Chinese Weapons Sales to the Middle East
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Winning the Salvo Competition Rebalancing America’S Air and Missile Defenses
WINNING THE SALVO COMPETITION REBALANCING AMERICA’S AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSES MARK GUNZINGER BRYAN CLARK WINNING THE SALVO COMPETITION REBALANCING AMERICA’S AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSES MARK GUNZINGER BRYAN CLARK 2016 ABOUT THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS (CSBA) The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments is an independent, nonpartisan policy research institute established to promote innovative thinking and debate about national security strategy and investment options. CSBA’s analysis focuses on key questions related to existing and emerging threats to U.S. national security, and its goal is to enable policymakers to make informed decisions on matters of strategy, security policy, and resource allocation. ©2016 Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. All rights reserved. ABOUT THE AUTHORS Mark Gunzinger is a Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Mr. Gunzinger has served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Forces Transformation and Resources. A retired Air Force Colonel and Command Pilot, he joined the Office of the Secretary of Defense in 2004. Mark was appointed to the Senior Executive Service and served as Principal Director of the Department’s central staff for the 2005–2006 Quadrennial Defense Review. Following the QDR, he served as Director for Defense Transformation, Force Planning and Resources on the National Security Council staff. Mr. Gunzinger holds an M.S. in National Security Strategy from the National War College, a Master of Airpower Art and Science degree from the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, a Master of Public Administration from Central Michigan University, and a B.S. in chemistry from the United States Air Force Academy. -
Design Characteristics of Iran's Ballistic and Cruise Missiles
Design Characteristics of Iran’s Ballistic and Cruise Missiles Last update: January 2013 Missile Nato or Type/ Length Diameter Payload Range (km) Accuracy ‐ Propellant Guidance Other Name System (m) (m) (kg)/warhead CEP (m) /Stages Artillery* Hasib/Fajr‐11* Rocket artillery (O) 0.83 0.107 6; HE 8.5 ‐ Solid Spin stabilized Falaq‐12* Rocket artillery (O) 1.29 0.244 50; HE 10 Solid Spin stabilized Falaq‐23* Rocket artillery (O) 1.82 0.333 120; HE 11 Solid Spin stabilized Arash‐14* Rocket artillery (O) 2.8 0.122 18.3; HE 21.5 Solid Spin stabilized Arash‐25* Rocket artillery (O) 3.2 0.122 18.3; HE 30 Solid Spin stabilized Arash‐36* Rocket artillery (O) 2 0.122 18.3; HE 18 Solid Spin stabilized Shahin‐17* Rocket artillery (O) 2.9 0.33 190; HE 13 Solid Spin stabilized Shahin‐28* Rocket artillery (O) 3.9 0.33 190; HE 20 Solid Spin stabilized Oghab9* Rocket artillery (O) 4.82 0.233 70; HE 40 Solid Spin stabilized Fajr‐310* Rocket artillery (O) 5.2 0.24 45; HE 45 Solid Spin stabilized Fajr‐511* Rocket artillery (O) 6.6 0.33 90; HE 75 Solid Spin stabilized Falaq‐112* Rocket artillery (O) 1.38 0.24 50; HE 10 Solid Spin stabilized Falaq‐213* Rocket artillery (O) 1.8 0.333 60; HE 11 Solid Spin stabilized Nazeat‐614* Rocket artillery (O) 6.3 0.355 150; HE 100 Solid Spin stabilized Nazeat15* Rocket artillery (O) 5.9 0.355 150; HE 120 Solid Spin stabilized Zelzal‐116* Iran‐130 Rocket artillery (O) 8.3 0.61 500‐600; HE 100‐125 Solid Spin stabilized Zelzal‐1A17* Mushak‐120 Rocket artillery (O) 8.3 0.61 500‐600; HE 160 Solid Spin stabilized Nazeat‐1018* Mushak‐160 Rocket artillery (O) 8.3 0.45 250; HE 150 Solid Spin stabilized Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org. -
A China Perspective • Domestic COVID-19 Situation • Aerospace Landscape • Q&A This PPT Should Be Viewed in PRESENTATION Mode
