AN ARCHITECTURE FOR BUILDING AN ARCHITECTURE FOR BUILDING PEACE AT THE LOCAL LEVEL: PEACE AT THE LOCAL LEVEL: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LOCAL PEACE COMMITTEES A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LOCAL PEACE COMMITTEES A Discussion Paper By Andries Odendaal AN ARCHITECTURE FOR BUILDING PEACE AT THE LOCAL LEVEL: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LOCAL PEACE COMMITTEES
A Discussion Paper By Andries Odendaal December 2010 This study was commissioned by the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The UNDP gratefully acknowledges specific project support from the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) Washington DC, USA, including access to its human and other resources. The views expressed in this study are the author’s and not the positions of the UNDP or the USIP.
Acknowledgements: Sincere thanks for substantive contributions go to: Ginny Bouvier; Timothy Sisk, Devin Finn (Nicaraguan case study author); Philip Visser (Nepal case study co-author), Laro Gonzales Canoura, Ljupco Gjorgjinski, Aisling Lyon, Clever Nyathi, Anita Ernstorfer, Magnus Ohman, Silva Pesic, Bishnu Sapkota, Chris Spies, Samuel Rizk, Gregory Connor. CONTENTS
Executive summary...... 5
Introduction...... 9
Local peacebuilding: Assumptions and considerations...... 10
Local peace committees: Concept clarification...... 14
Formal and informal local peace committees (LPCs)...... 15
Research methodology...... 16
Impact of local peace committees...... 17
Structure and methodology of LPCs: Towards tentative guidelines...... 20
1. The double-edged sword of a national mandate: Between political control and local ownership...... 20
2. The composition of local peace committees...... 29
3. The problem of ‘teeth’: A viable methodology for local peace committees...... 32
4. Relationship with local government...... 35
Recommendations to the UN system...... 36
Appendix 1: Case studies...... 39
Case Study 1: Nicaragua...... 39
Case Study 2: South Africa...... 48
Case Study 3: Kenya...... 56
Case Study 4: Northern Ireland...... 60
Case Study 5: FYR Macedonia...... 70
Case Study 6: Ghana...... 77
Case Study 7: Nepal...... 80
Case Study 8: Sierra Leone...... 89
References...... 97
GLOSSARY
AED Academy for Educational NTTP Nepal Transition to Peace Initiative Development OAS Organization of American States ANC African National Congress OAU Organisation of African Unity CDI Community Development Institute OECD Organisation for Economic Co- CSP Center for Systemic Peace operation and Development CEPAD Evangelical Council of Churches OFA Ohrid Framework Agreement CIAV International Support and OSCE Organization for Security and Co- Verification Commission operation in Europe CICR Committee for Inter-Community PPRC Political parties registration Relations commission DMC District Code of Conduct Monitoring PSNI Police Service of Northern Ireland Committee RPC Regional peace committee DPPB District Policing Partnership Board RUC Royal Ulster Constabulary DUP Democratic Unionist Party RUF Revolutionary United Front EU European Union ToR Terms of reference FYR Former Yugoslav Republic TRC Truth and reconciliation commission GTZ Gesellschaft fur Technische SDLP Social Democratic and Labour Party Zusammenarbeit UML United Marxist-Leninist IFES International Foundation for Electoral Systems UNDP United Nations Development Programme LPC Local peace committee UNIOSIL United Nations Integrated Office in MoPR Ministry of Peace and Sierra Leone Reconstruction USIP United States Institute of Peace MPLC Multi-party liaison committee USAID United States Agency for NEC National electoral commission International Development NGO Nongovernmental organization WANEP West Africa Network for NPA National Peace Accord Peacebuilding NPS National peace secretariat ZELS Association of the Units of Local Self Government NSC National steering committee
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This discussion paper at hand aims to:
• ensuring that UN staff who support LPCs have a high degree of technical expertise in conflict transformation;
• undertaking thorough analysis to determine if suitable conditions exist to establish LPCs;
• conducting further research to explore the possible role of LPCs in helping support local governance and decentralization;
• working directly with LPCs and national peace architectures by: i) providing institutional support to national bodies that have the task of implementing LPCs; ii) providing technical support through creating peace and development advisor positions, offering training events and providing in-service training support; iii) requiring that election monitoring missions cooperate with LPCs; iv) providing bridging finance to establish a peace architecture; v) explaining the usefulness of LPCs to relevant national audiences through conferences, seminars, consultations and information-sharing events across countries and regions; vi) stimulating deeper knowledge about LPCs by commissioning research on their various features, particularly their relevance to local development and governance.
INTRODUCTION
A man was shot dead because he got into a Macedonia, Kenya, Nepal, Sierra Leone and fight with a shopkeeper over change for a packet Serbia, as well as in Northern Ireland. The UN of cigarettes. This was a fairly un-noteworthy system has been involved in various supportive incident in South Africa in the summer of 1994, roles in some of these countries, and is at a time when the country was in the throes considering involvement in others. It is too early of giving birth to a new constitution. Both the to arrive at definitive international standards on shopkeeper and his customer lived in one of implementing these structures, but there is a the country’s many shantytowns, and both were sufficient body of experience to point to some well-connected to two opposing factions that tentative guidelines – the goal of this study. had split the township in two. The two factions pledged allegiance to the same dominant The study starts by briefly discussing the liberation movement, but an intense leadership basic theoretical assumptions that are the struggle for local control was underway. This basis of local peacebuilding, and by clarifying meant that the killing assumed local political the concept local peace committees. This overtones. The township was tense, with is followed by a systematic classification of everyone anticipating revenge at the funeral LPCs and a description of research methods. since violence often broke out at these times. Subsequent sections assess the impact of The police were perceived as ‘the enemy’ for local peace committees and identify tentative their role in enforcing apartheid, so local people methodological guidelines. The study concludes did not trust they would successfully deal with with recommendations for the UN system. the situation. The study aims to contribute to the wider discussion on local peace mechanisms and, based on practical Instead, the local peace committee established findings, attempts to increase knowledge of what works under the country’s National Peace Accord and what does not in local peace mechanism activi- (NPA), sprang into action. Meetings throughout ties. the week involved political, religious and social organizations. There was some tough and angry talk, but eventually all participants agreed on one goal – the funeral had to be peaceful, as indeed it was.1 The local peace committee had managed to defuse a potentially violent incident. It might also claim credit for having prevented a vicious
cycle of revenge attacks. UN Photo/Christo p her H erwig This study explores these local peace mechanisms and particularly focuses on structures established as part of a larger peace architecture. In 1997, Lederach2 noted two countries where regional and local peace commissions made effective contributions to peace: Nicaragua in the late 1980s, and South Africa in the early 1990s. Subsequently, similar local peace building mechanisms have been used in several situations as diverse as FYR
AN ARCHITECTURE FOR BUILDING PEACE AT THE LOCAL LEVEL: 2 A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LOCAL PEACE COMMITTEES LOCAL PEACEBUILDING: ASSUMPTIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS
This study fits within the context of two larger the legitimacy of democratic state discussions. The first is the growing body of institutions, and improving their capacity literature on peacebuilding; specifically, the role or effectiveness to perform their duties.6, of peace architectures. The second discussion 5 There are large overlaps – conceptually focuses on the importance of the local (i.e. and practically – in building peace in post- sub-national) dimension of peacebuilding. In conflict conditions and preventing violence other words, it deals with the effectiveness and in states that are fragile. importance of peacebuilding from below. • Peacebuilding is a multi-faceted and complex process. In their summary of the Peacebuilding and peace ‘revision of thinking’ on peacebuilding architectures: Assumptions during the past decade, Ramsbotham et al7 identified some emerging insights: This section will not extensively describe theoretical developments since former United i) The barriers to constructive intervention Nations Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros- are more formidable than previously Ghali3 popularized the concept of peacebuilding assumed. Embedded cultures and in 1992. Instead, it will summarize some of the economies of violence do not easily main relevant guiding theoretical assumptions of lend themselves to simple one- the study. dimensional interventions (such as mediation of elite ‘pacts’). • Peacebuilding is understood “...to refer to ii) Formal agreements need to be based those initiatives which foster and support on understandings, structures and sustainable structures and processes which long-term development frameworks that strengthen the prospects for peaceful will diminish cultures of violence and coexistence and decrease the likelihood of sustain peace processes on the ground. the outbreak, reoccurrence, or continuation iii) Local participants, the nongovernmental of violent conflict.”4 sector and links to local knowledge and wisdom are all significant. Sustainable • It is no coincidence that peacebuilding citizen-based peacebuilding initiatives is a post-Cold War concept. From 1945, should be enhanced, and participatory states were hastily established on very public political opportunities need to be superficial foundations during the post- made available. World War II decolonization drive. The world’s superpowers then propped them • The concepts of ownership and capacity up during the Cold War era. These actions are particularly relevant to implementing provide the main explanation of intra-state peacebuilding. According to Bush4, violent conflict. State fragility and warfare “peacebuilding is not about the imposition are closely connected,5 and imply that of solutions, it is about the creation of peacebuilding and state-building are twin opportunities. The challenge is to identify concepts. In most violent conflict locations and nurture the political, economic, and today, peacebuilding entails strengthening social space within which indigenous
3 participants can identify, develop, and neighbor and sometimes family member employ the resources necessary to build fears family member, and where each sheds a peaceful, prosperous, and just society.” blood – makes the emotive, perceptual, In other words, peacebuilding will succeed social-psychological, and spiritual if citizens of the affected society assume dimensions core, not peripheral concerns.” responsibility for implementing peace Therefore, transforming relationships is a (‘ownership’). Similarly, they need to be central peacebuilding objective willing to sustain the peacebuilding process by relying on local resources, both human and financial (‘capacity’). Peacebuilding from below: • The understanding that peacebuilding Some considerations requires sustained and deeply It is important to recognize that the concept transformative work has contributed of peacebuilding from below is not universally to the development of the concept of accepted. On the one hand, the peacebuilding ‘peace architectures’; alternatively called literature increasingly recognizes the importance ‘infrastructures for peace’. The concept of working at the local community level when was introduced by Lederach2 when he attempting peacebuilding. On the other hand, proposed his ‘modest thesis’ in 1997. He the idea of peacebuilding from below competes stated that the nature and characteristics with an understanding of reality where political of contemporary conflict “…suggested the elites and state representatives govern the need for a set of concepts and approaches behaviour of a conflict. This ‘elite’ approach to that go beyond traditional statist diplomacy. peacebuilding assumes that national political Building peace in today’s conflicts called for and ethnic ‘entrepreneurs’ alone determine the use and extent of violence. This theory implies long-term commitment to establishing an that local communities are passive recipients, infrastructure across the levels of a society, and victims of violence carried out by political an infrastructure that would empower the elites. It also is based on the idea that local resources for reconciliation from within that participants deserve to be only objects of society and maximize the contribution from humanitarian relief instead of active ‘architects’ outside.” His model called for structural of building their own peace. transformation within an extended and realistic timeframe. Lederach stated that The following summarized assumptions form infrastructure did not mean a rigid centrally- the basis of this study: controlled system. Instead, it referred to • There is not necessarily a contradiction a functional network that – like a spider’s between the roles of participants at various web – would cross the divisions and levels levels of global, regional, national and sub- of society and beyond, ensuring the best national conflict systems. Ramsbotham possible collaboration and coordination. et al7 have argued for a multi-layered • Meanwhile, there is a growing approach to peacebuilding in both analysing acknowledgement of what Nathan8 called conflicts and when implementing policies the ‘psycho-political’ dimensions of conflict. to resolve them. In fact, few people Lederach2 expanded on this issue in 1997, support an approach exclusively limited stating that “…although enormous pain to peacebuilding from below, as deep and deep-rooted animosity accompany any structural causes of violence will not be war, the nature of contemporary settings addressed through local peacebuilding of armed conflict – where neighbor fears alone. For example, in South Africa no
AN ARCHITECTURE FOR BUILDING PEACE AT THE LOCAL LEVEL: 4 A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LOCAL PEACE COMMITTEES Ar a bell Ce c il
amount of local peacebuilding would eventually demonstrate a return. In fact, this have produced a new democratic and just seems to be the dominant rationale for local constitution. This could only be negotiated peacebuilding projects. However, Anderson by national leaders. says evidence gathered when peacebuilding organizations analyse their efforts (‘reflecting • There are problems with local peacebuilding on peace practice’) suggests that “many because it is difficult to provide convincing good actions do not simply add up to proof that it can make an impact. On the peace.” She also reports two more key one hand, most donors have accepted findings. First, there must be a conscious there is value in local peacebuilding. In link between work at the local level and 2004, more than 4,000 NGOs from OECD broader socio-political developments. One countries were involved in overseas cannot assume that transformed individuals peacebuilding work, and another 20,000 or local communities will engage in relevant national NGOs outside of OECD countries processes of social transformation. Second, formed peacebuilding partnerships with strategies focusing on key people need to OECD NGOs. In addition, there were link to strategies to engage broader level countless community-based organizations participants in order to avoid working only 7 working on peacebuilding. Many of these with the local elite or groups of people who organizations had local peacebuilding do not have strategic relevance. This means objectives or believed their development that local peacebuilding projects must work had important peacebuilding demonstrate their strategic relevance to the implications. Donors that spent substantial larger peace process. Anderson’s findings amounts of money financing these projects have contributed to a significant and appear to have agreed. ongoing debate on the so-called peace and 10 • On the other hand, there is some room conflict impact assessment. The debate for skepticism. Anderson9 has concluded highlights the difficulty of achieving reliable that many people engage in peacebuilding impact assessments. activities because they assume they will
5 • Local and national conflict systems are both cooperated with civil society organizations interconnected and distinct. Consider the to make possible a conflict transformation following simple image: the earth and the process that used basic local peacebuilding moon circle the sun, and both are governed methods. Instead of seeking to put down by the same gravitational forces that the conflict by sending in security forces and determine their pathways around the sun. thereby inflaming the political atmosphere, The moon does not have its own separate a process was rather followed that engaged independent orbit. However, it does have local actors and used local peacebuilding its own trajectory around the earth due resources to defuse the conflict. This to its particular relationship with it. In this approach made a major contribution to the image, the moon represents local conflict reputation Ghana enjoys today as one of systems and the earth a national conflict Africa’s most stable democracies. system. Local conflict systems are invariably caused and driven by the same factors • A key learning point is that local participants that determine the national conflict system. actively take part in a conflict; they are not They are demonstrations of the same root mere victims. They both respond to and causes. Yet, local dynamics, participants manipulate the larger conflict according 11 and histories cause local conflict systems to to their own interests and needs. The develop a momentum of their own. In some Sierra Leone case study demonstrates this cases, achieving national peace is enough to dynamic and shows that tenacious local bring peace at a local level; in other cases, conflict systems have to be engaged on their it is not. In those situations, local conflict own merit through a process that respects systems must be dealt with in terms of their local participants and conditions. The own dynamics, not as automatic extensions Ghana example shows this engagement can of the national system. contribute positively to national stability.
• Ghana provides an example illustrating • The Ghana case also highlights the overlap in how local and national conflict systems are strategies needed to deal with post-conflict interconnected. The country has a history of and fragile state conditions. Ghana scored violent inter-community conflicts, especially 13 points (on a spectrum of 0-25) against the in the north. For example, between 1990 State Fragility Index 2009, as assessed by 5 and 2002 ethnic communities had 14 violent the Center for Systemic Peace. The score clashes. The 1994-95 Konkomba-Nanumba indicates that Ghana was not considered a conflict killed 5000 people. In 2002, a violent ‘seriously fragile’ state. This is despite the conflict broke out in the Dagomba Kingdom fact that in 2009 in its northern region both on the issue of succession to the throne. This state legitimacy and effectiveness were at conflict threatened national security since risk. Progress in the peaceful resolution the two main national political parties were of Ghana’s Dagbon conflict had a positive on opposing sides, and because an election impact on both post-violence and state was to be held in 2004. In March 2003, the fragility conditions in that area. The Kenyan Government declared a state of emergency. case study reveals similar dynamics. Based on these assumptions, the following • The Government had noted the distinct sections of this study examine ‘local peace methodology applied by civil society in committees’ as specific local peacebuilding previous conflicts and approached the tools. UNDP Country Office for help. UNDP
AN ARCHITECTURE FOR BUILDING PEACE AT THE LOCAL LEVEL: 6 A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LOCAL PEACE COMMITTEES LOCAL PEACE COMMITTEES: CONCEPT CLARIFICATION
‘Local peace committee’ (LPC) is an umbrella The definition of peace is a complex matter title. In practice, a variety of names are used based on deep ideological, philosophical and in addition to local peace committees: ‘district political concepts. LPCs with an overly idealistic peace advisory councils’, ‘district multi- understanding of peace may develop unrealistic party liaison committees’, ‘village peace and expectations. In practice, the meaning of peace development committees’, ‘committees for inter- derives from the specific nature and context of community relations’, and so on. a given conflict. Furthermore, peace parameters are usually defined by a national peace An LPC is an inclusive committee operating agreement or the country’s constitution. at sub-national level (a district, municipality, town or village). It includes the different For the purposes of this paper, it is enough community sections in conflict, and has to state that the peace sought by local peace the task of promoting peace within its own committees means ending the violence of the context. An LPC is appropriate in a situation past; preventing any occurrence or recurrence when the local community experiences, or is of violence; acknowledging that local patterns under threat of, violent or debilitating internal of exclusion and discrimination need to conflict. Generally speaking, an LPC includes be transformed, and with all participants all participants, emphasizes dialogue, promotes committing to collaborate and take action in that mutual understanding, builds trust and creates transformation to deal with the most threatening constructive problem-solving and joint action to and urgent problems facing the community. prevent violence. UN P HOTO /F RE D N O Y
7 FORMAL AND INFORMAL LOCAL PEACE COMMITTEES
There are two main categories of local peace This focus does not imply that informal LPCs committees. Some LPCs receive formal state are less worthy. They do have a track record recognition; they are established through a of achievement. For example, in Kenya, a national peace accord, legislation, or by a small group of women initiated an LPC in statutory body as part of its formal mandate. the Wajir district. It was so successful that Examples include: local peace committees in it was copied in other troubled districts and South Africa (established under the September ultimately recognized by the government. On 1991 terms of the National Peace Accord); the 23 May 2008, the Government passed the Committees on Inter-Community Relations in Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation Serbia (established under the terms of the Law Agreement, mediated by former UN on Local Self-Government of 2002, Art. 63); Secretary-General, Kofi Annan. It provided an and the District Code of Conduct Monitoring implementation schedule to establish LPCs Committees in Sierra Leone (established by in all districts of the country. Therefore, an the Political Parties Registration Commission informal LPC inspired the formalization of as part of its statutory mandate to mediate LPCs in Kenya. As previously noted, a similar disputes between political parties and to development took place in Ghana. promote pluralism). Other LPCs are informal: they are established by civil society participants and are not formally recognized by the state. There is evidence of widespread use of informal LPCs.12, 13 Their informal nature is UN P HOTO both a strength and a weakness. Informality means they are less indebted to political and government actors, and they are often composed of volunteers with a high level of personal interest in peace. Consequently, informal LPCs are often more committed and more creative than formal bodies. However, their weakness is that they sometimes lack the clout to engage with government and political leaders and are easily ignored by those who wield power. This study focuses primarily on formal LPCs since they are more closely associated with the mandate of the UN system to work primarily (though not exclusively) with government and state institutions. Furthermore, focusing on formal LPCs allows the study to examine the interface between local peacebuilding and formal national peace processes, and to view LPCs as a formal aspect of wider peace architectures.
