6 X 10.Long.P65

Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-84320-1 - Peirce’s Theory of Signs T. L. Short Index More information

Name Index

Albert, D., 121 Boyd, R., 197 Aldrich, V., 216 Bradley, F. H., 323 Alston, W., 43 Braithwaite, R. B., 140, 141n14, 299 Anaxagoras, 99, 101 Brandon, R., xii, 142, 143, 299 Anscombe, G. E. M., 15, 83 Brentano, F., 6, 11 Anselm of Canterbury, 21 Brock, J., xv, 243, 245n6 Anttila, R., 287 Bunge, M., 106n15 Apel, K.-O., xiv, 61n3, 64n4, 65, 66, 66n5, Burch, R., 74 69n7, 196n16, 214 Burger, R., 107n16 Aquinas, Thomas of, 93, 105 Burks, A., 115n20, 136n10, 237, 241 Aristotle,2, 5, 22, 32, 93, 98, 100, 104, 105, 106, 124, 136, 149, 164, 167n8, 201, Cantor, G., 35n7 204, 321, 326, 335 Carnap, R., 280 Armstrong, D., 291 Carnot, S., 128 Arnold, M., 307 Cassirer, E., 262 Augustine, 21, 23, 34, 161 Charlton, W., 106n14 Austin, J. L., 214n2, 242, 260 Chisholm, R., 10, 11 Ayala, F., 141 Churchland, Paul, 291 Ayer, A. J., 325n3, 331 Cicero, 326 Colapietro, V., 46n10, 313, 314 Bacon, F., 318, 329 Comte, A., 62 Baker, V., xivn3 Copleston, F., 105n13 Beckner, S., 140 Cornford, F. M., 106n14 Bense, M., 237n2 Cratylus, 22 Bergman, M., xv, 187 Cummings, R., 205n20 Berkeley, G., 197, 306 Bernard, C., 106n15 Darwin, C., 117 Bernstein, R., 51, 312, 314, 320 Dauben, J., 36n7, 331n7 Bohr, N., 337n11 De Morgan, A., 2 Boler, J., 79n10, 139n Delaney, C. F., 325n3, 337 Boltzmann, L., 121 Deledalle, G., xiv, 18 Boorse, C., 142 Democritus, 101 Bosanquet, B., 323 Dennett, D., xi, 125n5, 292, 295, 300, 301

361

362 Name Index

Derrida, J., xvi, 45, 308 Herzberger, H., 74 Descartes, R., 21, 33, 71, 139, 318 Hilpinen, R., 223n6, 245n6, 274n5, Dijksterhuis, E. J., 98n4 281n11 Dilthey, W., 139 Hintikka, J., 223n6, 265, 266n1 Diogenes La¨ertius, 23 Hippocrates, 21 Donellan, K., 264 Hobbes, T., 104n11, 140 Dray, W., 139 Hoffmeyer, J., xvi, 177 Dretske, F., xi, 297, 300 Hollinger, H., 119 Duns Scotus, 2, 50, 78 Hookway, C., 245n6, 246n7, 268n3, 325n3, 331 Eco, U., xvi, 24, 45, 228 Horwich, P., 332n10 Ehrenfest, P., 121n3 Houser, N., 50n16, 245n6 Ehrenfest, T., 121n3 Housman, C., 313 Eisele, C., 331n7 Hull, D., 95 Emmeche, C., xvi, 177 Hume, D., 66, 77, 83, 108, 326 Evans, G., 277n9 Husserl, E., 2, 8, 10, 60, 70, 71

Fetzer, J., 115n20, 306 Jakobson, R., 226, 227, 287 Feyerabend, P., xii, 2, 275, 284, 335 James, W., 81n12, 83 Fisch, M., xv, 28n2, 50n16, 199 Jeffrey, R., 113 Fisher, R. A., 132 Jeffreys, H., 112n17 Fitzgerald, J., xv Jesus of Nazareth, 20 Fodor, J., xi, 280, 281, 297, 298, 300, 301 Johansen, J. D., xv, 229 Fraassen, B. van, 342 Frede, M., 106n14 Kant, I., 2, 4, 27, 31, 60, 61, 64, 81, 107, Frege, G., 48, 246, 277, 280, 281 180, 196, 214, 292, 306, 312, 326, 346 Gadamer, H.-G., 139 Kent, B., 62 Galileo Galilei, 326, 335 Kerr-Lawson, A., 74 Gallie, W. B., 138n12 Kierkegaard, S., 308 Gentry, G., 43 Kim, J., 293 Ghiselin, M., 129n6 Kraus, O., 11 Gibbs, W., 121 Krausser, P., 28n2, 61n2 Girel, M., 81n12 Kripke, S., xii, 88, 225, 264, 276, 278 Gombrich, E. H., 228 Kruse, F., 90n17, 205n20, 231 Goodman, N., 197, 200, 214, 261, 307, 345 Kuhn, T., xii, 2, 200n19, 321, 322, 323, Greenlee, D., xv 331n8, 335, 341 Grice, H. P., 213, 305 Gr¨unbaum,A., 104n12 Lakatos, I., 336 Lambert, J. H., 60 Haack, S., 86n15, 199n18, 279n10, Lane, R., 274n5 337n12 Langer, S., 262 Habermas, J., xv, 214 Latour, B., 323 Hacking, I., 83n13, 284, 285 Leibniz, G. W., 326 Hare, R. M., 248n9 Lennox, J., 103n10 Harr´e,R., 83 Lewis, D., 88 Hartshorne, C., 79n10, 237, 240 Lieb, I. C., 237, 242 Hegel, G. W. F., 60, 139, 323 Lincoln, A., 94 Hempel, C., 112, 113, 125n4 Liszka, J. J., xiv, 168n9, 181n1 Heraclitus, 22 Locke, J., 2, 21, 66, 77

