Church Cmte Book III: National Security Agency Surveillance
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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY SURVEILLANCE AFFECTING AMERICANS CONTENTS Page I. Introduction and Summary-- _ _ _ - - __ _ _ _ __ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 735 A. NSA’s origins and official responsibilities __________________ 736 B. Summary of interception programs-- _ ____________________ 738 C. Issues and questions-- _ __ __ -_ - _ _ _- _ __ -_ _ __ __ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ 742 II. NSA’s Monitoring of International Communications- _____________ _ 743 A. Summary of watch list activity- _ _ _ _- _____ - ______________ 743 B. History_____------------------------------------------ 744 C. Types of names on watchlists------ _____________________ 749 D. Overlapping nature of intelligence community requests- _ _ _ _ 750 E. Drug watch lists: United States-South American intercepts- 752 F. Termination of the civil disturbance watch list activity- __ _ 756 G. Authorisation___-______---_------------------------------- 761 H. Conclusions------------------------------------------- 764 III. A Special NSA Collection Program: SHAMROCK ________________ 765 A. Legal restrictions _______________________________________ 765 B. The committee’s investigation- - _ - _ __ _ _ _ _ _- _ __ _ __ _ __ __ __ _ 766 C. The origins of SHAMROCK- - _ _________ ________________ 767 D. The participation of the companies-- __ __ _-_ __ _ -_ _-_ __ _ _ _ _ 770 E. NSA’s participation- _ _ _ ________________________________ 774 F. Termination of SHAMROCK- - _ - ________ -- _______ - _____ 776 IV. NSA Personnel Security and Related Matters- - - _ _ _ _ __ _-_ __ _-_ __ _ 777 A. Background---_-__-_-_-_--------------------------____ 777 B. Questionable activities-- _ _ ____________________---------- 777 (733) NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY SURVEILLANCE AFFECTING AMERICANS I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMM-ARY This report describes the Committee’s investigation into certain questionable activities of the National Security Agency (NSA) .I The Committee’s primary focus in this phase of its investigation was on NSA’s electronic surveillance practices and capabilities, especially those involving American citizens, groups, and organizations. NSA has intercepted and disseminated international communica- tions of American citizens whose privacy ought to be protected under our Constitution. For example, from August 1945 to May 1975, NSA obtained copies of many international telegrams sent to, from, or through the United States from three telegraph companies. In addi- tion, from the early 1960s until 19’i3, NSL4 targeted the international communications of certain American citizens by placing their names on a “watch list.” Intercepted messages were disseminated to the FBI, CIA, Secret Service, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs and the Department of Defense. In neither program were ~~r~~~~btained 2 With one exception,3 NSS contends that its interceptions of Ameri- cans’ private messages were part of monitoring programs already be- ing conducted against various international communications channels for “foreign intelligence” purposes. This contention is borne out by the record. Yet to those Americans who have had their communica- tions-sent with the expectation that they were private-intentionally intercepted and disseminated by their Government, the knowledge that NSA did not monitor specific communications channels solely to ac- quire their messages is of little comfort. In general, NSA’s surveillance of Americans was in response to requests from other Government agencies. Internal NSA directives now forbid the targeting of American citizens’ communications. None- theless, NSA may still acquire communications of American citizens as part of its foreign intelligence mission, and informat,ion derived from these intercepted messages may be used to satisfy foreign intel- ligence requirements. NSA’s current surveillance capabilities and past surveillance prac- tices were both examined in our investigation. The Committee recog- 1 See the Committee’s Foreign Intelligence Report for an overview of NSA’s legal authority, organization and functions, and size and capabilities. a Since the NSA programs involving American citizens have never been chal- lenged in court, the necessity of obtaining a warrant has not yet been determined. Although there have been court cases that involved NSA intercepts, NSA’s ac tivities have never been disclosed in open court. See pp. 765-766 of this Report and the Committee’s Report on Warrantless FBI Electronic Surveillance for a discussion of warrant requirements for electronic surveillance. ‘Between 1970 and 1973, NSA intercepted telephone calls between the United States and various locations in South America to aid the BNDD (now the Drug Enforcement Administration) in executing its responsibilitiees. See pp. 752756. (735) 736 nizes that NSA’s vast technological capability is a sensitive national a.sset which ought to be zealously protected for its value to our common defense. If not properly controlled, however? this same technological capability could be turned against the American people, at great cost to liberty. This concern is compounded by the knowledge that the pro- portion of telephone calls and telegrams being sent through the air is still increasing. In addition to reviewing facts and issues relating to electronic sur- veillance, the Committee also examined certain questionable activities of the NSA’s Office of Security. See pp. 777-783. A. NSA’s Origins and Official Responsibilities NSA does not have a statutory charter; its operational responsi- bilities are set forth exclusively in executive directives first issued in the 1950s. One of the questions which the Senate asked the Commit- tee to consider was the “need for specific legislative authority to gov- ern the operations of . the National Security Agency.” ’ According to NSA’s General Counsel, no existing statutes control, limit, or define the signals intelligence activities of NSA. Further, the General Counsel asserts that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to NSA’s interception of Americans’ international communications for foreign intelligence purposes5 I. origins NSA was established in 1952 bv a Top Secret directive issued by President Truman.” Under this directive, NSA assumed the respon- sibilities of the Armed Forces Security Agency, which had been created after World War II to integrate American cryptologic ef- forts.’ These efforts had expanded rapidly after World War II as a result, of the demonstrated wartime value of breaking enemy codes, particularly those of the Japanese. 2. Respmibilities (a) Subject Matter Respor&bilitks.-The executive branch ex- pects NSA to collect political, economic, and military information as part of its “foreign intelligence” mission.’ “Foreign intelligence” is an ambiguous term. Its meaning changes, depending upon the pre- ’ Senate Resolution 21, Section 2 (8). ’ Roy Banner deposition, 2/4/76, pp. 13,16,3Q. Banner stated that signals intelligence activities are authorized by the Presi- dent under Article II Gf the Cons‘iitution and “the Fourth Amendment does not restrict these signals intelligence activities” if the “purpose is solely to obiain foreign intelligence.” (Ibid., p. 39.) Memorandum from President Harry S. Truman to Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense, “Communications Intelligence Activities,” 10/24/62. ’ NSA exercises technical control over the three Service Cryptologic Agen- cies : the Army Security Agency, Naval Security Group Command, and Air Force Security Service. MA’s Director is always a military officer of at least three-star rank. He renorts to the Secretary of Defense. but resuonds to reauesta from other intelligence agencies for int&ligence information. - a “The purpose [of forming NSA] was to maintain and improve this source of intelligence which was c&side&d of vital importance to the national se- curity, to our ability to wage war, and to the conduct of foreign affairs. This mission of NSA is directed to foreign intelligme, obtained from foreign dec- trical communications and also from other foreign signals such as radars.” [Emphasis added.] Lew Allen, Jr. testimony, 10/29/75, Hearings, Vol. 5, p. 6. 737 vailing needs and views of policymakers, and the current world situ- ation. The internal politics of a nation also play a role in setting re- quirements for foreign intelligence, * the domestic economic situation, an upcoming political campaign, and internal unrest can all affect the kind of foreign intelligence that a political leader desires. Thus, the definition constantly expands and contracts to satisfy the chang- ing needs of American policymakers for informat.ion. This flexibility was illustrated in the late 196Os, when NSA and other intelligence agencies were asked to produce “foreign intelligence” on domestic activists in the wake of major civil disturbances and increasing anti- war activities. NSA’s authority to collect foreign intelligence is derived from a Top Secret National Security Council directive which is implemented by directives issued by the Director of Central Intelligence.” These directives give NSA the responsibility for “Signals Intelligence” (SIGINT) and “Communications Security” (COMSEC) . SIGINT is subdivided into “Communications Intelligence” (COMINT) and “Electronics Intelligence” (ELINT). COMINT entails the inter- ception of foreign communications and ELINT involves the inter- ception of electronic signals from radars, missiles, and the like. The COMSEC mission includes the protection of United States Govern- ment communications by providing the means for enciphering mes-