Peirce on Realism and Idealism Robert Lane Index More Information

Cambridge University Press 978-1-108-40096-1 — Peirce on Realism and Idealism Robert Lane Index More Information

Index

a priori method, 13, 17–19, 20, 40n5 bivalence, principle of (PB), 11, 165, 180–181, 187, Abbott, Francis Ellingwood, 59 189–193 Absolute, the, 74, See also idealism, absolute Boler, John, 61, 106n3, 113n17, 130n48, abstract terms, 132 134n58 abstraction, 10, 127, 128, See also hypostatic buried secrets, 8, 51–56, 145n14, 166–168, 174, abstraction; prescission 184–186 agapasm, 81n36 Almeder, Robert, 3n2, 4n4, 24n22, 44n13, 61, can be’s, 144–145, 164 66n13, 79n33, 85n2, 106n3, Cantor, Georg, 156, 157, 158 143n12 Cantor’s Theorem, 158 Altshuler, Bruce, 60 cardinal comparability theorem, 154 anancasm, 81 Carus, Paul, 36n40, 106n2 anti-realism, 32, 38n1, 43n9 chance. See tychism about artifacts, 1 clear and distinct ideas, 40–41 about minds, 1, 5, 7 coenoscopic science, 27 about modality, 148, 153 cognition(s) about truths, 14 as continuous, 89–91, 94, 96, 103 Apel, Karl-Otto, 176n11 real vs. unreal, 97 Aristotelicity, 156, 160n37 cognitionism, 97n15 Aristotle, 10, 16, 22, 72n25, 146, 156 conceptualism, 109–110 Armstrong, David, 112n16 concrete individuals. See individuals, concrete Atkin, Albert, 169n5 continuity, 11, 77, 90, 124, 134n58, 148, 152, Austin, J. L., 5n5 153n23, 155–164, 168, 180, 189, 192, See also authority, method of, 13, 16–17, 18–19, 33, synechism 40n5 and generality, 157, 159, 160–161 and possibility, 156–157, 158, 160–161 Bain, Alexander, 42 contradiction, principle of (PC), 139–142, Baldwin, James Mark, 26n27 144–145, 161, 190, 192–193 basic realism. See realism, basic Cooke, Elizabeth, 24n22 belief. See also doubt; methods of fixing belief cosmogony, 71–75, 81, 177 as having no place in science, 23–24 cosmology, 60, 173 as sensible effect of real things, 42 critical common-sensism, 64, 166n2 contrasted with doubt, 26–27, 28, 42, 45–46 pragmatic clarification of the idea of, 45–46, David, Marian, 21n18 130n48 de Waal, Cornelis, 35n37, 154n24, 157n34 Bergman, Mats, 46n15 “definite” and “indefinite,” Peirce’s uses of, Berkeley, George, 10, 36, 43, 54, 60n3, 68, 140n9 68n19, 70, 79, 87n4, 88n5, 91n9, 97n15, 106, “determinate” and “determined,” Peirce’s 112n15, 113, 114, 115n23, 116n26, 117, 120, definitions of, 123 122, 147 deficit indeterminacy, 11–12, 56, 165–194 Bernard of Chartres, 112n15 DeGrazia, David, 112n14