AN ARCHITECTURE FOR BUILDING PEACE AT THE LOCAL LEVEL: 8 A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LOCAL PEACE COMMITTEES
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The study is based on the following experiences: the interviews were conducted in line with the FYR Macedonia, Ghana, Indonesia (Aceh), author’s specific tasks at the time, rather than Kenya, Malawi, Nepal, Nicaragua, Northern structured by the current research objectives. Ireland, Serbia, Sierra Leone, South Africa and Uganda (Karamoja). Case studies have been It is important to note that in relation to this developed for the following (in chronological study, no specific field research has been order): Nicaragua, South Africa, Kenya, Northern done and no comparative quantitative data Ireland, FYR Macedonia, Ghana, Nepal and is available. Furthermore, processes in these Sierra Leone. countries are at various implementation stages, from complete (South Africa) to others still The study has relied on available documentation being planned (Uganda and Ghana). Therefore, such as published literature, unpublished reports the sections that follow are an interpretation and articles in the press. However, there is little of available evidence with further field-based independent LPC research and documentation, research required. and differing amounts of research are available within each country. Therefore, additional The documented case studies provide the information comes from the author’s personal primary information evidence basis of this knowledge of the contexts in Ghana, FYR study. The following sections will offer a brief Macedonia, Malawi, Nepal, Sierra Leone, South discussion of the more thorough case study Africa and Uganda. The author has worked in evidence, while the studies provide a more projects in these countries including interviewing substantive detailed analysis. local participants and observers. However, UN P HOTO / TI M MCKU L KA
9
IMPACT OF LOCAL PEACE COMMITTEES
The case studies show that LPCs have proven remained largely peaceful in the aftermath of to be useful local peacebuilding instruments. the elections despite a long history of political However, at the same time, it is clear there and inter-tribal violence.” However, this are very specific limitations on what they can statement should be interpreted cautiously, achieve. Their impact also varies from context to since other variables (such as the particular context – even within the same country. dynamics of the political contest) also had an The following evidence can help assess LPC impact on the situation. impact: • In Nicaragua, local peace commissions • The Kenyan experience described previously, made possible many local agreements. mentioned the success of the Wajir LPC that They have been particularly successful in initiated a process resulting in a national engaging contra guerillas who re-armed after agreement to implement committees in all the ceasefire agreement, and easing their districts. Kenyan LPCs have also facilitated reintegration into society at a time when all the so-called Garissa Declaration – an other attempts to deal with them had failed. agreement between northeast pastoralist • The South African LPC experience is fairly clans and the Government on procedures well researched and documented.16, 17, 18, 19, 8, 20, to deal with cattle rustling. Chopra14, 109 has 21, 22 Two of the assessments were conducted described and assessed this development, by independent outsiders, one on behalf of calling it a significant and good example of the United States Agency for International what she calls ‘bottom-up lawmaking’. Development (USAID),16 and the other for • The LPCs were particularly adept at International Alert.19 In addition, field research integrating a broad range of relevant local was undertaken in one of the regions of the stakeholders who could potentially achieve country.21 At one level, it may seem that the conflict resolution. From this base, the South African LPCs failed since their primary LPCs demonstrated further strengths such objective was to prevent violence. Yet, the as applying features of the local traditional number of deaths caused by political violence justice system, tackling cases of inter- increased each successive year during the ethnic conflict between groups with different LPCs’ lifetime – from 2649 in 1992 to 3567 values and customs, and facilitating a in 1994. This fact clearly demonstrates form of engagement between marginalized that the LPCs could not enforce peace. communities and the State – an achievement However, more significantly, all observers that has resulted in the State being more agreed that LPCs had successfully prevented responsive to these communities. many potentially violent events and had bolstered local dialogue and problem-solving • After post-election violence in Kenya between processes. December 2007 and March 2008, a UNDP report15 mentioned that “… the country’s • The outcome of this work is not quantifiable, northern and northeastern provinces, which but the USAID report’s summary had seen the building of significant local assessment16 provides the most apt capacities for peace prior to elections, had observation: “…viewed as a whole, the
AN ARCHITECTURE FOR BUILDING PEACE AT THE LOCAL LEVEL: 10 A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LOCAL PEACE COMMITTEES peace committees had a mixed record, and a • In Nepal, political stumbling-blocks have definite assessment of their success or failure hampered LPC rollout. The Ministry of Peace is impossible. Peace committees were unable and Reconstruction, which supports LPCs, to stop violence completely, but often limited has been involved in an ongoing political its occurrence. They were unable to end power-struggle for control. A February impunity on the part of the security forces, but and May 2008 research team of the 2008 they were able to help equalize the balance of Nepal Transition to Peace Initiative (NTTP) power between those in power and ordinary interviewed the 22 existing LPCs and found citizens and to strengthen accountability. Their that lack of support rendered most of them ability to address the underlying causes of dysfunctional. Yet, seven were active and conflict was circumscribed, but even in the had been somewhat successful in dealing most violence-ridden areas, peace committee with conflict situations. This illustrates staff were able to mediate conflict and create that even in very debilitating political and a safe space within which problems could be administrative circumstances, LPCs can discussed. And though unable to transform be successful if local participants seize the the ‘struggle mentality’, they were able to help opportunity they offer. South Africans take their first steps toward 25 understanding the value of negotiations and • In FYR Macedonia, Koceski found anecdotal how to engage in them constructively.” evidence that committees for inter-community relations effectively dealt with harmful rumours • In Sierra Leone, the 2007 European Union and facilitated solutions to disputes over inter- Election Observation Mission concluded: “… community coexistence. the National and District Code Monitoring The fundamental achievement of LPCs is that Committees proved themselves to be an they create opportunities for dialogue. In most of effective forum for addressing contentious the above cases, LPCs provided the opportunity issues. Their regular meetings acted as an for representatives of locally-divided communities efficient conflict mediation tool during the to meet and talk about their joint conflict. For campaign period and successfully promoted example, in FYR Macedonia, Sikoska26 reports reconciliation among political parties after there was almost no constructive political clashes between their supporters in a number dialogue between ethnic communities at national of areas including Kono, Kambia, Kailahun level. In this light the creation of committees and Bo districts.”23 on inter-community relations, designed to institutionalize ethnic dialogue at a local level, • In Northern Ireland, the design of the District was a significant development. Policing Partnerships was an attempt to 27 “…find the solution to the policing of a divided In Northern Ireland, some commentators felt community, one part of which had largely lost that the consociational model adopted by the Good Friday Agreement diluted the need for confidence in its police force.”24 Opinion polls inter-community reconciliation at the national from 2008 point to a remarkable normalization level. Against this background, Northern of community attitudes towards policing. Ireland’s district policing partnerships dealt However, credit for this is not due solely with the controversial matter of policing by or primarily to these local bodies; national institutionalizing regular discussions in deeply political developments played a major role. divided communities. These discussions were Instead, their value is that they provided the important for building better social cohesion and only available platform for local community contributed to normalizing policing and, therefore, dialogue on an issue that has always deeply to greater state legitimacy. divided communities.
11 u l L o k e an os Photos /At P
These are just two examples. It is difficult • enable local and national information flow so to measure the impact of local dialogue in local peacebuilding challenges can receive anchoring and promoting community ownership proper attention at the national level. of the local peace process. However, it might be reasonable to assume it has a significant impact. It is also important to note what LPCs are not able to do. LPCs cannot: By facilitating dialogue, LPCs can achieve certain major impacts. They can: • enforce peace, especially among groups that are bent on using violence; • enable communication between current or former protagonists to deal with potentially • deal with structural root causes of conflict, destructive rumours, fears and mistrust; particularly when conflict is driven by national political, economic or cultural • prevent violence through joint monitoring, interests. facilitating negotiations and joint planning for potentially violent events; • override national political imperatives; they have only a limited ability to counter national • facilitate local peacemaking processes trends. If the national political context makes leading to local peace agreements; peace impossible, it is unreasonable to • mediate ongoing or new disputes to achieve expect miracles from LPCs. joint problem-solving; In summary, LPCs are appropriate mechanisms to deal with situations of crippling polarization • strengthen social cohesion through within local communities, and minimal national LPC-facilitated dialogue – a necessary and local political will to make peace. In these precondition for sustainable, collaborative cases, ‘soft’ approaches such as dialogue, and inclusive governance; facilitation and negotiation are appropriate, while any form of coercion or arbitration will likely • facilitate reconciliation; prove counterproductive.
AN ARCHITECTURE FOR BUILDING PEACE AT THE LOCAL LEVEL: 12 A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LOCAL PEACE COMMITTEES STRUCTURE AND METHODOLOGY OF LPCs: TOWARDS TENTATIVE GUIDELINES
The following discussion on structure and Accord were - with one or two exceptions - not methodology will focus on four areas, including at all successful. LPCs’: In theory, a national mandate also enables 1. functionality in the context of a national information and resource flow between national mandate, including issues of local and local levels. In the best case scenario, it also ownership, requirements of a peace improves the likelihood that local communities architecture, external technical support and can table their issues on national agendas. One the value added by international monitoring of the main disadvantages of informal LPCs is their limited ability to have an impact on the missions; national process. 2. composition, including reference to civil For example, in Nepal during the Maoist society’s role and the need to include women insurgency (1996 – 2006), civil society on the committee; participants did first-rate work to defuse various potentially violent local situations and to 3. primary conflict transformation methodology; mediate local agreements between belligerents. 4. relationships with local government. The lack of connection between these and national level processes generated frustration. There were no feedback loops or platforms for interaction, limited access to national resources, 1. National mandates and local and restricted ability to put local issues on the ownership national agenda. Within a national framework, it is possible to achieve a much better flow of The specific objectives to be achieved when information in both directions. establishing LPCs vary from context to context. However, despite variations, the underlying However, there are inherent difficulties with objective of all formal LPCs is the same: to have operating in the national mandate context. a local mechanism that supports achieving Invariably, local processes are held hostage nationally-agreed peace objectives. Therefore, to national power-plays. This was the case formal LPCs are inextricably linked to the in Nepal. Political competition to control the national agenda – they need to operate in the peace architecture has seriously delayed framework determined by national agreements. its implementation and diluted its impact. This situation opens up simultaneous Since 2007 when an inclusive multi-party opportunities and challenges. decision established local peace committees, political control of the Ministry of Peace and A national mandate creates a window of Reconstruction has changed three times. Each opportunity for LPCs by removing major political time the peace process was seriously disrupted. stumbling-blocks to peace and legitimizing local In every case, the incumbent Minister exerted peace processes. In Nepal, Northern Ireland and damaging party-political control over the South Africa, establishing LPCs that included process. all protagonists would have been impossible without a national mandate. In fact, in South In FYR Macedonia, some municipal councils Africa, the political climate was so negative that have appointed representatives on LPCs local peacemaking efforts prior to the Peace on behalf of ethnic communities without
13 consulting them. In doing so, they have rested on two principles. The first was that the potentially undermined LPC legitimacy in national mandate granted legitimacy to local minority communities, rendering the committee peace processes. The second principle was subservient to the interests of the dominant that the need for local buy-in was recognized. members of the council. This equally important principle proved to be daunting in implementation. In fact, the National In order to ensure that LPCs make the most of Peace Accord (NPA) was an elite pact.19, 16, 18 It their function in a national mandate context, was negotiated behind closed doors and then three conditions need to be satisfied, including announced to the public. At grassroots level, the need for: there were pockets of strong resistance to the i) local buy-in through applying sound NPA in particular, and to peace in general. processes; For this reason, authorities soon realized that ii) a functioning peace architecture; LPCs could not be established by simply faxing iii) sufficient appropriate external support. instructions to local branches of organizations. They understood that carefully-facilitated processes were needed to secure local buy- Securing local buy-in in, and that LPCs needed to be rooted in the conscious decision of local participants to Political will at a local level is required to engage with the peace process. They realized make an LPC successful in practice. National this even though it meant that local participants participants do not implement or participate in had the right to say ‘no’ to and block the LPCs; local participants do. This fact explains formation of an LPC – as indeed happened in why LPCs have a varied success rate within the several instances. They learned it was critically same national context.28, 21 An LPC’s success important to work patiently and deal effectively is not determined by the national mandate, but with local resistance to confront concerns about by local political and non-political participants the peace process. using the opportunity the national mandate creates for them. The most fundamental aspects in making peace are the decision to do so and possessing the National political leaders need to understand will to embark on that road. To deprive local that if a national mandate stifles local ownership, participants of this right removes their power it defeats the very purpose of LPCs. There and weakens the quality of their commitment seems to be a contrary relationship between to peace. If local participants refuse to form an local ownership and imposed processes: the LPC, it means a distinct local conflict system more the process is imposed externally, the exists; it has to be engaged on its own merits weaker a LPC’s capacity to serve peace. In and requires its own specific peacemaking Kenya, the original LPC, the Wajir Peace and process. Development Committee, was highly successful because the process was wholly locally-owned In their assessment of the reasons why the and driven. Local and international NGOs ‘zones of peace’ failed in Aceh, Indonesia, Iyer 29 copied the model in other districts, and this and Mitchell noted local communities were not resulted in local ownership and effectiveness involved in decisions to establish these bodies. being weakened. “There seems to have been no sustained attempt to involve the local people – to give The best possible modus operandi is a national them space to express their own needs or mandate that grants enough ‘space’ for local suggest appropriate arrangements. From mute ownership; a mandate that recognizes that local spectators of war, they were asked to remain buy-in is needed. South Africa provides a good mute spectators of peace.” This was a sure example. Implementing LPCs in South Africa recipe for failure.
AN ARCHITECTURE FOR BUILDING PEACE AT THE LOCAL LEVEL: 14 A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LOCAL PEACE COMMITTEES Therefore, the process of forming an LPC is very i) A national multi-party body should be created important. A committee should not be formed to coordinate interaction with LPCs, provide by issuing a bureaucratic order. Instead it should advice and facilitate access to national be carefully managed through facilitation that, resources. A good example is Sierra Leone’s at a minimum, needs to adhere to the following National Code of Conduct Monitoring concepts: Committee – a multi-party body with the same composition as local bodies. When members • Proper information sharing should take of a District Code of Conduct Monitoring place with all relevant local parties and Committee experienced a problem they could organizations, ensuring local stakeholders not deal with on their own, they contacted have real opportunities to discuss the matter. the national body for assistance. The national body then provided the necessary political • During these discussions, the role, back-up or advised the local body on possible methodology and composition of an LPC steps. In some cases, key national participants need to be clarified. were required to travel to a town to help the LPC deal with the problem. • Local stakeholder questions and concerns need to be sought out and dealt with. In Ghana, the National Peace Council is positioned to play this role. In South Africa, • Potential participants should then be the National Peace Secretariat provided requested to discuss the matter with their coordination, but the most important members or supporters in order to obtain leadership and guidance came from multi-party a mandate that will guide discussions at a regional peace committees. These bodies met follow-up meeting. every two weeks and received reports from the LPCs. The Regional Peace Committee then • An LPC should only be constituted when deliberated on ways to support specific LPCs. these mandates have been received from all Its support included advice, acting on requests relevant organizations. for intervention from regional or national participants or, where appropriate, issuing a Details of the process can be adapted to joint statement to address specific concerns. contextual demands, but it is absolutely crucial for all participants to accept the underlying Achieving this level of cooperation is not always principle of securing meaningful buy-in from all easy. In Nepal, stakeholders failed to establish stakeholders before forming an LPC. multi-party oversight of the peace architecture. A decision had been taken in principle to establish a high-level peace commission, A functional peace architecture but it was never realized. In FYR Macedonia, a National Committee for Inter-Community The benefits of a national mandate will get lost Relations exists and has an identical legal if national and local interaction is not facilitated mandate to that of the local bodies. However, by well-functioning peace architecture. Similar there are no procedures for interaction and no to the popular Asian rickshaw, a functional examples of support given to a local body. peace architecture relies on three wheels: multi- party political oversight and leadership as the The particular context – and of equal front wheel, and technical and administrative importance, the underlying issue – should support as the back wheels. The wheels are determine the ways LPC and national body interconnected, and a puncture in any one interaction are facilitated. There are crises tire will have an impact on the movement of and disputes that local participants will find the vehicle. We will consider the three wheels impossible to deal with without constructive separately: inputs from the national level. For example, in 2008 the Committee on Inter-Community
15 Relations in Struga, FYR Macedonia, was Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone deeply involved in efforts to resolve a conflict (UNIOSIL)/UNDP provided crucial assistance over student demands to establish ‘ethnic to the entire process (in fact, without him shifts’ at a local secondary school (thereby there would probably have been no Code of effectively segregating the school along ethnic Conduct to monitor). In contrast, in Nepal LPCs lines). The conflict received much publicity and theoretically had access to skilled facilitators soon became a national political issue. Local but, in practice, there was no assistance. In participants, including the municipal council and Aceh, Indonesia, there was no technical support, school authorities, appreciated LPC efforts, but and in FYR Macedonia the support provided felt it was out of its depth on issues such as laws focused more on administrative rather than that regulated schools. Ideally, the LPC should technical skills. The situations also varied in have had the option of requesting technical and other ways, but it seems reasonable to conclude political support from a national body, and of that access to technical support may have working collaboratively with national participants enhanced LPC performance in these contexts. in dealing with the conflict. Technical capacity specifically needs to: If an LPC has access to a national body that shares the same make-up as the local body • enhance facilitation of processes to establish it allows it to draw on consensus opinion. LPCs (including the capacity to help create However, there is an obvious risk that the inclusive local peacemaking processes); reverse may also be true – the absence of a national consensus will have a negative impact • support mediation processes, or provide the on LPCs. capacity to act as external mediators; ii) LPCs require technical back-up: access to • provide orientation to LPCs. In most post- people who know the basic principles of conflict societies, people are emerging peace processes, and who have the skills to from authoritarian political cultures. The help all participants implement them. Setting concept of inclusive problem-solving is often up and providing continuing support to LPCs known within cultures, but is not used as a requires in-depth understanding of peace political tool. Consequently, an orientation is process demands and dynamics, and the skills needed on the methods LPCs should use. to manage them. LPCs should have access This orientation is particularly important to professional, skilled conflict transformation for role clarification, since a confusion of practitioners, as this is one of the wheels of roles among LPC members and the wider the rickshaw. community can have a negative impact on Current evidence suggests that LPCs with how the committees function; access to technical support fare better than those without it. However, this hypothesis needs • provide skills’ training to LPC members. further research. In Ghana, successful efforts to This training is generally useful, but it is the deal with the Dagbon crisis were directly related very experience of joint exposure to training to the quality of the facilitative role played by – former protagonists sharing the same civil society participants, the UN peace and training venue and experimenting with a development advisor and related UNDP-funded different style of dealing with conflict – that programme activities. In South Africa, the full- helps to build relationships and a better time staff deployed by the Peace Secretariat understanding of the task at hand. played an indispensable role in making LPC establishment possible, and in helping with The capacity to provide professional technical mediation and facilitation processes. In Sierra assistance is best positioned within the national Leone, the Technical Advisor of the United peace architecture rather than with international
AN ARCHITECTURE FOR BUILDING PEACE AT THE LOCAL LEVEL: 16 A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LOCAL PEACE COMMITTEES organizations. Ideally, full-time appointments offices and staff. In Ghana and Sierra Leone, the should be made at a ratio of one professional UN system provided the main administrative and facilitator for every three to five LPCs. This was financial back-up, whereas in Kenya, support roughly the situation in South Africa. In Nepal, was spread over several local and international one part-time facilitator was proposed for every NGOs. In FYR Macedonia, the Organization for three LPCs. Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and a local NGO shared most of this burden. To summarize, conflict transformation processes benefit from quality professional attention. Regardless of how administrative support Local peace processes are inherently complex; is organized, it is important to recognize the success is not necessarily easier than at interconnectedness of this ‘wheel’ with the other national level simply because the issues are two ‘wheels’ of the rickshaw. In the same way as smaller in scale. It is unreasonable to expect political decisions, administrative decisions may local participants to have the capacity to deal have a negative impact on peace processes with their conflict on their own. LPCs work if they are not based on adequate technical because ownership of local peace processes is understanding. In 2007, Nepal’s Ministry of at a local level, but this does not preclude the Peace and Reconstruction instructed all senior need for technical support. district officers to establish LPCs. This decision went against technical advice that a different (iii) The third wheel of the rickshaw is type of process was required – likely because administrative, logistical and financial the civil servants who issued the instructions support. LPCs are relatively cost-effective. had no technical understanding. The more this In principle, LPC members should offer ‘wheel’ is synchronized and moves in rhythm to work on a voluntary basis because with the technical ‘wheel’, the better chance of they are working for their own peace. success. Payment for services is not advisable. In Kenya the “uncouth behaviour”53 of some NGOs that offered ‘sitting fees’ to LPC members created many problems. However, External support to LPCs financing is necessary to support members’ ‘External’ support to LPCs refers to help from transport and accommodation costs, and sources outside the national peace architecture. for expenditure that may be incurred in It includes support from other national the process of making peace (such as the participants, national NGOs or international renting venues, public address systems, bodies. bus hire, etc.). The largest budget items are for providing technical support, orientation South Africa and Northern Ireland are the only and training of LPC members, and costs examples where LPCs have been established associated with establishing LPC offices if without considerable external technical and/or required. financial support. Both countries had enough internal capacity. In other contexts, external There are many models to follow for locating support was necessary, although its nature and managing administrative support. In South varied. For example, in FYR Macedonia, it was Africa, the peace structures were funded largely left to the OSCE, the Association of the through a Government budget and channeled Units of Local Self Government (ZELS) – an through the Department of Justice. However, impartial association of local governments – due to the liberation movements’ distrust and NGOs to promote implementing LPCs. of the Government, the peace committees In Ghana, the UN system – and the UNDP in created as much political and managerial particular – played a major role in helping to distance as possible between themselves and develop the peace architecture. In Sierra Leone, the Department. They had their own separate the UNIOSIL/UNDP technical advisor and the
17 International Foundation for Electoral Systems and the Community Development Institute (a (IFES) were indispensable. Macedonian NGO). They have actively promoted establishing committees for inter-community However, in Kenya, a major problem resulted relations (CICRs) and have enhanced their legal, from so many NGOs establishing LPCs that in financial aspects and their strategic planning some districts, competing NGOs established skills. They have also provided coaching to multiple committees. Kenya’s National Steering struggling CICRs and facilitated interaction Committee (NSC) was then created to make between municipal CICRs and the national body the process coherent and orderly. The UNDP and with similar bodies in Serbia. has subsequently become involved in providing technical support to the NSC. In Nepal, a The technical capacity to ease local conflict determination to be the master of its own peace transformation processes should ideally be process has made it more difficult to provide embedded in the peace architecture, and local external support. The Academy for Educational practitioners should be trained and equipped Development supported Nepal Transition to fulfill this role. This training needs to be a to Peace Initiative has provided significant continuous process of action and reflection, technical support to the Ministry of Peace rather than a one-off event. The objective: and Reconstruction, and the UNDP is poised develop a body of knowledge and skill relevant to move into a supporting role. This list is not to the specific culture and context. This training conclusive, but these examples demonstrate the is one of the most worthy areas to consider for need for various types of support. external participant support. Similar to a political mandate, external support A key requirement is that external support needs is a potential threat to local ownership. External to be sustained for as long as necessary, and support organizations that seek to pursue to focus on transforming local institutions with their own agendas, or that impose rather than long-term responsibility for managing conflict. provide support, may do more harm than good. A dysfunctional organization cannot sustain In Nicaragua, the Organization of American long-term processes. In 2008 in Sierra Leone, States (OAS) provided support to local peace both the UNIOSIL/UNDP and the IFES scaled commissions in the northern and central regions back their support to LPCs after the elections through its International Support and Verification of that year. This was unfortunate. It quickly Commission (CIAV). However, many people caused most LPCs to collapse despite their were suspicious of the Commission because success at bolstering inter-party relations at they felt it was biased towards the contras. The district level. The local institution – the Political local peace commissions in these areas did not Parties Registration Commission – has failed to contribute as much to the peace process as transform itself internally and has become largely in the south where churches were the primary dysfunctional. support organizations. Other factors also had an impact on the situation, but local structures In Malawi, GTZ, Deutsche Gesellschaft fuer lost credibility and ‘ownership’ because of their Technische Zusammenarbeit (German Agency association with this external service provider. for Technical Cooperation), supported the Forum for Dialogue and Peace in its constructive work External support is appropriate in relation to the to help district multi-party liaison committees two back wheels of the rickshaw – technical (MPLCs). These were LPCs with a specific and administrative support – but this support mandate to prevent violence and mediate should be specifically aimed at building capacity conflict during periods of elections. A 2009 and strengthening ownership. FYR Macedonia independent observer report stated: “reports offers a good example of well-applied of people involved with MPLCs on the ground administrative support. Substantial support in reflect a great sense of satisfaction and pride various forms has come from ZELS, the OSCE, that peace initiatives that started around 2004
AN ARCHITECTURE FOR BUILDING PEACE AT THE LOCAL LEVEL: 18 A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LOCAL PEACE COMMITTEES elections really bore fruit during the 2009 2. The composition of local elections which recorded a remarkable level of peaceful elections.”30 GTZ’s management peace committees now feels the Forum has reached the end of The composition of an LPC affects how it its life cycle and it is being phased out. This functions. In essence, an LPC is a discussion raises concerns over the future of MPLCs, their opportunity where local representatives of potential to build on their achievements, and the national protagonists meet. However, if the capacity of the Malawi Electoral Commission exercise is to work, the signatories of a national 31, 30 to sustain the initiative. The lesson from peace agreement or the main protagonists in the this example is that external organizations that conflict need to be represented. This means that ‘commit’ to provide support need to understand in line with what has been argued throughout the longer-term implications of their decision. this study, local conflict systems need to be engaged on their own merit in terms of their own dynamics. An LPC needs to be composed International observer missions of local organizations or movements relevant to the local peace process, and LPC membership A nationally-mandated peace architecture needs to be decided by local people. offers potential for international observer mission-LPC collaboration, particularly during The context of a conflict means the composition national elections. International observers help of LPCs differs significantly from one situation monitor specific potentially violent events, and to the next. In a few cases, civil society is they observe local negotiation processes. In not represented (as with FYR Macedonia Malawi, Sierra Leone and South Africa, observer and Serbia), but in most cases, civil society mission-LPC collaboration has helped to prevent participation has been welcomed. Civil society election-related violence. representatives are selected in a variety of ways. Malawi, Nepal, Northern Ireland, Sierra Leone In South Africa in 1992, the United Nations and Uganda all laid down their own specified deployed a monitoring team to help end ongoing quotas and procedures. In particular, Northern violence and to provide support in reaching a Ireland has a meticulous process for selecting negotiated transition. In addition, it also explicitly representatives. In South Africa, LPCs were aimed to support structures set up under the open committees; any relevant civil society country’s National Peace Accord. In reality, organization could apply for membership with no this meant LPCs could rely on international restriction on numbers. observers to support efforts to avoid violence and to shore up local negotiation processes. Key facets of successful LPC composition include: The presence of international observers served to strengthen South African LPC legitimacy • LPCs work well when there is a core body of and, in some cases, actively helped to defuse members who can occupy the middle ground potentially violent situations. However, according and counter polarizing forces. LPCs need 16 to Ball, much depended on the quality and members with skills to act as peacemakers, attitudes of members of the observer missions. conciliators or mediators. A committee She states that some were “useless,” nothing composed solely of protagonists risks being more than disguised tourists, while others added 32 significant value because they were proactive unmanageable. Wehr and Lederach, have and tried to understand the context and develop drawn on their experience and observations relationships of trust with participants across the in Nicaragua, and have called people with political spectrum. these skills “insider-partials”.
