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UC Berkeley UC Berkeley Electronic Theses and Dissertations Title Intention and Normative Belief Permalink https://escholarship.org/uc/item/8725w3wp Author Chislenko, Eugene Publication Date 2016 Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library University of California Intention and Normative Belief By Eugene Chislenko A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley Committee in Charge: Professor Hannah Ginsborg, Co-Chair Professor R. Jay Wallace, Co-Chair Professor Hubert Dreyfus Professor Tania Lombrozo Spring 2016 Copyright by Eugene Chislenko 2016 Abstract Intention and Normative Belief by Eugene Chislenko Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy University of California, Berkeley Professor Hannah Ginsborg and Professor R. Jay Wallace, Co-Chairs People can be malicious, perverse, compulsive, self-destructive, indifferent, or in conflict with their own better judgment. This much is obvious—but on many traditional views, it seems puzzling or even impossible. Many philosophers, from Plato and Aristotle to Kant, Davidson, and others, have thought that we act only “under the guise of the good,” doing only what we see as good, or best, or what we ought to do. These “guise-of-the-good” views offered a way to make sense of the attribution and explanation of action, while maintaining a generous view of human nature as essentially pursuing the good. But are they not hopelessly narrow and naïve? It seems clear that we often do what we do not see as good, and even what we see as bad. The classical view seems to paint an impoverished picture of human life, leaving out widespread and important forms of activity. It now seems natural to give up on such a view, and to look for a more viable alternative. In this dissertation I argue that, far from being narrow and naïve, even an ambitious “guise-of-the-good” view can offer a compelling picture of action in all its variety. In Chapter 1 I introduce the appeal, variety, and difficulties of such views, and suggest a strategy for investigating them: start with a simple, ambitious “guise-of-the-good” view, and see why and in what ways it must be weakened. The ambitious view I begin with is the view that intentions are themselves normative beliefs—that my intention to go to the store is a belief that I ought to go. I call this view the Identity View. In the rest of the dissertation, I argue that it does not need to be weakened at all. The Identity View can address a range of apparently powerful counterexamples and theoretical challenges, while offering a compelling conception of the nature and the details of our intentions. A central kind of counterexample is action and intention in which we intend to do what we believe we should not do: eat dessert, for example, or insult a friend. Such ‘akratic’ action seems widespread, and difficult to account for on a guise-of-the-good view. The Identity View has an added consequence: if intentions are themselves normative beliefs, it seems we will also have beliefs we believe we should not have. Akratic beliefs can seem especially difficult to describe convincingly, partly since, according to many people, they are not even possible. I 1 consider these beliefs in Chapters 2 and 3. The first of these chapters argues that the leading arguments against the possibility of akratic belief assume what they purport to show, and are derivative expressions of an underlying puzzlement about how belief can be akratic. The second addresses the puzzlement directly, by offering a conception of akratic belief, together with a range of examples of it. I argue that the marks by which we normally attribute belief—marks such as responsiveness to evidence, felt conviction, recall in relevant circumstances, reporting to others, and use in further reasoning—can be recognized, with some complications, in akratic cases as well. Chapter 4 turns to akratic action and intention. Here, it is widely accepted that akratic cases are possible, but this possibility itself seems inconsistent with views like the Identity View, on which we can only intend what we do believe we ought to do. But the implication of the Identity View is not that we cannot intend to do what we believe we ought not do. Instead, the implication is that, when we intend to do what we believe we ought not do, we must also believe that we ought to do it. I argue that akratic actions can be understood as cases of conflicting normative beliefs, in which we act on one belief while still holding the other, often more strongly or reflectively. These cases are, at the same time, cases of conflicting intentions. In the second half of the chapter, I defend the attribution of this much conflict in akratic cases. An account of akratic belief and action is only the first step toward a defense of a guise- of-the-good view. The full range of troubling cases is much broader. We sometimes seem to act intentionally without having any belief about whether we ought to take the alternative we intend to take. At other times, it seems, we can believe we ought to do something—get out of bed, or donate to charity—and have no intention to do it. In these cases, either the intention or the corresponding belief seems entirely absent, rather than in conflict. In Chapters 5 and 6, I offer a response to these other counterexamples. The first, an apparent lack of normative belief, arises in cases of indifference, like that of Buridan’s Ass, and in cases of apparently incommensurable or incomparable values. I argue in Chapter 5 that, even when we see no reason to favor one particular alternative over others, we can decide to act nonintentionally—to “just pick” an alternative and take it. We can believe we ought to act nonintentionally, and such a belief can account for our intentions in such cases. Drawing on empirical studies in psychology, I argue in Chapter 6 that the second kind of case, known as accidie, is best understood through an analogy to fatigue, in which an intention is in fact present but hindered by a psychological obstacle. Typical cases of this kind are ones in which we fail to act on an intention, rather than failing to intend to do something. Although it can be stated in one short sentence, the Identity View is the heart of a general theory of intention. It offers a way of understanding what intention is: an intention is a particular kind of belief. Chapter 7 begins to develop that theory, considering a set of more general issues about the nature of intention and belief. By addressing a series of apparent disanalogies between intention and belief with respect to ‘direction of fit’, voluntary control, and reasoning, I try to spell out what thinking of intention as normative belief entails, and why the view is believable. Together, these chapters offer a systematic defense of the classical thought that human motivation has an essential evaluative element. Even when confused, conflicted, or exhausted, we intend to act as we believe we should. 2 Preface Moral philosophy is an escape from dogmatism. It does not just insist that we be kind, eat healthy, and save lives if we can. It asks why we should do any of the things that have been thought to be good or right. To do moral philosophy is, partly, to ask whether and how it can answer the questions it is meant to address. Reflecting about moral questions usually turns at some point to reflecting about human nature. Plato’s consideration of justice brought him to think about the nature and parts of the soul. Aristotle’s inquiry into the characteristics of a good life led him to think about the characteristic activity of human beings. Hume and Kant took on a systematic investigation of willing, reasoning, and desire as part of their moral theory. Moral philosophy incorporates moral psychology, and helps make it interesting. These two kinds of reflection are related. One way to ask whether and how moral questions can be answered is to look for a source of value, goodness, or obligation in the nature of thought or action. The hope is that an adequate moral psychology can lead to an adequate moral philosophy, by helping to show which answers to moral questions are legitimate, and why. We can call an attempt to reach a conclusion about how one should act from a view about the nature of action or thought a “foundational argument” in moral philosophy. Foundational arguments are not new. Kant argued that “A free will and a will under moral laws are one and the same”(1997, 4:447)—that to govern oneself is to be governed by morality. As Korsgaard (2009, 32) puts it: “The laws of logic govern our thoughts because if we don’t follow them we just aren’t thinking…The laws of practical reason govern our actions because if we don’t follow them we just aren’t acting, and acting is something that we must do.” For Kant and Korsgaard, particular laws, or principles, have an inescapable claim on us. If we ask why we must follow them, there is a compelling answer. We must follow these principles, because that is what it is to act. There is widespread skepticism about the prospects of foundational arguments. The notion of action, or of thought, can seem not clear enough, or not restrictive enough, for action or thought to have any interesting basic features.