Presented by Dennis Scott Ass, Chief Designer: COMAC (since August 2011) A China Perspective • Domestic COVID-19 situation • Aerospace Landscape • Q&A This PPT should be viewed in PRESENTATION mode. These views are my personal opinion [email protected] and do not reflect the position of COMAC. Private & Confidential May 2020-V3 All Rights Reserved 2020 Dennis Scott: China Perspective 1. Coronavirus Situation • China has successfully completed the Coronavirus cycle (<5 new cases/<10 new symptomless cases per day). • All businesses, schools, colleges, sports centres have re-opened. 3 vaccines undergoing trials. • Currently, only Chinese nationals/Green Card holders allowed to enter China. • Every person entering China is tested before being quarantined for 14 days. Testing widely available. Private & Confidential Dennis Scott: China Perspective 1. Coronavirus Situation • Domestic flights now back up to 80+% of pre-virus level (trains are now essentially fully operational). • Discussions ongoing with Dubai, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam and New Zealand on how/when to re- start international flights, potentially from May 22nd (Emirates have started COVID-19 testing before check-in). • Comprehensive financial support has been provided to Chinese airlines and business in general. • Airline consolidation expected (Hainan Airlines + subsidiaries is a prime candidate). Private & Confidential • Drastic reduction/deferral of new aircraft orders and severe reduction in maintenance/after sales activities. • Aerospace supply chain facing a 30 to 50% reduction in order intake (short term). • Excess capacity and headcount is a global issue across the industry (but is not such4 a problem in China). Private & Confidential Dennis Scott: China Perspective 2. China Aviation Industry Overview • China was already a key aircraft market before COVID-19, with 25% of Airbus and Boeing production going to Chinese airlines. -
The China-Iran Partnership in a Regional Context
Occasional Paper Series No. 38 l September 2020 Last Among Equals: The China-Iran Partnership in a Regional Context By Lucille Greer and Esfandyar Batmanghelidj INTRODUCTION to reorient the balance of power in the Middle East in defiance of the United States, even In early June 2020, a scan of an 18-page though China’s policy is not to make alliances in document began circulating on Iranian social the region. media. Titled “Final Draft of Iran-China Strategic Partnership Deal,” the document, which While that the leaked document included no appeared to have been leaked from the Iranian financial targets, many news reports stated that Ministry of Foreign Affairs, immediately caused the deal would see China invest $400 billion in a firestorm among the general public and Iran, a completely fictitious number that can politicians alike. Soon, the international media be traced back to a dubious article published picked up the document and headlines blared in the spring of 2019.1 Such errors reflect the that Iran and China were forging a new “alliance” long-running overestimation of China’s economic Middle East Program Occasional Paper Series No. 38 l September 2020 engagement not just in Iran, but also in the wider China’s measured approach to building relationships Middle East. Reporting on potential or promised with several countries despite the mutual financing or investment is rarely balanced by the antagonism in the region. actual amount of capital committed and how it is applied across the region. This is the crucial context that is absent in most recent analysis of this deal and its ramifications. -
Iran's Ballistic Missile Programs: an Overview
Order Code RS22758 Updated July 21, 2008 Iran’s Ballistic Missile Programs: An Overview Steven A. Hildreth Specialist in Missile Defense and Non-Proliferation Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division Summary Iran has an active interest in developing, acquiring, and deploying a broad range of ballistic missiles. This was spotlighted in mid-July 2008 when Iran launched a number of ballistic missiles during military exercises, reportedly including the medium- range Shahab-3. On July 18, 2008, a Pentagon spokesman said Iran was “not testing new technologies or capabilities, but rather firing off old equipment in an attempt to intimidate their neighbors and escalate tension in the region.” Subsequent analysis of the July 2008 missile launches also shows Iran apparently digitally altered images of those launches. This short report1 seeks to provide an overview of the reported or suspected variety of Iranian ballistic missile programs. Because there remains widespread public divergence over particulars, however, this report