason for intervention was indicated. Namely that the war was intended to allow the US to get their hands on the oil reserves located on Iraqi soil (Lobelog:2013). Given the absence of any clear evidence supporting this claim the ‘oil-argument’ will not be discussed in the thesis.

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At the time it was impossible to objectively asses how much truth lay in US allegations, and consequently how much threat Iraq really posed. At a maximum, Saddam its WMD’s, and Al- Qaeda formed a triangle which put the security of the world at risk, and had consequently to be dealt with before it was too late. Under this scenario it seems likely that in all European states officials would fear what Al-Qaeda would do with WMD’s and the consequences of such an attack for their wellbeing. Given the great uncertainty surrounding these claims however, this assessment of threat was far from shared in all European capitals. What at this point is therefore important to note is that OIF was very different from earlier missions for the fact that the invasion was a pre-emptive strike, justified on claims that went far beyond the known facts and given evidence (Bluth, 2004:881).63 Without clear evidence, or international legitimation, and facing a very sceptical public opinion, the Europeans were asked to open up another front in a distant land and hereby commit themselves to a long term mission with the severe possibility of fatalities. The decision to provide support consequently depended on just how blindly executives were willing to follow the United States in their assessment of threat and preferred method of dealing with this threat. This ultimately came down to fundamentally different conceptions of the nature of international politics, the role of the United Nations, collective security and American intentions (Bluth, 2004:881). Iraq can therefore be considered as the ultimate test of Atlanticism.

Analysis As indicated, threat levels from Iraq were unclear, but would in accordance with earlier threats for the citizens of a state from Al-Qaeda terrorism be felt in the same way by European states, a distinction based on H2b seem unlikely. H2a would hereby predict a convergence in the contributions of European states, the data show no support for this claim.

63 The fact that evidence of the Iraqi WMD program was based on unreliable and incomplete information, and was later proven to be wrong shows how ambiguous of threat from the region really was (Bluth,2004:886).

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6.3 Domestic level explanations In the section below the feasibility of domestic level variables to explain differences in contributions will be discussed, starting with public opinion and followed by strategic culture

6.3.1 Domestic political setting United Kingdom: It was stated that, given the fact that British public was strongly against American intervention, if public opinion ever mattered for elites in Britain it would be during the Iraq-decision.64 Prior to the invasion Foreign Secretary Jack Straw summed up the British public mood by stating that if the country waged war without a UN resolution: “The Only regime change that will be taking place is in this room” (Davidson, 2011:141). It was hereby expected the Blair government could suffer significant Cabinet defections and even a ‘Parliamentary rebellion’ by committing troops to Iraq. In the end however, only one Cabinet Minister resigned prior to the war and open opposition in Parliament only came from the Labour party, who’s 140 members voted against the war.65 (Davidson, 2011:142). With British forces committed to the war the public showed its solidarity by rallying behind its forces, this support however faded away when it became clear that no WMD’s would be found in Iraq around. The degree to which the British population was sick of the country’s involvement in the war was shown by public opinion polls in 2006, at that point more than two-third of the population opposed the war (Everts & Isernia, 2005: 11-12). This however not withheld the British government to keep its forces in Iraq over an eight year period. Hereby showing great determination to uphold their commitment to the US (Von Hlatky, 2013:64). Opposition parties hereby never politicalized the issue enough to put the British commitment to the war in danger during this period (Davidson, 2011:142). France: A clear majority of the French public was against military involvement in Iraq.66 France non-contribution therefore seems a possible case where electoral politics provide a plausible explanation of the executive lack of support for the war (Davidson, 2011:154). However, to valid this claim the Chirac government must at first have seriously considered

64 The international EOS-Gallup poll of 2003 showed that 68% of British respondents opposed national participation in a US-led Iraq intervention without a preliminary decision of the United Nations, with 41% regarding it even ‘absolutely unjustified’ (EOS,2003:4). Additional polls indicate that almost two thirds of British citizens thought that their country should not participate in a US-led Iraq intervention without a UN mandate (Everts 2004: 218). 65 This being far from enough to stop Britain from making a considerable contribution to the war effort. 66 The international EOS Gallup poll of 2003 indicated that 84% of French citizens opposed French military participation in Iraq, 60% even regarded military participation under current circumstances as ‘absolutely unjustified’ (EOS,2003:4).

