Annual Report 2017
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Load more
Recommended publications
-
Abstract @On Ita (17 Dic
RETE OPERATIVA @ON PER IL CONTRASTO AI GRUPPI CRIMINALI ORGANIZZATI MAFIA-STYLE ________________________________________________________________________________ ABSTRACT 1. PREMESSA La DIA sta sostenendo con sempre maggior impegno l’azione di contrasto internazionale alle mafie , non solo sul piano operativo, ma anche attraverso una più energica opera di sensibilizzazione degli omologhi stranieri finalizzata a dare nuova e rafforzata consapevolezza del fenomeno transnazionale della criminalità organizzata e di quella di tipo mafioso. In tale contesto, è stato ritenuto necessario perfezionare, nel corso del Semestre italiano di Presidenza del Consiglio Europeo, uno strumento che integrasse a livello operativo gli strumenti di cooperazione di polizia già esistenti. Al riguardo, il Consiglio GAI 1 in data 4 dicembre 2014, su iniziativa italiana ha approvato l’istituzione della Rete Operativa Antimafia @ON. 2. COS’È @ON La Rete @ON , in collaborazione con Europol, rende possibile l’impiego sul posto di investigatori specializzati 2 delle Forze di Polizia aderenti al Network, per il contrasto delle organizzazioni criminali “gravi” e mafia-style presenti nell’Unione Europea e non, favorendo lo scambio di buone prassi ed il necessario rapporto fiduciario. I gruppi criminali attenzionati sono principalmente italiani, di etnia albanese, euroasiatici, bande di motociclisti, ma anche quelli emergenti (mafie nigeriane, cinesi, turche, ecc.) che pongono un serio rischio per la sicurezza e l’economia dell’U.E. La Rete @ON ed il suo progetto di finanziamento europeo denominato ONNET , si basano su un network di Paesi e su un “Core Group” (Italia, Francia, Germania, Spagna, Belgio e Paesi Bassi ) che funge da cabina di regia per la selezione delle investigazioni da supportare. -
Ort Firma Ansprechpartner Geschäftsführer Fachmann Str. Nr. PLZ Tel-Nr. WV Kleinmachnow Heizung-Klima-Sanitär Bölke Stephan
Installateurverzeichnis der MWA GmbH Zulassungsbereich: WAZV "Der Teltow" und WAZV "Mittelgraben" Stand: 02/2021 Ansprechpartner Ort Firma Fachmann Str. Nr. PLZ Tel-Nr. WV Geschäftsführer Kleinmachnow Heizung-Klima-Sanitär Bölke Stephan Bölke Stephan Bölke Hohe Kiefer 28 14532 033203/88800 MWA Kleinmachnow DieRo Rohrinnensanierung GmbH Frank Diekmann Frank Diekmann Igelpfad 7 14532 033203/886600 MWA Kleinmachnow HMS Haelke Ralf Haelke Ralf Haelke Heidefeld 32 14532 033203-79700 MWA Kleinmachnow Jordan & Jank GmbH Rudi Jordan Rudi Jordan Meiereifeld 2 14532 033203/22556 MWA Kleinmachnow Kraft Haustechnik GmbH Christian Kraft Christian Kraft Meiereifeld 28 A 14532 033203/883570 MWA Kleinmachnow F & K Haustechnik GmbH Ines Frohberg Matthias Kraft Meiereifeld 28 A 14532 033203/7590 MWA Kleinmachnow Ingo Mehnert Installateur und Heizungsbauer Ingo Mehnert Ingo Mehnert Elsternstieg 26 A 14532 033203/83838 MWA Kleinmachnow Jörg Miekley Installation GmbH Marion Miekley Jörg Miekley Zehlendorfer Damm 32 14532 033203/884477 MWA Kleinmachnow SHK Tobias Kleint Tobias Kleint Tobias Kleint Reiterweg 30 14532 MWA Kleinmachnow Noah Wärmetechnischer Dienst Detlef Noah Detlef Noah Langendreesch 19 A 14532 033203/72307 MWA Michendorf Block Haustechnik GmbH Andreas Block Andreas Block Querstraße 97 14552 033204/34167 MWA Michendorf Hipp & Ebert GmbH Silvio Ebert Silvio Ebert Schmerberger Straße 51 14552 033205/46120 MWA Michendorf Enderling / Gebhardt Haustechnik GbR Jörg Enderling Jörg Enderling Straße des Friedens 67 14552 033205/54427 MWA Michendorf Engelke -
Amtsgerichtsbezirke Des Amtsgerichts Potsdam / Ortsverzeichnis * 05
Amtsgericht Potsdam Gerichtsv ollzieher Geschäftsverteilung Amtsgerichtsbezirke des Amtsgerichts Potsdam / Ortsverzeichnis 2021 Stand 01.10.2021 Ort / Ortsteil (OT) / Gemeindeteil (GT) / Wohnplatz (WP) / Stadtteile (ST) A Alt Langerwisch (WP) < Gemeinde Michendorf Bender Alt Töplitz (WP) < Stadt Werder (Havel) Meyer Alte Dorfstelle (WP) < Gemeinde Schwielowsee (Ferch) Lorenz Am Kleinen Wentorf (WP) < Gemeinde Schwielowsee (Caputh) Lorenz Am Riegelberg (WP) < Stadt Werder (Havel) Rensch Auf dem Franzensberg (WP) < Gem. Schwielowsee (Geltow) Lorenz Ausbau (WP) < Gemeinde Stahnsdorf Heinz B Babelsberg Nord (ST) < Stadt Potsdam s. Straßenverz. Neydeck-Friese, Heinz Babelsberg Süd (ST) < Stadt Potsdam s. Straßenverz. Lorenz, Heinz Baumgartenbrück (WP) < Gemeinde Schwielowsee (Geltow) Lorenz Beelitz – Heilstätten (GT) < Stadt Beelitz Heidenescher