Islam and Identity in Germany
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ISLAM AND IDENTITY IN GERMANY Europe Report N°181 – 14 March 2007 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION: THE CURRENT DEBATE ......................................................... 1 II. GERMANY’S TURKS: THE BACKGROUND.......................................................... 4 A. THE EMERGENCE OF A TURKISH POPULATION.......................................................................4 B. NATURALISATION POLICIES ..................................................................................................5 C. THE DİTİB AND GERMAN MANAGEMENT OF ISLAM .............................................................6 III. ISLAMIC AND ISLAMIST ORGANISATIONS........................................................ 9 A. BEYOND DİTİB ....................................................................................................................9 1. Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland (ZMD).......................................................10 2. Union of Islamic Cultural Centres/Verband der Islamischen Kulturzentren (VIKZ) ...10 3. Islam Council/Islamrat (IR).....................................................................................10 4. Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Görüş (IGMG).......................................................11 B. JIHADIST NETWORKS AND TERRORISTS...............................................................................12 C. PROBING LINKS BETWEEN VIOLENT AND NON-VIOLENT GROUPS ......................................14 1. Verfassungsschutz calculations................................................................................14 2. A slippery slope? .....................................................................................................16 3. Protecting Germany from IGMG.............................................................................17 IV. INTEGRATION: GERMAN ATTITUDES AND POLICIES................................. 19 A. A RELATIVE SUCCESS STORY ?...........................................................................................19 B. ISLAM, PUBLIC OPINION AND THE RISK OF BACKLASH........................................................21 V. THE INTEGRATION QUESTION: MUSLIM ATTITUDES AND INDICATORS .. 22 A. INTEGRATION FAILURES IN EDUCATION AND EMPLOYMENT ...............................................23 B. THE POTENTIAL FOR CONFLICT...........................................................................................24 VI. REPRESENTING MUSLIMS AND ISLAM............................................................. 26 A. REPRESENTING MUSLIMS FOR RELIGIOUS PURPOSES..............................................................26 1. The German Islam Conference/Deutsche Islamkonferenz (DIK) ...........................27 B. THE SLOW AWAKENING OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES .........................................................29 VII. CONCLUSION: A DEBATE WITHOUT A DIRECTION ..................................... 31 APPENDICES A. MAP OF GERMANY..............................................................................................................32 B. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .......................................................................33 C. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON EUROPE ..........................................................34 D. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES ...................................................................................35 Europe Report N°181 14 March 2007 ISLAM AND IDENTITY IN GERMANY EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS The experience of Germany, with the largest Muslim German outlook and policy have changed; the reality population in Western Europe after France, shows that a of immigration and permanent settlement is now significant Muslim population at the heart of Europe need recognised and a new willingness, in principle, to not produce either violent Islamist groups or destabilising extend citizenship has developed. However, the view social unrest. Politicians now acknowledge it is a country that integration should precede naturalisation – the of immigration, with a large and permanent Turkish and requirement that Turks and other Muslims should first Muslim component. Citizenship is at last on offer, if still integrate and demonstrate their “German-ness” before under difficult conditions. Neither political nor jihadi they may acquire that citizenship – remains a formidable currents of Islamism have had much appeal for those of brake on the process. Turkish origin, three quarters of the Muslim population, and the handful of terrorist suspects that have been found It is unrealistic to expect those of Turkish origin to have been either German converts or dual nationals of become fully integrated into German society while Arab origin. But there are issues that must still be citizenship and full participation in public life are addressed more effectively if the genuine integration that withheld. By placing almost all the onus of adjustment will ensure social peace and stability is to be created. and evolution on the immigrant population, this unrealistic While the political system has been preoccupied with expectation tends to encourage the authorities and finding, or creating, a single Islamic interlocutor for itself, political class to evade their responsibilities to facilitate more important are practical issues, especially education this evolution and inhibits the emergence of a political and jobs, which matter to the many still disadvantaged party consensus on the principles that should underlie among the more than two million of Turkish origin and the integration process. the hundreds of thousands of others of Muslim background. The emphasis on ideological correctness, illustrated by This report is part of a series undertaken by Crisis Group the proposed use of demanding naturalisation on Islamism generally, and its impact in Europe. The questionnaires requiring applicants to agree with current German case is heavily influenced by the fact that the German public opinion on certain questions, leads the Muslim population is dominated by individuals from an authorities to stigmatise as inherently “un-German” avowedly secular country – Turkey – that has experience immigrant opinion that subscribes even to entirely non- with democratic norms, and that religion for this violent varieties of Islamist thinking. It also entails population is only one element of identification. While intensive surveillance of certain organisations and their the report discusses jihadi elements, greater attention is members even if those organisations are law-abiding. given to issues more relevant to the fundamental This policing of thought is experienced by Turks and question of what remains to be done if this population is other Muslims as discriminatory, hostile in spirit and to be truly integrated, as Germans now agree it should be. frequently provocative in practice. The relationship between Germany’s largely Turkish This complicates consultations between the authorities Muslim population and the German national and Muslim religious leaders on management of community was until recently conditioned by the Muslim religious life and practice. So, however, does political class’s refusal to acknowledge that the the Turkish government’s effort to monopolise the “guestworkers” were there to stay. German rather representation of Muslims in Germany, through an than Turkish attitudes were the primary factor organisation, the Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious precluding effective integration. Turks’ own Affairs (DİTİB), that is legally a German association uncertainty over whether they would eventually return but is in reality a satellite apparatus of the Turkish “home” and a tendency toward linguistic and social state and an instrument of its attempt to guard against segregation were reinforced for two generations by the possible growth of opposition in the Turkish German administrative practices. Since 2000, however, diaspora. This is in conflict with the plural nature of Islam and Identity in Germany Crisis Group Europe Report N°181, 14 March 2007 Page ii the German Muslim population, notably the presence 3. Take care that intra-party forums that may exist of Arab Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds as well as specifically for Turkish and/or Muslim members supporters of alternative currents of Turkish Islamism do not segregate them from the wider party represented in particular by the Islamic Community of membership by facilitating their participation in the National Vision (Milli Görüş, IGMG) movement. mainstream party activities and debates. The dilemma for the German authorities is that they 4. Avoid any temptation to use the debate over need Ankara’s cooperation in certain practical matters Turkey’s accession to the EU to stir up anti- but cannot afford to yield to DİTİB’s monopolist foreigner sentiment for domestic political pretensions without prejudice to the integration of all purposes but instead encourage Turkish Germans legitimate (constitutional) currents of religious and to take a positive part in that debate. political opinion within the immigrant population. The authorities need to ensure at both federal and To the CDU and CSU Parties in Particular: provincial (Länder) levels that whatever institutional 5. Recognise that effective integration cannot be arrangements are made for consulting religious leaders achieved on the basis of unrealistic or these respect the plurality of outlooks and organisations unreasonable