201

202 Index

Descartes, René, 34, 69, 74n29, 91n9 and hypostatic abstraction, 131–135 determinacy, absolute, 108, 121, 123, 124, See also and prescission, 130–131 individuals, strict general facts, 178 determinism, 72–73, 150 general signs, 122–126, 129, 138, 139–140 Devitt, Michael, 6 and the reality of generals, 129–130 diamond example, 53, 55, 142–146, 163, 184 same as indeterminate signs on Peirce’s early Dinge an sich. See things-in-themselves view, 123 doubt, 8, 17, 19, 32–33, See also belief general thoughts, 109 dreams general words, 107–108 as internal, 79 generality, 11, 111, 113, 115, 152, 163n41, 164, 165, as real, 86 176, 179n17 contents of, as figments, 86 and continuity. See continuity, and generality Dummett, Michael, 113n19 and possibility, 148, 155, 160–162, 164 generals, 9–10, 11, 19n11, 43n10, 106–113, 121–122, “Elegy Written in a Country Churchyard” 128–130, 133, 142–143, 157, 162 (Thomas Gray), 55n23, 86 as external, 83, 107, 114n21, 121, 127–128 emotions, as internal, 4, 79 not entities, 112–113, 129, 132, 133, 134, 135 Englebretsen, George, 24n22 not existents, 110 ens, 96, 113 that correspond to hypostatically abstracted entities, 112–113 concepts, 134 excluded middle, principle of (PEM), 110, genuine, the, 5 139–140, 144, 165n1, 179–181, 191–192 Glanzberg, Michael, 24n22 “existence,” Peirce’s use of, 71n23, 121n31, Guyer, Paul, 68n18 128n45, 131n52, 173n8 existence, 10, 110–112, 116 Haack, Susan, 5, 13n2, 21n16, 24n22, 25n24, unintelligibility of, 111–112 36n39, 92n11, 112n16, 116n25, 122n33, 143n12, existential graphs, 148 191n25 external, the, 3–4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 19, 20, 29, 30, 31, 34, haecceity, 112, 116, 128, 129 47, 50n17, 64–65, 66, 70, 76, 77n31, 79, Harris, William T., 87n4 105n22, 114n20, 119, 182, See also realism, Hausman, Carl, 57n25, 76–77 about the external Havenel, Jérôme, 156n28, 161n38 as cognizable, 94–95, 100, 121 Hegel, Georg, 66, 70, 74, 123n35 as continuous with the internal, 89–92 hic et nunc, 112, 134 as external to individual minds, 79–81 Hirst, R. J., 6, 60 causes of sensation, 115, 117–121 Hookway, Christopher, 2, 4, 11, 14, 23n20, 24n21, 65n10, 114n22, 125n40, 136, 153n23, 174n10, feeling, unpersonalized, 71–72, 73, 75 176n11, 179n17 vs. individual minds, 81–82 on whether Peirce separated truth and reality, feelings, as external, 82–83 169–172 fictional, the, 3, 4n4, 50n17, 86, 96, 101, 110, 114, hope and investigation, 11–12, 23, 56, 178–179, 142, 151, 165–166, 167–168 181–183, 186–189, See also optimism about fictive, the. See fictional, the investigation figments. See fictional, the Horstmann, Rolf-Peter, 68n18 final (ultimate) opinion, 43, 57, 58, 84, 85, 98, 116, Hume, David, 106n2 117–118, 122, 137, 167, 184 hylopathy, 71 Firstness, 66 hypostatic abstraction, 65n9, 131–135 Fisch, Max, 97n15, 107, 153n23, 156n30, 163n41, 191n25 icons, 126 Flew, Anthony, 68n18 ideal world, 155n27 Forster, Paul, 20n14, 24n22 idealism, 7, 9, 58, 135, 172 Fraser, Alexander Campbell, 10, 43, 87n4, 106 definitions of, 60n3 Friedman, Lesley, 65n11, 168n3 Flew’s statement of, 68n18 Hirst’s statement of, 6, 60 Galluzzo, Gabriele, 112n16 Peirce’sdefinition of, 65n11 general concepts, 10, 122, 127, 128, 157 idealism, absolute, 66–67, 70, 74