Beelitz (Stadt) Heidenescher Bergheide (GT) < Gemeinde Michendorf Bender Bergholz – Rehbrücke (OT) < Gemeinde Nuthetal Simon Bergholz (WP) < Gemeinde Nuthetal Simon Berliner Vorstadt (ST) < Stadt Potsdam Kessel Birkengrund (WP) < Stadt Teltow Kessel Birkhorst (GT) < Stadt Beelitz Heidenescher Bliesendorf (OT) < Stadt Werder (Havel) Rensch Bornim (ST) < Stadt Potsdam Meyer Bornstedt (ST) < Stadt Potsdam Kessel Brandenburger Vorstadt (ST) < Stadt Potsdam Reichelt Buchholz (OT) < Stadt Beelitz Heidenescher Buchholzer Mühle (WP) < Stadt Beelitz Heidenescher Busendorf (OT) < Stadt Beelitz Bender C Caputh (OT) < Gemeinde Schwielowsee Lorenz D Derwitz (OT) < Stadt Werder (Havel) Reichelt Dreilinden (WP) < -
General Information Pursuant to Section 55 of the Federal Data
General information pursuant to Section 55 of the Federal Data Protection Act (Bundesdatenschutzgesetz - BDSG) regarding data processing by customs authorities in the context of criminal offences and infringements of rules of law (Last updated: December 2018) Preface Among the functions of Customs are the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of certain offences and infringements of rules of law including the enforcement of the fines imposed by the customs authorities. In order to fulfil this role, the customs services are entitled to process personal data. The information detailed in this letter concerns: • Controls under aspects of customs and movement of cash law • Procedures concerning tax-related criminal offences and infringements of rules of law • Procedures concerning criminal offences and infringements in non-tax relevant areas (excluding the Financial Monitoring Unit to Control Unreported or Illicit Employment) The information contained herein only concerns the processing of personal data by the customs authorities (main customs offices, customs investigation offices, the German Customs Criminological Office, the Federal Treasury and its branches, and the General Customs Directorate). Data processing by the tax administration (tax offices, regional finance directorates, state offices for finance, Federal Central Tax Office) is not addressed. “Personal data” means any information that directly relates to an identified or identifiable natural person. When financial authorities “process” personal data, it means that they collect, save, apply, transfer, make available for retrieval, edit or delete data. In the following we will provide information about the kind of personal data that we collect, who we collect it from, and what we do with this data. In addition, we will inform you about your privacy rights in relation to data protection and advise you on whom to contact if you have any questions or complaints. -
The AFP Is Well Informed of the Criminal Practices and Illicit Trading Taking Place on the Dark Web
The AFP is well informed of the criminal practices and illicit trading taking place on the dark web. We are working with our partners to combat all forms of technology-enabled crime. In recent years there has been a steady increase in the number of seizures of all drug types via the mail system detected at the Australian border. High frequency-low volume importations such as ones through our mail system pose a considerable cumulative threat. These shipments contribute towards supplying the Australian market and exacerbate social problems within Australia associated with drug harm. Seizing these smaller importations can impact on disrupting the drug trade. The AFP and other Australian law enforcement agencies are well aware of this method of drug importation and are committed to targeting and combating it. The AFP works alongside its partner agencies on this matter, including Border Force and state and territory police. While it is not an offence to access websites that provide access to sellers of illegal substances, it is an offence to import or attempt to import a border controlled drug including synthetic drugs into Australia purchased from such a website. Offenders should be aware that if they seek to import illicit and synthetic drugs they will be subject of law enforcement scrutiny and investigation. Recently, a national co-ordinated policing campaign focused on detecting drugs being distributed via the Australian postal service saw a total of 62 illicit drugs or illegally obtained prescription medications seized by police. Operation Vitreus was co-ordinated by the National Methylamphetamine Strategy Group, which is currently lead by SA Police (SAPOL), but involved all State and Territory police agencies, working in conjunction with the Australian Federal Police, Australian Border Force (ABF), the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission and AUSTRAC. -
