University of Kentucky UKnowledge Theses and Dissertations--Philosophy Philosophy 2016 Becoming What We Are: Virtue and Practical Wisdom as Natural Ends Keith Buhler University of Kentucky, [email protected] Author ORCID Identifier: http://orcid.org/0000-0002-9495-6550 Digital Object Identifier: https://doi.org/10.13023/ETD.2016.502 Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits ou.y Recommended Citation Buhler, Keith, "Becoming What We Are: Virtue and Practical Wisdom as Natural Ends" (2016). Theses and Dissertations--Philosophy. 13. https://uknowledge.uky.edu/philosophy_etds/13 This Doctoral Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Philosophy at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations--Philosophy by an authorized administrator of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact [email protected]. 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Keith Buhler, Student Dr. David Bradshaw, Major Professor Dr. Clare Batty, Director of Graduate Studies BECOMING WHAT WE ARE: VIRTUE AND PRACTICAL WISDOM AS NATURAL ENDS DISSERTATION A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the College of Arts and Sciences at the University of Kentucky By Keith Buhler Director: Dr. David Bradshaw, Professor of Philosophy Lexington Kentucky Copyright © Keith Buhler 2016 ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION BECOMING WHAT WE ARE: VIRTUE AND PRACTICAL WISDOM AS NATURAL ENDS This dissertation is about ethical naturalism. Philippa Foot and John McDowell both defend contemporary neo-Aristotelian ethics but each represents a rival expression of the same. They are united in the affirmation that virtue is ‘natural goodness’ for human beings; they are divided in their rival conceptions of ‘nature.’ McDowell distinguishes second nature or the ”space of reasons” from first nature or the “realm of law.” Foot rejects this division. On Foot’s naturalism, natural goodness is a just as much a feature of first nature as health is, even though human practical reasoning is unique in the biological world. I defend Foot’s view by appealing to “generic propositions,” a little-utilized feature of linguistic theory. Life forms and functions described in generic statements are intrinsically normative and yet just as scientifically respectable as other naturalistic concepts. Hence, the generic proposition that ”humans are practical, rational primates” has both descriptive and normative content. It follows that the ethical and rational norms defining a good human life are a subset of natural norms which can be known as such from an “external” scientific point of view as well as from an “internal” ethical point of view. Going beyond Foot’s views, I present a new interlocking neo-Aristotelian account of virtue and practical reason. Virtues are excellences of practical reasoning and rational practice. Virtues enable and partly constitute a good life for human beings. Practical reasoning is the ability to pursue perceived goods and avoid perceived evils in every action. Practical wisdom, which is excellence in practical reasoning, is the master virtue that enables one to succeed in becoming truly human, despite varying abilities and life circumstances. In short, all of us ought to pursue virtue and practical wisdom because of what we are; virtue and practical wisdom are natural ends. I aim to secure the naturalistic credentials of my view by examining three influential con- ceptions of ‘nature,’ criticizing McDowell’s conception and showing how my view is consistent with the remaining two. The resulting view is called ’recursive naturalism’ because nature recurs within nature when natural beings reason about nature, about themselves, and about their own reasoning. KEYWORDS: ethical naturalism, neo-Aristotelianism, virtue, practical wisdom, natural law, natural ends Keith Buhler December 4, 2016 BECOMING WHAT WE ARE: VIRTUE AND PRACTICAL WISDOM AS NATURAL ENDS By Keith Buhler Dr. David Bradshaw Dissertation Director Dr. Clare Batty Director of Graduate Studies December 4, 2016 For Lindsay Elizabeth. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I am sincerely grateful to Dr. David Bradshaw for being my advisor on this project. He was not only a professor but a model of virtue and practical wisdom. I am also grateful for the early encouragement of friends and family members such as Kristi Buhler, who first taught me to dream big, and John Mark Reynolds, who first told me I was a philosopher. Alfred Geier, whom students have characterized as ”Zeus in human form,” mentored me in philosophical dialogue, while Gary Hartenburg’s invaluable feedback helped me transition into graduate school. Timothy Sundell first pushed me toward serious research in metaethics, and Anita Superson helped with early and tough criticism of my project. I am especially grateful to Stefan Bird-Pollan and Dan Breazeale for saving the day and serving on my committee last minute. Once I began writing in earnest, Lindsay Buh- ler was the first to read and edit each chapter. Even before a chapter was written, she played the role of Socratic midwife, testing each new idea to see if it was viable or only a ”wind egg.” Michael Garten was the last to read and edit each chapter, providing incisive objections I can only hope I have adequately overcome. Great strides in the construction of this dissertation would have been impossible without the very practical help of a few others: Dan Sheffler trained me, like his father trained him, in the ways of formatting in Markdown and LaTeX. Also, the University of Kentucky Graduate School hosted a writing boot camp to help folks like me to write intensively for two weeks. Eric Peterson was not only a fellow companion in graduate school but a friend and source of encour- agement. Finally, the United Way of the Blue Grass generously donated tuition dollars, books, and the laptop computer on which I wrote this dissertation. These people, and more whom I forgot to name, helped bring this project to fruition. My late father, Dr. Rich Buhler, received two honorary doctorates for his work in radio. I recently found out that he told others (when I had just started college) that he suspected I would be his first child to receive an earned doctorate. I was happy to learn this; I am even happier now to justify his suspicion. Table of Contents 1.1 Nature and Ethics ................................... 1 1.2 Neo-Aristotelian Ethical Naturalism ......................... 4 1.3 On Natural Goodness and Virtue Ethics ....................... 7 1.4 Organic and Social Naturalism ............................ 9 1.5 The Argument .................................... 13 1.6 Chapter Outline .................................... 14 1.7 A Word About Method ................................ 15 2.1 Two Challenges .................................... 18 2.2 Generic Truths, Natural Norms ........................... 20 2.3 Three Paths Forward ................................. 34 2.4 Against Reductionism ................................. 37 2.5 Conclusion ...................................... 45 3.1 Animals of a Peculiar Sort .............................. 47 3.2 Objections ....................................... 54 3.2.1 No Organic Natures ............................. 59 3.2.2 No Natural Teleology ............................. 60 3.2.3 Only Biological Nature ............................ 62 3.2.4 Responses ................................... 63 3.2.5 Knowing from Inside or Not Knowing At All ................ 66 3.3 Natural Norms, Human Norms ........................... 67 3.4 Conclusion ...................................... 75 4.1 Virtue as Natural Goodness .............................. 77 4.2 Excellent and Corrective Traits ............................ 84 4.3 Acquirable ....................................... 90 4.4 Rational and Practical ................................ 97 4.5 Traditional and Social ................................ 103 4.6 Conclusion ...................................... 110 vi 5.1 Virtue as Practical