19 UN P HOTO / TI M MCKU L KA
These members are not presumed to be • Another important reason for including civil impartial mediators, but local people who society representatives is to benefit from the provide leadership in peace processes, alternative perspectives that they offer. By or who can mediate because they are definition, civil society includes traditional, ‘connected’, belong to and, crucially, are religious, gender, cultural, business trusted by the community. “The trust comes representatives and labour movements partly from the fact that the mediators do or organizations with a stake in securing not leave the post-negotiation situation. a meaningful and just peace. They may They are part of it and must live with the also present an alternative perception on consequences of their work. They must proceedings to party-political representatives continue to relate to conflict parties who or nongovernmental organizations – that have trusted their commitment to a just and may have a dubious claim to represent durable settlement.”32 the community. These ‘voices’ may not be more conciliatory (civil society is invariably Insider-partials usually come from civil as polarized as political parties), but they society. In South Africa, religious and broaden the spectrum of voices on the LPC business leaders played this role and by representing different needs and interests. provided most of the LPC leadership. However, in other contexts religious leaders • Including civil society members also provides may not be able to play this conciliatory role coordination between peace initiatives in (e.g. Northern Ireland or Sri Lanka). In Kenya the informal and formal sectors. In many and Ghana, it was important to engage contexts, civil society participants have traditional leaders and some played very embarked on peace initiatives and may constructive roles. In the KwaZulu-Natal offer significant technical skills or other province of South Africa, traditional leaders advantages. An LPC provides the opportunity represented one party in the conflict, so to connect these initiatives with each other in generally could not play a conciliatory role. In any context, the challenge is to identify a more formal process. individuals or sectors of civil society with the • If feasible politically, LPCs need to be led greatest potential to strengthen the middle by insider-partials rather than members ground.
AN ARCHITECTURE FOR BUILDING PEACE AT THE LOCAL LEVEL: 20 A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LOCAL PEACE COMMITTEES of political parties or other organizations the committees’ ability to resolve conflict actively embroiled in conflict and who may because it created confusion over seek to manipulate the LPC. In both Northern traditional roles. Ireland and Nepal, the enabling law stipulated that the chairpersons of LPCs should be • On the other hand, in Nepal, conflict was a elected representatives (i.e. politicians) with response to age-old practices of exclusion the chair’s role rotating between parties. This and marginalization. The caste system, the is problematic. Some politicians may be able many marginalized ethnic minorities, and the to transcend sectional political interests, inferior position of women created a very many others may not. complex diverse set of marginalized groups. Consequently, if the LPC was to succeed, Ideally, the LPC should be led by someone it was vital to include them. The issue was who commands the respect of a broad how to achieve it in practice. The final section of society and has the skills Government-approved Terms of Reference to facilitate constructive dialogue and gave political parties 12 representatives, the negotiations without imposing his/her own business community one, civil society four, view. An LPC’s success depends on its conflict-affected groups four, and excluded ability to use the soft skills of facilitation and minorities not already represented, two. The mediation. If its leaders do not understand terms also stipulated that a third of members the methods or possess appropriate skills, should be women. The clear intent is to the committee is not likely to succeed. be widely inclusive, though the practical Therefore, LPC leaders need to be people implementation of this complex formula, who are, above all, ‘peace seekers’ who can and its uniform application on all 75 districts, facilitate and avoid seeking only sectional interests. is challenging.
• In any successful LPC process, it is • The debate over ‘best practice’ to ensure extremely important to include marginalized inclusiveness is linked to the much deeper sections of the community – particularly dilemma over the relationship between women. The lessons of this major point demands for peace, on the one hand, and are revealed through the contrasting the justice and equality on the other hand. situations in Kenya and in Nepal. In Kenya, The guiding principle of this study so LPCs were born out of the search for peace far is that local peacebuilding should be between warring pastoralist clans in the arid owned and managed as much as possible regions of the north. LPC success came from by local communities themselves. Their the members’ ability to work with traditional requirements and interests need to dominate authorities such as clan elders. However, the process and adopted procedures need these traditional structures are patriarchal to be locally meaningful. The nature and and exclude both women and youth. This manner of external assistance should bolster in turn can present difficulties according local capacity, not replace or damage it. 14 to Chopra:14 “…the dilemma is that relying Chopra said it is preferable to leave the on existing local structures may imbue the selection of true peacemakers at the local peace initiatives with the most legitimacy, level (i.e. not to prescribe from the top or but doing so replicates existing asymmetric from outside) because it is more likely to power structures within the community.” produce legitimate and respected members. At the insistence of donors, some NGOs The key is that LPCs should have the right operating in Kenya required that women and to determine their own composition; yet it youth be included in LPCs. This weakened should ideally be as inclusive as possible.
21 3. The problem of ‘teeth’ monitor compliance. For example, it provided for appointment of local justices of the peace In their 1988 book, Ury, Brett and Goldberg33 with authority to investigate cases of public made a now-familiar distinction between the violence and intimidation, and to refer them to three approaches to conflict resolution: a) the Attorney-General. In reality, no justices of power-based, b) rights-based and c) interests- the peace were appointed because participants based. These approaches are fundamentally realized peace could not be served because the different: using coercion in one of its many law was thoroughly discredited. It did not matter forms (i.e. power-based); applying arbitration or whether the Justice of the Peace was “black or adjudication (rights-based); or seeking to solve white”, since the law itself was ‘white’, and its the underlying problem to satisfy the interests enforcement invariably sparked violence. of all parties as much as possible (interests- based). The first approach relies on political, For example, in Northern Ireland, paramilitary economic and military power; the second on the force beatings and shootings to enforce justice system. Both of these approaches have supposed justice on people in partisan areas ‘teeth.’ By contrast, the third approach does not persisted after the Good Friday Accord was engage in hard bargaining and does not have signed. This clearly highlighted justice system ‘teeth.’ It relies on genuine negotiated mutually weakness. NGOs responded productively to satisfactory solutions. Its authority rests on the this situation by applying the principles and strength of the achieved consensus. procedures of restorative justice; restoring the relationship between victim and perpetrator LPCs typically operate in environments in by easing communications. This worked by which the first two approaches (power-based engaging former paramilitaries to enhance the and rights-based) have limited chances of process’s legitimacy.34, 35 In Sierra Leone, the succeeding. In most situations of deep-rooted Political Parties Registration Commission is a conflict or in post-conflict conditions, using statutory body with a mandate to regulate the coercion is inherently problematic and likely behaviour of political parties. It deliberately to spark further violence. Using the judicial opted for an interests-based approach because system or other forms of arbitration depends the justice system lacked capacity and on whether all parties recognize the legitimacy legitimacy. of the arbitrators or adjudicators. In most post-conflict situations or in weak states, Serbia provides the only example of LPCs the judicial system is often compromised or following a rights-based approach. Its inefficient, and therefore a poor instrument committees for inter-community relations have for conflict resolution. That leaves an interest- the right to ‘institute legal proceedings before based approach as the most obvious tool for Serbia’s Constitutional Court’ when they judge LPCs. The key instruments of this approach are minority rights have been violated by municipal dialogue, negotiation, conciliation, facilitation councils. In these instances, the assumed and mediation – the so-called ‘soft’ skills. This legitimacy of Serbia’s Constitutional Court approach is built on mutual recognition and a justifies this approach. search for sustainable solutions. It deals with the In most post-conflict situations and in fragile dilemma over legitimacy of power by seeking states, authority is contested or delicate, consensus and using it as the guiding authority requiring an interests-based approach to conflict in implementing decisions. resolution. The most successful LPCs have Case study examples demonstrate this point. followed this methodology. However, LPCs In South Africa, the liberation movement’s struggle to settle into this approach; for some main strategy was to refuse to work with the members the instinct to settle conflict through minority government and to actively promote some form of coercion is too strong. However, civil disobedience. The National Peace Accord the evidence shows that LPCs risk undermining provided legal procedural mechanisms to the very basis of their success when they give
AN ARCHITECTURE FOR BUILDING PEACE AT THE LOCAL LEVEL: 22 A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LOCAL PEACE COMMITTEES in to this instinct. The moment an LPC seeks where they had to choose which model to to exercise power and develops the urge to follow in each situation (in one instance a ‘bite’ – particularly against a key stakeholder district commissioner was taken to court over in a local conflict – it becomes just another the issue). In practice, formal authorities have arena for contesting power, and it relinquishes mainly opted to cooperate with LPCs in order to its unique role. An LPC should have authority prevent serious conflicts, rather than pushing for based only on consensus. This can mean LPCs formal means of conflict resolution.14 are vulnerable to spoiler groups intent on using violence, but there is contrasting evidence This dilemma raises a number of significant (e.g. from Nicaragua) that LPCs successfully questions. Does the quest for peace engaged spoiler groups in a peace process at a compromise the more urgent task of time when power-based participants – such as strengthening the democratic state? By the Government and military – could not make bypassing state institutions, is the peace any progress. achieved through informal negotiations creating a short-term gain, but a longer-term loss? The interest-based approach to conflict presents Should priority go to ensuring a state’s conflict a potential dilemma for LPCs. Chopra’s 2009 resolution mechanisms function properly, rather publication36 “When Peacebuilding Contradicts than investing in LPCs? Is restorative justice State-building” notes that agreements a good idea when restoring confidence in the negotiated between local parties almost police and the justice system may seem a inevitably contained compromises – possibly greater priority? diluting the law. For example, in Kenya, LPCs operated in pastoralist areas in a vacuum On the whole, LPCs are an aspect of a fragile 38 created by weak governance institutions peace process. They are imperfect bridges (particularly the justice system) that could not established to cross divides in communities in provide security and justice to communities. the absence of other bridges that work. The The weak judicial system came from a lack of answer does not lie in a dogmatic refusal to use resources and political will, but was exacerbated imperfect bridges. Instead, participants need to by the fact that clan and state concepts of be conscious of the associated dilemmas, and justice differed substantially. A similar situation therefore align processes to build peace with the existed in Uganda’s Karamoja region.37 larger objective of building the state. In Kenya LPC mediation involved more than problem-solving. The committee also mediated, 4. Relationship with local albeit unconsciously, at the level of fundamental values underpinning the justice system. government Chopra14 stated that in these situations the Often, LPCs operate where local government dilemma is that negotiated declarations are mini structures are discredited, or if established social compacts evolved through meaningful interim local government structures have a engagement between the state and local limited mandate, or when local government communities. However, they may fundamentally has no capacity to fulfill its conflict prevention contradict the constitutional values of the state. and resolution mandate. The existence of a Therefore, the declarations may offer peace, local peace committee that represents political but they compromise justice as defined by a participants, the security sector and government country’s constitution. officials (in some cases), and civil society, raises For example, Kenya’s Garissa Declaration questions about its relationship in relation to prohibited the free movement of pastoralist local government. clans, but the constitution guaranteed it. This The reality is that circumstance and context dilemma has placed state officials such as determine the nature of the relationship. For district commissioners in difficult positions
23 example, in some situations LPCs are called facilitate and mediate; they do not arbitrate, or on to establish the social cohesion that makes have the authority to intervene in or override governance possible. In South Africa, the governance functions. In Nepal, by design apartheid Government lacked legitimacy, LPCs are interim bodies with mandates that will and local government in black townships expire once a new Constitution (and therefore had collapsed almost entirely. The police legitimate local government) is in place. Ghana were unable to contain public unrest. In the presents a different model where LPCs are many instances of public protests, rallies seen as a permanent institutional first response and funerals, LPCs facilitated negotiations to community conflict. This is similar to an between the principal participants, including alternative dispute resolution system in civil the police, so these events could be orderly litigation. A Ghanaian LPC will seek to solve a and peaceful. LPCs were also often called dispute by using an interests-based approach on to mediate between municipalities and to achieve a mutually-satisfying solution. The the so-called ‘civics’ (resident committees). LPC is not allowed to arbitrate, although it may They were asked to help with conflicts in make recommendations to government. Its which specific outcomes were demanded, primary function is to facilitate peacemaking. If and sometimes they had to deal with the very that fails, formal legal processes may be used. essence of relationships. For instance, the ‘civics’ demanded to be recognized and taken Therefore, while there is no uniformity in seriously and the LPCs provided a platform for the way LPCs relate to local government, this to happen. it is important there is as much role-clarity as possible to avoid harmful confusion. It is In Sierra Leone, LPCs facilitated local particularly critical that LPCs are not seen agreements that made democratic elections as hostile to, or in competition with, local possible in districts where there were almost no government, but instead a means of enabling ordinary structures of governance. They did not dialogue and consensus, thereby creating an administer the elections (the National Electoral environment that provides effective governance. Commission did that competently), but they ensured the elections were not disrupted by Role clarity is also vital when the police political conflict or violence. In some areas of are involved with an LPC. Northern Ireland Nicaragua, LPCs effectively functioned as local provides the best example of a peace government because there were no alternative architecture created specifically to transform structures. policing. However, in Nepal and South Africa, the transformation of policing was also an At the other end of the spectrum, there are important peacebuilding objective. Including instances when governments passed laws police in an LPC brings them into dialogue giving LPCs an advisory role. In FYR Macedonia with the community, offers opportunities to and Serbia, LPCs advise municipal councils discuss the desired police role in preventing on ethnic relations’ matters. The Councils have violence, and begins to restore police credibility. to respond to submissions but are not obliged Once again, role clarity is essential because, to follow an LPC’s advice. The LPC is clearly unless specified by law, the police do not subordinate to local government, although they accept orders from an LPC and are not legally have some legal means to challenge council accountable to it. The LPC is a platform where decisions. Similarly in Northern Ireland, district the police interact with other participants policing partnerships were consultative bodies and work to forge a common approach to to district councils. preventing violence. However, they continue to be accountable to structures determined by In Ghana and Nepal, there is a clear conceptual relevant legislation. distinction between the roles of LPCs and governance structures. The committees
AN ARCHITECTURE FOR BUILDING PEACE AT THE LOCAL LEVEL: 24 A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LOCAL PEACE COMMITTEES RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE UN SYSTEM
For the UN to fulfill its peacebuilding mandate, ‘excessive’ and ‘sufficient’ are frustratingly local peace committee activities are very imprecise. By necessity, LPCs operate in relevant, particularly to the UNDP. LPCs are high-risk areas characterized by political mechanisms to support development and instability and deep distrust. Therefore, the governance in post-conflict and fragile states. question is not whether ideal conditions exist They can succeed because they have the to implement these committees, but whether potential to facilitate social cohesion, prevent there are opportunities to move forward violence, and mediate inclusive problem-solving processes. despite the risks. The UN system’s support of LPC achievements The UN system: in general, and the UNDP’s in particular in Ghana • enjoys credibility in this context as an and Sierra Leone, should serve as universal impartial and reliable facilitator; best practices. In both cases, competent staff with appropriate skills were available • has a longer-term commitment and support and had a thorough understanding of conflict for local governance and decentralization, transformation; a critical component of success. and understands the need to link and align These individuals were confident practitioners LPCs to both; and truly believed in the methodology they were publicizing. More than any other factor, the • has enough internal technical capacity (e.g. integrity and professionalism of such staff create peace and development advisors) to provide opportunities to provide meaningful technical quality technical advice for implementing advice and support. LPCs. Support to LPCs should be considered when the If these conditions are met, there are several following conditions exist: ways the UN can support LPCs and national • There is a clear need for local peacebuilding – peace architectures. One particularly attractive if local communities suffer major polarization, possibility is to use the UNDP. It has several strengths that position it to focus long-term have a history of violence, or show strong sustained attention on strengthening the capacity indicators of potential violence. of a peace architecture at all levels. First, its • Local governance systems cannot fulfill continued presence in a country is important. their normal conflict-resolution functions, Second, the UNDP has a global presence and community of practice to draw on to support or require a specific mechanism to promote long-run peacebuilding operations. Third, social cohesion and constructive conflict the agency already has a small group of staff resolution. with technical expertise in peacebuilding, and • Sufficient national political opportunities experience in transferring those skills to national participants. Fourth, the UNDP combines field exist to encourage implementing local operations, contacts with national NGOs, and peacebuilding processes. This includes an positive relationships with national governments, assessment of whether local peacebuilding so is well positioned to support both local will be excessively politicized, and if there peacebuilding efforts and national peace is enough national and local ‘buy-in’ to the architectures. concept. In the LPC context, words such as
25 The UNDP and other members of UN country • provide technical support by establishing teams can fulfill several roles to support a peace peace and development advisor positions, architecture that includes LPCs. They can: in-service training, or other forms of skills training and technical capacity creation; • work with existing LPCs to strengthen their role in monitoring and preventing violence • publicize the value of the LPC role with (as in South Africa), especially during relevant national audiences through election processes; conferences, seminars, and consultations;
• provide financing as a bridging measure to • Stimulate developing knowledge about help establish a peace architecture (as in LPCs by commissioning research on Ghana); their lesser known aspects (particularly their relevance to local development and • offer institutional support such as enhancing governance), and by organizing country and management or administrative systems regional information-sharing events. (as with Nepal’s Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction, or Kenya’s National Steering Commission); VAN S C H N EI D ER UN P HOTO / E VAN
AN ARCHITECTURE FOR BUILDING PEACE AT THE LOCAL LEVEL: 26 A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LOCAL PEACE COMMITTEES APPENDIX 1: CASE STUDIES (in chronological order)
Case Study 1: Nicaragua
Case Study 2: South Africa
Case Study 3: Kenya
Case Study 4: Northern Ireland
Case Study 5: FYR Macedonia
Case Study 6: Ghana
Case Study 7: Nepal
Case Study 8: Sierra Leone
27 1. NICARAGUA
Peace commission development in Nicaragua vote. They governed a country with a failing arose out of the 1987 Esquipulas Peace economy, widespread poverty and severe Accords – a regional initiative that brought environmental degradation. together Central American presidents in an effort to end civil wars in Nicaragua, El Salvador By 1980, the Sandinista government came and Guatemala. under attack by US-funded contra forces that sought to establish what the contras termed Starting in 1980, the United States- ‘real democracy’,41 and to protect the interests backed contra rebels fought the Sandinista of Nicaraguan and US business elites. The Government in a 10-year war that killed Sandinistas received financial and military 31,000 Nicaraguans.39 At the end of the support from Cuba and the Soviet Union; the war, there was no single conclusive peace contras received arms, training and assistance agreement. Therefore, local and regional from the US Government. The contras also peace commissions helped facilitate dialogue received major support from former national between the Sandinista Government and guardsmen allied with the ousted Somoza different factions of the contra army on issues regime, many of whom were exiled in Honduras including combatant disarmament, amnesty and Costa Rica. Amid a civil conflict defined by and reintegration. Religious leaders and church- Cold War-fueled tensions, Nicaraguans suffered based organizations were involved in conflict from malnutrition, poverty and an economy mediation, and helped contribute to the peace ravaged by natural disasters and political commissions’ impact by monitoring armed violence from the early 1970s. groups and entering into dialogue with them, 40 both during and after the war. Later in the Negotiations to end Nicaragua’s post-war period, with help from a verification mission led by the OAS, Nicaraguan-led peace civil war commissions were formed to help coordinate A series of national and regional agreements local conflict mediation and human rights and negotiation attempts characterized protection in the most highly-conflicted areas. efforts to conclude the war. Many settlements The following case study presents a brief ultimately failed due to rearming by previously background to the civil war and its incomplete demobilized combatants – the contras and settlement, an examination of two independent members of the Sandinista army. The process peace commission systems that were formed, to achieve the 1987 Esquipulas Peace and briefly discusses the most salient aspects Accords was led by Costa Rican President, of Nicaragua’s peace architecture. Oscar Arias. Through the Esquipulas process, Central American leaders developed a series of concrete steps that could lead to ceasefires and demobilization in wars throughout the region. Civil war in Nicaragua By 1988, the Sandinista Government faced Civil war in Nicaragua resulted from conflict over huge economic costs of war and declining control of government. The leftist Sandinista prospects of international support for its anti- National Liberation Front overthrew the regime imperialist revolution against the United States. of Anastasio Somoza in a violent revolution that This prompted it to negotiate to end the war. ended in 1979. The Sandinistas held power For their part, the contras faced cutbacks in US during the outbreak of the contra war and military support and severe internal divisions, were then elected democratically in the 1984 so they reluctantly accepted a ceasefire and presidential election, with 67 percent of the consequent demobilization.