Index 203

idealism, actual (Kant), 63, 64, 68 Kant, Immanuel, 5, 46, 48, 62–64, 68, 70, 89n6, idealism, basic, 9, 59–60, 62–70, 77–78, 84, 85, 91, 156, 160n37, 178, 179n16 87, 90, 111, 124, 125n39, 128, 172 Kanticity, 156, 160n37 idealism, conceptual, 85n1, 125n39 Ketner, Kenneth, 161n38 idealism, conditional, 67, 68n19, 76 Khlentzos, Drew, 7 idealism, critical (Kant), 63n6 Krauth, Charles, 60n3 idealism, dogmatic (Kant), 91n9 Kripke, Saul, 112n14, 126n43 idealism, empirical (Kant), 91n9 idealism, epistemological, 61 Ladd-Franklin, Christine, 26n27 idealism, material (Kant), 90–91 laws, 19n11, 173–174, 176, 177, See also generals idealism, mystical and visionary (Kant), 91n9 natural, 106, 108n5, 138n3, 148, 150, 163n41 idealism, objective, 9, 60, 61, 62, 66n13, 68n18, of perception, 29–30 70–83 psychical vs. physical, 72–74, 75–76, 77 idealism, ontological, 6, 68–69, 70, 79, 85, Legg, Catherine, 46n15 97n15 Leibniz, Gottfried, 108n7 Guyer and Horstmann’s statement of, 68n18 Locke, John, 61 idealism, pragmatistic, 68n17 Loux, Michael, 1, 5, 112n16 idealism, problematic (Kant), 91n9 idealism, realistic, 66 material objects. See physical objects idealism, semiotic, 85n1, 125n39 materialism, 68–69, 73, 75, 77 idealism, transcendental (Kant), 62–64, 70, mathematics, 136 91n9, 179n16 matter. See mind(s), and matter idealistic theory of reality. See real, the (reality), may be’s, 140n9 idealistic theory of Mayorga, Rosa Maria, 44n13, 53n20, 60, identity, 166 66n12, 106n3, 108n5, 112n14 idioscopic science, 27 methods of ﬁxing belief, 7, 13, 14–21, 24–25, 35, indices (indexical signs), 112n13, 126–127 See also a priori method; authority, method “individual,” meaning of, 108 of; science, method of (investigation); individualism, 108, 112n15, 129 tenacity, method of individuals, 10, 108, 157–158, 162 Meyers, Robert, 176n11 concrete, 108–109, 110–112, 116, 122, 124, Michael, Fred, 129n46 125–126, 127, 134n58, 138, 139 Migotti, Mark, 24n22, 26n26, 31n33, 39n5, strict, 108–109, 111n12, 112, 124–125, 127, 46n15 134n58, 138, 139 Mill, John Stuart, 130n47 induction, 87 “mind,” Peirce’s use of in the cosmological Information-Relative (IR) account of modality. series, 71 See modality, Information-Relative (IR) mind(s), 1, 3, 4, 5, See also feeling, unpersonalized account of and matter, 72, 73–76, 77, 81, See also idealism, inkstand example, 66 objective inquiry. See methods of ﬁxing belief universal, 61–62 internal, the, 3n2, 4, 5, 7, 9, 20n14, 66, 79, mind-independence, 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 47–48, 76, 194 88, 114n20, See also realism, about the Misak, Cheryl, 4, 8, 12, 14, 47n16, 50n17, 56n24, internal 113n17, 118n30, 136, 169n5, 176 as continuous with the external, 89–92 on bivalence and investigative hope, 186–189 as internal to some individual mind, 79–81, 88, on whether Peirce accepted a correspondence 107, 115, 152 account of truth, 47–50, 65n10 interpretants, 103, 104 modal realism. See realism, modal introspection, 88 modality, 9, 10, See also necessity; possibility intuition, 89, 90 essential (or logical), 149 investigation. See science, method of Information-Relative (IR) account of, 11, (investigation) 147–155, 156n28, 158, 160, 164, 184 mathematical, 149 James, William, 36, 39n2, 68n17, 116n26, 191 metaphysical, 149 Jardine, Nicholas, 56n24 physical, 149, 152

204 Index

modality (cont.) substantial. See modality, substantial practical, 149 Potter, Vincent, 156n28, 161n38 subjective, 149, 151, 153n23 powers, 118–119 substantial, 149–153, 154–155, 160, 164 pragmatic clarifications, 62n5, 163 monism, 71, 73, 76 as general, 138 Moore, Matthew, 156n28, 158 do not supersede first- and second-degree Morgan, Charles, 148n19, 153n23 clarifications, 44–45, 121 Murphey, Murray, 61, 85n1, 113n17, 130n48 indicative mood vs. subjunctive mood, 53, 58, Myrvold, Wayne, 154, 156n28, 161n38 95n12, 117n27, 142–143, 144, 148, 166–167, 168, 175, 176, 184 necessitarianism. See determinism pragmatic maxim, 8, 10, 26n26, 37, 38–41, 43, 44, necessity, 10, 141 45, 101, 102, 122n32, 130n48, 138, 145, 163n40, neutralism, 73 166, 183 Ney, Alyssa, 112n16 pragmaticism, 39, 142, 143, 146–147, Noble, Brian, 153n23, 156n28 155, 185 nominalism, 83, 106n2, 107–108, 114, 117n26, 127, pragmatism, 7, 35n37, 64, 67, 101, 102, 117n26, 128, 129, 133n54, 145, 146, 161, 119, 133, 134, 143n12, 146, 148, 152, 153n23, 163n41, 164 162, 163, 164, 166n2, 176n12, 186, 190 nominalistic conception of reality. See real, the prescission, 127n44, 130–131 (reality), nominalistic conception of Price, Huw, 47 nominalistic element of Peirce’s theory of probability, 148n20 cognition, 129 propositions, 29, 126–127, 165 nominalistic Platonism, 112, 117, 132, 134 protoplasm, 75 normative sciences, 40, 135 psychology, 27–28 noumena, 119 Putnam, Hilary, 30, 161n38

