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Stefan Berleb Thesis (PDF 2MB)

Stefan Berleb Thesis (PDF 2MB)

Stefan Berleb, B.A. (Hons) Queensland University of Technology School of Humanities and Human Services

Doctoral Dissertation:

‘… for ’s Benefit’: The Evolution and Devolution of German Influence on Chinese Military Affairs, 1919 – 1938

Brisbane 2005

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Statement of Original Authorship The work contained in this thesis has not been previously submitted for a degree or diploma at any other higher education institution. To the best of my knowledge and belief, the thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person except where due reference is made.

Date:

Signature:

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Abstract In the years between 1919 and 1938, and China, two nations each plagued in its own way by the foreign political fall-out of , by internal unrest and by the disastrous global economic situation of the inter-war era, established extraordinarily close military and military economic ties. German military advisers helped in the organisation and training of the troops of several Chinese and, after the re-establishment of the Chinese Republic under Chiang Kaishek, of the ’s armed forces. At the same time, German arms manufacturers and German trading companies delivered weapons and other war materials to arm and equip China’s soldiers, who fought first against each other and later against ’s Communist guerillas and Japanese invaders. Still, despite outward appearances, any kind of German military support for China was never official. Successive Weimar German governments tried everything in their power to stop the widely-condemned Sino-German military cooperation, while ’s National Socialists only tolerated it for as long as it did not interfere with their long- term political agenda. In the end, however, the German influence on Chinese military affairs was only minimal. German military advisers and German arms shipments, contrary to repeated world-wide accusations throughout the years, were too few in number and too small in amount to have any real impact on war-ravaged China. The breakdown of Sino-German relations due to National Socialist Germany’s alliance with and the Sino-Japanese War eradicated every trace China’s informal military supporters had left behind after their withdrawal in 1938.

4 ‘For China’s Benefit…’1: The Evolution and Devolution of German Influence on Chinese Military Affairs, 1919 – 1938

Contents Acknowledgments 8 Map of China, 1919 – 1938 9 1. Introduction 10 2. Literature Review 16 3. Weimar Germany and China, 1919 – 1928 24 3.1 Historical Background 24 3.1.1 A History of Sino-German Relations before 1919 24 3.1.2 The , 1919 27 3.1.3 The Sino-German Friendship Treaty, 1921 28 3.1.4 Warlord China, 1921 – 1928 31 3.1.5 Weimar Germany and her China Policy, 1921 – 1928 35 3.2 Military Relations 39 3.2.1 Early Sino-German Military Relations 39 3.2.2 The Sino-German Military Alliance that never was 40 3.2.3 German Military Relations with China’s Warlords 47 3.2.4 German Military Relations with the Guomindang 54 3.2.5 German and International Reactions 58 3.3 Arms Trade 60 3.3.1 The Origins of the Sino-German Arms Trade 60 3.3.2 The China Arms Embargo 61 3.3.3 The International Arms Trade with China 66 3.3.4 The Alleged Sino-German Arms Trade during the 1920s 72 3.3.5 The Actual Sino-German Arms Trade during the 1920s 76 3.3.6 German and International Reactions 80 3.3.7 Weapons Sold and Delivered 87

1 MA, Nachlaß Bauer, Aktenstück Nr. 50, Schriftwechsel mit Bewerbern für eine Mitarbeit in China (fortgesetzt von Ernst Bauer) 1928 – 1934. Vertrag, , no date. Colonel Max Bauer, Chiang Kaishek’s first German chief military adviser, preserved in his estate a blank employment contract to

5 3.4 Recapitulation 93 4. Weimar Germany and Nationalist China, 1928 – 1933 94 4.1 Historical Background 94 4.1.1 Nationalist China, 1928 – 1933 94 4.1.2 Weimar Germany and her China Policy, 1928 – 1933 97 4.2 Military Relations 100 4.2.1 Nationalist China’s Military Situation 100 4.2.2 Colonel Max Bauer, 1928 – 1929 102 4.2.3 The Establishment of the German Military Advisory Group 106 4.2.4 Max Bauer’s Theoretical Work in Chinese Service 112 4.2.5 Max Bauer’s Practical Work in Chinese Service 117 4.2.6 Lieutenant Colonel Hermann Kriebel, 1929 – 1930 124 4.2.7 Lieutenant General Georg Wetzell, 1930 – 1934 128 4.2.8 The Military Advisers at War 133 4.2.9 German and International Reactions 143 4.3 Arms Trade 150 4.3.1 The Military Advisers and China’s Arms Acquisitions 150 4.3.2 The Connection 157 4.3.4 German and International Reactions 163 4.3.5 Weapons Sold and Delivered 168 4.4 Recapitulation 170 5. The Third Reich and Nationalist China, 1933 – 1938 171 5.1 Historical Background 171 5.1.1 Nationalist China, 1933 – 1938 171 5.1.2 The Third Reich and its China Policy, 1933 – 1936 173 5.1.3 The Japanese Factor 176 5.1.4 The Third Reich and its China Policy, 1936 – 1938 179 5.2 Military Relations 182 5.2.1 General , 1933 182 5.2.2 General Hans von Seeckt, 1934 – 1935 187 5.2.3 General Alexander von Falkenhausen, 1935 – 1938 194 5.2.4 The German Military Advisory Group of the 1930s 199 be filled in by potential military advisers interested in serving the Nationalist Chinese government. The quote was translated from this form.

6 5.2.5 Nationalist China’s Military Situation 203 5.2.6 The Military Advisers at War 206 5.2.7 German and International Reactions 218 5.2.8 The Recall of the German Military Advisory Group 221 5.3 Arms Trade 225 5.3.1 The Sino-German Arms Trade, 1934 – 1935 225 5.3.2 The Military Advisers and the HAPRO 232 5.3.3 The Sino-German Arms Trade, 1936 – 1938 235 5.3.4 German and International Reactions 243 5.3.5 Weapons Sold and Delivered 245 5.4 Recapitulation 255 6. Conclusion 256 Appendix 1: German Military Advisors in Chinese Service, 1928 - 1938: 260 Appendix 2: German Military Hardware Exports to China, 1921 - 1938 265 Bibliography 267

Remark: All Chinese names in this dissertation are transcribed in the system. Exceptions to the rule will be mentioned separately in the footnotes.

7 Acknowledgments Over the years of work on my doctoral thesis, I have acquired debts to many people I now, at its conclusion, wish to acknowledge… To begin with, I want to express my gratitude to the Queensland University of Technology for its Overseas Postgraduate Research Scholarship and to the Centre for Community and Cross-Cultural Studies – which has lately been replaced by the Centre for Social Change Research – for its top-up funding. I have benefited enormously from the invaluable advice, friendly criticism and infinite patience of my Doctoral Supervisor Professor Carl Trocki throughout the tedium and terror of my research. My Associate Supervisors Doctor John Ainsworth and Associate Professor Chi-Kong Lai, too, provided me with their input. Furthermore, other members of QUT’s School of Humanities and Human Services, particularly Doctor Iraphne Childs, Doctor Peter Isaacs and Doctor Max Quanchi, never ceased to encourage me. I cannot thank them enough for their support. While I could translate all my German sources on my own, I always appreciated Karen Tsang and Dominic Wong’s help when it came to deciphering all the too confusing technical details found in some Chinese texts on military matters. Additionally, my own aviation advisors, Lennart Andersson from Sweden, Miroslav Herold from Germany and Clarence Fu from , sent me, quite unexpectedly, loads of useful information via mail or the internet, although I haven’t had the chance to meet them face-to-face so far. Thanks to them, too. I am equally indebted to the countless librarians and archivists at the Queensland University of Technology’s library and inter-library loans office, the Political Archive of the German Foreign Office in Bonn and the German Military Archive in Freiburg who were always friendly and helpful, even when I was looking for the most unusual books, articles or files. However, an especially heartfelt ‘Vergelt’s Gott’ goes to Doctor Stefanie Seidel and all my other friends and former colleagues at the Military Historical Library of the Federal Armed Forces’ University in Munich who made my research in Germany so much easier and enjoyable. Finally and most importantly, however, I want to thank my beloved wife Ellen Ruth, who was my source of tranquility while I was struggling to become a scholar, and my dear parents, who always helped me in more ways than they could possibly imagine. Without them, all this would never have been possible.

8 Map of China, 1919 – 1938

9 1. Introduction

‘At the heart of the [Communist insurgency against Chiang Kaishek’s2 Nationalist government] lay [] province where Communist leader [Mao Zedong] had succeeded in politicizing and organizing barely literate peasants into an effective guerilla army. By the autumn of 1934 the Nationalists, advised by officers on loan from the Reichswehr, had penned Mao and his followers into an increasingly small area. Faced with inevitable defeat, in October [Mao Zedong] and 100,000 Communists set off on [the Long March]…’3

The military cooperation between and Chinese during the 1920s and 1930s, or more often than not the Sino-German relations of that era in their entirety, are frequently summarized in the historical literature in such short and seemingly comprehensive and satisfying comments – if at all. Then again, on the other end of the historiographical spectrum, authors dealing more extensively with China’s foreign relations during the inter-war years describe the German Far East policy of the time equally plausibly as ‘colonialism without colonies’4 and argue that Germany actually exploited China both economically and militarily on a large scale and misused her relationship with the newly-emerged nation for her far-reaching plans to violently subjugate the whole planet in what was later to become World War II. However, in both cases, history is seldom this simple and unequivocal. Sino-German military relations in the time between the two World Wars indeed remain a little-known story. When they were treated in contemporary accounts or in the subsequent historical literature, they were frequently exaggerated, underrated, intentionally misinterpreted or utterly ignored, depending on the respective writer’s nationality, political point of view or personal conviction. Still, each observer or historian was looking for a system behind Germany’s military involvement in China, for some kind of master plan, for the proverbial red thread, but is doubtful that there ever was one. Instead, the entire German Far East policy of the 1920s and 1930s was shaped by countless uncoordinated and often conflicting activities initiated not only

2 transcription. In Pinyin: Jiang Jieshi. 3 Anderson, Duncan (2003) The Times; War; A History in Photographs, London: Times Books, p. 110. The emphasis is the author’s. 4 Peck, Joachim (1961) Kolonialismus ohne Kolonien; Der deutsche Imperialismus und China 1937, Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, p. 23, and Felber, Roland (1989) Forschungen zur Geschichte der deutsch- chinesischen Beziehungen in der DDR – Ergebnisse, Probleme, Perspektiven, in: [Anon.] (Ed.) (1989) Bulletin Faschismus/Zweiter Weltkrieg; Sonderheft 1989, Berlin: Zentralinstitut für Geschichte, p. 66.

10 by the responsible governmental authorities in Berlin, but also by various German armed forces officers and individual businessmen. Throughout all these years, the German foreign office, the Auswärtiges Amt, was acting as though it alone had the authority to formulate Germany’s foreign policy, even when its area of activity had long become some kind of free-for-all. Still, in the wake of her defeat in World War I and to honour the creation of the peaceful and democratic new Weimar German Republic, Germany would no longer ‘pursue any power politics’ in the Far East, the German Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann declared on 30 October 1925, during a speech. ‘Our goals in the East are exclusively the expansion of trade and the cultivation of cultural relations.’5 In accordance with this foreign policy credo of the Auswärtiges Amt, Germany officially renounced an active political role in the Far East and tried to keep her distance from the growing tensions between China, her various domestic factions and the different colonial powers present in Asia. Yet, the Germany which could indeed implement this foreign policy of unmitigated restraint did not exist. Weimar Germany, heir to the vanquished and burdened by the harsh peace treaty of Versailles, was politically and socially fragmented. Different factions, particularly in military and economic circles, were unwilling to accept things the way they were and instigated their own political activities, both foreign and domestic. China, during the warlord years and under Nationalist leadership, became a field of activity and a more-than-willing associate of the afore-mentioned factions. China, too, had been a loser of the Great War, if not for the same reasons. Despite openly supporting the Allied cause against Imperial Germany, the young Chinese Republic was still treated as a virtual colony by the victorious nations after the negotiations at Versailles had ended. As an almost unavoidable consequence, the 1920s witnessed a symphatic rapprochement between Germany and China, which culminated in the Sino-German Friendship Treaty of 1921 and after which diplomatic and economic relations between the two nations began to flourish. Yet, although the renewed economic relationship between Weimar Germany and China had many mutual advantages, it also showed severe drawbacks. Despite an international arms embargo against -plagued China throughout the 1920s, German arms manufacturers and traders sold weapons and ammunition to the Far East, arming the

5 Bloß, Hartmut (1980) Die Zweigleisigkeit der deutschen Fernostpolitik und Hitlers Option für Japan 1938, in: Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen (Number 1/1980), p. 58.

11 various warlord factions involved in the conflict. The newly-established German post- war government and its Auswärtiges Amt, eager to fulfill the strict obligations of the Treaty of Versailles, tried desperately to stop these activities, but were, in the end, powerless. Still, it must not be overlooked that not all of the so-called ‘German’ arms deliveries were actually coming from Germany. Instead, many international weapons manufacturers and embargo breakers shipped their goods via Germany’s free ports to China or sold German war materials which had been captured after the Great War. This caused, in hindsight, many misunderstandings. Indeed, during the 1920s, most Western powers pursued their own national agendas in China by more or less secretly supporting one warlord or another, while the even officially provided the fledgling Guomindang party with military and political advisers. Around the same time, individual Germans, too, started to work in the Far East as technical or military experts for the various warring factions, including the Nationalists in Canton. This equally contravened the articles of Versailles and the official German China policy, but, once again, the German authorities were unable to stop their citizens from seeking this kind of employment abroad. In 1927, after a successful military campaign to pacify and reunite the conflict- ridden country, Marshal Chiang Kaishek, the leader of the Guomindang, established a new internationally-recognized Chinese government. He immediately broke with both his Soviet allies and the Communist faction within his party, plunging his nation into another civil war. Still in desperate need for military advisers to modernize his armed forces, Chiang Kaishek approached Weimar Germany for help. The government in Berlin, concerned about its international standing, refused to cooperate with China on a military level. However, many private individuals, among them retired German army officers, war veterans and mere soldiers of fortune, entered Chinese military service against the German government’s will, on a strictly private basis, and began to train the Nationalist army. Chiang Kaishek personally selected a number of retired high-ranking German officers as the heads of his military advisory group6. Colonel Max Bauer worked for Chiang Kaishek from 1928 until his sudden death in 1929. He started to transform the Nationalist armed forces from a barely manageable mass of

6 Otto Braun and the other German Communists who travelled to China to join Mao Zedong’s revolutionary forces as military advisers are not part of this doctoral dissertation. They had been sent to the Far East by the and, as a consequence, saw themselves as Comintern agents, not as Germans. Furthermore, they do not mirror the Sino-German relations as such, but rather

12 former warlord soldiers into an effective fighting force, but became also increasingly embroiled in Chiang Kaishek’s attempts to rebuild China’s shattered economy. Lieutenant Colonel Hermann Kriebel, working in China in 1929 and 1930, became the Colonel’s successor. A relatively undistinguished individual, he went ahead with the training of selected Chinese elite units, but was soon replaced. General Georg Wetzell, too, continued the reorganisation of the Nationalist army between 1930 and 1934. He was able to witness the first smaller successes of German influence on Chinese military affairs, particularly during Chiang Kaishek’s campaigns against the insurgent Communists. Nevertheless, the enormity of their task and the lack of time prevented the German military advisers from training the Chinese army sufficiently to repel the Japanese invasion of in 1931. All the while, the Sino-German arms trade continued and even started to grow in scale. Once again, the German government and the Auswärtiges Amt tried to stop the activities of both military advisers and weapons salesmen, still to no avail. Weimar Germany proved to be too weak within and without to wield any real authority over these individuals, particularly since they were protected by the Chinese government. After the National Socialist Party became the ruling power in Germany in 1933 and the came to an end, there was no real break in Sino-German military relations, at least not initially. Adolf Hitler, more concerned about political and economic problems in Europe, neither supported nor opposed the activities of the German military advisers and arms traders in China. Meanwhile, semi-officially aided by the reemerging German military, Chiang Kaishek’s military advisory group started to grow both in size and status. General Hans von Seeckt, the founding father of Germany’s continuously independent-minded post-war Reichswehr, served as its leader in 1934 and 1935. Not unlike Max Bauer before him, he became involved both in the training of the Nationalist armed forces and, even more importantly, in the strengthening of China’s economy. Yet, the General’s old age and poor health limited the extent of his activities in the Far East. General Alexander von Falkenhausen became his successor and Chiang Kaishek’s last German chief military adviser from 1935 until 1938. His genuine enthusiasm for his duties and his loyalty to Nationalist China’s cause were rewarded during the early stages of the Sino-Japanese War by the modest Chinese victories in and at Taierzhuang. He was, however, also the relationship between the Communist Parties of the respective countries. In this regard, their activities are both too complex and too vague to be included in this thesis.

13 forced to experience the slow decimation of the majority of the German-trained elite units by the more experienced and technically superior Japanese troops and the forced withdrawal of the German military advisers. Meanwhile, back in Germany, the German army, eager to overcome the restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles, saw China’s conflicts as a unique opportunity for its own rearmament. With the help of private backers from Germany’s economy, it created the HAPRO7 company in 1934. Behind its facade, the German army and the German weapons producers delivered various manufactured goods, including arms and ammunitions, to China in exchange for urgently-needed raw materials like high-quality ores. Yet, the apparently cordial, even if unofficial, Sino-German relations started to slowly dissolve when Germany’s National Socialist government allied itself with Imperial Japan, China’s arch-enemy which had already occupied large parts of northern China. After the signing of the German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Pact in 1936, the Japanese increasingly pressured, even blackmailed Germany into withdrawing her military support for China. In the face of National Socialist Germany’s growing international isolation, Chiang Kaishek’s German military advisers and the HAPRO were judged as unacceptable liabilities. With threats of dire consequences, the German government coerced the reluctant military advisers into leaving Chinese service and returning home. German arms shipments to the Far East were cancelled only a short time later. Most traces of Germany’s support for China quickly disappeared. Almost all German-trained troops were killed within the first year of the Sino-Japanese War, while most of the HAPRO- delivered military equipment was lost on the battlefield. The goal of this doctoral dissertation is to try to clarify some of the misconceptions about the German influence on Chinese military affairs in the years between 1919 and 1938 which seem to prevail in the existing historical literature. The research to actually reach this objective was done in two stages. First there was an evaluation of the available scholarly examinations of the topic, of both the general and the more specific ones, to isolate the most conspicuous inaccuracies and oversights and, as a consequence, to prepare the field for further studies. Then followed an analysis and re-analysis of the broadest possible range of primary sources, including contemporary eyewitness accounts, original documents from German archives and any kind of obtainable picture material, to gain as balanced as possible an insight into the German

7 ‘HAPRO’ was the acronym of the ‘Handelsgesellschaft für industrielle Produkte’, the ‘Trading Organisation for Industrial Products’.

14 military advisorship for China and into the Sino-German arms trade of the period in question. The information contained in the archival files, plus that found in the more biographical narratives of the time, was sufficient to cover the issue of the military advisors and the rather complex relationship between official policies and unofficial individual actions. However, to determine the true scale of the trade in war materials between the two nations, an additional close examination of photographs of the Nationalist Chinese armed forces was necessary to identify delivered weapons and to fill in the blanks left behind by a frequently inadequate documentation of the various deals. All in all, an entirely unbiased and objective approach was deemed to be the top priority throughout the research, since it was apparent that already preconceived notions were the main reason behind the perplexing variety of previous interpretations of Germany’s influence on Chinese military affairs. The resulting thesis attempts to offer a comprehensive historical account by setting the whole extent of the Sino-German military relations, including their slow evolution, their quick devolution and their abrupt end, into their historical context, both in a general overview and in essential detail. It focuses on three distinctive periods which are defined by the political systems prevalent in Germany and China at the time and by their diplomatic relationships to each other. The first period covers Weimar Germany and Warlord China between 1919 and 1928, while the second and third periods concentrate on Weimar Germany and Nationalist China as well as on the Third Reich and Nationalist China in the years between 1928 and 1933 and between 1933 and 1938 respectively. Each of the three chronologically defined major chapters is topically divided into a short historical introduction, which offers essential background information, and two more extensive sub-chapters on the actual manifestations of the Sino-German military relations, the advisorship and the arms trade. The said historical account, however, is ultimately subordinated to the previously summarized hypothesis – there was never an official or explicitly sanctioned military cooperation between China and Germany during these years and the activities of the German military advisers and weapons traders in the Far East were carried out exclusively on an unofficial and private basis.

15 2. Literature Review For historical research about China in the early decades of the twentieth century a wide range of literature is at hand. However, when focussing on more distinct topics, for example on the German military influence on China’s countless interior and exterior conflicts during that particular era, the same literature seems to be far less ample. Yet, two different tendencies are recognisable within the available reference material – one of broad generalisation, which frequently leads to repetitions and overlaps, and one of extreme specification. The bulk of the available literature offers a very broad approach to the topic, in a temporal as well as in a spatial sense. These works often cover the whole of Germany’s colonial and post-colonial involvement in the Far East or China’s warlord and Republican eras in their entirety. These sources present such an overload of information that there is a constant confusion of incidents and dates. One gets easily lost among the countless facts of these eventful decades. Smaller sections of these books have still proven to be useful. However, constant comparison is necessary. Still, other references have the tendency to concentrate on very particular aspects of Sino- German relations during the 1920s and 1930s. These books often concentrate almost exclusively on certain high points of Germany’s diplomatic and military involvement in the Middle Kingdom, such as Germany’s attempt to mediate in the Sino-Japanese War in late 1937 or specific aspects of Chiang Kaishek’s German military advisory group between 1928 and 1938. Although they, too, offer essential information, they once again lack a comprehensive study of German influence on Chinese military affairs during the inter-war years as a whole. Among the best starting points for research in the area of Germany’s colonial and post-colonial role in China is Udo Ratenhof’s Die Chinapolitik des Deutschen Reiches 1871 bis 1945; Wirtschaft – Rüstung – Militär (1987, Boppard am Rhein: Harald Boldt Verlag). Equally helpful are Deutsch-chinesische Beziehungen; Ein Handbuch, edited by Rüdiger Machetzki (1982, Hamburg: Institut für Asienkunde), and Von der Kolonialpolitik zur Kooperation; Studien zur Geschichte der deutsch-chinesischen Beziehungen, edited by Kuo Heng-yü (1986, München: Minerva Publikation). The three works provide valuable insights into the entire history of Sino-German relations and how they drastically changed over the years in step with Germany’s own transformation from empire to to dictatorship. However, they frequently

16 create the impression that Germany even in her last phase of direct involvement in the Far East, during the 1920s and 1930s, was still a politically unified, monolithic nation with a clearly defined foreign policy, while in reality she was a rather indeterminate agglomeration of various factions with diverging interests. A similar approach is taken by William C. Kirby in his outstanding book Germany and Republican China (1984, Stanford: Stanford University Press) when he writes about about a thoroughly mutually agreeable German ‘’8 in China, particularly between 1928 and 1938, when Chiang Kaishek and the government had a relationship both with Weimar Germany and the Third Reich that was much closer than those with other nations at the time. John P. Fox’s equally notable book, however, Germany and the Far Eastern Crisis 1931 – 1938; A Study in Diplomacy and Ideology (1982, Oxford: Clarendon Press) is much more critical about Germany’s actual, far less altruistic motives behind her involvement in the Far East, which were, in any case, ultimately subordinated to her political goals in Europe. Still, while both historians cover Sino-German inter-war era relations in impressive detail, they, too, continue to look into ‘Germany’s China policy’ in their works, when a more distinctive concept along the lines of ‘China politics pursued by individual Germans’ would be perhaps more fitting. Not unlike the later large-scale scholarly examinations, contemporary analyses or eyewitness accounts of the Sino-German relations of the inter-war years are just as relevant for any kind of research into this topic. Even if they lack the historical objectivity of books and essays written decades after the actual events and are rather limited in their scope, their actuality offers an important insight into how Germany and her role in China was perceived by herself and others, regardless of the fact that they are frequently biased by their personal perceptions of occurences and, as a consequence, contradict each other radically. Djang Feng Djen, for example, in his The Diplomatic Relations between China and Germany since 1898 (1936, Shanghai: Commercial Press), judges Germany’s reestablishment of political, economic and military relations with China after World War I – for as long as they lasted, something the author could not foresee – as based on honesty and equality for which she was, in turn, rewarded with the trust and goodwill of the Chinese. Others, however, see things very differently. Kurt Bloch’s analysis of German Interests and Policies in the Far

8 Kirby, William C. (1984) Germany and Republican China, Stanford: Stanford University Press, p. 229.

17 East (1940, : Institute of Pacific Relations, International Secretariat) suggests that ‘certain German industrial groups’9 stood behind Germany’s entire involvement in China, including the German military advisers and the Far Eastern armaments trade. These unnamed reactionary factions within the German industry were not only exclusively interested in the economic profits of the Sino-German relations, but also in the influence on Germany’s domestic politics they would ultimately bring with them. Yet another group of contemporary witnesses, like Freda Utley in her China at War (1939, London: Faber and Faber) or Wolf Schenke in his Reise an der Gelben Front; Beobachungen eines deutschen Kriegsberichterstatters in China (1940, Oldenburg/Berlin: Gerhard Stalling Verlagsbuchhandlung), categorically applauds the German support for the Chinese without caring for its motives and regrets that it ultimately became a victim of a change in politics. Apparently even in the least specific reference material, the actual judgement – and description – of Germany’s role in China, military or otherwise, depends on a certain point of view. However, it is essential to carefully comb through these sources for the few sentences offering some information on the activities of German military advisors and arms traders who constitute the topic of this doctoral dissertation. Still, the activities of German military or military technological experts in China during the are hardly covered in the existing historical literature. Probably due to the scarcity of precise and reliable primary sources in the archives, not a single book is dedicated to the work of these individuals. The available information on them is frequently purely circumstantial and must be gleaned from frustratingly vague contemporary eyewitness accounts and diplomatic reports or from later scholarly examinations of the careers of the various Chinese warlords, for example Donald G. Gillin’s Warlord; Yen Hsi-shan in Shansi Province; 1911 – 1949 (1967, Princeton: Princeton University Press). However, constant cross-referencing and a certain amount of scepticism are necessary to separate fact from pure hearsay. In contrast, Chiang Kaishek’s pseudo-official German military advisory group in its various aspects has received the most attention of historians over the years, although, again, in the most contradictory ways. Judgement of the activities of the German military advisers ranges from one extreme to the other, one group of historians describing them as true friends of China who helped the Chinese during a

9 Bloch, Kurt (1940) German Interests and Policies in the Far East, New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, International Secretariat, p. 12.

18 time of great need, another seeing in them the tools of both the Guomindang and the German capitalists to oppress China and its people and a third regarding the extent of their influence as too negligible to even mention them. Researchers are disappointed when they consult Jonathan Spence’s otherwise profound To Change China; Western Advisers in China 1620 – 1960 (1980, New York (et al.): Penguin Books) to get some introductory information on this topic. While Jonathan Spence dedicates whole chapters to the Soviet military advisers of the 1920s and the American military advisers of the 1940s, the decade in between remains a complete blank for no apparent reason. However, even Generalissimo Chiang Kaishek himself, in his autobiography China’s Destiny (1985, Westport: Greenwood Press), omits any reference to his German military advisory group. As one of the victors of World War II, it was probably not politically prudent for him to admit any previous affiliation with a vanquished enemy. Frederick Fu Liu’s A Military History of Modern China 1924 – 1949 (1956, Princeton: Princeton University Press), on the other hand, describes the German reorganisation of parts of the Chinese army in depth and judges it as invaluable for China’s battles against domestic and foreign foes, only to regret that the German influence on Chinese military affairs had to end much too early. This opinion, however, is not shared by everybody. The essay collection Bulletin Faschismus / Zweiter Weltkrieg; Sonderheft 1989, (1989, Berlin: Zentralinstitut für Geschichte), compiled by Wolfram Adolphi and other leading historians of the former German Democratic Republic, is probably the harshest detractor of the German military involvement in the Middle Kingdom. The German advisers’ support for Chiang Kaishek’s government, allegedly on direct orders of the German capital, is denounced as reactionary, neo-colonialist and, even when unintentionally helping China to defend herself against the invading Japanese, ultimately aimed against the creation of an independent Chinese nation10. Although their use of historical facts is sound, the various essays are so deeply influenced by the GDR’s Communist ideology and so simplistic in their approach that it is hard to take them seriously.

10 On the other hand, the activities of the German Communists in Mao Zedong’s service are uncritically glorified. ‘The Communist and internationalist Otto Braun fought in China […] against the representatives of the reactionary German military who embodied the disastrous traditions of German militarism, who had killed [the Communist politicians] Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg [in 1919], who had incited the [of 1920] and who ultimately cleared the way for German .’ See Peters, Helmut (1989) Einige Anmerkungen zu Otto Braun und seiner revolutionären

19 Yet, there is also a number of very balanced treatises on the German military advisers and their activities, although they, too, diverge in their interpretations of their ultimate motivations or consequences. First among them is the essay and document collection Die deutsche Beraterschaft in China 1927 – 1938; Militär – Wirtschaft – Außenpolitik (1981, Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag), edited by Bernd Martin. Its various essays, written by the most eminent historians studying Germany’s relations with Asia, cover different aspects of the military advisory group, like the actual extent of its influence on Chiang Kaishek’s campaigns against the Chinese Communists or its possible ideological affinities to the Guomindang, and try to offer as objective an overview as possible. Still, for Bernd Martin, the German military advisory group constitutes a ‘picture puzzle’11 of German politics during the decade of its activity, so that, even in a rather distorted form, all military advisers in Chinese service represented Germany as a whole in the Far East. Chen Chern’s doctoral thesis Die Beziehungen zwischen China und Deutschland in den dreißiger Jahren unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Perzeptions-, Interessen- und Aktionsstrukturen der nationalchinesischen Regierung (1996, München: Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität) has a similar approach except in one detail. While it actually confirms that the German military advisory group was purely unofficial and that its members had been employed by the Chinese on a purely private basis, it also adds that the military advisers, although outwardly retaining this private character, became increasingly the representatives, or rather tools, of both the German armaments industry and the German Ministry of War. Fu Pao-Jen, in his dissertation The German Military Mission in Nanking 1928 – 1938; A Bridge connecting China and Germany, (1989, Syracuse: Syracuse University), judges the role of Chiang Kaishek’s military advisory group slightly differently. He sees the German military advisers predominantly as the intermediaries between the German and the Chinese economies who paved the way for the close economic Sino-German ties of the 1930s by establishing the first contacts and helping to negotiate all major deals. Their military help for China is more or less regarded as a by-product. However, he assesses this contribution of the German military advisers

Tätigkeit in China, in: [Anon.] (Ed.) (1989) Bulletin Faschismus/Zweiter Weltkrieg; Sonderheft 1989, Berlin: Zentralinstitut für Geschichte, p. 128. 11 Martin, Bernd (1981) Die deutsche Beraterschaft – Ein Überblick, in: Martin, Bernd (Ed.) (1981) Die deutsche Beraterschaft in China 1927 – 1938; Militär – Wirtschaft – Außenpolitik, Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, p. 38.

20 incorrectly, seeing them as stuck in the defence-oriented trench concepts of World War I and unable to change to mobile warfare, while they were actually trying to instruct the Chinese army how to use this new tactic. On the other hand, Jerry B. Seps’s German Military Advisors and Chiang Kai- Shek, 1927 – 1938 (1972, Berkeley: University of California), gives the German military advisory group way too much credit. Although he states that ‘[following Colonal Max] Bauer’s death in 1929, the leaders of the advisory group declined in ability and effectiveness’12, he also tries to create the impression – not always convincingly since he uses speculation too often – that Chiang Kaishek’s chief military advisers had so much political and military weight in the Middle Kingdom that they influenced, perhaps even controlled both China’s entire economy and her wars against her various enemies during their years of activity. Faced with so many different interpretations of basically the same facts in respect to the German military advisers in Chinese service, any research into this topic has to extensively analyse primary sources. Most original documents dealing with Chiang Kaishek’s German military advisory group can be found in the Political Archive of the German Foreign Office in Bonn and the German Military Archive in Freiburg, although some of them have already been selectively published over the years in the various volumes of the Akten zur Deutschen Auswärtigen Politik document collection series. However, never having been in continuous contact with the military advisers, the files of the German Foreign Office, consisting primarily of the correspondence between German diplomats stationed in the Far East and their superiors in Germany, are unfortunately incomplete and plagued by personal perceptions on the one hand and by a lack of insight on the other. The documents stored in the German Military Archive in Freiburg deal more closely with the military advisory group, its various members and their activities. Still, a large number of these primary sources, especially the countless duty rosters or the personal letters of the military advisers written to their friends and families, are so full of trivialities that it is time-consuming and often difficult to gain truly useful information for a closer analysis of the topic. Additionally, due to their being stored in so many different thematically sorted folders, continuous juxtaposition and comparison of the various documents with each other is absolutely imperative.

12 Seps, Jerry B. (1972) German Military Advisors and Chiang Kai-Shek, 1927 – 1938, Berkeley: University of California, Abstract.

21 While the activities of German military advisers in China during the 1920s and 1930s have at least found partial coverage, the Sino-German arms trade of the same era remains largely a historiographical vacuum. The lack of primary sources indeed makes it almost impossible to write a comprehensive account of the weapons and ammunitions shipments between the two nations and to come to an ultimate verdict. The documents stored in the Political Archive of the German Foreign Office and the German Military Archive provide only little information about this topic. Due to the secretive nature of the arms trade even under the best of circumstances, the German diplomats had once again too little insight into the dealings of the German weapons manufacturers and traders and their Chinese customers to be able to compile definite accounts of their respective business relations. Everybody involved in the Sino- German weapons trade was only too intent on preventing any kind of exposure at any given time, not only during the arms embargo. German salesmen did so to avoid domestic and international criticism or possible legal prosecution, while the Chinese buyers did so to protect their military secrets. The German military advisers, on the other hand, were so involved in the routine of China’s arms acquisition process that they often deemed it unnecessary to write about this topic in any detail. It is no wonder that this unfortunate deficiency of reliable information invited, and still continues to invite, every kind of speculation. Once again the descriptions of the Sino-German arms trade, not unlike the accounts on the activities of the German military advisers, show an extreme variety of interpretations. Ch’i Hsi-Sheng, in his Warlord Politics in China 1916 – 1928 (1976, Stanford: Stanford University Press) offers an in-depth look into the international armaments trade with China during the warlord era and hardly ever mentions the German weapons sales to the different warring factions. Chiang Kai-shek; His Life and Times, edited by Kenji Furuya (1981, New York: St. John’s University), goes so far as to completely omit the Sino-German arms trade throughout the 1930s, although it contains an entire chapter dedicated to China’s dependence on war materials deliveries from abroad. In contrast, Allen C. Burden’s doctoral thesis German Policy toward China and the Chinese Revolution, 1919 – 1931, with Special Reference to the Beginnings of Sino-German Military Cooperation (1972, Edmonton: University of Alberta) vilifies Germany as a large- scale arms dealer by claiming that all German governmental agencies were involved in the international armaments trade with China, if not actively, then at least by silently condoning it or by refusing to stop these activities. However, Allen C. Burden

22 frequently quotes from questionable sources, like the notoriously unreliable Chinese Maritime Customs Statistics, and seldom delivers, according to his own admission, proof for his allegations. Yet, even when he acknowledges the inadequacy of his argumentation, he continues to cling to his biased opinion13. Still, Burden’s point of view is shared by – and probably based on – most contemporary accounts of the German involvement in the China arms trade, for example by Helmut C. Engelbrecht and Frank C. Hanighen’s Merchants of Death; A Study of the International Armament Industry (1935, London: George Routledge & Sons) or George Seldes’ Iron, Blood and Profits; An Exposure of the World-Wide Munitions Racket (1934, New York (et al.): Harper & Brothers Publishers). Although these 1920s and 1930s equivalents of today’s investigative journalism lack a certain objectivity, they can still be helpful for further research, but only when used in conjunction with the few original documents found in the archives. In regards to the Sino-German weapons trade of the inter-war years, more balanced scholarly examinations can be found as well, like Anthony B. Chan’s Arming the Chinese; The Western Armaments Trade in Warlord China, 1920 – 1928, (1982, Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press). It paints a very objective picture of the general extent of the international export of war materials to China. Compared with the sales of other nations at the time, the German participation in the weapons trade seems to be almost negligible, contradicting many contemporay and later accusations. However, even the more balanced approaches can present a distorted image of historical facts. Zhang Xiaoming’s Toward Arming China: Arms Sales and Military Assistance, 1921 – 1941, (1994, n.p.: University of Iowa), for example, correctly contrasts, for completeness’s sake, the United States’ arms sales to the Far East with those of Germany, but still comes to the abstruse conclusion that American arms sales actually helped China’s cause while Germany’s weapons deals were considered to be detestable at the same time14. To avoid any kind of inaccurate judgement, one has therefore to use, once again, the widest possible range of available primary and secondary sources and cross-

13 ‘Even though the Chinese statistics […] are misleading in-so-far as Germany’s role in the weapons traffic is concerned, they undoubtedly do reflect more accurately the involvement of German nationals in the trade.’ See Burden, Allen C. (1972) German Policy toward China and the Chinese Revolution, 1919 – 1931, with Special Reference to the Beginnings of Sino-German Military Cooperation, Edmonton: University of Alberta, p. 149. 14 Zhang, Xiaoming (1994) Toward Arming China: United States Arms Sales and Military Assistance, 1921 – 1941, n.p.: University of Iowa, pp. 68 ff.

23 reference them with contemporary photographic material and dedicated weapons encyclopedias, like the Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft series of handbooks, edited by C.G. Grey and Leonard Bridgman throughout the 1920s and 1930s. Still, sometimes one cannot avoid making at least some educated guesses, particularly when all the surrounding facts are right and only the concrete proof is missing. It is apparent that there is a definite scarcity of Chinese sources in this dissertation. However, since this doctoral thesis focusses predominantly on the German side of the Sino-German military relations during the inter-war years and this issue alone is rich and complex enough as it is, the inclusion of the Chinese perspective would have gone far beyond the parameters of this study. Therefore this dissertation contents itself with sources in Western languages and uses only a small number of Chinese publications to accentuate the German aspect of this intricate topic. The major incentive behind this doctoral dissertation, besides a personal fascination with the topic, was the fact that the Sino-German military relations during the early decades of the twentieth century in their entirety find only unsatisfactory coverage in the existing historical literature. While it is true that Germany’s contribution to China’s truly epic twentieth century history was rather limited, the fact that this short chapter of Sino-German relations has been so neglected by historians remains an enigma, for it is still of undeniable interest. It demonstrates how unofficial the allegedly official relations between two nations can actually be and how a small number of determined individuals and their activities can assert an indisputable influence on both grand international politics and the general perception thereof. Sadly, it also confirms that years of hard work can simply be undone within such a short time that hardly anything worthwhile remains. It is hoped that this doctoral thesis can do its part to fill this historiographical void.

3. Weimar Germany and Warlord China, 1919 – 1928 3.1 Historical Background 3.1.1 A History of Sino-German Relations before 1919 Diplomatic and economic relations between Imperial China and Germany – or, in this case, primarily since Germany as such had not yet been united and was still a loose conglomerate of smaller states – date back to mid-nineteenth century. Due to its distance and power-political weakness, at least compared to great colonial nations like

24 Great Britain and , Germany was not seen as a threat by the Chinese people. On the contrary, the German Reich was hailed as a shining example, especially after the national unification of Germany under Chancellor Otto von Bismarck in 1871, which was seen by many Chinese as a possible solution for the Middle Kingdom’s own pressing problems. Imperial China, weakened and exploited by imperialist states since the mid- nineteenth century, was impressed by what it perceived as the national virtues of this far-away nation. ‘Germanness, Prussianness and soldiership’15 had not only created a unified state, but also catapulted it into a leading position within Europe. Emulating all the characteristics the Prussian soldier, and by extension the typical German, was supposed to have – courage, obedience and patriotism, as well as diligence, efficiency and responsibility – was seen among Chinese intellectuals as a way to strengthen the ‘dongya bingfu’, the ‘sick man of East Asia’16, as the Middle Kingdom was regarded, to throw off the colonial yoke and to reclaim the glories of the past. The best and quickest way to become like the German Reich was to seek political, economic and cultural cooperation with ‘the country with the best engineers, the most courageous soldiers and the brightest scientists’17, a concept which was taken up by the Imperial Chinese leadership to a limited degree in the late nineteenth century. Germany’s positive image severely suffered after its occupation of Jiaozhou in 1898 and its participation in the suppression of the in 1900 and 190118. The tensions between China and the German Reich, however, were only short-lived. The relatively small German possessions on the peninsula had more or less only symbolic value as a base for the German Navy to satisfy Emperor Wilhelm II’s craving for importance. Furthermore, since Jiaozhou was too small to be economically exploited, it was constructed as a prime example of how a modern colony should be19. It became an essential centre for the mutually profitable Sino-

15 Hwang, Shen-chang (1982) Das Deutschlandbild der Chinesen, in: Machetzki, Rüdiger (Ed.) (1982) Deutsch-chinesische Beziehungen; Ein Handbuch, Hamburg: Institut für Asienkunde, p. 15. 16 Ibid., p. 13. 17 Machetzki, Rüdiger (1982) Das Chinabild der Deutschen, in: Machetzki, Rüdiger (Ed.) (1982) Deutsch-chinesische Beziehungen; Ein Handbuch, Hamburg: Institut für Asienkunde, p. 11. 18 It is ironic that the German involvement in the punitive expeditions following the Boxer Rebellion did more harm to Germany’s image in the rest of the world than it did in China. Especially Emperor Wilhelm II’s infamous ‘Hunnenrede’, during which he called on the German soldiers to cause havoc like the Huns had done in earlier times, discredited Germany for the decades to come. 19 Martin, Bernd (1986) Das Deutsche Reich und Guomindang-China, 1927 – 1941, in: Kuo, Heng-yü (Ed.) (1986) Von der Kolonialpolitik zur Kooperation; Studien zur Geschichte der deutsch- chinesischen Beziehungen, München: Minerva Publikation, p. 327.

25 German trade, almost competing with Shanghai and Canton20 as a shipping port, and once again cultivating German prestige in the Far East. The German Reich’s moderate policy toward the newly declared Republic of China after 1911 also strengthened Chinese sympathies towards the Germans. Compared to the other imperialist powers, Great Britain in particular, Germany seemed to be the lesser evil. Sino-German relations came to an abrupt end with the outbreak of World War I in 1914. Realising that it could not possibly hold on its colonial territory in the Far East, the German Reich attempted to return its colonial possessions in the Shandong Peninsula at the very beginning of hostilities, but Great Britain, being among Germany’s enemies, pressured China to reject this offer21. Only short time later, Japan, using her military alliance with Great Britain as a pretext, declared war on Germany and attacked Jiaozhou in a swift move which completely ignored China’s self-imposed neutrality. The Japanese siege of the German colony lasted from 23 August 1914 to 7 November 1914 and ended, partially thanks to British naval support, with Japan’s overwhelming victory. Having conquered a foothold of Chinese territory, Japan issued the Twenty-One Demands in 1915, in which she called for economic and military concessions in Manchuria and China proper. Powerless, the government in accepted the demands despite popular Chinese protests. China remained neutral towards Germany for the biggest part of World War I, which even today is called the ‘Ouzhan’, meaning a strictly ‘European War’, by the Chinese. Only later, when a German defeat seemed to be only a question of time and pressured by the United States and the other Allied powers22, the Chinese government changed its restrained policy and declared war on the German Reich on 14 August 1917. The politician Liang Qichao was one of the fiercest proponents of a war with Germany, arguing that China’s support of the Allies’ cause would warrant its representation in the post-war peace negotiations and would make it an equal among the imperialist powers, therefore ensuring a possible cancellation of the Unequal Treaties23 and Japan’s Twenty-One Demands, as well as the bestowal of various other

20 Cantonese transcription. In Pinyin: . 21 Fabritzek, Uwe G. (1973) Gelber Drache, Schwarzer Adler, München/Gütersloh: C. Bertelsmann Verlag, p. 89. 22 Fochler-Hauke, Gustav (1938) Der Ferne Osten; Macht- und Wirtschaftskampf in Ostasien, Leipzig/ Berlin: B.G. Teubner, p. 35. 23 The Unequal Treaties had been established in the mid-nineteenth century after several wars between Imperial China and the various foreign powers.