AN ARCHITECTURE FOR BUILDING PEACE AT THE LOCAL LEVEL: 28 A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LOCAL PEACE COMMITTEES Peace negotiations focused on obtaining disarmament and peacebuilding phases. The NICARAGUA commitments to troop demobilization rather peace negotiations restarted in 1990, and the than reviewing the causes of conflict or the Chamorro government negotiated agreements grievances of opposing sides.39 The US with particular contra factions that ultimately Government then encouraged the contras led to a more complete disarmament. However, to ally themselves with the Unión Nacional Nicaragua remained a highly polarized society, Opositora (UNO) party headed by Violeta plagued by citizen insecurity and a significantly Chamorro, and were absorbed into the political weakened justice system.39 system in efforts to defeat the Sandinistas in the post-war election. This political arrangement meant that during peace negotiations the two History and formation of the factions at war never examined the reasons they were fighting. Therefore, polarization and peace commissions resentment continued during and after the The Esquipulas Agreement created Nicaragua’s transition from conflict. National Reconciliation Commission; one In March 1988, the two sides agreed to a of its main tasks was to monitor and verify ceasefire and to the contras withdrawing into the ceasefire declared in three zones of separate zones. Ultimately, the Sandinistas Nicaragua. President Daniel Ortega called and contra rebels created 23 self-governing these ceasefires a step toward an official development zones (20 percent of the nationwide halt to violence. The Nicaraguan country) where the contras could live and Government then actually went beyond the police themselves.42 Meanwhile, in 1989 the requirements of Esquipulas by assigning OAS created the International Support and the National Reconciliation Commission the Verification Commission (CIAV) to launch the task of establishing “…a more extensive Tela Accord with cooperation from Central internal structure that included region-specific American presidents. The Accord gave the commissions and an extensive network of local 2 CIAV-OAS mission a mandate to support commissions.” and oversee demobilization, repatriation and These local peace commissions developed voluntary resettlement of contras and their different regional characteristics and impacts. families, while ensuring their fundamental rights. Particularly in the south, the history and Regional presidents further agreed to deny characteristics of local peace commissions, access to irregular forces to their territories. differed from those of the central and During the war, the contras had depended on northern regions. The two systems of peace gaining access to sanctuary in Costa Rica and commissions developed independently Honduras, so this decision pushed them to end according to local and external dynamics, hostilities. and their leadership and operations diverged In early 1990, initial peace negotiations formally significantly, playing different roles at various ended the war, but the demobilization process moments during Nicaragua’s war and transition. collapsed quickly and most combatants re- armed by 1991. The contras were divided Southern Nicaragua: Peace internally and the UNO-contra alliance did not commissions and religious leaders survive the political realities of the transition. The Chamorro government was elected in In the south, religious leaders – particularly 1990, but failed to implement many Peace Catholic priests and evangelical pastors Accord commitments. Some analysts argue – joined forces at the peak of the war to that more international peace process oversight negotiate conflict-free zones by forming would have resulted in a greater degree of small commissions of local residents to try accountability and organization during the to foster community level dialogue between
29 the Sandinista Government and contra rebels. took up arms from hidden caches and reignited The commissions’ original mission included violence nationally, particularly in rural areas. documenting and investigating human rights During this renewed fighting, peace commission violations, advocating on behalf of victims, members spent months in the mountains and providing authorities with information.43 engaging the re-armed contras in dialogue and The peace commissions eased local violent taking action to protect them.44 conditions so peasants could then continue planting crops during the war. The CIAV-OAS mission and the By 1987, there were 28 commissions near development of local peace Nueva Guinea in the south, and by the end of commissions in northern and central the war in 1990, there were 60.44 Most peace Nicaragua commissions had five members: an evangelical pastor, a Catholic delegate, a representative The CIAV-OAS mission started work in 1990. of the Nicaraguan Red Cross, a member of Its first task was to supervise to demobilize the opposition party, and a representative of over 22,000 contra combatants in the northern the Government. Zone-based commissions and western regions of the country, and to oversaw and coordinated the work of local coordinate resettlement of the contras and commissions. The local work continued and their relatives. Central and northern Nicaragua more were added after the war ended as experienced the most violence during the war their remit extended to responding to intra- and the greatest flight of refugees. By the end community disputes, land conflicts and crime. of the war in 1990, the civil conflict had a direct impact on almost 20 percent of the country’s Peace commissions performed communication total population of 3.5 million – about 600,000 and mediation functions. They also people. Over 500,000 had left their homelands, strengthened the efforts of religious leaders including 400,000 who were internally to initiate and promote dialogue between the displaced. Sandinistas and contra rebel leaders of different factions at local and higher levels.40 The The CIAV assumed primary responsibility to religious character of the groups complemented care for and protect over 22,000 disarmed and helped facilitate the commissions’ combatants, more than 63,000 family members, neutrality. These commissions supplemented and some 24,000 repatriated individuals existing networks of personal contacts, enabling associated with the contras. At the end of the information exchange and continual dialogue war, displaced people sought to return to their between the Government and the contras. place of residence of the late 1970s or early Commission members were selected for their 1980s.45 As a result, the CIAV focused on these integrity and experience as intermediaries, and areas to fulfill its definitive mission of resettling for their useful connections with conflicting the contras and their families. parties, taking on the role of the ‘trusted insider- partial third party’ that emerges from within the In its early years, the CIAV helped fill an conflict itself.32 institutional vacuum and mitigate local conflicts in the most violent areas through mediation and The commissions had national-level impact human rights verification. Most of this work was through their efforts to negotiate a final done by CIAV-OAS staff members. By the end truce with contra rebels following the failed of 1990, when contras began to rearm, the CIAV disarmament and amnesty granted by the UNO had negotiated 30 agreements and had helped government. The Chamorro Government had demobilize 20,000 rearmed combatants.46 granted land, many amnesties, and, in some CIAV staff included contracted personnel cases, government posts to contra leaders in who had initially been hired for two months.45 exchange for their disarming 20,000 members. The CIAV hired Latin American professionals Months after the war’s end, the contras again and local Nicaraguans including demobilized
AN ARCHITECTURE FOR BUILDING PEACE AT THE LOCAL LEVEL: 30 A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LOCAL PEACE COMMITTEES contra combatants. The mission relied on left. It is not clear how much the CIAV-fostered NICARAGUA communication and travel among over a dozen peace commissions were officially or unofficially field offices in northern and central regions, and tied to bodies that operated during the war in the on efforts to develop relations with citizens in ceasefire zones. Unlike the south, the northern potential conflict areas through building school peace commissions were led by peasants. classrooms and undertaking other community- focused programmes.47 By 1995, the CIAV supported creating 96 peace commissions which worked in four main areas: However, the CIAV-OAS operation and mediation, verifying human rights protection, coordination efforts in Nicaragua have been promoting human rights and facilitating criticized on two fronts. First, some observers community projects.48 called the mission an instrument of the United States Government. Its funds for humanitarian assistance and repatriation of the contras were Salient aspects of the peace supplied by the US international development agency USAID.47 It funded 97 percent - $42.1 architecture million of CIAV-OAS’s budget for April 1990 to June 1993.39 At best, the mission was seen as Leadership and ownership of the peace caught between the wishes of its funder and the commissions OAS bureaucracy, and at worst, not politically neutral. Many believed the CIAV-OAS put special Much can be learned from the differences emphasis on protecting the contras from human in local commission leadership styles in the rights abuses and retaliation, while excluding different regions. In the southern region, religious other groups.39 In later years, the mission leaders were prominent and helped create investigated abuses against Sandinistas and local organizations by training community became more neutral. members as volunteer intermediaries between the Government and the Sandinista and contra Second, the high profile of Argentine officials combatants. This quickly bolstered negotiation in the CIAV-OAS mission generated negative processes as church leaders and members built feelings. Many Sandinistas falsely believed durable local institutions for intra-community these officials had links to Argentine military and conflict resolution. The Evangelical Council intelligence officers who first trained and armed of Churches (CEPAD) was among the first the contras in 1980-81. This created a lasting organizations to work on dispute mediation negative perception however misguided it may in Nicaragua’s conflict zones during the final 47 have been. years of the contra war.39 Many evangelical In 1994, the CIAV mandate was almost over pastors and parishioners represented by and it sought to ensure that local peace bodies CEPAD received deferments from the draft for would continue its peacebuilding and human religious reasons, allowing them to become rights work after it left the country. It originally relatively neutral agents of mediation and to wanted to create peace commissions in the achieve credibility with community members. most highly-conflicted areas since there were Their ecumenical commissions carried out no state institutions or NGOs to assume conflict regular workshops to discuss human rights and mediation and resolution. The overall lack of nonviolent conflict resolution, and practitioners state presence meant there were no legitimate shared this knowledge in their home public mechanisms to arbitrate disputes and communities. 48 impose criminal punishment. The CIAV wanted In the south, developing legitimate respected the local commissions to defend human rights, leaders and community institutions through promote peace and assume verification tasks peace commissions enabled the bodies to and conflict resolution and mediation when it serve as the local government, particularly in
31 rural areas where the state and police were Contextual differences not present. In other words, in the south, local peace commissions depended primarily on Contextual differences between the different churches to work towards peace. This was regions may further explain the divergent local enhanced when an official National Commission peacebuilding approaches. From the early for peace was formed to deepen and strengthen 1970s, political violence in the north created their efforts. patterns of inter-familial and intra-regional conflict. It intensified ideological polarization In the central and northern region, the CIAV- and meant the northern and central regions OAS supported peasant-led organizations were more prone to rebel activity. Demands for to encourage local ownership. Its aim was autonomy by northern coastal communities to create a network of peace commissions, further increased tension with the Government. particularly in conflict-prone areas. The CIAV Meanwhile, in the south, demobilizing contra tried to develop peace commissions through combatants received extensive amounts of land local churches which were seen as strong and local peace commissions were very active. representatives of Nicaraguan civil society,39 This may explain why peace came earlier and but they could not work in harmony. Some easier there. observers have argued the CIAV-OAS mission should have ended much earlier than 1997 However, local peace commissions were and its tasks adopted by Nicaraguans.49 In not the only reason for peace and stability in contrast to the south, the northern approach the south, and the temptation to make easy was strong intervention by an external agent comparisons between regions should be with an international mandate but not enough resisted (see Paul).44 A key factor is that the grassroots support. The lack of local support national conflict between Sandinistas and in the north was likely due to the fact that local contras manifested itself locally in particular and peace commission development began late, specific ways. For example, Lederach2 noted or because the CIAV-OAS did not have the that local peace commissions on the east coast same credibility as the churches; therefore local dealt with conflict that was primarily between ownership and sustainability did not take hold indigenous communities and the Sandinista as it did in the south. Government. The issue there was the needs and demands of indigenous communities; not Cold War ideological tensions. Coordination Nicaragua’s experience with peace Meanwhile, there was little regional or national commissions illustrates an important point: coordination among peace commissions regional historical and cultural differences operating in the south and the north. Arguably, in a war-torn country may require distinct the lack of a single formula or method for peacebuilding approaches attuned to particular forming peace commissions was due to the local conditions and capacities. gradual collapse of civil war, an incomplete peace settlement and an unclear transition to post-war society. During the transition phase, External participants: impartiality the actions of the contras, Sandinistas and and timing UNO government were inconsistent, and there was little joint planning and implementation In the early years, the CIAV-OAS did little to which had a negative effect when local peace promote developing local conflict resolution commissions were formed. institutions. The CIAV-OAS did make critical gains in demobilization, contra resettlement and human rights verifications, but it failed to develop enough local capacity.
AN ARCHITECTURE FOR BUILDING PEACE AT THE LOCAL LEVEL: 32 A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LOCAL PEACE COMMITTEES The limited success of the CIAV-OAS Inclusivity NICARAGUA mission points to what is required if regional organizations or external agents participate in The Sandinista Government supported local effective local peacebuilding. A regional political bodies’ collaborative character by naming body can only succeed if its mission is seen as well-known critic Cardinal Miguel Obando fair and impartial, independent from external y Bravo to head the National Reconciliation funders’ policies and not involved in wartime Commission – a step that was well accepted at alliances. local and regional levels. In forming their own commissions, citizens included well-known opponents. This model, and the commission The role of the church members’ efforts to bridge inter-personal and inter-group divides, helped them to The case of Nicaragua highlights the important catalyse direct negotiations among contras role played by Catholic and evangelical and Sandinista leaders in remote areas. It churches and their institutions in legitimizing also enabled commissions to act as a liaison peace commission roles. This support was between the Chamorro Government and the critical since the Government relied on peace rearmed Sandinista and contra armies. commissions to monitor the ceasefire and reach out to armed groups. Church support often ensured the commissions were perceived as neutral participants and not Government agents. Conclusion The credibility of the church developed over Peace commission efforts bridged a critical many years and mainly grew out of the moral gap between the Government’s efforts to stop authority of the church. The church also gained violence in Nicaragua during and after the war. credibility because it worked with peace Government ‘buy-offs’, the use of force, and commissions at an early stage when peace a series of amnesties failed to convince the was still elusive. Peace commissions gradually contras to abandon arms. Peace commissions received further institutional and capacity- performed important roles at local and regional building support that helped them become levels through confidence-building measures more expert at their work and assured some and sustained dialogue with rebel leaders uniformity of practice.40 – whose reintegration into society posed significant challenges the Government often could not address. Commission efforts helped Methodology to achieve the long-term truce that finally The insider-partial model that emerged is a emerged. key lesson of the Nicaraguan experience. The commissions enabled an ‘unprecedented Commission members were not neutral; they space for dialogue’ in which citizens could had deep links to different sections of the safely express their views and reunite with community. However, they succeeded because family members who were combatants.50 The they adeptly used their personal and institutional experience in Nicaragua also underlined the networks within the context. This networking critical issues of impartiality, insider-partiality, skill worked well with their credibility and inclusivity and credibility – preconditions needed personal and institutional-level confidence to for peace structures and processes to succeed. enable them to influence processes and create “…a successful response to the conciliation needs…of specific communities.”2, 32
33 2. SOUTH AFRICA
The transition between apartheid South Africa The main reason for establishing the NPA and the newly emerging democracy was served was to respond to the country’s escalating by a well-developed peace architecture; local violence that killed more than 6000 people peace committees were the main structures between 1985 and 1990. In February 1990, that prevented violence. These committees President FW de Klerk lifted a ban on liberation operated between 1991 and 1994, and were movements and soon after released imprisoned terminated following the successful national political leaders. It was then widely expected elections of April 1994. The pioneering nature that violence would subside as shared public of South Africa’s peace committees drew the commitment to a negotiated settlement attention of other countries as a model that took over. However, this expectation did not might be copied elsewhere. Ball16 estimates materialize. Between September 1990 and that “…the peace committee concept is August 1991, some 2600 people were killed.18 transferable, but the precise form such The number of deaths and the increasingly committees assume should be developed brutal nature of the violence were alarming. locally.” The South African experience is a Most people felt the violence was severely concluded process. Therefore, it is easier to damaging the prospect of a negotiated identify lessons to be learned about what local settlement. peace structures can and cannot achieve. The National Peace Accord was not a peace South African local peace committees were agreement in the strict sense of the word. It did a product of its 1991 National Peace Accord not contain a political settlement since parallel (NPA) between the main protagonists in its political negotiations were continuing in a stop- conflict. The following case study describes the start manner. The NPA was essentially a code Accord, discusses the architecture set up to of conduct that bound the Government, police implement it, and examines the main relevant and security forces, the political parties and lessons that that can help implementation of the liberation movements to a set of mutually- similar bodies elsewhere. agreed ground rules. It sought to regulate the behaviour of all the main participants while negotiating a political settlement. The NPA also The National Peace Accord had a chapter on socioeconomic reconstruction and development that bound all signatories to Twenty-seven South African political parties specifically focus on rebuilding communities and institutions signed the National Peace affected by violence. Furthermore, the NPA Accord (NPA). These included the Government, created the Goldstone Commission of inquiry the ruling National Party and most political into preventing public violence and intimidation. parties represented in various ‘parliaments’ of South Africa at the time (including the Chapters 7 to 9 of the NPA are relevant to this Tri-cameral Parliament and homelands study. These chapters provided the peace parliaments). The major liberation movements, architecture: a National Peace Committee of all including the African National Congress (ANC) signatories, regional peace committees in 11 also signed. Therefore, the NPA represented regions of the country, local peace committees all main political participants. However, some in all affected areas, and a National Peace fringe parties and movements such as the Secretariat (NPS) to establish and coordinate (white) Conservative Party and the (black) Pan regional and local peace committees. They Africanist Congress, representing a radical pro- also stipulated monitoring and enforcement African position refused to sign. procedures through justices of the peace, and provided an agreement on using arbitration
AN ARCHITECTURE FOR BUILDING PEACE AT THE LOCAL LEVEL: 34 A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LOCAL PEACE COMMITTEES in possible disputes between signatories over The RPCs supervised establishing local peace SOUTH AFRICA any wrongdoing related to the Accord. The last committees in regional towns and villages. chapter (Chapter 10) established special courts Their ultimate goal was to establish LPCs in to speed up all criminal cases resulting from all municipalities, but they initially focused on violent incidents. (The full text of the NPA can be towns that had experienced violence. LPC found in Gastrow18). composition mirrored the RPCs, but they were more inclusive; any civil society organizations Not all of the architecture was fully that wanted to join an LPC could do so. implemented. The National Peace Committee met only twice and was not a factor in peace A controversial decision was taken to locate process advancement. There were never any the bureaucratic administrative management appointments of justices of the peace with of the peace structures in the Department of legal authority to enforce NPA compliance, and Justice. The main funding for these entities arbitration was never used to deal with any came from the Government’s budget and it transgressions of the Accord. The NPA’s impact wanted a government department to oversee was achieved through the work of the Goldstone administration. The liberation movements Commission and regional and local peace distrusted the Government, particularly the committees (coordinated by the National Peace Department of Justice. This created problems Secretariat). and threatened the legitimacy of the peace committees. However, the committees needed to get on with their work, so to offset potential The peace architecture17, 18, 21, 16 damage, they established their own offices in separate premises and appointed their own The National Peace Secretariat was responsible staff. They also negotiated a considerable for implementing and coordinating the various degree of bureaucratic flexibility over structures that were created. The Secretariat procurement and payment procedures due to consisted of nine people agreed through a the urgency of the work they had to do. Local consensus of NPA signatories and was chaired peace committees were accountable to the by a senior advocate. Members represented the multi-party regional peace committees, and main political parties and movements and South ultimately to the National Peace Committee Africa’s Department of Justice. through the National Peace Secretariat. The Secretariat divided the country into 11 regions and helped establish regional peace committees (RPCs) in each. Not all regions LPCs’ mandate experienced the same levels of violence. The Under the NPA, LPCs were assigned the Secretariat focused on the most troubled following tasks (NPA, 7.4.8): regions; the PWV-area (roughly the same as the current Gauteng Province), KwaZulu-Natal, • Create trust and reconciliation between the Eastern Cape and the Western Cape. The relevant community organization leaders, regional peace committees consisted of regional including the police and the army. representatives of all signatories present in that region, as well as other relevant regional civil • Prevent violence and intimidation by society entities such as religious organizations, cooperating with the local justice of the trade unions, business and industry peace. representatives and traditional authorities. Other representatives included the police and defense • Resolve disputes that could lead to public force and relevant government ministries with violence or intimidation by negotiating with administrative responsibility for black townships. relevant parties, and recording agreements.