objectivity, 4, 5, 6, 7, 59n2 quantum mechanics, 166 Ockham (Occam), William of, 128 Quine, W. V. O., 166n2 Ockham’s razor, 73n27 ontological idealism. See idealism, ontological “real” opium example, 118–119, 133–134 Peirce’sdefinition of, 5–6, 98, 114, 137, 144, optimism about investigation, 54–55, 56, 151, 172 166–167, 168, 175, 176–177, 178–179 Peirce’s use of as synonymous with “true,” 97–99 panpsychism, 61 real, the (reality) Parks, R. Z., 191n25 absolute conception of (Williams), 65n10 Parmenides, 167 and hope, 181–183 Parsons, Terence, 166 as a matter of degree, 169n4 Pearson, Karl, 66, 87n4 as consensus, 84–85, 93–94, 99, 101 Peirce Edition Project, 59n1, 77n30 as ideal, 105n22 percepts, 87n4, 92 clarification of the idea of to the first and perceptual judgments, 92n11 second degrees, 41 percipuum, the, 92n11 idealistic theory of, 9, 66n13, 83, 84–85, 93–105, phenomenalism, 92 116, 121 Philip of Macedon example, 123–127, 139 nominalistic conception of, 113, 115–116, physical objects, 6, 20n13, 79, 83 117–120, 121 Plato, 113n17 pragmatic clarification of the idea of, 3n2, 8, 9, Plutarch, 124n37 10, 11, 14, 37, 38–58, 62, 67–68, 70, 76, 101, Porter, Noah, 112n13 102, 116, 134, 135, 136, 137–138, 145n14, 146, possibility, 10, 11, 12, 28n28, 141–144, 163n41, 168, 147, 166–168, 169–170, 172, 173, 175, 189, 192, See also vagueness; vagues 176n12, 179, 183–184, 189, 193 and continuity. See continuity, and possibility realist conception of, 10, 43, 113, 116–120, and generality. See generality, and possibility 121–122 logical, 154–155 social theory of, 97 positive and negative, 153–154 realis, 2n1