26 political and economic advantages24. Still, there was no particular Chinese hatred against the Germans after the declaration of war. The German Reich was only considered as a nominal enemy25. In line with this, Sun Yatsen26 and his exiled semi- autonomous revolutionary government in Canton insisted on China’s continuing neutrality towards Germany and deplored the absurdity, even immorality of China fighting alongside Great Britain, France, Russia and even Japan, the same arch- imperialists who kept parts of the Middle Kingdom under their colonial yoke. Furthermore, Sun Yatsen prophesied pessimistically, the Chinese would never gain any advantages from being among the victorious powers27.

3.1.2 The Treaty of Versailles, 1919 Sun Yatsen was proven only too right. Little did the Chinese know that already on 16 February 1917, during secret negotiations, Great Britain had assured Japan that the former German territories in China would be handed over to the Japanese after the war’s end, despite the fact that the Sino-German lease agreement regarding Jiaozhou, signed in 1898, had emphasized China’s ultimate sovereignty over the leased territory. Indeed, during the actual negotiations of the post-war peace agreement, the result of these secret negotiations came to pass. On the one hand, Articles 128 to 134 of the finalized Treaty of Versailles forced Germany to renounce all its colonial concessions in China, especially extraterritoriality, a fact which truly benefited China. On the other hand, however, Articles 156 to 159 transferred the former German colony on the Shandong peninsula to Japan, not to China. The Chinese pleas for a return of the occupied areas were ignored by the Allies at Versailles. Futhermore, the Unequal Treaties, which guaranteed the colonial nations such rights as extraterritoriality and tariff control, remained intact. The wording of the Treaty of Versailles unleashed a flood of demonstrations and protests by thousands of Chinese citizens. Equally outraged by this affront, the Chinese delegation refused to sign the entire agreement, a decision which was later

24 Hwang, Shen-chang (1982), p. 19, and Chen, Tsun-kung (1983) Lieqiang dui Zhongguo de Junhuojinyun (Minguo Ba Nian – Shiba Nian) [Monograph (Number 47)], : Academia Sinica, Institute of Modern History, p. 16. 25 Chen, Chern (1996) Die Beziehungen zwischen China und Deutschland in den dreißiger Jahren unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Perzeptions-, Interessen- und Aktionsstrukturen der nationalchinesischen Regierung, München: Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität, p. 12. 26 Cantonese transcription. In Pinyin: Sun Yixian or Sun Zhongshan. 27 Nieh, Yu-Hsi (1982) Zwischen den Kriegen – Ein Neubeginn, in: Machetzki, Rüdiger (Ed.) (1982) Deutsch-chinesische Beziehungen; Ein Handbuch, Hamburg: Institut für Asienkunde, p. 116. Sun Yatsen dictated most of these arguments for a brochure titled China’s Existential Question.

27 confirmed by the government in Beijing28. Many leading Chinese politicians, both in Beijing and Canton, were disgusted by Allies’ hypocrisy in their handling of the entire situation. China had, after coercion, become involved in the war against Germany. Admittedly, she had only offered some Chinese labour batallions to be sent to the Western Front, still China had been committed to the Allies’ cause and now her interests had been sold out completely. Although China refused to sign the Treaty of Versailles, Germany felt obliged to unilaterally fulfil all its articles, including those concerning China. Nevertheless, a legal state of war remained between Germany and China until an official armistice was finally declared by the Chinese government on 15 September 1919 and German diplomatic representation in the Far East was renewed29. This diplomatic act, however, was only the first step to re-establish relations between two losers of both the Great War and its subsequent peace treaty.

3.1.3 The Sino-German Friendship Treaty, 1921 The Treaty of Versailles made Germany’s young Weimar Republic and China ‘brothers in misery’30. The nations which had won the war and had forced Germany to accept the terms of Versailles were the same ones who insisted on the continuation of the Unequal Treaties in China. However, besides sharing resentment towards the victorious powers, both countries were struggling with their change from empires to republics. For many Germans and Chinese, citizens and politicians alike, this was enough to see a ‘connection of destinies’ between Germany and China31. Despite the Great War and Germany’s defeat, China never really had intended to sever its political and particularly its economic relations with Germany. Yet, in the spring of 1920, under American, British and French pressure, the Chinese government repatriated some 2,000 German citizens who were living and doing business in China

28 Pollard, Robert T. (1933) China’s Foreign Relations; 1917 – 1931, New York: Macmillan Company, p. 85, and Djang, Feng Djen (1936) The Diplomatic Relations between China and Germany since 1898, Shanghai: Commercial Press, p. 187. The presidential proclamation of 15 September 1919 included the statement that ‘dissatisfied with the conditions embodied in three clauses relating to Shandong, this country refused to sign the Treaty’. See Pollard, Robert T. (1933), p. 87. 29 Djang, Feng Djen (1936), p. 187. 30 Mende, Gunter S. (1975) The Image of China in Germany, 1919 – 1939, Irvine: University of California, p. 2. 31 Kirby, William C. (1994) Intercultural Contacts and International Relations: China’s Relations with Germany, the Soviet Union and the United States, 1927 – 1944, in: Kuo, Heng-yü & Leutner, Mechthild (Eds.) (1994) Deutschland und China; Beiträge des Zweiten Symposiums zur Geschichte der deutsch-chinesischen Beziehungen Berlin 1991, München: Minerva Publikation, p. 231. William Kirby quotes Max Ilgner, the chief executive of the I.G. Farben, the German Dye Trust.

28 back to Germany. In doing so, the Chinese ended any economic competition of the ‘obnoxious’32 Germans so unpopular with the other Western powers. This triumph was rather short-lived. In 1921, Adolf Boyé became the German emissary to China. He was an extremely able diplomat and refuted everything that could create the impression that the new Weimar Germany, at the time still inexperienced and without concrete foreign policies, could in any way fall back into its imperialist past. He insisted that Germany no longer should have any political interests in China, but should exclusively foster economic and cultural relations33. His approach was also shared by the German foreign minister, Gustav Stresemann. The idealistic Adolf Boyé was instrumental in working out the details of the Sino-German Friendship Treaty34 which was signed on 20 May 1921. In this treaty, Germany permanently waived consular jurisdiction over her nationals in China, placing them entirely under the authority of China’s laws, conceded tariff autonomy as far as German imports and exports were concerned and payed a fixed amount of indemnities to China to end the compulsory expropriation of German property in the aftermath of World War I. In addition, Germany also reconfirmed the validity of the Treaty of Versailles, although China still refused to sign it, by declaring that ‘owing to the events of the war and the Treaty of Versailles’ Germany had been forced to renounce all of its rights in Shandong Province and was therefore ‘deprived of the possibility of restoring them to China’35 herself. The last clause was only a gesture, but a very effective one, since it created a wave of sympathy among the Chinese towards Weimar Germany. This agreement, the first truly equal treaty between China and a major Western nation, was not only sensational because of its openly anti-colonial concessions to the Chinese Republic, but also because it made Germany the first country which offered the Chinese more than just verbal assurances of equality36. Germany’s new status as a non-extraterritorial power in China gained for her not only the growth of friendly relations between the two nations, but, quite unexpectedly, also a rapid increase in trade which none of the special privileges previously enjoyed had been able to secure. Since Germany had disavowed all its colonial concessions in China, it had to demonstrate friendship with China to be able to compete politically and economically with the imperial powers in the Far East. China was also aware that a relationship with Germany on an equal base could be a good argument in China’s struggle for the cancellation of the Unequal Treaties with the remaining colonial powers. As a result, Germany could create a

32 Briessen, Fritz van (1977) Grundzüge der deutsch-chinesischen Beziehungen [Grundzüge (Volume 32)], : Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, p. 107. 33 Briessen, Fritz van (1982) Deutsche Institutionen und Persönlichkeiten in China, in: Machetzki, Rüdiger (Ed.) (1982) Deutsch-chinesische Beziehungen; Ein Handbuch, Hamburg: Institut für Asienkunde, p. 76. 34 Reichsministerium des Innern (Ed.) (1921) Reichsgesetzblatt 1921, Berlin: Verlag des Gesetzsamm- lungsamts, pp. 830 ff. 35 Ibid. 36 Iriye, Akira (1965) After ; The Search for a New Order in the Far East 1921 – 1931, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, p. 13.

29 far stronger economic position position than it ever could as an imperial power. After the signing of the treaty, the number of German companies active in China immediately rose from nine to 300 in 192637. By the end of the war, trade between Germany and China had been non-existent. Shortly after the treaty came into power, German companies were already responsible for 2.8 percent of China’s foreign trade38. The Germans now could prove to anyone that ‘diligence [was] more valuable than privileges’39. Understandably, among the diplomats of the other foreign powers in China there was a certain animosity toward Weimar Germany because of her separate peace agreement with China. With the help of this agreement, Germany could once again become their economic competitor in the Far East, one they had thought already neutralized through the Treaty of Versailles40. The agreement also demonstrated that both China and Germany could create and uphold political relations outside the framework of the Unequal Treaties. The international press reacted very negatively as well. French newspapers viewed the agreement as a first step in the recommencement of German expansionism in China41, completely ignoring the fundamental message it intended to express. The Japanese press was very critical of the concessions made by Germany which, in the long run, would threaten the privileges of all remaining imperialist powers in China42. All in all, there were many allegiations that Germany’s renewed involvement in China was nothing but ‘colonialism without colonies’43. Still, there was never any danger of Germany trying to reclaim its lost colony. Even years later, during a speech in the Reichstag on 20 February 1938, Adolf Hitler summed up

37 Ruland, Bernd (1973) Deutsche Botschaft Peking; Das Jahrhundert deutsch-chinesischen Schicksals, : Hestia, p. 129. 38 Ibid., p. 142. 39 Ibid., p. 129. Bernd Ruland quotes the American historian Grover Clark. 40 Chen, Chi (1973) Die Beziehungen zwischen Deutschland und China bis 1933 [Mitteilungen des Instituts für Asienkunde Hamburg (Number 56)], Hamburg: Institut für Asienkunde, p. 60. 41 Burden, Allen C. (1972) German Policy toward China and the Chinese Revolution, 1919 – 1931, with Special Reference to the Beginnings of Sino-German Military Cooperation, Edmonton: University of Alberta, p. 40. The British, too, were fearful of the possible consequences of the friendship treaty which endangered to alter ‘a system which has in the past enriched alike Chinese and European’. See Etherton, Percy T. (1927) The Crisis in China, Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, pp. 96 ff. 42 Burden, Allen C. (1972), p. 40. 43 Dülffer, Jost (1984) Kolonialismus ohne Kolonien: Deutsche Kolonialpläne 1938, in: Knipping, Franz & Müller, Klaus-Jürgen (Eds.) (1984) Machtbewußtsein in Deutschland am Vorabend des Zweiten Weltkrieges, Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, pp. 247 ff., and Wünsche, Renate (1962) Einige Bemerkungen zur Kolonialpolitik des deutschen Imperialismus in der Endphase der Weimarer Republik, gezeigt am Beispiel seiner Beziehungen zu China, in: [Anon.] (Ed.) (1962) Nationaler Befreiungskampf und Neokolonialismus; Referate und ausgewählte Beiträge, Berlin: Akademie- Verlag, pp. 180 ff.

30 the German position on territorial possessions overseas. ‘Germany has no territorial interest in East Asia. […] We no longer want to return there.’44 Germany was no longer considered a threat for China’s sovereignty by the Chinese, but rather as having a huge potential. Many Chinese wished to foster their own nation-building efforts with German capital and German knowledge. They looked on Germany as a partner in their fight against international isolation and as their role model because of Weimar Germany’s centralized governmental system, her highly developed industry and her still strong military traditions45. Hopes for an ‘Alliance of Outsiders’46 began to grow, for an alliance in which both nations could face the victorious powers of the Great War. Still, for Germany, severely hit by the political turmoil and economic woes of the post-war years, there were more pressing concerns and therefore, during the early and mid-1920s, the Far East remained of relatively minor importance for Germany. The German government, preoccupied with the more significant European problems, could give China only secondary consideration, despite the sympathies professed for China. The chaotic domestic situation in the Chinese Republic was another reason why a desired alliance never materialized.

3.1.4 Warlord China, 1921 – 1928 When the fell in 1911 and Sun Yatsen created the Republic of China, it was not the end of the Chinese Revolution. It was only the end of the beginning of a process that would find a conclusion after years of unrelenting conflict. Within a few years, the first elected president of this new republic, , abused his office and proclaimed himself the new emperor. After his death in 1916, however, any form of an internationally representative and domestically influential Chinese government with a centralised control of the armed forces ceased to exist47. A so-called nationalist government continued ruling in Beijing. It was recognised by foreign states as the government of China and even opposing Chinese politicians spoke of it as such. Nevertheless, the nationalist government’s powers extended no farther than the sphere of influence of the prevailing Beijing warlord, ‘for the Beijing government was also a warlord government; it was the creature of whatever warlord

44 Schmokel, Wolfe W. (1964) Dream of Empire: German Colonialism, 1919 – 1945, New Haven/ London: Yale University Press, p. 141. 45 Chen, Chern (1996), p. 1. 46 Leutner, Mechthild (1986) Deutsche Vorstellungen über China und Chinesen und über die Rolle der Deutschen in China, 1890 – 1945, in: Kuo, Heng-yü (Ed.) (1986) Von der Kolonialpolitik zur Kooperation; Studien zur Geschichte der deutsch-chinesischen Beziehungen, München: Minerva Publikation, p. 425.

31 or warlord clique ruled the capital and its environs’48. These Chinese governments also changed with extraordinary rapidity. Between 1916 and 1928 China had seven heads of state (with one of them serving on two occasions), one imperial restoration, several periods of regency or caretaker governments and altogether twenty-five cabinets with an average lifespan of four months49. With such a weak central government, the whole of China became divided in two amorphous political domains, vaguely split along the Yangzi River50. The reactionary and more traditionally oriented Northerners remained in Beijing, where they formed their more or less autonomous government. Canton, however, became the headquarters of the Southerners. Here the disappointed Sun Yatsen withdrew with his Nationalist Party, the Guomindang51. The Southerners were in a weaker position than the Northerners and had to build up their power until they were strong enough to fulfil their political ideal of unifying the whole country under a stable and just government. This political fragmentation in China made it impossible to treat the country as having a single political regime. To make things worse, the absence of a strong ruling central power made the regional leaders of the Republican army and the provincial governors, the dujun, turn into warlords and fight each other for power and supremacy in the now divided Middle Kingdom. Chinese domestic affairs became mainly the fighting and political manoeuvring of military strongmen in quest of wealth and influence. Although most of these warlords fought, at least officially, under the flag of the Republic and explained their wars and so-called politics with patriotic and high- sounding slogans of every political shade (many of which may even have been sincere), none of them truly represented an important segment of the population, nor were their battles the expression of genuine national or social movements52. During this era of political and military strife the various warlords tried principally to expand the areas under their control and build up power bases by forming ever-changing factions among each other with the final aim of controlling all China. Most important for them was the seizure of the capital city, for the warlords could try to lend some kind of legitimacy to their respective regimes by capturing Beijing and forming a

47 Bonavia, David (1995) China’s Warlords, Hongkong (et al.): Oxford University Press, p. 6. 48 Sheridan, James E. (1975) China in Disintegration; The Republican Era in Chinese History, 1912 – 1949, New York: Free Press, p. 58. 49 Ibid. 50 The Yangzi River is also known as Yangzijiang or Changjiang. 51 Translation: ‘National People’s Party’.

32 government there53. In the end political and territorial disintegration had the effect that Chinese politics during the 1916 to 1928 period seemed ‘more to resemble an international than domestic situation’54. There were literally hundreds of warlords in China during the 1920s. Most of them were simple bandit leaders with only a handful of men at their command. These petty brigands had small areas under their control for short periods of time and disappeared as quickly as they had emerged. However, some of the warlords were political and military leaders of a grander scale. They were the generals of large, usually well- equipped armies who ruled over one or more provinces in China. Their political influence had enormous weight in Chinese domestic and even foreign affairs. The most important representatives of these true warlords were , the ‘Tiger of the North’ who was the leader of the Fengtian faction and who controlled the whole of Manchuria until his death in 1928, Wu Peifu, the so-called ‘Jade Marshal’ and leader of the faction, who was one of China’s best military leaders at the time and who was Zhang Zuolin’s main adversary, and finally , the leader of the ‘Guominjun’55, who was known as the ‘Christian General’ because he had converted to the Baptist faith and allegedly baptised his warlord troops by the hundreds with the help of a fire hose56. The political and military manoeuvring of these warlords and their respective factions during the 1920s was almost beyond the understanding of foreigners in China and abroad. Alliances between the warlords were shifting permanently and betrayal was the order of the day. They led campaigns ‘whose tactics and objectives were thoroughly incomprehensible’57. Some battles were actually won by putting on a big show and firing so-called ‘silver bullets’, that is by bribing the enemy commander into surrender. This created the impression among foreigners that the more than 140 wars of the different warlord factions in the years between 1916 and 1928 were

52 Sheridan, James E. (1966) Chinese Warlord; The Career of Feng Yü-Hsiang, Stanford: Stanford University Press, p. 9. 53 Jowett, Philip .S. (1997) Armies 1911 – 1949 [Men-at-Arms (Volume 306)], London: Osprey Publishing, p. 12. 54 Ch’i, Hsi-Sheng (1976) Warlord Politics in China 1916 – 1928, Stanford: Stanford University Press, p. 8. 55 Translation: ‘National People’s Army’. 56 This little anecdote is mentioned in several different sources, for example Jowett, Philip S. (1997), p. 13. However, other sources deny reports of Feng’s mass baptism vehemently. See Bonavia, David (1995), p. 113. 57 Strunk, R. & Rikli, M. (1934) Achtung! Asien marschiert!, Berlin: Volksverband der Bücherfreunde/ Wegweiser-Verlag, p. 33.

33 nothing but ‘comic opera wars’58 or ‘popgun warfare’59. However, these wars were neither funny nor harmless. The fighting was in fact extremely ferocious and it affected not only the warlord troops, but the civilian population as well. Murder, rape and the looting of whole areas were common at the time. All the smaller and bigger wars, for example the clash between the Anfu and Zhili factions in 1920 or the the First and Second Fengtian-Zhili War of 1922 and 1924 respectively60, killed more people, soldiers and civilians, than World War I61. Yet, while fighting went on all the time, none of the warlords ever gained full control of China. Meanwhile in Canton, Sun Yatsen watched the bickering among the military strongmen. He realised that the never-ending clashes in the North led nowhere, but also that the warlords would not relinquish their power voluntarily and the only way to achieve the democracy he wanted for the Middle Kingdom was by force. When Sun Yatsen died in 1925, he was succeeded by Chiang Kaishek, a skilful and equally ambitious political and military leader who continued his idealistic fight. In 1926 the Guomindang, in alliance with the Chinese Communist Party62 and supported by the Soviet Union, finally found the strength to oppose the Northern Warlords. The united front of Guomindang and CCP started the Northern Expedition with the aims to overthrow warlordism and to unify China. Chiang Kaishek’s campaign was a success, his nationalist armies defeated or drove out the main warlords. However, this victory had also its setbacks. The whole mass mobilisation campaign, but especially the accompanying violent anti-foreign riots, led to a confrontation with the imperialist powers in China. In addition, the alliance between the nationalist Guomindang and the Communist Party had always been fragile and more or less involuntary. Only their joint hatred of the warlords and their ambition to unify China had kept them together. With the common enemy overpowered and a government set up in Nanjing in 1927, Chiang turned his attention to his former allies, the CCP. He ousted all Soviet advisers and started his subsequent campaign to wipe out any Communist opposition throughout the entire Middle Kingdom.

58 Sheridan, James E. (1976), p. 22, and Ch’i, Hsi-Sheng (1976), p. 137. 59 Misselwitz, Henry F. (1928) The Chinese Soldier, His Equipment and Activities, in: China Weekly Review (Volume XLV, Number 6, July 1928), p. 191. 60 Dreyer, Edward L. (1995), pp. 83 ff. 61 Strunk, R. & Rikli, M. (1934), p. 29. 62 The or CCP was formed in 1921.

34 3.1.5 Weimar Germany and her China Policy, 1921 – 1928 While a civil strife-torn China struggled with itself, post-World War I Germany was facing an equally uncertain future. A short-lived Communist revolution in late 1918 had left the nation without its monarch, Emperor Wilhelm II, and forced it to accept a republican form of government. This newly established German government, called into being in the city of Weimar, was immediately forced to sign the Treaty of Versailles on 28 June 1919. According to this treaty, Germany had to accept the exclusive blame for the war and to pay extensive reparations to the victorious powers, to reduce her army and navy in numbers and types of weapons, to give up her air force and to cede both national territory and all her colonies. The Weimar government’s acceptance of the Treaty, albeit under extreme Allied pressure, fatally undermined its authority in the eyes of many Germans. As a result, the young Weimar Germany had to grapple with an enormous amount of domestic and international problems. The most pressing among these were the reconstruction of a war-shattered economy, the payment of almost insurmountable reparations, rampant inflation, mass unemployment, internal dissent coming from both the far left and the far right and, last but not least, the overcoming of its international political isolation. The main objective of the Weimar Republic, seen as the only solution to all these issues and turning, as a result, almost into a dogma63, was the revision of the Treaty of Versailles via negotiations. Consequently its entire political activity, both domestic and foreign, was in some way subordinated to this goal. On the foreign political stage therefore of highest priority was the restoration of a certain position of equality for Germany within the family of nations, which she tried to achieve with an international policy of neutrality and restraint. Throughout the 1920s, both the conception and implementation of Germany’s foreign policy was carried out by the professional civil servants of the Auswärtiges Amt, the German foreign ministry. Due to constant changes in the Weimar government’s make-up, which was primarily preoccupied with domestic or European issues, only in few cases did their foreign policies come under the scrutiny of Germany’s elected representatives. Still, they worked tirelessly on their own to pursue the politics of international neutrality and diplomatic restraint they deemed necessary to restore Germany’s place in the world. Under this proposition, Weimar Germany also wanted to restore its relations with China once again64. The first step in this direction had already been the Friendship Treaty of 1921. However, its deep-felt professions of good will had been directed at the Chinese people in their entirety, without favouring any party, be it the official, although weak government in Beijing, Sun Yatsen’s Guomindang in

63 Ratenhof, Gabriele (1984) Das Deutsche Reich und die internationale Krise um die Mandschurei 1931 – 1933; Die deutsche Fernostpolitik als Spiegel und Instrument deutscher Revisionspolitik, Frankfurt am Main (et al.): Peter Lang, p. 5. 64 A well-researched book dealing with the Sino-German approach after World War I is Glaim, Lorne E. (1973) Sino-German Relations, 1919 – 1925: German Diplomatic, Economic, and Cultural Reentry into China after World War I, n.p.: Washington State University.

35 Canton or one of the countless warlord factions. All Chinese people were supposed to look on Germany ‘not only as equals but as friends’65. It would be fatal if Germany gave in to the wishes of one or the other Chinese, or even German, party to choose sides. There were also other important factors to consider. Early on the Auswärtiges Amt in Berlin had recognized that, no matter how Germany tried to win back some role in the affairs of the Far East, it had to establish friendly relations with both the Chinese Republic and the various colonial powers omni- present on her territory. This precarious situation held the real danger that Weimar Germany, in doing that, would probably place herself between all chairs. Yet, such were the premises of Realpolitik which had to be accepted during these days. The Auswärtiges Amt decided that the best course of action in China, even in the entire Far East, was to emphasize Germany’s exclusive interests in the cultivation of friendship and the development of economic and cultural relations. The German Ambassador in China, Adolf Boyé, best summed up these interests by stating that ‘[the Germans] don’t pursue any political goals, [their] economic interests are insignificant compared to the enormous interests of the other powers, [they] only want to do peaceful business and nothing more’66. This ‘policy-without-politics’, a virtue born out of the necessity of post-Versailles helplessness67, eliminated any colonial competition with the imperial powers in the Far East. In addition, given the violent chaos of China’s domestic politics, it was also the best solution to avoid any Chinese resentment, especially since a great part of the violence in the Middle Kingdom was directed against foreigners. By trying to avoid any kind of controversy in their diplomatic and economic involvement in the Far East, the German foreign policy makers were extraordinarily successful in restoring Germany’s image throughout the world, which had been tarnished by the Great War, despite frequent sniping from various foreign diplomats and newspapers. German diplomats were often called on as mediators between China and other nations, for example during the Shameen Affair between China and Great Britain in 1927 and during the short conflict between China and the Soviet Union in 1929. They were even able to partially overcome the international isolation imposed by the Allies when Weimar Germany was invited to join the in September 1926. In the same year, the Western powers also offered Germany to

65 Causey, Beverley D. (1942) German Policy towards China, 1918 – 1941, Cambridge: Harvard University, p. 48. 66 Kuo, Heng-yü (1986) Deutschland und China im Jahre 1927 aus der Sicht deutscher Diplomaten, in: Kuo, Heng-yü (Ed.) (1986) Von der Kolonialpolitik zur Kooperation; Studien zur Geschichte der deutsch-chinesischen Beziehungen, München: Minerva Publikation, p. 296. Kuo Heng-yü quotes from Ambassador Boyé’s telegram to the Auswärtiges Amt, sent on 13 December 1926. 67 Ratenhof, Gabriele (1984), p. 16.

36 become a belated signatory of the Nine Power Treaty concluded at the end of the Washington Conference in 1922, to which she, an ‘international pariah’68 at the time, had not even been invited. This treaty proclaimed that all signatory powers69 respected the sovereignty of China, agreed not to interfere in the internal affairs of China and allowed the Chinese to solve their domestic problems and unify their country in their own way70. At the same time, however, it also protected the ‘Open Door’ policy, which had been intended to stabilise the imperialist competition among the various nations present in the Middle Kingdom during the late nineteenth century. It made no references whatsoever to a withdrawal of foreign troops from China or a change in the Unequal Treaty system and basically reconfirmed the status quo of the victorious powers of World War I, including their colonial ambitions in the Far East. Weimar Germany agreed with the more positive aspects of the Nine Power Treaty, yet, due to the other Western nations’ reconfirming of China as a semi-colony, she tried to avoid any endangering of her now special relations with the Chinese Republic. The Germans now no longer wanted to become members of the traditional imperialist clique and continued on their own to adhere to the policies which had been initially enforced by the Western powers and their Treaty of Versailles. The Germans would remain absolutely neutral to avoid becoming either a pawn of the colonial powers in China or a tool of one or the other Chinese political factions. Later, during the Northern Expedition between 1926 and 1928 and the resulting tensions between the Guomindang and the international powers, Germany remained non-partisan. The other foreign powers, especially Great Britain, tried to pressure Germany into taking their side, but the German diplomats wouldn’t have it. The activities of the Guomindang proved to be more anti-imperialist than anti-foreign and Germany had renounced imperialism with its Friendship Treaty with China, which is why Germans were hardly targeted during the unrests. Then again, Weimar Germany did not hurry to recognize the newly-established Guomindang government after its victorious conclusion of the Northern Campaign71. It continued its reserved position, always remembering that a revision of the Treaty of Versailles, primarily of those articles

68 Burden, Allen C. (1972), p. 100. 69 The signatory powers included the United States, China, Great Britain, France, Japan, , Italy, Portugal and the Netherlands at the time of the original signing. 70 One of the other few positive outcomes of the Washington Conference for China was the fact that Japan had been forced to relinquish the occupation of the former German colony of Jiaozhou. 71 Bloch, Kurt (1940) German Interests and Policies in the Far East, New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, International Secretariat, p. 12.

37 which impaired her economic recovery and curtailed her sovereign rights, was her ultimate goal. This required cordial relations with all foreign nations, especially with Treaty powers like Great Britain. Despite all good intentions, Sino-German relations were anything but easy to create and maintain. The fragmented nature of Chinese politics in the 1920s gave rise to a pattern of multi-tiered and multiple-choice foreign relations72. On the one hand, all foreign governments represented in China, including Germany, had to conduct relations directly with the progressively deteriorating Beijing government, as well as with the various warlords on less official levels. On the other hand, all different Chinese factions, from the official government down to the warlords, found it equally profitable to maintain contacts with foreign embassies and legations, military and naval officers, private businesspeople, the international press and missionaries. The instability of Chinese politics precluded any attempt by foreign governments to give unreserved support to one faction or party. Even ever-careful Germany found it difficult to evade the pitfalls of Warlord China’s political quagmire. Back home in Germany, the Weimar government had to come to terms with the fact that, despite all its efforts, it was weak within and without. In the face of a worsening economic downturn and struggling with political infighting, it did not have the complete support or the loyalty of all its citizens. The Germany of the post-World War I years was anything but a unified body. Many groups within the nation, no matter whether politically-oriented, military- or business-minded, tried to adhere to their own agendas, even on the international stage, regardless of the official policy of strict neutrality and non-interference pursued by the German government and its Auswärtiges Amt. As a result, the relations between Germany and China during the 1920s began to run on two different levels. On the governmental and diplomatic level, Sino-German relations were ‘cautious and correct’73. At the unofficial level, however, non-conformists in both countries, finding ‘common purpose in opposition to the West’74, following some other ideology or simply letting their business interests take over, created their own, much closer and more concrete, Sino-German relations. Over the years, these non- conformists, which in China included, besides various warlord factions, even the Guomindang in Canton, outflanked the official German agencies. From then on, the German China policy was increasingly devised outside the Auswärtiges Amt and its dictum, the absolute non-interference into China’s domestic and foreign affairs, became increasingly problematic to carry out. Illegal German arms trade with China and the frowned-upon employment of German military advisers by the one or the other parties in the Middle Kingdom flourished and revealed how extraordinarily difficult, almost impossible it was to retain even a certain degree of neutrality. Presumed neutrality always turned out to be disadvantageous, either to one of the opposing factions in China, to the other foreign nations or even to some German citizens, and was consequently undermined at every possible opportunity. Whatever path Germany chose, she was opposed by somebody. She was applauded when she fell in line and was vilified when her actions endangered the interests of

72 Wou, Odoric Y.K. (1978) Militarism in Modern China; The Career of Wu P’ei-Fu, 1916 – 39, Canberra: Australian National University Press, p. 148. 73 Burden, Allen C. (1972), p. 2. 74 Ibid, p. 3.

38 one or the other faction. Whatever she did, somebody would find a fault in it. Germany ran into danger of becoming a pawn for everybody, even for some of its own citizens, and there was nothing she could do about it.

3.2 Military Relations 3.2.1 Early Sino-German Military Relations Even before the violent civil struggles of the 1920s necessitated the various warring Chinese factions to look for help from abroad to make their armed forces more effective and to make a victory of their cause more likely, the Chinese already had a long tradition of hiring foreigners as advisers to modernize their country in the various fields they felt they had deficiencies. Particularly after facing the seemingly unstoppable armies of imperial powers like Great Britain and France during disastrous conflicts like the War of 1839 or the Arrow War of 1856, the Chinese were convinced that they urgently needed help from abroad to make up for all the time lost during the cultural stagnation and the technological standstill fostered by the Qing dynasty up until the mid-nineteenth century. Suddenly everything militaristic imaginable, ranging from the lowliest tactical advice to the most sophisticated technological know-how, was in dire demand to make China once again a force to be reckoned with on the battlefield. During the late nineteenth century, countless Chinese commissions traveled abroad to seek members of foreign armed forces willing to enter the services of the Middle Kingdom as advisers. German, particularly Prussian officers, were in high demand as military advisers for the Imperial Chinese armies and for the forces of the various subordinated viceroys. Since the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 these professional soldiers had established an excellent reputation in the entire world. In East Asia, too, the martial prowess of the newly-unified Germany made it the preferred source for military expertise. There was also another reason why Germany seemed to be the right choice for military relations with the Middle Kingdom. At least at that point in history, Germany, unlike several other European nations, had not yet faced China as an enemy and for the Chinese this was unlikely to change in the future. Also, alliances with far-away nations had since ancient times been among the guidelines for Chinese rulers. Already Zhang Yi, the head strategist of Qin Shi Huangdi, the first , had advised his lord, ‘yuan jiao, jin gong’, meaning ‘ally yourself with those in the distance to fight against those close by’75. During a journey to Germany in 1896, Hongzhang, the great general and official of the late Qing dynasty, witnessed the during its annual manoeuvres

75 Machetzki, Rüdiger (1982) Das Chinabild der Deutschen, in: Machetzki, Rüdiger (Ed.) (1982) Deutsch-chinesische Beziehungen; Ein Handbuch, Hamburg: Institut für Asienkunde, p. 4.

39 and decided to recreate the Imperial Chinese army after the German example and with potential German support in the form of a dedicated military mission and the necessary arms sales76. This project, however, was no longer pursued after the German image at the Imperial Chinese court had severely suffered after Germany’s unexpected occupation of Jiaozhou in 1898 and its participation in the brutal suppression of the Boxer Rebellion in 1900 and 1901. The lower-ranking provincial viceroys and governors were far less sensitive towards Germany’s imperialist ambitions. Since throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth century various Chinese regiments were already receiving training from foreign advisers hired in Great Britain, France, Russia or Japan, the viceroys were not unwilling to ask for German military support. Imperial Germany was equally disinclined to refuse these requests. As a consequence, several German officers found employment in the Far East. Among them was a young Captain , who entered the service of Viceroy Wuzhang as a military instructor during the 1890s77 and who later, during World War I, became head of the , the German army’s supreme command. In 1894, on an even larger scale, the acting governor general of Nanjing, , invited a German military mission of twelve officers and twenty-four warrant officers to turn his local troops into a modern army78. Besides military training Zhang Zhidong’s forces also received their weapons from Germany. With ups and downs these Sino-German military relations continued well into the early twentieth century, even after the fall of the Qing dynasty and the establishment of the Chinese Republic. President Sun Yatsen, too, hired a German officer, Lieutenant Colonel Dinkelmann, between 1911 and 1914 to advise the Guomindang Party on various military issues79. Only the outbreak of World War I brought a halt to these first Sino-German military relations.

3.2.2 The Sino-German Military Alliance that never was The early 1920s saw Sun Yatsen powerless and unable to regain control over the Chinese Republic he had created. Remaining the nominal president of the

76 Hwang, Shen-chang (1982) Das Deutschlandbild der Chinesen, in: Machetzki, Rüdiger (Ed.) (1982) Deutsch-chinesische Beziehungen; Ein Handbuch, Hamburg: Institut für Asienkunde, p. 16. 77 Vogt, Adolf (1974) Oberst Max Bauer; Generalstabsoffizier im Zwielicht; 1869 – 1929, Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, p. 419. 78 Bonavia, David (1995) China’s Warlords, Hongkong (et al.): Oxford University Press, pp. 30 f. 79 Vogt, Adolf (1974), p. 419.

40 Guomindang, albeit in exile, he travelled between Canton and Shanghai and continued to work toward the unification of China. From 1921 onward, Sun Yatsen finally tried to obtain support for his cause from various foreign nations. Great Britain, France, the United States, Canada, Japan and Hongkong were appealed to in one way or another80, however, with minimal success. Unable to remain discriminating, Sun Yatsen would have accepted any help he could get to further the Guomindang’s struggle, even from conflicting ideologies or from nations which had revealed themselves as unreliable and unscrupulous in the face of the Treaty of Versailles negotiations. Still, without true help forthcoming from any of these nations, Sun Yatsen had to turn to other possible allies. Perhaps remembering the previous services provided by Germans like Lieutenant Colonel Dinkelmann and once again realising that Weimar Germany and China were both, in their own way, losers of World War I and disadvantaged nations, Sun Yatsen thought that they could become suitable allies. He began to get in contact with various leading figures in Germany. Sun Yatsen had already long been known as a Germanophile81. He was quite convinced that the Germans were perfectly able to imagine themselves into the Chinese psyche and had no doubt that a close cooperation between the two nations would immediately be forthcoming. Germany’s increasingly unfortunate diplomatic relations with the Beijing government could also be beneficial for Sun Yatsen’s plans. Following political inertia and natural preference, all foreign powers, Germany included, continued to deal with the Beijing government, or rather with whatever warlord group held the titles to office in Beijing at the time, because this required no unsettling break in the succession. Yet, despite the much-lauded Friendship Treaty and a steady increase in trade with Germany, despite a continuation of imperialist policies by the other foreign nations, the Bejing government remained firmly in the Allied camp. Weimar Germany was considered weak and, as a consequence, ineffectual for China to revise the Unequal Treaties. As a consequence, the official relations with the Beijing government were oftentimes unexpectedly unfriendly82. In the eyes of the Beijing politicians, in spite of Chinese effusions about friendship won through equality, ‘Germany was a second-class, war-defeated country with little influence’83. The fact that the legality of the Beijing government – and, by extension, its treatment of Germany – was rejected by the Guomindang in Canton84 could therefore be an additional boon for Sun Yatsen.

80 MacNair, Harley F. (1931) China in Revolution; An Analysis of Politics and Militarism under the Republic, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, p. 70. 81 Näth, Marie-Luise (1976) Chinas Weg in die Weltpolitik; Die nationalen und außenpolitischen Konzeptionen Sun Yat-sens, Chiang Kai-sheks und Mao Tse-tungs [Beiträge zur auswärtigen und internationalen Politik (Volume 7)], Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, p. 139. 82 Fabritzek, Uwe G. (1973) Gelber Drache, Schwarzer Adler, München/Gütersloh: C. Bertelsmann Verlag, p. 102. 83 Causey, Beverley D. (1942) German Policy towards China, 1918 – 1941, Cambridge: Harvard University, p. 97. 84 Burden, Allen C. (1972) German Policy toward China and the Chinese Revolution, 1919 – 1931, with Special Reference to the Beginnings of Sino-German Military Cooperation, Edmonton: University of Alberta, p. 57.

41 In 1921, Sun Yatsen started his negotiations with Weimar Germany. These negotiations were made easier by the re-opening of German diplomatic missions all over China and so he could directly contact the German vice consul in Canton. During talks with Vice Consul Wilhelm Wagner on 25 September 1921, Sun Yatsen declared that he hoped to obtain Germany’s official recognition of his Canton government, to receive far-reaching German support in all areas of administration and economy and that he counted on Germany’s intelligence and proven organisational abilities. German technical and organisatorial competence was highly regarded in in the whole of China and its capabilities had not lost their prestige despite the defeat in a war virtually against the entire world. As an almost inconceivable incentive for Germany, Sun Yatsen was prepared to hand over China’s finances and administration, as well as all her economic and military affairs to the Germans85. He even went so far as to offer China – symbolically, of course – to Germany as a substitute for all its colonies lost after World War I. ‘Come, help me, organize as you would organize a piece of your own country!’86 These utopian and naive suggestions, however, were simply too far-fetched for the German diplomat. Embarrassed by the great Chinese leader, who suddenly looked almost ridiculous, Vice Consul Wagner rejected the offer. Disappointed by a lack of positive responses from German diplomats in China, Sun Yatsen decided to send emissaries directly to Berlin. In October 1921, General Zhu Hezhong travelled to Germany to probe for possibilities of a political, economic and military cooperation between Germany and the Guomindang in Canton and also to aim for the first time for a vaguely contrived union between China, Weimar Germany and the Soviet Union87. The German government, probably warned by its diplomats in China and clinging to its Auswärtiges Amt’s principle of non- interference in Chinese affairs, did not receive him. Neither did the German military. Zhu Hezhong, however, was able to meet with several representatives of the German industry, including Hugo Stinnes, who were prepared to support China’s industrial expansion financially. With their support, Zhu Hezhong tried to recruit German experts to help the Guomindang Republic in southern China to modernize almost everything, from its infrastructure and administration to its schooling system. He returned to China in the spring of 1922. A small number of German technical advisers accompanied him, but none of the military experts he and Sun Yatsen had hoped for. In his memorandum, The International Development of China88, published in 1922, Sun Yatsen drew up his plans for the modernization of China, mainly through the development of a national infrastructure and a domestic industry with multilateral foreign help. The disappointing results of the Washington Conference, however, put an end to these plans. Undeterred by his previous experiences, Germany alone, not the unsympathetic Western powers, became Sun Yatsen’s preferred partner for the rebirth of the Middle Kingdom. When a visit to Canton by Admiral von Hintze, the former

85 ADAP, Serie A, Band V, Document 143. Vice Consul Wilhelm Wagner to Auswärtiges Amt, Canton, 26 September 1921. 86 Ibid. 87 Nieh, Yu-Hsi (1982) Zwischen den Kriegen – Ein Neubeginn, in: Machetzki, Rüdiger (Ed.) (1982) Deutsch-chinesische Beziehungen; Ein Handbuch, Hamburg: Institut für Asienkunde, p. 116. 88 Bergère, Marie-Claire (1998) Sun Yat-sen, Stanford: Stanford University Press, pp. 281 ff.

42 German Minister to China, was becoming a possibility, Sun Yatsen decided to start concrete work on his ‘fantastic and dangerous’89 plans about a triple alliance among the Guomindang Republic, Weimar Germany and the Soviet Union. The timing seemed impeccable. The Treaty of Rapallo, reestablishing diplomatic and economic relations between Germany and the Soviet Union, had been signed on 17 April 1922. Like Germany, the Soviet Union had found herself excluded from the new world order created by the Anglo-Americans since the end of the war. Neither nation had been invited to attended the Washington Conference of late 1921 nor was bound to any of its agreements. Furthermore, the idea of a Sino-Soviet-German union was known to be shared by nationalist circles in Germany, not the least by several leading figures within the German military. So far, however, the incorporation of the Soviet Union in an alliance with China was not influenced by ideological connotations, but rather had geo-strategic reasons. Essential supplies from Germany could be delivered via the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union itself could put military pressure on the Beijing government in China’s north. Throughout the year, an alliance with Germany never left Sun Yatsen’s mind. In a letter to his confidant Deng Yanda, he outlined his future plans. ‘With the help of German knowledge and German competence, we should aim at making China rich and powerful in short time.’90 As soon as this goal was reached, ‘China would be prepared, with all his might, to free Germany from the shackles of the Treaty of Versailles’91. A strong southern Chinese army, he thought, modernized and equipped by Germany, could liberate the Germans by putting pressure on the Allied powers in the Far East92. To pay for Germany’s economic support, which was difficult since the Canton government lacked the necessary funds, Sun Yatsen hoped to deliver important raw materials to Germany and basically outlined the fundamentals of the much later HAPRO Treaty already at that early date. Sun Yatsen was still confident that the German government would recognise the merit of his suggestions. ‘If the

89 Liang, Hsi-Huey (1978) The Sino-German Connection; Alexander von Falkenhausen between China and Germany 1900 – 1941, Assen/Amsterdam: Van Gorcum, p. 45. A similar plan may well have been in the mind of Colonel Max Bauer who in the mid-1920s, even before deciding to become a military adviser in China, advocated good relations with the Soviet Union and military support for China. See Liang, Hsi-Huey (1978), pp. 45 f. 90 Hwang, Shen-chang (1982), p. 19. 91 Ibid. 92 Martin, Bernd (1986) Das Deutsche Reich und Guomindang-China, 1927 – 1941, in: Kuo, Heng-yü (Ed.) (1986) Von der Kolonialpolitik zur Kooperation; Studien zur Geschichte der deutsch- chinesischen Beziehungen, München: Minerva Publikation, p. 331.

43 German government looks up to China as its dawn of hope, then, in turn, China will see Germany as its one and only guiding star.’93 Once again, this idea was rejected by German political authorities. Even if they had been prepared to break their neutrality and to flout the Treaty of Versailles, Canton’s situation, just like China’s in general, was too insecure for high-flying plans like these. Also in 1922, Deng Jiayan, another one of Sun Yatsen’s emissaries sent to Germany, approached representatives of the German industry. He not only worked to foster an economic collaboration between the two nations. His activities primarily focused on a possible military cooperation94, especially on the establishment of arms industry and military contacts, on the employment of military advisers and the acquisition of ammunition and blueprints to be able to manufacture airplanes in Canton. He could, however, hardly hope for help of any kind coming from Germany, which had been forced to bow to Allied pressure during the occupation of the Ruhr industrial area and which vehemently insisted on obeying the Treaty of Versailles95. The final refusal of possible cooperation came when, in September 1922, Sun Yatsen’s secret plans were uncovered by the Hongkong Telegraph, which carried the headline ‘Plan for Triple Bolshevik Alliance’96. The German government completely denied any contacts with Canton and remained true to its treaty with the nominal Chinese government in Beijing. Still desperately seeking an alliance with a foreign power, Sun Yatsen had to face the fact that, given the political realities both in Weimar Germany and China, the German government was resolute in keeping a safe distance to Canton’s rather over-enthusiastic proposals. In principle, the Auswärtiges Amt was, so it assured the Guomindang, open to the possibilities of a reasonable economic cooperation with quasi-autonomous southern Chinese region, but only so long as military questions were excluded. For Sun Yatsen, however, these issues were inseparable97. Once again disappointed by the West, the Guomindang’s leader had to turn for help where it was offered, to revolutionary Russia. Not unlike post-war Germany, the young Soviet Union had announced the waiving of all Czarist Russian treaties in 1919, causing a similar impression on the Chinese people as the Weimar government’s renunciation of Imperial Germany’s concessions. Similarly,

93 Nieh, Yu-Hsi (1982), p. 117. 94 Drechsler, Karl (1989) Die Chinapolitik der Weimarer Republik und Hitlerdeutschlands 1920 bis 1939 – Grundlinien und Zäsuren, in: [Anon.] (Ed.) (1989) Bulletin Faschismus/Zweiter Weltkrieg; Sonderheft 1989, Berlin: Zentralinstitut für Geschichte, p. 13. 95 Ratenhof, Udo (1987) Die Chinapolitik des Deutschen Reiches 1871 bis 1945; Wirtschaft – Rüstung – Militär, Boppard am Rhein: Harald Boldt Verlag, p. 317. 96 Bergère, Marie-Claire (1998), p. 301. 97 Kirby, William C. (1994) Intercultural Contacts and International Relations: China’s Relations with Germany, the Soviet Union and the United States, 1927 – 1944, in: Kuo, Heng-yü & Leutner, Mechthild (Eds.) (1994) Deutschland und China; Beiträge des Zweiten Symposiums zur Geschichte der deutsch-chinesischen Beziehungen Berlin 1991, München: Minerva Publikation, p. 34.

