India's Relations with Russia : 1992-2002 Political
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
INDIA'S RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA : 1992-2002 ABSTRACT THESIS . SUBMITTED FOR THE AWARD GREE OF irfar of 3fflliliJ!50pl{g O POLITICAL SCIENCE I u Mi^ BY BDUL AZEEM Under the Supervision of Prof. Ms. Iqbal Khanam DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE ^^^ ^ ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY ALIGARH (INDIA) 2006 ABSTRACT India's friendly stance towards the USSR has greatly been exaggerated, misunderstood and misinterpreted in India and abroad. An examination of the subject appeared necessary in order to explain the nature, extent, direction and implications of India's relations with the USSR. An attempt has been made here to analyze India's policy towards the USSR and place it in proper perspective. The ever growing friendly relations between the two neighbours are the result of many factors such as the complementarily of their national interests and the constantly changing national and international situations. The Soviet Union's huge size, its vast potentialities and the geo-political situation compelled Indian leaders, Jawaharlal Nehru in particular, to realize, even before India attained independence, the need to develop close and friendly relations with the Soviet Union. India's attitude towards the USSR has been derived from its overall foreign policy objectives. In understanding and evaluating this attitude, it is therefore, indispensable to keep in view two important considerations: first, the assumptions, motivations, style, basic goals and the principles of India's foreign policy which governed her relations with other States in general; second, the specific goals which India sought to achieve in her relations with the USSR. It is the inter-relationship between the general and the particular objectives and the degree of their combination as well as contradiction that give us an idea of the various phases of India's relations with the USSR. Such an analysis, however, should not be restricted merely to the conceptual level. The interaction of such other factors as intimate geographical, historical and economic ties between the two States, the influence of external factors and the failure or success of Indian diplomacy at the international level should also constitute a part of the analysis. 1 The news of the Russian Revolution made an impact on India. It became a source of inspiration to the people in their struggle for freedom. They realised that the effects of the October Revolution would not be confined to Russia. Since the revolution was "against imperialism it might somehow help the movement for Indian independence which, with Mahatma Gandhi's advent on the Indian scene, was taking a new turn." As pointed out in Montague Chelmsford Report: The JRevoJutJon in Russia in its beginning was regarded in India as a triumph over despotism ... it has given an impetus to Indian political aspirations. The Indian press as well as the political leaders generally showed a lively interest in the October Revolution and the new state. It would not be out of place here to refer to the comments in some of the leading newspapers and periodicals, particularly those associated with the nationalist movement. The impact of the Russian Revolution on Indian nationalist intellectuals was sensitively reflected in the attitude of Jawaharlal Nehru. As a matter of fact, Nehru's thinking was the most important factor in bringing about a transformation in the Indian nationalist attitude towards the USSR. Nehru held a prominent position in the Indian National Congress. He exhibited lively academic interest in the scientific outlook of Marxism as an interpretation of history. Moreover, it is worth pointing out that his attraction for Marxism was confined to its broad features rather than to its fine points. At no time he could be termed a doctrinaire Marxist. His intellect was too independent to be subjected to the rigid discipline of any dogma. Gandhi's influence reinforced his dislike for violence. The shift in Soviet policy came soon after Stalin's death, almost as soon as Malenkov came to power the Soviet ceased being hostile to India. In a speech to Supreme Soviet on 8 August 1953, Malenkov said: 'The position of sucfi a considerabfe state as India is of great importance for strengthening of peace in the East'. Recognizing India's role in ending the Korean War, he said. "We hope that relatioP^ between India and Soviet Union would continue to develop and strengthen with friendly co-operation as their keynote". The USSR prop^^^^ India's name for a Neutral Nation's Commission to supervise the ceasefirP i^ Indo-China. Form 1954 onwards the USSR also worked for the inclusiO'^ °f India in all international forums on disarmament. For instance it callec^ ^^ ^^^^ ^^^ ^^^ addition of the Communist China, Czechoslovakia and Irt^'^ ^^ ^^^ UN's