as theUSnotonlywantedclose cooperation with ’s Atlanticist stance was always important, come until Donald Trumpwas elected.Until2016, between the US and , but the break did not largement. The war in Iraq shookthe symbiosis the expansion ofNATOfor EUen- US support and in stabilising Europe after1989, which included interest active America’s from benefited Poland factors haveonly ever played asecondaryrole. a function ofAmerica’s European strategy. Other Poland’s positioninUSpolicyhasalwaysbeen nificant forPoland’s European policy. relations,can to bemoreout turn it could sig- presidency will affectbilateral Polish-Ameri- a Biden While decisions. difficult many entail lantic partnership,rebuilding this alliancewill lowed by attemptstocreate anew transat- Europe and Poland. However, even if it is fol- the UnitedStates is goodnewsin election for Joe Biden’s victoryinthe2020 presidential Piotr Buras Commentary for Poland Biden’s victory:theconsequences it, such as the US presence in Poland, to significance great of issues to came it when East conference), butcouldcountongoodwill viewed critically by its EU partners (the Middle helped America implement initiatives that were Europeans(from America’s perspective).Poland and“worse” to entrench thedivideinto“better” its attitudetoBerlinandBrussels,served based onideologicalsimilarities) contrasted with Justice (PiS) government andpresident (partially ministration’s warmrelations with theLawand a particularly useful partnerinthis.TheUS ad- tension between EUmemberstates. Poland was tirely effective, Trump attempted to play on the an anti-German edge. Althoughhe was not en- towards Europe,with oneagainstEUunityand USpolicy different acompletely from benefited Over the past fouryears, Poland hassomehow American foreign policy(albeitdecreasingly so). Europe – Europe represented a crucial focus in

1 Stefan Batory Foundation European policy. its domesticpolicyandthedirectionchange ofits tion will notbeenough.Poland also needto important US ally, invokingits Atlanticist tradi- position. If it wishes to maintain its status as an US, whichwillhaveamajorimpactonPoland’s a new stageinrelations between Europe andthe A Biden presidency will mark the beginning of Stream 2sanctions. visa-free travel for Polishcitizensandthe Nord than afew yearsago. instruments). It is therefore a different partner its own system (e.g. using competition policy an Greenis more Dealand determinedtodefend recoveryThe EUisbankingontheEurope fund. - shown by thenewfor 2021–2027 budget and the newand efforts to strengthen itinternally, as than in 2016, due to Brexit, the rule of law crisis policy. Today’s EU is also in a different position tions do not result only from the changes in US rather thanunitethem.Infact,thenew condi - scale oftheproblems thatdividethepartners, en by Europe andAmerica can diverge and the also demonstrated drastically how theroads tak- implementing thisgoal,butitdidnotrescind it.It in office was characterised by the impossibility of Barackduring Obama’s presidency. Trump’s time The needtoreformulate theserelations was clear not theproduct ofthemostrecent presidency. are defined are interests international America’s against their interests), these changes in how steps without consulting allies (and occasionally approachica First” andhis tendency to take frontational political style, his professed “Amer - bythe USwascaused the EUand Trump’s con- reason issimple:althoughthetensionbetween model, which we know little about for now. The old European-American partnershipanda new a kind ofvolatile transition period – between the as ananomaly in , but as The Trump era will probably not be remembered partnership Towards anew transatlantic lations. The awareness ofagreater community the newworld and arrangement ofmutualre- US about the division of responsibilities in the EU willneedtohaveaseriousdiscussionwiththe Biden’s victory means theendofthispolicy. The regardless ofwhoisintheWhite House. relations thatwouldrequire anew arrangement, excuse to also put offthoseissues in transatlantic Europe (especially andFrance) agood allies. Inotherwords, theTrumppresidency gave symptom ofareluctant policy towards erstwhile taken withapinchofsalt or viewed asthe latest and tradesuch asmilitary spending couldbe declared expectations concerningmajorissues the Iran nucleardeal). In this context, Trump’s them against its interests (withdrawing from (e.g. themilitary withdrawal from Syria) or made He didnotconsultEurope aboutmostdecisions option of rebuilding the partnership anillusion. general and to Germany in particular madethe from thistest. Trump’s openhostility to the EUin doxically, aneasierchallengeasit “freed” Europe In this sense, the Trump presidency was, para- opportunities, butalsogreater expectations. sibilities. For Europe, this wouldmeangreater increased willingness to share tasksandrespon- based notonlyonmutualtrust,butalsoan the EUisabletobuildnew relations withtheUS idency mightendupbeingareal test of whether lantic relations. Mostimportantly, theBidenpres- ple return to the (often idealised) past in transat- probably Iran). Ofcourse,itwillnotmeanasim- policy, human rights, multilateral diplomacy and ation in at least several crucial spheres (climate between theUSandEurope andrestore cooper- tension the reduce significantly will win Biden’s der andits focus onChina(rather thanEurope). involvement as theguardian oftheglobalor- ness will be halted;thesamegoesforits reduced the move towards greater American assertive- built anew. Europeans shouldnotexpect that ened andtheconviction that its pillars must be with the US–EU partnership’s foundations weak- Biden therefore woninentirely new conditions,

2 Stefan Batory Foundation eie u ftr, aswell.” future, our define will It past. our define just not does contest this fascism andautocracy created thefree world.But triumph ofdemocracy “The and liberalism over outlining hisforeign policyplans,Bidenwrote: eral tendencies. In an article in ing democracy from authoritarian and non-lib- tion of thepriority in his political agenda: defend reflec- a as interpreted be should but Poland, for evolution will create many challengesforPoland. national stage and solves global problems. This an EUthatshares America’s burden ontheinter- ship. It will now bemeasured by engagement in attachment to NATO and America’s globalleader- factor in Atlanticism will no longerbemerely an or withlimitedUSinvolvement. The determining to solve some of its important problems alone rity umbrella will shrink andEurope will be forced nership andtheprevious one:theAmericansecu- will be themaindifference betweenthenew part- US onaraft ofissuescrucialforWashington. This them crave, they should bewilling to support the ministration,on rebuilt based trust,thatmostof to have the close cooperation with theBidenad- ever, it is equally certain that if EUcountriesare difference inrelations after theTrump era. How- of interests and values will certainly be a crucial must-lead-again, accessed20October2020. com/articles/united-states/2020-01-23/why-america- Affairs 2 wegrami/2fgzkt7,79cfc278, joe-biden-wymienia-polske-razem-z-bialorusia-i- onet.pl/informacje/onetwiadomosci/wybory-w-usa- Węgrami i‘totalitarnymireżimami’”, https://www. 1 tarian regimes”. Belarus andPolandinasinglebreath as“totali During a presidential debate, Biden referred to An allianceofdemocrats other. Bidenintendsto organise aglobalSummit two goals and makes them dependent oneach mocracyit to theglobalagendalinks andadding linked toTrump’s actions.Thecalltorebuild de- policy and the threats to the democratic order indicator of the problems in America’s domestic Foreign AmericaMustLeadAgain”, Foreign J. Biden,“Why “Joe BidenwymieniaPolskę razem zBiałorusią, , March/April 2020,https://www.foreignaffairs. 1 Thesewords were notintended accessed 20October2020. 2 Thisgoalisaclear Foreign Affairs Foreign - - da. dermine thecredibility of Biden’s political agen- veering towards anti-democratic rule wouldun- cial challenge –beingtooclosetoaPolandthatis with Trump’s America, with Biden it will be a cru- mocracy inPolandwasnotimportantrelations ownership inPoland).Whilethedeclineofde- interests are involved (e.g. theissueofmedia interventions to cases where American business suggest that the US will not limit its diplomatic eral democracy in Poland. Biden’s principles may of institutions, such astheEU, which supportlib- to authenticate (if not openly support) the activity Biden ismoreViktor Orbán.TheUSunder likely man rightsorganisations andsympathiseswith rule oflaw, beencriticised by democracy andhu- kind view of a Poland that has undermined the to implementhismaintask,Bidenwouldtake a is hard toimaginethat,whenseekingapartner tocrats whileshowingdisdain fordemocrats”. It of theotherteam,which“takes theword ofau- ticle, Biden portrays Trump as a representative ent aproblem forthePiSgovernment. Inhisar- Biden’s democratic offensivewillobviously pres- moting humanrightsbeyond theirborders. corruption, counteringauthoritarianism and pro- to commitaimsinthree areas: combatting ership, theUSwill want thesummit’s participants are backsliding”.Heclaims that, underhislead- honestly confrontinstitutions [and] nationsthat for Democracy to“strengthen ourdemocratic dow-opportunity, accessed20October2020. europe-needs-be-prepared-jump-through-biden-win https://www.gmfus.org/blog/2020/10/09/nity'”, to Jumpthrough a'BidenWindow ofOpportu- 3 lations withEurope. re- to significance special attach will who ident Joe Bidenislikely tobethelastAmericanpres - Washington–Berlin–Warsaw (the need to firmly resist China, limit military limit China, resist firmly to need (the lems inawaythatissimilaroridenticaltoTrump’s prob- some defines he if Even crucial. considers potential partner in solving problems that the US not viewbut rather theEUasanopponent, asa J. Kirkegaard, “Europe NeedstoBePrepared 3 Unlike Trump,Biden does

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3 Stefan Batory Foundation presidency, Poland’s importanceasapartnerfor During theBiden in aspirit of understanding. they expect Polandtocooperate withGermany when US representatives clearly indicated that ’s presidency (and even earlier) land, this spells a return to the situation during to cooperate with,rather thanconfront. ForPo- Once again, it will be a country that the US seeks largestEU policy. cloutwhenitcomestoshaping main European partner,asthe country with the fore return to its role as the US administration’s spending andChina policy. Germany will there- such asNord Stream 2,trade issues,defence many bilateral problemspressures and remain, its crisis-stricken relations with Germany, even if Under President Biden,theUSwill want torebuild past), butalsowhatitexpects from Europe. setting outnotonlyAmerica’s promises (asinthe ing democratic values from authoritarianismand new transatlanticcentred partnership ondefend give a speech in Berlin outlining his vision for a Germany unfairly. In heropinion,Bidenshould it willbethere. advisors, has suggested that his first overseas vis- Ju- lianne Smith, one of Biden’s closest foreign policy this. in role significant a play will Germany between itandtheUSpersistinmanyareas. want a strong EU, even if differences of interest entation of US policy towards theEU. Bidenwill This approach will lead toafundamentalreori- and multilateral institutions. ures; instead,hewillusethedesire tocooperate use blackmail,confrontation orunilateral meas- achieving thesegoalswill be different. Hewill not commitment from defenceallies), his strategy for engagement worldwideandextract a greater europe/, accessed20October2020. the-next-president-can-do-to-save-our-alliances-with- ly.com/magazine/january-february-march-2020/what- Our AllianceswithEurope”, https://washingtonmonth 5 res-an-inside-preview/, accessed20October2020. com/2020/08/20/the-biden-doctrine-exists-already-he- Here’s anInsidePreview”, https://foreignpolicy. 4 J. Smith, “What theNextJ. Smith,“What President CanDotoSave See: J.Traub, BidenDoctrineExists Already. “The 5 Shestresses thatTrump criticised 4 - - “endless wars”. the finish to time is it that said has Biden Africa. gic importanceforEurope: the MiddleEastand continue its withdrawal from regions ofstrate- will US the Thirdly, region. Indo-Pacific America) more involved in thestrategically important (for Secondly, theUSwill expect theEUtobecome Europe (afterceasingtobeoneunderObama). will not return to being anactive player in Eastern transatlantic cooperation again.Firstly, theUS not become the main area of discussion and andthe EU’s eastern neighbourhood will of its aspects is equally significant: policy towards make it less unpredictable. Nevertheless, another land’s interests andthechangeinpresident will America’s easternpolicy will be inline with Po- dential administration. plays the main role here, rather than the presi- against theproject, especially since Congress the policy not leadhimtoabandon of sanctions pipeline. Biden’s critical stance on this project will its stance onthefuture oftheNord Stream 2gas tomaintain likely is also America flank. ern negatively affecting thesecurity of NATO’s east- to reduce theAmericanpresence inGermany, However, Bidenmightreverse Trump’s decision presence in Poland are unlikely to be reversed. tration’s decisionstostrengthen theUSmilitary impact onPoland’s security. TheTrump adminis- on NATO, so his presidency will have a positive Biden is known to be critical of Russia and keen Not onlyEasternsecurity European policy. viewed as an unnecessary obstacle in America’s rent tensions in Polish-German relations will be salvages its relations with Germany. The cur- the USwillinlargeon how partdepend wellit tik/, accessed20October2020. usa-langfristige-trends-in-der-innen-und-aussenpoli- gen werben”, https://www.swp-berlin.org/publikation/ Trends, dieInnen-undAußenpolitikderUSAprä- 6 tothese response sufficient a be longer no will A traditional Atlanticist stance (support forNATO) See M.Overhausetal.,“JenseitsderWahlen. Sieben 6