35 • Eliminate conditions detrimental to peaceful be easy for South Africa to be sucked up relations and peace agreements. into a vortex of violence.”18 Violence had escalated, but the general consensus was • Promote compliance with peace this would have been far worse if there agreements. were no peace committees. LPCs helped to • Reach agreement on the rules and contain violence, but were unable to prevent conditions for marches, rallies and other it completely. public events. • LPCs facilitated local dialogue and, for the • Liaise with local police and magistrates on first time, assemblies of stakeholders made preventing violence and setting conditions up of all relevant categories of participants for rallies, marches and public events. were able to address local issues jointly. It is impossible to quantify the value of • Report and make recommendations to the these dialogues in terms of localizing the regional peace committee. search for peace, promoting relationships, legitimizing negotiations, fostering reconciliation and deepening democracy. LPCs’ contribution to peace • LPCs mediated many local disputes, mainly Several studies have assessed the impact of between township communities and local LPCs16, 17, 18, 19, 38, 20, 21, 22 and offered the following government. observations: • LPCs were powerless in the face of • A truly objective assessment is almost spoilers, or when political will was lacking. impossible because of the lack of As suspected at the time, and confirmed quantitative data. On one hand, LPCs had later, much of the violence was deliberately different success rates in different parts of stoked by the so-called Third Force the country. For example, LPC activities in (sections of the security establishment). the Western Cape were more successful Local bodies that operated through than KwaZulu-Natal (probably because the facilitation and mediation were powerless Inkhata Freedom Party was weak in the in the face of deliberate planned violence. Western Cape). In KwaZulu-Natal, most of They were equally powerless, for example, the violence occurred in clashes between in KwaZulu-Natal, when some local leaders Inkhata and ANC supporters. of political parties clearly signaled their lack of commitment to peace. • The verdict of the various studies is unanimous in concluding that LPCs • Somewhat unfairly, LPCs have been contributed towards containing the spiral of criticized for making ‘negative peace’, i.e. violence – despite the fact that the number for reducing violence without addressing of violent deaths increased during the its root causes.51 However, these root lifetime of the LPCs (from about 2600 to causes could only be addressed through over 3500 in two years). The minutes of RPC negotiating a completely new Constitution, meetings and the NPS contained regular which happened in a separate process. reports of successful LPC interventions. The LPCs operated in the context of a Star, a leading Johannesburg newspaper, discredited and largely dysfunctional state initially expressed skepticism about the where reducing violence was an urgent and NPA. However, by September 1992, it was immediate concern. writing that: “without an accord it would
AN ARCHITECTURE FOR BUILDING PEACE AT THE LOCAL LEVEL: 36 A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LOCAL PEACE COMMITTEES Ball’s summary16 of events is possibly the townships where there were high levels of SOUTH AFRICA most apt: “…viewed as a whole, the peace anger and outrage. Placing police on LPCs was committees had a mixed record, and a definite a contentious matter as they were seen as the assessment of their ‘success’ or ‘failure’ is ‘enemy’ in the townships and there was doubt impossible. Peace committees were unable to about whether they were genuinely committed stop violence completely, but often limited its to peace. For example, some liberation activists occurrence. They were unable to end impunity realized that they would be sitting on an LPC on the part of the security forces, but they with police officers implicated in their arrest and were able to help by equalizing the balance of torture in the recent past. power between those in power and ordinary citizens, and to strengthen accountability. Regional peace committee members Their ability to address the underlying causes understood the peace process needed to be a of conflict was circumscribed, but even in the carefully-facilitated process to secure local buy- most violence-ridden areas peace committee in, and that LPCs could not be established by staff were able to mediate conflict and create simply faxing instructions to the local branches a safe space within which problems could be of organizations. Establishing an LPC had to discussed. And though unable to transform be rooted in the conscious decision of local the ‘struggle mentality’, they were able to help participants to engage with the peace process South Africans take their first steps toward – even though that implied they had the right understanding the value of negotiations and to say ‘no’ to, or block LPC formation (as how to engage in them constructively.” happened in several instances). A precondition for an LPC to succeed was the need to work patiently through local resistance to peace and deal with related local concerns. Lessons The regional peace committees decided to The following lessons may be relevant for local employ fieldworkers on a full-time basis and to peacebuilding processes elsewhere: give them the task of facilitating processes to establish LPCs. A typical process21, 17 involved a The process of establishing LPCs was series of one-on-one meetings with the various as important as the national mandate local organizations in which people discussed to create them NPA implications and their concerns. The entry point was often a particular violent incident In terms of their legitimacy, the LPCs were that had occurred, or a dispute that was founded on two ‘legs’. The first was the potentially violent. Local organizations were mandate provided by the National Peace asked to seek a mandate from their members Accord. Without such a national agreement, in to form an LPC as a means of dealing with the many places it would have been impossible to particular dispute or the fallout of violence. establish LPCs, since resistance would have Establishing an LPC only took place once all come from all sides of the conflict, the political the significant participants had received this and security establishment and liberation mandate. In some places, LPCs were never movements. established; in others, they were only created after protracted local negotiations. Sometimes, The second leg is as crucial as the first; local LPCs became quite inactive after their creation buy-in into the concept of LPCs. The National as the process of establishment itself was the Peace Accord was an elite pact19, 16, 18 true peacemaking event. negotiated behind closed doors and then announced to the public. At grassroots level, The analysis showed there were no guarantees there were pockets of strong violent resistance local communities would make peace to the NPA, much of it occurring in black simply because national leadership made
37 that decision. In the South African case, the support, and also helped the LPCs national agreement provided an opportunity, to design and implement appropriate a framework and a legitimate mandate, but strategies to deal with conflicts. The local participants ultimately needed to take appointed staff members were mainly responsibility for their own peace. from civil society, especially the business, religious and NGO sectors. At the time, staff The LPCs relied on a functioning peace received little preparation or orientation architecture for their work and there were no ‘best practices. Some local and international LPCs could not have operated in an NGOs provided training to some of the staff. administrative or logistical vacuum. The peace On the whole, staff mainly had to act on architecture created provided support as NPA principles, regional peace committee follows: decisions and their own instincts. RPC staff • Funding. LPC members did not receive were an indispensable ingredient of the financial compensation, but costs success achieved. associated with meetings, workshops and • UN and other international monitors. other peace activities were covered through When the UN deployed its monitoring team the national budget. The greatest peace in 1992, the members decided to work architecture costs were employing staff and closely with the peace committees. Other equipping their offices. observer missions (the European Union • A functioning network. LPCs did not exist (EU), the British Commonwealth and the in isolation but were linked with other area Organisation of African Unity (OAU) followed committees, regional peace committees and suit and became very closely associated the NPS. Through these networks, LPCs with the peace committees. On the whole, could call on regional or national resources their presence added value to committee to help deal with specific local disputes. work, especially in monitoring potentially Problematic issues for individual LPCs were violent marches or other public events. The discussed at regular two-weekly meetings presence of these international participants of the regional peace committees. When strengthened LPC legitimacy, and in some possible, the regional peace committee cases helped to defuse potentially violent helped with access to relevant resources. situations. However, Ball16 made the valid This support often included intervention by observation that the calibre of the help regional or national participants who had they provided depended on the quality and the clout to defuse a particular bottleneck. attitude of individuals. Some were little more than disguised tourists, while others who • The professional services of full- were willing to be proactive added the time staff. The staff that regional peace most value. committees appointed played a key role how peace committees worked. Typically, staff stepped into a violent conflict situation The NPA created opportunities for on behalf of the committee and initiated substantial civil society involvement a peace process. If they succeeded, an The NPA process could not have succeeded LPC would usually be set up. Once it was without input from civil society. The Accord established, regional peace committee itself was the product of a joint initiative staff provided logistical and administrative between the business sector and the churches.
AN ARCHITECTURE FOR BUILDING PEACE AT THE LOCAL LEVEL: 38 A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LOCAL PEACE COMMITTEES Its final text was negotiated by religious and civil disobedience. There was no way that SOUTH AFRICA business leaders. The Consultative Business justices of the peace could serve peace by Movement (CBM) was involved. It was a joint applying the law because the legitimacy of the instrument of big business companies that law was fundamentally challenged. It did not facilitated their social engagement. CBM matter whether the justice of the peace was provided much of the process’s administrative black or white because the law was ‘white’, back-up. It also seconded several staff to the and imposing it invariably sparked violence. NPS and regional peace committees. Regional bodies and LPCs were chaired by civil society LPCs were most successful when they used figures that drove the peace process forward. ‘soft’ approaches to conflict, i.e. dialogue They occupied the middle-ground and kept all facilitation and mediation. They faced much parties together, countering strong polarizing criticism from all sides because they were forces. These chairpersons led most of the perceived to lack the will or the ‘teeth’ to facilitation, mediation and violence prevention censure people who acted violently. These work. They can best be described by perceived perpetrators were, of course, fellow Lederach’s term of ‘insider-partials’. They were LPC members. However, it was unfair to expect not impartial (no South African was), but their LPCs to become arbitrators or referees in local commitment to the greater good of preventing disputes where the very rules of the game were violence and finding workable solutions made contested. Instead, the essence of the LPC them credible to a wide spectrum of people. process was that it created an opportunity for civil society leadership to bring protagonists The lesson here is that the ‘business’ of peace together while keeping communication alive. cannot be left solely to politicians. The peace LPCs were unable to enforce peace, but they process gained much depth and breadth could bring it about by using softer approaches because it fostered opportunities for insider- to conflict. partials to operate effectively. The lesson in this is that LPCs should not be burdened with unrealistic expectations, The dominant methodology must fit particularly related to enforcing peace. The the circumstances same applies to LPC ability to address the root causes of conflict. They cannot be expected NPA design included measures to enforce to transform deep-rooted conflict without the compliance by providing for the appointment necessary national framework, mandate and of local justices of the peace to investigate resources in place. cases of public violence and intimidation. When the problem could not be solved through mediation, they could refer the matter to the Empowerment of women South Africa’s Attorney-General. The justices There is a very pertinent criticism of the NPA of the peace could also apply rules of natural and its structures. It did not pay enough justice to resolve disputes; by implication this attention to including marginalized groups would ensure that LPC decisions were legal. such as women and youth. Political party and However, no justices of the peace were ever organization leaders dominated the LPCs; appointed because authorities felt that putting most members were men. To be fair, women’s them in place would be ineffective and too organizations and youth structures were always dangerous. In essence, the ‘struggle’ in South invited to join, and in many places they did. Africa was based on the black community’s However, there was no deliberate policy to rejection of the white government’s authority. strengthen the ‘voice’ of women in local peace During the 1980s, the internal liberation processes, or to ensure they were included in movements tried to achieve their goals through LPC leadership structures.
39 3. KENYA
Kenya is a fascinating example of a bottom- peacemaking and peacebuilding activities in up process to establish a peace architecture. the district, and second, to ensure continued The process is not yet complete, but several participation by people with formal authority.52 dilemmas and consequent lessons have already However, how to formalize the process was emerged. a problem due to the strained relationships between civil society activists and government The move to achieve peace in Kenya was officials (a common situation in Africa). initiated in 1993 by a group of women from If government controlled a formal peace the Wajir district that borders Somalia and structure, some civil society participants would 52 Ethiopia. At the time, a highly destructive be unhappy. If civil society had control (for cycle of violent conflict raged there between example, by forming an NGO), cooperation with different clans of Kenyan Somalis, leading to government officials would be strained. more than 1200 deaths over four years. The violence was caused by: Eventually it was decided to integrate peace initiatives into the one structure in • a very weak district government presence the district administration in Kenya that that led to state institutions failing to brought government, NGOs and citizen regulate conflict, provide security and groups together – the District Development promote development; Committee. In May 1995, the Wajir Peace and Development Committee was formed with • an arid drought-plagued physical the District Commissioner as chairperson. environment with few natural resources to Members included the heads of all government sustain the population; departments, representatives of various peace groups, religious leaders, NGO representatives, • a pastoralist culture of local inhabitants that village chiefs and security officers. condoned livestock raiding; The Wajir Peace and Development Committee • an influx of refugees from Somalia and succeeded in implementing and maintaining Ethiopia; peace in the district, which soon led to the model being copied in other northern districts. • a ready availability of small arms. After this success, international donors, NGOs The Wajir initiative consisted of civil society and the National Council of Churches in Kenya participants working together to sensitize became involved in facilitating and supporting the population on the need for peace. They establishing local peace committees. However, started by engaging the elders of different the uncoordinated and haphazard process clans in a mediation process. After several sometimes led to several peace committees meetings, the elders agreed to sign a code of being set up in a single district. In addition, the conduct called the Al Fatah Declaration. During same model was not always followed. Adan 53 this process, on a voluntary basis, the civil and Pkalya identified three main varied models society participants worked with and involved for peace committee leadership, from those representatives of formal authority, particularly chaired by the District Commissioner, to others the district commissioner and the member of chaired by an elected civil society member. Parliament. The national Government soon took notice of However, about a year after the initiative local peace committees. In 2001, it established started, two reasons to formalize the process the National Steering Committee (NSC) on emerged: first, to provide coordination of all the Peacebuilding and Conflict Management
AN ARCHITECTURE FOR BUILDING PEACE AT THE LOCAL LEVEL: 40 A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LOCAL PEACE COMMITTEES which aimed to formulate a national policy on different values and customs were at stake. KENYA conflict management, and to coordinate various In addition, peace committees have helped peacebuilding initiatives including the local marginalized communities and the Government peace committees. In the same year, it used to engage – making it more responsive to these the creation of local peace committees in five communities. districts to negotiate the Modogashe Declaration with various pastoralist clans. The Declaration However, the following issues and dilemmas essentially laid down ground rules for dealing have emerged: with ongoing conflict associated with cattle • The peace committees in Kenya’s pastoralist rustling. It was amended in 2005 and re-named areas operated in the vacuum created by the Garissa Declaration. In some respects, this Declaration conflicted with the Kenyan weak governance institutions – particularly Constitution and jurisprudence14, but it has been the justice system – that could not provide formally recognized by the Government. security and justice to communities. This weakness was caused by a lack of resources The process of formulating a national conflict and political will, and by the ‘disconnect’ management policy proved to be politically between two different models of justice: complicated. The NSC had tabled a draft policy the clan model and the state model. The document as far back as 200654. In terms of mediation offered by peace committees the new constitution ratified in 2010, however, involved more than problem-solving; they the NSC will be transformed into the national coordination agency for peacebuilding and also mediated, albeit unconsciously, at conflict prevention. The peace architecture is the level of those fundamental values therefore still work in progress. underpinning the justice system. In 2007, post-election mayhem killed more • However, Chopra14 has identified a dilemma than 1500 people, and some 350,000 were posed by this situation. The negotiated displaced by inter-ethnic violence. This led to declarations are prime examples of mini the National Accord and Reconciliation Act ‘social compacts’ that are evolving through of 2008 which recommended establishing a meaningful engagement between the district peace committees in all of Kenya’s state and local communities. However, at districts. The fact that districts with peace certain points these compacts fundamentally committees reported much less violence than contradict the constitutional values of the others15 considerably raised awareness of the state. The negotiated declarations offer importance of enhancing local capacities for peace, but they compromise constitutional peace. In the implementation plan, coordinated by NSC with UNDP support, priority was given justice. This has made matters difficult for to the Rift Valley area where most of the violence state officials such as district commissioners had occurred.55 because they have had to choose which model to follow in each situation. There is reasonable consensus among researchers and observers that, on the whole, • Another dilemma arose around issues Kenya’s peace committees have succeeded of inclusion and democracy. Traditional by showing they can manage inter-community customs, particularly the authority of elders, conflict, and contain or prevent violence. meant that women and youth could not In particular, Chopra14 has noted the peace participate in peace processes, and also committees’ ability to integrate a broad range reinforced traditional unbalanced power of relevant local stakeholders to help resolve structures. NGOs and donors often lobbied conflict; apply features of the local system; for women and youth to be included on and tackle cases of inter-ethnic conflict where
41 peace committees, but doing so did not • Finally, there is a dilemma regarding local substantially challenge the power structures ownership and external support. The and was little more than window dressing.14 Wajir process was almost wholly locally owned. In most other cases, NGOs and • There was also a dilemma as to whether donors oversaw establishment of peace committees should use mediation or committees. There seems to be an inverse arbitration as the primary peacemaking correlation between local ownership and method. Arbitration assumes conflicting external support: the more the process parties recognize the authority of the relies on external support, the weaker it is. arbitrating body. Mediation assumes the Adan and Pkalya53 went as far as accusing parties share mutual confidence in the NGOs of encouraging uncouth behaviour mediator. The proposal to formalize peace by offering sitting fees to peace committee committees was based on a perceived need members. Yet, some external support is to enhance their authority, and therefore necessary. Without key logistical, intellectual their capacity to arbitrate. However, once and technical support for mediation the committees were seen as having formal processes, most peace committees would authority, they experienced power struggles not be able to function. Official recognition 53, and competition to control key positions. is also a type of support, although the 14 The very heart of the conflict in Kenya is more the process is formalized, the less differing views of legitimacy of authority, so local ownership and initiative is possible. adopting arbitration as a primary intervention The dilemma is how to provide necessary model might yet prove counter-productive. support to peace committees without undermining local ownership. UN P HOTO / TI M MAKU L KA
AN ARCHITECTURE FOR BUILDING PEACE AT THE LOCAL LEVEL: 42 A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LOCAL PEACE COMMITTEES 4. NORTHERN IRELAND NORTHERN IRELAND
Introduction people in favour of partition and others who felt it betrayed the Republican ideal. At first glance, Northern Ireland’s District Policing Partnerships seem like any other In 1967, a civil rights campaign was launched community-policing mechanism; many to promote liberal reforms. It resulted in high examples of these exist worldwide. Yet, levels of disorder that resulted in the British Northern Ireland’s mechanisms were part of a Army intervening to impose order. This had an peacebuilding architecture with a very specific unintended outcome; it radicalized Republican remit: to bring about local consensus on sentiments. The Provisional Irish Republican effective policing in a context where policing Army was formed and shortly after embarked was at the very heart of the conflict. Therefore, on a campaign of deliberate violence against the country’s District Policing Partnerships were the British Army. Paramilitaries with sentiments in fact local peace committees with a definite loyal to the Unionists also joined the fray. The national peacebuilding objective. violence peaked in 1972 when 468 people died. The situation in Northern Ireland was characterized by social and economic inequality Background between the two communities, especially in employment and housing. Catholics faced The ‘troubles’ in Northern Ireland have been clear disadvantages. The civil rights campaign the topic of extensive research – some 10,000 succeeded in bringing reform for some of 56 studies. The causes of the conflict are varied, the problems, but not enough to check the but historically the seed was sown by the momentum of the violent conflict.108, 57 colonial displacement of Irish inhabitants by British settlers which began in 1609.57 In 1921, In this context, it was no surprise that from the Ireland was partitioned into a Republican South moment of its birth, policing in Northern Ireland and a Unionist North (as a consequence of the was controversial. Unionists felt threatened and Government of Ireland Act of 1920, the so- took steps to ensure their security. They relied called Anglo-Irish Treaty) in what was effectively on the security forces of Great Britain, but also a demographic compromise.57 The six counties set up the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) that formed Northern Ireland represented the and equipped it with powers and resources largest area that could comfortably be held, to maintain stability and provide security. One with most people in favor of a union with means of doing so was the Ulster Special Britain. Constabulary (or ‘B-Specials’) established in 1920. It was made up almost exclusively of The Unionists were mostly Protestant and Protestant Unionists and was a quasi-military took political control of Northern Ireland until force designed to counter insurgency. Unionists the Good Friday Agreement of 1998 ushered viewed the Royal Ulster Special Constabulary in power-sharing with the mostly Catholic as a valiant bulwark against illegal insurgency Republicans who constituted approximately 30 and terrorism, but the Republicans saw it percent of the population of Northern Ireland. as a brutal instrument used to enforce their The birth of Northern Ireland was mired by marginalization in society. The force was violence. Between July 1920 and July 1922, 257 disbanded in 1970. Catholics and 157 Protestants were murdered These perceptions also spilled over into the 58 in sectarian attacks. The settlement of 1921 RUC in general. The RUC was dominated precipitated a civil war in the South between
43 by Protestants – in 1998, 88.1 percent were Establishing an architecture for Protestant and 8 percent Catholic.59 Republicans believed the RUC was the armed wing of transforming policing Unionism and the key bulwark of British The Good Friday Agreement acknowledged that occupation.110 The RUC was the defender of the police reform was both a relevant and sensitive state in the context of a severe contestation of issue. In their own words, the signatories the legitimacy of the state, and became a visible recognized that “… Northern Ireland’s history of and deeply resented symbol of oppression.59 deep divisions has made policing highly emotive, Feeling against the RUC was so strong that its with great hurt suffered and sacrifices made by police officers did not dare tell their children many individuals and their families, including what they did for a living because they feared those in the RUC and other public servants. They attack. The Unionists believed RUC members believe the agreement offers the opportunity for were heroes in the front-line against terrorism; a new beginning to policing in Northern Ireland custodians of nationhood.59 In the line of duty, with a police service capable of attracting and 303 RUC members were killed and thousands sustaining support from the community as a injured.60 In this context, transforming policing whole. They also believe that this agreement was a much needed peacebuilding objective. offers a unique opportunity to bring about a new political dispensation which will recognize the full and equal legitimacy and worth of the The Good Friday/Belfast identities, senses of allegiance and ethos of all Agreement of 1998 sections of the community in Northern Ireland.”61 The signatories felt a transformed police service The April 1998 Good Friday Agreement61 was a would be a key way to achieve an inclusive, major breakthrough. “For the first time, the two equal and free society. To succeed, they knew sovereign governments of the United Kingdom that local peacebuilding structures would be and the Republic of Ireland, with the support necessary. of the United States, along with parties from The Agreement provided for establishing a across the political divide, agreed on a new Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland to political framework for Northern Ireland.”27 A advise on the best way to transform policing. The country-wide referendum a month later endorsed Agreement also stipulated some fundamental the Agreement with strong majorities in both objectives the Commission should pursue. communities. The Agreement introduced One was to ensure that “… there are clearly the principle of power-sharing and inclusive established arrangements enabling local people, governance and committed the parties to non- and their political representatives, to articulate violent political processes. It also abolished their views and concerns about policing and to the Republic of Ireland’s territorial claims on establish publicly policing priorities and influence Northern Ireland in favour of formal mechanisms policing policies, subject to safeguards to ensure for cooperation between the Republic of Ireland, police impartiality and freedom from partisan Northern Ireland and Britain. political control...”.61 However, implementing the Accord proved This Commission subsequently became known extremely difficult. The first power-sharing as the Patten Commission after its chairperson, Government collapsed in 2002, mainly due to Lord Chris Patten. Its report contained a detailed failure to make progress on decommissioning peace architecture to transform policing. It weapons. In May 2007, after more intense recognized that “… the issue of policing is at the negotiations, elections established a new heart of many of the problems that politicians power-sharing executive of Sinn Fein and the have been unable to resolve in Northern Ireland Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) – both the hard- ...”.59 The Commission recommended forming line political factions of the two communities. a Policing Board to hold the Chief Constable
AN ARCHITECTURE FOR BUILDING PEACE AT THE LOCAL LEVEL: 44 A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LOCAL PEACE COMMITTEES to account, with the authority to approve component – the police – to engage with the NORTHERN IRELAND annual policing plans determining policing community.62 In this way, he felt consensus priorities. The Policing Board would have would be built on priorities for policing within a 19 members, 10 Members of the Legislative divided community, and trust would be restored Assembly representing parties that served in the in the police as a professional service across Executive, but members would not be Ministers. the community. The other nine members would be independent Unionist circles viewed the Patten Report representatives of various parts of society with alarm. David Trimble, leader of the Ulster (such as business and trade unions), composed Unionist Party, called it the “shoddiest report in “… with the aim of finding a group of individuals 35 years.”63 He was partly concerned the police representative of the community as a whole, force would “… be dominated by politicians and with the expertise both to set policing priorities district policing partnerships, again dominated and to probe and scrutinize different areas by politicians - and constructed, particularly of police performance, from management with the gerrymandering of Belfast, in such a of resources to the safeguarding of human way as to enable certain paramilitary-related rights.”59 Creation of this Board meant that politicians (read: Sinn Fein) to exercise undue policing became the joint responsibility of all influence over policing.” Another controversial political parties and the wider civil community. aspect was the report’s call for drastic measures to balance the composition of the Furthermore, the Agreement stated that each new police service so that it represented both district council should establish a district communities, and to abolish the existing police policing partnership board (DPPB). These service emblem, flag, name and oath.64 bodies would be a committee of council, composed on similar lines to the national The Patten Commission recommendations body, with one more elected member than had to be enacted into law. In light of the independents. The DPPBs were designed to be controversy, the Police (Northern Ireland) Act of broadly representative of the district in terms of 2000 contained some inevitable and substantial religion, gender, age and cultural background. compromises. Hillyard and Tomlinson64 have The chair of the DPPB would be held by an criticized the Bill for completely rejecting the elected member and rotated between parties Patten Commission Report’s core proposition. yearly. “The P(atten Commission) R(eport)’s structure of a central Police Board and district partnerships The DPPBs were to have an advisory, is retained, but both levels are stripped explanatory and consultative role. “The of effective powers and many democratic Boards should represent the consumer, voice elements are neutralized.” the concerns of citizens and monitor the performance of the police in their districts …”.59 Their complaints related specifically to the The Agreement called for monthly meetings following changes: between the DPPB and the local police commander, and police would be compelled • District Policing Partnerships (note how the to consider the views of the DPPB. Patten word ‘Board’ was dropped) would only have also created links between the DPPBs and consultative powers, leaving final decision- the Policing Board through annual meetings, making to the police. regular seminars and other events, in addition to ensuring an adequate flow of information. • Persons convicted of terrorist offences would not be allowed to serve on the DPPs. Patten’s idea with the DPPBs was to ensure a constant dialogue at local levels between • DPPs would not be allowed to deal with the the police and the community, providing a unfinished business of the past. They were mechanism to compel the more powerful strictly confined to the present and future.