does not provide specificity to what Iran may or may not have, or is in the process of developing. This report may be updated. Iran’s ballistic missile program dates to the late 1970s after the Shah was overthrown and the Islamic Republic of Iran established. The new Iranian government embarked on a ballistic missile program marked by considerable secrecy. Many consider that Iran’s effort was in full force by the mid-1980s during its protracted war against Iraq, during which Iran reportedly launched more than 600 ballistic missiles. Today, there is little disagreement among most experts that Iran has acquired some number of ballistic missiles from other countries and has developed other ballistic missiles indigenously or in cooperation with others. -
2019 China Military Power Report
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019 Office of the Secretary of Defense Preparation of this report cost the Department of Defense a total of approximately $181,000 in Fiscal Years 2018-2019. This includes $12,000 in expenses and $169,000 in DoD labor. Generated on 2019May02 RefID: E-1F4B924 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019 A Report to Congress Pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, as Amended Section 1260, “Annual Report on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Public Law 115-232, which amends the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Section 1202, Public Law 106-65, provides that the Secretary of Defense shall submit a report “in both classified and unclassified form, on military and security developments involving the People’s Republic of China. The report shall address the current and probable future course of military-technological development of the People’s Liberation Army and the tenets and probable development of Chinese security strategy and military strategy, and of the military organizations and operational concepts supporting such development over the next 20 years. -
Illinois Current Through P.A
State Laws and Published Ordinances – Illinois Current through P.A. 101-591 of the 2019 Regular Session of the 101st General Assembly. Office of the Attorney General Chicago Field Division 100 West Randolph Street 175 West Jackson Blvd., Suite Chicago, IL 60601 1500Chicago, IL 60604 Voice: (312) 814-3000 Voice: (312) 846-7200 http://www.illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/ https://www.atf.gov/chicago- field-division Table of Contents Chapter 430 – Public Safety Firearm Owners Identification Card Act Section 430 ILCS 65/1.1. Firearm defined; Firearm ammunition defined. Section 430 ILCS 65/2. Firearm Owner's Identification Card required; exceptions. Section 430 ILCS 65/3. Transfer of firearms; records; exceptions. Section 430 ILCS 65/3a. Reciprocal rights in Iowa, Missouri, Indiana, Wisconsin and Kentucky. Section 430 ILCS 65/3.1. Dial up system. Section 430 ILCS 65/3.2. List of prohibited projectiles; notice to dealers. Section 430 ILCS 65/4. Application for Firearm Owner's Identification Card. Section 430 ILCS 65/5. Approval or denial of application; fees. Section 430 ILCS 65/6. Contents of Firearm Owner's Identification Card. Section 430 ILCS 65/7. Validity of Firearm Owner’s Identification Card. Section 430 ILCS 65/8. Grounds for denial and revocation. Section 430 ILCS 65/8.1. Notifications to the Department of State Police. Section 430 ILCS 65/8.2. Firearm Owner's Identification Card denial or revocation. Section 430 ILCS 65/8.3. Suspension of Firearm Owner's Identification Card. Section 430 ILCS 65/9. Grounds for denial or revocation. Section 430 ILCS 65/9.5. Revocation of Firearm Owner's Identification Card. -
Red Diamond Published by TRADOC G-2 Operational INSIDE THIS ISSUE Environment & Threat Analysis Directorate, Fort Leavenworth, KS
