Stefan Berleb, B.A. (Hons) Queensland University of Technology School of Humanities and Human Services Doctoral Dissertation: ‘… for China’s Benefit’: The Evolution and Devolution of German Influence on Chinese Military Affairs, 1919 – 1938 Brisbane 2005 2 Statement of Original Authorship The work contained in this thesis has not been previously submitted for a degree or diploma at any other higher education institution. To the best of my knowledge and belief, the thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person except where due reference is made. Date: Signature: 3 Abstract In the years between 1919 and 1938, Germany and China, two nations each plagued in its own way by the foreign political fall-out of World War I, by internal unrest and by the disastrous global economic situation of the inter-war era, established extraordinarily close military and military economic ties. German military advisers helped in the organisation and training of the troops of several Chinese warlords and, after the re-establishment of the Chinese Republic under Chiang Kaishek, of the Nationalist government’s armed forces. At the same time, German arms manufacturers and German trading companies delivered weapons and other war materials to arm and equip China’s soldiers, who fought first against each other and later against Mao Zedong’s Communist guerillas and Japanese invaders. Still, despite outward appearances, any kind of German military support for China was never official. Successive Weimar German governments tried everything in their power to stop the widely-condemned Sino-German military cooperation, while Adolf Hitler’s National Socialists only tolerated it for as long as it did not interfere with their long- term political agenda. In the end, however, the German influence on Chinese military affairs was only minimal. German military advisers and German arms shipments, contrary to repeated world-wide accusations throughout the years, were too few in number and too small in amount to have any real impact on war-ravaged China. The breakdown of Sino-German relations due to National Socialist Germany’s alliance with Japan and the Sino-Japanese War eradicated every trace China’s informal military supporters had left behind after their withdrawal in 1938. 4 ‘For China’s Benefit…’1: The Evolution and Devolution of German Influence on Chinese Military Affairs, 1919 – 1938 Contents Acknowledgments 8 Map of China, 1919 – 1938 9 1. Introduction 10 2. Literature Review 16 3. Weimar Germany and Warlord China, 1919 – 1928 24 3.1 Historical Background 24 3.1.1 A History of Sino-German Relations before 1919 24 3.1.2 The Treaty of Versailles, 1919 27 3.1.3 The Sino-German Friendship Treaty, 1921 28 3.1.4 Warlord China, 1921 – 1928 31 3.1.5 Weimar Germany and her China Policy, 1921 – 1928 35 3.2 Military Relations 39 3.2.1 Early Sino-German Military Relations 39 3.2.2 The Sino-German Military Alliance that never was 40 3.2.3 German Military Relations with China’s Warlords 47 3.2.4 German Military Relations with the Guomindang 54 3.2.5 German and International Reactions 58 3.3 Arms Trade 60 3.3.1 The Origins of the Sino-German Arms Trade 60 3.3.2 The China Arms Embargo 61 3.3.3 The International Arms Trade with China 66 3.3.4 The Alleged Sino-German Arms Trade during the 1920s 72 3.3.5 The Actual Sino-German Arms Trade during the 1920s 76 3.3.6 German and International Reactions 80 3.3.7 Weapons Sold and Delivered 87 1 MA, Nachlaß Bauer, Aktenstück Nr. 50, Schriftwechsel mit Bewerbern für eine Mitarbeit in China (fortgesetzt von Ernst Bauer) 1928 – 1934. Vertrag, Berlin, no date. Colonel Max Bauer, Chiang Kaishek’s first German chief military adviser, preserved in his estate a blank employment contract to 5 3.4 Recapitulation 93 4. Weimar Germany and Nationalist China, 1928 – 1933 94 4.1 Historical Background 94 4.1.1 Nationalist China, 1928 – 1933 94 4.1.2 Weimar Germany and her China Policy, 1928 – 1933 97 4.2 Military Relations 100 4.2.1 Nationalist China’s Military Situation 100 4.2.2 Colonel Max Bauer, 1928 – 1929 102 4.2.3 The Establishment of the German Military Advisory Group 106 4.2.4 Max Bauer’s Theoretical Work in Chinese Service 112 4.2.5 Max Bauer’s Practical Work in Chinese Service 117 4.2.6 Lieutenant Colonel Hermann Kriebel, 1929 – 1930 124 4.2.7 Lieutenant General Georg Wetzell, 1930 – 1934 128 4.2.8 The Military Advisers at War 133 4.2.9 German and International Reactions 143 4.3 Arms Trade 150 4.3.1 The Military Advisers and China’s Arms Acquisitions 150 4.3.2 The Reichswehr Connection 157 4.3.4 German and International Reactions 163 4.3.5 Weapons Sold and Delivered 168 4.4 Recapitulation 170 5. The Third Reich and Nationalist China, 1933 – 