44 Soviet Russia was looking for international recognition and possible allies abroad, while, more clandestinely, seeking to create bases neccessary for the ultimate advance of her Bolshevist world revolution. Subsequently, believing that China was not yet ripe for due to its lack of an urban workers’ class, the Soviet government proposed to aid the Guomindang to achieve national unity and intended, at the same time, to create a political climate favourable for Communism. It was quite obvious that Sun Yatsen had distanced himself ideologically from the Soviet Union throughout the early 1920s. In none of his publications of that time could any sympathies for the Bolsheviks’ cause be found98. Only in 1923, when no other international support had been found, did Sun Yatsen accept the Russian offers for the urgently needed economic and military help and initiated the approach between southern China and the Soviet Union. Yet, for him a cooperation with the Soviet Union – and potentially with the Chinese Communists – remained a tactic which was dictated by dire circumstances. At the moment, nobody else was willing or able to support his cause. Some other, more compatible, powerful and useful ally might eventually appear, but for now the Bolshevists had to do. The final unification of China under the banner of the Guomindang justified any path taken to achieve it. ‘As for moral integrity, that was measured by personal honesty and loyalty to the essential objectives – democracy, modernisation, justice, and social harmony – with which Sun [Yatsen] never ceased to identify and be identified by his fellow citizens.’99 All his professed pro-German feelings aside, ultimately Weimar Germany too would have been a mere tool to reach these goals. A Sino-Soviet agreement was signed by Sun Yatsen and Adolf Joffe in Shanghai on 26 January 1923. It finally brought the Guomindang the kind of support Germany – and any other Western nation for that matter – was unable or unwilling to offer. Still, the steadily growing economic and military cooperation between Canton and the Communist International or Comintern did not spell the end of Sino-German relations. Sun Yatsen not only continued to pursue the possibility of a triple alliance, but had also not yet given up his plans to make use of the German technological know-how and industrial potential with which the Soviet Union simply could not compete. The idea of a military partnership with the German army, the Reichswehr, had not been forgotten either. In 1923, another special Guomindang envoy was sent to Berlin to make contact with leading figures of the German armed forces, including Erich von Falkenhayn, , Hans von Seeckt and Georg Wetzell, and ask them for material and personal support for the modernisation of the south Chinese armed forces. As compensation, the envoy once again offered the exchange of Chinese natural resources against German weapons and ammunition100. The Reichswehr, however, showed no interest and the Sino-German military cooperation Sun Yatsen had hoped for once again did not materialize. Only a number of German engineers, privately employed, arrived in Guangzhou in late 1923. During a meeting with German diplomats in Canton on 16 January 1924, Sun Yatsen made a final attempt to convince his preferred partners of the benefits of a far-reaching political, economic and military cooperation between Weimar Germany and his southern Chinese regime. He once again expressed his intention

98 Chen, Chi (1973) Die Beziehungen zwischen Deutschland und China bis 1933 [Mitteilungen des Instituts für Asienkunde Hamburg (Number 56)], Hamburg: Institut für Asienkunde, p. 79. 99 Bergère, Marie-Claire (1998), p. 290. 100 Chen, Chi (1973), p. 82.

45 to import weapons and ammunition directly from Germany, but again the German consul-general had to refuse his request, reminding Sun Yatsen of the statutes of the Treaty of Versailles which were quite unambiguous in relation to this topic. Sun Yatsen then proposed that the German armaments industry should be relocated to China. ‘You are disarmed, now you must arm China. That is most likely your only salvation.’101 The diplomat, however, patiently ignored this outburst of Sun Yatsen’s fantasy, especially when he continued to propose to organize and arm the Chinese masses within three years to attack France in Indochina and Great Britain in India to liberate Germany from the shackles of Versailles102. In a telegram to his superiors at the Auswärtiges Amt Consul-General Remy, Germany’s leading diplomat in Canton at the time, restated an essential reason for Weimar Germany’s negative attitude towards the Guomindang’s numerous friendly overtures. Despite being a great Chinese leader, Sun Yatsen seemed to be too naive and unworldy ‘about the prospect of solving a problem of world-historical importance’103 to be taken seriously. During the following years, the official contacts between Berlin and Canton were minimal. Weimar Germany never officially recognized Sun Yatsen as President of China and maintained formal Sino-German relations exclusively with the government in Beijing which represented the official Republic of China as a whole and not only the revolutionary Chinese south. Despite occasional diplomatic discord, relations with the Chinese north continued to be more important than Sun Yatsen’s vague, risky and sometimes downright immature pipe dreams. Political, economic and military leaders in Germany had to consider the position of the other foreign powers in China as well, not only in regard to a potential revision of the Treaty of Versailles. The fact that Sun Yatsen’s Guomindang, through its radical anti-foreignism, had incurred the hostility of Great Britain and the other colonial nations, made the Auswärtiges Amt cautious, although German nationals had not been targeted by any anti-Western violence. Bolshevist Russia’s strong political influence in the entire affair did also not help to create sympathies with the ‘revolutionary Asiatic Russo-Chinese-Mongol bloc which seemed to loom menacingly on the horizon’104. Weimar Germany did not want to make the same mistake and interfere in China’s internal affairs. Finally, due to domestic economic changes, the German industry’s interest in a cooperation with southern China was already waning at the time105. Until his death in 1925, Sun Yatsen was saddened by the fact that his proposals for a more intimate Sino-German friendship had been rebuffed by the official political and economic authorities in Weimar Germany. It was even more frustrating for him to see that numerous private parties in the same Germany did not even hesitate to break the relevant articles of the Treaty of Versailles, to provide military or military technological advice or to ship weapons and ammunition to the Middle

101 ADAP, Serie A, Band IX, Document 105. Consul-General Remy to Auswärtiges Amt, Canton, 19 January 1924. 102 Ibid. 103 Ibid. Other contemporary commentators were even less flattering about Sun Yatsen. They saw him as ‘China’s gravedigger’ who, having no real political knowledge along Western lines, made fatal mistakes wherever he could and was rather damaging to the Chinese Republic’s cause. See Kreitner, Gustav Ritter von (1932) Hinter China steht Moskau, Berlin: Verlag von E.S. Mittler & Sohn, p. 21. 104 Bloch, Kurt (1940) German Interests and Policies in the Far East, New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, International Secretariat, p. 12. 105 Drechsler, Karl (1989), p. 13. Karl Drechsler unconvincingly suggests that right-wing tendencies were common among German politicians and that Canton was too democratic for their taste.

46 Kingdom – however, only in rare cases to his rebel government in Canton and mostly to his enemies, the warlords in China’s north. These other factions could afford to pay their business partners in cash, not in ‘promises for the future’106 like the notoriously strapped-for-cash Guomindang. It was quite apparent that Canton could not expect support from official German sources for its cause but rather from private and less scrupulous parties within the country and had to take appropriate measures.

3.2.3 German Military Relations with China’s Warlords By the early 1920s, the Republican Chinese army had basically ceased to exist as a national defence force against foreign aggression. Within relatively short time, it had disintegrated and then degenerated to a tool for the enrichment and self-glorification of the various regional governors or its military commanders who themselves became known as ‘dujun’, ‘duban’ or simply as ‘warlords’. By Western standards Chinese armies were enormous in scale. In 1924, the army of Beijing’s Central Government alone consisted of some 1,404,000 men, including gendarmerie, and was organised into thirty-five divisions and twenty-seven mixed brigades107. Parallel to this official army existed an almost uncountable number of warlord units, ranging in size from mere robber bands to veritable armies of their own, similar to the Republic’s armed forces, which was not unusual since in many cases they had once been part of exactly the same outfit. Undoubtedly all Chinese armies of the 1920s shared certain common characteristics. Yet, it would be erroneous to assume that they were all alike. They came from different regions, had underwent different kinds of military training, were armed with different weapons and equipment and were shaped by the allegiances and agendas of their respective leaders. Some Chinese units were comparable to what was found in the European armed forces of the time. Others, however, were little better than rabble. In general, among foreign observers, Chinese soldiers were held in low esteem. While real wars were regarded as a purely Western monopoly, the countless conflicts between the different warlord factions were regarded almost as farces, conducted in a typical Oriental fashion – ‘haphazardly and at times almost somnambulantly’108. The soldiers involved in these wars were not seen as the genuine article. ‘Chinese fighters seemed unmartial to Westerners; they were rarely threatening, often absurd.’109 The stories about the ubiquitous umbrellas110 and other ‘eccentricities’

106 Kirby, William C. (1984) Germany and Republican China, Stanford: Stanford University Press, p. 36. 107 Waldron, Arthur (1995) From War to Nationalism; China’s Turning Point, 1924 – 1925, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 56. 108 Misselwitz, Henry F. (1928) The Chinese Soldier, His Equipment and Activities, in: China Weekly Review (Volume XLV, Number 6, July 1928), p. 191. 109 Waldron, Arthur (1995), p. 54.

47 of the Chinese soldiers were popular in the Western press. Just as the standard of Chinese military training was a frequent aim of foreign mockery, the criticism of their arms and equipment was equally caustic. Despite its size, the Republican Chinese army was estimated to possess perhaps only 1 million rifles, of which eighty percent were ‘antiquated, badly kept, or in poor condition’111. They had been acquired from various nations, like Russia, Japan and Italy. German types, primarily Mauser Gewehr 88 and Gewehr 98 rifles, were also in use. The number of machine guns in the whole of China was estimated at 1,394. Among them were, once again, various British, French, Russian, Japanese and German models. The Republican Chinese was armed, besides with French Hotchkiss and Schneider-Creusot guns and Japanese Arisaka guns, with 7.5-centimetre cannons112. Warlord armies hardly had different or better equipment. The warlords, however, were not only interested in buying large amounts of military equipment from abroad. In general, they wanted to become independent and manufacture their own war materials. Since their own technological knowledge was only minimal and the manufacturing facilities under their control were inadequate, they had to employ Western experts to oversee the creation of a local armaments industry. To rectify any deficiencies in the military training of their troops, the warlords also sought to hire military advisers from the ranks of the many foreign officers and soldiers made redundant after the end of World War I. There was no lack of job opportunities for German war veterans in the Middle Kingdom during the 1920s. Despite Germany’s ultimate defeat in 1918, officers and soldiers of the former Imperial German army still enjoyed an excellent reputation in the entire world and were consequently in high demand in China, as the numerous factions in the country maneuvered for power in the indeterminable intrigues of their civil wars. Certainly, facing dire circumstances, the more adventurous among these officers and soldiers thought about offering their military experience to China. In May 1919, the German army still had some 400,000 officers and men. According to Article 163 of the Treaty of Versailles, however, the size of this army had to be reduced to a mere 100,000 men in total, without tanks, heavy artillery, aircraft or a general staff and with only a tiny, almost negligible navy. As a result, 300,000 men were discharged from the armed forces or were forced to retire at a time when severe economic depression and mass unemployment had hit post-war Germany. Large numbers of professional officers were left without a job and without any opportunity to use the only training they had ever received. In addition, many lower-ranking soldiers had had all their education through the Great War and were essentially good for nothing but fighting. These men, too, were often unemployed and unemployable back in civilian life. Having heard about possible job opportunities in the Far East, many

110 Despite all derisions, these umbrellas, made of waxed paper, were actually quite useful since most Chinese soldiers had neither rainproof gear nor tents for the night. 111 Waldron, Arthur (1995), pp. 56 f. Still, ’s lists, transcribed from various China Year Books, are not entirely reliable since they contain several grave mistakes. The Mauser C 96 automatic pistol, for example, is called a ‘Lüger [sic] Parabellum’ by him, while other mentioned weapons, like the allegedly German ‘Pack’ machine gun cannot be identified at all. 112 Waldron, Arthur (1995), p. 57.

48 among their numbers contacted the Auswärtiges Amt and asked about the validity of these rumours since they had no chance to find adequate work in Germany. The German foreign office sympathised with their situation, but still vehemently advised against going to China. Article 179 of the Treaty of Versailles strictly prohibited German citizens to seek employ in the armed forces of foreign countries and the presence of private German military advisers in the Far East would cause unforeseeable foreign political embarrassment both there and in the rest of the world. As a consequence, only a few German officers and soldiers actually travelled to China. Many, despite their unveiled contempt for the diktat of the Treaty of Versailles, obeyed the articles it contained to the letter as a matter of honour. Others were delayed by the turbulent political conditions in Weimar Germany which sometimes called for military expertise in the large-scale street brawls between left- and right-wing extremists. Finally, the ongoing political and economic breakdown of the Middle Kingdom, which seldom could afford the services of professional foreign advisers, made them think twice about seeking employment there. The number of German military or military technological advisers eventually working in Chinese service is unknown but must have been rather limited. The extent of their actual activities – no matter whether they were with the Beijing government, with the warlords or with the Guomindang in China’s south – is just as little known. German diplomats assigned to China at the time often had to rely on hearsay about the isolated hirings of these individuals and could only send vague rumours back to the Auswärtiges Amt in Berlin. Since, however, the German legations in the Far East could hardly find anything worth reporting – except perhaps some wildly exaggerated gossip – the exploits of these German ex- military members must have been anything but outstanding and their influence can only have been minor. The Auswärtiges Amt in Berlin was not alone in taking measures to stop German citizens from entering the service of the various Chinese armed forces. In addition to his attempts to curb down the illegal Sino-German arms trade, Ambassador Adolf Boyé also did everything in his, albeit very limited, power to stop private German military advisers from coming to China. In particular, he thought about the impact the unchecked support of German citizens for one or the other party in the Chinese civil wars had on Weimar Germany’s standing in the international community. Remembering Germany’s already low international reputation due to the Great War, he commented that tolerating German military advisers in China would symbolize ‘for the entire world a flagrant violation of the peace treaty, even when we assure a hundred times that official authorities are not involved in the employment [of the advisers] in any way’113. Regarding the enquiries of former officers and soldiers about a possible employment as military advisers in China, Adolf Boyé sent a damning telegram to the Auswärtiges Amt. ‘When adventurous Germans want to be employed in China, […] so they will do this on their own account and at their own risk; they should, however, know, that they will do

113 ADAP, Serie B, Band VI, Document 99. Ambassador Boyé to Auswärtiges Amt, Beijing, 9 August 1927. It should be added that Adolf Boyé, in general, had a strong dislike towards any of the political parties in China at the time. In his eyes, all of them were led by so-called ‘half-Chinese’ who had picked up some education from foreign missionaries or during overseas studies and who now used every opportunity to amass power and riches for their own gains. As a result, every German attempt to support any of these parties was sure to backfire. This polemical view, however, was not shared by his colleagues. Still, it can be found in the writings of other foreign observers at the time. See Gilbert, Rodney (1926) What’s wrong with China, London: John Murray.

49 neither a service nor a favour for the German government and they will not be able to count on the financial or official support German citizens usually receive abroad.’114 However, the German military advisers in warlord China were not the only cause for concern in Germany’s diplomatic circles. The possibility of German arms technicians, similarly unemployed in a post-war economy which neither was permitted nor had a demand to develop war materials, offering their services to any paying employer caused an equally great scare. Officials at the Auswärtiges Amt were afraid that it was quite probable that one or the other Chinese civil war faction could even find willing scientists who were prepared to help in the manufacture of poison gas. The lure of possible payments offered was definitely strong enough115. The Chinese, in any case, no matter whether they were petty warlords or Guomindang military officials, were fascinated by the poison gases developed and used by the warring nations of World War I, particularly by Germany. They seemed to be completely ignorant of the fact that chemical weapons had been banned by an international agreement in 1925. Perhaps they simply didn’t care. The Beijing government had the least opportunity to hire private German military or military technological advisers. Being the officially recognised regime of the Chinese Republic and being exposed to constant international scrutiny, it had been hit hard by the Arms Embargo Agreement of 5 May 1919. Furthermore, it had signed the Friendship Treaty with Weimar Germany, in which the validity of the Treaty of Versailles had been reconfirmed – a fact which included, although not explicitly, the articles regarding the legality of German ex-military members in its service. Throughout the 1920s, as part of its international obligations and for reasons of self-preservation, the Central Government also worked frantically on trying to stop any foreign advisers from entering the service of opposing warlord factions. This, however, did not hinder its officials to employ a certain retired Captain König as an adviser in a ‘purely military capacity’116 during the early 1920s117. Even on request, the German diplomats in China were unable to find any relevant information about the elusive Captain König or his activities to send back to the Auswärtiges Amt, except the fact that he eventually died of cancer in June 1921. The various warlords were far less scrupulous about hiring foreigners to help them secure and expand the territories under their control. They were also rather unconcerned about the international condemnation these shady business agreements

114 Ibid. 115 ADAP, Serie A, Band IX, Document 105. Ambassador Boyé to Auswärtiges Amt, Beijing, 27 February 1924. Ambassador Boyé quotes from a memorandum sent to him by Consul-General Remy in Canton. 116 Burden, Allen C. (1972), p. 182. 117 PA, R 85697, Abteilung IV – Politische Abteilung, Po. 13 China, Militärangelegenheiten, Band 1. Reichswehr Department of Personnel to Ministry of Reichswehr, Berlin, 18 August 1920.

50 might cause for both employer or employee. In the end, only a potential victory in the fight for dominance in the Middle Kingdom mattered. Marshal Zhang Zuolin, the ‘Tiger of Manchuria’, a staunch anti-revolutionary and the sworn enemy of the Guomindang in Canton, was probably the most active warlord when it came to seeking the expertise of technical advisers from abroad. Manchuria, his main area of influence, was rich in iron ore, coal and agricultural products, perfect for establishing a local armaments industry, and wealthy enough to pay for foreign support, both material and intellectual. Zhang Zuolin frequently received arms deliveries from Japan, but also imported weapons from other nations, including planes from France118. His main ambition, however, was to foster his own arms manufacturing capabilities to become independent from the vagaries of the international weapons and ammunition market. Zhang Zuolin established numerous new arms factories in his territory and modernised already existing arsenals, especially the one at Mukden119. When he had initially taken over the Mukden arsenal, it had been in a ‘shocking state’120. By mid-1924, it was in business again and running as efficiently as never before, thanks to Frank ‘One-Arm’ Sutton, a British veteran of World War I who had lost an arm while fighting against the Turks at Gallipoli. He had previously, and unsuccessfully, offered his services to both Sun Yatsen and Wu Peifu and had finally found an employer in the Manchurian warlord who appointed him as his ‘Master General of Ordnance’. When ‘One-Arm’ Sutton had finished re-equipping the Mukden arsenal, it was producing machine guns and rifles, grenades and some 200,000 rounds of ammunition per day121. To expand the capabilities of his arsenals even further, Zhang Zuolin approached various Japanese, Danish, Austrian and German companies specialising in industrial equipment. One of the German corporations is known to have delivered machinery necessary for the production of field guns122. Eventually all of Zhang Zuolin’s manufacturing facilities contracted foreign technicians, among them many Germans, English, Americans, Swedes, Japanese and White Russians123. A number of German engineers, for example,

118 Elleman, Bruce A. (2001) Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795 – 1989, London/New York: Routledge, p. 164. 119 Today: . 120 Bonavia, David (1995), p. 74. 121 Ibid. 122 Waldron, Arthur (1995), pp. 62 f. 123 The numbers of foreigners in Zhang Zuolin’s employ vary from source to source. Antony Chan counts some 1,516 foreign technicians while Arthur Waldron offers the much smaller figure of ‘perhaps 100’. See Chan, Anthony B. (1982), Arming the Chinese; The Western Armaments Trade in

51 worked in one of the weapons factories which produced Chinese copies of the German Mauser rifles. According to vague foreign diplomatic sources of the time, by the mid-1920s, Zhang Zuolin also employed three German chemists, Meyer, Fuchs and Liedermann, to help with the installation of a chemical plant in Mukden and to produce poisonous gases, epecially chlorine, phosgene and mustard gas124, which had been used by the German army during World War I. Despite investigations of its own, the Auswärtiges Amt and its branch offices in China could neither determine the absolute numbers of German nationals in Zhang Zuolin’s employ nor their actual activities125. As a consequence, the veracity of the allegiations that German chemists manufactured chemical weapons for the Manchurian warlord remains in doubt, given the additional fact that the use of poison gas is never mentioned in the existing literature. Still, in the end the foreign advisers and the steady supply of war materials did not bring Zhang Zuolin victory. He ultimately submitted to Chiang Kaishek during the course of the Guomindang’s Northern Expedition of 1928 and was assassinated later in the same year. Another warlord not averse to fostering his own gains with the help of foreign know-how was Wu Peifu, the so-called ‘Jade Marshal’, a powerful warlord with his power base located in the east-central areas of Hubei and . As leader of the Zhili faction, he was the most respected of all Chinese warlords. He was as much a scholar and follower of Confucian principles as he was a gifted military commander. Since he was, at least ‘by Chinese standards’126, not corrupt, he had good relations with the foreign powers in China, especially with Great Britain and the United States who saw him ‘as a force for good and a potential protector of their interests’127. Wu Peifu, in turn, looked upon Great Britain and the United States as his allies128. To be victorious in his battles, he believed in retaining the traditional Chinese theories

Warlord China, 1920 – 1928, Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, p. 111, and Waldron, Arthur (1995), p. 62. 124 Chan, Anthony B. (1982), p. 46. Arthur Waldron, however, only mentions one unnamed German gas expert. See Waldron, Arthur (1995), p. 62. 125 PA, R 104863, Politische Abteilung VIII – China, Po 13, Militärangelegenheiten in China. Ambassador Boyé to Auswärtiges Amt, Beijing, 30 September 1925. To calm the concerns of the Auswärtiges Amt in Berlin, Ambassador Boyé declared that, according to inquiries of the consulate in Mukden, no German chemists were working for Zhang Zuolin. 126 Bonavia, David (1995), p. 85. 127 Ibid., pp. 90 f. 128 Wou, Odoric Y.K. (1978), p. 151.

52 taught by the great military theoretician Sun Zi129 while at the same time making use of Western military know-how and equipment. Although the British and American governents refused to officially supply Wu Peifu with war materials, they could not prevent private citizens of their respective nations from supporting Wu Peifu with the necessary weapons and knowledge. These individuals became his principal supply of foreign war materials, but he also bought weapons from Italian sources130 and communications equipment from ‘Siemen [sic] & Company’131 in Germany for his base in Wuzhang. Yet, not unlike his main adversary Zhang Zuolin, Wu Peifu was also intent on establishing his own armaments industry. Once he had taken control of the nominally Republican Chinese arsenals in Hanyang, Dezhou and Gongxian, he looked for help from abroad to upgrade them to modern standards. Technical equipment was bought, for example, from Niles, Bement and Dord of New York and delivered via the German trading houses Arnhold Karburg & Co. and Carlowitz & Co. in Shanghai132. To train and supervise his Chinese workers in the various arsenals, Wu Peifu engaged numerous foreign experts. One of them was a retired German officer, Major René Dammron133, who worked as a technical adviser at the Hanyang arsenal in 1920. His actual duties there remain unclear, however, since the Hanyang arsenal manufactured, among other things, copies of the German Mauser rifles, he might have had something to do with their production. Major Dammron’s stint with Wu Peifu was short. When representatives of the Chengdu arsenal offered him more money, he quit immediately and moved to in 1921 where his tracks were lost. In 1923, another Geman, an engineer named Modde, was employed in an unknown function at the smaller Xiaoyi arsenal which produced ammunition for the warlord134. Yet, even the improved arms manufacturing capabilities didn’t guarantee Wu Peifu’s military success. He, too, was defeated by Chiang Kaishek’s forces during the Northern Expedition and fell into insignificance after 1926. Making use of foreign support on a much smaller scale was , the tenacious warlord of . Also known as the ‘Model Governor’, he rarely went on campaign but focussed primarily on turning his home province into a showcase

129 Sun Zi was a famous military theoretician, strategist and writer who lived during China’s Spring and Autumn period (772 to 476 B.C.). 130 Ibid., p. 177. 131 Ibid., p. 67. 132 Waldron, Arthur (1995), p. 67. 133 PA, R 85697, Abteilung IV – Politische Abteilung, Po. 13 China, Militärangelegenheiten, Band 1. Carlowitz & Co. to Auswärtiges Amt, Hamburg, 27 August 1920. 134 PA, R 85697, Abteilung IV – Politische Abteilung, Po. 13 China, Militärangelegenheiten, Band 1. Vice Consul Scheffler to Auswärtiges Amt, Hankou, 5 May 1923.

53 for exemplary local administration and modern infrastructure. Still, like the other warlords, he was dependent on the influx of foreign war materials to secure his territory and was also known to hire engineers from several nations for their technical knowledge. In February 1924, London’s Daily Telegraph printed an indignant article which stated that Yan Xishan had employed several German military and scientific experts in his arsenal in Taiyuan to produce poison gas for his allegedly ongoing military campaigns135. It was indeed true that German technicians were working at the Taiyuan arsenal at the time, since Yan Xishan had on occasion acquired machinery from Germany, but no chemical weapons were ever manufactured at the arsenal136. Yan Xishan later joined the Guomindang on its Northern Campaign and helped in the reunification of China, but caused a lot of dissent after 1928 when he refused to accept Chiang Kaishek’s claims to be the sole ruler in Nanjing.

3.2.4 German Military Relations with the Guomindang Throughout the 1920s, the Guomindang in Canton hardly differed from the various warlord factions in the other parts of China. Not even the prestige of its leader Sun Yatsen, Republican China’s former president, could improve the negative image it had among the majority of foreign nations, especially after the Guomindang’s regular anti-foreign excesses. However, unlike the continually struggling warlords in the north, the Guomindang could count on open, dependable and, most of all, extremely generous support from abroad. A Sino-Soviet treaty signed in January 1923 had finally brought the Canton regime the kind of support no other nation had been willing to offer. As a direct result of this aggreement, between June 1923 and August 1927, over a 1,000 Soviet advisers, led by Mikhail M. Borodin and Marshal Vasili K. Blyuker137, provided essential political and economic support and helped the Guomindang to reorganise and train its National Revolutionary Army. The Soviet military mission soon became an integral part of Canton’s armed forces. Highly gifted as both a soldier and a diplomat, Marshal Blyuker became Sun Yatsen’s chief military consultant and eventually assumed the operational leadership of nearly all units, sometimes issuing directives to the Chinese field commanders138. During the mid-1920s, he was instrumental in developing the strategies of the campaigns to ultimately defeat the warlords and reunify China, including the Northern Campaign which accomplished the conquest of Beijing. Closely involved in the entire process was General Chiang Kaishek, ailing Sun Yatsen’s confidant and the rising star of the Guomindang. He became the president of the Whampoa139 Military Academy, China’s first professional military school, which had been established in 1924. Right from the start, the Sino-Soviet military cooperation seemed to be extraordinarily effective, so much so that, even years later, ‘[no] other foreign organization can be credited with as much influence in the rise of the Nationalist

135 PA, R 104863, Politische Abteilung VIII – China, Po 13, Militärangelegenheiten in China. Memorandum of the W.T.B., no place, 20 February 1924. 136 Gillin, Donald G. (1967) Warlord; Yen Hsi-shan in Shansi Province; 1911 – 1949, Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 28. 137 Marshal Blyuker was also known under his nom de guerre, Galen. 138 Ch’i, Hsi-Sheng (1976) Warlord Politics in China 1916 – 1928, Stanford: Stanford University Press, p. 199. 139 Cantonese transcription. In Pinyin: Huangbu.

54 Army in China as [the Russian] military mission’140. Yet, despite their unwavering support for the Gomindang’s cause, the Soviet advisers in Canton had a double function. Virtually omnipresent in all army units, they not only offered military counsel, but also provided subtle ideological indoctrination to create a Chinese branch of the international military cadre which would ultimately spread the Boshevist world revolution all over the world141. Although Sun Yatsen’s attempts to secure Weimar Germany’s support for the Guomindang had repeatedly been rebuked by the government in Berlin and the Auswärtiges Amt, he stubbornly refused to give up and finally found German help from more private and less conspicuous sources. In the early 1920s, an emissary sent to Berlin to establish relations with leading figures in Germany’s political, economic and military circles was able to secure several smaller, strictly non- military trade agreements. Additionally, through the recommendations of one of the signatories, the industrialist Hugo Stinnes from Hamburg, a number of Germans were privately hired as civilian advisers of the Canton government142. Among them were Wilhelm Schrameier, an adviser for possible land reforms, Professor Schwinning, whose task became the reorganisation of the Chinese school system, and Mister Hildebrandt, who had previously been the head of a governmental planning department and who was to work on the modernisation of China’s railway system143. They arrived in Canton with the approval of Germany’s diplomatic representatives, but at that time most of the positions of influence had already been filled with Soviet advisers and their actual impact was small. Far less support from the Auswärtiges Amt existed for the employment of a German scientist, Doctor Ansel, who allegedly focussed his research efforts at the Canton arsenal on the development of and on protection against poison gas144. Two other German chemists, Doctor Buhs and Mister Schoepe, also worked at the Canton arsenal. However, these gentlemen contacted the German consul in Canton and assured him explicitely that they would not produce poison gas but only help in the manufacture of explosives145. Only Gustav Amann, an engineer working for the Siemens Corporation in China, reached a position of some influence in Canton. He became a sometime confidant of Sun Yatsen and saw himself as a kind of agent to secure European support for China’s reconstruction146. There were rumours that Gustav Amann hired a number of German military pilots for service in Canton147. Many former German army officers had previously declined Canton’s offers for employment as military advisers, not only

140 Liu, Frederick Fu (1956) A Military History of Modern China 1924 – 1949, Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 6. 141 Ibid., pp. 3 f. 142 Chen, Chi (1973), p. 82. 143 ADAP, Serie A, Band VI, Document 103. Memorandum of Counsellor Bethcke, Berlin, 18 May 1922. 144 Wang, Zheng-hua (1987) Kang Zhan Shiqi Waiguo dui Hua Junshi Yuanzhu, Taipei: Huan Qiu Shuju, p. 46. 145 PA, R 85697, Abteilung IV – Politische Abteilung, Po. 13 China, Militärangelegenheiten, Band 1. German Consulate Canton to German Embassy Beijing, Canton, 6 October 1924. 146 Causey, Beverley D. (1942), p. 98. 147 Burden, Allen C. (1972), p. 186. Allen Burden quotes from Ambassador Boyé’s telegram to the Auswärtiges Amt, received on 10 May 1924.

55 because the German government was strictly opposed to this prospect, but also because, in their eyes, the entire political situation in south China was too instable to do any good. For reasons unknown, however, several German officers now accepted the Guomindang’s overtures. In a telegram to the Auswärtiges Amt, Ambassador Boyé reported that Sun Yatsen had engaged several retired German Air Force officers on a private basis148. Among them were Captain Richard Walter, who was later to become the head of Lufthansa and Eurasia, Captain Werner Charlottenburg, a former bomber pilot, Lieutenant Robert Ritter von Greim, who had received the Pour le Merite for his accomplishments during World War I149, Robert Heibert and Mister Schnäbele. They arrived in Canton in 1924 and immediately went to work as lecturers at the Whampoa Military Academy150 and as flying instructors151. In addition, Robert Ritter von Greim became the chief training officer at Canton’s small military flying school and assisted in the organisation of the budding Chinese Air Force, while Richard Walter primarily worked on the establishment of civilian air traffic in the Middle Kingdom. More secretly, however, Richard Walter proposed that the Canton government should acquire civilian planes and convert them into military aircraft to circumvent the restrictions of the international arms embargo which was still in power at the time152. Still, the roles of these German aerial advisers do not seem to have been crucial ones. In comparison to those of the members of the Soviet military mission, they were almost negligible. Schnäbele almost immediately returned to Germany and the others sooner or later found out that they could achieve frustratingly little with the limited resources available in Canton. The last privately-hired German aviation advisers were officially dismissed in 1927. Meanwhile, the expansion of the Guomindang’s power base continued unabated, first against the local southern warlords, then on a much grander national scale, finally

148 Seps, Jerry B. (1972), p. 26. Jerry Seps quotes from Ambassador Boyé’s telegram to the Auswärtiges Amt, received on 10 May 1924. 149 Mombeek, Eric (et al.) (1999) Birth of the Fighter Force [Jagdwaffe (Volume 1, Section 1)], Crowborough: Classic Publications, p. 30, and Pletschacher, Peter (1992) Die Königlich Bayeri- schen Fliegertruppen 1912 – 1919, Planegg: Aviatic Verlag, p. 97. Robert Ritter von Greim, the commander of the Bavarian Jagdstaffel 34 and of Jagdgruppe 10, worked in several leading positions in the German aviation industry after World War I. He re-entered the service of the German Air Force after his return from Canton, became the head of the Air Force’s personnel department and participated in World War II. He commited suicide in 1945 before he could be taken prisoner by the Allies. 150 Seps, Jerry B. (1972), p. 26. Jerry Seps quotes from Ambassador Boyé’s telegram to the Auswärtiges Amt, received on 10 May 1924. 151 Andersson, Lennart (2002) Chinese Aviation until 1949, [Unpublished].

56 culminating in the Northern Expedition of 1926. The ultimate success of the Northern Expedition was for a large part based on Soviet support though previous training, continuous weapons and ammunition deliveries and, albeit to a smaller degree, military advisers in the field. At the same time, however, Chiang Kaishek, the leader of the Guomindang after Sun Yatsen’s death in 1925, grew increasingly suspicious of subversive Communist activities and purged the Nationalist ranks of all leftists in a swift and brutal operation. Despite the fact that it provided invaluable support, the Soviet military mission also began to displease Chiang Kaishek. Its political commissars had now infiltrated rank and file of the Nationalist Army and focussed far more on political indoctrination than they did on the actual military training153. For Chiang Kaisek, this was no longer altruistic aid for the Nationalists’ cause, but a clear attempt to gain domination in the Middle Kingdom, even if it differed from the usual working methods of imperialist nations. Having outstayed their initially warm welcome, Mikhail M. Borodin, Vasili K. Blyuker and all other Soviet military advisers had to leave China in August 1927. Yet, the reorganisation and modernisation of the Nationalist Army had not been completed, not by a long shot. The same forces, which had just conquered most of China during the Northern Campaign, were still just a ‘motley bunch of provincial and green recruits’154, far removed from the elite troops Chiang Kaishek had envisioned. They were still too little trained by Western standards, underequipped and, due to the assimilation of the forces of the subjugated northern warlords, rather heterogeneous and almost impossible to coordinate155. Chiang Kaishek still needed the help of foreigners to turn China into a military power to be reckoned with, preferably from a nation which had no ulterior motives behind the support for his cause. With nationalistic feelings running at their highest in China at the time, it was out of the question for him to employ military advisers from one of the imperialist nations still encroaching Chinese territory. It was therefore hardly surprising that Chiang Kaishek, just like his predecessor Sun Yatsen only a couple of years earlier, decided to turn to German military experts to fill in the vacant positions left behind by the expelled Russians. Only short time after Chiang Kaishek had dismissed all Soviet advisers in 1927 and had relocated the Whampoa Military Academy from Canton Nanjing, General Li Nai156 was the first to suggest that the Nationalist Government should hire German

152 ADAP, Serie A, Band XIII, Document 92. Vice Consul Behrend to Auswärtiges Amt, Canton, 5 June 1925, and ADAP, Serie A, Band XIII, Document 162. Ambassador Boyé to Auswärtiges Amt, Beijing, 25 June 1925. 153 Liu, Frederick Fu (1956), p. 21. 154 Abegg, Lily (1940) Chinas Erneuerung; Der Raum als Waffe, Frankfurt am Main: Societäts-Verlag, p. 143. 155 Liu, Frederick Fu (1956), p. 61. 156 General Li Nai had undergone parts of his military training in Germany before World War I. See Nieh, Yu-Hsi (1982), p. 117.

57 officers as instructors for its armed forces. For this reason, Chiang Kaishek sent a commision to Germany in the same year. Only too aware of past rejections, the commission did not even bother to contact the German government, not even the Ministry of the Reichswehr, but directly approached General Erich Ludendorff, the retired great strategist of World War I. General Ludendorff, a known , was not prepared to go to China himself, but recommended another able officer for the task, the former Colonel Max Bauer.

3.2.5 German and International Reactions For the German government, there was never any question about the issue of German military advisers in Chinese service, no matter which faction wanted to hire them. Article 179 of the Treaty of Versailles unequivocally banned the activities of German citizens as military advisers in any foreign country and Berlin, wary of any foreign political entanglements, insisted on following it to the letter. The majority of Germans concurred, primarily because they were preoccupied with concerns of a different nature in an economically strained post-war environment. Of course, there were malcontents in Germany, both among the broader population and the more extreme political factions of the Reichstag, who rejected the Treaty of Versailles in general and its military restrictions on Germany in particular. In relation to the government’s stance towards the Far East, the same people felt that the Treaty, especially Germany’s adherence to the relevant articles, had degraded Germans to ‘Second-Class Whites’157 in the eyes of the Chinese, to a weak and increasingly insignificant people. However, the Weimar government and its Auswärtiges Amt tried to remain resolute and did everything in their power to curb any illegal activities of German citizens in regard to the Middle Kingdom. It proved to be a wise decision. Within a few years, Germany was able to re-establish a diplomatic position of fair standing in China and to watch the trade between the two nations grow again. She could also be content that the understandably strained relations with the rest of the world started to relax as well. Still, German politicians and diplomats had to remain watchful since even the suspicion of a breach of the Treaty of Versailles could endanger all of Weimar Germany’s accomplishments.

157 Urach, Fürst Albrecht (1940) Ostasien; Kampf um das kommende Grossreich, Berlin: Steiniger- Verlage, p. 73.

58 Unfortunately, this weakness could and was all too often exploited by foreign nations and the various Chinese factions who saw their political, military and economic interests increasingly threatened by Germany’s slowly growing influence in the Far East. They used the international press as their tool to discredit Germany in order to further their own standing or to reach their own objectives in one way or another. The German military advisers and military technological experts were among the preferred targets for of a deluge of negative headlines in newspapers all over the world. It didn’t matter that a large part of the unfavourable press reports were predominantly a regurgitating of local rumours without any concrete proof. Often the relevant information used by the journalists was provided by highly dubious sources, even by the enemies of the factions supposedly being in close cooperation with German militarists. Some articles were unnecessarily and unfairly selective, some were blown out of proportion, while others were nothing but deliberate and spiteful misinterpretations of obvious facts. Particularly hurtful for young Weimar Germany’s image – both in China and the rest of the world –was a report in London’s Daily Telegraph in February 1924 which boldly stated that the warlord Yan Xishan had employed an unspecified number of German scientists to produce poison gas for his military campaigns158, although no chemical weapons had ever been manufactured in the arsenal in question159. The latter fact, however, was conveniently ignored. Similar charges re-appeared on a regular basis160, insinuating that German chemists manufactured poison gas for virtually every party involved in the Chinese civil wars and thereby creating, by extension, the impression that the newly-established Weimar Germany was nothing but a disguised continuation of Emperor Willhelm II’s reviled Reich. Still, Germany’s calculated ostracisation by parts of the international community had nothing to do with the alleged and actual foreign political concepts it followed. Often the threat of harm to German prestige was viewed as a legitimate means to counter Weimar Germany’s attempts to re-establish herself politically and economically on the global stage or to pressure her into compliance with the aims of the protestor in question. In some cases the negative press reports could be attributed to the lingering passions aroused by the Great War. There was still so much pent-up hatred for the Huns left all over the world that revanchism remained a popular – if cheap – motivation for further discrediting an already vanquished enemy. Finally, denouncing headlines created the perfect diversion to hide one’s own misdeeds. German-bashing was so much easier than facing the awkward fact that citizens of one’s own nation – sometimes even with the government’s approval – were similarly involved in dishonest activities in China. All this perfectly exemplifies the unenviable situation Weimar Germany was in throughout the early post-war years. She tried desperately to evade malevolent

158 PA, R 104863, Politische Abteilung VIII – China, Po 13, Militärangelegenheiten in China. Memorandum of the W.T.B., no place, 20 February 1924. 159 Gillin, Donald G. (1967) Warlord; Yen Hsi-shan in Shansi Province; 1911 – 1949, Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 28. 160 PA, R 104863, Politische Abteilung VIII – China, Po 13, Militärangelegenheiten in China. Ambassador Boyé to Auswärtiges Amt, Beijing, 25 October 1924.

59 reports about underhanded politics in the international press, while at the same time she made any effort to create good relations with the Entente Powers and other foreign nations and to maintain a strict neutrality in the Chinese civil wars in an attempt to antagonize nobody. Unfortunately, the world frequently preferred to believe the malevolent rumours. They can still be found as historical facts in the existing literature.

3.3 Arms Trade 3.3.1 The Origins of the Sino-German Arms Trade In comparison to the rest of the world, gunpowder had been invented early in the Middle Kingdom. China had also been among the first nations to recognize this new substance’s military potential and used it successfully for warfare. However, due to the arrogant Sino-centric world view of the Qing dynasty, which ruled the Middle Kingdom from 1644 onward, a political, cultural and military stagnation set in and China lost its previous technological lead. This became all too apparent in the mid- and late nineteenth century, when China was confronted by the Western colonial powers and an increasingly aggressive Japan. Her armies were soundly defeated in various conflicts, ranging from the Opium War of 1839 and the Arrow War of 1856 to the first Sino-Japanese War of 1895 and the Boxer Rebellion of 1900. The Middle Kingdom, however, had not only to face external threats. In China, war had often been the response to many domestic disputes, particularly to the growing internal unrest against the ruling Qing dynasty. Chinese leaders soon recognized that they had to do something to become competitive again. Weapons and ammunition had always beeen the essential ingredients for the conduct of war, especially after the rapid technological progress of modern firearms, and all nations had to equip themselves with the latest military equipment either by manufacturing or purchasing it on the open market. Unfortunately, due to its self-inflicted technological backwardness, China had never been able to develop a significant domestic arms and ammunition industry and became dependent on the import of military hardware from abroad. In times of conflict, as during the late 1800s, the demands for weapons from overseas increased. The weapons trade with the Middle Kingdom soon became big business. British, French and German arms merchants were in fierce competition with each other, but the accomplishments of German weapons during the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 gave the Germans the edge. Due to their good quality and reliablity, German arms and ammunition gained enormous prestige worldwide and particularly in China. The subsequent financial success of the Krupp company’s sale of light and heavy cannons

60 in China161 also inspired other German arms manufacturers, for example the Mauser company162, to participate in the Far Eastern business. In the early twentieth century many Chinese military units were armed with Mauser rifles, supported in the field by Krupp artillery of various calibres and, naturally, instructed in their use by the first German military advisers to come to the Middle Kingdom. All this changed with World War I. Following its declaration of war in 1917, the Chinese government took over the German concessions in Hankou and , confiscated all German property on Chinese soil and stopped the Sino-German trade entirely. Finally, in the spring of 1919, it repatriated all Germans, sending them home aboard British ships. According to the Treaty of Versailles, it was the duty of the German government to compensate its citizens for the loss of their overseas property. Within a short time, the government indeed did pay up, but not enough and too late, at a time when, as a result of the rapid post-war inflation, the money had already lost its value163. Additionally impeded by several harsh articles of the Treaty of Versailles and other political and economic factors, the Sino-German trade, particularly the formerly lucrative arms trade, which had already been non-existent during the war years, seemed to have come to an end by the early 1920s.

