The Congress in -- Crisis and Split Author(s): Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr. Source: Asian Survey, Vol. 10, No. 3 (Mar., 1970), pp. 256-262 Published by: University of California Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2642578 Accessed: 28-07-2015 19:24 UTC

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This content downloaded from 128.83.205.78 on Tue, 28 Jul 2015 19:24:04 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions THE CONGRESS IN INDIA- CRISIS AND SPLIT / RobertL. Hardgrave,Jr. The Universityof Texasat Austin

n November1969, the Congress party of India was torn apart after four monthsof inner-partyconflict. The truncatedleadership of the partyor- ganization,isolating itself from the will of the majorityof the Congress ParliamentaryParty, expelled Prime Minister ,daughter of Nehru,from the Congress. In thecentenary year of Mahatma Gandhi's birth, twoCongress parties fought for the tattered standard of the nationalist move- ment. From the timethe Congressfirst assumed the responsibilitiesof public office,there has been conflictbetween the governmentaland organizational wingsof the party.In the earlyyears afterindependence, as the political centerof gravityshifted from the party to theGovernment, Prime Minister Nehrubattled party presidents, and in 1951 assumedthe Congresspresi- dencyhimself. To hold thePrime Minister accountable to theparty, Nehru argued,would reduceparliamentary democracy to a "mockery."The re- sponsibilityfor decision-makinglay withthe Government.With Nehru's declineand death,however, the leadershipof the organization,a coterie of statebosses called the Syndicate,reasserted itself and, engineeringthe two successionsto bringShastri Lal Bahadur (1964) thenIndira Gandhi (1965 and 1967) to power,sought to dominatethe office of the Prime Minis- ter. The traditionalconflict between the two wingswas accentuatedby the widespreaddefeats inflicted on the Congressin the 1967 electionsand the loss of powerin half the states.Beyond this, however, increasing political consciousnessamong the mass electorateunderscored two basic facts: (1) theobsolescense of a Congresspolitical machine which rested on thesupport of wealthypeasants and landowners,and (2) the wideningeconomic dis- paritiesof thenation, reflecting the gap betweenCongress policy and effec- tive implementation. In the tensionbetween the Governmentand the partyorganization, the presidentialelection in 1969 broughtthe conflict to thesurface and initiated the fourmonth crisis that split the 84-year-oldIndian NationalCongress. In challengeto theSyndicate, Indira Gandhisought to securelyreestablish

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This content downloaded from 128.83.205.78 on Tue, 28 Jul 2015 19:24:04 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions ROBERT L. HARDG RAVE, JR. 257 thedominance of thePrime Minister within the party, and facingthe 1972 elections,she soughtto secureher choiceof candidatesin nominationand to giveeffective meaning to theCongress commitment to socialism. The firstround of battletook place at themeeting of theAll-India Con- gressCommittee at Bangalorein July1969. To gain initiativeat theBanga- lore session,Mrs. Gandhisent a note of "straythoughts" to the Working Committeeurging a more aggressivestance toward economic policy-na- tionalizationof major commercialbanks, effective implementation of land reforms,ceilings on urban incomeand property,and curbs on industrial monopolies.The Syndicate,ideologically incohesive, was dividedin its re- action.Conservatives S. K. Patil and CongressPresident Nijalingappa sided withMorarji Desai in opposition;Kamaraj and Home MinisterY. B. Cha- van expressedfavor. To avoid a spliton theeve of thepresidential nomina- tion,Chavan secureda unanimousresolution calling on the centraland stategovernments to implementthe Prime Minister's suggestions. The Syn- dicate,however, in alliance withDesai, soughtto retainits hold over the partyand to securethe Congresspresidential nomination for its own man, Sanjiva Reddy,Speaker of theLok Sabha, in oppositionto Mrs. Gandhi's preferencefor V. V. Giri,the seventy-fouryear old ActingPresident who tookover on thedeath of PresidentZakir Hussain earlierin 1969. By custom,the nomination is made by theeight-member Central Parlia- mentaryBoard, elected by the All-India Congress Committee. With no chance forGiri, Mrs. Gandhi,with the supportof FakhruddinAli Ahmed,Indus- triesDevelopment Minister, formally proposed Jagivan Ram, Ministerfor Food and Agriculture.Reddy's nomination, however, was securewith the supportof Nijalingappa, Kamaraj, Patil, and Desai. HomeMinister Chavan threwhis lot withthe majority. With Reddy's nomination by Congress,V. V. Giri enteredthe presidentialcontest as an independent.He resignedas ActingPresident, and in a vigorouscampaign drew the support of theSam- yuktaSocialist Party, the regional Dravida Munnetra Kalagam (D.M.K.)- theruling party in Tamilnadu-the MuslimLeague, the two wingsof the Communistparty, and almostall elementsof theUnited Front governments of Kerala and West Bengal. The rightwing opposition,the Jana Sangh, Swatantraand the BharatiyaKranti Dal (B.K.D.) of UttarPradesh, put forwardformer Finance Minister C. D. Deshmukhas theircandidate. The Praja Socialistssat the fencebetween Giri and Deshmukh. Withinthe Congress,as Chavan soughta rapprochementbetween the PrimeMinister and the Syndicate,Mrs. Gandhirelieved of his Finance portfolio,deepening the wedge betweenthe two groups.To save his "self-respect,"Desai thenresigned as DeputyPrime Minister. Al- thoughMrs. Gandhiclaimed to have takenthe actionbecause of Desai's positionon her economicmeasures, Desai had, if grudgingly,accepted the A.I.C.C. resolution.The Syndicateviewed the affairas a vendetta,but as sympathygrew for Desai, Mrs. Gandhi retainedthe initiative.She an- nouncedthe nationalization of fourteenmajor commercialbanks, at once