Index 205

realism Secondness, 66, 110n10 about artifacts, 5 semiotic, 29, 102, See also signs; thought-signs about minds, 5, 83, 85, 87, 88, 89, 109 semiotic indeterminacy, 10, 23, 165, See also about the external, 3–4, 9, 62, 65–66, 69, general signs; vague signs 70n21, 79, 82, 84, 85, 89, 92–94, 99, as underspecificity, 123–124 105n22, 119 sense experience, 20, 29–30, 31 about the internal, 4, 70n21 and generals, 115–116 about the physical, 20n13, 83 sentiment, 18 about truths, 14 Sfendoni-Mentzou, Demetra, 60 Devitt’s statement of, 6 Shields, Paul, 156n28, 161n38 Hirst’s statement of, 6, 60 Short, T. L., 3n2, 13n1, 15n5, 19n10, 25n23, 43n11, Khlentzos’s statement of, 7 53n19, 71n22, 72, 73n26, Loux’s statement of, 1, 5 74n29, 85n1, 112n13, 116n25, 123, 125n39, realism, basic, 2–3, 5–6, 7, 9, 20, 29, 30–34, 45, 58, 126n43, 127, 129n46, 133n55 60, 62, 65, 68, 70, 78, 84–85, 87–88, 93–94, signs, 49, 50, 86, 90, 92, 98, 103 96, 99, 100, 105n22, 106n2, 119, 181–182 “singular,” meaning of, 108 realism, epistemological, 3n2, 79n33 singular signs, 139 realism, logical, 157n35 Skagestad, Peter, 23n20, 24n22, 50n18, realism, modal, 56, 137–164 70n21, 113n17, 122n32, 130n48, strong, 11, 53, 95n12, 148, 153, 155, 158, 159, 162, 131n50, 143n12, 162n39 163, 167, 175, 184, 192 skepticism, 34 weak, 148, 152–153, 155 Skow, Bradley, 166 realism, scholastic, 7, 9–11, 30n30, 43n10, 65n9, Smart, J. J. C., 38n1 76, 83, 106–136, 137, 142, 143, 147, 148, social impulse, 15, 17, 19, 35 153n23, 157, 161, 163, 164, See also generals sorites paradoxes, 139n4, 141n10 Early Argument for, 10, 122, 126, 127, 129, 138 speculative grammar, 27 Late Argument for, 10, 137–138, 143 Spinoza, Baruch, 69, 123n35 realism, scientific, 3n2 strict individuals. See individuals, strict realist conception of reality. See real, the (reality), subjectivity, 5 realist conception of supermultitudinousness, 158 reality. See real, the (reality) symbols (symbolic signs), 21, 126–127 retroduction, 182–183 synechism, 44n13, 77, 147n16, 157n35, Riley, Gresham, 123n35 See also continuity Robin, Richard, 25n24 Rosenthal, Sandra, 168n3 Tarski, Alfred, 47 Royce, Josiah, 66–67, 70, 74, 169, 175 tenacity, method of, 13, 14–15, 18n9, 24n22, 40n5 things-in-themselves, 49, 59n2, 62, 63, 64–65, Savan, David, 60 95, 119 Scheffler, Israel, 24n21 thinking vs. thought, 58n26, 61, 109–110, 122 Schelling, Friedrich, 78 Thirdness, 66 Schiller, Ferdinand Canning Scott, 36, 39n2 Thompson, Manley, 153n23 scholastic realism. See realism, scholastic thought-signs, 89–90, 92, 94, 98, 109, 124 Schröder, Ernst, 147 virtual meaning of, 103–105 science, method of (investigation), 7, 8, 9, 11–12, time, continuity of, 158, 160 13, 14, 19–21, 24, 26, 29–31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 39, “transcendental” 42–43, 44, 51–56, 57–58, 62, 84, 94, 97, 100, Kant on, 63n6 102, 117, 118, 120, 121, 122, 125–126, 127, 135, Peirce’sdefinition of, 63n6 138, 143, 145–146, 165, 166–168, 169–170, 173, triadic logic, 12, 181, 189 174, 175, 176, 182, 185, 187–189, See also hope truth, 7, 116 and investigation; optimism about and the a priori method, 18 investigation and the external, 19 and the reality of generals, 128–130, 134, 135, 136 and the method of authority, 16 vs. the activities of professional scientists, 24 and the method of tenacity, 15 Scotus, Duns, 2n1, 106, 107, 108n7, 112, 113, 127, as convergence, 169, 171, 172 128, 129 as indeterminate, 136

206 Index

truth (cont.) “Truth and Falsity and Error,” 23, 26, as property of propositions, 23, 26, 28, 48–49 135–136 as satisfaction, 8, 34–37 Turquette, Atwell, 191n25 Berkeleyan conception of, 36 tychasm, 81n36 clarification of the idea of to the first and tychism, 72–73, 147n16, 148, 150–151, 152, 164, second degrees, 46–47, 173–174 coherence theory of, 47 correspondence theory of, 14, 21, 24n22, ultimate opinion. See final (ultimate) opinion 26n27, 46n15, 47–49 universals. See generals deflationist theory of, 47 genealogy of the idea of, 7–8, 13, 20, 24–29, vague signs, 123n36, 137, 138–141 38–39 vagueness, 10, 11, 165, 179n17, 190, See also impersonal nature of, 17, 18, 19, 30 possibility indefinite, 190 vagues, 10, 11, 136, 137, 142, 161, 192–193, See also investigative aspect of Peirce’s account of, 8, 13, possibility 14, 25–26, 28, 29, 30, 34, 37, 39, 42–44, 48, Venn, John, 23n19 49, 51, 56, 68, 98, 117, 125, 138, 143, 145, 169, 171, 172, 179, 186, 189, 190 Watson, John, 70 Peirce’s pragmatic theory of, 8, 14, 38, 47, Welt an sich. See things-in-themselves 56n24 Whately, Richard, 108n6 pragmatic clarification of the idea of, 46–51, Wiggins, David, 18n9, 20n13, 25n24, 68, 186 35n37, 44n13 public nature of, 15–16, 17, 18, 19, 30 Williams, Bernard, 65n10 representationalist aspect of Peirce’s account Wilson, Aaron, 116n25 of, 8, 13, 14, 21–23, 24, 25–26, 28, 30, 34, would be’s, 19n11, 52–53, 140n9, 144–145, 164, 37, 38, 42, 48, 51, 65, 95–96, 98, 136, 143, 168 165, 171 would have been’s, 55, 145