3.3.2 The China Arms Embargo The virtual breakdown of the ineffectual Beijing government in the late 1910s and the subsequent incessant warfare between various warlord factions made China a most profitable market for arms and ammunition of any provenance. After World War I, the arms trade blossomed simply because there was such a vast surplus of arms left over from the devastating conflict in Europe. In addition, all major powers faced great reductions in their armament industries at the end of the war. If commercial markets could not be found, cuts in production would lead to the dispersal of skilled technicians, which might hamper future military preparedness164. Consequently, it

161 Düring, Henry William von (1977) Krupp-Kanonen für das kaiserliche China, Teil I; 20 Jahre als deutscher Kaufmann im Reich der Mitte, in: Damals; Zeitschrift für Geschichtliches Wissen (Number 4, April 1977), pp. 345 ff. 162 Seel, Wolfgang (1988) Mauser; Von der Waffenschmiede zum Weltunternehmen, Dietikon-Zürich: Verlag Stocker-Schmid/Motorbuch Verlag, p. 75. 163 Beutler, Heinz (1946), Hundert Jahre Carlowitz & Co. Hamburg und China; Ein Beitrag zur wirtschaftsgeschichtlichen Entwicklung des deutschen China-Handels, Hamburg: Universität Hamburg, p. 69. 164 Valone, Stephen J. (1991) ‘A Policy calculated to benefit China’; The United States and the China Arms Embargo, 1919 – 1929 [Contributions to the Study of World History (Number 25)], New York (et al.): Greenwood Press, p. 61.

61 didn’t take long for a wholesale dumping of war materials from Europe, America and Japan into China to start. Yet, with the memories of the Great War fresh on their minds, many idealists of the late 1910s deplored this international arms trade. They argued that an uncontrolled international weapons trade both promoted and prolonged wars. Without a reliable outside source for military goods, many nations would never enter a war, but rather settle their differences by more peaceful means. They even went further and blamed the ‘nefarious brotherhood’165 of arms traders for intentionally ‘promoting international intrigues and lawlessness’166. The pacifistic public opinion of the West, mirrored in the publications of George Seldes, Helmut Engelbrecht and Frank Hanighen, and China’s rapid and all too obvious move toward absolute chaos indeed seemed to justify an international arms embargo by the United States and the other world powers against China. The ultimate idea behind an international arms embargo was to promote stability and discourage the civil unrest that plagued China. As a hardly altruistic side effect, it was also intended to protect foreign interests in China. Finally, it was planned to stay in place indefinitely, or at least until a stable, strong and representative government was in place and peace and prosperity had been restored countrywide. Ultimate logic dictated ‘that, if the sale of foreign arms could be stopped, most of the troubles in China would cease automatically’167. Since the warlords’ own arsenals did not have the capacity to supply fighting equipment on the scale required for exensive warfare, China’s wars would soon peter out if the supply from abroad was completely cut off. The vision of a peaceful Middle Kingdom without arms trade was a beautiful dream, but impossible to accomplish in reality. The actual arms export control turned out to be a Sisyphean labour. Even before a final understanding between the United States and several other major powers had been reached regarding the international arms embargo, there was a continuous haggling and nitpicking about its details. No party involved was sure about what actually constituted the arms and munitions of war which were supposed to be banned from export to China, whether or not they also included the raw materials for the manufacture of weapons or the machinery used in their production. To avoid further time-consuming discussions, industrial equipment necessary to manufacture weapons and ammunition, as well as airplanes of any

165 Dong, Stella (2001) Shanghai; The Rise and Fall of a Decadent City, New York: Perennial, p. 129. 166 Johnson, Julia E. (1934) Introduction, in: International Traffic in Arms and Munitions [Reference Shelf (Volume IX, Number 9)], New York: H.W. Wilson Company, pp. 10 f. 167 Seldes, George (1934) Iron, Blood and Profits; An Exposure of the World-Wide Munitions Racket, New York (et al.): Harper & Brothers Publishers, p. 111. Georg Seldes quotes from an unspecified issue of the China Weekly Review.

62 kind, were exempted from the agreement and allowed to be sold openly. Notwithstanding, the signatory powers affirmed their concerns for Far Eastern stability by formally imposing an arms embargo upon China on 5 May 1919 until the country had found peace again168. The United States took the lead in this endeavour, but reservations by Japan and Italy soon effectively nullified the intended purpose of this attempt to curb the civil war in China. In the following years, America and Great Britain tried to strengthen and even extend the embargo, still convinced that the civil wars could not continue for very long without foreign arms imports. The Chinese, as could be expected, were absolutely appalled by the arms embargo. It was nationwide regarded as an ‘insulting restriction on their liberty of action, which placed them [in their eyes] on a level with the barbarians of darkest Africa’169. What made it worse was the fact that the embargo did not make any distinction between the official Chinese government in Beijing, Sun Yatsen’s Guomindang in Canton and the lawless warlords. Since even the allegedly legitimate and internationally recognised government had been included in the arms embargo and was therefore prevented from acquiring foreign arms, it was, as a consequence, hindered in fulfilling its national duties. Weapons and ammunition Beijing had ordered from the Allies– and already paid for – were never delivered after the embargo had been initiated170. The Chinese government became virtually defenseless in the face of the wardlord threat, ‘thus weakening [the internal security and] national economy and maybe even prolonging China’s anguish’171. Needless to say, neither China’s central government nor the Guomindang nor the provincial military governors were willing to accept the arms trade restrictions imposed on them from the outside. One important nation not asked to sign the China arms embargo of 1919 was Germany, since, at that time, the ‘Germans were regarded as mere ‘Huns’, not worthy to associate with other members in the concert of nations’172. Also, some of the world’s other leading weapons manufacturers, including Czechoslovakia, Denmark and , had not signed the agreement either and, as a result, both the government and private citizens of these nations could continue to engage in the armaments trade with China. The fact that Germany had never been invited to join the arms embargo turned out to be of great benefit for some because, in order to stay true to the letter of the agreement, certain gentlemen living in the nations which had signed it began very shortly afterwards to supply China with arms, ‘using some

168 For the wording of the arms embargo see Zhang, Xiaoming (1994) Toward Arming China: United States Arms Sales and Military Assistance, 1921 – 1941, n.p.: University of Iowa, p. 17. 169 Teichman, Eric (1938) Affairs of China; A Survey of the Recent History and Present Circumstances of the Republic of China, London: Methuen Publishers, p. 258. 170 Chen, Tsun-kung (1983) Lieqiang dui Zhongguo de Junhuojinyun (Minguo Ba Nian – Shiba Nian) [Monograph (Number 47)], Taipei: Academia Sinica, Institute of Modern History, p. 4. 171 Zhang, Xiaoming (1994), p. 63. 172 [Anon.] (1934) Arms and the Chinaman, in: Johnson, Julia E. (Ed.) (1934) International Traffic in Arms and Munitions [Reference Shelf (Volume IX, Number 9)], New York: H.W. Wilson Company, p. 157. This cannot have been the only reason though.

63 German subject as a figure-head to sign the contracts’173. All too soon it seemed that some German trading firms had won almost a monopoly174. Not to be outdone by any competition, German or otherwise, the signatory powers themselves began to take on more active roles in the arms trade so that, by 1924, ‘violations became so frequent and flagrant that the embargo ceased to exist for all practical purposes’175. The Auswärtiges Amt in Berlin knew that Germany was not bound to the American, British, French, Russian, Spanish, Portuguese, Brazilian and Japanese arms embargo agreement since she had never been approached to sign it. This had not been necessary, however, because Article 170 of the Treaty of Versailles prohibited the export of war materials from Germany to other foreign countries anyway176. Two separate, if general weapons sales bans, one in 1921 and another one in 1927, reconfirmed the German government’s stance on the issue. German diplomats also declared on various occasions that their nation ‘[was] prepared to do its part to stop the export of weapons to China. For foreign political reasons, the participation of German citizens in the armaments trade with China [was] therefore unwelcome’177. Yet, despite the various bans forbidding the export of war materials and a lack of diplomatic security in the Far East due to the loss of extraterritoriality after World War I, German manufacturers and traders were hardly reasonable. In the post-war years of rapid economic downturn, profits were all that counted. The German diplomats in China were disappointed in their fellow countrymen’s lack of ethics. ‘The little traders out [didn’t] care about the damage they [were] doing to [their

173 Ibid. 174 PA, R 94874, Abteilung IV – Wirtschaft, Waffen A, Kriegsmaterial nach China, Band 1. Consul General Betz to Auswärtiges Amt, Tianjin, 26 July 1924. 175 Ch’i, Hsi-Sheng (1976) Warlord Politics in China 1916 – 1928, Stanford: Stanford University Press, p. 121. It is interesting to note that, in his in-depth look at the international armaments trade with China during the warlord era, Ch’i Hsi-Sheng never mentions the German weapons sales as being influential or outrageous. This view is also shared by Bates, Gill & Kim, Taeho (1995) China’s Arms Acquisitions from Abroad; A Quest for ‘Superb and Secret Weapons’ [SIPRI Research Report (Number 11)], Oxford (et al.): Oxford University Press. 176 ADAP, Serie A, Band VI, Document 92. Ambassador Boyé to Auswärtiges Amt, Beijing, 8 May 1922. Some historians, however, seem to believe that Germany ‘regarded the adherence to the embargo as a device to avoid hostile reactions from any of the Chinese camps and to reduce the possibility of friction with the Entente Powers’, simply because ‘[never] were arguments expressed by German officials that arms were instrumental in the continuation of civil strife in China or that Germany should subordinate her nationalist interests to a higher international morality.’ See Burden, Allen C. (1972) German Policy toward China and the Chinese Revolution, 1919 – 1931, with Special Reference to the Beginnings of Sino-German Military Cooperation, Edmonton: University of Alberta, pp. 166 f. These statements can hardly be taken seriously in the face of the Entente Powers’ own involvement in the arms trade. 177 PA, R 94874, Abteilung IV – Wirtschaft, Waffen A, Kriegsmaterial nach China, Band 1. Auswärtiges Amt to Senatorial Commision for Domestic and Foreign Affairs, Berlin, 31 August 1924.

64 country] as long as they [could] cash in their more or less legitimate profits. Weapons export and weapons trade [were] businesses Germany [could not] afford right now’178, especially when she was still under closest international scrutiny in connection with the Treaty of Versailles. When no voluntary accomodation of the German businesspeople in question was forthcoming and international criticism of Weimar Germany’s apparent flouting of the China arms embargo was growing louder, official steps had to be taken. On 31 March 1928 the Reichstag passed a new law, finally forbidding the traffic of arms into China. This law banned – at least for one year – all weapons deliveries from and via Germany, as well as the involvement of German citizens in the arms trade179. There was a provision that the duration of the law could be extended, pending the end of the Chinese civil war and the emergence of an internationally recognizable Chinese government. Despite having a limited effect in the beginning, overall the international arms embargo against China was an ‘unqualified failure’180. The naive supposition that the Chinese civil war would stop due to the lack of weapons and ammunition reflected the all too simplistic belief of some Western nations that weapons as such caused conflict. Unfortunately, as they had to find out, China’s troubles were not determined by the imports of foreign weapons. The embargo also did not instantly restore peace in China, as they had assumed. Instead it ‘seemed to increase the difference between negotiating parties, actually delaying the restoration of peace in China’181. On a more practical side, Adolf Boyé, the German Ambassador in China, recognized after a short time that the arms embargo, as well as the Beijing government’s own efforts to stop the influx of arms into China, only served to drive up the prices, making the trade more profitable and thereby actually encouraging it182. It is the sad truth that, due to half-baked foreign political concepts and insufficient international cooperation in the implementation of the China arms embargo, illicit supplies of foreign arms and ammunition never ceased to reach China. The biggest flaw of the agreement was the fact that the original signatories were only the dozen powers with diplomatic representatives in Beijing in May 1919. Without additional signatories, including the defeated Germany and Czechoslovakia, which had not yet existed at the time, the embargo could only be an imperfect instrument for fostering peace in the Far East. Also, challenges to the embargo’s integrity occurred almost from the start. Already on 15 May 1919, ten days after the official signing of the document, Italy insisted on making a first exception for war

178 ADAP, Serie A, Band VI, Document 92. Ambassador Boyé to Auswärtiges Amt, Beijing, 8 May 1922. 179 Ratenhof, Udo (1987) Die Chinapolitik des Deutschen Reiches 1871 bis 1945; Wirtschaft – Rüstung – Militär, Boppard am Rhein: Harald Boldt Verlag, p. 345. 180 Chan, Anthony B. (1982), Arming the Chinese; The Western Armaments Trade in Warlord China, 1920 – 1928, Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, p. 65. 181 Zhang, Xiaoming (1994), p. 62. 182 PA, R 94874, Abteilung IV – Wirtschaft, Waffen A, Kriegsmaterial nach China, Band 1. Ambassador Boyé to Auswärtiges Amt, Beijing, 15 January 1924.

65 materials already contracted by but not yet delivered to China183. The various activities of the Soviet Union became even more significant. By 1922, sure about their position at home and seeking to expand influence abroad, ‘the Soviets flouted the embargo and intervened in the Chinese civil war in search of political advantage’184. They soon openly supported all pro-Bolshevist factions in China with weapons of war and military advisers, particularly Sun Yatsen’s Guomindang in Canton. Furthermore, the economic post-war necessities of some countries around the world and the prevalent greed of all nations were more important than the lofty morals on which the China arms embargo had been based. A fierce battle for markets and sales started almost immediately after its signing. Once one nation had broken the embargo, all others were forced to follow suit so that they would not lose out on the big business. Ultimately, without much ceremony or other diplomatic ado, the China arms embargo agreement was almost silently cancelled on 26 April 1929. Not that it actually had made any difference in China, one way or another. As soon as the embargo had been signed in 1919, hordes of illegal arms traders descended upon Chinese port cities like Tianjin or Shanghai, trying to sell their enormous stocks of surplus World War I-vintage weapons to their more than willing customers. ‘Sinister-looking German, American, British, French, Italian and Swiss arms dealers appeared in the lobby of the Astor House and Palace hotels to dangle fat catalogues of their wares before the eager eyes of any buyers185’.

3.3.3 The International Arms Trade with China Despite the wide-spread enthusiasm of political leaders around the world for the China arms embargo of 1919, the reality of the Chinese situation favoured, even necessitated the illegal arms trade. The Middle Kingdom’s inherent and deep-rooted conflicts could simply not be talked away on a global level and would continue one way or another until the Chinese themselves had solved them. Unfortunately many factions in China, predominantly the warlords, saw violence as the only possible way out of the Far Eastern quagmire. They would utilize every weapon they could lay their hands on for their never-ending warfare. The average Chinese military commander of the early 1920s could expect to fight with weapons ‘approximating to American Civil War conditions’186. Not infrequently spears, swords, shortguns187, even antiquated muzzle-loaders were used. The most common weapon for the average soldier was, of course, the rifle. However, the increasingly growing warlord armies and the rapid consumption of arms and

183 Valone, Stephen J. (1991), p. 58. 184 Ibid., p. 96. 185 Dong, Stella (2001), pp. 128 f. 186 Whitson, William W. & Huang, Chen-hsia (1973) The Chinese High Command: A History of Communist Military Politics, 1927 – 1972, New York: Praeger, p. 11. 187 Chi, Hsi-Sheng (1969), p. 91.

66 ammunition made any kind of already existing domestic weapons industry insuffucient to start with and therefore most equipment, including rifles and heavier arms, had to be acquired from abroad, in a process which the infamous ‘One-Arm’ Sutton liked to call the ‘importation of special merchandise’188. Soon every warlord was scrounging around, willing to take whatever weapons he could afford or even get. The result was a plethora of British, American, French, Russian, Italian, German and Japanese arms of every imaginable model and calibre. It was quite common for one warlord army to be equipped with different guns and ammunition which were not interchangeable. Many of these weapons were obsolete and most were poorly maintained. In hindsight, it is probably safe to say that just about every rifle and machine gun available at the time was used in China. Completely ignoring the arms embargo, a veritable army of arms traders stood prepared to fulfill every order one of the Chinese factions might have, always following their eleventh commandement, ‘Thou shall not be found out’189. In general, the war materials sold to China by the various industrial nations originated from three different sources. The first source were arms factories owned by the state, such as military arsenals, the second source were companies subsidized by the state or standing under state control, while the third source were the private firms engaged in whole or in part in the manufacture of instruments of war. Of these three sources, the private firms were by far the most important and influential. Since they were, for the biggest part, dependent on the international weapons trade, violations of laws and ethics were almost a necessity and therefore only too common – not only by some of the usually suspected outlaw states, but by all nations190. Yet, there was nothing secretive, exciting or adventurous about the international arms trade with China. It was a business like any other. One sold weapons of war ‘just like another one sells straw hats’191. The arms negotiations between salesman and prospective buyer and were conducted in secret. The actual deliveries into China, however, were open to the observation of diplomats and custom officials, particularly the Chinese Maritime Customs Service, Preventive Branch. This intelligence

188 Waldron, Arthur (1995) From War to Nationalism; China’s Turning Point, 1924 – 1925, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 65. 189 Sampson, Anthony (1977) The Arms Bazaar; The Companies, the Dealers, the Bribes: From Vickers to Lockheed, London (et al.): Hodder and Stoughton, p. 21. Anthony Sampson quotes Dany Chamoun, a Middle Eastern weapons trader of the 1970s. 190 Some rather disillusioned historians like to add that the Western governments were wary of their subjects becoming involved in illicit arms deals with China only because ‘their own machinations in carving up her wealth were complex enough, without adventurers blundering in’. See Bonavia, David (1995) China’s Warlords, Hongkong (et al.): Oxford University Press, p. 14. 191 Schenke, Wolf (1940) Reise an der Gelben Front; Beobachungen eines deutschen Kriegsbericht- erstatters in China, Oldenburg/Berlin: Gerhard Stalling Verlagsbuchhandlung, p. 83.

67 organisation, staffed largely by ‘efficient and incorruptible’192 Europeans, many of them British, was charged with enforcing the arms embargo. Proof of the continuous violations of the embargo was found in the daily seizure of foreign arms by the custom authorities, but smuggling was simply too profitable to disappear. Small arms and ammunition could easily be hidden by the weapons traders in shipments of scrap metal or diguised as innocent goods. Heavy mortars, for example, were preferrably labelled as ‘hydraulic tubes’193 on ships’ manifests from England. However, shipments of larger war materials, such as tanks, armoured cars or aircraft, were difficult to conceal and therefore directly sneaked into China. Primarily, smuggling was routed through the Shandong area because ports there were less closely watched than either Shanghai or those on the Manchurian coast. Yet, even Shanghai’s close customs supervision did not deter the more audacious weapons traders. ‘In daily changing positions the arms smugglers [took] over their valuable goods, [shipped] them up the Yangzi River during the night and [unloaded] them on the shores of the Huangpu River where Chinese traders and soldiers already [waited] with their trucks’194. Apparently it was not easy to overlook, even for the most innocent foreign bystander, when one just knew where to look. In general, war material sales and purchase did not suggest a pattern of preference or dependence between the various Chinese factions and the foreign arms merchants. The profit motive was the driving factor in the majority of the transactions. One party was eager to buy, the other was eager to sell and politics, ethics or ideology played only a minimal role. The lack of morality and loyalty to the customer was particularly mirrored by the fact that the goods delivered consisted primarily of old, outdated equipment of low value and poor quality which was billed at terribly inflated costs and did not help China to develop any true military strength. The deliveries were usually handled via third countries, which had not signed the arms embargo. This offered the involved Western powers the perfect opportunity to get into the China armaments trade without actually breaking any laws. According to the 1934 statistical yearbook of the League of Nations, the large- scale manufacture of war materials of the previous decade was limited to ten

192 Waldron, Arthur (1995), p. 65. Other historians apparently don’t share this view when they state that ‘bribery ruled the business’. See Seldes, George (1934), p. 111. 193 Waldron, Arthur (1995), p. 68. 194 Strunk, R. & Rikli, M. (1934) Achtung! Asien marschiert!, Berlin: Volksverband der Bücherfreun- de/Wegweiser-Verlag, p. 64.

68 industrial countries. In 1930, these ten countries supplied 93.2 percent of the total export in weapons and ammunition195. The leading nation by far was Great Britain196 with 30.8 percent, followed by France with 12.9 percent and the United States with 11.7 percent. Added together, these three nations constituted more than 55 percent of the global arms trade in 1930. Looking back, however, the arms industries of these three countries had been the source of approximately 75 percent of all the war materials exported throughout the world since 1920197. The big three were joined by several comparatively minor contributors, including the Soviet Union, Italy, Czechoslovakia, Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Japan. The numbers of companies from the respective nations involved in the China arms trade were legion. Vickers and Handley Page from Great Britain, Schneider, Breguet and Caudron from France, Bethlehem and Dupont from the United States, Terni and Ansaldo from Italy, Skoda from Czechoslovakia, Bofors from Sweden, Raufoss and Kongsberg from Norway, as well as Nielsen and Winther from Denmark were all, one way or another, brought into connection with the illegal China arms trade throughout the 1920s. It has often been alleged that the warlords were actually the ‘running dogs’198 of the foreign powers who basically led wars by proxy by supporting one Chinese faction or the other. The Fengtian-Zhili War of 1922, for example, was seen, in a sense, as a conflict between Japan on the one side, backing Zhang Zuolin, and Great Britain and the United States on the other side, backing Wu Peifu199. Also, both the Nationalists and Chinese Communists maintained that the leading imperialistic nations like Japan and Great Britain were the ‘major exporters of arms to support their favorite militarists in their respective spheres of influence’200. However, the private weapons salesmen of the nations in question were – with the exception of the Soviet Union and perhaps Japan – not acting on orders of their respective governments, even

195 Stone, William T. (1934) International Traffic in Arms and Ammunition, in: Johnson, Julia E. (Ed.) (1934) International Traffic in Arms and Munitions [Reference Shelf (Volume IX, Number 9)], New York: H.W. Wilson Company, p. 115. Strangely enough, Weimar Germany is not included in the statistics since, in the international comparison, her contribution to the international arms trade was almost negligible. However, when taken out of context, Germany’s involvement seemed to be absolutely outrageous. 196 With the disarmament of Germany after World War I and the dismantling of its weapons manufacturing plants, the British armaments industry had become the most influential and most highly organized in the world. 197 Stone, William T. (1934), p. 115. 198 Chan, Anthony B. (1982), p. xiii. 199 McCormack, Gavan (1977) Chang Tso-lin in , 1911 – 1928; China, Japan, and the Manchurian Idea, Folkestone: Dawson, pp. 76 f. 200 Ch’i, Hsi-Sheng (1976), p. 122.

69 when the continuation of their trade throughout the embargo can be attributed to the fact that the governments generally adopted a non-interference policy regarding the business world201. Naturally, there were certain preferential business relationships between Chinese civil war factions and foreign arms traders depending on how and where their particular spheres of influence and interest touched. The warlord Zhang Zuolin was mainly equipped by the Japanese. He also received Nippon’s political support and and became, in a way, her ally – or rather puppet – on the Chinese mainland. In 1922 alone, Zhang Zuolin spent one million yuan on the purchase of Japanese military equipment originally stored in Vladivistok for the planned invasion of Siberia202. Throughout the decade Japan continued to deliver huge amounts of weapons and ammunition into Manchuria, her main area of interest, via Port Arthur. Japan, however, did not remain the only supplier of war materials for the ‘Tiger of the North’. In 1924 and 1925, England, France, the United States and Italy203 also sold arms and military equipment to northern China204. France, for example, delivered Renault FT-17 light tanks and almost a hundred aircraft of the latest types, including Breguet 14 light bombers205, doing her part in making Zhang Zuolin probably the best-equipped warlord in China at the time. On the other hand, it was constantly rumoured that Wu Peifu, Zhang Zuolin’s mortal enemy, was essentially supported by Great Britain. In fact, however, the English never supplied him with significant material aid206. Wu Peifu’s principal supply of foreign arms came from private foreign merchants, among them some Americans207. The Italians were particularly forthcoming when it came to the sale of war materials. In 1921 alone, some 20,000 rifles, plus ammunition and spare parts, were delivered to Wu Peifu via Shanhaiguan. A few years later, in 1926, Italian pistols were smuggled into China, disassembled and hidden in food packages with the help of a German firm, Leiter & Co., located in Belgium. The handguns arrived in Qingdao, were gathered and assembled by an Italian agent and, after bribing a Chinese customs official, transported by rail to Wu Peifu in Hankou208. Still, when it

201 Chan, Anthony B. (1982), p. 49. 202 Bonavia, David (1995), p. 72, and McCormack, Gavan (1977), p. 107. 203 In 1923 and 1924, Zhang Zuolin bought Italian weapons and ammunition valued at some 6 million Mexican silver dollars. See Ch’i, Hsi-Sheng (1976), p. 123 (Footnote). 204 Ratenhof, Udo (1987), p. 304. 205 Jowett, Philip .S. (1997) Chinese Civil War Armies 1911 – 1949 [Men-at-Arms (Volume 306)], London: Osprey Publishing, p. 15. War materials this heavy were probably delivered to the Far East via France’s concessions in China to ‘arm her colonial police and volunteer forces’. France, just like other Western governments, ‘thus [was] able to to ship large quantities of arms to China on the pretext that the arms were meant for [her] own forces’. See Ch’i, Hsi-Sheng (1976), p. 121. 206 Sheridan, James E. (1975) China in Disintegration; The Republican Era in Chinese History, 1912 – 1949, New York: Free Press, p. 95. 207 Wou, Odoric Y.K. (1978) Militarism in Modern China; The Career of Wu P’ei-Fu, 1916 – 39, Canberra: Australian National University Press, p. 177. 208 Ibid.

70 came to military vehicles, Wu Peifu preferred to buy his Citroen-Kegresse armoured half-track trucks from France209. Not unlike in the instance of military advisers in Chinese service, the Soviet Union was not overly discriminating when it came to supporting Chinese civil war factions with weapons and ammunition. In the early 1920s, Feng Yuxiang, the so- called Christian General, received most of his military equipment and other substantial aid from the Soviets210. From 1924 onward, however, the Soviet Union almost exclusively armed the Guomindang in Canton211. The first Russian shipment of war material, some 8,000 rifles and ammunition, arrived in Canton on 7 October 1924212. There were many more deliveries to come, ranging from rifles to heavy machine guns to artillery, which were paid in cash cash or via other transactions. However, in general the Russian aid was not as generous as it was usually reported to be. ‘Its quantity was meager, its quality was low’213. Many obsolete weapons, even some German ones captured in World War I almost a decade earlier, were unloaded on the Chinese Nationalists at obscenely overinflated prices. Help for the Nationalists also came from a frequently overlooked source. Overseas Chinese, especially those in the United States and Southeast Asia, were Sun Yatsen’s main supporters. They not only contributed money to his cause, but also gifts in kind. Among their more unusual donations were two Ettrich Taube monoplanes214 which were shipped to Shanghai by a group of Chinese sympathizers in the hope that they could influence the revolution against the Imperial government. The two aircraft arrived in China in 1912, too late to be of any help. Eventually, over the succeeding years, they were used to train pilots. Still, violations of the China arms embargo by their citizens do not seem to have been a big issue for the major powers during the 1920s. Simply by cursory browsing through old All the World’s Aircraft editions, one cannot help finding great numbers of British, French and Italian military aircraft which had been sold to the various warring Chinese factions – including the central government in Beijing and the warlords – despite the embargo ageement. Obviously none of these nations was overly embarrassed to be mentioned in an international aircraft index which was publicly available all over the world and there doesn’t seem to have been much of a

209 Jowett, Philip S. (1997), p. 15. 210 Bonavia, David (1995), p. 109, and Sheridan, James E. (1975), p. 95. 211 Ratenhof, Udo (1987), p. 304. 212 Liu, Frederick Fu (1956) A Military History of Modern China 1924 – 1949, Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 14. 213 Ibid., p. 26. 214 Rosholt, Malcolm (1984) Flight in the China Air Space 1910 – 1950, Rosholt: Rosholt House, p. 6. There, however, are some inaccuracies in Malcolm Rosholt’s book. He alleges that the ‘Etrick monoplane’, as he calls it, was an Austrian aircraft, while it was actually a product of the German Rumpler company which had been license-built in before World War I.

71 public outcry regarding these apparent breaches of the sanctions against China. Everybody preferred to be satisfied with the knowledge that many warlords had merely purchased commercial planes and converted them into fighter and bomber aircraft simply by equipping them with machine guns and improvised bomb chutes215. These impromptu war machines, however, had not even been included in C.G. Grey and Leonard Bridgman’s listings of purely military aircraft.

3.3.4 The Alleged Sino-German Arms Trade during the 1920s After Germany’s defeat in World War I and the subsequent armistice negotiations, a German armaments industry was virtually non-existent. The Treaty of Versailles, signed in 1919, demanded the wholesale destruction of the German military infrastructure. The sixteen liaison offices of the Inter-Allied Military Control Commission, staffed by 396 officers and 610 soldiers, made 33,381 inspection visits at the various factories throughout Germany to observe the disarmament proceedings216. The demilitarisation of the former German Reich was quick and rigorous. At the Krupp company’s manufacturing plant in Essen alone, the Allies destroyed some 60,000 tons of war machinery, as well as furnaces, arms and ammunition valued at 104 million gold marks217. No German weapons producer was spared, although small-scale manufacturing capabilities were preserved in order to guarantee both Weimar Germany’s ability to equip her armed forces and the survival of the arms industry in general. The Allied commission seemed to be satisfied with the progress made when it was finally dissolved in late 1926. However, even after the dissolution of the Military Control Commission, the League of Nations had an eye on the German armaments industry. It could count on the cooperation of the German government. Weimar Berlin, too, strived to follow the obligations of the Treaty of Versailles, intent on rebuilding Germany’s shattered reputation in the world. As a result, German arms manufacturers were unable to restart their mass production in the early post-war years and the only orders firms like Mauser had were insignificant numbers of infantry rifles and pistols bought by China and several South American nations218. The rest of German arms production was strictly limited to sporting or police weapons. The situation remained stagnant until 1928, when Chiang Kaishek, as Nationalist Chinese leader, officially ordered 168 cannons, 370 machine guns and 22,000 rifles from Germany219.

215 Chan, Anthony B. (1983), p. 84. 216 Seel, Wolfgang (1988), p. 74. 217 Seldes, George (1934), p. 198. 218 Seel, Wolfgang (1988), p. 86. 219 Ibid.

72 Still, according to many international observers, there were great discrepancies between Germany’s supposed and actual weapons trade throughout the 1920s. Under the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, Weimar Germany was forbidden to import or export weapons or military equipment of any kind and the production of arms was strictly limited to the requirements of her insignificant 100,000-men Reichswehr. Nevertheless, German weapons exports increased from 2,000,000 dollars in 1924 to 3,000,000 dollars in 1930220. The Leage of Nations, though, presumed that this trade statistic included the already mentioned manufacture of firearms for sporting purposes and the sale of explosives for commercial use and officially accepted this explanation in its statistical yearbook221. Apparently unexplainable at the time, however, was the fact that shortly after the Great War, huge amounts of German war materials swamped the international markets. Illegal German involvement was immediately suspected, but the actual truth was somewhat different. After World War I, most of the German weapons had to be left behind in France and Belgium before the surrendering soldiers were allowed to return home. Also, the Inter-Allied Military Control Commission watched over the disarmament of the German armed forces in their mother country. Under its watchful eyes, Germany surrendered some 2,500 heavy cannons, 2,500 field guns, 25,000 machine guns, 3,000 trench mortars and 1,700 aircraft to the the Allies222. The weapons which were not destroyed straight away were sold all over the world. Still, the assumption that the existence of large stocks of surplus weapons as a result of the demobilization actually stimulated German involvement in the armaments trade with China223 is erroneous. These massive amounts of arms did indeed find their way into the hands of illegal exporters, but, given Weimar Germany’s state during the early post-war years, the chances that any of these weapons ended up in the stores of German arms traders were slim. Although it was never made openly public, several nations, particularly Czechoslovakia, Belgium and France, were deeply involved in the arms trade with China by selling German weapons impounded after the end of the Great War224. The British firm of Fleming & Co. also purchased German rifles and ammunition left behind in Latvia after World War I for resale in Qingdao225. In late 1927, the Norwegian steamer Skule shipped 25,000 rifles and ammunition from Oslo to Qingdao, this time, however, with the marginal involvement of two German China trading houses, Carlowitz & Co. and Siemssen & Co. The rifles had been Mauser rifles, left behind by German troops in Belgium after the war. They had been bought by a Belgian company from the Belgian government and delivered straight from Belgium to Zhang Zuolin in China via Norway, never actually touching German hands or German soil226. Still, the German government was held responsible and came under fire. The Chinese Nationalists immediately protested

220 Stone, William T. (1934), p. 120. 221 Ibid. 222 Horne, Charles F. (Ed.) (1927) Source Records of the Great War, Washington: National Alumni, p. 421. 223 Burden, Allen C. (1972), p. 134. 224 Ratenhof, Gabriele (1984) Das Deutsche Reich und die internationale Krise um die Mandschurei 1931 – 1933; Die deutsche Fernostpolitik als Spiegel und Instrument deutscher Revisionspolitik, Frankfurt am Main (et al.): Peter Lang, p. 24. 225 Chan, Anthony B. (1982), p. 50. 226 Kuo, Heng-yü (1986) Deutschland und China im Jahre 1927 aus der Sicht deutscher Diplomaten, in: Kuo, Heng-yü (Ed.) (1986) Von der Kolonialpolitik zur Kooperation; Studien zur Geschichte der deutsch-chinesischen Beziehungen, München: Minerva Publikation, p. 313.

73 at the German consul’s office in Shanghai against the alleged German support for their opponent in the north227. Yet, warlords were not the only recipients of German weapons deliveries. Previously, in August 1924, the Guomindang had seized the Norwegian steamer Hav which was carrying a large shipment of German arms, allegedly 5,000 infantry rifles with 1,200,000 rounds, 4,500 Mauser rifles with 2,000,000 rounds and 600 pistols with 900,000 rounds. These weapons had been sent from Alfred Bleymüller in Antwerp to Canton and had been destined for the so-called Merchant Volunteers, a paramilitary organisation financed by the British and some wealthy Chinese business men to fight against the Guomindang in Canton228. British authorities in both Canton and Hongkong had known about the shipment. Once again, the weapons had come from the lots of impounded German World War I weapons in Belgium, England and Czechoslovakia and had been sold, as Ambassador Adolf Boyé put it, by an ‘international pusher syndicate’229. Probably the most curious case of German war materials deliveries to China involved several Fokker D.VII biplanes of World War I-vintage which ended up in the service of one of the warlord armies230. How they actually came to China remains a mystery. They could not have been sold by Weimar Germany since all German military aircraft were destroyed immediately after the war and no new ones were manufactured for quite a while. There is, however, the vague possibility that they were exported by Poland after several captured Fokkers had been in Polish service for several years in the early 1920s. Unbelievably, they were still in operational use in the 1930s in northern China. In any case, both China and Weimar Germany were the losers in the trade in obsolete German World War I weapons – China because it received obsolete and often deteriorated war materials and Germany because its reputation as a world- class arms manufacturer was damaged in the eyes of many Chinese customers who had thought that they had purchased the best German companies had to offer231. Another issue which damaged Weimar Germany’s precarious standing in the world by implicating her in the illegal arms trade with China was the transit of goods, in this case war materials, from other nations via German territory to their intended recipients. Throughout the 1920s, Chinese customs figures named Germany as the largest source of arms and ammunition, especially between 1925 and 1927, when allegedly more than fifty percent of China’s entire weapons imports came directly from Germany232. The presented facts were most perplexing, especially for German governmental officials and diplomats. A list of weapons and ammunition imports for the year 1925233, sorted by country of origin and value in Hongkong taels, indeed showed Germany indeniably on the top with 3,813,644 taels, followed by Norway with 1,278,855 taels, Italy with 1,014,333 taels, Japan with 420,900 taels, Hongkong with 211,957 taels, Sweden with 141,875 taels, France with 96,036 taels, the United States with 77,999 taels, Great Britain with 67,050 taels and with 46,402 taels. The apparently indisputable implication of

227 Ibid. 228 ADAP, Serie A, Band XI, Document 43. Ambassador Boyé to Auswärtiges Amt, Beijing, 17 August 1924. 229 Ibid. 230 Rosholt, Malcolm (1984), p. 31. 231 Liang, Hsi-Huey (1978) The Sino-German Connection; Alexander von Falkenhausen between China and Germany 1900 – 1941, Assen/Amsterdam: Van Gorcum, p. 61. 232 Stone, William T. (1934), p. 120. 233 ADAP, Serie A, Band XII, Document 274. Ambassador Boyé to Auswärtiges Amt, Beijing, 25 April 1925. The table in Adolf Boyé’s report had been compiled from the 1925 Chinese maritime statistics.

74 that list was that, despite the severe restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles and the China arms embargo, Germany was the chief arms-exporting nation of the world. However, the Chinese Maritime Customs statistics on which the list was based were misleading since they reflected the Maritime Customs’ standard procedure of regarding the port of departure listed on the cargo manifest of a ship as the indication of the country from which the cargo originated234. Since many non-German consignments bound for the Far East were trans-shipped from German ports, especially Hamburg, Germany’s role in the weapons trade was, as a consequence, disproportionally overstated. Unfortunately, there was nothing the government in Berlin could do. While Article 170 of the Treaty of Versailles directly banned the import and export of war materials to and from Germany, there were no regulations in regard to the transit of war materials through German territory. Quite on the contrary, Article 321 of the same treaty obliged Germany to permit the transit of goods through her territory, exempting them from all customs or similar duties235. The transit of war materials had not been explicitly excluded by the Treaty powers. Moreover, the Barcelona Convention on Free Trade of 21 April 1921, which the Weimar government had belatedly signed on 4 October 1923, also obligated Germany to provide the free transit of goods to and from Switzerland and Czechoslovakia236, two nations which were both known to be among the leading weapons and ammunition manufacturers and exporters of the time. Already by the early 1920s, Hamburg was known as the main arms smuggling port of Europe237. In 1923, twenty percent of China’s arms imports were shipped from German ports. Three years later, sixty percent of the delivered weapons came from Germany238. It was, however, widely ignored that Germany, due to its favourable location in the heart of Europe, served as the transit country for Czechoslovakia and Sweden, the fourth- and fifth-largest weapons traders according to the afore-

234 Casper, Karl (1937) Deutschland und China im gegenseitigen Warenaustausch, in: Weltwirt- schaftliches Archiv; Zeitschrift des Instituts für Weltwirtschaft an der Universität Kiel (Volume 45, 1937 I), p. 411 (Footnote), and Ratenhof, Gabriele (1984), p. 24. Still, this significant fact was often disregarded when Weimar Germany’s involvement in the Chinese arms trade was examined in both contemporary sources and later scientific treatises. 235 Chan, Anthony B. (1982), p. 56. 236 PA, R 94874, Abteilung IV – Wirtschaft, Waffen A, Kriegsmaterial nach China, Band 1. Auswärtiges Amt to British Embassy Berlin, Berlin, December 1924. 237 Chen, Tsun-kung (1983), p. 142. However, Chen Tsun-kung exaggerates when he alleges that Germany was the reason that the arms embargo was a failure. See Chen, Tsun-kung (1983), p. 145. 238 Martin, Bernd (1986) Das Deutsche Reich und Guomindang-China, 1927 – 1941, in: Kuo, Heng-yü (Ed.) (1986) Von der Kolonialpolitik zur Kooperation; Studien zur Geschichte der deutsch- chinesischen Beziehungen, München: Minerva Publikation, p. 332.

75 mentioned League of Nations statistics. Both nations sold their goods through the ports of Hamburg or Nordenhamm an der Weser239 and all too often the Chinese recipients of the military hardware listed the shipping port as the country of origin, no matter where the delivery had actually come from. Naturally, the German government rejected the accusations that Germany was the Far East’s main source of illegal war materials. It also repeatedly insisted that it was not in a good position to police the harbor of Hamburg, an international free port in accordance with the Treaty of Versailles, and stop foreign ships from transporting arms to China240. The Ostasiatischer Verein, an association of German merchants doing business predominantly in the Far East, joined in with a statement of its own, trying to clarify that none of the weapons and ammunition delivered to China actually originated from Germany, but were only shipped to China via Germany241. Yet, these declarations fell on deaf ears all over the world and were only regarded as weak German attempts to weasel out of the entire embarrassing affair. Even today it remains difficult to estimate exactly how much of the China- bound arms deliveries were truly of German origin. It is, however, strange that in contemporary photographs of warlord soldiers or Nationalist troops only occasionally German weapons and military equipment can be seen – or at least nothing heavier than a regular rifle or a pistol. Even with the German surplus war materials of World War I-vintage included, the biggest part of the weapons used in China during the 1920s seems to have originated in Great Britain, France and the United States.

3.3.5 The Actual Sino-German Arms Trade during the 1920s The fact that German citizens were indeed involved on a certain scale in the illegal arms trade with China made all declarations of German integrity sound hollow in the ears of the world. It did not help Berlin’s efforts to strengthen the newly- established German Republic and hindered the diplomats of the Auswärtiges Amt from creating unencumbered foreign political relations in the Far East and elsewhere. The renewed Sino-German trade had started on a positive note. Shortly after the end of World War I and their Allied-enforced repatriation, many Germans returned to the Middle Kingdom, reopened their old businesses or founded new ones and became once again active in industry, trade and shipping. This was made relatively easy by the separate peace agreement between Weimar Germany and China which had been signed in the summer of 1921. Also, understandably after decades of Unequal Treaties, the Chinese found it quite appealing to do business with foreigners subjected to the jurisdiction of their own government and the loss of extraterritoriality actually proved to be profitable. Moreover, despite highly negative effects in Europe, the

239 Burden, Allen C. (1972), p. 149. 240 Zhang, Xiaoming (1994), p. 43 (Footnote), and Chen, Tsun-kung (1983), p. 143.

76 inflation of the 1920s greatly helped to increase the German exports to the Far East. As a result, although Germany’s pre-war political influence in China was gone, its trade with the Chinese Republic was growing rapidly. Despite the common understanding that the German taipans of the China trade were ‘solid as a rock’242 and never trafficked in illegal goods, the transgressions of a minority sullied both the accomplishments and the good name of the majority. The first infringements already started on German soil. Intent on ignoring the relevant regulations of the Treaty of Versailles and quite astute in evading the Inter-Allied Military Control Commission, some companies within the German heavy industry started manufacturing weapons and military equipment for China at the earliest possible opportunity. Through investments, patents and licenses, well-known German arms manufacturers became involved with major foreign companies and relocated smaller, rather questionable parts of their production abroad. Switzerland, the Netherlands and various Scandinavian countries offered German companies the freedom to remain in business, at least marginally. Bofors in Sweden, for example, the Schweizerische Industriegesellschaft Neuhausen in Switzerland and H.I.H.243 in the Netherlands cooperated closely with German corporations like Krupp, Mauser and Rheinmetall244. These pseudo-fusioned companies were represented by their own representatives, by the established trading firms or by a special breed of travelling salesmen who sought to turn a profit at the expense of a politically and militarily torn China. However, since it is extremely difficult to discern where the independence of the foreign manufacturers ended and the influence of the German contributors started, the actual direct involvement of the German arms industry in the production of war materials for the China of the 1920s remains an enigma. In contrast, German trading firms and shipping lines were soon openly known to be involved in the armaments trade of other nations with China, either as go-betweens or transports. For a certain percentage of the profits, these established companies and other private intermediaries were willing to intervene between seller and buyer to minimize any possible complications arising from the transcontinental trade. The activities of German citizens in the international China arms trade could be

241 PA, R 33381, Abteilung II F – M (Militär und Marine), Verkauf von Kriegsmaterial nach Asien. Ostasiatischer Verein to Auswärtiges Amt, Hamburg, 1927. 242 Kaim, Julius R. (1963) Damals in Schanghai; Kaiser, Kaufleute und Kommunisten, München: Prestel-Verlag, p. 8. 243 ‘H.I.H.’ was the acronym for the ‘Holländische Industrie- und Handelsgesellschaft’.