The Police Academy of Montenegro
PI VOCATIONAL SCHOOL POLICE ACADEMY The Police academy is located in Danilovgrad, Montenegro. It is the only Law Enforcement Educational institution in Montenegro. It was established by the Decision of the Montenegrin Government in March 2006 as a public institution with the status of legal entity. The Police academy was established as a result of the “Montenegrin Police Education Reform“project (2005) and was supported by: International Institutions and Associations; Competent Ministries; NGOs. The goal of Montenegrin Police and other Law Enforcement Agencies is to: Harmonize their activities with European standards; Increase the level of legality, accountability, professionalism and respect of human rights; Provide more efficient response to modern security challenges. The scope of work of the academy is: I - Education, training and professional development of the Police Directorate employees, implemented through: I/a – Basic Police Education; I/b – Supplementary courses for police officers; I/c – Professional and specialized training; I/d – Police management training; I/e – Foreign languages and computer science (ECDL standard). II - Education of the Ministry of Interior and Public Administration employees III - Education of the Customs employees IV - Education of the Penitentiary Institution employees V - Education, training and professional development of the employees dealing with persons and property protection staff – security services VI - Librarian, publishing and research related activities VII - International cooperation. The core task of the Police academy is Basic police education which enables students to gain: policing competences; the basic knowledge for professional and specialized development as well as professional career development. So far 256 cadets have completed Basic Police education. At this moment we are educating 22 cadets. -
027075/EU XXVII. GP Eingelangt Am 15/07/20
027075/EU XXVII. GP Eingelangt am 15/07/20 Rat der Europäischen Union Brüssel, den 14. Juli 2020 (OR. en) 9639/20 COPEN 201 ENV 419 CRIMORG 61 JAI 592 CATS 50 ENFOPOL 175 VERMERK Absender: Generalsekretariat des Rates Empfänger: Delegationen Betr.: Achte Runde der gegenseitigen Begutachtungen – „Praktische Umsetzung und Durchführung der europäischen Strategien zur Verhütung und Bekämpfung der Umweltkriminalität“ Folgemaßnahmen zu dem Bericht über Deutschland 9639/20 lh/el 1 JAI.B DE www.parlament.gv.at ANLAGE Bundesministerium der Justiz und für Verbraucherschutz 31. März 2020 Achte Runde der gegenseitigen Begutachtungen „Praktische Umsetzung und Durchführung der europäischen Strategien zur Verhütung und Bekämpfung der Umweltkriminalität“ Bericht über die Umsetzung der im Bericht vom 21. September 2018 an Deutschland gerichteten Empfehlungen Empfehlung Nr. 1 „Auch wenn das Zollkriminalamt (ZKA) die Ansichten der deutschen Polizei im Rahmen von EMPACT mitvertritt, so wäre es doch für alle Länder von Vorteil, wenn die deutsche Polizei (d. h. das BKA) an den Sitzungen dieser Priorität teilnehmen würde, um speziell polizeibezogene Fragen direkt zu erörtern.“ Zollkriminalamt (ZKA) und Bundeskriminalamt (BKA) haben ihre Zusammenarbeit und die Kooperation mit Fachbehörden des Bundesministeriums für Umwelt, Naturschutz und nukleare Sicherheit (BMU) und des Bundesministeriums für Ernährung und Landwirtschaft (BMEL) intensiviert, um bei polizeibezogenen Fragen im Rahmen der EMPACT-Priorität „Umweltkriminalität“ einen umfassenden Austausch zu gewährleisten. 9639/20 lh/el 2 JAI.B DE www.parlament.gv.at Das BKA ist sowohl nationale Kontaktstelle für Europol als auch kriminalpolizeiliche Zentralstelle und National Contact Point des informellen polizeilichen EU-Netzwerks zur Bekämpfung der Umweltkriminalität (EnviCrimeNet). In dieser Funktion unterstützt es das ZKA, die polizeilichen Fachdienststellen sowie die Umweltverwaltungsbehörden von Bund und Ländern bei der Umsetzung der Priorität auf nationaler Ebene. -
Drucksache 16/5531
