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Cross-Border Operations from Jordan to Syria CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS FROM JORDAN TO SYRIA Under UN Security Council Resolution 2165 2014-2018 Independent Review 9 June 2019 By Tamara Marcello TABLE OF CONTENTS ACRONYMS ...................................................................................................................................... III ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .................................................................................................................. IV DISCLAIMER .................................................................................................................................... IV EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................................................... V RECOMMENDATIONS ..................................................................................................................... 1 SECTION ONE: BACKGROUND ..................................................................................................... 3 1.1 CONTEXT ....................................................................................................................................................... 3 1.2 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES ............................................................................................................................... 4 1.3 SCOPE AND METHODS ................................................................................................................................ 4 1.4 STRUCTURE OF THE REVIEW ..................................................................................................................... 5 SECTION TWO: START UP OF CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS ........................................... 6 2.1 INFORMAL CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS ............................................................................................... 6 2.2 ESTABLISHING THE UNITED NATIONS MONITORING MECHANISM (UNMM) ................................ 7 2.3 UNOCHA’S ROLE IN THE FORMAL CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS JORDAN-SYRIA ........................ 8 2.4 TRUST BUILDING ......................................................................................................................................... 9 2.5 THE WHOLE OF SYRIA COORDINATION ARCHITECTURE .................................................................. 11 2.6 ESTABLISHING THE JORDAN HUB COORDINATION ARCHITECTURE ............................................... 11 2.7 COORDINATING SHARED NEEDS ASSESSMENTS ................................................................................. 12 SECTION THREE: SUPPORTING SYRIAN PARTNER ORGANISATIONS ......................... 17 3.1 INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................................... 17 3.2 PARTNERSHIP MANAGEMENT APPROACHES ...................................................................................... 17 3.3 CAPACITY BUILDING ................................................................................................................................ 18 3.4 DUTY OF CARE TO SUB-CONTRACTED SNGO STAFF ......................................................................... 22 3.5 COORDINATION ......................................................................................................................................... 25 SECTION FOUR: MAINSTREAMING PROTECTION, PSEA, AND ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS ................................................................................................................................. 26 4.1 PROTECTION MAINSTREAMING ............................................................................................................. 26 4.2 PROTECTION FROM SEXUAL EXPLOITATION AND ABUSE (PSEA) ................................................. 26 4.3 RISKS TO HUMANITARIAN PRINCIPLES ................................................................................................ 27 4.4 ENSURING ACCOUNTABILITY ................................................................................................................. 28 SECTION FIVE: RISK MANAGEMENT AND REMOTE MONITORING ............................... 29 5.1 RISK MANAGEMENT ................................................................................................................................ 29 5.2 REMOTE MONITORING ............................................................................................................................ 31 SECTION SIX: ENGAGEMENT ..................................................................................................... 34 6.1 GOVERNMENT OF JORDAN ...................................................................................................................... 34 6.2 NON STATE ACTORS ................................................................................................................................ 35 6.3 LOCAL COUNCILS ...................................................................................................................................... 36 6.4 STABILISATION ACTORS .......................................................................................................................... 37 SECTION SEVEN: INTER-AGENCY CONTINGENCY PLANNING, CONTINUITY OF SERVICES, AND CLOSE DOWN ................................................................................................... 41 7.1 CONTINGENCY PLANNING ....................................................................................................................... 41 7.2 EMERGENCY RESPONSE DURING THE FINAL OFFENSIVE IN SOUTHERN SYRIA ............................ 42 7.3 CONTINUITY OF SERVICES AND CLOSING DOWN SAFELY .................................................................. 42 SECTION EIGHT: CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................... 45 i Acronyms [Syrian Coalition-formed] Syria International NGO Regional ACU SIRF Assistance Coordination Unit Forum Syrian Non-Governmental ANF Al Nusra Front SNGO Organisation CBTF Cross Border Task Force SOP Standard Operating Procedure British Department for DFID SWG Sector Working Group International Development ERC Emergency Relief Coordinator TPM Third-Party Monitoring United Nations Disaster Assessment ERR Emergency Response Roster UNDAC and Coordination FSA Free Syrian Army UNFPA United Nations Population Fund United Nations High Commissioner HCT Humanitarian Country Team UNHCR for Refugees HNO Humanitarian Needs Overview UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund United Nations Monitoring IATF Inter-Agency Task Force UNMM Mechanism United Nations Office for the IDP Internally Displaced Person UNOCHA Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs International Non- INGO UNSC United Nations Security Council Governmental Organisation International Organisation for The United States Agency for IOM USAID Migration International Development International Rescue IRC WASH Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene Committee Investing in Syrian ISHA WFP World Food Program Humanitarian Action ISWG Inter Sector Working Group WHO World Health Organisation JKBW Jayesh Khalid bin-Walid WoS Whole of Syria MOFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs OFDA Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance Protection against Sexual NFI Non Food Item PSEA Exploitation and Abuse Non-Governmental QR Quick Response NGO Organisation NRG Needs Response Group Resident and Humanitarian RC/HC Coordinator RNA Rapid Needs Assessment SEA Sexual Exploitation and Abuse iii Acknowledgments Thank you to the many individuals who gave generously of their time to share their views on the collective humanitarian response inside southern Syria from Jordan. Thanks to Asmaa Al Shimary for research and translation assistance and Catherine Richards for editing support. Thanks also to Ana Nikonorow and the team at UNOCHA Jordan for their engagement throughout this process and for providing the opportunity for an independent review. Disclaimer This review was written by Dr Tamara Marcello for the Cross-Border Task Force (CBTF) and was submitted in May 2019. The opinions expressed are those of the reviewer and do not necessarily reflect those of any individual humanitarian agency or governmental organisation involved in the cross-border response. At the time of writing this document the cross border operations from Jordan to south west Syria remain suspended. UN Security Council Resolution 2449, which extended the original UN Security Council Resolution 2165, remains valid until January 2020. iv EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Context By mid-2014, three years into the Syria war, 150,000 people had been killed including 10,000 children and 10 million people were in need of humanitarian assistance. Securing access to civilians caught up in the Syrian conflict had long been a major challenge particularly so for those in Hard To Reach1 areas including opposition-held areas in southern Syria. Significant lobbying from many including the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) and the Government of Jordan resulted in the unanimous adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2165 (2014) which authorised UN agencies to use four border crossing points, including Al-Ramtha (Jordan- Syria) to deliver humanitarian assistance to people in need in Syria. Under this resolution and for the next four years, cross-border humanitarian actors worked to deliver humanitarian aid from Jordan to the most vulnerable inside southern Syria. In doing so they supplemented the substantial humanitarian
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