63 providing military support, but was later kept from acting in accordance with this preference by the fear of being electorally punished (Davidson,2011:154). As indicated earlier, way before the issue became of eventual electoral importance, France executives already publicly opposed the war in Iraq because of the absence of an international mandate and the lack of threat for French interest. Consequently, in neither its rhetoric nor in any visual preparations, the French government ever showed a sign of considering to provide a military contribution (Davidson, 2011:154). It therefore seems more reasonable to assume that public opinion just sided with executive preferences. Denmark: Denmark was no exception in the severe skepticism its citizens felt towards participation in the war.67 Despite this unfavorable public climate the Danish executive still pushed on with its decision to commit troops to Iraq. Unlike the political consensus it faced regarding Afghanistan, this time however there were signs of political contestation. The country’s vote in Parliament to go to war was for example, far from overwhelming (61 against 50 votes).68 The fact that despite public and parliamentary opposition the mandate for Danish forces in Iraq was extended on several occasions between 2003 and 2006 shows how strong incentives were in consecutive executives to support the United States (De Vries,2007;220). Belgium: The Belgian situation shows a high degree of similarity with the situation in France, both being non-contributing countries with a public opinion strongly opposed of intervention in Iraq.69 Like France, Belgian executives hereby made it clear from the start that without an international mandate it would never provide any form of support for the mission in Iraq. Consequently, public opposition did not seem to have altered the government’s decision on providing support, it only sided with it.

67 The international EOS Gallup poll indicated that 83 % of Danish citizens regarded Danish participation in a military intervention ‘unjustified” and 58% as ‘absolutely unjustified’ (EOS,2003:4). This data is supported by a Danish sources. On the question: “Should Denmark participate in a war with Iraq for which the UN has NOT given a mandate? Only 4% answered yes, against 87 % answering no. (Hummels,2007:12) 68 ). It was observed that this vote coupled with later Parliamentary opposition against the war hereby de facto put an end to Denmark's post-war foreign policy consensus (Stahl, 2005: 20). 69 The international EOS Gallup poll indicated that 84% of Belgian citizens regarded Belgian participation in a military intervention was ‘unjustified’ and 59 % even strictly opposing the war as absolutely unjustified (EOS,2003:4).

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Analysis Both prior to the intervention, and throughout the entire occupation, public opposition against coalition interference in Iraq was strong. Public pressure however did not lead to significant changes in policy in the countries under investigation. Both the UK and Denmark pushed on with their decisions to contribute despite considerable public opposition. In France and Belgium public opinion sided with the executive, but did not seemed to have influenced it. Both claims are in line with H4a. Contrary to earlier situations, this time parliamentary opposition emerged against executive decisions in both the United Kingdom and Denmark. However, these pressures never became strong enough to limit the Atlanticist states from contributing in line with their strategic preferences. In Belgium and France parliament was not consulted on the situation, hereby not directly influencing the decision. Both claims support H4b.

6.3.2 Strategic culture

United Kingdom: The British strategy in Iraq shows much similarity with its strategy in Afghanistan. Consequently, the determination to uphold the ‘special relationship’ provides a convincing story in explaining the country’s major contribution to OIF (Bluth, 2004:6). In a 2002 interview on Iraq British Prime Minister Tony Blair already stated that:

“The special relationship meant that the UK should be willing to commit themselves to pay the blood price” Public statement Tony Blair (Cook, 2004:199).