LANDTAG R HEINLA ND -PFALZ Drucksache 16/ 16 .Wahlperiode 5531 01. 09. 2015 Kleine Anfrage des Abgeordneten Matthias Lammert (CDU) und Antwort des Ministeriums des Innern, für Sport und Infrastruktur Geplante Optimierung der Spezialeinheiten der rheinland-pfälzischen Polizei (Teil 3) Die Kleine Anfrage 3675 vom 12. August 2015 hat folgenden Wortlaut: Aktuell ist durch die Landesregierung die Entscheidung getroffen worden, den Arbeitsgruppenbericht der „AG Spezialeinheiten“ umzusetzen. In diesem Zusammenhang berichtet die Landesregierung in der Antwort zur Frage 1 der Kleinen Anfrage 3357, Druck - sache 16/5086, darüber, dass der Personenschutz Gegenstand der Überprüfungen der Expertengruppe gewesen sei. Diesbezüglich sei eine Abfrage in allen Bundesländern, beim Bundeskriminalamt und der Bundespolizei durchgeführt worden. Im Ergebnis wurden keine Änderungserfordernisse für die Polizei Rheinland-Pfalz im Bereich des Personenschutzes gesehen. Vor diesem Hintergrund frage ich die Landesregierung: 1. Welche Aussagen trifft der Abschlussbericht der „AG Spezialeinheiten“ zur vorgenannten Untersuchung des Personenschutzes (bitte Darstellung der Zitate)? 2. Welche „Abfragen“ sind mit welchem Wortlaut konkret bei den Bundesländern, beim BKA und der Bundespolizei durchgeführt worden und welche Abfrage bezog sich dabei konkret auf den Personenschutz? 3. Bei der Beantwortung der Frage 3 der Kleinen Anfrage 3357, Drucksache 16/5086, wird berichtet, dass die Personenschutzauf - gaben in den Ländern durch unterschiedliche Dienststellen, überwiegend durch Spezialeinheiten, wahrgenommen werden. Zu - meist seien diese organisatorisch den Landeskriminalämtern oder den Polizeipräsidien zugeordnet. Wie stellen sich die organisatorische Zuordnung und die Zuordnung der Spezialeinheiten zu welcher Polizeibehörde in den je - weiligen Bundesländern konkret dar (bitte aufgeschlüsselt nach den jeweiligen Bundesländern und eine gesonderte Auflistung der Bundesländer, in denen der Personenschutz beim SEK angegliedert ist)? 4. -
Homeland Security: the Department of Defense’S Role
Order Code RL31615 Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web Homeland Security: The Department of Defense’s Role Updated May 14, 2003 Steve Bowman Specialist in National Defense Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress Homeland Security: The Department of Defense’s Role Summary For over a century the U.S. military has focused on expeditionary warfare overseas. Its participation in domestic operations has been sporadic and generally in response to natural disasters. With the heightened concern about large-scale terrorism, have come efforts to involve DOD more closely with federal, state and local agencies in their homeland security activities. DOD resources are unique in the government, both in their size and capabilities, and can be applied to both deter and respond to terrorist acts. While the DOD leadership is ready and willing to play a supporting role in these efforts, it wishes to maintain overseas military operations as the Department’s primary focus, and avoid an drain of fiscal, materiel, and personnel resources to the homeland security mission. In response to the increased focus on homeland security, on October 1, 2002, DOD activated a new combatant command, Northern Command or NORTHCOM.. Exactly how DOD and a new DHS will establish and maintain coordination and cooperation remains to be seen. Legislation creating the DHS (P.L. 107-296) is silent on this question, and details on the new NORTHCOM are scarce. The intelligence collection and analysis capabilities within the Department of Defense are a substantial portion of the United States’ national intelligence assets. -
Combating Political Violence Movements with Third-Force Options Doron Zimmermann ∗
Between Minimum Force and Maximum Violence: Combating Political Violence Movements with Third-Force Options Doron Zimmermann ∗ Introduction: Balancing the Tools of Counter-Terrorism In most liberal democratic states it is the responsibility of the police forces to cope with “internal” threats, including terrorism, since in such states terrorism is invariably defined as a criminal act rather than a manifestation of insurgent political violence. In many such instances, the resultant quantitative and qualitative overtaxing of law en- forcement capabilities to keep the peace has led to calls by sections of the public, as well as by the legislative and executive branches of government, to expand both the le- gal and operational means available to combat terrorism, and to boost civilian agen- cies’ capacity to deal with terrorism in proportion to the perceived threat. The deterio- rating situation in Ulster in Northern Ireland between 1968 and 1972 and beyond is an illustrative case in point.1 Although there have been cases of successfully