This content downloaded from 128.83.205.78 on Tue, 28 Jul 2015 19:24:04 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 258 THE CONGRESS IN INDIA justifyingher earlier action and pushingthe Desai controversyinto the background.The purposeof nationalization,she announced,was to pro- vide moreequitable access to bank credit,particularly for small farmers and artisans.Chavan, Kamaraj, and AtulyaGhosh, previous advocates of bank nationalizationwhen Mrs. Gandhiseemed uninterested, welcomed the decision.The banks,holding some 70% of the country'stotal bank assets, werelargely in the hands of a few dominantbusiness families, the Birlas, Tatas, Dalmias, and Jains. Nationalizationinvolved the expenditureof littlepolitical capital and reapedwidespread support for the Prime Minister. She declaredthe action as "onlythe beginning of a bitterstruggle between the commonpeople and the vestedinterests in the country." Indira Gandhi,though having signed Reddy's nominationpapers, had yet to come out clearlyin favorof the party'sconservative nominee. In- deed,there was speculationthat Reddy would try to use theuntested powers of thepresidency against the Prime Minister, if notto unseather altogether. Whereat firstReddy's election seemed assured, with the Congressholding 52% of the votes,increasing rumors of defectionsto Giri caused consider- able unease amongSyndicate members. Within one week of the election, partyPresident Nijalingappa issued a whip instructingall Congressmem- bers of parliamentand the statelegislative assemblies to vote for Reddy and also asked Mrs. Gandhito make a statementof supportimmediately forthe Congressnominee. The PrimeMinister, the leader of the Congress ParliamentaryParty, refused to issue a whipfor Reddy, and her supporters calledfor a "freevote" of consciencein theelection. A largenumber of the CongressM.P.s indicatedtheir support of a freevote; some publiclytore up the whipnotice. Support for Giri was now in the open. Fifteencandidates, with three leading contenders, stood for the election, heldon August16. As neitherReddy nor Giriachieved the required number of voteson the firstcount, the second preferencesindicated on the Desh- mukhballots were then tabulated. On the secondcount, Giri was declared elected.Giri's lead on thefirst ballot came primarilyfrom the non-Congress statesof Tamilnadu,Kerala, and WestBengal. On the secondcount, it was the secondpreference votes of the B.K.D. whichgave him the victory,as the secondpreference vote of Deshmukh'sJana Sangh and Swatantrasup- portersgenerally went to Reddy.Violations of the Congresswhip-particu- larlyin Andhraand UttarPradesh-were considerable.On the firstpref- erencevote, two out of fiveCongress M.P.s and one out of fourM.L.A.s supportedGiri. Giri's electionwas greetedwith tremendous popular enthusiasm. In the wake of Reddy's defeat,the Syndicatewas in disarray.It had been em- barrassedand was determinedto bringdisciplinary action against the Prime Minister.With pressure from those states with narrow Congress majorities, wherea splitmight put them out of office,and withthe mediation of Chavan, theWorking Committee "closed" thematter with a plea forunity. The unityresolution only papered over an almostconspiratorial atmo-