It was written that in the summer of 2002 British executives already gave the order to begin planning for a role in a possible US-led war against Iraq. This was explained as evidence that the UK was ready to support the US regardless of an international mandate or even decisive evidence of Iraq’s possession of WMD’s. The UK held on to its Afghanistan strategy with its executives still convinced that convinced providing support for the United States would translate into greater influence. The strategy of showing maximum closeness publicly hereby was hereby perceived as the best way maximize influence privately (Davidson, 2011:135). The British strife for influence was accompanied with great value for the Transatlantic alliance. Von Hlatky later wrote on the War on Terror years that: “For the UK its alliance with the US was seen as a power multiplier through which British policy makers sought to enhance security and prestige” (Von Hlatky, 2013:61). It was later recalled that the extreme determination of the British executive to stay close to the US, hereby led to a publicly shared

65 perception of threat, despite the fact that many officials were far from convinced that Saddam posed a direct threat for British interest (Davidson, 2011:137).70 France: French opposition to the war was harsh from the start, mostly because its elites saw no real threat in Saddam. Chirac expressed his threat perception in an interview in the New York Times: “Saddam Hussein might threaten Iraqis but he did not threaten Frenchmen” (New York Times, 2002). It was later written that French intelligence could not conclude indefinitely whether Iraq did or did not have WMD’s, and French executives were very sceptical of Iraq’s alleged ties to Al-Qaeda (Vernet & Cantaloube, 2004:194). France therefore clearly did not share the conception of threat with the US, and was unlike Britain, not willing to pretend it did, Minister of Foreign Affairs De Villepin stated:

“We believe that nothing today justifies military action” French Foreign Minister Dominique De Villepin on Iraq after the UN meeting on 20-01-2003 (NY Times, 2003).

French opposition to the war was hereby undoubtedly strengthened by the clear lack of value the country held for its alliance with the US during the time. With the earlier experiences with the Bush administration during Afghanistan fresh in mind, the French expected that their influence with the Americans would be minimal even if did contribute (Davidson, 2011:148).71 Coupled with the fact that international coordination takes a central place in the French strategic narrative, these factors seem to explain the great French opposition against American action in Iraq. Denmark: Once again Denmark’s strong value for its relationship with the US seems to explain Danish commitment. Danish president Rasmussen was clear on the role of the unipole for Denmark during the time: “Who else could guarantee our security? Could France – could Germany? There is only one power on this earth that can: the USA” (Copenhagen Post, 2003). In his view Europe had a long tradition of depending on the US, it was therefore Denmark’s obligation to help:

’We (Denmark) have an obligation to help. We cannot just sail under a flag of convenience and let others fight for freedom and peace” President Forgh Rasmussen (Washington Post, 2003)

70 Later commentators even indicated that executives consciously overstated the level of threat coming from Saddam’s WMD because this would sell better with the British public (Davidson,2011:141). 71 The great annoyance French held with American policies during this period gave rise to the idea within the French establishment that the US was a major obstacle in the achievement of important French state goals like and closer ties with Russia (Davidson,2011:148).

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Consequently, the country’s contribution was meant to set an example of how a true American ally should behave. 72 And publicly Denmark shared a full perception of threat with the US, holding that the use of military force was sometimes necessary to deal with the new non-conventional threats of the globalized world (Laybourn, 2003:1). All in all, the above hints at the importance of moral incentives for Denmark to contribute, however also a more practical incentive was observed. It was written that the country’s search for a ‘most favoured’ status with the US led Danish elites to believe that Iraq was another round in this competition for goodwill (Mouritzen, 2007:155). Especially because so few European states had joined the coalition the few that did would could disproportionally for Bush in political terms (Mouritzen, 2007:162-164). Belgium: The Belgian government responded in almost similar fashion to Iraq as it had done ten years earlier during the Gulf War (Coolsaet, 2009:46). The country affirmed that no country had the right to act outside the UN, and expressed its preference for a common European position at the expanse of an independent NATO role (Coolsaet, 2009:46). When this didn’t happen Belgium did everything it could to oppose US unilateralism.73 As a result of Belgian opposition the country became subject of intense criticism by both American officials and media. The country was branded as ‘strategically irrelevant’, a ‘free rider’ and ‘infected with hypocritical ’ (Coolsaet, 2009:47). This remarkable opposition of a small state against the hegemon was later attributed to the specific Belgian strategic culture. It was observed that deeply rooted in this narrative lay the deep respect for deep respect for international rules (Coolsaet, 2009:48). Since if state power was not checked by international institutions this would lead to unpredictable behaviour by the bigger powers from which, as had been seen on many instances before, the small powers would suffer first. 74 (Coolsaet, 2009:48). There were the Atlanticist states chose their eyes for the more unilateral American strategies in order to maximize utility, the effect of the Belgian strategic narrative was so strong that it could never allow itself to support the US under current levels of threat and without international mandate.