Operational Environment & Threat Analysis Volume 10, Issue 3 July - September 2019 Focus on CHINA Bits in the Wire: Advancing Threats in China’s the Cyber Domain Maritime Militia Also: Worldwide Equipment Guide (WEG) Showcase and Updates APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED OEE Red Diamond published by TRADOC G-2 Operational INSIDE THIS ISSUE Environment & Threat Analysis Directorate, Fort Leavenworth, KS Competition in 2035: Training for Multi-Domain Topic Inquiries: Operations in Competition with China .................... 3 Angela Williams (DAC), Branch Chief, Training & Support Jennifer Dunn (DAC), Branch Chief, Analysis & Production China’s Belt and Road Initiative and Its Infamous Debt: More of a Threat than a Trap ................................... 8 OE&TA Staff: Penny Mellies (DAC) Director, OE&TA [email protected] 913-684-7920 China’s Maritime Militia ........................................ 11 MAJ Megan Williams MP LO [email protected] WO2 Rob Whalley UK LO Bits in the Wire: Advancing Threats [email protected] 913-684-7994 in the Cyber Domain ........................................... 20 SGT Rodney Knox AU LO [email protected] 913-684-7928 The Combined Arms Battalion and Combined Arms Laura Deatrick (CTR) Editor Brigade: The New Backbone of the Chinese Army .. 27 [email protected] 913-684-7925 Keith French (CTR) Geospatial Analyst [email protected] 913-684-7953 INTERVIEW Interview: Dennis J. Blasko, LTC, USA (Ret) ............ 42 Angela Williams (DAC) Branch Chief, T&S [email protected] 913-684-7929 Film Review: Operation Red Sea ........................... 47 John Dalbey (CTR) Military Analyst [email protected] 913-684-7939 Jerry England (DAC) Intelligence Specialist [email protected] 913-684-7934 WEG Showcase .................................................. -
Iran and the Gulf Military Balance - I
IRAN AND THE GULF MILITARY BALANCE - I The Conventional and Asymmetric Dimensions FIFTH WORKING DRAFT By Anthony H. Cordesman and Alexander Wilner Revised July 11, 2012 Anthony H. Cordesman Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy [email protected] Cordesman/Wilner: Iran & The Gulf Military Balance, Rev 5 7/11/12 2 Acknowledgements This analysis was made possible by a grant from the Smith Richardson Foundation. It draws on the work of Dr. Abdullah Toukan and a series of reports on Iran by Adam Seitz, a Senior Research Associate and Instructor, Middle East Studies, Marine Corps University. 2 Cordesman/Wilner: Iran & The Gulf Military Balance, Rev 5 7/11/12 3 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................................. 5 THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ....................................................................................................................... 6 Figure III.1: Summary Chronology of US-Iranian Military Competition: 2000-2011 ............................... 8 CURRENT PATTERNS IN THE STRUCTURE OF US AND IRANIAN MILITARY COMPETITION ........................................... 13 DIFFERING NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES .............................................................................................................. 17 US Perceptions .................................................................................................................................... 17 Iranian Perceptions............................................................................................................................ -
Iran's Foreign and Defense Policies
Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policies Updated May 8, 2019 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov R44017 SUMMARY R44017 Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policies May 8, 2019 Iran’s national security policy is the product of many overlapping and sometimes competing factors such as the ideology of Iran’s Islamic revolution, perception of threats Kenneth Katzman to the regime and to the country, long-standing national interests, and the interaction of Specialist in Middle the Iranian regime’s factions and constituencies. Iran’s leadership: Eastern Affairs x Seeks to deter or thwart U.S. or other efforts to invade or intimidate Iran or to bring about a change of regime. x Has sought to take advantage of opportunities of regional conflicts to overturn a power structure in the Middle East that it asserts favors the United States, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and other Sunni Muslim Arab regimes. x Seeks to enhance its international prestige and restore a sense of “greatness” reminiscent of ancient Persian empires. x Advances its foreign policy goals, in part by providing material support to regional allied governments and armed factions. Iranian officials characterize the support as helping the region’s “oppressed” and assert that Saudi Arabia, in particular, is instigating sectarian tensions and trying to exclude Iran from regional affairs. x Sometimes disagrees on tactics and strategies. Supreme Leader Ali Khamene’i and key hardline institutions, such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), oppose any compromises of Iran’s national security core goals. Iran’s elected president, Hassan Rouhani, and Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif support Iran’s integration into regional and international diplomacy. -