45 Ryan62 distinguished between ‘democratic’ and policing in their districts. In fact, Protestant ‘liberal’ policing. The Patten Report argued for satisfaction dropped by a significant 4 percent ‘democratic’, the Bill settled for ‘liberal’. The from 2006, mainly because the Protestants liberal model is wary of popular participation in felt the justice system was too lenient. Most policing, and focuses on strong accountability respondents had neutral attitudes towards the structures and forcefully policed human rights police, about a quarter of both were dissatisfied legislation. Ryan stated this model curtailed with the police. However, it is striking how DPP potential to facilitate deliberations needed attitudes towards the police have normalized. in such divided communities. The negative perception of policing among Catholics has largely been overcome. About The Democratic Unionist Party, Ulster Unionist 80 percent of both groups believe people are Party, and the Social Democratic and Labour willing to engage with the police. Party (SDLP) accepted the Bill, but Sinn Fein rejected it, refused to take up its entitled two This said, the lingering impact of the troubles seats on the Policing Board, and discouraged is reflected in responses on why people would all Republicans from serving on DPPs, stating: be unwilling to engage with the police. Two “They have whittled down the powers of the thirds of Protestants blamed the justice system partnerships in terms of accountability so you for being too lenient (45 percent of Catholics). have a local community body to which the Dislike or fear of the police was mentioned as RUC Chief might speak but it has no actual a factor by fewer Protestants than Catholics. A accountability.”62 It was only in late January person’s political opinion mattered somewhat 2007 that the general membership of Sinn to both groups; while the history of the Fein decided to support policing reforms. As a troubles was a factor for fewer Protestants result, Sinn Fein has joined the Policing Board than Catholics. Only 8 percent of Protestants and DPPs. thought the police were not representative of their community, compared with 19 percent of Consequently, almost 10 years after the signing Catholics. of the Good Friday Accord, the architecture created to facilitate police reform could claim to The statistics, however, do not capture the have support from all the main participants. depth of resentment among minorities that still distrust the police. Sinn Fein’s decision to support PSNI has led to several defections Progress in police from the party.67 In December 2007, the Sunday Times reported68 that during the previous transformation months signs of disquiet had become visible Between 2003 and 2008, regular surveys were among grassroots Republicans in key areas conducted to gauge citizens’ perceptions and on the issue of Sinn Fein support for policing. attitudes about policing in general, and of the In Strabane, a town where dissidents were DPPs in particular. Survey findings support seeking members, two Sinn Fein councillors the view expressed in 2008 by Sir Hugh refused to take up their places on a DPP; the Orde,65 Chief Constable of the Police Service positions went to the DUP. of Northern Ireland (PSNI) as the police were Sinn Fein pointed out that 55 of its councillors now formally called. He said that policing had had joined DPPs, but the party could not come through “massive changes” with positive conceal widespread discontent. Dissent results. gave rise to the more worrying threat of A 2008 survey66 by the Northern Ireland recourse to violence. In December 2007, the Statistics and Research Agency found that Irish Republican Liberation Army, a dissident 69 more Catholics (33 percent) than Protestants group, issued a statement vowing to kill Sinn (30 percent) were generally satisfied with Fein members who sat on District Policing
AN ARCHITECTURE FOR BUILDING PEACE AT THE LOCAL LEVEL: 46 A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LOCAL PEACE COMMITTEES Partnerships. Furthermore, it stated that Northern Ireland officials. However, these NORTHERN IRELAND “people in Republican communities who give acknowledgements have not provided any information to the PSNI will be treated as meaningful substantiation. informers. The punishment for that is death.” A fairly high awareness of DPPs exists in local However, at the same time the threats and communities. The 2008 survey found that defections did not weaken Sinn Fein’s resolve three-quarters of all respondents had heard to support PSNI. On several occasions, Gerry of DPPs. About a third of Protestants and Adams, the Sinn Fein leader, has declared that Catholics said they were confident DPPs were much progress has been made. For example helping to address local policing problems, in April 2008, Adams met with Sir Hugh Orde although around half of both groups did not and said: “clearly there has been progress – we have much confidence in the DPPs. In terms would be the first ones to acknowledge that, of awareness, more than half of respondents and I have said on many occasions there has learned about DPPs through the press. been progress. There have been positive things happening, but there is some more work to be A cursory review of newspaper articles on done.”70 Sinn Fein leaders have also withstood DPPs over the past two years shows they local intimidation. For example, the Sinn Fein focused on controversial DPP incidents. There chairman of the Moyle DPP was threatened is not much press coverage on the substance with death in November 2009 if he attended a and tone of DPP discussions. Furthermore, the DPP meeting, but he went anyway.71 public view of DPPs has not shown significant sectarian variance. Catholics are more On the whole, remarkable progress has been favorably disposed to them than Protestants. made, much to Lord Patten’s satisfaction. In October 2008, he described the PSNI as a DPPs were not the only social mechanisms “very professional police service, which others working to normalize community-police around the world look to as a model of how to relationships. Important work was done by police a previously divided society.”65 In some civil society groups such as the Community respects, the increasingly violent response Safety Partnerships and restorative justice from marginal groups may underscore the projects which aimed to counteract the success of transforming policing in Northern administering of justice by paramilitary 35, 34 Ireland. In 2010 the final and politically very groups. Between 1998 and 2005, more difficult stepof completely devolving police and than 1800 paramilitary-style shootings and justice departments from British control to the assaults were recorded in Northern Ireland. Northern Ireland Government was taken. In his independent assessment of the work by Community Restorative Justice Ireland and Northern Ireland Alternatives, Mika35 found that their projects on restorative justice The impact of DPPs had a measurable and significant impact. In It is difficult to assess how much credit communities with these projects, there was a DPPs can claim for what has been achieved. clear reduction in paramilitary punishments. Clearly, national intra- and inter-party work is These projects were undertaken in responsible for much of the progress (such communities with a perceived absence of as the progression in Sinn Fein’s position on legitimate policing, and where “…statutory policing). Work done with and by the police to bodies appear to be indifferent to victims professionalize their services has contributed who reside in working class areas…”.35 The substantially. projects relied on former paramilitary leaders The role of DPPs has been publicly to enhance confidence, and promoted acknowledged by many highly placed reconciliation and restitution rather than punishment.
47 However, there was tension between the work integrated Northern Ireland, so processes on restorative justice and efforts to restore promoting reconciliation were largely driven police and wider justice system credibility. by civil society. The DPPs seem to be the only The restorative justice projects largely worked formal local mechanism that included both through informal processes of reconciliation political and civil society representatives. and restitution. They bypassed the formal judicial system at a time when restoring What then was the specific contribution of its legitimacy was a national priority. As DPPs? On one hand, they lacked the power to demonstrated elsewhere (such as in Kenya), hold the police accountable; they were often civil society peacebuilding projects have the dismissively referred to as ‘talk-shops’. On capacity to facilitate justice in contexts where the other hand, they provided a platform for state institutions are weak or compromised, representatives of a much-divided community although they are potentially at odds with the to meet with representatives of a highly larger state-building project. controversial security institution, the police. Their joint task was to build consensus on This does not mean that civil society projects policing priorities in a manner described in an should be discouraged, but rather that the article in the Irish News:73 implicit tension should be acknowledged and managed. Consider the statement by John “There is something of a quiet, largely unseen Braithwaite,35 winner of the 2005 Stockholm revolution, taking place inside the Republican Prize in Criminology: “Northern Ireland actually community and the PSNI, as each comes has a more mature debate on standards and to terms with the other in their joint task of principles of restorative justice than any society creating a new policing service for a society I know. ... I suspect this is because Northern emerging from war and conflict. I got an insight Ireland has a more politicized contest between into that quiet revolution last Thursday night at state and civil society models of restorative a meeting of the West Belfast District Policing justice than can be found in other places. Such Partnership. On one side, those with a long fraught contexts are where there is the greatest history in the IRA and Sinn Fein and their risk of justice system catastrophes. But they community. On the other, those once with the also turn out to be the contexts with the richest RUC – the armed wing of Unionists – now with prospects for rising to the political challenges new police officers in the PSNI, a police service with a transformative vision of restorative on the cusp of change beyond its imagination. justice…” There were others representing the SDLP and independents, but the fascinating experience Another factor to consider when assessing was in the occasion itself … The meeting was a the DPP impact is that the Good Friday constructive and critical encounter. The cut and Agreement basically opted for a consociational thrust of the exchange reflected clear progress dispensation. Consociational theory postulates being made in tackling anti-community crime.” that communal identities are irreconcilable and should be politically accommodated through From the above description, it is clear that systems of power-sharing that are based on DPPs provided a social space where an their explicit recognition. Farry27 pointed out exchange could take place. It was the dialogue that adopting this model for Northern Ireland that mattered. Of course, the concrete contributed to persistent deep communal outcomes were important, but without building divisions and increased political polarization. enough mutual understanding, bureaucratic Politicians had no incentive to moderate outcomes would have been meaningless. identity-based statements. “Peace has come The Newry Democrat74 provides more insight 27 at the price of reconciliation.” There was no from a different angle. In November 2009, it overarching political vision for a united and reported that the new DUP chair of a certain
AN ARCHITECTURE FOR BUILDING PEACE AT THE LOCAL LEVEL: 48 A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LOCAL PEACE COMMITTEES DPP had said that he thought the DPP was a Conclusion NORTHERN IRELAND waste of time. “There was a hidden agenda to DPPs when they were first set up,” he said. • DPPs offered a platform for local political “It was to get certain people to sit down with elites to meet and conduct dialogue on police. Now that Sinn Fein has come on board normalizing the police. As such, they with policing, there’s no real purpose to them…I enhanced local political ownership of police did agree with DPPs, but they’ve run their transformation. course…” The statement rather off-handedly recognizes that the real value of DPPs was their • DPPs were possibly the only formal ability to facilitate interaction and engagement local mechanism where civil society – not only between the police and Sinn Fein, representatives and politicians from but between all relevant local stakeholders. across the board could discuss a key In terms of the more technical aspect of peacebuilding objective. determining policing priorities, DPPs may well • The relative importance of DPPs must be be overtaken by more efficient structures. judged against a background where no Discussions to strengthen this mechanism are ongoing,75 but the historical reality should be emphasis was given to reconciliation in the acknowledged. Whatever their future, DPPs wider peace process context. were a local opportunity for communities • Similar to local peace committees across to formally meet, sit down and talk about the world, local leadership and conditions jointly managing their future security. DPPs were essentially a local confidence-building co-determined the outcomes achieved. mechanism. In other words, success was ultimately determined by what use local leaders – This does not mean DPPs were an unqualified including the police commander – made success. News reports reflected a fairly of the opportunity. To some extent, this high level of petty political grandstanding in accounts for the patchy nature of DPP some DPPs. The fact that the Bill required achievements.76 the chairperson to be an elected person (i.e. a politician) potentially deprived DPPs • The impact of DPPs could probably of more expert and even-handed facilitation have been enhanced if the chair did not 62 of meetings. Ryan has cited the following have to be a representative politician. criticisms of DPPs: they were too much a This would have enabled someone with ‘middle-class thing’ that alienated working broad acceptability and greater facilitation class people and youth (an observation capacity to take on this role. Furthermore, strengthened by the survey on public attitudes towards DPPs); the chair was a politician; the more could have been achieved if meetings meeting style favoured politicians, thereby were run with the deliberate objective of disempowering community representatives; encouraging constructive dialogue. and police presentations at meetings were too • DPPs should be evaluated for their impact stylistic and defensive to enable substantive discussions. Furthermore, it seems as if much on bringing about effective community has depended on the local police commander; policing, and also for their impact on if the commander was not well disposed to a building local social cohesion and state DPP, it resulted in top-down communication legitimacy. and overly bureaucratic discussions.76
49 5. FYR MACEDONIA
In FYR Macedonia, the peacemaking process Despite forming almost two thirds of the has been driven by the Committees for country’s population, the Macedonian Inter-Community Relations (CICRs). Their community always saw itself as being under achievements are significant for the following threat. The Bulgarians challenged its legitimate reasons: existence as a language community, the Greeks challenged its cultural identity as Macedonians • Their mandate is rooted in a negotiated and their claim on the name, and the Serbian peace agreement. Orthodox Church challenged its religious identity as Macedonian Orthodox Christians. • Their specific focus is on ethnic conflict. Most important of all, its territorial integrity was • Their relationship to local governance has seen to be threatened byAlbanian irredentism. Conversely, the Albanian minority felt it was been restricted by legislation. being politically, culturally and economically Furthermore, their implementation has marginalized, and was insisting on proportional highlighted important issues on their representation in governance and economic composition and political independence. matters. The OFA reaffirmed Macedonia’s territorial integrity and multi-ethnic character, stating that Background there “…are no territorial solutions to ethnic issues.”79 It guaranteed greater political inclusion Ethnic relations are at the heart of FYR of minorities with fairer representation in public Macedonia’s struggle for peace, identity and administration, the police and army. One of the prosperity. The country’s population is around major instruments for achieving OFA objectives two million. The relationship between the was local decentralization. Article 1.579 stated: majority Macedonians (64 percent) and the “The development of local self-government is Albanians (25 percent) is particularly important. essential for encouraging the participation of FYR Macedonia became an independent citizens in democratic life, and for promoting country in 1991 and deliberately opted for a civil respect for the identity of communities.” democracy. However, ethnic coexistence has Therefore, local decentralization was never been easy. After independence, several implemented for two reasons: more effective incidents boiled over into armed conflict when governance and achieving fair ethnic inclusion the National Liberation Armywas formed in and participation for all. 1999. A relatively brief period of armed conflict was ended in 2001 by the Ohrid Framework To achieve these objectives, the borders of the Agreement (OFA), achieved through extensive existing 123 municipalities were redrawn to international mediation. form 84 municipalities, in addition to the capital, Skopje. In 21 of the new municipalities, the The roots of ethnic conflict are complex.77, 78, demographic composition has resulted in ethnic 26 They involved historical patterns of privilege minorities representing 20 percent or more of the and exclusion, the collapse of the socialist population. These municipalities are considered system, economic hardship and unequal particularly at risk of ethnic conflict. However, economic opportunities, the weakness of the the process of restructuring has disturbed the state, FYR Macedonia’s problematic relationship existing ethnic balance in some municipalities, with its neighbors, and the trend towards the creating new sets of ethnic majorities and ‘institutionalization of ethnicity’ that marked the minorities. Ironically, this has increased tension region through the late 1980s and early 1990s.26 in some districts rather than diminishing it. Tensions between the Macedonians and
AN ARCHITECTURE FOR BUILDING PEACE AT THE LOCAL LEVEL: 50 A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LOCAL PEACE COMMITTEES Albanians dominate the political landscape, but shall propose the remaining members of the FYR MACEDONIA there are also other ethnic minorities (Turks 3.8 Committee.” percent, Roma 2.6 percent, Serbs 1.8 percent, Vlachs 0.5 percent, and others 1.9 percent), “The Assembly elects the members of the and they are often caught in the middle of the Committee. The Committee considers issues dominant power struggle. of inter-community relations in the Republic and makes appraisals and proposals for their Much progress has been made in implementing solution. The Assembly is obliged to take into the peace agreement,78, 26 but enthusiasm for consideration the appraisals and proposals of the OFA is not equally shared80, 26 and there is the Committee and to make decisions regarding a trend towards increasing tension and ethnic them. In the event of a dispute among members segregation. On the whole, political parties are of the Assembly regarding the application of formed along ethnic lines, and professional the voting procedure specified in Article 69(2), associations, the media, and social life in the Committee shall decide by a majority vote general face pressure to segregate.78 Even whether the procedure applies.” NGOs are mainly ethnically based. Politicizing ethnicity means that a municipal democratic The voting procedure relates to the so-called election is a mechanism for endorsing ethnic Badinter Rule. Art. 69 (2)and stipulates: “For control. The OFA was a brave decision to laws that directly affect culture, use of language, commit FYR Macedonia to a multi-ethnic education, personal documentation, and use of democracy, but implementing it is proving symbols, the Assembly makes decisions by a difficult and frustrating. majority vote of the Representatives attending, within which there must be a majority of the Against this background, this study assesses votes of the Representatives attending who the role of Committees for Inter-Community belong to communities not in the majority in Relations (CICRs). However, the first aspect to the population of Macedonia.” In effect, the examine is the function of the national CICR. Badinter Rule gives the right of veto to ethnic minorities in Parliament on certain issues of ethnic coexistence. If there is a dispute over Committees for inter-community applying the voting procedure, then the CICR decides by majority vote. relations ii) Municipal committees for inter- i) The national Committee for Inter- community relations Community Relations At national level, an Inter-Community Relations Legal mandate Committee has existed since independence in accordance with the 1991 Constitution of the The Constitution and the OFA do not provide Republic of Macedonia (Art. 78, Amendment for establishing municipality-based CICRs. VII). The Constitution states: However, the OFA required the Law on Local Self-Government to be revised, and the “The Committee consists of 19 members revision81 provided for establishing CICRs of whom seven members each are from the (Art. 55). The concept of committees for inter- ranks of the Macedonians and Albanians community relations was judged specifically within the Assembly, and a member each appropriate to support the local decentralization from among the Turks, Vlachs, Romas, Serbs process, and more generally the peaceful and Bosniaks. If one of the communities coexistence between local ethnic groups. does not have representatives, the People’s Municipal CICRs were founded by the OFA- Attorney (Ombudsman), after consultation with inspired Law on Local Self-Government, so they relevant representatives of those communities, have their roots in that Agreement. However,
51 UN P HOTO
municipal CICRs do not have the authority to and functional administrative arrangements. The determine or interpret the application of the Law on Local Self -Government stipulated the Badinter Rule, as does the national body. committee shall be composed of “… an equal number of representatives of each community By law, only 21 municipalities with a minority represented in the municipality” (Art. 55.2). This community of more than 20 percent of the composition levels the playing field and allows population are required to establish a CICR each community – regardless of its size – an (Art. 55.1). However, this does not preclude equal say in how the body functions. municipalities from voluntarily establishing CICRs even if the 20 percent ruling is not Identifying and selecting members poses more relevant. problems. A 2006 study by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) The Law on Local Self-Government states the and the Community Development Institute mandate of CICRs is to “…review issues that (CDI) found that five of the 21 municipalities refer to the relations among the communities that had to establish CICRs by law issued a represented in the municipality and … give ‘public call’.25 This meant citizens were invited opinions and proposals on the ways for their to apply for CICR positions. This was followed resolving” (Art. 55.4). The municipal council must by a transparent public selection process. In review the opinions and proposals submitted by the remaining municipalities, councils made the CICR and “…make a decision with regards the appointments. Civil society was invited to to them” (Art. 55.5). Therefore, the municipal propose names for non-council members in only council is not bound by a CICR decision, but it four of those cases. must discuss the proposals raised and respond. In other words, the municipal council cannot Koceski25 stated the disadvantage of this ignore CICR proposals. approach was that communities were not aware of and did not identify with the CICR. The CICRs are representative bodies of ethnic representatives selected in this manner were communities that legally must ensure the people with which the council was comfortable. municipal council is aware of how decisions This resulted in communities not represented on they are considering will affect the relationship the council having their CICR representatives between these communities. As such, they imposed on them. This situation potentially institutionalize local inter-ethnic dialogue and seriously weakened the CICR because members ensure minority community views are taken were accountable to the council that appointed 25 seriously by council. them instead of the communities they purported to represent. Composition A precondition for success in meeting the Violence prevention and problem- above mandate is the way ethnic community solving representatives are appointed. Individual CICRs were assigned a role prescribed by law, municipalities determine the CICR composition but in practise they also took on other roles.