This content downloaded from 128.83.205.78 on Tue, 28 Jul 2015 19:24:04 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions ROBERT L. HARDGRAVE, JR. 259 sphereon bothsides. Movingto give "a morecohesive and purposivedi- rection"to the workof the Council of Ministers,Mrs. Gandhi requested the resignationof fourjunior ministerswho were knownto supportthe Syndicate.In heatedexchanges with Nijalingappa, Mrs. Gandhilaunched a signaturecampaign among the membersof the A.I.C.C. to have a new CongressPresident elected by the end of the year. The PrimeMinister argued thatCongress policies cannot be fullyimplemented unless the party organi- zationis fullycommitted to them.More than fourhundred of the seven hundredodd electedmembers of the A.I.C.C. signedthe requisition. Seekingto cast the inner-partystruggle in an ideologicalmold, Mrs. Gandhihad strengthenedher hand immeasurably. "Ideological divergences," wrotePran Chopra in The Citizen (August23, 1969), "offeredaid and abetmentthe more they were brought in to concealambition; towards the end theybegan to mattermore than anything else." The Syndicateis funda- mentallynon-ideological, but conservativein temperand tied to a base of supportamong landed and big businessinterests. Indira Gandhi,if com- mittedto socialism,is no radical,and among her followersare some of highlyquestionable ideological credentials. The CongressChief Ministers of thestates, most of whomare alignedwith her) had neverbeen particularly anxiousto implementa socialistpolicy of land reformand riskthe aliena- tion of theirlanded sourceof moneyand votes.Their assessmentof Con- gresschances in 1972, however,prompted an openingto the leftand a recognitionthat long professedCongress policies if left unimplemented wouldleave Congressmenbehind at thepolls at thenext election. On October31, on thenight before the scheduled meeting of theWorking Committee,Nij alingappa announcedhis decision to drop two of Mrs. Gandhi'ssupporters from the Working Committee. , a nominatedmember, was chargedwith anti-party activities and informed that he no longerenjoyed the confidenceof the CongressPresident. C. Subramaniam,opponent of Kamaraj in Tamilnadu,was toldthat his mem- bershiphad "lapsed" withhis pressuredresignation from the presidency of theTamilnad Congress Committee. These actions,designed to ensurethe Syndicateof a majorityin theWorking Committee meeting, were met by thePrime Minister and her supporterswith boycott and a parallelmeeting at herresidence. There, with Home MinisterChavan now firmlywith Mrs. Gandhi,they resolved to hold a meetingof the A.I.C.C. at in late Novemberto electa newCongress President. Withdemonstrators outside, the elevenmembers out of twenty-onewho attendedthe regularWorking Committee meeting at the A.I.C.C. head- quartersdeclared the requisitionillegal. They affirmedtheir own com- mitmentto the path of socialism,and accused the Prime Ministerof attempting"to find in the Congressorganization a scapegoat for the manifestfailures of theadministration." Exchanges between the two camps continuedwith increasing vituperation and pettiness.Nijalingappa, pressed by Kamaraj and Morarji Desai, accused the Prime Ministerof intrigue,

This content downloaded from 128.83.205.78 on Tue, 28 Jul 2015 19:24:04 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 260 THE CONGRESS IN INDIA

indiscipline,and corruptionand serveda "show cause" noticeon her to explainwhy disciplinary action should not be takenagainst her. Mrs. Gandhi, in turn,requested the resignation of theRailway Minister, Dr. Ram Subhag Singh,a Syndicatesupporter. The CongressChief Ministers, working to save theirown governments,attempted various compromise formulas and evenarranged an abortiveluncheon between the two combatants. On November12, theWorking Committee expelled Indira Gandhifrom the Congressand instructedthe CongressParliamentary Party to elect a newleader. The C.P.P., however,has its ownconstitution, and a motionof no-confidencerequires a two-thirdsmajority. Meeting the followingday, the C.P.P., in an overwhelmingmajority of its 432 members,reaffirmed its supportfor the leadershipof Mrs. Gandhi. Syndicatesupporters in Parliamentboycotted the meetingand met informallyat Morarji Desai's residence.Meeting again two days later in formalsession, one hundred and elevenCongress M.P.'s electedDesai as chairmanof the Congress Parlia- mentaryParty in Opposition.Dr. Ram Subhag Singhwas electedleader of the partyin the , the lower house. With sufficientnumber in theparty to gainofficial recognition (which no partybefore had everdone), Dr. Singh emergedas India's firstLeader of the Opposition.Against the 60 or so Congressmenin oppositionin theLok Sabha, the PrimeMinister held the supportof morethan two hundred.With the formalsplit in the Congressparty, however, the Government of IndiraGandhi no longercom- mandedan absolutemajority in Parliament.While a fewCongress rebels fromearlier days began to returnto the partyfold, the survivalof the Governmentnow dependedon supportfrom members of the opposition. The PrimeMinister weathered her firstchallenge on the openingday of thewinter parliamentary session, November 17. On a de factomotion of censurefor adjournmentin the Lok Sabha, a numberof independents, waverersfrom various parties, the D.M.K., and the two Communistparties stoodwith the CongressGovernment. Ranged on the otherside were the Jana Sangh,Swatantra, the Praja Socialists,the SamyuktaSocialists, and theCongress Opposition. The Congresssplit was institutionalizedin December 1969 with two separateCongress sessions. The old Congressunder Nijalingappa, meeting at Ahmedabad,engaged largely in a ritualof attackand self-justification. It had, however,attracted a fargreater number of delegatesthan expected. The Indiragroup challenged their claim to a majorityof themembers and questionedthe credentials of manydelegates. A weeklater, at Bombay,the newCongress met with an equallyimpressive number of delegates-in turn challengedby the Syndicate in whatbecame a meaninglessgame of numbers. JagjivanRam, Indira's choice, became the new CongressPresident, suc- ceedingC. Subramaniam,who had servedas ActingPresident during the previousweeks. That the new Congressembodied many of the old con- tradictionswas clear withSubramaniam's interim appointments to fillthe vacancieson theWorking Committee. The ideologicalconflict between left