72 It was later stated that the Danish contribution was meant as a final showdown over the policy of passivity in previous times (Mouritzen, 2007:162). 73 Two incidents between the US and Belgium stand out in this respect: First, the country vetoed military preparations for the protection of Turkey to which Belgian Foreign Minister Louis Michel commented: “If we bowed to this request, we would embark on the logic towards war ” (The Guardian,2003b). Second, in the beginning months of 2003, the US threatened to withdraw its support for new NATO headquarters in Brussels, after Belgium adopted controversial human right law which would make American officials subject to criminal investigations (EU Observer,2003). 74 Belgium hereby articulated the classic fear that under international anarchy: “The strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must“ (Thucydides, 1996:351).

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Analysis The Iraq mission provides the ultimate evidence of the importance of strategic culture under the unipolar moment. Again, both Denmark & the UK and Belgium & France showed a high convergence in their strategy. For the Atlanticist moral and utility maximizing strategies reinforced each other to a diplomatic line of full support for the US accompanied with a contribution to the war effort. For the non- Atlanticist their perception of a lack of threat from the region coupled with the lack of an international mandate made it the country’s not only not joined the wartime effort but even were willing to go to great lengths to oppose the war. For France the lack of influence hereby seemed to have played a role, but especially Belgium’s strategic narrative made it that the country defied the hegemon in order to defend its view of the world.

6.4 Conclusion Operation Iraqi Freedom was an operation different from the missions discussed earlier for the fact that it was a pre-emptive strike, against a target of which the level of threat was ambiguous at least. This led to a situation in which European states, most of which were already engaged in Afghanistan, were asked to join the United States in a mission without international mandate. Under these circumstances, neither the relative material capabilities thesis nor domestic political regime seems to hold any explanatory value. Atlanticism however again proves crucial. For both Denmark and the United Kingdom moral obligations coupled with the prospect of political influence were decisive for their contributions. Their determination to stay close to the US was accompanied by publicly shared perceptions of threat, even if these were seriously doubted in the UK. In the non- Atlanticist countries states critique on the US course of action was clear. For France, the fact that no prestige or influence could be obtained from the mission, coupled with a lack of threat perception and annoyance with American policies during the mission enforced each other into strong opposition. Belgium was hereby even willing to put its relationship with the US at risk to defend its strategic preference for international coordination. Last, under this storm of systemic and strategic pressures domestic political configurations have been of little importance. Despite strong public opposition both Denmark and the United Kingdom contributed troops to Iraq and were willing to keep them in the country for a long period of time. In France and Belgium the executive was against intervention from the start, making public opinion irrelevant.

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7. Conclusion In the section below the thesis will be concluded. The section will start with a recapitulation of the facts presented above, hereby formulating an answer to the research question. Hereafter the academic and policy implications of the work will be discussed. The thesis will end with a discussion of the prospect of future Transatlantic burden-sharing.

7.1 Summary Throughout the thesis the question how differences between European states in their contributions to US-led missions could have been so different after the Cold was at the heart of the analysis. It was hereby argued that where all other variables associated with coalition burden-sharing fail to provide a convincing explanation, Atlanticism as part of strategic culture can. Recapping the data presented in the cases: On the system level, the relative material capabilities thesis helped explain some of the difference in contributions during the Gulf War, by holding that the nature of the Gulf mission provided the bigger nations a unique opportunity to show their grandeur on the world stage. The thesis however failed short of explaining the differences in diplomatic support and differences between states holding the same capabilities. The shortcomings of the hypothesis became more imminent in Afghanistan were small states like Denmark were willing to take a considerable share of the burden. In Iraq, the hypothesis failed to explain the non- contribution of France and Belgium, hereby showing that the logic of collective action is transformed by private incentives states hold towards contributing. For the first of these private incentives: alliance dependence it was already indicated that it could be assumed that this could not cause the states to vary because of their high similarity. This similar nature was also important for the second private systemic incentive: balance of threat. It was shown that threat levels were relatively high during the Gulf and Afghanistan, the fact that this applied to all states in more or less the same manner consequently could not form a satisfactory explanation of differences in troop contributions.75 In Iraq it was shown that it’s not per se systemic threat but rather the perception of this threat by elite’s on the state-level that explains differences in contributions. On the state-level, the influence of domestic political variables on executive decision-making were analysed during the missions. The data presented during the missions corresponds to the thesis assumption that this would hardly matter for the European states under unipolarity,