AN ARCHITECTURE FOR BUILDING PEACE AT THE LOCAL LEVEL: 52 A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LOCAL PEACE COMMITTEES Most importantly, they succeeded in resolving various policy and logistical services to local FYR MACEDONIA local disputes that threatened to escalate governments. OSCE, in partnership with into potentially violent ethnic conflict. These the Community Development Institute – a conflicts included cattle herding, graveyards Macedonian NGO – has offered substantial and public symbol vandalism, local incidents support. This has included actively promoting of public discontent (such as stoning vehicles), establishing CICRs, focusing on their legal and and disagreements over re-naming of public financial aspects, enhancing their strategic buildings and streets.25, 82 It appears that planning skills, providing coaching to struggling one of the most important CICR roles was to committees, and facilitating interaction between defuse potentially harmful rumours and facilitate municipal CICRs and the national body, negotiations between relevant stakeholders. and between similar bodies in Serbia. Other international NGOs have also worked with However, CICRs did not always succeed, individual CICRs, providing conflict resolution particularly when a conflict was highly skills training to members. complex or politicized. For example, in the municipality of Struga in 2008, Macedonian Municipalities must budget for the operation of and Albanian students refused to attend the CICRs, but by April 2008 only 10 municipalities same school at the same time, and demanded had done so.83 Committee members do not ethnic shifts. This issue raised the country’s receive payment (only reimbursement of costs), political ‘temperature’ and involved the but CICRs require access to funding for some intervention – constructive and otherwise – of their activities. of national politicians and bureaucrats. The CICR exerted considerable energy trying to resolve the conflict, with a mixed verdict on its Conclusion effectiveness. The Struga Council and relevant schools appreciated its efforts, others in the • The concept of CICRs is innovative and Ministry of Education and Science felt that exciting as it offers substantial local CICR was ‘out of its depth’ and did not have peacebuilding potential. Of note are the enough clout to deal with the issue. ways they can establish a platform so CICR potential to actively promote better minority views can be heard and ensure relationships between communities has also that ethnic community views are being been recognized, but there are limited examples taken seriously by the municipal council. of where this has taken place. This activity has Furthermore, against a background of the primarily been organizing joint cultural or sport dire need for inter-ethnic dialogue, Koceski25 events, and by making public announcements observed that CICRs institutionalize this about incidents with potential to damage capability at municipal level. Sikoska26 25 relationships, thereby calming the waters. has also noted that the biggest challenge facing the government of FYR Macedonia Capacity is the “…lack of political dialogue with the opposition.” Macedonian politics CICRs receive substantial support to enhance are ‘ethnicized’ to such an extent, that their capacity, and it is doubtful they would have political dialogue translates into inter-ethnic become operational at all without this support. dialogue. CICRs offer a municipal platform There are several supportive organizations. for this dialogue and their value cannot be The Association of the Units of Local underestimated. Self Government (ZELS), is a non- partisan Macedonian institution to which • An objective assessment of CICR all municipalities belong. It is a national effectiveness requires more intensive platform for local governments and provides research than the scope of this case study
53 allows. The study provides mixed signals. On the municipal councils and the communities one hand, there is anecdotal evidence that they are meant to serve do not clearly or CICRs have been able to defuse potentially uniformly understand their role; this hinders violent situations, are effective in defusing their impact. potentially divisive rumours, and facilitate dialogue and promote better relationships.25 • The experience in Macedonia confirms the These examples are anecdotal and limited, importance of capacity building. On the but are still encouraging. whole, these local bodies cannot function without substantial support. They need • However, on the other hand, it is clear that logistical role-clarifying and skill-enhancing establishing municipal CICRs is not high support to perform their roles. CICRs also on Macedonia’s official political agenda; it need orientation, training and access to was left to non-government participants to national resources. At national level, they stimulate the process and provide capacity. should be able to call for support from This may point to a lack of political will or the National CICR, politicians, influential little appreciation for the value CICRs could personalities, and facilitators and mediators add. In addition, CICRs cannot deal with so they can respond to the demands of a excessively politicized disputes, or others specific conflict. that can only be resolved by a high degree of political clout and sophistication. On the • Despite similarities in their legal mandates, whole, it might be said that CICRs have yet there seems to be little interaction between to demonstrate their true potential. the National CICR and municipal bodies, but OSCE and CDI support of interaction • It is possible that the greatest threat to between these bodies is encouraging. CICRs is political interference and excessive Ideally, local peacebuilding bodies should political control. The manner of appointing be able to place local issues on the national CICR members is particularly worrying since agenda, and some reporting structure or the council – a political body – will invariably feedback loop with the national body would appoint members who maximize specific also be useful. ZELS is certainly a valuable party-political interests. This dooms a CICR national partner, precisely because it offers to becoming another platform for political a non-partisan, professional platform with a contests, or a docile representative of the history of effective networking. The National major political party’s interests. Either way, CICR and its municipal counterparts are the CICR becomes meaningless. similar in legal status and composition. Therefore, closer interaction would be There are two mechanisms to address this beneficial. situation: first, an open transparent process for appointing representatives with legitimacy • Finally, CICRs do not specifically emphasize and standing in their own communities, and or have strategies for including women second, selecting insider-partials32 who can as members. A mixed gender CICR is occupy the middle-ground without losing theoretically possible; there are some integrity in their communities. This would examples. However, many municipalities give CICRs a stronger capacity to facilitate have decided to appoint only one member meaningful inter-ethnic dialogue and to per community, so it has become difficult mediate local disputes. to achieve more balanced gender representation. For this to occur, each • Another issue is the lack of CICR role-clarity community should have at least two at every level.84, 25 The CICRs themselves, representatives.
AN ARCHITECTURE FOR BUILDING PEACE AT THE LOCAL LEVEL: 54 A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LOCAL PEACE COMMITTEES 6. GHANA GHANA
Ghana currently enjoys a well-deserved Following this success, with UN support reputation as one of Africa’s most democratic the Government set out to create a national and stable countries. However, it has mechanism to prevent, manage and resolve experienced high levels of debilitating and conflict. It wanted to formally recognize often violent inter-community conflict. For and support the successful approach in the example, between 1990 and 2002 there were Dagomba Kingdom. It set out a national 14 violent clashes between ethnic community architecture for peace councils (i.e. statutory groups. Most of these conflicts occurred in the bodies) of relevant stakeholders and individual northern region where people feel politically Ghanaians who were highly trusted and and economically marginalized in relation to respected in society. It called for national, the more powerful and prosperous south. One regional and district councils with mandates of these conflicts, the 1994-1995 Konkomba- to facilitate dialogue, problem-solving and Nanumba war, killed 5000 people. reconciliation processes. These would be served by full-time professional peace promotion At the time of the Konkomba-Nanumba war, officers connected to the 10 regional peace civil society organizations had combined advisory councils. A Peacebuilding Support their efforts to facilitate peacebuilding. An Unit was established in Ghana’s Ministry of the inter-NGO consortium worked to support Interior to coordinate all government agency dialogue and negotiation processes that were support and collaboration.85, 86 successful in restoring peace. Civil society’s approach was very different from the Ghana This peace architecture is still being established. Government’s efforts. The latter’s approach The National Peace Council has been created, suppressed violence by using force, appointed but still has no legal standing as Parliament has a commission of inquiry that allocated blame, yet to debate a Bill to legalize its role. Despite and then often ignored the commission’s this, the Council reportedly played a major role recommended sanctions because they had in ensuring peaceful elections in 2008 and in unpalatable political consequences. In contrast, enabling a smooth transfer of power. It has done civil society’s approach sought to uncover the this through discreet meetings with stakeholders deeper sources of conflict, and to focus on that have defused considerable tension. dialogue, deeper mutual understanding, joint The Council’s lack of legal status means it is problem-solving and reconciliation.111 dependent on donor funding, mostly supplied by the UNDP. Finally, UNDP also focused on In 2002, a more violent conflict broke out in strengthening the capacity of the Council, Dagomba Kingdom which killed the King of Dagbon and 40 others. The violence was The regional peace advisory councils’ position is caused by a long-simmering dispute between more complex. They have not been established two royal houses on ascension-to-the throne everywhere and, where they do exist they have issues. The conflict happened in an excessively merged with regional security structures that politicized climate and had the potential to primarily deal with early warning and security. destabilize the northern region. In March 2003, There is no consensus on the precise regional the Government declared a regional state of peace council role. Some feel each should be emergency and asked the UN system Country a peacebuilding body focused on dialogue Office to help. UNDP appointed a ‘Peace and problem-solving; others are seeking a and Governance Advisor’, whose work with primarily security body. Despite this uncertainty, Government and civil society actors contributed the North’s regional peace advisory council to achieve dialogue and negotiation that reportedly played a constructive role in ensuring defused the conflict and made much progress in peace during the 2008 elections. dealing with underlying conflict issues.
55 UN P HOTO / O li v ier Ch a ssot
The Ghanaian peace architecture is incomplete, • The quality of support and capacity building but a number of features stand out: from civil society and the UN system contributed to this success. Positive results • Ghana’s national peace architecture is the were achieved by the presence of highly first official African national programme for professional UNDP peace and development peacebuilding. It matches the Resolution of advisors and by its sustained capacity African leaders at the 2002 First Standing building programme. Conference on Stability, Security and Development in Africa. The Resolution • The peace architecture sets out technical proposed that each country establish a and administrative support for councils national framework to prevent, manage and through a peacebuilding support unit. resolve conflicts. • At a conceptual level, there is a clear • Ghana’s local peacebuilding process has distinction between the roles of the peace made a major contribution to national councils and governance structures. The security. The Dagbon conflict was treated peace councils facilitate dialogue and joint as a distinct conflict cycle, and peace was problem-solving. They do not arbitrate or secured by engaging local participants and have the authority to intervene in or override stakeholders in a carefully facilitated process governance functions. Role clarity is key that defused much national political tension. since Ghana still faces challenges from ongoing confusion over peacemaking and • Across the board political consensus exists security roles and the restrictive effect this on the usefulness and value of peace has had on peace councils. councils. However, as it stands, the conceptual peace • Consensus has arisen from the experience architecture in Ghana is a textbook example of a of all involved with peacemaking approaches well-designed structure. used in the north and during the 2008 elections. This consensus is based on the success of carefully-facilitated dialogue and joint problem-solving processes (as opposed to strong-arm tactics).
AN ARCHITECTURE FOR BUILDING PEACE AT THE LOCAL LEVEL: 56 A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LOCAL PEACE COMMITTEES 7. NEPAL NEPAL
The search for peace in Nepal has been a The fourth layer is possibly the most important. multi-layered process. The first layer was to end The country needs an established peace that violence associated with the Maoist uprising offers improved conditions and basic rights that led to almost 13,000 deaths between 1996 protection to the millions of marginalized, and 2006. The Maoists fought for a communist impoverished and landless rural poor people. people’s republic to end the monarchy and This marginalization has been caused by factors its associated feudal system. In April 2006, a such as ‘untouchability’, gender, land tenure massive popular civil society-led demonstration practices and ethnicity. Much transformation supported by most political parties (including is needed to address this issue, and without the Maoists), effectively ended the king’s relevant action Nepal will remain a country absolute rule. A 2006 peace agreement (the seriously at risk of continued conflict. Comprehensive Peace Agreement) between the Maoists and the political parties led to The peace movement has made significant successful elections for a Constituent Assembly progress, but much work still remains. in April 2008. The Assembly’s first act was to abolish the monarchy and declare Nepal a federal democratic republic. The contribution of civil society The second layer was the struggle for minority Nepal’s peace processes have moved in two rights. Nepal has a highly diverse population clearly discernable streams: in civil society and of about 23 million people (2001 Census) at a formal political level. Strong international with 103 caste and ethnic groups, and 92 NGOs operating in the country have supported living languages. Many of these groups were civil society by providing a great deal of marginalized under the monarchy and often peacemaking and peacebuilding capacity violently struggled to achieve minority rights. building. Many projects are strengthening the The violence has been ongoing, especially in the ‘voice’ of marginalized people and enabling Terai region during 2007-08. The transformation dialogue between groups. Civil society has of this conflict has been a difficult, tense mainly focused on human rights, with specialists and sometimes violent process as more and in this field often doubling as mediators to more identity groups clamour for their rights. intervene in specific local incidents. Even The Constituent Assembly has most of the during the worst days of violence, civil society responsibility for addressing minority rights participants have succeeded in mediating the and has to negotiate a new Constitution with a release of hostages, preventing violence and federal character. However, progress is relatively achieving small-scale local peace agreements. slow and adds to uncertainty and instability. They have persistently acted to protect the rights of innocent victims of the violence. The third layer is the highly unstable and fragmented intra- and inter-party political National civil society organizations played system. The political process is characterized a critical role in mass demonstrations, by excessive bickering and dysfunctional particularly ‘Janaandolan II’ – the April 2006 behaviour that contributes to high levels of event that unseated the king. Prominent social disorder in society, including mass individuals have supported informal dialogue protests and strikes. In this context, peace between protagonists and contributed to the means establishing a stable and functional decision to establish a Ministry of Peace and political system. Reconstruction.87
57 A national peace infrastructure Minister who similarly made no effort to establish a Peace Commission. It then became clear At a political level, the negotiators were quite that every political party would try and control outspoken and assertive in their commitment implementation of the peace process. to a fully Nepalese-owned agreement, although external agencies provided various support to the peace process. This included help from Local peace committees the Special Representative of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in the early A key MoPR task was to provide administrative stages, followed by the United Nations Mission support for implementing Local Peace in Nepal. They provided a stabilizing middle Committees (LPCs).88 A multi-stakeholder Peace ground and impartial monitoring in the peace and Reconstruction Consultative Committee was process – especially during the billeting of envisaged to provide LPC policy guidance to the combatants and the 2008 election process. MoPR, but it still is not in place. However, there was no consistent facilitation The process to establish LPCs was the same of political negotiations. Breakthroughs often rocky process as other facets of the peace occurred in one-on-one meetings between the architecture. In 2006, the Cabinet decided to then-Prime Minister and the Maoist leader. In establish Local Peace Councils.89 The decision effect, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was based on Janaandolan II and agreements was essentially an elite pact negotiated between with the Maoists that emphasized the need to and signed by top political leaders. From a ground the peace locally. However, the specific conflict resolution perspective, the negotiating decision to establish LPCs was not negotiated process was not managed impartially, but was in with the Maoists; it was a unilateral move by itself a power struggle. the political parties in government at the time. Consequently, there was no progress. In 2007, Various steps to create a peace architecture the Maoists joined a unity Government and culminated in the 2007 establishment of the the matter was revisited and LPC Terms of Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction (MoPR). Reference (ToR) were adopted in August 2007. However, from the first structure that was erected (the Peace Negotiation Coordination However, instead of following the MoPR’s Secretariat in 2003) through its various mutations Implementation Manual, authorities issued a to the present Ministry, the process was bureaucratic instruction in September 2007 to characterized by the reluctance to establish joint chief district officers to set up LPCs. More than multi-party control over the peace architecture 30 LPCs were set up in the following months, and by efforts to exclude or side-line key but the Maoists withdrew from Government stakeholders. In spite of the fact that MoPR leaving the newly-formed bodies with no was established by an inclusive, multi-party political legitimacy. Some LPCs continued to government, the Minister in charge was the function (often including Maoists), but it was not Secretary-General of the Nepali Congress, the an ideal situation. One of the demands of the then ruling party. Maoists at the time as a precondition to return to government was the establishment of the High This created serious legitimacy problems for the Level Peace Commission to ensure all-party MoPR, particularly in the eyes of the Communist oversight over MoPR. Party of Nepal (the Maoist political group). The Party repeatedly demanded that MoPR should This was a key issue. At the time, the Maoists be dissolved and replaced by a high level peace effectively controlled most rural areas, while commission (i.e. a multi-stakeholder body other political parties in the districts were in to control the peace process). However, the disarray. Creating LPCs offered the Maoists the new 2008 Government was controlled by the opportunity to maintain political ground, while it Maoists and the MoPR came under a Maoist
AN ARCHITECTURE FOR BUILDING PEACE AT THE LOCAL LEVEL: 58 A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LOCAL PEACE COMMITTEES offered the political parties the chance to regain police representatives to attend meetings NEPAL it. Therefore, political control over LPCs was a as observers and provide help on request. very important prize. Furthermore, LPCs can demand that local or central government report on implementation of The stalemate continued until a new the Comprehensive Peace Accord. Government was formed in 2008 following national elections. The Maoists emerged A core group of nine members would function as the strongest party. New ToR for LPCs as an LPC secretariat and be involved in were created and gave greater powers of investigating and resolving local conflicts. control over them to the MoPR, now under The ToR also stated that: a third of the LPC the control of a Maoist Minister. Opposition would be women, international facilitators or party objections resulted in a third draft of mediators would be used as needed, and the the Terms of Reference being accepted by committees would exist and work until a new Cabinet in early 2009.90 In May 2009, the Constitution was going to be implemented.91 Maoists resigned from government and control of the MoPR shifted to the third biggest party By November 2009, 63 LPCs had been formed. in the Constituent Assembly, the Communist The MoPR opened a committee office in each Party of Nepal (United Marxist-Leninist) (UML). district with a civil servant acting as secretary; However, the Terms of Reference remained meaning the MoPRwas exerting political unchanged which indicated that the consensus control over LPCs. The first batch of secretaries around the framework remained intact. was recruited on short term contracts in April 2009. Most of the 75 appointees were The Terms of Reference provide for an inclusive Maoist members or sympathizers since the district body of representatives from all relevant Maoists were the Government. However, communities. A new feature is the creation of the Government resigned in May 2009 and village- and municipal peace structures guided the MoPR Ministry shifted to UML and the by the district committee. The primary objective secretaries’ contracts were not renewed. New is: “to create an environment conducive for a recruits were found by October 2009, but the just system through restoration of sustainable time without secretaries damaged LPC ability peace by resolving the remnants of conflict at to function. the local level and systematically promoting the processes of peace and reconstruction through mutual goodwill and unity.”91 Comments The 23-member LPC composition has a The experience in Nepal demonstrates the specific formula: political parties have interconnectedness between the political, 12 representatives, the business community administrative and technical dimensions of a has one, civil society four, conflict-affected peace architecture: groups four, and excluded minorities not already represented, two. A third of the representatives should be women and the chair The political dimension will rotate every six months. The objective is to create an inclusive body that does not fall prey Problems include the failure to establish to political manipulation. However, it is unclear effective multi-party oversight of the peace how the formula will be implemented in practise architecture and the inability to provide political in all 75 districts. guidance through multi-party consensus. These have had a debilitating impact on the process. The Terms of Reference further stipulate Furthermore, successive governments have that LPCs cannot arbitrate or override any chosen not to submit the committee ToR for local government decision. However, they scrutiny and debate in Parliament; doing so may request local government or local would have given them a much stronger and
59 UN P HOTO /A G N IES ZKA M I KU LS KA
widely-supported mandate. Instead, ruling MoPR credibility. It withdrew its support to parties have chosen to use the faster track LPCs more than once for political reasons, Cabinet route which entrenched the interests of resulting in a loss of local confidence in the ruling party. the MoPR and, more seriously, in local A lesson from this experience is that a central commitment to the LPC. political mandate is necessary, but political • The lack of a regular MoPR-LPC manoeuvering for one-sided control undermines communication mechanism left committees the architecture’s very purpose. Nepal’s local in limbo with no idea of when to expect level experience illustrates this dilemma. Prior to the Comprehensive Peace Accord local support. peacemaking activities suffered because they • The slow pace of administrative and had no political legitimacy or access to and financial support directly affected LPCs. an impact on the national process. Now, in Local participants began to doubt the principle, LPCs have political legitimacy, but political party manipulation has made local sincerity and intentions of the MoPR and peacebuilding ineffective. It is now caught in the central political stakeholders since they dilemma of how to obtain a secure legitimate provided little or no support for meetings, mandate free of interference by national fieldtrips, interventions or projects. LPCs participants. needed to be informed of limited central support realities and allowed to use local The administrative dimension resources for a secretariat and other facilities. Nepal has been innovative in establishing a Government ministry dedicated to providing Technical support administrative support to the peace process. However, despite its strong commitment, the The process of establishing an LPC is at least MoPR has been crippled by political infighting. as important as the end product. Setting up properly supported LPCs requires a thorough The following failings reveal lessons that need understanding of the needs, dynamics and to be learned: necessary management skills of peace • The breakdown in political consensus processes. Vital ingredients of a peace affected political legitimacy and eroded architecture are to identify technical support and to make knowledge and skills available.