77 ridiculously small. When a warlord in Sichuan province intended to establish a private air force, Wilhelm ‘Bubi’ Trendel, a German correspondent of the Transozean news bureau, offered to buy an aircraft for him. He indeed acquired a plane – and a Russian pilot who had participated in the Great War and ‘whom the Germans had forgotten to shoot down’, as observers rudely commented – and was already on the way to Chungking when both men were arrested and the aircraft was impounded245. Yet, not only small-scale smugglers or fly-by-night operators were involved in the illegal weapons trade, but numerous other German firms, either the Chinese branch offices of German companies or Chinese-registered corporations owned by German citizens. Among them were also long-established and venerable China trading firms like Carlowitz & Co. The company had had a long history in the China trade, having started its business in the mid-nineteenth century. Known for its reliability and the quality of its goods, it had a good reputation among the Chinese which even World War I had been unable to destroy. Over the years, Carlowitz and Co. could secure itself several major official orders. As representative of several well-known German companies in East Asia, including Carl Zeiss in Jena and Zeiss-Ikon in Dresden, as well as the Krupp company in Essen and its Swedish partner Bofors246, it delivered technical equipment for the National Construction Ministry of Communication and the China Automotive Company247. However, contravening both the international arms embargo and official German policies, the trading house also sold the necessary machinery for the construction of several governmental arsenals, especially electric generators and machine tools, plus anti-aircraft guns, cannons and optical equipment for the Chinese armed forces on orders of the Chinese Ministry of War248. Furthermore, with the help of Carlowitz & Co, several manufacturing facilities, including chemical plants for the production of the highly explosive trinitrotoluol, were erected for Zhang Zuolin, the warlord of Manchuria249. Other German trading houses were equally involved at some time or the other. Via W. Edelbuttel & Co. in Qingdao, the Shandong warlord Zhang Zongchang ordered huge amounts of weapons which were delivered on German or Norwegian steamers.

244 Ratenhof, Udo (1987), p. 307. 245 Schenke, Wolf (1971) Mit China allein; Entscheidende Jahre 1939 – 47, Hamburg: Holsten-Verlag, p. 158. 246 Beutler, Heinz (1946), p. 90. 247 Ibid., p. 75. 248 Ibid., pp. 75 f.

78 One delivery alone, made on 24 January 1927 on the Bertram Rickmers, included 6,600 rifles of 8-millimetre calibre and 4,371 rifles of 9.8-millimetre calibre with more than 3 million rounds of ammunition, 200 machine guns and 2000 Mauser pistols with more than 2.2 million rounds of ammunition250. Another delivery, made in late 1927 on the Norwegian steamer Aker, also contained, amongst other things, nine airplanes manufactured by the German Udet/BFW company251. These aircraft were most likely Udet/BFW U-12 Flamingos, which usually were used as civilian training aircraft. In Zhang Zongchang’s service, however, aircraft like these were flown by Russian aviators and used for reconnoitering252. The Hsin Hua Trading Company, owned by Arthur Scholz, imported 500 Mauser pistols from World War I stocks for the provincial governor of Zhili. The German-Chinese company of Bielefeld & Sun imported twenty-seven boxes of unspecified pistols and 110 boxes of ammunition. Furthermore, Eduard Meyer & Co., Krippendorff & Co. and its subsidiary, the Deutsch-Chinesische Import- und Export Gesellschaft, were regularly mentioned in indignant German diplomatic dispatches as known importers of mostly unspecified war materials253. Still, some cases of German embargo violations were not completely clear-cut under closer scrutiny. When actually taken to task for his involvement in the China arms trade, the head of Sander, Wieler & Co. in Hongkong informed the German consul general in Tianjin that all the weapons he had delivered came from German territories under Allied occupation, from England and from Czechoslovakia, had previously been seized by the Allied Control Commision and were sold by an ‘international organisation’254. Therefore, one could never escape the suspicion that many foreign arms merchants secretly favoured German trading and shipping companies since they could only profit from the Sino German arms traffic and could put the sole blame on Germany if anything went wrong. However, even the

249 Bloch, Kurt (1940) German Interests and Policies in the Far East, New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, International Secretariat, p. 20. 250 Chan, Anthony B. (1982), pp. 93 f. The uncommon 8-millimetre calibre hints at the fact that at least some of the rifles delivered were not of German manufacture. 251 Ibid., p. 94. 252 Kotenev, Anatol M. (1937) The Chinese Soldier; Basic Principles, Spirit, Science of War, and Heroes of the Chinese Armies, Shanghai (et al.): Kelly and Walsh, p. 125. 253 PA, R 94874, Abteilung IV – Wirtschaft, Waffen A, Kriegsmaterial nach China, Band 1. German Consulate Tianjin to Auswärtiges Amt, Tianjin, 23 March 1923, German Embassy Beijing to Auswärtiges Amt, Beijing, 15 January 1924, and German Embassy Beijing to Auswärtiges Amt, Beijing, 19 January 1924. 254 ADAP, Serie A, Band X, Document 225. Consul General Betz to Auswärtiges Amt, Tianjin, 26 July 1924. The unnamed ‘international organisation’ allegedly worked in cooperation with corrupt British officers and civil servants.

79 British Foreign Office, never known for its sympathies for Germany, had to admit that ‘it has never been proved that this traffic was a deliberate violation of Germany’s obligation under Article 170 of the Treaty of Versailles’255 and, compared to the weapons trade between other foreign nations and warlord China, the contribution of the German trading houses seems indeed almost negligible – even if any German involvement had been a foolish thing to start with.

3.3.6 German and International Reactions Weimar Germany’s position on the arms trade with China, both official and illegal, had always been one of absolute rejection256. Already in the early 1920s, Berlin had rebuffed President Sun Yatsen proposals for a close cooperation between the Chinese and German heavy industry, especially between the arms manufacturers of the two nations, which he saw as essential to reunite the fragmented Chinese Republic and to make it ‘rich and powerful’257. The German expertise was so essential for Sun Yatsen’s political plans that, when he started to formulate his national defense program in 1921, one of its chapters was titled ‘Plans for the Expansion of the Hanyang Arsenal after the Example of Krupp’s Cannon Factories’258. Since China was sorely lacking any financial means, Sun Yatsen hoped to be able to pay occuring debts with the surplusses coming out of Sino-German joint ventures, like infrastructural projects, mines or even an airflight company259. Because his plans were not based on sound financial planning and almost completely out of touch with the Chinese reality, but primarily because they contravened all German foreign political concepts of the time, Berlin was once again forced to snub Sun Yatsen. Abstract foreign political concepts, however, remained almost exclusively the concern of the Berlin government and its diplomats in the Far East. For the German industry, trading houses and shipping companies, business was still business. They didn’t have a clue about China’s political situation, but the profit opportunities of the weapons trade were simply too great for them to ignore. Asked about any possible motivations of the German merchants, Wilhelm T.E. Wallroth,

255 Chan, Anthony B. (1982), p. 64. Chan quotes from a memorandum of the British Foreign Office on Germany, Czechoslovakia and the trade in arms to China, written on 5 June 1928. 256 Ratenhof, Gabriele (1984), p. 24. 257 Schmidt, Burkhard (1989) ‘Die Industrialisierung Chinas’ – Wunschtraum, Berufung, Gefahr; Deutsche und Chinesische Vorstellungen in der Zeit zwischen den Weltkriegen, in: Gransow, Bettina & Leutner, Mechthild (Eds.) (1989) China; Nähe und Ferne; Deutsch-chinesische Beziehungen in Geschichte und Gegenwart; Zum 60. Geburtstag von Kuo Heng-yü, Frankfurt am Main (et al.): Verlag Peter Lang, p. 220. 258 Ibid, p. 221. 259 Ibid.

80 a ministerial director of the Auswärtiges Amt, stated that German involvement in the arms traffic was in no way politically motivated but merely forthright business. Of course, the government in Berlin would try everything in its power to restrain the weapons trade, still, because of an insuffucient legal foundation, there was little it could actually do260. Germany’s ambassador in China, Adolf Boyé, did not share Director Wallroth’s opinion. He continuously lobbied for a total German ban on the shipment of arms to the Far East, without which Germany would have to suffer ‘heavy damage to reputation and respect’261 in China and in the entire world. Unlike the officials in Berlin, German envoys were actually faced with the various offences of their fellow countrymen and the following diplomatic backlash. They reported all incidents of German involvement in the armaments trade back to the Auswärtiges Amt in Berlin as soon as they found them out, but, due to the deliveries’ clandestine nature, these reports were only fragmentary. All too often arms deliveries had been wrongfully declared. Hand weapons had been labelled as ‘iron mongery’262, ammunition boxes had been classified as ‘pianos’, while poison gas had been shipped as ‘exterminator for the protection of plants’263. In many cases the diplomats were completely unaware of any transgressions. Frequently the diplomats and the Auswärtiges Amt learned about German weapons sales only through the international press or when one of the Chinese civil war factions or another country formally protested about the illegal activities of German traders. Faced with the backlash in the Far East, both the German diplomats in China and the Auswärtiges Amt asked the relevant governmental departments to categorically outlaw the entire Sino-German arms trade. The responsible authorities in Berlin registered the plight of the German diplomats, but chose to take no further actions. The Reichswirtschaftsministerium, Germany’s ministry of economics, explained that the existing laws to control arms exports from Germany had to suffice. Any further regulations, such as prohibiting the trade specifically with China, would be impractical since would-be arms traders could circumvent them without any difficulties by shipping their wares to other nations and then to China264. It was simply impossible to plug all legal loopholes. The Reichsfinanzministerium, Germany’s ministry of finance, stated for its part that it could do nothing more than refuse export permits for any kind of war materials, which it was already doing265. Apparently any tightening of the existing export laws would seem like an admission of guilt in the face of repeatedly unbased international accusations. On the other hand, in times of economic decline the already suffering German armaments industry had to be supported too266, even though only with a blind eye turned to it. By and large, the German government had more pressing matters to

260 ADAP, Serie B, Band IV, Document 135. Ministry Director Wallroth to German Embassy London, Berlin, 13 January 1927. See also Zhang, Xiaoming (1994), p. 43 (Footnote), and Chen, Tsun-kung (1983), p. 143. 261 ADAP, Serie B, Band IV, Document 247. Ambassador Boyé to Auswärtiges Amt, Beijing, 14 March 1927. 262 PA, R 94874, Abteilung IV – Wirtschaft, Waffen A, Kriegsmaterial nach China, Band 1. German Embassy Beijing to Auswärtiges Amt, Beijing, 19 January 1924. 263 Engelbrecht, Helmut C. & Hanighen, Frank C. (1935) Merchants of Death; A Study of the International Armament Industry, London: George Routledge & Sons, p. 231, and Seldes, George (1934), p. 112. The labelling as insecticide, however, might have been actually true. 264 Burden, Allen C. (1972), p. 138. 265 Ibid. 266 ADAP, Serie A, Band XIII, Document 46. Ministry Director Köpke to German Embassy Beijing, Berlin, 18 May 1925.

81 attend to during the early 1920s, like the mounting war reparation problems, the French occupation of the Ruhr and the stabilisation of the German currency. Unwilling to give up, the Auswärtiges Amt hoped at least for a certain amount of voluntary cooperation coming from the various trading and shipping companies to limit the completely unnecessary Chinese and international criticism. It instructed its various branch offices in Germany to approach the local export firms in their respective regions and try to convince them that the weapons trade with China, even in items not specifically banned by the Treaty of Versailles and the Inter- Allied Control Commission, was damaging to Germany’s political and economic interests in the Far East and should consequently be shunned267. Throughout the 1920s, the German trading houses were told over and over again how they damaged Germany’s image and standing in the entire world through their unscrupulous dealings, but all admonitions went unheeded. To think that businesspeople would let their profits go just because a newly-established government, which was hardly respected by its own citizens at the time, asked them to do so – especially without being backed up by the necessay laws – was more than naive. As a result, some firms proved to be less than cooperative, either denying their participation in the war materials trade outright or continuing to insist that the weapons they were selling were absolutely legal police or sporting firearms268. Still, often enough, when weapons deliveries to China had been stolen, impounded or simply not been paid for, the same German trading companies contacted their embassy and asked for help. In every case the German diplomats refused, stating that the firms had brought themselves into this unfortunate situation. In the face of China’s political situation, international rulings and Germany’s lack of extraterritoriality, they could not offer any kind of legal protection269. In the late 1920s, during Chiang Kaishek’s extraordinarily successful Northern Campaign to re-unify China under his guidance, it became an important diplomatic issue whether Weimar Germany should officially recognise the Nationalists to foster her standing in the Far East. Precisely at this moment, it became known that German merchants were once again involved in the armaments trade with the warlords of northern China. The Nationalists – and, quite hypocritically, the other foreign powers present in the Middle Kingdom – protested vehemently against this obvious interference into China’s domestic affairs270. Berlin was, more than ever before, embarrassed. The German government now finally had enough of having to continually defend itself for the actions of an unreasonable minority, even if its motivations had been ‘just business’ without any ‘political intentions’271. In late January 1927 the Auswärtiges Amt started to draft a law which, in accordance with the China arms embargo, would completely ban the shipment of arms and ammunition destined for the Middle Kingdom. This draft, which, unfortunately, cannot be found in the German archives any more, was discussed with the Ostasiatischer Verein and the Verband Deutscher Reeder, the

267 PA, R 94874, Abteilung IV – Wirtschaft, Waffen A, Kriegsmaterial nach China, Band 1. Auswärtiges Amt to Department for Foreign Trade, Leipzig, 25 September 1924. 268 Burden, Allen C. (1972), p. 142. 269 Ratenhof, Gabriele (1984), p. 25. 270 Arendt, Brian B. (1993) Germany and the National Revolution in China, 1925 – 1928, Washington: Georgetown University, p. 143. 271 Ratenhof, Udo (1987), p. 343.

82 association of German shipping companies. The draft was put on hold for the time being after both the Ostasiatischer Verein and the Verband Deutscher Reeder guaranteed that they would see to it that no war materials whatsoever would be transported on a German ship from a German or any other port to China. The Auswärtiges Amt accepted this promise, which from then onward was known as the ‘April Agreement’272. This voluntary understanding was thought to be essential since 1921’s ban on the export of weapons from Germany, which had been reconfirmed on 27 July 1927, still not prohibited an arms trade with China via foreign nations. Yet, consequently and despite the agreement, the German involvement in the arms trade with China continued, albeit under foreign flags. The Rickmers shipping company alone chartered seven foreign steamers to transport war materials to the Far East273. For the time being, the German government remained powerless to stop the breaches of the agreement. Even if it had been made an official law, there were still too many legal loopholes to cover all eventualities. Finally, after long deliberations and negotiations, 1928’s Law against the Weapons Trade with China274 completely banned both the sale and transport of weapons, ammunition or parts of weapons or ammunition, which were intended to be used in China, for a duration of at least one year. By that time, however, an apparently stable Nationalist China under Chiang Kaishek’s leadership was slowly but surely crystallizing, the international arms embargo against China was quietly withdrawn and the new law became unneccessary even before it had been properly enforced. No matter whether in Weimar Germany or elsewhere, the task of arms smuggling was, to a large extent, left to intrepid individuals and corporations. The war-torn China of the 1920s was ‘an area of high adventure and quick profits for the daring entrepreneur’275 and consequently citizens of every nation broke the international arms embargo. However, Germany was singled out for international scorn. This was most inopportune for the government in Berlin which desperately tried to keep a ‘low profile’276 on the stage of international politics. The young German Republic was particularly vulnerable to international criticism of any kind. Even unfounded rumours could create tensions with the Treaty powers and other foreign nations and damage Germany’s already precarious standing even more. Nothing was more suited to stirring up international sentiments against Weimar Germany and disillusioning still-sympathetic foreigners, Adolf Boyé observed, than the participation of German business people, with or without official tolerance, in the

272 Ibid., p. 344. 273 Ibid. 274 Reichsministerium des Inneren (Ed.) (1928) Reichsgesetzblatt; Teil I; 1928, Berlin: Verlag des Gesetzsammlungsamtes, p. 149. 275 Kirby, William C. (1984) Germany and Republican China, Stanford: Stanford University Press, p. 26. 276 Burden, Allen C. (1972), p. iv.

83 arms trade with the Middle Kingdom277. As the German ambassador put it, ‘not a week went by’ without some mention in the East Asian press of German involvement in the arms traffic, no matter whether it was the participation of German firms, banks or steamship companies or the fact that the illegal weapons uncovered were originally of German provenance278. These reports were then quickly spread throughout the world by Reuter or the United Press. Soon British, French and American newspapers used each new occurrence to assert that the ‘German armaments trade’ was prolonging the Chinese civil war279 and to prove, by extension, that Germany was as much a threat to the world as ever before. It didn’t make any difference that it was an open secret that ‘[international] journalism, in search of the sensational, was often alarmist when reporting in this field, making use of innuendo and guilt-by-association to liven the bare facts of the trade’280. The unveiled animosity created by Allied wartime propaganda had not yet disappeared and Germany remained a popular victim for journalists around the globe who cared little for the damage they did with their articles. Even German newspapers, especially left-leaning dailies like the Hamburger Volkszeitung, frequently – and unfoundedly – reported alleged German arms sales, with the knowledge of the Weimar government, to the warring factions in China281. This was, however, merely a rather unsuccessful attempt of the German Communists, both of those sitting in the Reichstag and of those active in the media, to destabilise the young German government for their own political goals. It was understandable that, on an international level, the government in Berlin tried to play down any allegiations of German complicity in the arms traffic as attempts to mar Germany’s reputation or as ‘evil-willed propaganda aimed at German trade’282. Yet, there was nothing the German politicians and diplomats could actually do. Just as was the case in regard to the purported German military advisers in Chinese service, the international press was not motivated by the search for truth, but mostly by anti- German sentiments and sensationalism. It did not help that there was apparently a common approach among the great trading nations to point fingers at some other

277 PA, R 104815, Politische Abteilung VIII – China, Po 2, Politische Beziehungen Chinas zu Deutschland, Band 2. Ambassador Boyé to Auswärtiges Amt, Beijing, no date. 278 ADAP, Serie A, Band XII, Document 93. Ambassador Boyé to Auswärtiges Amt, Beijing, 14 February 1925. 279 Ibid. 280 Burden, Allen C. (1972), p. 129. 281 Causey, Beverley D. (1942) German Policy towards China, 1918 – 1941, Cambridge: Harvard University, p. 102. 282 Causey, Beverley D. (1942), p. 126.

84 country, especially one which was in no position to refute the accusations, to distract from their own misgivings. British, French, American or Japanese complaints that Germany was openly breaking the arms embargo all smacked of hypocrisy since citizens of these countries were just as involved in the weapons trade with China. One also could not escape the impression that the criticism brought up by the Allied powers against German trade activities in China was, in large part, sour grapes. After the Great War, these nations had intended to freeze out the German competition from the Far Eastern market for good and then had to realize that all their plans had backfired with the Sino-German Friendship Treaty. Furthermore, Germany’s involvement in the arms trade with China became an occasional political tool in the disputes between other nations. When in early 1927 tensions between Great Britain and the Soviet Union grew over the several armed incidents in China, the British government suspected Germany of sympathizing with the Bolsheviks’ cause and even of delivering weapons to the Chinese Communists283. The Soviet press, on the other hand, attacked Germany for supporting the northern anti-Bolshevist warlord armies with war materials284. German arms deliveries indeed had happened, but the British and Russian assumptions behind them were all equally ludicrous. Germany’s positive image in the Far East was also threatened by the fact that the Chinese press, sympathetic to one or the other faction within warlord China, started to print similar – exaggerated and insincere – accusations285 to influence the outcome of the seemingly endless conflict. Guomindang-supporting journalists accused the Germans of selling war materials to northern China, while correspondents close to the northern warlords denounced the same German merchants for supporting the revolutionaries in the south286. Still, the Guomindang were only opposing German arms sales when they were destined for their enemies. While protesting loudly when others were the recipients of weapons deliveries, they made inquiries about purchasing German arms themselves287. In the end, the government in Berlin was continuously attacked abroad and at home for allegedly condoning arms sales it was unable to stop. Not even stricter laws

283 ADAP, Serie B, Band IV, Document 135. Ministry Director Wallroth to German Embassy London, Berlin, 13 January 1927. 284 Ibid. 285 ADAP, Serie A, Band XII, Document 93. Ambassador Boyé to Auswärtiges Amt, Beijing, 14 February 1925. 286 Ratenhof, Udo (1987), p. 343. 287 Arendt, Brian B. (1993), p. 143.

85 or tighter controls could interrupt the armaments shipments to China. In a politically unsettled nation with a weak post-war economy profits simply were a greater motivation than the adherence to the Treaty of Versailles, particularly since a great number of Germans were convinced that the enforced peace agreement had been unnecessarily harsh, even unjust. The German diplomats in the Far East were equally incapable of tackling the problem. Weimar Germany’s lack of extraterritoriality in China, coupled with the powerlessness of the Beijing government and the unwillingness of all Chinese civil war factions to end the arms trade in general, made every attempt to that end futile. Besides, the inefficient cooperation between the various Treaty powers themselves had made the China arms embargo ineffective to start with, even when the German government, as a non-signatory, at least had tried to follow the spirit of the aggreement. Yet, what is frequently overlooked, but must not be forgotten, is the relative weakness of the Weimar Republic and its governmental institutions throughout the 1920s. Coping with a lost war and its unavoidable repercussions, it had to attempt to build a stable democracy which was alien – and suspect – to many conservative Germans who were still used to the mindset of the old empire. Besides being rejected by many of its citizens, it was further weakened by a number of additional problems. There were, for example, economic instability in the wake of a global economic crisis and the fierce political infighting between radical left- and right-wing groups. While the German involvement in the arms trade with China did not actually lead to the dreaded diplomatic confrontations with the major powers, none of the nations in question saw or acknowledged the constant political pressure under which the young Weimar Republic was reeling. The entire world expected Germany to fulfill all of her obligations and criticized her when she was unable to do so. Without any international affirmation, the German political weakness was bound to continue in the years to come. Having had only an apparently limited control over Germany’s involvement in the Far East to start with, the Auswärtiges Amt’s control of German China policy declined more and more, ‘foreshadowing the involvement of many different German government agencies in the extensive Sino-German cooperation during the Third Reich’288, not to mention the additional meddling of other private factions and individuals. Any apparent control over the various groups getting mixed up in

288 Burden, Allen C. (1972), p. iv.

86 Germany’s China policy, however, had been a mere illusion anyway. What both the German politicians and the diplomats of the Auswärtiges Amt had seen as control had been nothing but damage control.

3.3.7 Weapons Sold and Delivered The generally clandestine nature of the arms trade makes it extraordinarily difficult to determine the makes and models or exact sales numbers of weapons put on the market. Official documents, either from governmental offices or from the business world, are often unavailable or too vague and in some cases photos are the only source material obtainable. This is particularly true in the case of warlord China, where the sheer numbers of unscrupulous arms merchants and all-too-willing buyers, despite or rather, because of, the international arms embargo, are virtually impossible to grasp. As a result, every analysis, even when it is narrowed down to a single nation and its weapons manufacturers, must by necessity remain incomplete. An analysis as such is made even more difficult by the fact that China in the 1920s, notwithstanding the enormous influx of war materials from abroad, had its own flourishing, albeit very limited arms production, which was primarily focussed on manufacturing copies of proven and popular foreign designs. Nearly every provincial capital in China had an arms factory of one sort of the other able to churn out moderate quantities of weapons and ammunition and there existed, in addition, numerous workshops not much better then the local blacksmiths’ shops. However, most of the alleged factories, often imposingly called arsenals but more correctly defined as armories, were mainly concerned with the storage and repair of arms. Nevertheless, there were a few, perhaps twenty, true arsenals with the capacity for manufacturing war materials. They included the larger arsenals of Dezhou in Shandong, Hanyang in Hubei, Hongxian in Henan, Mukden in Manchuria, Taiyuan in Shanxi, as well as the smaller ones of Anqing, Fuzhou, Nanjing and Shanghai. Supervised by foreign engineers and equipped with increasingly modern machinery imported from overseas, these facilities produced mostly small quantities of pistols, rifles, machine guns and simple field and mountain cannons, including the necessary ammunition289. Of the wide variety of hand weapons that was being manufactured in China, by far the most widely produced and used was the so-called Hanyang 88, a

289 Wou, Odoric Y.K. (1978), p. 85.

87 copy of the 7.9-millimetre Mauser 88 five-shot repeating rifle which was manufactured in the factory complex at Hanyang290. Even various Krupp-type artillery pieces, like 7.5-centimetre guns, were produced in the Middle Kingdom in a process that had already begun in 1905 and that continued well into the 1920s291. These weapons also frequently created the impression that larger amounts of arms had been imported from Germany than it actually had been the case. Yet, even a production run of some 200,000 rifles a year, which was the peak figure of China’s arms manufacturing capabilities for 1928, was hardly enough to meet the needs of the huge warlord armies292. In addition, it must be admitted that more often than not second-hand weapons from the West appeared to be better than the best first-hand Chinese products. As a consequence, the majority of China’s arms and ammunition had still to be acquired from overseas. Aircraft fell into a grey zone when it came to China’s acquisition of war materials. To strengthen their military powers, the Beijing government and the provincial warlords purchased limited quantities of airplanes from the Western powers. Since local authorities all over China sought foreign assistance in developing their own aviation programs, foreign businesspeople took the opportunity to extend their influence in China even more by building aircraft factories and establishing flying schools. American, British, French, Italian and, to a far lesser degree, German aircraft manufacturers scrambled for the Chinese market. Given the circumstances, Weimar Germany had to remain a minor player. The post-war depression, but particularly the Treaty of Versailles’ ban on the production of military aircraft, forced the German aircraft companies to focus their limited business on Europe. The Far Eastern market was hardly relevant. However, there were some attempts by larger companies like Junkers, as well as several pet projects of intrepid individuals, to gain at least small shares of the potentially vast Chinese market.

290 Waldron, Arthur (1995), p. 66. Beginning in 1935, the Chinese arsenals also began to produce a copy of the Mauser 98k carbine, which was known as the ‘Chiang Kaishek Rifle’ or the ‘Generalissimo Chiang Model’ and which followed the design of the German original ‘so closely that you could interchange the locks’. See Kirby, William C. (1984), p. 218. William Kirby quotes from an interview he conducted with Gerhard Flatow, an employee of the Otto Wolff company which was deeply involved in the Sino-German trade. 291 Waldron, Arthur (1995), p. 59. 292 Ch’i, Hsi-Sheng (1976), p. 120.

88 Via the trading house of Siemssen & Co., the Junkers company sold unspecified numbers293 of one-engined two-man Junkers F 13 transport aircraft, one-engined two- man Junkers W 33 transport aircraft, one-engined two-man Junkers A 20 training aircraft, one-engined two-man Junkers A 35 training aircraft and one-engined two- man Junkers K 53 reconnaissance planes, which had been manufactured by Junkers’ branch factories in Sweden, to various Chinese customers. Among the buyers were the local warlords of the Shanxi, Shandong and Henan provinces, as well as Chiang Kaishek’s Nationalists in China’s south. For example, one of the Junkers F 13s was ordered for Shanxi province in April 1925 and was shipped from Germany. It was, however, seized in Shandong in February 1926 and paid for by that province in June of the same year. Another machine, which had previously been used as a demonstrator in Siam, was shipped from Bangkok as a substitute. In February 1927 this aircraft was impounded by Shandong as well. A third Junkers F 13 finally arrived in March 1928, was delivered to Taiyuan and entered service with Shanxi’s air force in April294. Shanxi had already ordered one of the Junkers A 20s in April 1925. This machine was seized by Shandong, along with the Junkers F 13, in February 1926. The German steamer Etha Rickmers arrived with a new Junkers A 20 intended for Shansi in January 1927, but it, too, was captured by Shandong and converted into a military aircraft by a Junkers engineer working in China at the time. Shandong signed a contract for another ten machines of the Swedish-built Junkers K 53, military versions of the Junkers A 20. In July 1928, when the last of these aircraft reached China, Shandong’s air force had already been absorbed by Zhang Xueliang’s Manchurian air force and they were delivered directly to Mukden295. With the exception of the Junkers K 53, which was an already armed military aircraft built exclusively in Sweden, all Junkers planes sold to China were purely civilian. Still, with the right equipment any of these aircraft could be converted into a makeshift warplane. It is therefore safe to assume that most of the Junkers A 20s served as reconnaissance aircraft in warlord service, while the Junkers F 13 transport planes probably saw action as provisional bombers. All in all, however, ’s rather limited production facilities during the 1920s, as well as the demand for aircraft in Germany and elsewhere, hampered big sales in the Far East.

293 The exact numbers are not available since most of the sources are either vague or openly contradict each other. 294 Andersson, Lennart (2002) Chinese Aviation until 1949, [Unpublished].

89 There was also a group of enthusiastic small-scale engineers who tried to manufacture, on a strictly private basis, their own aircraft designs in China since Germany’s aircraft industry was so seriously encumbered by the Treaty of Versailles. One of them was Ferdinand Leopold Schoettler who, with the assistance of E.O. Fuetterer, produced in 1924 his unique Fuetterer-Schoettler I biplane ‘under the most severe of circumstances’296 for Zhang Zuolin in Mukden. Whether this aircraft was used for military or civilian purposes remains, however, unknown. The Mauser company had already been well known for its contacts with Imperial China since the 1870s. Most of the rifles of the modern trained and equipped units of the Imperial Chinese army had been delivered directly from Oberndorf, where the main factory of the Mauser concern was located. However, Mauser weapons were also sold by some of the German trading houses located in China, for example by Mandl & Co. in Shanghai297. This trend continued, although on a more limited scale, even after World War I. While the sales of military rifles, banned by both the Treaty of Versailles and the China arms embargo, were almost negligible, the pistols business was soaring. Yet, once again, the actual sales numbers of Mauser weapons delivered to China cannot be found, not even in the company’s archives298. Many rifles were also sold over and over again, from nation to nation, before they finally ended up in the Middle Kingdom. The Mauser C 96 7.63-millimetre semi-automatic pistol, first manufactured in 1896 and famous in the English-speaking world as the ‘broomhandle’, became the Mauser company’s biggest export article with more than 1 million of all variants of the handgun being sold299, even though the Treaty of Versailles limited the German manufacture and export of weapons to the barest minimum. According to the Treaty the production of guns with barrels longer than 101 millimetres was banned. To circumvent these restrictions, Mauser started to produce a new line of C 96s in 1920. This pistol had a barrel length of just 99 millimetres and therefore broke neither the articles of Versailles nor the German laws limiting the the trade in war materials300.

295 Ibid. 296 Langsdorf, W. von (Ed.) (1927) Jahrbuch 1927 – 28 [Fortschritte der Luftfahrt (Number 14)], Frankfurt am Main: Bechhold Verlag, p. 209. 297 Wimmel, Walter E. (1995) Shansi-C96 in .45 ACP, in: Internationales Waffen-Magazin (Number 10, October 1995), p. 587. 298 Seel, Wolfgang (1988), p. 95. 299 Schiller, David T. (1992) Retour-Kutsche, in: Visier (Number 12, December 1992), p. 116. 300 ADAP, Serie A, Band X, Document 225. Consul General Betz to Auswärtiges Amt, Tianjin, 26 July 1924.

90 The sales success of the Mauser C 96 automatic pistol after these design changes basically saved Mauser from bankruptcy during the post-war years. In the years between 1924 and 1930, some fifty-four percent of the company’s turnover were sales of exactly this type of weapon301. Ironically enough, the arms embargo against China also became one of the contributing factors for the Mauser C 96’s popularity in the Far East. Since rifles were simply too long and difficult to hide when being smuggled, Mauser pistols became in many cases some kind of standard armament of the armies of the Chinese civil wars, especially since, due to the weapons’ wooden butt stocks, they could easily be turned into carbines. Almost every Chinese officer was carrying a Mauser C 96 in his holster and Chinese elite units, no matter whether belonging to the warlords, the Nationalists or the Communists, insisted on using this handy and effective weapon302. This huge success, however, created many imitators. Many C 96 imitations, manufactured by Royal or Astra in Spain since 1928, were sold to the Middle Kingdom. Several arsenals in China, particularly the ones in Shanghai or Hanyang, also manufactured C 96 copies to cover the enormous demand for this popular weapon. They even tried to imitate the original German engravings, albeit with many spelling mistakes303. When the supply of 7.63-millimetre ammunition started to diminish due to National Socialist Germany’s abandonment of China in the late 1930s, Chinese engineers converted many Mauser C 96s to use the more readily available 9-millimetre and 0.45-inch304 ammunition. All these copies, however, were by far not of the same quality as the originals. Nevertheless, they make it once again almost impossible to find out whether a ‘Mauser’ pistol used by Chinese troops was actually German-made or just some cheap knock-off. Also, as a consequence, the Mauser company had to improve their pistol to remain competitive and in later years brought on the market the fully automatic Model 1930 and Model 1932 C 96s, which

301 Seel, Wolfgang (1988), p. 89. 302 The Mauser C 96 pistol and its Chinese copies remained in Chinese service well into the 1980s. See Benz, Martin & Hugo, Martin (1990) Für Kaiser, Gott und Vaterland, in: Visier (Number 12, December 1990), pp. 14 ff., and Schiller, David T. (1995), pp. 30 ff. 303 Some of the pistols had ‘Paliered’ engraved in their frames instead of ‘Patented’ and claimed to be manufactured in ‘Oberaudorf’. See Schiller, David T. (1992), p. 119. 304 A 0.45-inch C 96 copy was, however, already manufatured by the Taiyuan arsenal in Shanxi province as early as 1929. Enlargements of available pictures show both the eighteenth and nineteenth years of the Chinese Republic as manufacturing dates engraved in the weapons’ frames. Rumours have it that this type of pistol had to be manufactured after a shipment of Thompson M1928 submachine guns from the United States got lost on the way and only the 0.45-inch ammunition was delivered, for which the Chinese had no suitable weapon. See Wimmel, Walter E. (1995), p. 588.

91 were basically compact submachine guns. Thousands of pistols of the first production run of these types were sold to China alone. While the sales of Junkers aircraft and Mauser handguns can be at least partially traced back through official documents, one of the more enigmatic weapons used in warlord China remains the Bergmann submachine gun. After the disarmament of the German army in late 1918, the existing World War I-vintage Bergmann MP 18 9- millimetre submachine guns were modified as MP 18/20s for German police service by replacing the unwieldy Luger snail magazines with box magazines. A large number of these box magazine submachine guns ended up in China in the hands of warlord troops, particularly of those fighting for Zhang Zongchang, the Shandong warlord and ‘enfant terrible’305 among the allies of the Manchurian warlord Zhang Zuolin. These ‘soldiers of the Northern Army’ can clearly be identified in contemporary photographs, ‘with their machine-guns ready for the attack’306. The troops of Wu Peifu’s ‘Tin Hat Brigade’, an elite unit which was, unlike other Chinese units of the time, wearing steel helmets, were also armed with Bergmann MP 18/20 submachine guns, but only after they had captured them from their enemies of the Fengtian warlord faction307. The question remains by whom and how these weapons had been sold to China since their use was supposed to be exclusively limited to the German police. A certain W.J. Leigh, a man of mixed English and Chinese parentage, was employed as an advisor for arms transactions by Zhang Zongchang. He often dealt with the German trading firms who still had their commercial base in the former German territory on the Shandong peninsula308. Perhaps these companies were somehow involved in the acquisition of the MP 18/20s. Still, there is no concrete proof for the arms sales, especially since W.J. Leigh had also extensive business connections with Czechoslovakians and Norwegians. In 1928, the MP 18/20 was placed back into limited production in Germany, designated as the MP 28. This submachine gun was also manufactured in Belgium and Spain for export all over the

305 Krarup-Nielsen, Aage (1928) The Dragon Awakes, London: Bodley Head, p. 203. Zhang Zongchang was also a close friend of the wife of , the Chinese foreign minister during the 1920s, who, despite his infamous excesses, remembered him fondly in her autobiography. See Koo, Madame Wellington & Taves, Isabella (1975) No Feast lasts forever, New York: Quadrangle/ Book Co., pp. 158 f. 306 Krarup-Nielsen, Aage (1928), opposite p. 158. Aage Krarup-Nielsen had joined the crew of one of warlord Zhang Zongchang’s armoured train as an observer and had taken the photographs himself. Another photograph can be found in McCormack, Gavan (1977), p. 138, showing Zhang Zongchang and his bodyguards boarding a train in early 1925. 307 Jowett, Philip S. (1997), pp. 42 f. 308 Chan, Anthony B. (1982), pp. 53 f.

92 world309, but its production run started far too late for it to be the weapon seen on the photos of Zhang Zongzhang’s soldiers.

3.4 Recapitulation The early twentieth century brought immense changes to Germany and China. Lost wars, falling imperial regimes, the emergence of republican systems of government, economic weakness and subsequent political and social disorder created an atmosphere of instability, if not outright lawlessness in both nations. Still, these seemingly insurmountable problems brought Germany and China closer together, however, not in the way the governments of the two countries had intended. At the beginning of the 1920s, the governments in Berlin and Beijing had come to an agreement to foster predominantly impartial diplomatic, economic and cultural relations and not to interfere in each other’s more than volatile domestic affairs. Yet, their own political weaknesses made this kind of international relationship impossible. Having no true control over their own nations, the governments of Germany and China were unable to stop the different factions which destabilised their nations and which they tried so desperately to suppress from creating their own close alliances. Within only a short time, Chinese regional governors and military warlords hired small numbers of discharged German officers and soldiers, German technical experts unable to find employment in Germany’s severely restricted armaments industry and other various disillusioned and disgruntled German citizens to help them fight against the central government in Beijing and establish their own rule. Furthermore, against explicit orders from Berlin, purely profit-oriented German trading companies and obstinate German weapons manufacturers delivered war materials to the Far East to arm the continuously-fighting Chinese warlord armies. Not even the international community could bring the Middle Kingdom’s anti-governmental forces and their German associates into line, particularly since many foreign nations, officially and unofficially, were equally involved in China’s domestic struggles. As the years passed, the battles between the Chinese warlords and the Beijing governments – and the limited influence of the various German parties on them – threatened to go on forever. However, by 1928, one of the warring Chinese factions,

309 Bishop, Chris (Ed.) (2000) WWII: The Directory of Weapons, London: Greenwich Editions, p. 258, and Hogg, Ian V. (1997) The Military Book Club Encyclopedia of Infantry Weapons of WWII, London: Saturn Books, p. 60.

93 the Guomindang under the leadership of Chiang Kaishek, was finally able to vanquish most of its opponents, reunify China and establish a more stable government. The Middle Kingdom’s difficulties seemed to be over. The German government also cherished the thought that from now on German influence on China’s military affairs would become obsolete. Yet, the unofficial Sino-German military relations had not found their end. On the contrary, under Chiang Kaishek and in the face of new threats in the Far East, they were to become even closer and rise to an entirely new level.

4. Weimar Germany and Nationalist China, 1928 – 1933 4.1 Historical Background 4.1.1 Nationalist China, 1928 – 1933 The year 1927 was a turning point in the . It saw the successful conclusion of the Northern Expedition, during which the Guomindang’s National Revolutionary Army had marched seemingly unstoppable northwards from Canton, defeating or converting all warlords along the way and annihilating or assimilating all opposing warlord troops into its own ranks. As a result of this victorious campaign, the Middle Kingdom could finally be reunited under a Nationalist government, with Nanjing becoming the new capital310. Yet, the same year also witnessed the ultimate and momentous break-up of the alliance between the Guomindang on one side and the Chinese Communists and the Soviet advisers on the other. The union between the Nationalists and the Communists had always been tenuous. Only their ambition to unify China had kept them together over the years. Already after Sun Yatsen’s death in 1925, the first political infighting within the Guomindang had broken out between the party’s right wing, which still sympathized with the traditional elites and the old order, and its revolutionary left wing, which was supported by the Chinese Communists and the Soviet advisers. Only the victorious Nationalist army, headed by Chiang Kaishek, could stop the disintegration of the party and the resulting weakening of the Chinese Republic, which would only have benefitted the warlords and the colonial powers. Chiang Kaishek had long been wary

310 When Nanjing became the capital of the Chinese Republic on 8 June 1928, Beijing’s name was changed to ‘Beiping’, meaning ‘Northern Peace’, as opposed to ‘Northern Capital’, the translation of its original name. For reasons of simplicity, however, ‘Beijing’ will be retained throughout the text.

94 of Mikhail M. Borodin, the Soviet chief adviser, whom he saw as ‘the dictator of the Chinese Communist Party and at the same time the most influential man in the new government directing the policy and the strategy of the Revolution’311. With quick actions he took over the leadership of the Guomindang and turned against his former allies. Chiang Kaishek quickly expelled the interfering Soviet advisers in August 1927 and seemingly eliminated any further, possibly undermining influence of the Chinese Communists, mostly through violent means, as he did during the outright massacre of striking Bolshevist sympathizers in Shanghai earlier that year. On 8 June 1928, the Nationalist army finally marched into Beijing and took possession of the city. With peace and stability apparently restored throughout the country, the Nationalist government in Nanjing at last received the international recognition it had so long fought for. Still, under the guidance of Chiang Kaishek, the Chinese Republic was slowly transformed into a military dictatorship. During Sun Yatsen’s lifetime, the military had been a relatively disparaged element of the Guomindang movement, just as it had always been in Chinese society. Under Chiang Kaishek, however, Sun Yatsen’s relative ranking of these groups within the Guomindang – first the party, then the government and lastly the army – was turned upside down and the army became the predominant element312. This was not completely unexpected. Chiang Kaishek was first and foremost a soldier and military force had become the ‘primary political coinage’313 in this time of strife, during which violence had all to often proven to be the only viable solution to China’s dilemma. These dire circumstances, as well as his clever use of various political, economic and social affiliations, had accelerated Chiang Kaishek’s meteoric rise within the Guomindang from a mere military commander within few years. In 1928, after he had ultimately gained the leadership of the Chinese Republic, Chiang Kaishek’s primary goals were to break the power of the remaining warlord elements in northern China and to defeat the Chinese Communists, who had gone underground after the brutal persecution of the previous year314. He calculated that he could only reach these internal goals with the establishment of an efficient domestic armaments industry, with the import of large amounts of weapons from abroad and

311 Ballantine, Joseph W. (1970) International Settings: A Study of Strained Relationships between China and Foreign Powers, in: Sih, Paul K.T. (Ed.) (1970) The Strenuous Decade: China’s Nation- Building Efforts, 1927 – 1937 [Asia in the Modern World (Number 9)], Kingston: St. John’s University Press, p. 9. As an aside, it is strange that, while Joseph Ballantine writes extensively about the Soviet advisers as scheming Comintern agents and the American advisers as China’s steadfast allies against the Japanese invaders, he completely fails to mention the activities of the German advisers. 312 Eastman, Lloyd E. (1991) Nationalist China during the Nanking Decade, 1927 – 1937, in: Eastman, Lloyd E. (et al.) (1991) The Nationalist Era in China 1927 – 1949, Cambridge (et al.): Cambridge University Press, pp. 8 f. 313 Ibid., p. 15. 314 Zhang, Xianwen (1989) Zur Entwicklung der chinesisch-deutschen Beziehungen in den dreißiger Jahren des 20. Jahrhunderts, in: [Anon.] (Ed.) (1989) Bulletin Faschismus/Zweiter Weltkrieg; Sonderheft 1989, Berlin: Zentralinstitut für Geschichte, p. 26.

95 with the creation of a strong Chinese army under his direct control. Still, Chiang Kaishek’s break-up with the Soviet Union had not only meant the end of Soviet support for the Chinese Communists, but also cut off Soviet military and economic help for the Guomindang. Considering the existing relationships between China and other countries, particularly the powerful colonial powers still present in the Middle Kingdom, Chiang Kaishek could only ask Germany for support. Once again, Weimar Germany seemed to be the ideal partner for China. It was, in Chiang Kaishek’s eyes, despite the temporary setbacks of a lost war and a weakened economy, still a strong nation and, moreover, was even on the way to becoming a totalitarian state in 1933, mirroring his own plans for China315. All other nations were either inappropriate for his goals or had too many of their own interests at stake in the Far East. A cooperation between the two nations, particularly on a military level, could also be beneficial for both sides – or so Chiang Kaishek thought. Weimar Germany, however, proved to be reluctant. Throughout the mid-1920s, both the government in Berlin and the Auswärtiges Amt had been extremely concerned about the ideological nature of the Guomindang’s forceful reunification of China. Still, Chiang Kaishek’s ousting of the Soviet Russian advisers and his anti-Communist stance found approval in Germany. Once a stable government had been established in Nanjing, Weimar Germany, in concert with other foreign nations, officially recognized Chiang Kaishek’s Nationalist China. The door was now open for freshly invigorated and even more extensive relations between the two nations, particularly on political, economic and cultural levels. Military cooperation between Berlin and Nanjing, however, remained as much out of the question, as it had been throughout the 1920s. The reasons for the rejection of Chiang Kaishek’s wish for close military ties remained the same. The Treaty of Versailles and Weimar Germany’s fragile standing on the global stage still prohibited any martial activities. Only diplomatic, economic and cultural ties were seen as sufficiently obligation-free to be considered as official China policy by the government in Berlin. Still, Chiang Kaishek didn’t have to be too concerned about Weimar Germany’s rebuttal. While the government and the Auswärtiges Amt didn’t budge from their position concerning military support for Nationalist China, substantial help was soon on the way from various private and not-so-private sources in Germany. Within only a short time, the first German military advisers had entered Chinese service. Weapons and ammunition exports to the Far East also started to increase and established a new trend which was to continue and even expand over the coming years. This unofficial and only semi-legal German support would play an important role in Chiang

315 Rostek, Horst (1989) Zur Rolle der deutschen Militärberater bei der chinesischen Nationalregierung 1928 bis 1938, in: [Anon.] (Ed.) (1989) Bulletin Faschismus/Zweiter Weltkrieg;

96 Kaishek’s upcoming campaigns, first against the last remaining warlords and, from 1930 onwards, against the Chinese Communists.