This content downloaded from 128.83.205.78 on Tue, 28 Jul 2015 19:24:04 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions ROBERT L. HARDGRAVE, JR. 261 militantsand thecentrists, manifest in thecontroversy surrounding the ap- pointments,emerged almost at once in the Bombaysession. The economic programpresented, largely a restatementof past Congresscommitments with a promisefor implementation,caused considerabledisappointment amongthe Young Turks in theparty who sought a farmore radical posture forthe Congress.Indira Gandhi,for all her efforts,however, remained on a politicalleash whichlimited the range and freedomof her action.The PrimeMinister nevertheless now operatedfrom a positionof greatlyen- hancedstrength both as leaderof her party and, for the time at least,of the nation. The splitin theCongress was mirroredin thecontradictions and confusion ofthe parties in theopposition, but theprospects for a generalpolarization in Indianpolitics are unlikely,for both on theleft and on the right,there are deep divisionsin ideology,temperament, and social base. The Prime Minister,to maintainsupport and to ready herselffor forthcomingelec- tions,will have to effectivelyimplement the Congresseconomic program. Slogansand rhetoricwill no longersuffice. The Governmentwill inevitably be drawnfurther to the left,both to fulfillits own self-imageand to meet thepressure from its new allies amongthe opposition.The confidencethe PrimeMinister now commandswill be strainedincreasingly, however, as each of the groupssustaining her survivaldemand a greaterrole in the Government.Although now with a substantialmajority, the Prime Minister is vulnerableto politicalblackmail, as any one of theelements can threaten to withdrawsupport and potentiallydefeat the Government.Mrs. Gandhi can onlygo so farwithout losing the base of supportwithin her ownparty. At a pointwhere the Prime Ministeris unable or unwillingto yield to outsidepressure, she mightthen dissolve the Lok Sabha, and in parliamen- tarymid-term elections seek a mandatefrom the people in the formof an absolutemajority in her own right.In orderto gain controlof the Con- gressorganization in the states,or to establishalternative structure where necessary,Mrs. Gandhiwill likelypostpone elections as long as possible, perhapsuntil the general elections of 1972. She nowrides a crestof popular support,however, and would be at a tacticaladvantage in holdingparliamen- taryelections separately from the generalelections, where the contestsfor thestate assemblies would challenge the Prime Minister's search for a stable Congressmajority at theCenter with distracting local issues. The instabilityand patternof defections which have characterizedpolitics at thestate level since 1967 mightwell rise to the top. In the formof the FrenchFourth Republic, political immobilisme might shift responsibility of governmentfrom popularly-elected representatives to bureaucraticcivil servants.Presidential intervention becomes a seriouspossibility at theCenter and theposition of themilitary more critical. The eventsof 1969 open a new era in Indian politics.The fragileunity of the Congressis broken, but unlessshort-term stability itself becomes the highestvalue, the unity of a partyin inactionand in sustenanceof thevested interests of the status

This content downloaded from 128.83.205.78 on Tue, 28 Jul 2015 19:24:04 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 262 THE CONGRESS IN INDIA quo is unlikelyto yieldpopular support. Tle systemof one-partydominance in India has cometo an end,and if thepolitical horizon affords a prospect of unstablecoalition government, both in the statesand at the Center,it bringswith this threat also the possibilityof governmentmore genuinely responsiveto thepeople.

ROBERT L. HARDGRAVE,JR. is an AssociateProfessor of Governmentat theUni- versityof Texas at Austin.

This content downloaded from 128.83.205.78 on Tue, 28 Jul 2015 19:24:04 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions