The Congress in India -- Crisis and Split Author(S): Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr

The Congress in India -- Crisis and Split Author(s): Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr. Source: Asian Survey, Vol. 10, No. 3 (Mar., 1970), pp. 256-262 Published by: University of California Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2642578 Accessed: 28-07-2015 19:24 UTC Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/ info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. University of California Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Asian Survey. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 128.83.205.78 on Tue, 28 Jul 2015 19:24:04 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions THE CONGRESS IN INDIA- CRISIS AND SPLIT / RobertL. Hardgrave,Jr. The Universityof Texasat Austin n November1969, the Congress party of India was torn apart after four monthsof inner-partyconflict. The truncatedleadership of the partyorganization,isolating itself from the will of the majorityof the Congress ParliamentaryParty, expelled Prime Minister Indira Gandhi,daughter of Nehru,from the Congress. In thecentenary year of Mahatma Gandhi's birth, twoCongress parties fought for the tattered standard of the nationalist move- ment. From the timethe Congressfirst assumed the responsibilitiesof public office,there has been conflictbetween the governmentaland organizational wingsof the party.In the earlyyears afterindependence, as the political centerof gravityshifted from the party to theGovernment, Prime Minister Nehrubattled party presidents, and in 1951 assumedthe Congresspresi- dencyhimself. To hold thePrime Minister accountable to theparty, Nehru argued,would reduceparliamentary democracy to a "mockery."The re- sponsibilityfor decision-makinglay withthe Government.With Nehru's declineand death,however, the leadershipof the organization,a coterie of statebosses called the Syndicate,reasserted itself and, engineeringthe two successionsto bringShastri Lal Bahadur (1964) thenIndira Gandhi (1965 and 1967) to power,sought to dominatethe office of the Prime Minis- ter. The traditionalconflict between the two wingswas accentuatedby the widespreaddefeats inflicted on the Congressin the 1967 electionsand the loss of powerin half the states.Beyond this, however, increasing political consciousnessamong the mass electorateunderscored two basic facts: (1) theobsolescense of a Congresspolitical machine which rested on thesupport of wealthypeasants and landowners,and (2) the wideningeconomic dis- paritiesof thenation, reflecting the gap betweenCongress policy and effective implementation. In the tensionbetween the Governmentand the partyorganization, the presidentialelection in 1969 broughtthe conflict to thesurface and initiated the fourmonth crisis that split the 84-year-oldIndian NationalCongress. In challengeto theSyndicate, Indira Gandhisought to securelyreestablish 256 This content downloaded from 128.83.205.78 on Tue, 28 Jul 2015 19:24:04 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions ROBERT L. HARDG RAVE, JR. 257 thedominance of thePrime Minister within the party, and facingthe 1972 elections,she soughtto secureher choice of candidatesin nominationand to giveeffective meaning to theCongress commitment to socialism. The firstround of battletook place at themeeting of theAll-India Con- gressCommittee at Bangalorein July1969. To gain initiativeat theBanga- lore session,Mrs. Gandhisent a note of "straythoughts" to the Working Committeeurging a more aggressivestance toward economic policy-na- tionalizationof major commercialbanks, effective implementation of land reforms,ceilings on urban incomeand property,and curbs on industrial monopolies.The Syndicate,ideologically incohesive, was dividedin its re- action.Conservatives S. K. Patil and CongressPresident Nijalingappa sided withMorarji Desai in opposition;Kamaraj and Home MinisterY. B. Cha- van expressedfavor. To avoid a spliton theeve of thepresidential nomination,Chavan secureda unanimousresolution calling on the centraland stategovernments to implementthe Prime Minister's suggestions. The Syn- dicate,however, in alliance withDesai, soughtto retainits hold over the partyand to securethe Congresspresidential nomination for its own man, Sanjiva Reddy,Speaker of theLok Sabha, in oppositionto Mrs. Gandhi's preferencefor V. V. Giri,the seventy-fouryear old ActingPresident who tookover on thedeath of PresidentZakir Hussain earlierin 1969. By custom,the nomination is made by theeight-member Central Parlia- mentaryBoard, elected by the All-India Congress Committee. With no chance forGiri, Mrs. Gandhi,with the supportof FakhruddinAli Ahmed,Indus- triesDevelopment Minister, formally proposed Jagivan Ram, Ministerfor Food and Agriculture.Reddy's nomination, however, was securewith the supportof Nijalingappa, Kamaraj, Patil, and Desai. HomeMinister Chavan threwhis lot withthe majority. With Reddy's nomination by Congress,V. V. Giri enteredthe presidentialcontest as an independent.He resignedas ActingPresident, and in a vigorouscampaign drew the support of theSam- yuktaSocialist Party, the regional Dravida Munnetra Kalagam (D.M.K.)