4.1.2 Weimar Germany and her China Policy, 1928 – 1933 While China had experienced enormous change by the late 1920s, Weimar Germany’s post-war situation had stagnated. The German population continued to suffer from endless political the infighting between the various left- and right-wing groups and seemingly unsurmountable economic woes. A stable government and true domestic peace were nowhere in sight. This internal stagnation also had its effect on the continuity of German foreign policy, which was still devised and implemented under the spectre of the Treaty of Versailles. Weimar Germany had finally been accepted as a member of the League of Nations in 1926. Due to her countless international obligations resulting from the defeat in the Great War, particularly the reparation payments and the political dependency on the goodwill of the victorious powers, Germany pursued a policy of strictest neutrality. In an attempt to keep a low profile and appease possibly all parties, the Auswärtiges Amt chose the path of least resistance, never antagonizing anybody and never taking sides whatever the argument might be. In the beginning, this approach was surprisingly effective. The amicable relations existing between Weimar Germany and various other League of Nations members were illustrated during the short-lived Sino-Russian conflict of 1929, when both China and the Soviet Union asked a ‘reluctant Germany’316 to help in a mediation between the antagonists and to take care of their interests in the other party’s territory. Despite its lack of influence on the global stage, China was one of the few members of the League of Nations which was sympathetic towards Weimar Germany and which supported the German attempts to revise the harshest articles of the Treaty of Versailles. The Beijing government saw similarities between itself and Germany. In its eyes the Treaty of Versailles was almost identical to its own Unequal Treaties. Also its increasingly worsening relationship with Japan resembled the Franco-German relations insofar that a militarily superior nation tried to impose unfair treaties to enforce a security concept it had envisioned for its own best advantage317. Still, the Beijing government was predominantly concerned with its own agenda. It only stood by Germany’s side when its support didn’t interfere with its own relations with the

Sonderheft 1989, Berlin: Zentralinstitut für Geschichte, p. 116. 316 ADAP, Serie B, Band XII, Document 108. State Secretary von Schubert to German Embassy Moscow, Berlin, 19 July 1929. 317 Ratenhof, Gabriele (1990) Das Deutsche Reich, Japan und die internationale Krise um die Mandschurei 1931 bis 1933, in: Kreiner, Josef & Mathias, Regine (Eds.) (1990) Deutschland – Japan in der Zwischenkriegszeit, Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, p. 114.

97 victorious powers and the other colonial nations – which happened all too often. The Auswärtiges Amt continued its positive relationship with the government in Beijing, but the victory of the Guomindang in the Northern Expedition slowly began to change the balance of power in China. While keeping in contact with the Chinese government in Beijing, the Auswärtiges Amt in Berlin didn’t have any qualms, in the spirit of neutrality, to approach Chiang Kaishek and his new Nationalist regime. There was no true German loyalty to Beijing. Adolf Boyé, the German Ambassador in China, was often disappointed by Beijing’s good relations with the Treaty powers at Germany’s expense. Already in 1926 he had written a telegram to his superiors and acidly remarked that the Beijing government had not necessarily ‘spoiled [Germany] with friendship despite the equal treaties’318. Without a second thought the Auswärtiges Amt followed the other foreign nations into officially recognizing Nanjing as the legitimate Chinese government in 1928. Weimar Germany’s foreign policy of non-interference, however, continued despite its professed good relations with Nationalist China. This happened not only as a matter of principle, but also because it had proven successful to advance Germany’s status in the world. Particularly after the unfortunate Manchurian Incident of 1931, in the course of which Japan invaded the northern part of China under the pretence of an endangered national security, Germany’s government under Chancellor Heinrich Brüning, even more than the previous governments, clung to the tenets of a neutral German foreign policy. To possibly explain this stance, the usual economic and political troubles in Germany, but also resurfacing tensions with France, forced it to remain focussed almost exclusively on Europe. However, in the previous months Japan, keenly aware of Germany’s sympathies for China, had pursued an obviously calculated pro-German policy in the League of Nations in regard to several key articles of the Treaty of Versailles. Berlin did not intend to gamble away this kind of benevolence319, especially not in the face of 7 million Reichsmarks in war reparations which still had to be paid to Japan320. In any case, whatever the Chinese might have expected Berlin to do, they overestimated Weimar Germany’s influence in the League of Nations and underestimated its self-interest. The first and foremost goal of the German government’s increasingly revisionist foreign policy was to re-establish Germany’s position among the nations of the world. In an attempt to solve the escalating crisis in the Far East, in 1932 the League of Nations sent a Commision of Inquiry to Manchuria on a fact-finding mission.

318 Kuo, Heng-yü (1986) Deutschland und China im Jahre 1927 aus der Sicht deutscher Diplomaten, in: Kuo, Heng-yü (Ed.) (1986) Von der Kolonialpolitik zur Kooperation; Studien zur Geschichte der deutsch-chinesischen Beziehungen, München: Minerva Publikation, p. 296. Kuo Heng-yü quotes from Adolf Boyé’s telegram to Director Köpke, sent on 13 December 1926. 319 Ratenhof, Gabriele (1984) Das Deutsche Reich und die internationale Krise um die Mandschurei 1931 – 1933; Die deutsche Fernostpolitik als Spiegel und Instrument deutscher Revisionspolitik, Frankfurt am Main (et al.): Peter Lang, p. 49. 320 Bloch, Kurt (1940) German Interests and Policies in the Far East, New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, International Secretariat, p. 7.

98 Japan had – unsuccessfully – tried to prevent Weimar Germany’s involvement in the so-called Lytton Commision, named after its head, the British Lord Edward Lytton, since it knew about continuing German sympathies for China. Indeed, in Japanese-occupied Manchuria, Heinrich Schnee, the German member of the delegation, spoke to German merchants and heard their complaints about Japanese attempts to bully them out of their businesses321. It was quite clear to everybody involved that the Japanese were striving for a total monopoly in the area and were trying to close the ‘Open Door’ policy so passionately protected by the Western powers. Still, after the return of the Lytton Commission, Weimar Germany, in concert with the other League of Nations members, took up up a position of neutrality and restraint which actually favoured Japan and did nothing to curb its aggression on the Asian mainland. Although knowing better, Germany did not want to embrace a policy different to the ones pursued by the other great powers and did not want to antagonize Japan since Japan had hinted at possible concessions for Germany’s attempts to revise the Treaty of Versailles322. Additionally Japan, probably in an attempt to pressure Germany into a more positive attitude, had brought up exaggerated reports about the activities of the German military advisers in China. The German government wanted this uncomfortable topic to disappear from the international headlines as quickly as possible since it could be construed as evidence for a breach of the articles of the Treaty of Versailles in the upcoming conferences. Strangely enough, any kind of criticism aimed at Berlin in regard to the military advisers disappeared after Germany had demonstrated its neutral, in other words pro-Japanese, position in Geneva323. Still, changing Germany’s stance might merely have been an additional benefit. Apparently the criticism had also been used to explain the initial Japanese defeats in Manchuria to an exasperated Japanese public. The failure of the League of Nations over the Manchurian Incident had severe repercussions throughout the world. It was the unrefutable proof that this international organisation was unable to counteract wrongdoings of any kind in its alleged sphere of influence. The League of Nations failure – and the German participation in it – also had its effects on Weimar Germany. Throughout the 1920s idealistic soldiers of fortune and unscrupulous opportunists from Germany had supported China both with military knowledge and war materials. Now others joined their ranks. Private individuals, dissatisfied with Weimar Germany’s policies, both domestic and foreign, created their own China policy. Within short time, they were even clandestinely joined by official German institutions like the Reichswehr in undermining the foreign policy of the German government. The employment of the first German military advisers under the leadership of Colonel Max Bauer, Chiang Kaishek’s campaigns against the Chinese Communists and finally the Japanese occupation of Manchuria in 1931 found great interest in the German press and among the German people, whose sympathies lay definitely with Nationalist China. In 1931, Oskar Trautmann, the former head of the Far Eastern department of the Auswärtiges Amt, was appointed the new German

321 Nish, Ian (1990) Germany, Japan and the Manchurian Crisis: Dr. Heinrich Schnee and the Lytton Commission, in: Kreiner, Josef & Mathias, Regine (Eds.) (1990) Deutschland – Japan in der Zwischenkriegszeit, Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, pp. 113 ff. 322 Martin, Bernd (1986) Das Deutsche Reich und Guomindang-China, 1927 – 1941, in: Kuo, Heng-yü (Ed.) (1986) Von der Kolonialpolitik zur Kooperation; Studien zur Geschichte der deutsch- chinesischen Beziehungen, München: Minerva Publikation, p. 347. 323 Ratenhof, Gabriele (1984), p. 137.

99 emissary to Nanjing. A known Sinophile, he became instrumental in the slow but steady change of the German China policy. He also tried to improve the relations between German diplomatic circles and the military advisers, but received little cooperation from either side. Notwithstanding the rise of pro-Chinese feelings throughout Germany, the Auswärtiges Amt in general attempted to continue to pursue the official German policy of neutrality and non-involvement in the Middle Kingdom. Chiang Kaishek had not yet been completely successful in consolidating his position in China and the German government had to remain realistic and consider all factors in the long-lasting struggle for power in the Far East.

4.2 Military Relations 4.2.1 Nationalist China’s Military Situation A well-known Chinese proverb says that ‘good iron is not made into nails, nor good men into soldiers’324. This attitude has always been so deeply rooted in the Chinese psyche that, as a result, throughout China’s history the armed forces never held the emminent position they occupied in most of the western nations. The educated scholar stood at the top of the Middle Kingdom’s social ladder, while the soldier was banished to its very bottom. Therefore, Chinese armies had always consisted of the most despised ‘dregs of the country’325. Still, after the Nationalist revolution and the Northern Expedition of 1926, the image of the soldier slowly started to change. No longer was he a mere bandit who roamed the country, killing and plundering indiscriminately as he had done during the warlord years. Now he became the saviour and guardian of the Chinese Republic, an essential member of society, who no longer needed to be ashamed of his profession. Unfortunately, in the early 1930s the composition of the Chinese armies had barely changed in accordance with the transformation of their popular image. During the disunity and the civil wars of the 1920s, the Chinese armies had both disintegrated and grown to monstrous sizes at the same time. It was impossible for foreign observers ‘to give any coherent account of the organization and equipment of the myriads of soldiers, rebels, bandits and irregulars, who were in those days under arms’326, although by the end of the decade the majority of them was considered to be completely integrated into the Guomindang’s National Revolutionary Army. Furthermore, despite the victorious struggle for reunification of the past years, the China of the time had not yet reached the stage of national

324 Waldron, Arthur (1995) From War to Nationalism; China’s Turning Point, 1924 – 1925, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 55. 325 Carlson, Evans F. (1940) The Chinese Army; Its Organization and Military Efficiency, Westport: Hyperion Press, p. 3. 326 Teichman, Eric (1938) Affairs of China; A Survey of the Recent History and Present Circumstances of the Republic of China, London: Methuen Publishers, pp. 257 f. Sir Eric Teichman was a member of the British consulate in China during this critical period and a keen observer.

100 development where its armed forces in their entirety could be considered as a truly national army whose loyalty to the central government was undivided. The Chinese soldiers – just like the Chinese nation in general – were still plagued by regional and personal allegiances. Patriotism or nationalistic feelings as such were unfamiliar to the Chinese. These concepts seemed to be so outlandish that, when German instructors took over the training of the Chinese troops, one of them was even taken aside and asked what amounts of money and Erich Ludendorff, Germany’s commanders-in-chief during World War I, had received to let their Fatherland lose the war327. As a consequence, the armed forces of Nationalist China in 1928 were uncontrollably large and unwieldy, heterogeneous in their composition, training and equipment and often of questionable allegiance. The government of Chiang Kaishek faced an enormous task if it wanted to be able to stabilize and protect the newly-unified China328. All Chinese armed forces had to be brought under Chiang Kaishek’s unified command. As many provincial armies as possible had to be integrated into the central army and the central army itself had to be reorganized and better equipped. The soldiers’ training had to be improved and the number of officers graduating from the military academies had to be enlarged. Both the navy and the air force had to be modernized and turned into effective parts of the amed forces. The Chinese armaments industry had to be brought up to efficient modern standards as well. All this meant that most of the limited funds available to the newly-established Nationalist government had to be used for its armed forces, particularly since both the new military hardware and the necessary military knowledge had to be brought in from abroad. Still, every modernisation attempt of Chiang Kaishek and his hired foreign military advisers was also bound to meet severe ideological obstacles and not only the organisational, logistical or financial ones one would usually expect. Among them was a certain arrogance of the older Chinese military leaders who simply could not get used to the idea that they should learn from the Western barbarians. This predicament was only intensified by another central problem of the modernisation of the Chinese armed forces – tradition. Many Chinese commanders still oriented their military thinking after Sun Zi’s supposedly timeless classic on the art of war. Sun Zi’s basic theory was that in warfare a truly good commander had to avoid all head-on confrontations with the enemy, as this would deplete his own men, even if he won the battle. Instead the commander was to deploy a variety of strategems to deceive and intimidate the opponent and attack him when he was weakest. When facing certain defeat, it was even possible to defect to the enemy, while it was equally possible to bribe an enemy into submission without even firing a shot. Additionally, the Chinese traditionally preferred an antiquated style of defensive warfare and structured both their military theory and practice along this line of thinking. The 1920s and early 1930s, however, were an age of revolution in the field of warfare for China. New strategies and tactics, different kinds of threats, both domestic and foreign, as well as countless technical innovations, like military aviation, tanks and machine guns, now increasingly present on the battlefields,

327 Strunk, Roland & Rikli, Martin (1934) Achtung! Asien marschiert! Ein Tatsachenbericht, Berlin: Volksverband der Bücherfreunde/Wegweiser Verlag, p. 99. 328 Domes, Jürgen (1969) Vertagte Revolution; Die Politik der in China, 1923 – 1937 [Beiträge zur auswärtigen und internationalen Politik (Volume 3)], Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., p. 578.

101 required the Chinese military commanders to completely change their points of view – and the foreign military advisers had come to the Far East to help them.

4.2.2 Colonel Max Bauer, 1928 – 1929 After Chiang Kaishek had purged the Guomindang of every trace of Soviet influence and had expelled all his Russian military advisors in 1927, it was not surprising that he decided to turn to German military experts to fill in the now vacant positions. With nationalistic feelings running higher then ever in China at the time, it was out of the question to employ new military advisers from one of the imperialist nations still occupying parts of the Middle Kingdom. Therefore, shortly after the Whampoa Military Academy had been relocated from Guangzhou to Nanjing, General Li Nai329 suggested to Chiang Kaishek that he should hire German officers as teachers at the officers’ school. However, the initial selection of Germans to constitute the new advisory group for the Guomindang’s National Revolutionary Army was a result not only of a search to replace the departed Soviet advisers, but also, once again, of a desire to utilise German industrial sources and experience for the modernisation of the Chinese nation. Whatever the exact reason, a commision under General Zhen Shaowu was immediately sent to Weimar Germany to facilitate the employment of German advisers. In the meantime, the National Chinese government, through its representatives in Berlin, had already – unsuccessfully – tried to persuade the German government to fully support its side in the still lingering domestic struggles and the already brewing conflict with Japan and to gain, as a result, military advice and war materials to strengthen its defence capabilities. Consequently, General Zhen Shaowu’s commission did not even bother to contact the German authorities, but went directly to the retired General Erich Ludendorff, the great strategist of World War I. The general was not prepared to go to China himself to head a potential German military advisory group, but suggested another able officer for the task, a certain Colonel Max Bauer, who was more than willing to accept the offer. Both for the German diplomats in China and for the officials of the Auswärtiges Amt in Berlin, Max Bauer’s employment came as a complete surprise. Asked why they had not contacted the Auswärtiges Amt when they had hired the retired colonel, Chinese diplomats in Berlin coldly answered that they had ignored the German Foreign Ministry on purpose since they were convinced that it would never have given its consent330. This clandestine manoeuvring behind the back of the German authorities actually set a precedent for all the military relations

329 General Li Nai had undergone parts of his military training in Germany and was known for his pro- German sympathies. See Nieh, Yu-Hsi (1982) Zwischen den Kriegen – Ein Neubeginn, in: Machetzki, Rüdiger (Ed.) (1982) Deutsch-chinesische Beziehungen; Ein Handbuch, Hamburg: Institut für Asienkunde, p. 117. 330 ADAP, Serie B, Band X, Document 83. Memorandum of Counsellor Trautmann, Berlin, 26 October 1927.

102 between Nationalist China and the waning Weimar Germany. It was a fact that the German government was unwilling to commit itself to the Middle Kingdom, except on strictly diplomatic, economic or cultural levels. Friends of China, however, could be found among the active and retired officers of the Reichswehr and in the German industry. All these individuals had little sympathy for the Weimar Republic331. Some of them were even openly hostile to it because of what they perceived as its endless list of post-war failures in the face of the Treaty of Versailles. Loosely cooperating, these different circles pursued their respective independent or at least semi-independent policies and gladly accepted China’s offer for a Sino-German military cooperation. Yet, it was Colonel Max Bauer himself who set the tone for the character of the German military advisory group of the following decade. He and his successors, as the chief advisers, became the face of the entire mission. The advisers did the jobs they were hired to do, but the chief advisers alone, confidants of Chiang Kaishek, characterised the group, which was judged by their accomplishments or lack thereof and by their way of working. In this regard, the ‘short and important career of Max Bauer’332 set a high standard and created a lot of expectations. Colonel Max Bauer, an artillery officer with a distinct logistical talent, had been a member of General Erich Ludendorff’s staff during World War I. As an expert in the field of wartime economy, he had been instrumental in the establishment of the so- called ‘Hindenburg Program’, which centralized the entire German industry and focussed its production capabilities purely on the war333. While working as an economic coordinator for the German army’s high command, he established strong connections with the German armaments industry334. These good connections would years later become interesting for his Chinese employers. The retired Colonel Max Bauer could never accept Germany’s defeat in the Great War. He was among the first propagators of the so-called ‘stab-in-the-back myth’ which alleged that the entire war had not been lost by the German army in the field, but by weak Communist-influenced politicians at home and that its outcome could therefore not be accepted. For this reason he got involved in the so-called Kapp Putsch of 1920, a failed right-wing coup attempt against the Weimar government.

331 Causey, Beverley D. (1942) German Policy towards China, 1918 – 1941, Cambridge: Harvard University, p. 143. 332 Liu, Frederick Fu (1956) A Military History of Modern China 1924 – 1949, Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 60. 333 Chen, Chi (1973) Die Beziehungen zwischen Deutschland und China bis 1933 [Mitteilungen des Instituts für Asienkunde Hamburg (Number 56)], Hamburg: Institut für Asienkunde, p. 110. 334 Groehler, Olaf (1989) China im Kalkül deutscher Militärpolitik 1933 – 1945, in: [Anon.] (Ed.) (1989) Bulletin Faschismus/Zweiter Weltkrieg; Sonderheft 1989, Berlin: Zentralinstitut für Geschichte,

103 Wanted by the German police, Max Bauer and his friend, the equally retired Lieutenant Colonel Hermann Kriebel, another coup participant, fled abroad. Max Bauer continued to travel around the world, while Hermann Kriebel soon returned to Germany to get involved in further revolutionary activities at the side of a then still unknown Adolf Hitler. While sporadically working as a military advisor in Austria, Soviet Russia, Spain and Argentina, Max Bauer, ‘a brilliant man in many ways but erratic and not sound in his opinions’335, began to develop and elaborate complex political theories. Fundamentally, he could not accept the changes which the end of World War I had brought. He rejected the slowly budding democracy of the Weimar Republic as thoroughly as he was disgusted by the global social changes he had to witness throughout the 1920s. A ‘cultural pessimist’336, Max Bauer was now looking for a country which had not yet been spoilt by the Western poisons of democracy and liberalism, a country which he could help to rise up against the world-wide decline of society. In China he found this nation. There he intended to realize a ‘Third Way’ between and communism and to create a national-social people’s community which could be a model for all the nations under semi-colonial influence and which could take a stand against the global capitalism propagated and personified by Great Britain337. For Max Bauer Nationalist China was the clean slate he had always looked for, a young state, unspoilt, ready and waiting for his revolutionary ideas – ideas which, unwittingly, were also shared in a great part by Chiang Kaishek himself. A certain degree of hubris and ideological bias notwithstanding, it is still admirable that a political autodidact338 like Max Bauer, based on his own observations and experiences, drafted such an extensive reform program which aimed at mobilizing the economic potential of an entire nation and which, despite some misjudgement, showed remarkable insight and knowledge339.

p. 96. For this reason, Olaf Groehler unfairly accuses Max Bauer of being an ‘agent of the German heavy industry’ while working as a military adviser in China. 335 MA, Msg 160/55, Quellen zur deutschen Militärberaterschaft in China (Kopien aus Beständen des American National Archive). G-2 Report No. 9782, no place, 9 November 1928. 336 Martin, Bernd (1986) Das Deutsche Reich und Guomindang-China, 1927 – 1941, in: Kuo, Heng-yü (Ed.) (1986) Von der Kolonialpolitik zur Kooperation; Studien zur Geschichte der deutsch- chinesischen Beziehungen, München: Minerva Publikation, p. 337. 337 Ibid. and Vogt, Adolf (1974) Oberst Max Bauer; Generalstabsoffizier im Zwielicht; 1869 – 1929, Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, pp. 96 f. 338 Liang, Hsi-Huey (1978) The Sino-German Connection; Alexander von Falkenhausen between China and Germany 1900 – 1941, Assen/Amsterdam: Van Gorcum, p. 47. 339 Vogt, Adolf (1974), p. 449.

104 Colonel Max Bauer was only too happy to accept the Chinese offer to head a German military advisory group which had been indirectly arranged by his former superior, Erich Ludendorff340. On 14 November 1927 he arrived in Canton. He first contacted the semi-independent Nationalist Canton regime, but had to flee northward after an outbreak of revolutionary unrest in southern China. When he reached Shanghai, Max Bauer was finally introduced to Chiang Kaishek. There was an immediate rapport between the Chinese head of state and the newly- arrived military expert from Germany. The two men indeed shared many visions – so many, in fact, that a deep friendship between the two men developed within only a short time341. Consequently, Chiang Kaishek hired Max Bauer, not only for his military expertise, but also for the political, economic and social visions he thought could be turned into reality in a new China, and the retired colonel became the head of a German military advisory group in November 1928, for a very generous monthly payment of 1400 Shanghai dollars (3920 Reichsmarks)342. Max Bauer accepted his employment in China against the explicit wishes of the German government and the diplomats of the Auswärtiges Amt. Yet, Max Bauer hardly cared anymore. For him his position within the Chinese military meant the final break with Weimar Germany and its post-war politics, as well as the jettisoning of his own nationalist ideals, which had been so influential in his activities during the early 1920s343. Indeed, Max Bauer’s first and foremost loyalties were now, without doubt, to Chiang Kaishek, his employer, and to China, for whose progress he was working. Still, the retired colonel received the tacit support and the blessing of the German industry and the Reichswehr which secretly hoped that he could foster Sino-German relations in ways the timid German government never could. Whether Weimar Germany liked it or not, Max Bauer and his supporters back home were convinced that he was working for Germany’s – their Germany’s – benefits, as well. While he was the first quasi-official German adviser, Max Bauer was by far not the only foreign adviser of the Chinese government at the time. Nanjing had employed advisers from various countries344, depending on their field of experience. Indeed, so many foreigners offered their expertise to the Nationalists in the late 1920s that critical outside observers remarked that the Far East seemed to be virtually ‘advisor-ridden’345. These political, economic and military advisers from the different major nations soon began to see an unwanted competition in Max Bauer, especially as they had to watch his influence growing, which was particularly remarkable since, unlike them, he didn’t have the political or financial backing of

340 This stands in stark contrast to assertions that Max Bauer was employed by Chiang Kaishek after he had been recommended by a German industrialist. See Bloch, Kurt (1940) German Interests and Policies in the Far East, New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, International Secretariat, pp. 12 f. 341 A long time after the death of his first German military adviser, Chiang Kaishek still fondly remembered his ‘great friend Bauer’. See Hwang, Shen-chang (1982) Das Deutschlandbild der Chinesen, in: Machetzki, Rüdiger (Ed.) (1982) Deutsch-chinesische Beziehungen; Ein Handbuch, Hamburg: Institut für Asienkunde, p. 21. 342 Vogt, Adolf (1981) Oberst Max Bauer, in: Martin, Bernd (Ed.) (1981) Die deutsche Beraterschaft in China 1927 – 1938; Militär – Wirtschaft – Außenpolitik, Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, p. 101. According to other, less reliable sources, however, Max Bauer refused to accept any payment. 343 Vogt, Adolf (1974), p. 419. 344 Ungern-Sternberg, Leonie von (1933) Krieg in China; Der Bürgerkrieg in China und der chinesisch-japanische Konflikt, Berlin: Junker und Dünnhaupt Verlag, p. 27, and Braun, Otto (1973) Chinesische Aufzeichnungen (1932 – 1939), Berlin: Dietz Verlag, p. 30. 345 Hahn, Emily (1955) Chiang Kai-shek; An Unauthorized Biography, New York: Doubleday & Company, p. 165.

105 his home country346. There were repeated attempts of the British, French and Belgians to have Max Bauer and the German military advisers, who arrived soon after him, supplanted by officers of their armed forces. Still, Chiang Kaishek kept the Germans in his employ, even though the French tried to tempt him with the promise that they would cover all the payments of French military advisers. The British government was more successful and actually pressured Nanjing into accepting a naval advisory group in April 1929347, which was not such a big achievement after all since the Chinese Navy of the time was almost non-existent and would continue to remain that way. In the years to come, the foreigners in China seemed to develop some agreement with the Chinese in regard to military advisers. Germany was responsible for the Chinese army, while Great Britain and the United States took over the Chinese navy and air force, respectively348.

4.2.3 The Establishment of the German Military Advisory Group As soon as he had entered Chinese service, full of enthusiasm and with his own and Chiang Kaishek’s plans in mind, Colonel Max Bauer approached several German military officers and civilian specialists and offered them employment in the Far East under the order of the Nanjing government. Many retired officers and unemployed experts of various kinds had already heard or read about the retired colonel’s China project and had sent him their applications. From the very beginning, Max Bauer tried to find only the best people for the tasks ahead in the Far East, particularly in regard to Chinese military affairs, like the possible creation of a dedicated training unit and the staffing of the officer academies349. However, he didn’t limit his search to Germany alone, but contacted people worth considering in Austria, Switzerland350 and the Netherlands as well. Max Bauer did not care what Weimar Germany’s authorities and the rest of the world were thinking about his activities. He was working for China now. Still, to keep up appearances, he guaranteed the diplomats in China and the Auswärtiges Amt in Berlin over and over again that he did not plan to hire German citizens as military advisers. According to his own, not exactly honest words, he only indended to employ German doctors, geologists, engineers, administrators and police personnel for purely civilian projects.

346 Vogt, Adolf, (1974), p. 470. 347 Ibid., p. 444. 348 Beutler, Heinz (1946) Hundert Jahre Carlowitz & Co. Hamburg und China; Ein Beitrag zur wirtschaftsgeschichtlichen Entwicklung des deutschen China-Handels, Hamburg: Universität Hamburg, p. 84. 349 MA, Nachlaß Bauer, Aktenstück Nr. 50, Schriftwechsel mit Bewerbern für eine Mitarbeit in China (fortgesetzt von Ernst Bauer) 1928 – 1934. Colonel Bauer to Captain Ritter, Berlin, 7 July 1928. 350 PA, R 85697, Abteilung IV – Politische Abteilung, Po. 13 China, Militärangelegenheiten, Band 1. Memorandum of Counsellor Trautmann, Berlin, 26 October 1928.

106 Indeed, the Auswärtiges Amt did not oppose non-military advisers going to China. Quite on the contrary, these men would actually deserve the special support of the Foreign Office351. Military advisers, on the other hand, were out of the question. The Auswärtiges Amt would even officially approve Max Bauer’s employment by Chiang Kaishek if he limited his activities to the civilian sector alone352. Behind the scenes the German army was far more forthcoming. Until the late 1920s, the leadership of the Reichswehr, retaining its conservative, nationalistic and basically pre-World War I mindset, had more or less cooperated with the government in Berlin. Due to the continuous weakening of the civilian authorities, however, the Reichswehr started to create its own domestic and foreign politics353, independent from the Weimar Republic it was supposed to serve and which it despised for its feebleness. There was certainly Reichswehr sympathy for Nationalist China354. In the eyes of its leaders, close relations with China could strengthen Germany’s position against the signatory powers of the Treaty of Versailles, who were same as the colonial powers firmly entrenched in China. The Reichswehr could also sympathize with the Nanjing government’s struggle against domestic foes like the Communists. A militarily strengthened China could check the Soviet Union in the Far East. At the same time, the political and social agendas of Chiang Kaishek, including his , anti-democracy and militarism, were very appealing to its leaders. Last but not least, there were the possibilities of an arms trade with China. The Reichswehr was prepared to support Max Bauer. However, although the Ministry of the Reichswehr helped in the recruitment of potential members of the advisory group, their actual employment was arranged by discussions between Chiang Kaishek, his staff and the chief adviser. Chiang Kaishek could always insist on an individual adviser’s removal or deny his appointment if his competence and loyalty were in question. Even without Reichswehr assistance, there were more than enough potential candidates. In 1919, in accordance with Article 163 of the Treaty of Versailles, the size of the German army had been reduced to a total of 100,000 officers and ranks. Some 300,000 men had been discharged from the armed forces or coerced to retire at a time when economic depression, mass unemployment and political turmoil hit

351 Vogt, Adolf (1974), p. 442. 352 PA, R 85698, Abteilung IV – Politische Abteilung, Po. 13 China, Militärangelegenheiten, Band 2. Memorandum of Director Trautmann, Berlin, 27 February 1929. 353 Ratenhof, Udo (1987) Die Chinapolitik des Deutschen Reiches 1871 bis 1945; Wirtschaft – Rüstung – Militär, Boppard am Rhein: Harald Boldt Verlag, p. 368.

107 defeated Germany. Together with jobless workers and soldiers, nationalist youths and other military adventurers, many of the demobilized officers formed paramilitary ad- hoc units, so-called Freikorps355, to fight the Soviet-style communist councils which had sprung up in many German cities and which they believed responsible for Germany’s post-war plight. Still, hopeless unemployment or political urban warfare did not make for promising future prospects and many veterans of the Great War looked for an opportunity, any opportunity, to make a living for themselves and their families. Other embittered and disillusioned individuals thought they simply should go somewhere ‘where soldiers were despised, instead of worshipped, but where [they] could sell [their] knowledge of warfare, the only real knowledge [they] had’356. Consequently, the post of a military advisor in Chinese service was very attractive to every unemployed German army officer who had not been accepted into the 100,000- man Reichswehr. During two years of work, which were fixed by a contract, an adviser, depending on rank and field of activity, could earn between 400 and 1100 Shanghai dollars (between 1120 and 3080 Reichsmarks) per month, much more than he could have earned in Germany in the same time. He was provided with travel expenses, was quartered in luxurious houses with domestic servants and could even bring his family to the Far East357. In addition to that, Chiang Kaishek was known to be very generous and often sent expensive presents. When Chiang Kaishek and Max Bauer finally had made their selection, the trading department of the Chinese legation in Berlin was responsible for arranging the actual employment of the various German civilian and military advisers for the Chinese government358. The Chinese diplomats preferred not to inform the German authorities when it came to the spiriting away of retired German officers to the Far East. Approached about their dubious activities, they avoided cooperating with the Auswärtiges Amt. They had nothing to gain and feared that they would lose too much

354 Groehler, Olaf (1989), p. 97. 355 For more information on the history of the see Thomas, Robert & Pochanke, Stefan (2001), Handbuch zur Geschichte der Deutschen Freikorps, München: MTM Verlag and Venner, Dominik (1989) Ein Deutscher Heldenkampf; Die Geschichte der Freikorps 1918 – 1923; Söldner ohne Sold, Kiel: Arndt Verlag. 356 Archer, C.S. (1950) Hankow Return, Toronto: W.M. Collins Sons & Co., p. 50. The novelist C.S. Archer sums up a notion apparently widespread among German military advisers through the words of the ficticious character of Wilhelm Schmidt. 357 Vogt, Adolf, (1974), p. 432. 358 PA, R 85698, Abteilung IV – Politische Abteilung, Po. 13 China, Militärangelegenheiten, Band 2. German Embassy Beiping to Auswärtiges Amt, Beiping, 19 March 1929. See also Ruland, Bernd

108 if it would give in to Germany’s request. Every officer, most of them highly professional former staff officers of the former Imperial army plus some Reichswehr officers on leave359, had to sign the same standard contract. ‘The Chinese Government employs Mister […] under the following conditions as a […]. Mister […] commits himself, in accordance to his knowledge and abilities, to work for China’s benefit for as long as this contract is valid and not to abuse the position of trust embodied by his engagement neither during nor after his employment […]’360. From that moment onward, the military advisers were no longer members of the German armed forces. They had signed private agreements with the Nanjing government and were now in the service of the Chinese army, even when they did not wear its uniform. Since the Treaty of Versailles prohibited German citizens from seeking employ in the armed forces of foreign countries361, the military advisers posed as ‘scientific teachers’, ‘economic advisers’ or ‘police trainers’362 when they finally started their journey to the Middle Kingdom. However, neither the German Auswärtiges Amt nor the omni-present foreign observers believed these statements. In March 1929, Max Bauer’s advisory group consisted of seventeen members, including officers Lieutenant Hummel, Major von Wangenheim, who served as the instructor of the experimental Lehrbrigade, and General Lindemann, who was chosen to head of the Nanjing War Academy363. Some of its members, like Professor Stoelzner and Baurat Piegl, were civilian specialists and involved in the non-military aspects of Nationalist China’s restructuring. This group grew to forty-six men over the following months. By August 1932, ninety-four German military advisors were active in Chinese service, although not all at the same time. This cost Chiang Kaishek’s government some 2.26 million yuan, including wages, travelling expenses

(1973) Deutsche Botschaft Peking; Das Jahrhundert deutsch-chinesischen Schicksals, Bayreuth: Hestia, p. 185. 359 The former Reichswehr officers in Chinese service, however, didn’t see themselves as ‘retired from service’, but rather on ‘assignment overseas’. See Groehler, Olaf (1989), p. 97. 360 MA, Nachlaß Bauer, Aktenstück Nr. 50, Schriftwechsel mit Bewerbern für eine Mitarbeit in China (fortgesetzt von Ernst Bauer) 1928 – 1934. Vertrag, Berlin, no date. 361 ADAP, Serie B, Band XI, Document 130. Memorandum of Counsellor Michelsen, Berlin, 20 March 1929. Counsellor Michelsen quotes a Chinese memorandum. 362 Schmidt, Burkhard (1989) ‘Die Industrialisierung Chinas’ – Wunschtraum, Berufung, Gefahr; Deutsche und Chinesische Vorstellungen in der Zeit zwischen den Weltkriegen, in: Gransow, Bettina & Leutner, Mechthild (Eds.) (1989) China; Nähe und Ferne; Deutsch-chinesische Beziehungen in Geschichte und Gegenwart; Zum 60. Geburtstag von Kuo Heng-yü, Frankfurt am Main (et al.): Verlag Peter Lang, p. 225. 363 Causey, Beverley D. (1942), p. 207.

109 and accomodation364. Alone or in small groups, they could be found everywhere – in the general headquarters and at staff meetings, in the army departments reponsible for finances, ammunition, equipment, transport, medical services or aviation, with military units like the 36th, 87th and 88th Divisions or the railway artillery and in every military academy where they supervised the training for the infantry, cavalry, artillery and supply troops. Highly qualified professionals, the military advisers worked with clockwork precision. Wherever they went, they were accompanied by Chinese translators, but they never wore uniforms, neither German nor Chinese, only simple khaki suits. Progress or action reports were submitted to their highest superior, Chiang Kaishek – ‘without accusation, assessment of faults, or boasts’365. Soon even foreign observers recognized the merits in Chiang Kaishek’s hiring of Colonel Max Bauer and his German military and civilian advisers. ‘The French […] are too arrogant and impatient to be of any use as military advisers in China. They tell the Chinese command what it should do and then shrug their shoulders when it doesn’t get done. The British are too lazy; only the Germans have the necessary patience. […] [The Russians are also] not bad, but their psychology is too similar to that of the Chinese. Their nichevo (‘can’t be helped’) and the Chinese [mei you fazi] (‘nothing can be done about it’) are too similar. Besides, their military advisers are too specialised. Each knows just one thing and no more. For instance, their technical advisers just understand one particular make of gun, and that is hopeless in China, where [they] have armaments from all over the world.’366 There was never a doubt that the German officer were outstanding technicians. It was the way in which they treated their Chinese subordinates, colleagues and superiors, however, that won them the lasting respect of the Chinese. They clearly understood the Far Eastern concepts of gaining, having or losing ‘face’. Whenever a Chinese officer erred, the advisers made their recommendations only in private discussion or through the chief adviser, never in front of others. Furthermore, all the German army manuals they had brought with them were adapted to meet the Chinese requirements, while imported equipment was often modified under their supervision. Still, most important of all, ‘the German

364 Zhang, Xianwen (1989) Zur Entwicklung der chinesisch-deutschen Beziehungen in den dreißiger Jahren des 20. Jahrhunderts, in: [Anon.] (Ed.) (1989) Bulletin Faschismus/Zweiter Weltkrieg; Sonderheft 1989, Berlin: Zentralinstitut für Geschichte, p. 29. 365 Walsh, Billie K. (1974) The German Military Mission in China, 1928 – 1939, in: Journal of Modern History (Number 46, September 1974), p. 512.

110 officers remained aloof from Chinese politics, avoiding the path that had led to the Russians’ ouster’367 only a few years earlier. All in all, the Germans fulfilled every criterion deemed so important by the Americans who would eventually become their successors in the Far East, particularly that all foreign military advisers in Chinese service must be ‘imaginative leaders […] who gain the confidence of the Chinese with whom they will work. The Chinese may not understand the workings of an internal combustion engine, but they can see through a man. […] Chinese will not work effectively with foreigners unless they feel these foreigners are genuinely sympathetic to their cause and country’368. However, Colonel Max Bauer and his military advisory group were not the only Germans in Chinese service during the late 1920s and early 1930s. A German air force was virtually non-existent at the time and German pilot training standards were equally low, so it was understandable that Nationalist China never considered employing dedicated German aviation advisers to improve its own air force. Apparently with the ‘consensus’369 of the German chief adviser, the Chinese asked the United States and Italy for support instead, two nations which were famous for their aeronautical superiority at the time. Nevertheless, a small number of German pilots and aviation experts served on a private basis in the Middle Kingdom but were never officially part of Max Bauer’s military adviser group. Among individual specialists were gentlemen like Fuchs, Boehler, Rubens, Techel, Welkoborski- Brandenburg, Lehmann, Moltke, Hartmann and Möllenhoft370 who worked in the various Chinese Air Force departments or at the two existing flying schools as technical and organisational advisers or as instructors371. In the summer 1931, the German pilots Erich Brammen and Hermann Frommherz were hired for several months to train the Chinese pilots of Nanjing aerodrome’s so-called Pursuit Squadron on Junkers K 47 fighter aircraft372. Erich Brammen was killed in a tragic accident on 10 when an irresponsibly low-flying aircraft on a training flight hit his

366 Utley, Freda (1939) China at War, London: Faber and Faber, p. 8. Freda Utley, a staunch supporter of the German military advisory group, quotes Walter Stennes, a German officer in Chiang Kaishek’s service. 367 Walsh, Billie K. (1974), pp. 504 f. 368 Chennault, Claire L. (1949) Way of a Fighter; The Memoirs of Claire Lee Chennault, Major General, U.S. Army (Ret.), New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, p. xix. 369 Borke, Kurt von (1938) Deutsche unter fremden Fahnen, Berlin: Schlieffen-Verlag, p. 325. 370 The first names of these gentlemen cannot be found in any of the available sources. 371 Andersson, Lennart (2002) Chinese Aviation until 1949, [Unpublished]. 372 Ibid.

111 head while he sat in the cockpit of his parked Junkers K 47373. Additionally, the aerial surveyor and photographer Hans Ruef worked as an ‘aerial adviser’374 and reconnaissance trainer at the Central Aviation School at and lectured at the Nanjing War Academy between 1930 and 1933375. Still, even when combined together, the German military and aviation advisers in Chinese service were almost insignificant in number when compared to Marshal Vasili K. Blyuker’s more than 1,000 Soviet advisers who had helped to train the Guomindang’s armed forces until 1925.

4.2.4 Max Bauer’s Theoretical Work in Chinese Service As soon as he had accepted the Chinese employment offer, even before his actual depature to the Far East, Colonel Max Bauer started to write the first of his numerous memoranda for Chiang Kaishek on the areas where he saw possibilities for the modernization of China, ranging in subject from supplementary political concepts for the Guomindang to minute details in the equipment of Chinese soldiers. These lengthy commentaries were based on facts about the Middle Kingdom he had researched beforehand and were strongly influenced by his own political, social and military theories and by his personal ideological constructs. Max Bauer continued to work on his memoranda when, in late 1927, he travelled for weeks through China. Together with General Li Nai, his translator and earliest proponent, he visited Shanghai, Hankou and Nanjing to get first impressions about the military and economic potential of these areas376. In mid-January 1928, he finally settled down in Nanjing, where he received his own office from the Nationalist government to analyse the results of his extended tour. However, Max Bauer regularly updated and expanded his writings, for example, after he had accompanied Lieutenant General Chen Yi’s study mission to Weimar Germany and had joined the Chinese officials, in his function as ‘industrial adviser to the Chinese government’377, on several inspection and acquisition tours through German factories.

373 MH, Nachlaß Brammen, Frommherz und Ruef. Mister Sterz to Mister Frommherz, Shanghai, 21 January 1932. 374 MH, Nachlaß Brammen, Frommherz und Ruef. Captain Lehmann to Mister Ruef, Döberitz, 5 August 1935. 375 MH, Nachlaß Brammen, Frommherz und Ruef. Curriculum vitae of Hans Ruef, no place, no date. 376 Vogt, Adolf (1974), p. 423. 377 PA, R 85697, Abteilung IV – Politische Abteilung, Po. 13 China, Militärangelegenheiten, Band 1. Memorandum of Counsellor Trautmann, Berlin, 26 October 1928.

112 Within one year and on military matters alone, Max Bauer wrote an impressive number of surprisingly original memoranda for his Chinese employers. His writings exhibited an intimate knowledge of China’s problems and how they could eventually be solved, given enough time, money and, most important of all, devoted people to work on them. Some of them were very general or rather abstract in their approach and bore titles like Military Observations in Regard to China, The Military Rebuilding of China, The Organization of Modern Armed Forces, Thoughts on the Demobilization of the Chinese Army, Military Schools for China, Dedicated Schools for the Instruction in the Use of Specialized Weaponry or The Coastal Defense of China378. Other memoranda, however, were far more detailed and dealt with the most pressing practical issues of modern armed conflict, including tactics, technology and the relationship between the two, military aviation, positional and mobile warfare, camouflage and the like. Since all of them were primarily based on the analysis of the German successes and failures during World War I, they were not only innovative, but sometimes even revolutionary for their time. In his grand strategic overview, Military Observations in Regard to China, Max Bauer recognized that the enormous size of China, plus its strategic situation, new tactical demands and overall logistical problems, required completely new approaches to its entrenched concept of armed forces379. These included the integration of an air force and of tank units into the already existing Nationalist army. To span the wide geographic reaches of the Middle Kingdom and to be actually able to fight there, a dedicated air force was absolutely essential380. However, the establishment of a Chinese air force had first of all to include the creation of the necessary aviation infrastructure like airfields and maintenance facilities with trained personnel. As a consequence, for reasons of financial and political expediency, military and civil air flight had to be developed in parallel. ‘Every peace aircraft must be a war aircraft when necessary and every peace pilot must be able to be a war pilot.’381 Also due to Nationalist China’s general lack of funds and for practical reasons, the Chinese air force should limit itself to two types of airplanes – small one-

378 MA, Nachlaß Bauer, Aktenstück Nr. 41, Denkschriften zum militärischen und politischen Aufbau Chinas 1928/1929 (1930). 379 Vogt, Adolf, (1974), p. 436. 380 MA, Nachlaß Bauer, Aktenstück Nr. 42a, Denkschriften für den waffentechnischen Aufbau des Heeres und den Aufbau des Bahnwesens in China, Band 2, 1928 – 1929. Memorandum of Colonel Bauer, Nanjing, no date. 381 Ibid.