1938 171 5.1 Historical Background 171 5.1.1 Nationalist China, 1933 – 1938 171 5.1.2 The Third Reich and its China Policy, 1933 – 1936 173 5.1.3 The Japanese Factor 176 5.1.4 The Third Reich and its China Policy, 1936 – 1938 179 5.2 Military Relations 182 5.2.1 General Hans von Seeckt, 1933 182 5.2.2 General Hans von Seeckt, 1934 – 1935 187 5.2.3 General Alexander von Falkenhausen, 1935 – 1938 194 5.2.4 The German Military Advisory Group of the 1930s 199 be filled in by potential military advisers interested in serving the Nationalist Chinese government. The quote was translated from this form. 6 5.2.5 Nationalist China’s Military Situation 203 5.2.6 The Military Advisers at War 206 5.2.7 German and International Reactions 218 5.2.8 The Recall of the German Military Advisory Group 221 5.3 Arms Trade 225 5.3.1 The Sino-German Arms Trade, 1934 – 1935 225 5.3.2 The Military Advisers and the HAPRO 232 5.3.3 The Sino-German Arms Trade, 1936 – 1938 235 5.3.4 German and International Reactions 243 5.3.5 Weapons Sold and Delivered 245 5.4 Recapitulation 255 6. Conclusion 256 Appendix 1: German Military Advisors in Chinese Service, 1928 - 1938: 260 Appendix 2: German Military Hardware Exports to China, 1921 - 1938 265 Bibliography 267 Remark: All Chinese names in this dissertation are transcribed in the Pinyin system. Exceptions to the rule will be mentioned separately in the footnotes. 7 Acknowledgments Over the years of work on my doctoral thesis, I have acquired debts to many people I now, at its conclusion, wish to acknowledge… To begin with, I want to express my gratitude to the Queensland University of Technology for its Overseas Postgraduate Research Scholarship and to the Centre for Community and Cross-Cultural Studies – which has lately been replaced by the Centre for Social Change Research – for its top-up funding. I have benefited enormously from the invaluable advice, friendly criticism and infinite patience of my Doctoral Supervisor Professor Carl Trocki throughout the tedium and terror of my research. My Associate Supervisors Doctor John Ainsworth and Associate Professor Chi-Kong Lai, too, provided me with their input. Furthermore, other members of QUT’s School of Humanities and Human Services, particularly Doctor Iraphne Childs, Doctor Peter Isaacs and Doctor Max Quanchi, never ceased to encourage me. I cannot thank them enough for their support. While I could translate all my German sources on my own, I always appreciated Karen Tsang and Dominic Wong’s help when it came to deciphering all the too confusing technical details found in some Chinese texts on military matters. Additionally, my own aviation advisors, Lennart Andersson from Sweden, Miroslav Herold from Germany and Clarence Fu from Taiwan, sent me, quite unexpectedly, loads of useful information via mail or the internet, although I haven’t had the chance to meet them face-to-face so far. Thanks to them, too. I am equally indebted to the countless librarians and archivists at the Queensland University of Technology’s library and inter-library loans office, the Political Archive of the German Foreign Office in Bonn and the German Military Archive in Freiburg who were always friendly and helpful, even when I was looking for the most unusual books, articles or files. However, an especially heartfelt ‘Vergelt’s Gott’ goes to Doctor Stefanie Seidel and all my other friends and former colleagues at the Military Historical Library of the Federal Armed Forces’ University in Munich who made my research in Germany so much easier and enjoyable. Finally and most importantly, however, I want to thank my beloved wife Ellen Ruth, who was my source of tranquility while I was struggling to become a scholar, and my dear parents, who always helped me in more ways than they could possibly imagine. Without them, all this would never have been possible. 8 Map of China, 1919 – 1938 9 1. Introduction ‘At the heart of the [Communist insurgency against Chiang Kaishek’s2 Nationalist government] lay [Jiangxi] province where Communist leader [Mao Zedong] had succeeded in politicizing and organizing barely literate peasants into an effective guerilla army. By the autumn of 1934 the Nationalists, advised by officers on loan from the Reichswehr, had penned Mao and his followers into an increasingly small area. Faced with inevitable defeat, in October [Mao Zedong] and 100,000 Communists set off on [the Long March]…’3 The military cooperation between Germans and Chinese during the 1920s and 1930s, or more often than not the Sino-German relations of that era in their entirety, are frequently summarized in the historical literature in such short and seemingly comprehensive and satisfying comments – if at all.