Name Index 363

Lucretius, 140 Quine, W. V. O., 13, 175, 263, 266, 293, Lycan, W., 15n4 320, 320n2, 325n3, 328

Madden, E., 83 Railton, P., 112, 114, 125 Malthus, T., 124 Ransdell, J., xv, 43n9, 50n15, 50n16, Markus, R. A., 23, 24 168n9, 186n5 Maxwell, J., 118, 121, 125 Reichenbach, H., xii, 2, 104n12 Mayr, E., 141 Rescher, N., 331n8, 337n12, 343n15 Meinong, A., 175 Reynolds, A., 118n1, 138n12 Mendelssohn, F., 204 Roberts, D., 266, 266n2, 276n7 Meyers, R., 168n9 Robin, R., 345 Migotti, M., 325n3, 332 Rorty, R., 86n15, 307 Mill, J. S., 125n4 Ruse, M., 105 Millikan, R. G., xii, 262, 297, 300, 303, Russell, B., 2, 175 309 Misak, C., 263, 325n3, 332n10 Salmon, W., 113 Mises, R. von, 112n17 Sanders, G., 237 Mitchell, O. H., 48 Santaella, L., xvi, 177 Monod, J., 141 Saussure, F. de, 16, 27 Morris, C., xv, 19n6, 262, 306 Savan, D., xiv, 206, 237, 238n3, 345 Müller, R., 237 Scheffler, I., 141, 141n14, 299, Murphey, M., 36n7, 48n13, 50n15, 50n16, 323 65, 66, 330 Schelling, F. W. J. von, xii Schröder, E., 2 Nagel, E., 125 Schrödinger, E., 118, 122 Neurath, O., 324 Schweber, S., 132n8 Newton, I., 99n5 Searle, J., xi, 10n2, 243, 293, 294 Niiniluoto, I., 118n1 Sebeok, T., xvi, 21, 177 Nute, D., 115n20 Sellars, W., 292 Sextus Empiricus, 23 Ockham, William of, 2 Shapiro, M., 287 Oehler, K., xv Shields, P., 36n7 Owen, G. E. L., 106n14 Skagestad, P., 325n3 Sklar, L., 121n3 Pape, H., xvi, 177 Smyth, R., 331n9 Papineau, D., 297, 299, 300, 309 Soames, S., xiiin2, 332n10 Parmenides, 175 Sober, E., 125n5, 128, 297 Parmentier, R., xv Socrates, 99, 101 Peirce, B., 1 Spiegelberg, H., 61n2, 61n3 Place, U. T., 291 Stalnaker, R., 88 Plantinga, A., 88 Stern, P., 103n9, 107n16 Plato, 21, 34, 93, 94, 99, 101, 105, 106, Stitch, S., 292 175, 224, 323 Strawson, P. F., 175 Plato, J. von, 121n3 Suppes, P., 115n20 Popper, K., xii, 2, 115n20, 128, 324, 336 Potter, V., 36n7, 136n10 Taylor, C., 139 Prigogine, I., 134, 294 Taylor, R., 140 Putnam, H., xi, xii, 36n7, 118n1, 198n17, Theophrastus, 106 199, 264, 278, 279, 285, 292, 294n3, Toulmin, S., 2, 321 304, 306, 341 Turley, P., 139n

364 Name Index

Vlastos, G., 103n9, 106, 106n14 Winch, P., 139 Wittgenstein, L., 11, 86n14, 139, 263, 292, Wallace, W., 106n15 308 Walther, E., 237n2 Wolff, C., 4, 98 Weiss, P., 237, 240, 241 Woodﬁeld, A., 104n11, 140 Whewell, W., 327 Woodward, J., 114 Whitehead, A. N., 2 Wright, C., 333 Wicksteed, P. H., 106n14 Wright, G. von, 139 Wiener, N., 140 Wright, L., xii, 141, 299 Wiggins, D., 104n11, 106n14, 278 Zeno of Elea, 36 Wimsatt, W., xii, 141, 299 Zenzen, M., 119