113 engined pursuit and reconnaissance planes with two-man crews and large multi- engined bombers and transport aircraft382. Mirroring the contemporary misconceptions also shared by military thinkers in France, Italy and the United States, Max Bauer declared that light interceptor planes were a waste of money, since their actual impact on aerial combat was judged as negligible. Large military aircraft with multiple machine gun positions or even machine cannon armament were, apparently, the future. In this point, Max Bauer, however, distanced himself from the entrenched aerial combat tactics of the French and British. He suggested a much heavier general armament for combat aircraft, like several French Hotchkiss 2-centimetre machine cannons, which would be used like the cannons of battleships, firing broadsides at enemy airplanes383. This proposal was never put into action, not because it was too bizarre, but because it was not financially practical at the time. It was still too early and cost-prohibitive to acquire large bombers for China. For a start, medium-sized multi-purpose aircraft were best suited. Junkers aircraft fit in perfectly in Max Bauer’s plans. Since the end of World War I, the German Junkers company had switched almost completely to the manufacture of civilian all-metal aircraft, which were easily available on the world market. These planes could be effortlessly converted into bombers or attack aircraft, as had already been done by some of the warlords. Yet, Nationalist China’s need to economize also inspired Max Bauer to contemplate other, at the time even more radical uses for military aircraft. The planes of a Chinese air force should not only deployed purely for aerial warfare, but in support of ground warfare as well, basically as flying artillery. Incidently, this idea already foresaw Germany’s use of Junkers Ju 87 Stuka dive bombers during the Blitzkrieg phase of World War II. Additionally, due to the prohibitively high costs of a navy, some of its tasks could be covered by a special maritime warfare branch of the Chinese air force which could first disorient enemy warships with bombs creating a smoke screen and then destroy them through regular heavy bombardment384. Max Bauer also drew up plans for the establishment of armoured units for the Chinese army, following the German experiences of World War I, even though he

382 Vogt, Adolf, (1974), p. 436. 383 MA, Nachlaß Bauer, Aktenstück Nr. 42a, Denkschriften für den waffentechnischen Aufbau des Heeres und den Aufbau des Bahnwesens in China, Band 2, 1928 – 1929. Memorandum of Colonel Bauer, Nanjing, no date. 384 Vogt, Adolf, (1974), p. 438.

114 cautioned Chiang Kaishek that tanks should not be overestimated385, despite their prevalent image of being unstoppable war machines. First of all, tanks had to be suitable for China’s terrain. Fuel-efficient motors for a wide range of action were an absolute must, but, in the face of China’s simple road network, large and unwieldy tanks, like the ones built by Great Britain since the end of World War I, were useless. Therefore Max Bauer declared two medium-type tanks, one infantry tank with machine gun armament and one with a small-calibre cannon for battlefield support, sufficient for modern warfare in China386. To become independent from the vagaries of the international arms trade, these tanks should be built in China. After World War I, gas warfare was considered a necessity by many military thinkers all over the world. However, in agreement with the Chinese authorities, Max Bauer early on rejected the building of manufacturing plants for poison gas. Still, he kept the idea on his list of projects387. ‘Even if China had so far not met an enemy using poison gas and and artificial smoke on the battlefield, she better be prepared.’388 The import and, later, the local production of gas masks became consequently part of the re-equipping process of the Chinese army. Similar to the creation of a Chinese air traffic network, the expansion and improvement of the Middle Kingdom’s road and railway network had to be done for martial reasons as well. Remembering his own logistical planning during World War I and the fact that Germany had been able to fight on three different fronts at the same time thanks to its sophisticated railway network, Max Bauer devised several intricate plans how to modernize China’s infrastructure. Not only passengers and goods, but also troops could easily be transported to any hotspot when necessary, as long as the roads and railways were kept in prime condition389. Given the circumstances in China at the time, most of Max Bauer’s memoranda, no matter how sophisticated or idealistic, were often little more than theoretical games due to the Nationalist government’s lack of funds which were necessary to turn them into reality. Despite his uncurbed enthusiasm, Chiang Kaishek’s chief military adviser had to admit in March 1929 that the creation of a modern Chinese

385 MA, Nachlaß Bauer, Aktenstück Nr. 42a, Denkschriften für den waffentechnischen Aufbau des Heeres und den Aufbau des Bahnwesens in China, Band 2, 1928 – 1929. Memorandum of Colonel Bauer, Nanjing, no date. 386 Ibid. 387 MA, Nachlaß Bauer, Aktenstück Nr. 41, Denkschriften zum militärischen und politischen Aufbau Chinas 1928/1929 (1930). Memorandum of Colonel Bauer, Berlin, 20 August 1920. 388 MA, Nachlaß Bauer, Aktenstück Nr. 42a, Denkschriften für den waffentechnischen Aufbau des Heeres und den Aufbau des Bahnwesens in China, Band 2, 1928 – 1929. Memorandum of Colonel Bauer, Nanjing, no date. 389 Ibid.

115 army would at least need thirty years of work390. Not easily discouraged and keeping China’s financial situation firmly in the back of his head, Max Bauer still tried constantly to get as much bang for the Chinese buck as possible. He proposed only to buy what was necessary in the long run and tried to standardize every kind of military hardware as much as possible for maximum efficiency. Max Bauer did not stress the fusion between the military and civilian sectors without good reason. Chiang Kaisek’s relationship with his military advisers was not only limited to military affairs. The Colonel’s suggested military reforms were only a small but essential part of a nationwide reform program, which was ultimately to result in China’s complete military, economic and political independence. This vision had already been conceived years earlier by the ‘phantast and dreamer’391 Sun Yatsen, but Chiang Kaishek, unlike his predecessor, was much more down to earth. The Chinese head of state, just like his German military adviser, had this idée fixe of completely restructuring the Middle Kingdom with the Chinese military serving as some kind of modernizing elite392. Speaking to Chinese politicians and high-ranking officers on 22 December 1928, Max Bauer assured that, despite a certain financial weakness which could be countered with the help of foreign loans, the chances for the development of an economically independent Nationalist China were extraordinarily promising. The country had all the necessary raw materials. Its people were industrious and modest. A wide-reaching economic and social development program and the creation of an armaments industry, coupled with well-trained armed forces, would guarantee the desired independence from all foreign powers, as well as a consolitation of domestic political and economic affairs393. The most important requirement for this reform process, however, was the establishment of a strong central authority, namely Chiang Kaishek and the Chinese military. To contribute to this goal Max Bauer was asked to make – purely theoretical – suggestions and write further memoranda on how China’s economy and consequently its nation as a whole could be drastically improved. From the beginning, the Colonel had recognized that the solution of the Middle Kingdom’s problems necessitated a total approach – political, economic, financial, industrial and military. Now the Colonel amended his already comprehensive earlier writings on the strengthening of China. Clearly more concerned with long-tem achievements than with fast and easy results, Max Bauer once again demonstrated extreme thoughtfulness and composed elaborate blueprints for the expansion of China’s entire transportation system, the modernisation of its postal and telegraph systems, the construction of canals, the creation of heavy and chemical industries, the reformation of the Chinese agriculture, the modernisation of the mining industry and more394. Unfortunately, over the months, Max Bauer had to give up much of his initial high- flying idealism when he came face to face with China’s reality. For a successful reconstruction of the Middle Kingdom according to Chiang Kaishek’s and his plans, all the necessary preconditions were missing. China was poor and, despite

390 Vogt, Adolf, (1974), p. 470. 391 Chen, Chi (1973), p. 81. Chen Chi quotes Herbert Cuno von Borch, the German emissary to Beijing/ Beiping between 1928 and 1931. 392 Martin, Bernd (1986), p. 326. 393 Vogt, Adolf, (1974), pp. 430 f. 394 MA, Nachlaß Bauer, Aktenstück Nr. 39, Berichte Bauers über seine Reisen nach China 1927 –1929 (1930). Memorandum of Colonel Bauer, no place, no date.

116 the victorious Northern Expedition, still at war with herself. Max Bauer was aware of the necessity for domestic peace in order for China’s growth as a nation to be most effective395. However, to create a new China it was simply not enough to unify the country with force and keep it under tight control with the help of modern armed forces to make it prosperous. On the contrary, social reform and education would have been far more prudent to make the people more aware that it was them who were building a nation for themselves. Yet, many aspects of Chiang Kaishek’s overall concept, supported and elaborated by Max Bauer in his memoranda, collided with what the Chinese people really wanted and needed and could therefore not be successful, particularly not the Nanjing government’s attempts to militarize an entire nation. What else could have been expected from an professional soldier? Max Bauer, despite his extensive knowledge and his empathy for the Far East, focused as military adviser mainly on the military aspects of China’s planned rebirth. Undeterred, in a memorandum on the Chinese character and China’s situation at the time in general, Colonel Bauer justified his theoretical work, its militaristic undertones and his enthusiastic idealism for it. ‘[Every reformer] will have to tolerate two objections, one, that all these great projects are just utopian dreams and, two, that they require a neverending amount of money. Regarding the utopian dreams, it is true that their implementation will take decades, for sure, but one can start already now, since all the prerequisites are already there, except one, China’s pacification. In the moment the civil war is over, the development everybody is waiting for will start.’396

4.2.5 Max Bauer’s Practical Work in Chinese Service Yet, other important factors encumbered the implementation of Chiang Kaishek’s and Max Bauer’s ideas, besides the popular rejection of their all-too-apparent radicalism and Nanjing’s general lack of assets. There was still an enormous potential for trouble within the newly-established Guomindang government. Chiang Kaishek’s position as head of state had not yet been thoroughly consolidated. The lines of authority had not yet become entirely clear. Disputes over respective areas of responsibility were still common and in many cases rivalry seemed to outweigh the willingness to cooperate. As a result, despite his close relationship with Chiang Kaishek, Max Bauer’s employment was not undisputed even within the Nationalist ranks. Many leading figures distrusted the Colonel’s suggested reform program, suspecting it to be a barely disguised attempt by Chiang Kaishek to use German help to make himself dictator. His actual competences had also never really been defined and many Chinese politicians, managers and high-ranking military officers felt, if not actually threatened, at least patronized by the Colonel’s approaches. Many had their own

395 Seps, Jerry B. (1972) German Military Advisors and Chiang Kai-Shek, 1927 – 1938, Berkeley: University of California, p. 147. 396 MA, Nachlaß Bauer, Aktenstück Nr. 39, Berichte Bauers über seine Reisen nach China 1927 –1929 (1930). Memorandum of Colonel Bauer, no place, no date.

117 agenda and did not respond well to any kind of interference. In addition, it did not bode well that Max Bauer’s allegedly German economic and military mission never received any backing from the German government. He interfered with the interests of the other foreign powers and their lobbies within the Chinese government who saw their own political, economic and militray influence dwindling in the face of the chief military advisers’s conspicuous omni-presence. Therefore, a less than cooperative attitude of various Chinese authorities and even outright intrigues behind the back of the German advisory group made Max Bauer’s task more difficult than it already was. One prime example was the attempt to establish a domestic and international air traffic network for China. While the Colonel, together with several leading Chinese politicians and the Junkers company, already had begun to create what would later become the Eurasia civilian airflight company, , China’s railway minister and one of Chiang Kaishek’s fiercest opponents in the Guomindang government, used the backing of his influential American backers and business associates to call a competing enterprise into life, the China National Aviation Corporation397. Max Bauer’s handicap was that he was exclusively an adviser. He was subordinated only to Chiang Kaishek and had to follow nobody else’s orders. On the other hand, however, nobody was forced to heed his advice. While many of the Max Bauer’s memoranda came to nothing for various reasons, he and the German military advisory group had much more success in the training of the Chinese armed forces. The Nationalist Chinese army, despite its outstanding victories over the previous years, had several weaknesses. Compared with international standards, the training of the troops and their equipment were inadequate, there was a serious lack of non-commissioned and junior officers, and, worst of all, there was a complete deficit of advanced military knowledge among officers in the upper echelons398. This deplorable state of affairs, however, seemed to be bound to continue since all Chinese military affairs were dealt with by an inflexible central military council, which had been established by the Soviet military advisers. It was therefore imperative for Max Bauer to completely modernise and restructure the Chinese armed forces to get rid of the still-lingering negative influences of Imperial China, the Soviets and warlordism once and for all. Supported by Chiang Kaishek and definitely helped by the long-standing Chinese admiration for Germany’s military arts, the Colonel became the influence behind the Guomindang government’s adoption of the German military system which brought almost all aspects of military command and operations in the hand of its head of state. Chiang Kaishek willingly accepted the majority of suggestions contained in Max Bauer’s memoranda to reorganize the Nationalist Chinese army at its core.

397 Rosholt, Malcolm (1984) Flight in the China Air Space 1910 – 1950, Rosholt: Rosholt House, pp. 59 ff., and Vogt, Adolf (1974), p. 445. Adolf Vogt, however, calls the rival company CATC. 398 Borke, Kurt von (1938), p. 323.

118 Following the Imperial German army as an example, Max Bauer immediately began to diversify the authorities within the Chinese army, creating different levels of authority, each with its own fixed areas of expertise and accountability399. These different levels were the General Staff, responsible for strategy and tactics, the Ministry of War responsible for military administration, the military advisory group, a department for military training, a National Defence Council to coordinate all political and military questions, the headquarters for the security of the capital Nanjing and the headquarters of the head of the armed forces. They all coordinated their activities, streamlining the entire bureaucratic process behind the Chinese armed forces as a result, and were ultimely answerable to Chiang Kaishek alone. After the restructuring of its administrative aparatus, the training and equipment of the armed forces had to be standardised on all levels since the Nanjing government’s troops were still mostly heterogenous in this regard. The first step was to establish a Central Military Academy at Nanjing for the intensive training of a new generation of young Chinese officers. The previously relocated and now reorganised Whampoa Military Academy would produce some 6,000 junior officers in the decade of German military advisership and retrain at least as many already commissioned officers400. Over the following years, military schooling was gradually extended and more and more specialised. New schools exclusively for the infantry and artillery were created in 1933, for cavalry and tanks in 1934 and for military intelligence and engineers in 1935401, particularly in new locations like Luoyang, Yunnanfu and Chengdu. Between five and seven German military advisers taught full-time at the Central Military Academy and one or two were permanently attached to each of the specialist schools. The German officers instructed their students, both officers and troops, via Chinese interpreters, concentrating mainly on theoretical topics and using the German army manuals they had brought with them as their guideline. Within a short time the training methods of the Nationalist army approximated those of most modern Western armies in their efficiency. It was, however, significant that only those officers and troops received the new kind of military training whose divisions were under the direct and personal control of Chiang Kaishek. Since the Chinese had always been known as being only too fond of theoretical learning, intensive practical instruction received as much attention as pure classroom education. To make this task easier and more effective, Max Bauer and the German military advisers created a so-called Lehrbrigade in the spring of 1929, an experimental training brigade dedicated to teaching officers newly-developed tactics under realistic circumstances, like the cooperation between the different arms of service or the use of their mobility in small-scale independent operations. The graduating officers would later instruct the other divisions of the National army. Commanded by Major von Wangenheim, the Lehrbrigade initially consisted of two infantry battalions with machine guns and light artillery, one artillery regiment, one engineer batallion, one signals troop and one supply troop402. This combined elite unit became Chiang Kaishek’s pride, particularly after it successfully participated in its supreme commander’s campaigns against rebellious

399 Vogt, Adolf, (1974), p. 433. 400 Sutton, Donald S. (1982) German Advice and Residual Warlordism in the Nanking Decade: Influences on Nationalist Military Training and Strategy, in: China Quarterly (Number 91, 1982), p. 389. 401 Ibid. 402 Vogt, Adolf, (1974), p. 440.

119 Hankou and in Henan province403, and would be expanded and improved under Max Bauer’s successors. The overall ideas behind the German attempts to create a modern Chinese army by creating the crack Lehrbrigade first could be traced back to World War I. During its final stages, the German army’s supreme command had ordered the training of several assault detachments, so-called Sturmabteilungen, to break the deadlock of the trenches by using shock tactics. These small elite units represented a revolution in military tactics at the time404. They were comprised of aggressive and self- reliant stormtroopers, armed with a range of light and heavy weapons, like machine guns, flamethrowers, hand grenades, mortars and field guns, and trained to attack independently, using mobile fire-and-movement tactics to exploit any opportunity to penetrate the enemy’s frontline and press ahead. This combination of modern weapons and innovative tactics proved an indisputable, if costly, success in last great German offensive of the Great War, the Kaiserschlacht of March 1918, before it lost its momentum due to a lack of vital resources. Germany’s ultimate defeat in the war, however, did not disprove the validity of the stormtrooper concept. Quite on the contrary, for mobile warfare on a future battlefield small self-sufficient units with stromtrooper training and equipment promised to be even more suitable than within the limited area of operations of the trenches. Consequently, the entire concept was immediately revived by Colonel General Hans von Seeckt, Weimar Germany’s commander-in-chief, when he faced the seemingly insurmountable task of turning the limited 100,000-man Reichswehr of the post-war years into a strong and effective force to be reckoned with. ‘We shall be able to replace platoons with machine guns, companies with tanks, cavalry regiments with air squadrons and to rely, indeed, entirely on the machine – but only if we can count upon a high grade of specialist’405, was one of the military credos of the time. Consequently the small Reichswehr made a virtue out of necessity and reinvented itself as a highly trained army of specialists, imbued with an intelligent system of combat, an ablility to fight as individuals or in small combined units and a significant offensive power which could call on a variety of modern war machines and technologies to counter any shortcomings. While forced upon Weimar Germany, the Reichswehr’s minimalism was also a viable option for the Chinese armed forces. Developing the tactics introduced during World War I and the early post-war years even further and still keeping China’s limited resources in mind, Max Bauer envisioned an army for Chiang Kaishek consisting almost exclusively of stormtroopers. Its ground troops had to be highly mobile, while at the same time possessing as much firepower as possible. Machine guns, machine cannons and light field cannons were best suited as its main equipment. Heavy artillery had become dispensable since its tasks could be done by bomber aircraft406. Best of all, the necessary weapons were already in possession of the Chinese armed forces or widely available on the market, particularly rapid-firing automatic rifles for every Chinese soldier – which would have made the Nationalist army the most modern in the world at the time. However, in the cases of both the German Reichswehr and the Chinese armed forces, the creation of an army of highly-trained stormtroopers was not the final

403 Ratenhof, Udo (1987), p. 380. 404 Bull, Stephen (1999) Stormtrooper; Elite German Assault Soldiers, London: Publishing News, p. 6. 405 Ibid., p. 57. Stephen Bull quotes from an unspecified publication of Ernst Jünger, a German intellectual, writer and World War I veteran. 406 Vogt, Adolf, (1974), p. 438.

120 goal in itself. From the beginning it was an accepted fact that this small elite army would only serve as a core onto which, in the event of war, a mass of newly raised men would be grafted. This concept was known as the ‘Führerarmee’407. Max Bauer’s Lehrbrigade was literally to become this army of leaders. Its private soldiers would be capable of acting as non-commissioned officers for the eventual bigger army. In turn, its non-commissioned officers would serve as officers and its officers would assume the responsibilities of higher command. It was quite clear that only a limited number of units in the already existing Nationalist army were actually suitable for reorganisation or retraining according to Max Bauer’s suggestions. For the others there was no place in the new Chinese armed forces. It was paradoxical, but the Middle Kingdom had first to disarm to arm itself. Yet, what should be done with the gigantic army which had conquered China for the Guomindang government and which now cost obscene amounts of money nobody had to keep it battle-ready? Chiang Kaishek himself rationally described the situation on 18 December 1928. ‘Our military expenditure is now 300,000,000 [Shanghai dollars]. In fact, the actual military outlay may be much greater than this. […] Any country that spends [eighty percent] of its annual revenue on its military establishment is bound to go bankrupt. […] [Nothing] is left for national reconstruction, for laying a solid economic foundation, for improving the livelihood of our people.’408 As part of his modernisation process and to save money which was urgently needed elsewhere, Max Bauer suggested in another memorandum for Chiang Kaishek the demobilization of all the former warlord units which did not stand under the authority of the Nanjing government. These underequipped and insufficiently trained troops made up sixty percent of China’s 2.2 million soldiers409 and were not only of questionable military worth but also an unacceptable financial burden for the entire nation. While the new elite units were drilled in the ways of modern warfare and some of the older, lesser-trained divisions had to be kept, if only to quell the frequent internal unrest, the remaining undisciplined and useless rabble now wearing uniforms, including all incompetent officers, had to be disarmed. However, what should be done with all these soon-to- be unemployed masses who had never learned anything but killing? Without solving this problem quickly, reintegrating these soldiers into society, new warlord armies would soon rove the country once more. For this reason, Max Bauer additionally proposed in his memorandum the creation of a dedicated national commision to assist in the reorganization of the armed forces. This committee was to decomission unneeded military personnel and group them into workers’ battalions for the time being while at the same time transferring qualified personnel and usable military equipment to the Nanjing government’s army410. As soon as China had been reunited and the Guomindang government had been established in 1927, Chiang Kaishek had started to think about a partial disarming of the Nationalist armed forces to cut back on military expenditures, with all savings going to the national reconstruction. Amidst the unexpected complexities of the formation of a viable government, however, the notion had come to nothing. After receiving Max Bauer’s memorandum, Chiang Kaishek picked up the idea once again and invited Feng Yuxiang, Yan Xishan and the other remaining minor

407 Bull, Stephen (1999), p. 61. 408 Furuya, Kenji (Ed.) (1981) Chiang Kai-shek; His Life and Times, New York: St. John’s University, p. 270. 409 Ratenhof, Udo (1987), p. 359. 410 Vogt, Adolf, (1974), p. 435.

121 warlords to attend a Military Reorganisation and Disbandment Conference to be held in Nanjing between 1 and 25 January 1929411. Nationalist China’s financial situation was no longer the only issue behind the demobilization conference. As already earlier acknowledged by Chiang Kaishek and Max Bauer, many of the warlords and their armies had not actually been beaten during the Northern Expedition but incorporated into the Guomindang’s armed forces. The continued existence of these quasi-independent military units reminded everybody that China’s unification was not yet perfect and that the warlordism which had plagued the Middle Kingdom for years was, in fact, only dormant and could return at any time. Indeed, while the ideas contained in Max Bauer’s memorandum were generally accepted, even by the invited warlords, they were not turned into reality. Feng Yuxiang, Yan Xishan and particularly simply distrusted Chiang Kaishek too much. They suspected that he would use their demobilization only to make himself the dictator of China while they would lose even more of their already painfully restricted powers412. The former warlords were actually not far from the truth. Chiang Kaishek indeed planned to make himself the central figure of Nationalist China to remake the nation according to his vision. He was already the president of the State Council, the president of the Guomindang government, as well as the nominal commander- in-chief of the Nationalist armed forces and intended now to remove every remaining possibility that anybody else but him could control the army413. The lack of control over the Chinese armed forces had already toppled Sun Yatsen’s Republic of 1911 and Chiang Kaishek wanted to avoid a repetition of the calamitous warlord era. Consequently, Chiang Kaishek’s attempt to centralize power over the army under his guidance, no matter for what reasons, met the fierce resistance of the still independent-minded warlords. The fundamental questions of who had to give up what, when and to whom led ultimately to a breakdown of the negotiations414. When the Guomindang government tried to enforce a disbandment of their armies, the former warlord generals terminated their alliance with Nanjing to form a rival regime and soon another series of petty, yet bloody civil wars broke out. All plans to reduce China’s bloated armed forces were scrapped415. On the contrary, the upcoming battles swelled the strength of the participating armies even more, from some 150 million soldiers at the time of the Military Reorganisation and Disbandment Conference to some 225 million in September 1929416. The demobilization conference only too painfully demonstrated the limits of the influence Max Bauer and the other German military advisers could possibly exert. The Colonel’s reform plans were only as far-reaching as the authority of Chiang Kaishek and the Nanjing government, no matter how keen his insight was or how much respect he enjoyed among the leading figures of Nationalist China. After that, the only thing he and his advisory group could do was to help their employers weather the storms of the Middle Kingdom’s harsh reality. Max Bauer had always been aware of the necessity for domestic peace in order for China’s growth along Chiang Kaishek’s and his reform plans to be most effective.

411 Pause, Hans (1978) Militärischer Regionalismus in China von 1928 – 1936, München: Ludwig- Maximilians-Universität, pp. 29 ff. 412 Ratenhof, Udo (1987), p. 358. 413 Chen, Chi (1973), p. 117. 414 Kirby, William C. (1984) Germany and Republican China, Stanford: Stanford University Press, p. 59. 415 Liu, Frederick Fu (1956), pp. 73 f. 416 Vogt, Adolf, (1974), p. 436.

122 Consequently, he didn’t shy from involving himself in the Nationalist campaign against the dissident warlord clique, however, only ‘when other alternatives were exhausted’417. There were indeed no other options left for the Colonel when, only short time after the failure of the demobilization conference, fighting broke out in February 1929 between Chiang Kaishek on one side and Li Zongren, Bai Zhongzi, Huang Shaohong and Li Jishen, four generals from , on the other. Chiang Kaishek immediately moved a massive army up the Yangzi River with such surprising swiftness that Hankou, Li Zongren’s power base, capitulated within just a week. It was widely known at the time that Max Bauer and other German military advisers took part in the military operations against Hankou418, so it was no wonder that contemporary foreign observers, as well as later historians, credited the decisive and well-planned moves of the Nanjing army exclusively to the Colonel’s advice419. A New York Times report of 7 May 1929 was characteristic of Western opinion in general. ‘It was not a Chinese mind that conceived the triple line of advance, the secret move around ’s left’420 and the other essential tactical manouvres which led to Chiang Kaishek’s quick triumph over his former allies. Still, it is not easy to determine how instrumental Max Bauer and the other German military advisers actually were in the rapid conclusion of the campaign. Other, external factors were at least equally important, particularly the desertion of Feng Yuxiang, an initially expected ally of the four rebel generals, and the unfortunate overestimation of the military capabilities of their own troops by the rebellious warlords. Chiang Kaishek himself and the Guomindang government never credited Max Bauer’s advice as crucial. The Colonel himself, never known for being vain, also denied that he was more than an observer on the campaign421. In a letter to confidants in Germany he described and explained his actions. ‘I want to add in confidence, that I knew about [the war between Chiang Kaishek and the four warlords in the spring of 1929] early on and that I participated (as a war correspondent, of course). You can recognize that we enjoy the trust [of the Chinese] and rightly so, because, as long as I’m here, I will do everything possible to help and to advise. Only when we win their trust, we can stand up against the predominance of American money and American politics. It is understandable that we are in a difficult situation, since we don’t have

417 Seps, Jerry B. (1972), p. 147. 418 ADAP, Serie B, Band XI, Document 166. Memorandum of Counsellor Trautmann, Berlin, 11 April 1929. 419 Kreitner, Gustav Ritter von (1932) Hinter China steht Moskau, Berlin: Verlag von E.S. Mittler & Sohn, p. 112, Ungern-Sternberg, Leonie von (1933), p. 99, Carlson, Evans F. (1940), p. 17, and Stahmer, Heinrich Georg (1952) Niederlage – Asians Sieg; Aufstieg eines Größeren Ostasien, Bielefeld: Deutscher Heimat-Verlag, p. 231. 420 Seps, Jerry B. (1972), p. 103. The so-called triple city of Wuhan consisted of Hankou, Hanyang and Wuzhang and all four place names were used at one time or the other. 421 Vogt, Adolf, (1974), p. 460.

123 any political support and are even treated with hostility in Germany.’422 As an aside, undeterred by the latter, Max Bauer asked his contacts in Berlin to approach the Auswärtiges Amt and convince its officials that they should issue a strict warning to German import firms to stop selling any war materials to military forces in China not under the direct control of Chiang Kaishek423. Still, evidence from Max Bauer’s own private papers, combined with the reports on troop movements against Hankou, reveal a definite correlation between the advice he had offered Chiang Kaishek and the actual actions of the Nationalist Chinese troops424. This was a result which could be expected from the modus operandi of the German military advisory group. Max Bauer accompanied Chiang Kaishek on his train into the hostile territory and conferred with his employer every day. He suggested and Chiang Kaishek – sometimes – put his recommendations into action. The final decision and the responsibility laid always with the supreme commander. Only what he deemed good was turned ultimately into reality. Whatever their actual contribution, the indisputable success of the campaign against Hankou strengthened the prestige of the German military advisers. They had won face and this was of great importance among the Chinese425. Unfortunately, the moment of triumph was tinged by tragedy. Max Bauer was already sixty years old when he had entered the Nanjing government’s service. Still, it was unexpected when the Colonel fell seriously ill during the campaign against Li Zongren and died short time later, on 6 May 1929, in Shanghai of smallpox. Chiang Kaishek said a final goodbye to his chief military adviser with a grandiose funeral ceremony and there was nationwide mourning in the Middle Kingdom. Yet, there were also rumours going around that Max Bauer had been infected on purpose – by persons unknown – and that his accidental death might actually have been premeditated murder426. Strangely, there had been no other cases of smallpox infection in the area at the time.

4.2.6 Lieutenant Colonel Hermann Kriebel, 1929 – 1930 On his dying bed and with Chiang Kaishek’s assent, Colonel Max Bauer had already selected his successor, Lieutenant Colonel Hermann Kriebel, his old friend and comrade from his days as political agitator in the early 1920s who had joined him in

422 MA, Nachlaß Bauer, Aktenstück Nr. 46, Bernhard Waurick (Handelsabteilung der Chinesischen Gesandtschaft in Berlin) 1928/1929. Colonel Bauer to Mister Waurick, Nanjing, 16 April 1929. 423 MA, Nachlaß Bauer, Aktenstück Nr. 45, Geschäftlicher Schriftwechsel mit dem Sohn Ernst (bei der Handelsabteilung der chinesischen Gesandtschaft in Berlin) 1928/1929. Memorandum of Colonel Bauer, , 28 October 1928. Colonel Bauer to Mister Waurick, Nanjing, 16 April 1929. 424 Seps, Jerry B. (1972), p. 104. 425 MA, RH 2/1822 Fremde Staaten […]. Memorandum of Captain Hauger, no place, no date. 426 Causey, Beverley D. (1942), p. 166, and Seps, Jerry B. (1972), p. 144. Adolf Vogt, Max Bauer’s biographer, is somewhat sceptical about these rumours which were predominantly brought up by Luise Engeler, the Colonel’s personal secretary in China. See Vogt, Adolf, (1981), p. 105 (Footnote 24).

124 the Far East as soon as the German military advisory group had been established. Obeying Max Bauer’s last wishes, Hermann Kriebel took over the position as Chiang Kaishek’s chief military advisor until various circumstances, not all beyond his control, put an end to his career only short time later. During the last two years of World War I, Lieutenant Colonel Hermann Kriebel had worked as a staff officer for the Oberste Heeresleitung, the German army’s supreme command. After the armistice, he was elected member of the commision which was to represent Germany at the peace negotiations in France and is perhaps best remembered in history for his famous and eerily prophetic farewell remark after the actual signing of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 – ‘See you again in twenty years!’427 Like many of his former comrades, Hermann Kriebel was embittered by Imperial Germany’s defeat in the Great War and the subsequent creation of a German republic and found consolation in ultra-nationalistic right- wing political activities as soon as he returned home428. After working with several Bavarian para-military organisations, so-called Einwohnerwehren, and the failed Kapp Putsch, he threw in his lot with the newly-established National Socialist Party and participated in Adolf Hitler’s failed Beer Hall Coup in Munich in 1923. He even became one of the few close and personal friends of the later Führer. On the run from the German law, Hermann Kriebel sought, albeit without success, employment as a military expert in Afghanistan, Bolivia and Chile, but was ultimately called to Nationalist China by Max Bauer as a member of Chiang Kaishek’s immediate advisory staff. Despite being embraced by both Max Bauer and Chiang Kaishek, Hermann Kriebel was by far not the perfect choice for the post of German chief military adviser. A militarist through and through, he shared neither the late Colonel’s extensive political or economic knowledge, his deep insight or his overwhelming idealism nor was he comfortable or even familiar with the world of politics. Max Bauer had always tried to focus mainly on the economic and political aspects of his job as chief adviser to Chiang Kaishek and had seen his military activities more or less as a subordinate, if neccessary part of it. Now, without him giving it direction, the German advisory group’s ambitious program for the economic reconstruction of China fell to pieces. The various civil experts brought to the Far East by the Colonel over the last couple of years found themselves engaged in purposeless activity in their respective fields429, quit in frustration and returned home. Additionally, most of the industrial contacts Max Bauer and his associates in Germany and China had worked so hard to establish were all but abandoned after his death. The military aspects of the German advisers’ activities in the Middle Kingdom, however, not only continued unabated but actually gained top priority. This was just as well, since it had already become more than apparent that Chiang Kaishek and the government in Nanjing focussed almost exclusively on military reforms anyway, neglecting the economic modernisation of China in these times of apparently never-ending warfare430. However, not even on the military level could

427 Kirby, William C. (1984), p. 62. 428 Groehler, Olaf (1989), p. 96. Amongst other choice things, Olaf Groehler calls Hermann Kriebel a ‘narrow-minded militarist’ and ‘Nazi insurrectionist’. 429 Causey, Beverley D. (1942), p. 168. 430 Vogt, Adolf, (1974), p. 463.

125 Hermann Kriebel fulfil the exaggerated hopes raised by Max Bauer over his few years as chief adviser. First of all, he lacked the organisational skills necessary to coordinate the military training of an overwhelmingly big number of Chinese officers and soldiers with only a small number of advisers under his command. Hermann Kriebel also had apparently no trust in the ability of his men to teach their students or in the capability of the Chinese troops to understand the instructions they received. Chiang Kaishek had repeatedly insisted that he needed German-trained troops for his fight against the renegade warlords Yan Xishan and Feng Yuxiang by April 1930, yet, with the exception of the already proven elite Lehrbrigade, not a single Chinese unit under his supervision was considered battleworthy by Hermann Kriebel when they were urgently needed in the field431. This was just as disappointing for Chiang Kaishek as the fact that the Lieutenant Colonel, instead of helping the Chinese with their field operations like Max Bauer had done, rather wanted to limit the German military advisory group’s activities to theoretical instructions and technical drill at the war academies432. Yet, these were not the only reasons for the Nationalist government’s complaints. Lacking the cultural finesse of Max Bauer, Hermann Kriebel promptly mismanaged the relations between the German military advisers and their Chinese employers. On more than one occasion, he deeply offended high-ranking military leaders and officials of the Guomindang by rudely criticising their shortcomings in the presence of his Chinese translator433 or even subordinates. This kind of faux pas was simply unacceptable for the eminently sensitive Asians. However, Hermann Kriebel’s problems were not only limited to his Chinese employers, but affected the German military advisors as well. The entire advisory group was dependent on the personality and leadership style of its chief adviser and the Lieutenant Colonel grew just as unpopular among his fellow advisers as he already was among the Chinese officials434. The German military advisory group had in the meantime grown to twenty-seven members, some of them on leave from the Reichswehr but most of them retired officers from the former Imperial army, but it had lost some of its efficiency. Due to his brusque personality, Hermann Kriebel did not receive the same loyalty from the advisor corps that Max Bauer had enjoyed before him. His arrogance, stubbornness and particularly his strong National Socialist inclinations soon split the advisory group in two factions. While some advisers thought him to be a worthy successor of Max Bauer, others, especially those who had left Germany to escape the increasingly popular Fascist ideology, considered him as damaging to the standing of the the military advisory corps with the Chinese people435. The Auswärtiges Amt was also worried about some of the private political activities of Herman Kriebel and several other military advisers in the Far East. National Socialist circles in Germany had already professed their interest in expanding their influence in China and the German diplomats at home and abroad Amt were only too aware of what damage to Weimar Germany’s image in the world would be done by a Nazification of the German advisory group. Consequently, the government in Nanjing was informed

431 Liang, Hsi-Huey (1978), p. 93. 432 Ibid. 433 Ibid., p. 92. 434 ADAP, Serie B, Band XIII, Document 159. Ambassador von Borch to Auswärtiges Amt, Beiping, 28 November 1929. 435 PA, R 85699, Abteilung IV – Politische Abteilung, Po. 13 China, Militärangelegenheiten, Band 3. Heeresstatistische Abteilung Berlin to unknown receiver, Berlin, 4 March 1930.

126 by the German embassy that the National Socialist sympathizers around Hermann Kriebel were opponents, not representatives of Germany’s current constitutional form of government436. Still, they didn’t have to be overly concerned about the danger of a Fascist organisation growing in China437. Sooner rather than later, the German military advisory group threatened to dissolve completely because of Max Kriebel’s political point of view and his generally lacklustre performance as chief adviser. Chiang Kaishek finally had enough. He dismissed the Lieutenant Colonel and asked his middlemen in the trading department of the Chinese legation in Berlin to find another retired German officer, one better suited to head his military advisory mission. The gentlemen once more approached General Erich Ludendorff who suggested that Lieutenant General Georg Wetzell would make an excellent chief adviser. Max Kriebel couldn’t find any reason in himself why his activity as Chiang Kaishek’s chief advisor had been so short-lived. Instead, he became increasingly bitter about what he saw as Weimar Germany’s continuing opposition to his activities in the Far East. He was absolutely convinced that he and his military advisory corps had accomplished far more for the German industry and Germany’s image in China than the entire German consular staff in China438. The Lieutenant Colonel even wrote a furious letter to his brother, complaining that the German military advisers had received more support from the British than from all German authorities combined439, completely ignoring the fact that even the usually sympathetic upper Reichswehr echelons kept a certain distance from him because they regarded him as a ‘Nazi’440 and as the proverbial ‘bull in the Chinese china shop’441. Hermann Kriebel’s dismissal from the Chinese government’s service was, however, not the end of his career in the Far East. In 1934, he returned to Shanghai as the German consul general. In his function as diplomat he was actually far more useful to China than he had ever been as Chiang Kaishek’s chief military adviser. Having no ill feelings of any kind towards his former employers, Hermann Kriebel remained a passionate supporter of the Chinese cause and arranged many of the Middle Kingdom’s industrial and military purchases from Germany442, often deliberately contravening the official policies dictated by his former personal friend and then superior, Chancellor Adolf Hitler, and by the National Socialist government. Only when diplomatic relations between Nationalist Socialist Germany and China were definitely cancelled in February 1941, did Consul General Hermann Kriebel return home for good.

436 ADAP, Serie B, Band XIII, Document 31. Director Trautmann to German Embassy Beiping, Berlin, 23 September 1929. 437 ADAP, Serie B, Band XIII, Document 159. Ambassador von Borch to Auswärtiges Amt, Beiping, 28 November 1929. 438 PA, R 85698, Abteilung IV – Politische Abteilung, Po. 13 China, Militärangelegenheiten, Band 2. Ministry of the Reichswehr to Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin, 9 November 1929 (includes a copy of a letter of Lieutenant-Colonel Kriebel to Karl Kriebel, Nanjing, 11 September 1929). 439 Ibid. 440 Ratenhof, Udo (1987), p. 391. 441 PA, R 85699, Abteilung IV – Politische Abteilung, Po. 13 China, Militärangelegenheiten, Band 3. Heeresstatistische Abteilung Berlin to Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin, 6 March 1930. In accordance with the German version of the proverb, however, Herman Kriebel he was compared with an elephant in the original document. 442 Liu, Frederick Fu (1956), p. 75.

127 4.2.7 Lieutenant General Georg Wetzell, 1930 – 1934 Around Christmas 1929, shortly after he had been contacted by officials of the Chinese legation in Berlin, the retired General Erich Ludendorff sent a postcard to Lieutenant General Georg Wetzell, asking only one question – ‘Do you want to go to China?’ Georg Wetzell’s answer was equally short. ‘When His Excellency believes that it lies in Germany’s interest, with pleasure.’443 Without much further ado, the Lieutenant General took leave of absence from the Reichswehr and travelled to the Far East to take over the vacant post of Chiang Kaishek’s chief military adviser. Georg Wetzell had been a professional soldier all his life. During World War I, he had been a high-ranking member of the Oberste Heeresleitung, the German army’s supreme command, and had been instrumental in the creation of the battle plan with which the Italian army was defeated on the Alpine front in 1917. In the post-war years, he was one of the few officers who were accepted into the newly-established Reichswehr. There he headed the Truppenamt of the Reichswehr, which, against all restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles, served as a disguised general staff and trained high-ranking officers for wartime duties. In this position he also became a friend and close confidant of Colonel General Hans von Seeckt, the commander-in-chief and great reformer of the Reichswehr who would eventually become his successor as head of Chiang Kaishek’s German military advisory group. Even when the exact relationship between the advisers and the Reichswehr remains ‘frustratingly obscure’444, the fact that with Georg Wetzell a formerly regular member of Weimar Germany’s Reichswehr became involved in Chinese military affairs began to change the nature of the German military advisory group. It seems that with its blessing of the Lieutenant General’s employment as chief military adviser in China, the Reichswehr had given up its initial reservedness and given to the advisory mission at least a semi-official character445. Furthermore, it is possible that, at that time, the military authorities in Berlin saw the German military advisors in China as potential assets for the Reichswehr’s planned rearmament, for example, by promoting the export of German war materials. They definitely showed certain interest in the supply and demand of the Middle Kingdom’s military economic market and how they could

443 Borke, Kurt von (1938), p. 321. 444 Seps, Jerry. B. (1981) General Georg Wetzell, in: Martin, Bernd (Ed.) (1981) Die deutsche Beraterschaft in China 1927 – 1938; Militär – Wirtschaft – Außenpolitik, Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, p. 107. 445 Martin, Bernd (1986), p. 340.

128 be coordinated with their own long-term plans446. In parallel, Georg Wetzell changed at least the superficial image of Chiang Kaishek’s German military advisers through the establishment of a liaison office between the advisory group and the Reichswehr in Berlin. Its head was Lieutenant Colonel Rolf Brinckmann. Shortly afterwards, the Reichswehr created another direct connection between the military advisers and its military-statistical department. This little bureau, with the inconspicuous designation ‘T3’, was responsible for ‘Foreign Contacts (Foreign Armed Forces)’ in general and was managed by Colonel Kühlenthal447. However, contrary to the Chinese belief that these two offices acted with the knowledge and consent of the German government, they were never seen by the Reichswehr as more than convenient arrangements for communication with448 and, if necessary, exertion of influence on the German military advisers. In any case, the military economic activities of both bureaus, even in collaboration with the military advisers in the Far East, were rather sporadic. Not unlike Hermann Kriebel, Georg Wetzell, as head of the advisory group, lacked the will, abilities and opportunities to foster a true Sino-German cooperation in this area. Furthermore, the German government and the Auswärtiges Amt continued to reject the idea of a German military adviser group in China categorically and still had enough authority to stop the latently dissident Reichswehr from openly declaring its own foreign and economic policies. Yet, besides giving Georg Wetzell’s military advisory group a quasi-legal image in Chinese eyes, the involvement of the Reichswehr in the entire affair had no further impact on how Chiang Kaishek or the Nanjing government viewed their employees. In a letter to his superior, Georg Wetzell declared in all earnest that ‘[the] German officer knows no higher command than the protection of his honour and loyalty to his Fatherland. The same applies to the German officer when he serves the Chinese government. The German officers who serve here under my command work for China as if China were their own Fatherland’449. Additionally, judging them by their actions, the Chinese never had the slightest impression that the German military advisers had a divided loyalty or were

446 Geyer, Michael (1981) Motive und Bedingungen einer aktiven Fernostpolitik des deutschen Militärs (1928 – 1936), in: Martin, Bernd (Ed.) (1981) Die deutsche Beraterschaft in China 1927 – 1938; Militär – Wirtschaft – Außenpolitik, Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, pp. 54 ff. 447 Rostek, Horst (1989) Zur Rolle der deutschen Militärberater bei der chinesischen Nationalregierung 1928 bis 1938, in: [Anon.] (Ed.) (1989) Bulletin Faschismus/Zweiter Weltkrieg; Sonderheft 1989, Berlin: Zentralinstitut für Geschichte, p. 118. 448 Walsh, Billie K. (1974), p. 506. 449 MA, Msg 160/3, Schriftwechsel Beraterbüro Nanking mit General Wetzell. General Wetzell to Chiang Kaishek, Kuling, 27 August 1933.