Disarmament Commission. The Soviet reapP'"'''^''*' of India's role in world affairs coincided with the increase in Indo-AmeH^^ differences. Deep, abiding frictions arose between India and the United States on issues such as recognition of Red China, the Japanese Peace TreatV' the Kashmir dispute and the formation of military alliances in South East Asia by the United States of America. The signing ^^ Pakistan-US military pact in May 1954 marked a watershed in Indo-So^iet relations. India's reaction to the alliance was sharp. Indian leaders and pre^s bitterly criticized the agreement. Nehru who had tried to prevent the Asian i^ountries from being dragged in the cold war expressed deep concern. Accor^^'^'g to Indian leaders the US military assistance to Pakistan would chan^^ the entire regional balance of power and Pakistan would be inflated out ^f all proportions to her size. Nevertheless despite his outspoken opposition to the US- Pakistan Pact and later on to the S^^^^^ Nehru did not publicly mention the acclaim his stand was receiving f(^^ the Russians. The praise of Communist nations was probably embarrassing to him as it nurtured a belief in the West that India was moving towards an a^^^^Pt^nce of the Communist bloc line in world affairs. Nehru wanted a mod^s vivendi with the Communist world but not at the expense of rapidly wofsening relations with the West. It is worth noting that shortly after the Geneva Conference Indo-Soviet contacts increased markedly. India accepted the Soviet offer of assistance for her Second Five Year Plan. It may be inferred that Nehru attached considerable significance to the Soviet behaviour at Geneva. The atmosphere between New Delhi and Moscow began to clear rapidly after the negotiated settlement on Indo-China at the Geneva Conference. In September 1954, the Soviet Union made an unexpected and dramatic offer to build a giant steel plant in India to help and to develop its iron and steel industry. Nehru welcomed the Soviet offer and indicated India's readiness to accept the Soviet aid because Soviet help would "go a long way in the rapid industrialization of our country". He also regarded the Soviet offer as a welcome alternative source for the supply of capital and machinery and also a bargaining counter to the West. On 2nd February 1955 the USSR and India signed an economic agreement providing the Soviet assistance for the construction of a giant steel mill at Bhilai. The agreement came at a time when a negotiation with Britain for another steel plant was bogged down on technical grounds. In mid-1959 border clashes took place between India and China. After maintaining a long silence on the Sino-Indian dispute, the Soviet Union came out with a cryptic statement on 8th September, 1959 in the TASS. The USSR had friendly relations with both China and India, built respectively on "fraternal ties" of international socialism and 'friendly' collaboration in accordance with the idea of peaceful co-existence. It expressed the hope that India and China with both of whom the Soviet Union enjoyed friendly relations would settle their disputes peaceably. In the following month, the third session of the Supreme Soviet while regretting the incidents between the two states friendly to it called for friendly negotiations for Solving the disputed frontier question. A week later, Khrushchev termed the entire dispute 'sad' and JBBSIt 'stupid' in as much as the area under contention had no strategic importance, nor was it even inhabitable. In September 1961, Nehru had paid another visit to Moscow. The Belgrade Conference of nonaligned states had entrusted the task of conveying the concern of nonaligned world to Nkrumah and Nehru, who was, in fact, to visit the USSR on his way back which was fixed earlier. The public enthusiasm for the Indian Prime Minister in Moscow did not match with that of his 1955 visit. It confined chiefly to recalling previous meetings with Nehru. But he preferred to Icll Khrushchev that in the world in those chiys many new important problems have come up and he would be glad to discuss them with Khrushchev. In Moscow Nehru repeatedly stressed India's past and present opposition to nuclear experiments. He frankly told Khrushchev that the resumption of nuclear testing retarded disarmament talks and aggravated the international situation. In his major speech, Nehru told his audience at the Indo- Soviet friendship rally what had happened at Belgrade and why he came to Moscow which was withheld from them by the Soviet media. The Soviet support to India's claims on Goa had been made public from the very outset. During their 1955 visit, the Soviet leaders had expressed the hope that Goa would soon become a part of India. The Soviet President Brezhnev, who was on a state visit to India at the time of Goa operation declared in Bombay that the Soviet Union had complete sympathy for the Indian people's desire to liberate Goa, Daman and Diu from Portuguese colonialism.