4 Stefan Batory Foundation joint European effort–includingPoland’s. tions aboutothercountries’involvementinthe and task-sharingwill sooner or later raise ques- towards a partnership more based on interests move from anunconditionalsecuritycommunity but alsohasthereal ability and will to act.This which not only has security interests in this area, America’s gazewill of coursefocusonFrance, ing prepared toactively in thisway,engage too. to be fully involved. Being aUS ally means be- security inplaceswhere theUSnolongerintends pect the EU to be able to take responsibility for Crucially, theBidenadministration islikely toex- to actindependentlyoftheUS? oping European “strategic its ability autonomy”, it look like? Or perhaps the focus shouldbe devel the new strategic context?if so,whatshould And, NATO’s European pillarberebuilt inresponse to the US in the Should southern neighbourhood? by left gap the fill countries European can How a role outside Europe? Ifso,whatkindofrole? land’s foreign policypriorities.ShouldNATO play and will concern many issues that lie beyond Po- possible finally now is security on US the and EU new challenges.Serious dialogue betweenthe between the EU and the US becomes a solid and interest in particular that the new partnership It willbeinPoland’sthe EUandPoland,though. lantic partnership.Itwillbeamajortestforboth Europeand torenewstrengthen and the transat - for Poland – opportunity final the perhaps and Biden presidency will represent anenormous– important role than before. Nevertheless, the Europe andits internal problems will play a less the internationalarena, onitsrivalrywithChina. cused on its growing domestic problems and, in In comingyears,theUS will remain sharplyfo- Conclusions - 20 October2020. european_views_of_the_transatlantic_relati ecfr.eu/article/commentary_touching_the_elephant_ views ofthetransatlantic relationship”, https://www. 7 act independentlyintheinternationalarena). “European sovereignty” (i.e.theEU’s capabilityto to Europe maysomewhat weakenof supporters The prospect ofaUSadministration favourable ment whenitcomestorelations withtheUS. that will arise due to the need fora new arrange- tance will be giventothediscussionwithinEU dependent ofthat, though, fundamentalimpor- US andinsteadfacecriticism and pressure. In- course, itwillceasetobeavaluedpartnerforthe of lawwill be paramount. Ifitdoesnotchange Poland, its problems with democracy and the rule reorientation inmanyimportantpolicyareas. For of the long-term trends in its policy will require a ca’s expectations and facingthe consequences lasting construction. However, meeting Ameri- the future oftheEU. on questions difficult the to responses Poland’s tiedto are inseparably America for significance The new model of Polish Atlanticism and Poland’s place in parallel – and be mutually conditional. European sovereignty will therefore haveto take atlantic partnership andthe strengthening of how tobringthisabout.Therenewal ofthetrans- Europe will not avoid a serious discussion about can treat seriously. Even though Biden has won, lations can beausefulpartner–onethattheUS and effectiveagentininternationalrependent - Ultimately, though,only an EUthat is an inde- J. Puglierin,“Touching theelephant:European November 2020 , accessed 7

5 Stefan Batory Foundation Piotr Buras – director of the Warsaw office of the European Council on Foreign Relations and non-res- ident fellow at the Institute of Human Sciences (IWM) in Vienna. He is a journalist, author and expert on European and German . In 2008–2012, he was Gazeta Wyborcza’s Berlin correspondent. Pre- viously, he worked at the Centre for International Relations (CSM) in Warsaw, the German Institute at the University of Birmingham, and the University of Wrocław. He was a visiting fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) in Berlin.

Stefan Batory Foundation Publication is licensed under Sapieżyńska 10a the Creative Commons 00-215 Warsaw Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 tel. (48-22) 536 02 00 Poland Unported Licence (cc BY-SA 3.0) fax (48-22) 536 02 20 [email protected] www.batory.org.pl ISBN 978-83-66543-47-8 Warsaw 2020