Subject Index

abduction, 319 compared with Austin’s, 243; contrary abstraction, see hypostatic abstraction; to Peirce’s sometimes denial, is prescinding significant, 246–247; see also actuality (existence), distinguished from propositions; statements reality, 86–87; see also 2ndness adicity, 71 categories, Peirce’s system of: as formal antifoundationalism: 318; its sources, acquire phaneroscopic meaning, 86; 318–322, 323–324; raises question of as phaneroscopic, 74; no proof a subjectivism, 323 priori of their completeness, 74;as architectonic, Peirce’s: compared with metaphysical (also modal or Kant’s, 61–62; principles of, 62; ontological), 74–75, 86–87; ordering of the sciences, 62–63; does sometimes treated ordinally, 74n8, not prescribe a temporal order, 63; 238n3; see also 1stness; phaneroscopy; essentially teleological, 64; inspired by 2ndness; 3rdness problem of phenomenological causation, final vs. efficient (mechanical): description, 64 136; attributions of either type of argument: Peirce’s inconsistent use of the cause are always hypothetical and term, 248; as distinct from its empirical, 152–153; ‘ideal’ causation expression, not a sign, 248;as neither one nor the other,139n; final expression, named ‘delome’, 248; causation is not so-called reverse see also rheme/dicisign/argument; causation, 104; cybernetic devices are seme/pheme/delome mechanical, 140; see also teleology art: judgment of vs. emotional causation, mechanical (efficient): interpretation of, 205; Goodman’s experience of can be direct yet still comparison of to science and the fallible, 82–83; Peirce’s analysis of comparison implicit in Peirce’s compared with Hume’s, 83; semeiotic, 261; works of art are semes probabilistic, 115n20; idea of but may be composed of phemes, ‘bottom-up’ causation (Searle) 253–254; see also music criticized, 294–295; causal laws are artificial intelligence, Fetzer’s Peircean always mechanistic, 108 critique of, 306 ‘cause’: etymology of, 106; in philosophical assertion: a subtype of replication of dicent usage, 107; as correct translation of symbols, 247–248; Peirce’s analysis aitia, 105–106; breadth of the

365

366 Subject Index

‘cause’ (cont.) convergence of opinion: Peirce’s concept conception, as objective factor of, 339, distinguished from Putnam’s, responsible for an effect, 108 341; Kuhn’s argument against, 341; causes, final: as types for which selection is its continuance not guaranteed, made, 137–138; never particular, 97; 343–344; see also truth can be agentless, 102; entail value, critical common-sensism, 275–276; see also 153–154; vs. formal causes, 102–103; common sense in Aristotle’s philosophy, 100–101; cosmology, Peirce’s, 138n12 Peirce’s concept of differs from counterfactuals, see conditionals Aristotle’s by making chance essential, 137; see also purpose degenerate, vs. genuine, 89–90 chance, used here as in chaos theory, delome, see seme/pheme/delome; see also 137n11 argument collateral experience (collateral determine: as meaning to limit (objects observation): interpretation of diverse determine signs, and signs signs of same object, requiring interpretants, in this sense), 167; indices, 192–193; implicated in Peirce’s struggle to determine its correction, 193–194; not restricted to meaning, 165–168 individual objects, 194–195; Peirce’s dicisign, see rheme/dicisign/argument inconsistent use of the term, 193n11 common sense: exists not in minds but in economics of research, 343n15 speech, 272; imports inspecific ellipticity, 72 assumptions, 275; refutable in entia rationis: introduced by hypostatic principle but relatively immune to abstraction, 267; in empirical science, change, 335–336; see also critical 268; sometimes real, 269 common-sensism ‘exists’, often used broadly, 87; for narrow concepts: preceded by speech, 273–274; use, see actuality; 2ndness not psychological and therefore may explanation: fundamental division is into incorporate social and external mechanistic and anisotropic, 116; the determinants of meaning, 280–281; principles of explanation form an reference to the actual built into emergent hierarchy, 144–145; always some, 281–283; as grasped transcend of aspects (Hempel), 125 the grasping, 282–283; in Peirce’s explanation, forms of: anisotropic, 115; semeiotic, 282–283 mechanistic always invokes laws conditionals, counterfactual and relating particulars to particulars, subjunctive: truth of, 87; 96–97; nomological, 97; probabilistic, Stalnaker-Lewis theory criticized, 115; see also explanation, statistical; 88–89; Peirce’s theory of is a explanation, teleological; natural phaneroscopic analysis of experience, selection not a logical analysis of concepts, 89; explanation, statistical: standard models, see also law; 3rdness 112–113; Salmon’s models, 113–114; consciousness: as feeling, 311; as feelings Railton’s model, 114–115; mechanistic involved in self-control, 311–312; and anisotropic forms of self-control requires signs, which thus distinguished, 115; anisotropic become the stuff of consciousness, statistical explanation in statistical 312; see also inwardness; mind; self mechanics contrasted to teleological continuity: concept of, 357n7; experience explanation, 123–124; see also of combines sensation and thought, statistical mechanics 80–82; experience of continuity is explanation, teleological: explanation by itself continuous, 82; thought’s role final causes, a form of anisotropic sometimes analytic, sometimes statistical explanation, 138; Wright’s synthetic, 85 analysis, 142–143; Brandon’s analysis,