75 The fact that more oil-dependent states during the Gulf War failed to live up to their expectations hereby directly contradicted the hypothesis.

69 because: First, as shown during the Gulf and initial stages of Afghanistan, publics and opposition would on many occasions be supportive of the mission. Second, because even when facing a hostile domestic setting, executives were willing to take great electoral risk to act in accordance with their strategic preferences. This was shown by Danish and British executives in Iraq, but also by all states under investigation during the later stages of the Afghanistan campaign. This makes strategic culture key. It was shown that those European states in which the elite had adopted a strategic narrative of Atlanticism, time and again, converged around a strong commitment for US-led missions. 76 Executives in the Atlanticist counties publicly justified these contributions by appealing to the feasibility of the Transatlantic alliance and by developing similar narratives of threat in line with those of the US. Privately, and sometimes even in the open, the prospect of political influence in Washington, seem to have also pushed executives towards strong contributions. Consequently, a reinforcing combination of morality and utility explains why elites in these countries were willing to deliver, even when the US embarked on less noble courses of action. For the less Atlanticist states, like France and Belgium, it was shown that the strategic narrative of their elites led to policy preferences which on many occasions withheld these states from acting in full accordance with US preferences. This became especially clear when threat levels, prospects of prestige and influence, and international legitimation were low during the War on Terror.

7.2 Implications research In the section below the outcomes of the thesis will be discussed for both academic research as for policy recommendations.

7.2.1 Further Academic research Given the limited scope of the thesis, multiple outcomes ask for further exploration: First, the thesis contention that strategic culture accounts for differences in contributions has been tested against European states that, given their relative material capabilities and levels of ascribed Atlanticism, fall on the far ends of these spectrums. The thesis hereby held the

76 As shown in their degree of diplomatic support, relative troop contributions, and willingness to accept fatalities under their troops during all mission under investigation.

70 assumption that for the other states outcomes would fall somewhere between these extremes, given their more moderate scores on this parameters. More multi-case research on the effect of Atlanticism as part of strategic culture on these states however is needed to fully justify this assumption. Second, the need for more research on the other states, in order to fully generalize findings, becomes more imminent by the fact that for the thesis four ‘typical’ Western European states were used as unit of investigation. The possibility therefore exists that, in especially the more Southern European states like Spain and Italy, different historical trajectories have created situations when deciding on supporting US-led missions which are not fully captured by the operationalization of current variables.77 Third, every thesis faces the trade-off between scope and detail. The thesis high aim to control for the effects of several variables, and over multiple countries and missions, consequently brought with it a loss in the detail to which these variables could be discussed. So even tough, the thesis was able to sketch the broad lines of the effect of Atlanticism for outcomes in contributions. And hereby showed that a reinforcing combination of morality and realpolitical incentives were the driving factors behind this, in the fine details of this interplay remains room for additional research. It might consequently well be possible that there are different ‘types’ of Atlanticism, not just in strength, but also in justification. With some Atlanticism being more morally driven and some Atlanticism more influenced by the prospect of political leverage. Developing a better understanding of what exactly drives elites to share the burden with the US, and just how big a factor political leverage with the hegemon hereby is would seem promising. Not just for improved understanding of burden- sharing debates, but also on a wide range of policy topics between both sides of the Atlantic.78

7.2.2 Policy implications By focussing on the past the facts presented in the thesis prove more feasible in terms of academic value than in terms of policy recommendations. If however a future US-led mission was to happen within the current configuration of power, evidence presented in the thesis points to one important policy discussion, for most notably US executives: the trade-off between autonomy and increased European contributions.