AN ARCHITECTURE FOR BUILDING PEACE AT THE LOCAL LEVEL: 60 A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LOCAL PEACE COMMITTEES The following lessons have emerged from • In late 2008, to its credit, the MoPR NEPAL the difficult experience involved in providing commissioned an LPC operating manual, technical support to Nepal’s peace process: strategic framework, and a capacity development plan. The manual is a • It appears that both politicians and civil resource document based on the ToR and servants in the MoPR underestimated the describes the concept, roles, functions and importance of technical support. The first responsibilities of various LPC participants. ToR Implementation Manual specifically It outlines the relationships between recommended that LPCs should only stakeholders, develops report formats and be established after a thorough local outlines the technical support needed, stakeholder consultation process has been including a monitoring and learning system. conducted. Civil society-based conflict
transformation practitioners warned that The strategic framework and capacity people generally distrusted processes development plan complement the manual. imposed by Government, and that this top- More recently, a shortened LPC directives down imposition would prevent LPCs from document explains the ToR. These being any different from other contested important documents helped clarify key political and social structures. roles and processes, but unfortunately they • In practise, LPCs were established were completed very late in the process. following a letter from the Ministry of Local They were also mainly developed by Government and the MoPR to chief district external consultants. The MoPR now needs officers. Officials then called the parties to to internalize and ‘own’ the contents so the a meeting where the LPC was established. documents can strengthen the quality of This meant most of the community did support it provides. not know LPCs existed and had little • Again, to its credit, the MoPR established an understanding of their role. Some LPC LPC project implementation unit. However, members also became angry when MoPR to function at its best, the unit will need communications and administrative support to improve its technical peacebuilding stopped. knowledge and skills, as well as provide • An important feature of the Implementation administrative support to develop these Manual was its call to orient and train a aspects. The unit can best support LPCs group of expert facilitators who would be by combining administrative and technical accountable to the MoPR’s multi-party peacebuilding expertise. Both administrative Consultative Committee. These facilitators and technical staff should work as one would provide part-time technical support team and plan their support in an integrated by facilitating processes to establish LPCs manner since there are many overlapping and providing further ongoing technical areas in the required administrative and support as requested. In theory, a facilitator technical inputs needed to enhance LPC would be provided for every three districts, peacebuilding capacity. although deployment was to be flexible, taking issues of identity into consideration Support by the international community (e.g. making a dalit facilitator available where the relevant issue concerned dalit inclusion). The interplay between international The current Terms of Reference provide organizations and the MoPR has been a for access to national or international core dynamic affecting technical support. International organizations provided a mixed facilitators, but this has not happened.
61 response to the LPC concept. Many thought efficiency. Various international agencies have it was a good idea but were uncertain how it offered technical support, but many have would be implemented. Once the political see- wanted to control its delivery, funding and saw started, many said they doubted political implementation to ensure quality and efficiency. parties were serious about implementing LPCs, This has been politically unpalatable in Nepal. and questioned whether the MoPR had the Therefore, all participants need to negotiate an technical capacity to support the committees. acceptable arrangement to coordinate various As part of its general budget support for forms of technical and administrative support. Nepal’s Government, the Asian Development For its part, the MoPR needs to communicate Bank provided $4.5 million of funding over regularly and openly with all partners. three years to support LPCs. The Ministry then used the funds to establish basic LPC LPC successes infrastructure; rented offices, purchase of office equipment and three members of staff per LPC. Despite general confusion and lack of support, there is evidence that at least some LPCs In 2009, an LPC project implementation unit have achieved positive interventions such as was formed within the Ministry, supervised preventing violence and mediating agreements. by a Joint Secretary. The Nepal Transition to For example, in June 2008, the Nepal Transition Peace Initiative (NTTP) was mainly funded by to Peace Initiative released a case study USAID through the Academy for Educational report92 on the Chitwan LPC which had proved Development (AED), and has provided successful in a context of state illegitimacy substantial technical support to LPCs from and incapacity, showing impressive results in the time of their creation. The current UML its two months of existence. The report quoted Minister has recently stated that it is now the LPC Chairperson: “We’re living in a virtual urgent to set up more than 1000 village and stateless situation here. The administration and municipal committees. The World Bank is police cannot deal with many cases. Therefore, now considering a Nepalese request for a people call us whenever there is some major substantial grant to fund creating them. problem.”92 Where LPCs have succeeded International organizations believe that their it was due to the initiative and commitment responsibility is to provide the MoPR with of individuals who used the opportunity technical support that clarifies district roles, that establishing a committee provided. It is builds skills and competence so LPC members notable that people interviewed for the report can resolve conflicts. They also help the MoPR overwhelmingly supported the LPC concept. to address related understaffing and limited technical capacity. LPC composition Over time, it became clear that ’ the initial fears The composition of LPCs is also a key factor. of international organizations were correct.. The committees have one less civil society Most of their technical support plans got stuck representative than political parties (11 out and to date they have provided very little of 23). This balance is positive; most civil technical capacity to either the MoPR or LPCs. society representatives do have clear political The only significant progress has been creation affiliations, but LPCs provide the only platform of the above-mentioned three core documents for politicians and civil society to interact and with funding from USAID and the UNDP. constructively cooperate. LPC composition The Nepal experience reveals a dilemma over also creates opportunities to more beneficially how to manage the tension between the need use society’s conflict transformation capacity. for national peace process ownership and the requirement to achieve the best possible
AN ARCHITECTURE FOR BUILDING PEACE AT THE LOCAL LEVEL: 62 A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LOCAL PEACE COMMITTEES 8. SIERRA LEONE SIERRA LEONE
In Sierra Leone, local peace committees The Revolutionary United Front (RUF) started established voluntarily by political parties have the civil war in 1991 (allegedly in collaboration played a significant role in ensuring peaceful with Charles Taylor’s NPFL). The war was initially elections. This case study explores the portrayed as a people’s revolution against background to the country’s civil war (1991 – the corrupt and self-serving elite, but it soon 2001), specifically focusing on the impact of the became clear there was no guiding revolutionary violence on rural districts, development of the ideology or any unity of purpose. The TRC district code of conduct monitoring committees noted an “astonishing factional fluidity” (Vol. 3A, (DMCs) and an assessment of their contribution. par.96) among a militia that switched sides and causes at every opportunity. Raw anger, greed and brutality dominated as the country sank Background into an orgy of self-destruction. Much violence was directed at the elite, but before long there Sierra Leone’s Report of the Truth and was no identifiable logic to it except that the Reconciliation Commission (TRC) called the pre- collapse of law and order presented economic conflict African nation a “fragmented, exploited opportunities for people with guns. For some and deeply insecure country.”93 At the time, analysts,94 the real cause of the violence was the British administration that ran the colony economic. As they see it, the illegal diamond created separate and unequal development for trade caused the civil war. descendants of liberated slaves and the inland protectorate of the country’s original peoples. This case study focuses on a key factor: It also manipulated and undermined the the consequences of state collapse in the chieftain system, setting up the coming serious districts. During the pre-conflict period, district ‘disconnect’ between rulers and the ruled. After participants felt profoundly alienated from and British rule ended, the colony swiftly descended neglected by the country’s central authorities. into a one-party dictatorial predatory state The TRC report contains seven district case where the political elite gained huge wealth and studies outlining how they had suffered from advantages at the expense of the citizens. neglect (Ch. 3A, par. 113). The studies clearly also show that when the RUF entered districts, The TRC found that the pre-conflict and they found ready collaborators motivated by conflict period reflected “a colossal failure of specific grievances and unresolved disputes. leadership at all levels of public life” (Vol. 2, Each district had unique political, economic and Ch. 2, par. 67). The political elites of all the ethnic factors, much of it related to chieftain post-colonial regimes, particularly the rule of issues, personalities, political competition and President Siaka Stevens (1969-1985), were patterns and degrees of exclusion. held directly responsible for creating the conditions for conflict. Political elites mainly This district alienation issues suggest the Sierra caused the conflict described as “endemic Leone conflict also had its roots in specific greed, corruption and nepotism that deprived district conditions and tensions. The battle was the nation of its dignity and reduced most not nationally imposed on peaceful districts; it people to a state of poverty” (par. 13). By the fed on existing local conflict and made it worse. end of the 1980s, the failure of the state meant The violence also ruined community social that notions of citizenship and patriotism were fabric. Those fighting deliberately undermined meaningless concepts. For both communities social taboos by raping mothers and sisters, and individuals, survival depended on whether violating children, abusing elders and, in they could successfully gain access to the some cases, resorting to cannibalism. Each patronage system. district and village experienced brutal violence
63 aimed at the very values and customs that held particularly on the contribution of the Political communities together. Violence was carried Parties Registration Commission (PPRC). out by outsiders and, more devastatingly, by neighbors and even by members of the same Provision to establish the PPRC was made in family. the 1991 Constitution but was not enacted. In 2002, a Political Parties Act was passed, but In this context, peacebuilding needed to work at creation of the PPRC was further delayed until both local and national levels. It is against this December 2005 when it was required by NEC background that Sierra Leone’s DMCs should restructuring to end complaints about its (the be assessed. NEC’s) impartiality and efficiency. The PPRC’s mandate is to register political parties; to monitor party affairs and conduct to ensure they comply Sierra Leone’s code of conduct with the constitution; to promote pluralism and the spirit of constitutionalism; and to mediate monitoring committees conflict and disputes between political parties 98 Sierra Leone finally emerged from the cycle of or leaders. violence with the democratic elections of 2002. The UN Integrated Office in Sierra Leone In 2007, the country took two more huge steps (UNIOSIL), the UN Development Programme forward by successfully conducting the next (UNDP), and the International Foundation for round of Presidential and Parliamentary elections, Electoral Systems (IFES) provided considerable and by peacefully transferring power to the financial and technical support to the PPRC. opposition party. These were highly significant All supplied the Commission with dedicated achievements. They were a rare feat in Africa, experienced technical advisors who helped and also should also be viewed in the context a great deal to empower it. In 2006, the that almost half of all post-war countries return to Commission lacked even basic infrastructure to 95 war within the first five years of peace. function, such as telephones and furniture. The The 2007 elections were also the first post- advisors helped address these practical matters conflict elections managed entirely by Sierra and, more importantly, shored up the PPCR so it Leonean institutions (the 2002 elections were could understand and fulfill its role. managed by the UN). However, a positive The Constitution stated the PPRC Chairperson outcome was never a foregone conclusion. should be a senior judge or someone of similar Tension flourished because the incumbent competence. The remaining three members president was not a candidate and various were to include one from the legal profession, splits and anxieties in the main political parties the Chairperson of the NEC and a trade union caused complications. Violence occurred in both representative. With this composition the the capital city and districts; a July 2007 early assumption easily followed that the Commission warning report by the West Africa Network for was to apply the law and impose legal sanctions Peacebuilding (WANEP) sounded a pessimistic in cases of misbehaviour. note96 predicting a return to anarchy as a possible, but not unavoidable, scenario. This was indeed the Commission’s initial assumption. However, the PPRC had to face The elections succeeded for several reasons. the judiciary’s complicity in the past failure The most important reason was that the National of the state (TRC 2004). At the same time, Electoral Commission (NEC) managed them the opposition was accusing the ruling party very professionally and received well-deserved of mismanaging the peace and reverting to 23, 97, 95 credit. Other reasons included improved old ways. Therefore, imposing legal punitive civil society input and sound technical support sanctions on political parties that breached the received from UNIOSIL and the diplomatic law would have been highly problematic. These community. However, this case study focuses
AN ARCHITECTURE FOR BUILDING PEACE AT THE LOCAL LEVEL: 64 A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LOCAL PEACE COMMITTEES sanctions can work if they have widespread the Independent Radio Network’s district SIERRA LEONE legitimacy and the means exist to impose radio stations strengthened this perception them. Neither of these conditions was in as Committee members participated in bi- place. Furthermore, Nyathi99, 100 pointed out weekly radio programmes. Second, their local that the electoral law ensured political parties knowledge allowed them to identify potential could have direct access to the courts without areas of conflict and act to avoid them from recourse to the PPRC. This begged the developing further. Third, if conflicts did occur, question of what value the PPRC would add. the DMCs were well placed to mediate between In Nyathi’s view, the PPRC needed to establish the different participants. Ohman listed a relationship built on trust between it and the 46 incidents in 2007 and 2008 where DMCs political parties, and should use mediation as its mediated or intervened in situations of conflict primary strategy. Only if that failed should there and violence. be recourse to the law. Nyathi100, 103 made the following additional The Commission accepted this understanding observations: of its role and its members subsequently attended courses to enhance their mediation • There have been other civil society-based skills. Doing so meant the PPRC succeeded initiatives to facilitate peace at a local level, outstandingly in facilitating negotiations but the DMCs had advantage of a formal between all registered political parties on a mandate enshrined in the National Code of voluntary Code of Conduct. It was an intense Conduct and set out by all political parties process,99 but in November 2006, the Code of on the NMC. This meant that at district level Conduct was publicly signed at an impressive DMCs had the clout to bring on board all ceremony at Parliament. Parties made a political parties, the NEC, the police and civil voluntary and public commitment to the Code society. of Conduct, and a National Code of Conduct Monitoring Committee (NMC) was established • DMC success was bolstered by the fact with one representative from each of the there were no alternative credible and registered political parties, one from the NEC, functioning institutions to regulate district two from civil society, one from the police, one conflict since all other mechanisms had from the Inter-Religious Council and one from been destroyed. The DMCs offered them an the National Commission for Democracy and opportunity to start anew. Human Rights.101 The Committee selected its Chairperson from its non-political members, and • The context within which DMCs operated became an effective platform for dialogue and was much less sophisticated than at the problem-solving between political parties during national level, but also much less ‘political’. the election period. One of its first decisions The sheer need to prevent a return to was to copy the structure at regional and district levels. The PPRC then established district code violence enabled the local structure to of conduct monitoring committees (DMCs) in all operate more effectively than the national districts. body which had to contend with deeper political tensions. These committees played a major role in ensuring the relatively peaceful nature of • A key aspect of DMC work was the elections. Ohman102 stated that the DMCs technical and political support the served three functions. First, they showed the committees received. This included training, electorate that representatives from different access to the technical advisers for ongoing political parties could work together for peaceful advice and access to the PPRC for national elections. This helped to reduce tensions. support. On occasion, the full Commission Important collaboration between DMCs and has traveled to specific districts to support
65 DMCs. Other times the PPRC has called However, other events had positive overtones. on national political party leaders to help One took place in the northern region to prepare specific DMCs to deal with issues that for a discussion between political parties on involved their parties’ local structures. specific grievances.107 The story is told that the acting PPRC Regional Commissioner and • The composition of DMCs mirrored that of the regional minister facilitated a joint ‘feast’ the national body. There was no flexibility to between the three dominant political parties. allow for local variations of demography or Each party cooked food in its own offices, and other identity issues, or to specifically include the three parties went together from one office women or youth. Local chiefs were not to the next to share in the feast and ‘build represented either despite their considerable peace’. This contrast with the violent incidents demonstrates that bodies such as DMCs clout in the districts. can play a solid role in sustaining democratic Another important aspect of DMC operation pluralism and peace, even in the period between was the network created to link the national elections. with local levels (NMC, PPRC and DMCs) and DMCs were local peacebuilding bodies with to connect the committees with each other. the specific task of ensuring peaceful elections. Regular meetings between DMCs strengthened They had no mandate for the periods between cooperation and discussed possible areas of elections. Following the elections of 2007 and conflict.102 In addition, committee structures 2008, sporadic incidents of violence related promoted links between political parties, to political tolerance continued to occur in the statutory bodies, security institutions and civil country. In 2009, a series of incidents occurred society. This enabled dialogue and interaction, in the diamond-rich Kono district: the office of thereby broadening and deepening their an opposition party was smeared with human collective input to peacebuilding. Finally, excrement, a rally the next day was disrupted DMC success was acknowledged by election and a woman was gang-raped.10 observers.104, 105, 95 The next test for Sierra Leone’s progress in peacebuilding came at the local elections of Conclusions July 2008. Once again, the overall outcome was positive; observers called the elections In creating an understanding of local “credible”, but noted that “…peace in this peacebuilding structures, several aspects of country is still on a tenuous footing.”97 Some DMCs stand out: violent incidents occurred during the elections and there were reports of intimidation, especially • Methodology matters. Sierra Leone provided against independent candidates. a context where disciplinary coercion of political participants would have been risky The work of DMCs continued during this period. and potentially counterproductive because Their composition was rearranged after February the state lacked legitimacy and resources. 2008 and the PPRC also gave them the mandate The only viable alternative was to negotiate of monitoring the Code of Campaign Ethics, an a new social compact to use collective NEC document that also covered independent monitoring, and to adopt a problem-solving candidates. With IFES support, the DMCs received conflict prevention training twice in approach to deal with disputes. The PPRC 2008. They were also more active in 2008 than and the DMC approach focused on building in 2007.102 Evaluation meetings were conducted trust and facilitating compliance and this with all DMCs before their work was effectively proved effective (although they never suspended at the end of September 2008. relinquished legal sanctions as a last resort).
AN ARCHITECTURE FOR BUILDING PEACE AT THE LOCAL LEVEL: 66 A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LOCAL PEACE COMMITTEES • Sustained technical support to local necessary organizational and management SIERRA LEONE structures is necessary. DMCs could changes that could have avoided the not have operated without technical and sharp decline in efficiency. financial support provided by the UNIOSIL/ The quality of technical advice matters. UNDP and the IFES. The post-2008 Furthermore, the way advice is offered is as collapse of DMCs testifies to this fact. important as its substance. • Stakeholders should pay attention to Much of the discussion in peacebuilding transforming the institutions responsible circles today focuses on entry points – what for conflict transformation. The capacity events or systems allow suitable entry points to implement advice and sustain for external peacebuilding support, and what momentum depends on the organizational constitutes a sufficient invitation to intervene. health and culture of the institution. In This case study suggests that the manner and the case of the PPRC, staff members qualitative substance of technical advice can, who were civil servants seconded from in itself, provide such an entry point. When the other departments performed well under advisor is trusted, opportunities open up for pressure during elections However, after creative initiatives. However, the downside is the elections the PPRC failed to make that when too much reliance is placed on the advisor, sustainability becomes an issue. RR AN UN P HOTO /A LBERT GO NZA LE Z FA
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AN ARCHITECTURE FOR BUILDING PEACE AT THE LOCAL LEVEL: 72 A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LOCAL PEACE COMMITTEES LOCAL PEACE COMMITTEES United Nations Development Programme One United Nations Plaza New York, New York 10017 USA www.undp.org/LPC
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