Subject Index 367

143–144; see also causation, final vs. abstraction, 266–267; in mathematics efficient; cause, final; teleology and empirical science contrasted, 267; ‘external’, Peirce’s early uses of, 38n8 does not always introduce entia rationis, 267–268; in empirical science, facts, concept of presupposes acquaintance a limiting case of abduction, 268; with assertion, 247 varieties of, 269 fictions, not unactualized possibilities, hypostatic abstractions, scholastic (SHAs): 269–270 269; introduce actualities or fictions, final cause, see cause, final never unactualized possibilities, 270; ‘finious’, designates irreversibility less the warp of thought, 270; sometimes accurately than does ‘anisotropic’, abstracted from other SHAs, 271; 117–118 normally unformulated, 271–272; use 1stness: as monadicity and as quality of of in intellectual history, 272; found in feeling, 75–76; of complexes, 76; 1sts common sense, 272, abstracted from are possibilities, 76, not reducible to verbal practices, 273; inspecific, 274; their occurrences, 76, yet fully designate rigidly, 279 determinate, 78–79 foundationalism: 318; weak icon/index/symbol, division based on foundationalism attributed to Peirce grounds of significance, 214; see also wrongly, 337–338 icon; index; symbol foundherentism (Haack), 337n12 icon: sign that signifies by its own qualities, freedom: Enlightenment ideal of as 215; pure cannot be likenesses, autonomy, adopted by Peirce, 346; 215–216; impure are likenesses, depends on possibility of objective samples, examples, 218; pure (e.g., inquiry, 347; requires faith, 347; always music), a limiting case of sign, 205; imperfect, 347 icons as embodied 1sts vs. icons as the functionalism, see mind, contemporary 1stnesses of 2nds and 3rds, 217–218; theories of each 2nd or 3rd is many icons, 217; fuzziness, see vagueness iconic legisigns (diagrams), 223; iconic qualisigns, 217; iconicity generality: Peirce’s use of ‘general’, xviii; defended from Goodman’s positive (3rdness) vs. negative arguments, 215n3; some complex (1stness), 79; positive generality is the cases in the arts, 216–217 indeterminate, the continuous, and idealism, see realism entails law, 79; in individual existence, incommensurability: problem of, 322–323; 80 its assumption of ‘basic’ theories genuine vs. degenerate, 89–90 undercut by recognition of SHAs, ground of significance (prior relation of a 333–334 sign to its object): 162; distinguished index: introduction of, 47–49;a from significance, 53; requires reality component of knowledge, 49; of potentiality, 53, and final causation, discovery of led to phaneroscopy and 54; fallibility of, 160–161 the category of 2ndness, 49–50; inadequate concept of in the ‘New haecceity, 50, 77–78; see also 2ndness List’, 48n13; not necessarily hypoicons: a subset of iconic sinsigns, 216; compulsive, but always in existential images, diagrams, metaphors, 218 relation to another existent, 219; pure hyposemes (or subindices): indexical and impure, 219–220; role of in a legisigns, 220; includes pronouns, symbol’s growth in meaning, 286 223, and proper names, 224–225 indexicals, 222–223 hypostatic abstraction: a tool of thought, individuals: Peirce’s early theory of as 265; in second-order logic, 265–266; general, 38–40; the ‘absolute’ distinguished from prescisive individual is not general but also not

