04__DONNELLY.DOC 6/18/2007 3:01 PM CONSTRUCTING THE CO-ED MILITARY ELAINE DONNELLY* I. INTRODUCTION .....................................................................................................816 A. The Importance of Objective Analysis ......................................................816 B. Standard of Review .....................................................................................818 II. DOUBLE STANDARDS INVOLVING WOMEN (DSIW) UNDERMINE MILITARY STRUCTURE...........................................................................................820 A. Current Department of Defense (DoD) Regulations and Law ..............822 1. The Tailhook Turning Point....................................................................823 2. Ground Combat: Violations of Policy and Law.......................................833 3. The Congressional Debate: 2005 .............................................................841 B. Incrementalism + Consistency = Radical Change ...................................849 1. Costs of Confusion...................................................................................849 2. What Do Women Want? .........................................................................853 C. Complications on Co-Ed Submarines .......................................................856 1. Feminist Engineering and the “Silent Service” ......................................857 2. The Bartlett Amendment Mandating Oversight.....................................868 D. Double Standards in Naval Aviation ........................................................869 1. Death of an Aviator .................................................................................869 2. The Dangers of DSIW in Carrier Aviation Training..............................878 III. GOOD ORDER AND DISCIPLINE.............................................................................880 A. Aberdeen to Abu Ghraib.............................................................................880 1. Co-Ed Basic Training ..............................................................................880 2. The “Ungendered” Military....................................................................886 B. The Military Service Academies ................................................................892 1. Mixed Signals on the Severn River .........................................................892 2. Rape and Victimology .............................................................................895 C. The 1993 Law Regarding Homosexual Conduct .....................................899 1. Congressional Oversight .........................................................................900 2. Enforcement Regulations Inconsistent with the Law..............................910 3. Campaign to Repeal the Law ...................................................................913 IV. CONCLUSION.........................................................................................................928 A. The Military/Civilian Connection.............................................................928 1. What Our Military Says About Cultural Values ...................................929 2. Rumpelstiltskin Recruiting .....................................................................936 * Elaine Donnelly is President of the Center for Military Readiness, an independent, non- partisan public policy organization that specializes in military personnel issues. In 1984, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger appointed her to the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS) for a three-year term, and in 1992, President George H.W. Bush appointed her to the Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces. 815 04__DONNELLY.DOC 6/18/2007 3:01 PM 816 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 14:815 2007 B. Constructing a Stronger Military...............................................................938 1. Recommendations for the Secretary of Defense .......................................938 2. The Only Military We Have ...................................................................948 APPENDIX A..............................................................................................................949 I. INTRODUCTION The armed forces of the United States are organizationally strong. All branches and communities have proud histories, cultural traditions, and members motivated by patriotism as well as personal career goals. The institutional strength of the military, however, also makes it vulnerable to political pressures that can undermine its culture. Because everyone must follow orders, the armed forces are a prime venue for social engineering. Some civilians believe in “social constructionism” the idea that fundamental human characteristics, including gender differences other than obvious anatomy, are learned behaviors that can be radically changed. Some want to construct a new gender-free military, putting to the ultimate test theories about the interchangeability of women and men in all roles. Independent review of social change in the armed forces is critically important. Our gender-integrated volunteer force is at war and undergoing radical organizational and cultural change at the same time. Individual men and women stand between our nation and enemies who would do us harm, but the success of their mission depends on a complex organization that is more demanding than anything in civilian life. This institution asks courageous men and women to surrender their individuality and independence, many of their personal rights, and sometimes their very lives. The rest of us should lend support by guarding the strength and integrity of the institution in which they serve. A. The Importance of Objective Analysis On January 27, 1967, a deadly accident occurred that could have stalled America’s program of space exploration indefinitely. During a pre-launch test of the Apollo One spacecraft,1 an electrical spark ignited the pure-oxygen atmosphere inside the cramped capsule, killing astronauts Virgil Grissom, Edward White, and Roger Chafee.2 Critics demanded to know why the mechanical and electrical engineers of the National Aeronautic and Space Administration (NASA) failed to recognize the inherent dangers of operating in a pure-oxygen environment. In the aftermath of that tragedy, NASA made choices that are instructive to another institution today: the United States military. In 1967, a pure-oxygen atmosphere was thought to be the best for sustaining human life in orbit; pure-oxygen systems weighed less than mixed- 1. Apollo One is the official name given retroactively to the Apollo/Saturn 204 (AS-204) spacecraft. See National Air and Space Museum, Apollo One Summary of Events, Jan. 27, 1967, http://www.nasm.si.edu/collections/imagery/apollo/AS01/a01sum.htm (last visited May 1, 2007). 2. Mary C. White, NASA History, Detailed Biographies of Apollo 1 Crew—Epilogue (Aug. 4, 2006), http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/History/Apollo204/zorn/epilog.htm. 04__DONNELLY.DOC 6/18/2007 3:01 PM CONSTRUCTING THE CO-ED MILITARY 817 gas systems and had been deployed successfully in the Mercury and Gemini missions.3 This basic assumption would prove to be both flawed and fatal. Moreover, indicators of trouble immediately preceding the fire—including communication problems, a “sour smell” in the spacesuit loop, and a sudden, unexplained rise in oxygen flow to the spacesuits—were noted but disregarded. Tragically, only eight seconds after Grissom reported fire in the cockpit, the astronauts perished in a fireball that melted and fused their spacesuits.4 NASA temporarily suspended the Apollo program and conducted a full investigation. During that critical time, NASA engineers could have defended their previous assumptions regarding the benefits of a pure-oxygen atmosphere in orbit. They could have defined as their goal the perfection of spacecraft machinery—that is, using pure-oxygen atmospheres in all orbiting spacecraft, with “zero tolerance” of sparks. Instead, NASA engineers challenged and objectively reevaluated the basic assumptions that had guided the space program prior to the fire. As a result, the pure-oxygen system aboard the Apollo spacecraft was replaced with a less volatile mixed-gas atmosphere. Furthermore, redundant backup systems that presumed both imperfection and potential failures were built into all spacecraft systems and machinery. Less than two years after the Apollo One fire, in December 1968, Apollo Eight became the first manned mission to successfully orbit the moon. This episode in American history teaches lessons that are applicable not only to rocket science but also to social science. The mechanical engineers of NASA objectively reevaluated their basic assumptions, analyzed their mistakes, and implemented steps to prevent predictable and avoidable disasters. By contrast, social engineers out to change the culture of America’s military have refused to reevaluate their basic assumptions and have disregarded the negative consequences of their own mistakes. Young men and women are being asked to risk their lives in the equivalent of a volatile, pure-oxygen atmosphere—an environment that social engineers insist will “work” as long as the military enforces zero tolerance of “sparks.” This theoretical hubris disregards human failings, which are even more common than imperfections in spacecraft 3. Conversation with Capt. Walter M. Schirra, U.S. Navy (Ret.), one of the original seven Mercury astronauts,