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Iraqi Army Day Army’S 89Th Anniversary The Advis r United States Forces-Iraq February 2010 Growing the Force: A Glimpse Into Iraqi Federal Police Training Page 7 An Iraqi Federal Policeman stands ready during his graduation ceremony at the Al Furat Training Academy The Advis r Volume 7 Issue 2 A monthly publication of the United States Forces-Iraq (DCG for A&T) Deputy Commanding General (Advising and Training) Lt. Gen. Michael D. Barbero, USA Public Affairs Officer Lt. Col. Martin Downie, USA Public Affairs Staff Maj. Glenn Burks, USA Capt. Kelli Chevalier, USA Master Sgt.Michael Colucci, USA Senior Airman A.J. Hyatt USAF Internal Affairs Warrant Service Team members prepare to enter the Chief Petty Officer Michael Kennedy, USN “shoothouse” to run through the live-fire scenario. (Photo by U.S. Maj. Robert Owen, USA Army Maj. Bob Owen) Sgt 1st Class Patricia Ruth, USA Advisor Editor Staff Sgt. Amy McLaughlin, USA Translator February Issue Dan Al Taraji Arabic-Edition Content Editor Dr. Adel N. Hansen Edmon Artin Warrant Service Team members train in rapid identification and engagement of The Advisor is an authorized publication for members of the U.S. Defense Department and Elite Police Clean House 4 suspect targets with speed and lethality. multinational and Iraqi partners. Iraqi Air Force and Iraq Training and Contents of this paper are not necessarily the official views of the U.S. government or multinational Partnership, Advisory Mission-Air Force build opera- partners of the U.S. Department of Defense. Communication tional command and control capabilities Builds Success 6 together. Direct questions and comments to: [email protected] DCG (A&T) USF-Iraq Growth, Strength, Iraq displays the rising capabilities of APO AE 09348 its armed forces and celebrates the Iraqi DSN: 318-852-1434 Sovereignty: Iraqi Army Day Army’s 89th anniversary. February 8 The Advis r Cover United States Forces-Iraq February 2010 An Iraqi Federal Document and media exploitation teams Growing the Force: A Glimpse Policeman stands in Iraq’s National Information and Inves- Into Iraqi Police ready during Training Page 7 NIIA Nabs Criminals his graduation tigation Agency use high-tech means to With Modern Technology ceremony at the 14 fight crime. Al Furat Training Academy Photo by U.S. Army Sgt. An Iraqi Federal Policeman stands ready during his Ferdinand Thomas graduation Ministry of Interior celebrated the 88th ceremony at the Al Furat Training Academy. AFN Iraq anniversary of Iraq’s police force and the United States Forces - Iraq, Deputy BPC Celebrates largest graduating class ever from the Commanding General (Advising and Police Day Baghdad Police College. Training) Facebook page: 16 http://www.facebook.com/pages/Baghdad/ 2 TheMulti-National-Security-Transition-Command- Advisor • February 2010 Iraq/153407622188?ref=sgm The commandingUSF-I generals and sergeants majorActivates of Multi-National Force-Iraq (front), Multi-National Corps- Iraq (left), Task Force 134 (right), and Multi-National Security and Transition Command-Iraq (rear), cased the colors during the United States Forces - Iraq activation ceremony at Al Faw Palace, Camp Victory Iraq, Jan. 1. (Photo by U.S. Army Spc. Karin Leach) Chief of Staff Earns U.S. Legion of Merit On behalf of U.S. Presi- increase the country’s stabil- dent Barack Obama, Gen. ity,” said Odierno. Ray Odierno, commander of The U.S. Legion of Merit United States Forces – Iraq, is a high level medal that can awarded Gen. Babakir Ze- be awarded to non-American bari, Iraqi armed forces chief commanders who make ex- of staff, the U.S. Legion of traordinary efforts for their Merit for his role in stabiliz- countries. ing security in Iraq. “Words cannot express “Gen. Zebari made great our happiness,” said Zebari. efforts, especially in the pe- “This is an honor for all the (Courtesy photo) riod of 2007-2008, where he Iraqi Army.” helped reduce violence and The Advisor • February 2010 3 Elite Police Clean House Photo and story by U.S. Army Maj. Bob Owen USF-I, DCG, A&T-PAO have courage under fire and Iraqi Internal Affairs’ elite squad of the best way to policemen performs rigorous training, gain this is through movement techniques and rifle battle drills.” marksmanship to prepare for their mission as Warrant Service Team members. Habib who plays a major part in the training talks with the men about the This ongoing training is intensive and importance of protecting civilians who may be in prepares these units to serve high-risk the area of operations and how using focused fire warrants on members of the Ministry of the can keep them safe. Interior who are wanted by the courts for a variety of reasons. In addition to the rifle range where the men fire in a timed event to measure their performance in the The program begins with the Iraqi police standing, kneeling and prone positions, the team advisors training