368 Subject Index

individuals (cont.) interpretants, emotional/energetic/logical real, 38–39; early theory criticized, 39; emotional: 204–206; idea of teleological Peirce’s later theory of, in which and realistic, 205; thus, emotions are individuals are reconceived in terms cognitive as such, and not as of haecceity, 50–51, and as judgments, 206 law-governed continua of 2nds, 87; energetic: 201–204; idea of teleological includes genotypes (Ghiselin), 129n6 and realistic, 203–204 inspecificity: a variety of vagueness distinct logical, 57 from fuzziness, 274; inspecific ultimate: a subdivision of logical, 57;as concepts are often indefinitely changes in habit, 58–59, 173; necessity applicable without being fuzzy, for, 172–174; distinct from final consistent with each of many mutually interpretant in definition even when inconsistent theories of the same same in fact, 178–179; see also thing, and less open to doubt than pragmatism more specific concepts of the same interpretants, immediate/dynamic/final thing, 274–275 immediate: 54–56, 187–188; changes in intentionality: 6–7; intentional inexistence, conception of, 181–182; determined 7; Brentano’s two theses, that by grounds of significance, 189; intentionality is the mark of the distinguished from final by different mental, 7–8, and that the mental is types of mistake in interpretation, inexplicable, 9–11; nonpsychical 183–184 phenomena that seem to possess dynamic: 183, differs from final in intentionality, 9–11; formal mode definition even when identical in fact, criteria of, 11–15, 16, 174; Chisholm’s 188 project analyzed, 12–13; Quine on final: 182–183, as that to which other intentional idioms, 13; intentional signs are relevant, 190; changes in verbs, 14–15; formal mode criteria conception of, 182–183; distinguished applied dialectically, 14; not from ultimate, 57–58; ‘final’ not dependent on thought, 175; explained always the best term for,190n7;may by purposeful action, 175–177; be more than one per sign (contrary Putnam’s argument against to Peirce), 190, not all of which evolutionary explanations of cohere,190; despite Peirce’s tendency intentionality not germane to Peirce’s to identify with ‘the final opinion’, view, 309–310 never the whole truth, 190; sometimes interpretant: distinguished from called ‘normal’, 183; relation to interpretation, 18; equivalence of dynamic object varies, 202 distinct interpretants relative to interpretation: two senses of, 156–157; interest, 18n5; Peirce’s introduction of problem of arbitrariness of, 43; that the term, 29–30; extended to include problem solved, 56; as translation, actions and feelings, 52; infinite error of exclusive attention to, 156; progression of interpretants can be mistaken, 157; mistaken types eliminated, 56; may be mistaken in distinguished, 189; entails intentional either of two ways, 159–160; may be of inexistence, 174; not always any category except the impossible, intellectual, 201; rules of are not 163–164; always has a purpose, which interpretants, 221; variety of relations is the interpreter’s, 171–172 that justify, 161; relative to purpose yet interpretants, divisions of: reasons for, can be shared by different, even 178–179; two trichotomies of are antagonistic purposes, 189 frequently presented in the same interpreter, extended to include other passages as distinct, 180–181; modal animals as well as humans, 52–53 argument for conflating the two interprets, ‘R interprets X as a sign of O’ trichotomies rebutted, 179 defined, 157–159

Subject Index 369

inwardness: as voluntary inhibition, error Peirce long ago exposed, observable in self-control, 314–315; see 301–302; neural-identity (Place, also consciousness; self Armstrong, et al.), 291–292; eliminative materialism (Churchland kinds: real vs. nominal, 87; artifactual et al.), 292; Dennett’s theory, (Wiggins), 278; natural are designated 292–293; Kim on supervenience, 293; rigidly, 278, but contrary to Kripke et Searle’s theory, 293; functionalism al., there is for each an SHA true of (Putnam, Fodor, et al.), 292, its exactly it, 279 computer analogy, 292, and its problem with content, 295–297; law: can be apprehended only in a symbol, teleological functionalism (Papineau, 85; not reducible to regularity, 87; see Millikan, et al.), 297–298, attempts to also conditionals; continuity; reality; square it with mechanicalism, 3rdness 299–300, requires Peirce’s concept of legisign: a law established to signify final causation,301; Fodor’s critique of (Peirce’s usual and our stipulated use; teleological functionalism cf. legisign(G)), 210; defined by criticized, 298–299, as it succeeds only formation rules subordinately to rules against timid versions,300; Dennett’s of interpretation, 212–213; excludes response to Fodor’s critique fails, causal laws, 211; and Augustine’s signa 300–301 data, 26, 211–212; many not mind, Peirce on: his broad usage of ‘mind’ conventional, 211; not all are symbols, and ‘mental’, 290; writings on 222–223; significance of consists in distinguished from implications of his their existing for the purpose of semeiotic, 290–291; his 1892–3 theory signifying, 210; see also of, 291n1; mind as observable, 295; qualisign/sinsign/legisign; replicas mind as semeiosis of a higher order, legisign(G): any law that is a sign, 210; 302; ‘inner representations’ required term introduced to resolve ambiguity only when not acting is an option, of Peirce’s broader and narrower use 303; see also consciousness; of ‘legisign’, 210 intentionality; inwardness; thought; lekton, Stoics’ concept of, 23 self modality, see categories; conditionals ‘matter’, changes in meaning of, 95–96 morality: application of semeiotic to moral meaning: meanings of, 162, 263;in discourse runs counter to the semeiotic, the meaning of a sign is its subjectivism of modern thought, immediate interpretant, 263; contrary 206; extension of analysis of to many, the translation theory is not a commands to analysis of moral duty, theory of meaning, 44; Grice’s division 204; moral realism a corollary of of meanings restated in Peirce’s terms, treating moral feelings as emotional 213–214; grows with use, as a function interpretants, 205–206, 214; of knowledge, 264; ‘the’ meaning of a ‘discourse ethics’ (Habermas), term – a dubious concept, 283; 255n15; see also value Putnam’s argument that ‘meanings music: as iconic, 204; as feeling are not in the head’ examined, 279; contemplated, 204; dynamic and final see also pragmatism; pragmatic maxim emotional interpretants of, 204–205; mechanicalism, 98; see also physicalism emotional interpretant of identical to mechanics: changes in conception of, 95; the feeling embodied in the sound, science of, 95–96 204; its immediate and dynamic mechanistic: 96; excludes the teleological objects are identical, 205; logical 95, 97 interpretants of are deficient and mind, contemporary theories of: as ‘inner inessential but useful, 204; reality of representation’ – a lingering Cartesian what it represents, 205; see also art