transmogrifying police forces into military-like formations, the best-known and arguably most frequent example of aug- mented state responses to the threat posed by insurgent political violence movements is the use of the military in the fight against terrorism and in the maintenance of internal security. While it is imperative that the threat of a collapse of national cohesion due to the overextension of internal civil security forces be averted, the deployment of all branches of the armed forces against a terrorist threat is not without its own pitfalls. Paul Wilkinson has enunciated some of the problems posed by the use of counter-ter- rorism military task forces, not the least of which is that [a] fully militarized response implies the complete suspension of the civilian legal system and its replacement by martial law, summary punishments, the imposition of curfews, military censorship and extensive infringements of normal civil liberties in the name of the exigencies of war. -
Border Violence Prevention Council FACT SHEET
Border Violence Prevention Council FACT SHEET Building on the principles of co-responsibility for and co-management of our shared border espoused in coordination mechanisms like the 21st Century Border Management Initiative and the High Level Economic Dialogue, the United States and Mexico created the Border Violence Prevention Council. The Council is co- led by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the Secretariat of Foreign Relations (SRE) of Mexico, and the Federal Police of Mexico, and includes the participation of other U.S. Department of Homeland Security components, the U.S. Department of State, and the Secretariat of Governance of Mexico. The Border Violence Prevention Council is a policy-level decision making body that promotes initiatives aimed at preventing incidents of border violence through collaborative efforts, joint public engagement campaigns, increased transparency and information exchange, and the sharing of best practices. The Council has met four times, most recently on November 3, 2016, where we noted significant past accomplishments, including: Undertaking actions to increase the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s and CBP’s accountability, transparency, and notification regarding use of force cases. Increasing the understanding of use of force policies and officer training efforts in both countries, which included policy and technical discussions, exchanges of information and visits to each other’s enforcement training centers. Exchanging information on changes to relevant policies and procedures. Conducting joint community outreach and engagement initiatives between the 12 Consulates of Mexico located at the border, Mexico´s Federal Police, U.S. Customs and Border Protection including its component, the U.S. -
Women in Police Services Eu 2012
WOMEN IN POLICE SERVICES IN THE EU FACTS AND FIGURES - 2012 © 2013 Institut for Public Security of Catalonia Ctra. C-17 Barcelona-Ripoll, km 13,5 08100 - Mollet del Vallès www.gencat.cat/interior/ispc Editor: Lola Vallès [email protected] Design: Conxita Gandia February 2013 Women in police services in the EU 2012 Summary Introduction.......................................................................................................................... 5 The researchers................................................................................................................. 7 Acknowledgements............................................................................................................ 7 The questionnaire .............................................................................................................. 9 Austria ................................................................................................................................ 11 Belgium .............................................................................................................................. 13 Cyprus ................................................................................................................................ 15 Denmark ............................................................................................................................. 17 England and Wales............................................................................................................ 19 Estonia...............................................................................................................................