the noncommissioned also trains on maneuvering as a unit to secure officers and officers on how to conduct the a target. training themselves. “It is important to have very quick reactions,” This “train-the-trainer” technique works Habib said. well as the Iraqis have taken the lead conducting the rifle training for their teams. The training consists of moving as a group, taking fire and reacting by performing Prisoner transfer is another duty of these immediate action drills to neutralize the highly dedicated policemen. All over Iraq, threat. prisoners are kept in temporary confinement until their court dates, but occasionally, some The most recent class conducted these drills have to be moved from local jails to more hundreds of times until they were perfected. secure facilities. The training gives the WST “The level of unit cohesiveness is by members the necessary skills to handle this far the best I have seen,” said U.S. Air tough task. Force Maj. Joseph Musacchia, deputy “I want every man to trust himself,” said director, Rule of Law for ITAM-MoI. Iraqi Police Officer 2nd Lt. Habib Majid, “They are absolutely applying the commander of 1st platoon. “Each man should lessons we have provided.” 4 The Advisor • February 2010 Internal Affairs Warrant Service Team members prepare to enter the shoothouse to simulate serving a high-risk warrant as part of the live-fire scenarios conduct- ed during the training. The Advisor • February 2010 5 Partnership, Communication Builds Success said U.S. Air Force Maj. Russ Driggers, deputy chief of the Iraqi AOC military training team. “[They] have to be able to talk to airborne aircraft and communicate changes ... as missions develop.” The ability to communicate is crucial to accomplishing that, and with this training, the Iraqi Air Force is making great progress, he said. Iraqi air force Maj. Mainea Salman, a communications specialist, has been working within the IAOC for longer than a year. He has maintained the Iraqi defense network, radios and computers, and said he is U.S. Air Force Tech Sgt. Jeffrey Scott, A6 communications advisor, Iraq Training appreciative for the assistance and Advisory Mission – Air Force, assists an Iraqi air force officer with program- that U.S. Airmen have given. ming a Falcon 2 multi-band radio. Scott ensures Iraqi air force members properly “I’m very comfortable working configure and maintain radios that allow the Iraqi air operations center to com- municate with their aircraft and bases throughout the country. (Photo by U.S. Air with Scott and I’m very glad that Force Tech. Sgt. Johnny L. Saldivar) I got a chance to learn from him,” Salman said. “Although we’re doing very well now, I am looking By Senior Airman Alyssa C. Miles Tech. Sgt. Jeffrey Scott, ITAM Air forward to making our AOC even U.S. Air Forces Central Public Affairs Force AOC A-6 advisor, works with better.” While the Iraqi army focuses on the A6 communication director to ensure he has oversight across Assisting the Iraqi airmen is radio communication with ground an important task and a healthy forces, the Iraqi air force is advancing the Iraqi Air Force on their current system status and to make sure relationship between the two forces on communication with units moving is imperative. through the sky. their equipment is operational and functioning properly. “In the end, I think the most The Iraqi Air Operations Center is Scott uses a common U.S. important thing is not going to be building and expanding its command whether they have this radio system and control capabilities through its Air Force method of training to teach IAOC airmen how running perfectly by the time we partnership with Iraq Training and leave,” said Diggers, “it will be the Advisory Mission - Air Force. to maintain their equipment. “I go by training records,” he said. “I relationships we build with them.” Airmen from ITAM - Air use them as a guideline on what they These relationships grow through Force, attached to the 321st Air should know.” their experiences together with the Expeditionary Advisory Group, are Iraqi air force. teaching their Iraqi counterparts He explains what maintenance how to translate orders from the top steps they must perform throughout “These opportunities – the into mission-specific information for the life cycle of their communication problems we work through and individual squadrons. equipment to keep them operational. celebrations we have together when The fundamental skills the Iraqi we have successes – they help build a Taskings come to the AOC from airmen learn here are necessary for tight relationship,” Driggers said. the Ministry of Defense and the the success of the IAOC. “ AOC organizes and distributes the That,” he added, “is the key reason taskings to the squadrons who fly in “The work he does is really the and benefit of us being here.” support of current operations.
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