370 Subject Index

natural kinds, see kinds represented by them completely, 196; natural selection: Peirce on central idea of, doctrine of embodies Peirce’s realism, 128; ‘selection of’ and ‘selection for’ 199 (Sober), 130; anisotropic, not objects, immediate: the Stoics’ lekton, mechanistic, 130–132; fundamental 179–180, 191; the immediate object is theorem of (Fisher), 132; tautology in, the dynamic object as represented, 124; consists of mechanical events, 196; need not obtain, 159; specified 132; no mechanism of, 132–133; but not perfectly specific, 159 improbability of types selected-for, observation, generality of, 124–125; see also 133–134; without purpose or perceptual judgments direction, 145; nor do species or their observation, justification of: agreement of members have a purpose, 145–146; observations is a logical relation controversy over reveals among judgments, 68n6; distinction misunderstanding of dynamic nature between justifying observations and of science, 327n4 justifying relying on observations, 338; naturalized epistemology (Quine): scants convergence of opinion certifies normative questions, 320–321; reliability of observation, 339; anticipated by Peirce (without observations are relied on without scanting normative questions), 320n2 justification, 339, and that reliance is nonbeing: problem of the nonexistent then justified by theories that explain object in Peirce’s early theory, 42, 46; observations and their agreement, how to speak of what is not, 175– 339; sources of erroneous view that 176 there are warrants for individual nonequilibrium thermodynamics observations, 338n13 (Prigogine), 134–135 percept and percipuum, 319n1 object, breadth of the conception, 162–163 perceptual judgments: as ‘first judgments’ objectivity: the word’s change in meaning of what is before one’s senses, 51; and its new application to inquiry, 324; fallible, 51–52; contains general ideas defined, 324–325; evolution of and introduces assumptions, 318–319; methods and aim poses problem for an extreme case of abduction, the defense of, 344; see also theory 319–320; occurs uncontrollably but evaluation; value, objectivity of can be corrected later, 320; occurs objects, division of: immediate vs. dynamic, without warrant, 337–338; semeiotic 191; immediate corresponds to analysis of, 339–340 immediate interpretant, dynamic to phaneron, the: vs. Lockean ideas, 66–68; final interpretant, 191; distinguished does not exclude thinking, 81; its in terms of process of interpretation, observation, 68, and description, 191–192; commands have both 70 objects, 201–203 phaneroscopy: and phenomenology, objects, dynamic: explains difference 60–61; depends on algebra of between success and failure of relations, 64–66; presuppositions of, interpretants, 191; Pierce conceived of 70; not a form of intuitive knowledge, as the object of the final opinion (qua 61n3; to understand, reader must complete knowledge), 195; contrary to repeat observations himself, 70–71, Peirce, defined as that which can be 76; see also phaneron; signified by diverse signs and which phenomenology explains differences between final and pheme, see seme/pheme/delome immediate interpretants, 195–196;no phenomenology: Continental, 8–9; sign lacks one, 196; cannot be problem of phenomenological misrepresented by pure icons and description in Husserl and Peirce, 61; pure indices but cannot be see also phaneron; phaneroscopy

Subject Index 371

physicalism: ambiguity of, 294; the physical qualisign/sinsign/legisign: division based not necessarily mechanical, 294 on what a sign is in itself, which may pragmatic maxim: 263; correctly entails be of any category, 209; qualisigns are inexhaustiblility of meaning, 58, that mere possibilities, 209; sinsigns are the list of verification conditions single things or events, 209; legisigns, continues to grow, 288 see legisign; legisign(G) pragmaticism, see pragmatism pragmatism (pragmaticism): not a general realism, and idealism: thing-in-itself vs. theory of meaning, 57; contrasted to reality in Peirce’s early, idealistic logical positivism, 84; not a theory of theory, 37, 38; Peirce relinquished his how reference is fixed, nor a early form of idealism, 46–47; his verifiability theory of meaning, subsequent use of the terms 287–288; makes practice to be for the ‘conditional idealism’ and ‘objective sake of theory, 173; reformulated in idealism’, 47n12; idealism a root of his 1907 as the doctrine of ultimate theory of inquiry, 324; typical interpretants, 56; see also pragmatic arguments for subjective idealism, maxim 196–197; Goodman’s argument for prescinding, 71–72 semiotic idealism, 197; limitations of prior relation of sign to its object, see Putnam’s defense of realism against ground of significance Goodman’s argument, 307n6; central probabilistic causation, see causation argument for subjective idealism propositions: Peirce and Austin on, refuted, 198–199 243–244; Peirce’s inconsistent use of realism, internal vs. metaphysical the term, 244–245; as distinct from its (Putnam): 199–200; Kuhn’s expression, not a sign, 245–246; ‘post-DarwinianKantianism’ an reality of questioned, 246n8; see also example of metaphysical realism, assertion; statements 342 ‘purpose’, ordinary usage of: 108–110; realism, Peirce’s: defined, 199; embraces survives Darwin’s theory, 109; ‘having but is distinguished from scientific a purpose’, 110; ‘acting realism, 199; Fisch on, 199; required purposefully’/‘acting for a both by purpose and by semeiosis, purpose’/‘purposeful action’, 111; 200; neither internal nor ‘used for a purpose’, 112; ‘serving a metaphysical, 342–343; see also law; purpose’, 111, ‘existing for a purpose’, reality; 3rdness 111 realism, scientific: 197–198; argument for purpose: as type, 92–93; not psychological, not internal to science, 340 but objective, 93; defined, as type of realism vs. nominalism: xvii; Peirce’s early outcome for which an agent acts or for discussions of, 40–42; his idiosyncratic which something is selected as a definitions of these two doctrines, 40; means, 110; not every final cause is a his characterization of their ‘theories purpose, 135; does not have to be of reality’, 40–41; his failed attempts conscious, 110; can be irrational, to reconcile those theories, 41–42 149, or absurd, 164; cannot be reality: ‘real’ defined, 41;as3rdness, 86; described without use of intentional no reality without actuality, 87;of idioms, 174–175; see also cause, processes and events, 87; see also law; final 3rdness purposeful actions, bases of, 155 reference: ‘reference’ refers to different purposefulness, evolution of: 146–150; things, 263; in semeiotic, the referent emancipation of purpose from is the dynamic object, 263; fixed biology, 148–150; how some purposes independently of meaning, 264,which come to be valued over others and depends on indexical signification, endure or prevail, 148–150 266; ‘traditional’ theory of, 267; ‘new’