77 Slight differences in state-society relations, geographical positions, and historical relations with the US, here come to mind. 78 In depth case studies supported by interviews of the highly opaque political interplay on both the national level as with a state’s negotiations with US officials are hereby a necessary first step in order to create more generalizable theory.

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As was shown during the Gulf mission, the US allowed its contributing allies the prospect of political influence, not only during the wartime decision-making, but on a wider range of international topics. Despite the fact that the US hereby limited its room to manoeuvre and increased the mission’s logistics, it was also shown that this prospect led a state like France to share a considerable part of the burden. In the Bush Jr. years, the US however showed a great desire to go it alone. Political access at this point was limited to a handful of fully obedient followers. This strategy had as advantage that it limited coordination problems between the allies, and allowed the US to conduct their preferred method of fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, the ruling elites of almost all of the potential American allies hold strategic narratives that withhold these countries from becoming fully obedient in order to achieve political result. Several allies hereby have shown to be willing to openly defy the US if they show a lack of respect for international rules. As a result of this American unilateralism consequently many European states refused to share a burden of the Iraq mission. So, if the prospect of political leverage and prestige leads states to contribute more, and assuming that both the US and the European states hold tenets towards utility maximizing, it might for the US be feasible to rethink its preference on the trade of between autonomy and the sharing of influence during future burden-sharing debates. Since a more responsive American line would, following this logic, lead to a bigger share in the burden by its allies.

7.3 Epilogue: Burden-sharing in an age of uncertainty After the storm of Western intervention was losing its strength around 2010, for a brief moment it was hoped that the international system would lose its turbulence of the previous decade, and US-EU relations would reach calmer waters as a result. In following years however, several events on the world stage made it that burden-sharing debates between both sides of the Atlantic remained at the centre of debate. First, the chaos following the Arab revolutions in 2011 spurred the West once again into action in the Middle East. First, in Libya where Muammar Gaddafi threatened to use force on its own population, the West saw a ‘window of opportunity’ to get rid of this irrational factor (BBC, 2011).79 And hereafter in Syria where amidst the chaos of civil war IS rose to power

79 The NATO coordinated mission in Libya was UN-mandated and consisted of 19 states. Most states however did little more than providing legitimacy and showing symbolic presence by enforcing the no-fly zone. The fighting part of the operation was provided by France, the UK and US (BBC,2011).

72 and overran large parts of Iraq.80 Second, by 2014 the ghost of ‘balance of power’ of politics returned to the European continent when Russia seized the Crimea island from Ukraine after a pro-European uprising had driven out the ruling regime. Western accusations of Russian involvement in the ongoing civil war in the Eastern part of the country, led to economic sanctions and a return of Cold War tension between East and West. In the midst of these crises it becomes clear the United States still has an important role to play for Europe. The European common pillar on security and defence issues is still weak, and facing renewed assertiveness from Russia and severe instability at its borders alliance dependence on the US is high as ever. At the same time, even in a future world were US power will no longer be unchallenged, active foreign policy by the country will be required to uphold its alliance-structure and safeguard its interest. And, despite the alleged ‘pivot to Asia’ the US have hereby found it extremely difficult to keep out of international conflicts over the last decades. The way the US eventually decides to come to the aid of the Yazidi population in Iraq this summer, just shows how unlikely the scenario of a return to ‘American isolationism’ seems for the near future. American activism coupled with European alliance dependence will consequently make Transatlantic coalitions of the willing a phenomena to be seen well into the 21th century. The lessons learned in Afghanistan and Iraq will undoubtedly change their nature, changing power relations on the world stage will likely change their frequency, but at a future point in time the United States will call on its allies again to share a part of the burden of its intervention. If Atlanticism at this point will be as decisive, or will prove to be an excess of the heydays of American unipolarity, remains to be seen. However one thing is certain, America will not be alone.

80 The coalition fighting IS consist of 62 countries. Most of these states however just provide legitimacy. The main share of the bombing is conducted by the US and its closest allies like Australia, the UK and (Foreign Policy,2014)

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