A Review of Intelligence Oversight Failure: NSA Programs That Affected Americans
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A Review of Intelligence Oversight Failure: NSA Programs that Affected Americans by Major Dave Owen The views and opinions expressed here are those of the as the State Department or the Central Intelligence author and do not necessarily refl ect the offi cial policy Agency (CIA).3 or position of any agency of the U.S. Government. President Truman created NSA in 1952 to remedy Introduction this situation. He issued a classifi ed memorandum After World War II, the National Security Agency to do this, and followed it up with National Security (NSA) established and directed three programs that Council Intelligence Directive 9. This classifi ed di- deliberately targeted American citizens’ private com- rective explicitly stated that the NSA would be the munications. Despite ethical and legal concerns, “executive agent” for foreign communications intel- these programs continued through the early 1970s. ligence for the entire government.4 However, this di- This intelligence oversight failure, once it was iden- rective did not establish any limitations within the tifi ed, resulted in a thorough U.S. Senate investi- foreign SIGINT mission. Even as late as the 1970s, gation. Out of this investigation came the 1976 according to the NSA’s general counsel, “no ex- document “NSA Surveillance Affecting Americans,” isting statutes control, limit, or defi ne the signals which led to legal restrictions on the agency and ro- intelligence activities of the NSA.”5 Since foreign in- bust intelligence oversight processes to ensure that telligence can be derived from American citizens’ it continued to adhere to these restrictions.1 This private communications, and since domestic issues article will summarize the programs that led to this can affect foreign policy (requiring ‘foreign intelli- situation, review the legal decisions that affected gence’ support for these domestic issues), this situ- these programs, and discuss the impact that is still ation resulted in minimal control of NSA activities. felt within the NSA today. Additionally, since both the memorandum and di- rective which led to its creation were classifi ed, the Background NSA was generally unknown to the public. The NSA rose after World War II in order to cen- As a result, the agency existed in an environment tralize and manage U.S. cryptologic efforts. Prior to of unquestioned SIGINT authority, minimal intelli- and throughout the war, these efforts were mostly gence oversight, and no statutory limitations. This spread among the military services, and were poorly environment was exacerbated by a marked appre- coordinated, controlled, and understood. In fact, ciation for SIGINT capabilities, especially due to the the success of Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor was “demonstrated wartime value of breaking enemy largely due to this confusing cryptologic situation, codes, particularly of the Japanese.”6 These fac- as the U.S. had clear warnings through Signals tors resulted in a situation which could easily have Intelligence (SIGINT) but failed to act.2 In 1949, the led to the NSA exploiting American citizens’ private Department of Defense (DoD) attempted to rem- communications. However, one additional factor edy this situation by creating the Armed Forces made this possibility a certainty, and also shaped Security Agency (AFSA). Under the command of the the SIGINT culture so that exploiting American citi- Joint Chiefs of Staff, this agency combined the sep- zens’ communications seemed to be a normal part arate efforts underway in each service. However, of operations: Project SHAMROCK. the AFSA was ineffective, as continued inter-service rivalries, coupled with poor coordination basically Project SHAMROCK (1945 to 1975) maintained the situation of divided, independent Project SHAMROCK began in August 1945, shortly cryptologic efforts. Additionally, as an agency of the before the end of World War II and over seven years Joint Chiefs of Staff, AFSA was not responsive to prior to the establishment of the NSA.7 This time the SIGINT needs of elements outside of DoD, such frame is important to note when considering the October - December 2012 33 culture of the SIGINT enterprise. By the time NSA 1976, the NSA continued to claim that “the Fourth was established, Project SHAMROCK was a long- Amendment does not apply to the NSA’s intercep- standing, well-accepted program. tion of Americans’ international communications 11 Project SHAMROCK originally started as an effort for foreign intelligence purposes.” to improve wartime intelligence activities and was Though Project SHAMROCK undoubtedly col- continued after the war due to its intelligence value. lected and analyzed American citizens’ private com- It consisted of access to telegraph communications munications on a large scale, this effort still focused that transited networks owned by several U.S. com- on foreign intelligence. The project was created as panies which then provided daily microfi lm copies an effort to improve the foreign communications in- of all traffi c. Though this traffi c included