372 Subject Index

reference (cont.) 2ndness: as dyadicity and as two-sided or ‘causal’ theory of anticipated by experience of effort and resistance, Peirce, 267; causal theory clarified 76–78; irreducibly dyadic, it is a fact of (reference fixed existentially, not complexity, not a complex of facts, 77; always causally), 277–278; irreducible contrasted to Locke’s idea of solidity, to psychology, 282–283 77; pervasive in experience, 77, relations: analysis of, 72–73; reduction of, contrary to what Hume implied, 77; 73; some are irreducible additional to 1stness in the (indecomposable), 73; external occurrence of a 1st, 78; as actuality, structure of, 73–74 78 replicas (instances of legisigns): can be self, the: a hypothesis introduced to produced only for purpose of explain ignorance and error, 312; replicating, 212; signify legisigns self-control an observable process of iconically and indexically, 212; which the self is not the agent but a indexical legisigns signify through product, 312–313; as ‘teleological their replicas, 213, yet the immediate harmony of ideas’ and semeiotic interpretants of the two differ, process, 313–314;asanens rationis 223–224; legisigns and their replicas abstracted hypostatically from facts do not entail two layers of significance, about control, on which higher grades 223–224, posing a problem for of control depend, 314–316;anens Peirce’s semeiotic taxonomy, 225 rationis consequential and therefore representamen, 55n18 real 316; see also consciousness; reverse causation, see causation, final vs. inwardness; mind, Peirce on efficient seme/pheme/delome: 232; reason rheme/dicisign/argument: a preferable to rheme/dicisign/ generalization of term/proposition/ argument, 248 argument, 231–232; variant semeiosis: as sign’s ‘action’, 172; purpose a designations, 232; distinguished not fourth element in, 158; the purpose by differences in compositional essential to it is that of an interpreter, complexity but by mode of influence 171–172 on interpreters, 233–234; see also semeiotic (Peirce’s theory of signs): a argument; seme/pheme/ science, 151; overextension limits its delome explanatory power, xvi, 177; rigid designation (Kripke): 276–277; development toward naturalism, 53; untoward consequences of its divorce provides a naturalistic theory of mind, from conception, 283–285 290; not behavioristic, 289, nor reductive,290; does not make signs in science as inquiry: developed in modern general to have a function, 309–310 period, 326–327; in modern science, semeiotic taxonomy, principles of: 235; can the purpose of theory is to advance only be justified a posteriori, 207–208; inquiry, 327; Peirce defined science by each sign must be of one division of its ‘spirit’ rather than by its method, each trichotomy, 232; no sign may be 328; breadth of Peirce’s conception, of more than one division of any 328; scientific methods vary in trichotomy, 231; other forbidden objectivity, 328–329; aim of modern combinations, 235–236; need to science remains intellectual, despite explain the striking pattern of claims of many, 329; dynamic nature adicities, 237–242; order of of modern science, 329–330; its components in the sign relation, evolution in methods and social 238–242; relative simplicity, 239; forms, 329–330 determination, 240; the ten classes of scientism: Putnam’s critique of and Peirce’s 1903, 236–237; the ten trichotomies avoidance of compared, 306–309 of 1908 criticized, 259–260