Securing the Belt and Road Initiative: China's Evolving Military
the national bureau of asian research nbr special report #80 | september 2019 securing the belt and road initiative China’s Evolving Military Engagement Along the Silk Roads Edited by Nadège Rolland cover 2 NBR Board of Directors John V. Rindlaub Kurt Glaubitz Matt Salmon (Chairman) Global Media Relations Manager Vice President of Government Affairs Senior Managing Director and Chevron Corporation Arizona State University Head of Pacific Northwest Market East West Bank Mark Jones Scott Stoll Co-head of Macro, Corporate & (Treasurer) Thomas W. Albrecht Investment Bank, Wells Fargo Securities Partner (Ret.) Partner (Ret.) Wells Fargo & Company Ernst & Young LLP Sidley Austin LLP Ryo Kubota Mitchell B. Waldman Dennis Blair Chairman, President, and CEO Executive Vice President, Government Chairman Acucela Inc. and Customer Relations Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA Huntington Ingalls Industries, Inc. U.S. Navy (Ret.) Quentin W. Kuhrau Chief Executive Officer Charles W. Brady Unico Properties LLC Honorary Directors Chairman Emeritus Lawrence W. Clarkson Melody Meyer Invesco LLC Senior Vice President (Ret.) President The Boeing Company Maria Livanos Cattaui Melody Meyer Energy LLC Secretary General (Ret.) Thomas E. Fisher Long Nguyen International Chamber of Commerce Senior Vice President (Ret.) Chairman, President, and CEO Unocal Corporation George Davidson Pragmatics, Inc. (Vice Chairman) Joachim Kempin Kenneth B. Pyle Vice Chairman, M&A, Asia-Pacific (Ret.) Senior Vice President (Ret.) Professor, University of Washington HSBC Holdings plc Microsoft Corporation Founding President, NBR Norman D. Dicks Clark S. Kinlin Jonathan Roberts Senior Policy Advisor President and Chief Executive Officer Founder and Partner Van Ness Feldman LLP Corning Cable Systems Ignition Partners Corning Incorporated Richard J. -
China's Role in the Chemical and Biological Disarmament Regimes
ERIC CRODDY China’s Role in the Chemical and Biological Disarmament Regimes ERIC CRODDY Eric Croddy is a Senior Research Associate at the Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Program, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies. He is the author of Chemical and Biological Warfare: A Comprehensive Survey for the Concerned Citizen (New York: Copernicus Books, 2001). odern China has been linked with the prolif- least—and with considerable diplomatic effort—China eration of nuclear, chemical, and missile weap- broadcasts its commitment to both the CWC and the Mons technology to states of proliferation con- BWC. cern, and its compliance with arms control and disarma- Few unclassified publications analyze the role that CBW ment is seen as key to the effectiveness of weapons of have played in Chinese military strategy, nor is much in- 1 mass destruction (WMD) nonproliferation efforts. In this formation available on Beijing’s approach to negotiating context, the answer to Gerald Segal’s question, “Does CBW disarmament treaties. This is not surprising: China 2 China really matter?” is most definitely, “Yes.” In the is an extremely difficult subject for study where sensitive realm of chemical and biological weapons (CBW), military matters are concerned. A 1998 report by Dr. Bates Beijing’s role is closely linked to its view of the multilat- Gill, Case Study 6: People’s Republic of China, published eral disarmament regimes for CBW, namely the Chemi- by the Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, cal Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and was the first to seriously address the issue of China and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), and of related mul- CBW proliferation.