foreign telligence mission, and that purpose continued to communications, it also included a vast amount of be the primary reason for its existence. communications from or to American citizens. Project SHAMROCK was just one of three ma- The companies involved in Project SHAMROCK jor programs that infringed on Americans’ privacy. questioned the legality of these activities, especially The other two programs more directly pursued the in peacetime. In fact, they only agreed to support private communications of American citizens. The it “provided they received the personal assurance fi rst of these two remaining programs was Project of the Attorney General of the U.S.”8 Additionally, MINARET. representatives of the companies met with the Secretary of Defense in 1947 to discuss their con- Project MINARET (1960 to 1973) tinued participation. The Secretary of Defense as- Project MINARET was essentially the NSA’s watch sured them that Project SHAMROCK was “in the list. It used existing SIGINT accesses (to include in- highest interests of national security” and that both formation from Project SHAMROCK), and searched the Attorney General and the President approved.9 for terms, names, and references associated with The companies again brought up this issue in 1949, certain American citizens. with similar results. However, though the compa- Though Project MINARET offi cially started in nies did fear that Project SHAMROCK was illegal, 1969, the watch list itself existed at least as early as they “never sought assurances that that the NSA 1960.12 Originally, this list had nothing to do with was limiting its use to the messages of the foreign American citizens. According to the 1975 testimony targets.”10 of a senior NSA offi cial, “the term ‘watch list’ had to At its peak, Project SHAMROCK collected approxi- do with a list of names of people, places or events mately 150,000 messages per month. NSA gener- that a customer would ask us to have our analysts ated reports based on this collection to customers keep in mind as they scan large volumes of mate- 13 including the DoD, the CIA, the Federal Bureau rial.” However, starting in 1967, the NSA started adding selectors associated with American citizens of Investigation (FBI), the Secret Service, and the to the watch list, establishing a ‘civil disturbance’ Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (a pre- watch list. This was due to requests from the White cursor of the Drug Enforcement Administration). House, the FBI, and the Attorney General.14 These The inclusion of the FBI and the Bureau of Narcotics requests included: and Dangerous Drugs is especially noteworthy, as their mission included mostly domestic targets. “Indications that foreign governments… are controlling or attempting to control or infl uence The Director of the NSA terminated Project the activities of U.S. ‘peace’ groups and ‘Black SHAMROCK in 1975 amongst increasing Power’ organizations.” Congressional concerns that this collection was in violation of the Fourth Amendment which guards “Determining whether or not there is evidence of against unreasonable searches and seizures un- any foreign action to develop or control these anti- less authorized by a warrant. A previous Supreme Vietnam and other domestic demonstrations.” Court decision (Katz v. the United States, 1967) “Identities of individuals and organizations identifi ed private communications as protected by in the U.S. in contact with agents of foreign Fourth Amendment rights. However, even as late as governments.”15 34 Military Intelligence The Secret Service also requested support through In 1969, due to the growth of the ‘civil disturbance’ the ‘civil disturbance’ watch list program, submit- watch list and concerns over the security controls, ting “names of individuals and organizations ac- NSA established Project MINARET. This project tive in the antiwar and civil rights movements.”16 contained the entire program, and increased the Finally, the CIA asked for “The activities of U.S. in- security requirements. Prior to Project MINARET, dividuals involved in either civil disorders, radical only intercepts where both communicants were student or youth activities, racial militant activities, American citizens were held to the tighter security radical antiwar activities, draft evasion/deserter practices detailed in the preceding paragraph. With support activities … where such individuals have the establishment of Project MINARET, all commu- some foreign connection.”17 nications “to, from, or mentioning U.S. citizens” were held to this higher security standard. After receiving these requests, the Director of the NSA sent a cable to the Director of Central Intel- After the NSA established Project MINARET, the ligence and every member of the U.S. Intelligence FBI sent the agency two memoranda in an effort Board. In this cable the Director informed them that to ensure that this activity continued. In these the the NSA was “concentrating additional and continu- Director of the FBI stated “this Bureau has a con- ing effort to obtain SIGINT” in support of these re- tinuing interest in receiving intelligence information quests.18 Though there is no record that the U.S.