Subject Index 373

semiology (Saussure): 16; assumption that signa data (Augustine): vs. signa naturalia, a sign is a two-part entity 16–17; 24–26; term usually mistranslated, assumption of arbitrariness, 17; 24–25 relation of thought to language, significance: Peirce’s early failure to 17–18 explain, 43–44; not dependent on semiology vs. Peirce’s semeiotic: danger of actual interpretation, 53; defined as their conflation, xv–xvi; dyadic vs. grounded interpretability, 53, 162; still triadic, 18; compositional vs. triadic because distinct from its relational, 18–19; difference in ground, 214–215; a form of breadth, 19–20; each aims to be a intentionality, 174; derivative from science, 20; absurd consequences of interpretation’s purpose, 172–174; failure to see their fundamental not dependent on ‘inner opposition, 20–21; Eco’s conflation of representation’, 301 Saussure’s semiology with Peirce’s space and time: perception of, 81n12; not semeiotic criticized, presupposed by indices but 228–230 apprehended by coordinating indices semiotic: non-Peircean sign theories successfully, 192n9; spatio-temporal derived from Saussure’s semiology, location, 97n2 xin1 statements, distinguished from sentences, SHA, see hypostatic abstraction, scholastic 242–244; see also assertion sign: a technical term, 20, 151; Peirce’s statistical inference, 103n8 unchanging conception of, as one statistical mechanics: reasoning in, 113, part of a triad, 30; extended to include 118–123; ergodicity and ensembles, natural effects and resemblances, 52; 121; quantum mechanics in, 121–122; defined, 160; Peirce’s definitions of, explanation in is not by forces, and 164–165; as defined here agrees with therefore not mechanistic, 122–123; Peirce’s tendencies, 168; breadth of introduces a new way of looking, 124; Peirce’s conception, 185–186; signs not faute de mieux, 125–127; Second need only be interpreted potentially, Law, though explained statistically, is 161; not always produced purposefully, mechanistic, 127–128; see also 186; how counted, 161, 188–189; may explanation, statistical be of any category, 163, 209; reference statistical phenomena: reality of, 128; to can be either opaque or potency of, 133 transparent, 188; ambiguity of ‘false symbols: legisigns whose objects are sign’, 160n4; false or misleading signs assigned by rules of interpretation, correspond to a type of mistaken 220–221; signify types, 222; replicas of interpretation, 189; genuine vs. are not symbols, 221, yet may signify degenerate, 230–231; compound, types through symbols replicated,224; 161–162; ‘sign to’ a deceptive their replicas, being sinsigns, may locution,227; suppositions that icons signify individuals, 222; growth of, and indices require a symbolic 285–288; as purpose, 287–288; their component (Eco) or that signs ‘blend’ ‘essences’ are SHAs, 287 ( Jakobson) or that there is a ‘perfect’ or ‘complete’ sign (Peirce) refuted, teleology: etymology of, 98; Aristotle’s 225–227 philosophy its locus classicus, 98;a sign, other theories of: ancient Greeks, 21; sophisticated doctrine, 98–100; Plato, 21–22; Aristotle, 22; Stoics, 23 introduced to explain the emergence (see also lekton); Epicureans, 23; of order from chaos, 99; Augustine, 23–26 (see also signa data); misunderstood because of mechanist Locke, 2–4; Millikan, 303–306; assumptions, 100; Plato’s teleology, Morris, xv, 19n6, 306; for Saussure, see 99–100, 101–102, 103, 103n8; theistic semiology versions, 103–104; Peirce’s sheriff

374 Subject Index

teleology (cont.) transcendental argumentation, Peirce’s analogy not theistic, 139n; Aquinas’ rejection of, 66 versus Aristotle’s, 105; contrasted to truth: its definition seen as evolving, vitalism, 104; Kant’s, 107; attempted 331–332; its definition as impersonal mechanistic reductions of, 104; is a cultural development, 333; influence of the ideal on the actual, defined as that toward which objective 94; see also cause, final; explanaton, inquiry progresses, 325–326, which teleological definition is not a theory of truth in teleonomy (Mayr et al.), 141 the contemporary sense, 332, but is theorematic vs. corollarial reasoning, rather an ideal that Peirce 265–266 recommended,333; does not depend theory evaluation: growth more important on actual convergence, 326;no than surviving tests, 336; role of guarantee a priori that truth in this research programs (Lakatos) and sense exists, 331–332; Peirce relevance of inspecificity to, 336–337; anticipated the deflationary theory, tests by observations presupposing 332–333; ‘truth in’ a treacherous SHAs, 275, 334; crucial experiments, locution,88n16; see also convergence of 334–335; Kuhn’s view of theory opinion choice, 342 type/token distinction, same as 3rdness: triadic, as in combination, 84; legisign/replica, 209 continuity ‘the perfection of’, 84; the whole of a 3rd is irreducible to its universals and particulars, xvi–xviii parts, 84–85; see also causation, mechanical; conditionals; vagueness, as fuzziness, 274; as lacking continuity, experience of; law; specificity, see inspecificity reality value: some dimensions of implicit in thought: as internalized discourse, 4–5; the significance, 154–156; objectivity of, 1868–9 doctrine of thought signs, 34, 154, 344–346; see also art; morality; and its problem accounting for music; objectivity; teleology; theory individual thoughts, 36 evaluation; truth