- theruling party in Tamilnadu-the MuslimLeague, the two wingsof the Communistparty, and almostall elementsof theUnited Front governments of Kerala and West Bengal. The rightwing opposition,the Jana Sangh, Swatantraand the BharatiyaKranti Dal (B.K.D.) of UttarPradesh, put forwardformer Finance Minister C. D. Deshmukhas theircandidate. The Praja Socialistssat the fencebetween Giri and Deshmukh. Withinthe Congress,as Chavan soughta rapprochementbetween the PrimeMinister and the Syndicate,Mrs. Gandhirelieved Morarji Desai of his Finance portfolio,deepening the wedge betweenthe two groups.To save his "self-respect,"Desai thenresigned as DeputyPrime Minister. Al- thoughMrs. Gandhiclaimed to have takenthe actionbecause of Desai's positionon her economicmeasures, Desai had, if grudgingly,accepted the A.I.C.C. resolution.The Syndicateviewed the affairas a vendetta,but as sympathygrew for Desai, Mrs. Gandhi retainedthe initiative.She an- nouncedthe nationalization of fourteenmajor commercialbanks, at once This content downloaded from 128.83.205.78 on Tue, 28 Jul 2015 19:24:04 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 258 THE CONGRESS IN INDIA justifyingher earlier action and pushingthe Desai controversyinto the background.The purposeof nationalization,she announced,was to pro- vide moreequitable access to bank credit,particularly for small farmers and artisans.Chavan, Kamaraj, and AtulyaGhosh, previous advocates of bank nationalizationwhen Mrs. Gandhiseemed uninterested, welcomed the decision.The banks,holding some 70% of the country'stotal bank assets, werelargely in the hands of a few dominantbusiness families, the Birlas, Tatas, Dalmias, and Jains. Nationalizationinvolved the expenditureof littlepolitical capital and reapedwidespread support for the Prime Minister. She declaredthe action as "onlythe beginning of a bitterstruggle between the commonpeople and the vestedinterests in the country." Indira Gandhi,though having signed Reddy's nominationpapers, had yet to come out clearlyin favorof the party'sconservative nominee. In- deed,there was speculationthat Reddy would try to use theuntested powers of thepresidency against the Prime Minister, if notto unseather altogether. Whereat firstReddy's election seemed assured, with the Congressholding 52% of the votes,increasing rumors of defectionsto Giri caused considerable unease amongSyndicate members. Within one week of the election, partyPresident Nijalingappa issued a whip instructingall Congressmem- bers of parliamentand the statelegislative assemblies to vote for Reddy and also asked Mrs. Gandhito make a statementof supportimmediately forthe Congressnominee. The PrimeMinister, the leader of the Congress ParliamentaryParty, refused to issue a whipfor Reddy, and her supporters calledfor a "freevote" of consciencein theelection. A largenumber of the CongressM.P.s indicatedtheir support of a freevote; some publiclytore up the whipnotice. Support for Giri was now in the open. Fifteencandidates, with three leading contenders, stood for the election, heldon August16. As neitherReddy nor Giriachieved the required number of voteson the firstcount, the second preferencesindicated on the Desh- mukhballots were then tabulated. On the secondcount, Giri was declared elected.Giri's lead on thefirst ballot came primarilyfrom the non-Congress statesof Tamilnadu,Kerala, and WestBengal. On the secondcount, it was the secondpreference votes of the B.K.D. whichgave him the victory,as the secondpreference vote of Deshmukh'sJana Sangh and Swatantrasup- portersgenerally went to Reddy.Violations of the Congresswhip-particu- larlyin Andhraand UttarPradesh-were considerable.On the firstpref- erencevote, two out of fiveCongress M.P.s and one out of fourM.L.A.s supportedGiri. Giri's electionwas greetedwith tremendous popular enthusiasm. In the wake of Reddy's defeat,the Syndicatewas in disarray.It had been em- barrassedand was determinedto bringdisciplinary action against the Prime Minister.With pressure from those states with narrow Congress majorities, wherea splitmight put them out of office,and withthe mediation of Chavan,

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