129 serving anything but the Middle Kingdom’s best interests, just as it had been laid down in their employment contracts. This, however, didn’t mean that there were no problems with the German military advisory group or its leader. Despite being supposed to replace the all-too-rude Hermann Kriebel as Chiang Kaishek’s adviser general, the old and blunt Great War veteran Georg Wetzell was equally inadequate for the delicate political facets of his task. The Lieutenant General, too, was often criticized for his style of leadership450. Georg Wetzell proved to be too unapproachable, too uncompromising and generally ‘too Prussian for the Chinese’451. Furthermore, due to his know-all attitude452, he antagonized many people around him. He reprimanded everybody at every opportunity without any regard for other people’s personal feelings453. Both Chinese and Germans were embarrassed by his condescension, especially when he stressed in his lectures the superior German military knowledge, ‘which had been tested and strengthened through experience in war and peace’454, to give his arguments seemingly more weight. To make matters even worse, Georg Wetzell was handicapped by his ‘almost compulsory pedantic streak and by his inability to understand the Chinese mentality’455. These two character traits probably were the reasons for the well-known animosity between Georg Wetzell and Chen Yi, the Nanjing government’s Vice Minister of War, after the Lieutenant General had concluded several big armaments deals directly with the former Chinese Minister of Finance T.V. Soong456 without giving corrupt Nationalist army generals the opportunity to direct some of the money involved into their own pockets457. Professionally, despite his undisputed abilities and effectiveness, Georg Wetzell, too, could not live up to the almost unnaturally high expectations created in his Chinese

450 There was a certain similarity between Lieutenant General Georg Wetzell and General Joseph W. Stilwell, the American military adviser to Chiang Kaishek during World War II who had to face similar situations and reacted in a similar way. Joseph W. Stillwell’s activities in China are well covered by Spence, Jonathan (1980) To Change China; Western Advisers in China 1620 – 1960, New York (et al.): Penguin Books. Strangely enough, the book completely ignores the presence of the German military advisers a decade earlier. 451 PA, R 85703, Abteilung IV – Politische Abteilung, Po. 13 China, Militärangelegenheiten, Band 7. Unsigned memorandum, Berlin, 8 November 1933. 452 Martin, Bernd (1986), p. 342. 453 ADAP, Serie C, Band II/1, Document 157. Ambassador Trautmann to Auswärtiges Amt, Beiping, 30 December 1933. 454 MA, Msg 160/3, Schriftwechsel Beraterbüro Nanking mit General Wetzell. Memorandum of General von Wetzell, Nanjing, Dezember 1931. 455 Liu, Frederick Fu (1956), p. 76. 456 Anglo-Cantonese transcription. In Pinyin: Song Ziwen.

130 employers by Colonel Max Bauer. Still, he tried to do his very best and served to strengthen the position of the German military advisers so his successors were able to channel it into an increasingly strong influence458. All the while, the work of the German military advisery group, which had increased in size to some seventy members459, continued at the different military academies and with the various selected units of the Nationalist armed forces. Parallel to the number of military advisers, the number of Chinese officer cadets attending the lectures at Nanjing War Academy grew, despite the fact that their instruction, both in the lecture halls and on the training grounds, became more and more demanding. The prospective leaders of the Chinese army were given ‘rigorous military training’ and were ‘deliberately exposed to hardships’460. The same happened to the officers and troops of the 87th and 88th Divisions, which were established under the guidance of Georg Wetzell and which would, after theoretical instructions and technical drill, prove their status as German-trained elite units in the years to come. The military exercises under realistic combat conditions, however, came with a price, even for the German military advisory group. On 17 February 1930, the adviser von Hornhardt was tragically killed while demonstrating the use of a hand grenade461. The same happened to adviser von Bock on 23 June 1931462. To streamline the ongoing reform process of the Nationalist armed forces and to make day-to-day operations more effective, Lieutenant General Georg Wetzell created the new position of liaison officers for some of his military advisers. This way almost every Chinese general had his own German military advisor at his side463. Serving as aide-de-camps to the various high-ranking Nationalist army generals, however, soon demonstrated the limits of the influence the German advisers thought to have. Every time the Western way of military thinking clashed with time-honoured Chinese tradition, not even their most plausible advice was followed. Many of them

457 ADAP, Serie C, Band II/1, Document 157. Ambassador Trautmann to Auswärtiges Amt, Beiping, 30 December 1933. 458 Liu, Frederick Fu (1956), p. 76. 459 Seps, Jerry B. (1972), p. 257. 460 Liu, Frederick Fu (1956), p. 83. 461 PA, R 85699, Abteilung IV – Politische Abteilung, Po. 13 China, Militärangelegenheiten, Band 3. Ambassador von Borch to Auswärtiges Amt, Beiping, 18 February 1930. The first name of von Hornhardtk cannot be found in any of the available sources. 462 PA, R 85701, Abteilung IV – Politische Abteilung, Po. 13 China, Militärangelegenheiten, Band 5. German Embassy Beiping to Auswärtiges Amt, Beiping, 26 June 1931. The first name of von Bock cannot be found in any of the available sources.

131 were confronted with the same arrogant mindset as one of Feng Yuxiang’s foreign advisers had been years earlier. This adviser, who took his job apparently too seriously, was once asked by the warlord whether he knew what the word ‘adviser’ meant in Chinese. The adviser did not and Feng Yuxiang explained to him that it meant ‘looking and asking… and I only want you to talk when I look at you and ask you something’464. This approach to any foreign adviser was also common among the old guard of Chinese generals. They loved to listen to extensive theoretical lectures to learn about the principles of modern warfare, but they did not want to have anybody, especially not a foreign devil, giving them advice. It was therefore no wonder that many German military advisers, not only the notoriously impatient Georg Wetzell, became increasingly annoyed when their suggestions, particularly when they really could have made a difference, were simply ignored. Just like many of his German subordinates, Georg Wetzell had not been prepared for the backwardness of the Chinese armed forces when he arrived in 1930 to take over the leadership of the advisory corps. Despite years of military reforms and huge amounts of money spent on weapons acquisitions, Chiang Kaishek’s Nationalist army still only had limited modern armament, particularly very little heavy artillery and hardly any combat aircraft. To adapt the military training of the Chinese army to these rather limiting circumstances, especially in the face of the upcoming battles against Communists guerillas and Japanese invaders, some of the ideas previously brought up by Max Bauer in his memoranda were rejected by Georg Wetzell. The premature and overly enthusiastic plans to coordinate the operations of the Lehrbrigade, or any Chinese army unit for that matter, with the operations of the Chinese Air Force were put on ice for the time being465. Instead, Georg Wetzell once again focussed more on conventional tactics and made military equipment already at hand, like heavy machine guns, light artillery and mine throwers, the primary armament of the Chinese units under his direct influence. Based on his experiences during the first military campaign he participated in at the side of Chiang Kaishek, the fight against warlord remnants in 1930, the Lieutenant General wrote a memorandum of his own on the reorganisation

463 Haupt, Werner (1969) Deutsche Militärberater in China, in: [Anon.] (Ed.) (1969) Deutsches Soldatenjahrbuch 1969; Siebzehnter Deutscher Soldatenkalender, München: Schild Verlag, p. 260. 464 Abegg, Lily (1940) Chinas Erneuerung; Der Raum als Waffe, Frankfurt am Main: Societäts-Verlag, p. 145. Feng Yuxiang probably alluded to the Chinese word ‘guwen’, which consists of two characters, one meaning ‘to look after’ and the other meaning ‘to ask’. 465 Vogt, Adolf, (1974), p. 467.

132 of the Chinese army466. It repeated many of the suggestions already brought up by Max Bauer years earlier, particularly that the Chinese troops needed an extended period of peace to regroup and to rectify all their shortcomings in training or equipment. Furthermore, Georg Wetzell suggested that the money spent on China’s armed forces should be recalculated since more than fifty percent of 1930’s national budget had been used for just this single campaign. Chiang Kaishek did not heed the Lieutenant General’s advice. Instead, the supreme commander insisted even more that he needed his German-trained troops for his upcoming fights. Georg Wetzell’s and the other military advisers’ objections to sending their still only half-trained recruits into battle were frequently brushed aside467. Consequently, over his four years in Chiang Kaishek’s service, Georg Wetzell became more and more convinced that he had become absolutely useless in his job as chief reorganiser and instructor of the Chinese army. No one was listening to his propositions any longer and his attempts to truly train the his supposed elite units were made as good as impossible since Chiang Kaishek sent them into battle before they had even finished their training468. In 1934, however, without knowing it, he was already waiting for his successor.

4.2.8 The Military Advisers at War It is quite probable that Georg Wetzell would have been dismissed almost as quickly as Hermann Kriebel before him had not his input as Chiang Kaishek’s personal military adviser been deemed indispensable in these times of increasing need. Only a short time after the Lieutenant General had arrived in China, he and the other German military experts were drawn into a series of conflicts between the Nationalist government and its interior and exterior foes which merged into each other and which seemed to drag on endlessly. As a consequence, the training of the Guomindang’s armed forces soon became just one task among others. Throughout the 1920s there had been a balance between Feng Yuxiang and Yan Xishan, two of China’s major warlords. Sometimes they were allies, but most of the time they were fighting each other, holding each other in check, much to Chiang Kaishek’s benefit. When Georg Wetzell arrived in 1930 and wrote his first assessment of the military situation as he saw it, he identified the evolving Feng-

466 MA, Msg 160/2, Nachrichten, Denkschriften. Memorandum of General von Wetzell, no place, no date. 467 ADAP, Serie C, Band IV/1, Document 101. Director Meyer to German Embassy Beiping, Berlin, 24 May 1935. 468 ADAP, Serie C, Band II/1, Document 157. Ambassador Trautmann to Auswärtiges Amt, Beiping, 30 December 1933.

133 Yan alliance as a major threat which would sooner rather than later need to be neutralized. Chiang Kaishek, however, absorbed in his early campaigns against the Chinese Communists, paid no attention to his new chief adviser’s advice469. Indeed, in the summer of 1930, a fierce war broke out when a dissident left-wing faction of the Guomindang allied itself with the northern warlords and rose up against Chiang Kaishek. During the following Henan campaign, Georg Wetzell and other German military advisers were actively and ‘with success’470 involved in staff duty at Chiang Kaishek’s mobile headquarters. To end the conflict as soon and as effectively as possible, the German-trained elite Lehrdivision was also committed against the warlord troops471. Nine military advisers – Erich Heise, Franz Hummel, Richard Kotz, Max Simon-Eberhard, Karl-Theodor Martin, Constantin Meyer, Egidy, Fehrmann and Fischer472 – even joined the Nationalist divisions in the field to support their trainees in any way possible. According to unnamed eyewitnesses, these German officers personally participated in the battles against the Northern Coalition ‘with rifles in their hands’473, although this was never officially confirmed. Still, all these men put themselves in grave danger, particularly after Chiang Kaishek’s opponents had threatened to execute all foreign advisers caught in the fighting474. This threat, however, did not deter the advisors from carrying out what they saw as their duty. After a successful breakthrough at Guide and the victorious advance on Kaifeng, Chiang Kaishek and the Nanjing government emerged triumphant from this short but costly and bloody civil war. Still, amid all the victory celebrations, statements acknowledging the German aid were notable by their absence. Georg Wetzell did not create the impression of being hurt by this lack of appreciation. The chief military adviser rather summarized his impressions of the campaign against the warlord remnants in another memorandum475 and asked for an extended period of peace and stability for his main duty, the reorganisation of the Chinese army, to be able to be completed successfully. He would not get it. According to the China Year Book, the Nationalist Chinese armies of the early 1930s totalled close to two million men476. Such an enormous number should, one might think, deter even the most aggressive foreign invader. Still, Imperial Japan chose exactly this time and these opponents when she decided to expand her dominion from Korea further into the East Asian mainland. The highest-ranking Japanese army officers rightly knew that the numbers of Chinese soldiers alone was of little importance since most of them were hardly trained, insufficently equipped

469 Seps, Jerry. B. (1981), p. 113. 470 MA, Msg 160/4, Briefe General Wetzell an Verbindungsstelle Berlin und Oberst Brinckmann, 1932 – 1934. General von Wetzell to Lieutenant-Colonel Brinckmann, Nanjing, 9 November 1933. 471 Liang, Hsi-Huey (1978), p. 90. 472 The first names of Egidy, Fehrmann and Fischer cannot be found in any of the available sources. 473 PA, R 85700, Abteilung IV – Politische Abteilung, Po. 13 China, Militärangelegenheiten, Band 4. Ambassador von Borch to Auswärtiges Amt, Beiping, 16 June 1930. 474 Ibid. and PA, R 85699, Abteilung IV – Politische Abteilung, Po. 13 China, Militärangelegenheiten, Band 3. German Embassy Paris to Auswärtiges Amt, Paris, 16 April 1930 (includes the 16 April 1930 article from La Republique). 475 MA, Msg 160/2, Nachrichten, Denkschriften. Memorandum of General von Wetzell, no place, no date. 476 Teichman, Eric (1938), p. 259.

134 and incompetently led. They estimated that they could take on the Chinese troops ‘at a ratio of five or ten to one’477. Ultimately, on 18 September 1931, Japanese soldiers faked a Chinese bomb attack on a railway line near Mukden478 and immediately after, seemingly as an act of retaliation, started a large-scale invasion of Manchuria and northern China. The Manchurian troops of the ‘Young Marshal’ Zhang Xueliang, heir of the late Zhang Zuolin’s warlord fiefdom and Chiang Kaishek’s ally in the north, were unable to put up any serious resistance against the Japanese juggernaut and neither could the Nationalist troops which had been withdrawn from their ongoing anti-Communist campaign and sent to the newly-established frontline. Within only a short time, the Japanese occupied Manchuria and proudly integrated her into their empire. The Chinese, on the other hand, and particularly their armed forces ‘had been robbed of spirit and could hardly overcome the sense of inferiority’479 caused by their tragic defeat by the superior Japanese. Still, no German military advisers had been involved in any way in the battle against the Japanese in northern China480. Georg Wetzell himself had been too occupied with Chiang Kaishek’s fight against the Chinese Communists at the time to be of any help481. Understandably, anti-Japanese sentiment was rampant among the Chinese people, especially in locations where Chinese and Japanese were forced to meet each other face-to-face, like in the international port city of Shanghai. To counter the first violent outbursts of the Chinese against the foreign invaders, the Japanese brutally bombed a Chinese residential district of Shanghai on 29 January 1932 and started a full-scale assault on the Nationalist troops stationed in the city soon after. It became an absolute surprise for the entire world when the Chinese troops, which according to the opinion of most international military experts were worth next to nothing, stood up longer than expected against the superbly-trained and modern-equipped Japanese army. First only the local Guomindang troops of the 19th Route Army, armed with hardly anything but rifles and machine guns, withstood all Japanese onslaughts from land, air

477 Ibid. 478 Today: Shenyang. 479 Kotenev, Anatol M. (1937) The Chinese Soldier; Basic Principles, Spirit, Science of War, and Heroes of the Chinese Armies, Shanghai (et al.): Kelly and Walsh, p. 133. 480 Ratenhof, Gabriele (1984) Das Deutsche Reich und die internationale Krise um die Mandschurei 1931 – 1933; Die deutsche Fernostpolitik als Spiegel und Instrument deutscher Revisionspolitik, Frankfurt am Main (et al.): Peter Lang, p. 149. 481 MA, Msg 160/4, Briefe General Wetzell an Verbindungsstelle Berlin und Oberst Brinckmann, 1932 – 1934. General von Wetzell to Lieutenant-Colonel Brinckmann, Nanjing, 9 November 1933.

135 and sea482. A short time later, however, the elite 87th and 88th Divisions, which had been established and trained under the guidance of the German military advisers, were brought into the lines around Shanghai to strengthen the Chinese defences. The crack Chinese units particularly, supported by heavy artillery, stubbornly resisted the Japanese attackers and even broke their concentrated armoured assaults by skillfully using Shanghai’s surrounding rice paddies, improvised mine fields and accurate anti- tank cannon fire483. Weeks of determined Chinese resistance finally forced the withdrawal of the Japanese troops on terms which amounted to a stalemate. The Japanese, quite unexpectedly, had taken enormous casualties during the fierce street fighting and ‘achieved practically nothing’484 except the establishment of a vaguely defined neutral zone around Shanghai. Yet, for the Chinese the first marked a turning point in their morale485 and created ‘never before known feelings of martial pride and nationalism’486 all over the Middle Kingdom. When the fighting broke out in Shanghai in in late January 1932, Georg Wetzell received only notice when it was already too late to become personally involved in the defence of the city. Still, he did travel to the port city, allegedly to visit his daughter who went to the German school there. His presence alone fanned rumours of German help for the Chinese cause487. However, the only things the Lieutenant General actually did was to discuss what to do with the German expatriates in the combat area488, to give some general strategic and tactical advice after a short tour of the urban battlefield and to write a firm statement against Imperial Japan, the ‘doom’, as he succinctly put it, ‘that threatens the entire world’489. Georg Wetzell also assured the German diplomats in China that he had instructed his military advisers not to get

482 Liu, Frederick Fu (1956), p. 113. 483 Tomczyk, Andrzej M. (2002) Japońska Broń Pancerna; Japanese Armor Volume 1 [Tankpower (Volume 9)], Gdansk: AJ-Press, p. 104, and Zezschwitz, G.P. von (1938) Heigl’s Taschenbuch der Tanks; Teil III: Der Panzerkampf, München/Berlin: J.F. Lehmanns Verlag, pp. 173 ff. 484 Tomczyk, Andrzej M. (2002), p. 96. Andrzej Tomczyk quotes the Polish general Kordian Zamorski who wrote a contemporary comment on the events in the Far East. 485 Liu, Frederick Fu (1956), p. 113. 486 Jaenicke, Wolfgang (1963) Das Ringen um die Macht im Fernen Osten; Vorgeschichte des Chinesisch-Japanischen Krieges 1937 auf politischem und wirtschaftlichem Gebiet und Auswirkung auf die Gegenwart, Würzburg: Holzner Verlag, p. 123. 487 ADAP, Serie B, Band XIX, Document 261. Director Meyer to General von Hammerstein-Equord, Berlin, 23 February 1932. 488 MA, Msg 160/2, Nachrichten, Denkschriften. Memorandum of Captain Krummacher, no place, no date. 489 Groehler, Olaf (1989), p. 98. Olaf Groehler quotes from a letter written by Georg Wetzell to the German embassy in Nanjing.

136 involved in any kind of fighting490. Chiang Kaishek himself understood the position of his German officers only too well. The entire theatre of operations was in the immediate neighbourhood of Shanghai’s international settlements and therefore, to avoid any international criticism or, even worse, diplomatic entanglements, they could not stand by the side of the Chinese troops they had trained491. Still, the relationship between the German military advisers and their Chinese soldiers was extraordinarily close492, even so close that some of the officers apparently ignored Georg Wetzell’s orders. Dressed as civilians, yet acting as observers or tactical counsellors, they visited the frontline where they helped to plan various smaller military operations493. However, their involvement was never officially acknowledged. The Japanese, after a relatively quick victory in Manchuria, had counted on an equally easy military success in Shanghai. Therefore they initially tried to exonerate the unexpected and costly defeat of their armed forces by putting the blame on a ‘gigantic Chinese army which only waited to massacre the Japanese troops’494. When it became common knowledge that at the outbreak of hostilities only one regiment of Chinese troops had been quartered in the port city, they needed another scapegoat to counter their loss of prestige. As a consequence, Japanese newspapers started to print articles accusing the German military advisers of fighting actively alongside the Chinese troops495. Others, too, picked up the idea that it was solely the leadership of the German military advisers which accounted for the strong Chinese resistance496. The Auswärtiges Amt in Berlin recognized the Japanese frustration in the wake of a military failure for what it was and rejected all Japanese accusations that the German advisers had fought side by side with Chinese soldiers. If Germans indeed had fought against Japanese they must have been volunteers, officers who must have left the advisory group497. Yet, even if a number of German military advisers had indeed visited the frontlines in and around Shanghai, they were not the reason why 50,000

490 Ratenhof, Gabriele (1984), p. 149. Gabriele Ratenhof quotes from Ambassador Trautmann’s telegraph to the Auswärtiges Amt, written on 1 February 1932. 491 Liang, Hsi-Huey (1978), p. 93. 492 Ibid., p. 57. 493 MA, Msg 160/2, Nachrichten, Denkschriften. Memorandum of Captain Krummacher, no place, no date, and PA, R 85699, Abteilung IV – Politische Abteilung, Po. 13 China, Militärangelegenheiten, Band 3. Ambassador von Borch to Auswärtiges Amt, Beiping, 9 May 1930. 494 MA, N 247/133, Nachlaß Seeckt, Beratertätigkeit von Seeckts in China. General von Wetzell to Lieutenant-Colonel von Seeckt, Nanjing, 14 March 1932. 495 Ratenhof, Gabriele (1984), p. 150. 496 Causey, Beverley D. (1942), p. 205. Beverly Causey quotes from an article printed in the 26 January 1932 issue of the Neues Wiener Extrablatt.

137 Chinese soldiers repeatedly repulsed the attacks of some 100,000 Japanese soldiers and marines in early 1932. Not German command, but primarily Chinese fury over the Japanese occupation of Manchuria and Chinese leadeship on the spot – paired with the German military advisers’ previous and still ongoing army reforms and advanced military training, as well as sufficient modern war materials – had made China’s valiant stand at Shanghai possible. The last major Japanese military operation before the actual outbreak of the Sino- Japanese War in 1937 was the general advance to the Great Wall to fortify the Japanese position in northeastern China. During the battle for Jehol province498 in early 1933, Georg Wetzell and several other German military advisers were in Beijing to help in the planning of the Chinese resistance against the Japanese attack499 without German diplomats or the international community ever voicing any criticism. At that time, Imperial Japan had rejected the report of the Lytton Commission and had finally turned its back on the League of Nations and, as a result, there were no sympathies left for Japan’s cause. Not even Germany’s newly elected National Socialist government sided with its later ally under these circumstaces. In the end, however, the Chinese were once again defeated and lost control of all territory north of the Great Wall. Apparently only the chief German military adviser, Georg Wetzell, could give the disaster a positive spin when wrote to a letter to the Reichswehr’s liaison office in Berlin. ‘In spring 1933, in accordance to [Chiang Kaishek’s] wishes, I was in [Beijing] where […], I believe, I did useful work because otherwise the Japanese would be sitting in Beiping and Tianjin right now.’500 Despite its ferocity, the battle against the Japanese invaders during the early 1930s was only a subordinated theatre of war in comparison to Chiang Kaishek’s relentless campaigns against the Chinese Communists. After they had almost been wiped out in 1927, the remaining Communists, under the leadership of Mao Zedong, had founded a Chinese Soviet Republic in southern Jiangxi province in October 1930. Using this remote area with its rugged mountain ranges and dense forests as their base, they had started a guerilla war against the Nanjing government short time later. From the beginning, the mere existence of this Communist stronghold within the Middle Kingdom was a thorn in Chiang Kaishek’s side. Over the following years, however, it became a virtual obsession of his. Even in the face of Imperial Japan’s more and more brazen intrusions into Chinese territory, he continued to insist that the extermination of the Communists should have absolute priority since, without solving this internal

497 Ratenhof, Udo (1987), p. 398. 498 Today: province. 499 MA, Msg 160/3, Schriftwechsel Beraterbüro Nanking mit General Wetzell. Lieutenant von Busekist to Captain Krummacher, Beiping, 23 March 1933. 500 MA, Msg 160/4, Briefe General Wetzell an Verbindungsstelle Berlin und Oberst Brinckmann, 1932 – 1934. General von Wetzell to Lieutenant-Colonel Brinckmann, Nanjing, 9 November 1933.

138 problem first, China would never be fully able to withstand an external threat. Standing by Chiang Kaishek’s side, Georg Wetzell and the other German military advisers were dragged into this increasingly savage yet ultimately futile conflict. The First Extermination Campaign against the Chinese Communists began in October 1930, while the Fifth – and last – Extermination Campaign started in October 1933. However, even after the conclusion of the latter, the Communists were still far from being exterminated. Just how much actual influence the German military advisers had on the five campaigns is debatable. The Nanjing government usually played down the influence of its foreign helpers to make its own accomplishments seem more glorious. The Chinese communists, on the other hand, exaggerated the activities of the advisers to excuse their own failures and to put pressure on Weimar Germany on the international stage. Yet, it seems that the activities of the military advisers were mostly limited to Georg Wetzell drafting campaign plans and offering advice which was, in many cases, only accepted by Chiang Kaishek and the Chinese military leaders when it coincided with their own ideas. Chiang Kaishek had, at least in principle, taken Georg Wetzell’s memorandum501 of mid-1930 to heart when he refrained from using his own Nationalist Army troops in the First Extermination Campaign against the Jiangxi Soviet and sent exclusively provincial armies under the command of General Lu Tiping. Why should he use his best German-trained elite troops against what he saw as a pitiful band of Communist bandits? Unfortunately, his arrogance cost him dearly. Initially victory seemed assured when General Lu Tiping’s 100,000 men moved against 42,000 Communist guerillas, only half of whom actually had rifles502, the rest fighting with spears. Yet, the actual campaign was badly coordinated and the various troop contingents were generally sub-standard. As a consequence, the Communists lured them deeper and deeper into their territory, surrounded and thoroughly defeated them503. Since Chiang Kaishek’s fighters had only been provincial troops, not official Nationalist soldiers, no German military advisers had accompanied them in the field. Georg Wetzell had also not been asked for advice regarding the campaign.

501 MA, Msg 160/2, Nachrichten, Denkschriften. Memorandum of General von Wetzell, no place, no date. 502 Sommer, Walter (1971) Zur Rolle deutscher Berater in den Einkreisungs- und Vernichtungsfeld- zügen gegen die südchinesische Sowjetrepublik, 1930 – 34, in: Zeitschrift für Politik (Number 3, September 1971), p. 272. 503 Dupuy, Trevor N. (1969) The Military History of the Chinese Civil War, New York: Franklin Watts, pp. 27 ff.

139 Only three months later the Second Extermination Campaign was initiated. This time, General led 200,000 men against the Communist guerillas. Once again, no troops of the Nanjing government were sent into battle, but former warlord soldiers which only a year earlier had still fought under the warlord Feng Yuxiang504. The overall plan of operations remained the same as during the previous campaign and, as a consequence, its result was identical. Once again, the German military advisers had not participated in the campaign. After the second disastrous failure in his crusade against the Communists, Chiang Kaiskek personally took over the command of the Third Extermination Campaign in the summer of 1931and asked Georg Wetzell to join him in his headquarters. The chief military adviser had much to say during the planning of the campaign. He advocated a war of movement, first surrounding the entire area with a vast number of troops and then attacking it simultaneously from all directions – the complete opposite of the previous two campaigns’ strategy505. However, Georg Wetzell was not the only adviser Chiang Kaishek listened to. Many of the Chinese generals, despite their proven incompetence, gave their input as well and changed the German’s plan substantially during the following discussions. Since Chiang Kaishek was politically dependent on them, he felt obliged to heed their suggestions. Compared to them, Georg Wetzell, a mere foreigner, did not have enough influence. In the end, almost 200,000 Nationalist soldiers, among them the elite 14th Division which had trained under German supervision during the previous years506, moved into the Communist heartland. Slowly but surely, this campaign too turned into a fiasco. Bad coordination and a lack of initiative on the side of the Chinese officers in the field increasingly played into the hands of the Communists507. They simply evaded the uncoordinated advance, regrouped and defeated Chiang Kaishek’s troops piecemeal with the typical ‘Chinese warfare’508 which Georg Wetzell had so desperately – and increasingly frustrated – tried to avoid. Ultimately, when the Japanese marched into Manchuria and northern China after the of 18 September 1931, the entire campaign had to be called off without having reached a definite conclusion.

504 Sommer, Walter (1971), p. 273. 505 MA, Msg 160/2, Nachrichten, Denkschriften. Feldzug gegen die Kommunisten 1931; Nach Diktat von General Wetzell, 24 June 1931 to 25 July 1931. 506 Sommer, Walter (1971), p. 275. 507 MA, Msg 160/2, Nachrichten, Denkschriften. Feldzug gegen die Kommunisten 1931; Nach Diktat von General Wetzell, 24 June 1931 to 25 July 1931.

140 Now more convinced than ever that a resistance against Japan could only be successful after the Communists had been thoroughly beaten and China’s internal unity had been completely secured, Chiang Kaishek started his Fourth Extermination Campaign in January 1933, sending some 154,000 soldiers of various divisions into battle509. The plan of operations and the final result of this campaign were similar to the earlier ones and it was finally cancelled after three months when it had reached an unbreakable stalemate. No German military adviser had ever been asked to contribute to the planning or the execution of the campaign. Georg Wetzell himself had spent its entire duration in Beijing, conferring with He Yingqin on how the Japanese invasion of northern China could possibly be beaten back510. In the face of another shameful defeat, Chiang Kaishek used a completely new strategy for his Fifth Extermination Campaign. Instead of sending his troops blindly into another Communist ambush, he ordered that the entire Chinese Soviet Republic in southern Jiangxi was to be besieged like a fortress. Half a million Nationalist soldiers, including the German-trained elite units, the majority of the Chinese Air Force’s fighter planes and exceedingly strong artillery would ensure a glorious victory this time. Yet, first a network of thousands of mutually supporting blockhouses and pillboxes was built at key points on the periphery of the Communist-occupied territory, increasingly tightening the Nationalist encirclement and thereby destroying the economic self-sufficiency of the Communists’ base area. Strangely enough, the Communists unwittingly helped Chiang Kaishek in his attempt to finally destroy them. Their had proven itself as an excellent guerilla force during the previous four extermination campaigns. However, overwhelmed by their own successes and now getting cocky, the Communists rejected Mao Zedong’s previously successful concept of guerilla warfare as an unnecessary anachronism511 and tried oppose the Nationalist troops in their fields of expertise – large-scale positional warfare and wars of attrition. The block house strategy of the Fifth Extermination Campaign proved to be extraordinarly effective and ultimately led to the famous Long March of 1935, when the remaining Communists broke through Chiang Kaishek’s encirclement to flee to province. The actual extent of German military advisers’ influence on the initial strategy and final outcome of the Fifth Extermination Campaign is apparently still under discussion. Georg Wetzell and even his successors, Colonel General Hans von Seeckt and General Alexander von Falkenhausen, are frequently mentioned as the masterminds behind its victorious modus operandi512. The infamous Otto Braun, a German member of the Comintern who had been sent to the Far East in

508 MA, Msg 160/4, Briefe General Wetzell an Verbindungsstelle Berlin und Oberst Brinckmann, 1932 – 1934. General von Wetzell to Lieutenant-Colonel Brinckmann, Nanjing, 4 December 1933. 509 Sommer, Walter (1971), p. 289. 510 MA, Msg 160/4, Briefe General Wetzell an Verbindungsstelle Berlin und Oberst Brinckmann, 1932 – 1934. General von Wetzell to Lieutenant-Colonel Brinckmann, Nanjing, 9 November 1933. 511 Sommer, Walter (1971), p. 288. 512 Seps, Jerry B. (1972), p. 297, and Wei, William (1981) The Role of the German Advisers in the Suppression of the Central Soviet: Myth and Reality, in: Martin, Bernd (Ed.) (1981) Die deutsche Beraterschaft in China 1927 – 1938; Militär – Wirtschaft – Außenpolitik, Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, p. 176.

141 support of Mao Zedong and who himself served as a military adviser to the Chinese Communists in 1932 and 1933, shared the same views at that time. He thought that only the German military advisers could stand behind this kind of strategic and tactical planning513. However, the approach used for the final extemination campaign was ultimately Chinese and was based on the tried and tested ideas of Zeng Guofan, who had suppressed the in the 1850s, and Zuo Zongtang, who had pacified the revolt in the 1870s514. Only two German military advisers515, one of them Captain Constantin Meyer516, personally participated in the campaign, usually accompanying their trainees of the 87th and 88th Divisions. Georg Wetzell himself had merely been involved in the campaign’s initial planning sessions and had judged its siege mentality as nothing but an expression of incompetence and cowardice. Perhaps traumatised by his personal experience of the trench warfare of World War I, he vehemently yet unsuccessfully insisted on the adoption of a mobile and hard-hitting kind of warfare which could not possibly be bogged down. ‘No one has the guts to attack any more’517, he complained in a letter to a confidant when his own suggestions had finally been rejected. Still, this time Georg Wetzell had voiced his many criticisms, for example of Chiang Kaishek’s allegedly feeble leadership style518 under domestic and international pressure, China’s general irresoluteness519 or the fact that the Nationalist leadership continuously ignored the advice of their German military advisers520, once too often. Over the years, his constant and condescending interference into Nanjing’s military affairs, particularly when not asked for his opinion, had made him many enemies in the Guomindang government who had already instigated several unsuccessful plots to get rid of him without having to confront him personally. Now Georg Wetzell’s professional and private relationship with Chiang Kaishek was strained as well521. He had always known that his position as chief military adviser to the Nanjing government had always been a tenuous one since in the Middle Kingdom ‘[when] things go wrong the foreigners generally offer the most convenient scapegoat and are easily saddled with the national woes’522. Unable to fulfil the unrealistic expectations of his employers in an increasingly counterproductive environment, he had to accept the fact that Chiang Kaishek had already invited his preferred successor,

513 Braun, Otto (1973), pp. 30 and 35. 514 Furuya, Kenji (Ed.) (1981), p. 421. 515 Ratenhof, Udo (1987), p. 436. 516 Sommer, Walter (1971), p. 296. 517 MA, Msg 160/4, Briefe General Wetzell an Verbindungsstelle Berlin und Oberst Brinckmann, 1932 – 1934. General von Wetzell to Lieutenant-Colonel Brinckmann, Nanjing, 9 November 1933. 518 Ibid. 519 Martin, Bernd (1986), p. 342. 520 Ibid. 521 Fu, Pao-Jen (1989) The German Military Mission in Nanking 1928 – 1938; A Bridge connecting China and Germany, Syracuse: Syracuse University, p. 56. 522 Chennault, Claire L. (1949), p. 76.

142 Colonel General Hans von Seeckt, to join him in China. Georg Wetzell was not prepared to continue to work for Nanjing under these circumstances and returned to Germany in April 1934, a disappointed and bitter man.

4.2.9 German and International Reactions Throughout the 1920s, the positions of Weimar Germany’s government and of the diplomats of the Auswärtiges Amt in regard to German citizens entering the military service of a foreign country like China had not changed. If anything, the two German institutions became even more vehement in their attempts to stop former soldiers of their armed forces from accepting employment offers from abroad, particularly after they found out that not only the rogue factions of the war-torn Middle Kingdom tried to hire German military experts. Now even China’s officially recognized Nationalist government made inquiries to that end and ignored the fact that, in doing so, it openly undermined the contractual responsibilities of the Treaty of Versailles Weimar Germany worked so hard to fulfil. Colonel Max Bauer was fully aware of the mindset prevalent among Weimar Germany’s government officials when he chose to become Chiang Kaishek’s new chief military adviser, but he had no qualms whatsoever about lying to the representatives of a German state to which he felt little connection anymore. His loyalty was now primarily to his employer and to a Chinese Republic he wanted to help build in accordance to his own visions and ideals. Before he left Germany, he sent a declaration to the Auswärtiges Amt which was already fit for publishing if the diplomats chose to do so. ‘With respect to the malicious and tendenciously distorted reports […] in our own democratic and left-leaning papers’, Max Bauer pronounced that he was ‘not in any way, militarily or otherwise, in the service of the Chinese government’ nor did he have ‘any contractual agreement’523. He added that was ‘working in China in the interests of German industry and German science, to help in the economic reconstruction of the country and to promote Sino-German friendship,

523 MA, Nachlaß Bauer, Aktenstück Nr. 45, Geschäftlicher Schriftwechsel mit dem Sohn Ernst (bei der Handelsabteilung der chinesischen Gesandtschaft in Berlin) 1928/1929. Memorandum of Colonel Bauer, Potsdam, 28 October 1928. Translations of the full statement can be found in Bloch, Kurt (1940), p. 13, and in Burden, Allen C. (1972) German Policy toward China and the Chinese Revolution, 1919 – 1931, with Special Reference to the Beginnings of Sino-German Military Cooperation, Edmonton: University of Alberta, p. 241.

143 not for financial or political gain but only from a sense of duty’524. Furthermore he assured that he was neither responsible for the recruitment of German military advisers nor did he know of any experts already in the service of the Chinese government. After his arrival in the Far East, in an officially sanctioned interview with the North China Daily News525, the Colonel repeated most of his previous statements and emphasized that he was in no way involved in any military work since Nationalist China did not have a real army due to the lack of the necessary strong industrial base. He was, however, in China as Chiang Kaishek’s private advisor to create exactly this industrial base. The seemingly all too obvious ploy to calm both the Weimar German authorities and the press worked. Indeed, the Auswärtiges Amt would even have embraced Max Bauer’s employment by Chiang Kaishek if he had only limited his activities to the economic sector526. Yet, he did not and neither did the military and civilian experts he brought to China over the following months. When the actual martial activities of the advisory group around Max Bauer became apparent, particularly to the German diplomats stationed in the Far East, Adolf Boyé, Weimar Germany’s ambassador in Nanjing, sent a stern warning to the Auswärtiges Amt. He reminded his superiors that Article 179 of the Treaty of Versailles banned the activities of German citizens as military advisers in foreign countries and cautioned that, if retired German officers were proven to work for Nationalist China’s armed forces, the entire world would condemn their activities as an outright violation of Weimar Germany’s post-war obligations, even if the German authorities were not involved in their employment. ‘It may be inconvenient, but I suggest […] to try to stop [Colonel Max Bauer] by any means possible from hiring German officers and military instructors.’527 The ambassador also added his own personal suspicions. ‘When the Chinese now look for military and other instructors in Germany, they do so not because they like Germany or because they admire German diligence. The Germans are harmless and convenient for the Chinese.’528 All in all, Germany should restrict its activities in Nationalist China to the economic sector. China was an area

524 Ibid. 525 PA, R 85697, Abteilung IV – Politische Abteilung, Po. 13 China, Militärangelegenheiten, Band 1. German Embassy Beiping to Auswärtiges Amt, Beiping, 19 November 1928 (includes the 15 November 1928 article from the ). 526 PA, R 85698, Abteilung IV – Politische Abteilung, Po. 13 China, Militärangelegenheiten, Band 2. Memorandum of Director Trautmann, Berlin, 27 February 1929. 527 ADAP, Serie B, Band VI, Document 99. Ambassador Boyé to Auswärtiges Amt, Beijing, 9 August 1927. 528 Ibid.

144 neither for political involvement nor for any cultural activities. However, the political authorities in Berlin already had their own reservations about the activities of the German military advisors, not only for the indisputable foreign political reasons, but also because of the fact that Chiang Kaishek’s advisory corps seemed to have become a haven for extreme right-wing ex-officers with close contacts to the emerging National Socialist Party and other known anti-Republican groups529. Yet, the government of Weimar Germany and its institutions did not have the necessary authority to stop German ex-officers and civilians from entering Chinese service. Neither the existing laws nor any other official threat had the desired effect530. For example, on the basis of Article 28 of the Reichs- und Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz, which regulated all matters of nationality, a German citizen could be deprived of his citizenship if he did not obey a command of the German government to resign from the armed services of a foreign power531. Also, any misrepresentation to the German passport authorities as to the purpose of going abroad was punishable by law. Furthermore, in the case of retired army officers and World War I veterans, any state pension paid could be interrupted if they became involved in illegal activities of any kind532. However, in a time of political instability and economic insecurity, some people didn’t seem to care. With their own citizens proving to be uncooperative, the Weimar German government instructed its diplomats in China to contact Max Bauer to try to stop the ongoing employment of German ex-officers by the Guomindang government on the spot. Besides emphasizing once again that ‘[the] German experts fight a heavy battle for the good of Germany’533, the Colonel denied any involvement in the process, saying that he was not responsible for the Chiang Kaishek’s choice of German instructors for the Nationalist armed forces. The actual hiring was concluded by a dedicated agency of the Chinese Legation in Berlin534. As a consequence, the German Legation Counsellor Wagner met with Nanjing’s foreign minister and appealed to the Guomindang government to refrain from employing German nationals as military advisers. The politician ‘listened with interest’, but declined to do anything except to

529 Groehler, Olaf (1989), p. 96. Olaf Groehler generally brands all former German army officers in Chiang Kaishek’s employ as ‘desperados’ and ‘counter-revolutionary insurrectionists’. 530 ADAP, Serie B, Band XIV, Document 18. Memorandum of Director Trautmann, Berlin, 5 March 1929. 531 PA, R 85699, Abteilung IV – Politische Abteilung, Po. 13 China, Militärangelegenheiten, Band 3. Unsigned Memorandum, Berlin, April 1930. 532 ADAP, Serie B, Band XI, Document 31. Counsellor Trautmann to German Embassy Beiping, Berlin, 22 January 1929. 533 ADAP, Serie B, Band XI, Document 31. Colonel Bauer to Auswärtiges Amt, Nanjing, 26 February 1929. 534 PA, R 85698, Abteilung IV – Politische Abteilung, Po. 13 China, Militärangelegenheiten, Band 2. German Embassy Beiping to Auswärtiges Amt, Beiping, 19 March 1929

145 pass the German request on to the responsible authorities535. A short time later, the Auswärtiges Amt sent a memorandum to the Chinese Legation in Berlin, stating, without going into much detail, that from now on Germany would actively try to prevent German ex-officers from accepting Chinese job offers and asking for cooperation in this matter536. The Chinese diplomats chose to ignore the letter, conscious of the ‘sovereignty of [their homeland] and its right to hire military advisers wherever it chose for the protection of its people’537. Nationalist China had nothing to gain and too much to lose much if it gave in to Berlin’s request. In the meantime, Max Bauer, as head of Chiang Kaishek’s German advisory group, became the bogey man of Great Britain, France, Japan and all other imperialist nations with interests in the Far East. Afraid of a supposedly unstoppable subversive German takeover of the entire Asian mainland, the international press was buzzing with unfounded rumours, paranoid fantasies and barely disguised scaremongery538. However, looking behind the newspaper headlines of the respective nations, it become increasingly clear that all the British, French and Japanese protests against the activities of the German military advisors were less motivated by the often-invoked concerns about a breach of the Treaty of Versailles than by real worries that Weimar Germany could infringe on their own substantial interests in the Far East. Still, it was extraordinarily difficult for the Auswärtiges Amt in Berlin to convince the world that the new German Republic had no colonial or military interests of any kind in China, even when the facts were, at least superficially, looking more and more that way. Its officials prepared an elaborate statement for publication to counteract criticism, both domestic and international. This article was published on 1 November 1928 in the Ostasiatische Rundschau, the journal of the Ostasiatischer Verein, the union of German merchants doing business in Asia. It was also sent to at least one representative of the League of Nations who had particularly loudly protested that Max Bauer’s activities violated the Treaty of Versailles539. In essence, the article emphasized once more that the Colonel had travelled to China as a private individual, with no connection whatsoever to any of the German governmental institutions, and that Weimar Germany as a nation could not be expected to assume the responsibility for the actions of one of its citizens540. However, the diplomatic backlash the Auswärtiges Amt was so concerned about and the feared breakdown of the cautiously developing political post-war relations with the major powers never came to pass. One of the reasons for the ultimate inaction of the various nations in this regard was that the international position on the activities of the German military advisors was not consistent in itself. The

535 Ibid. 536 PA, R 85698, Abteilung IV – Politische Abteilung, Po. 13 China, Militärangelegenheiten, Band 2. Auswärtiges Amt to Chinese Legation Berlin, Berlin, 20 March 1929. 537 PA, R 85699, Abteilung IV – Politische Abteilung, Po. 13 China, Militärangelegenheiten, Band 3. Auswärtiges Amt to Ministry of the Reichswehr, Berlin, 3 March 1930. 538 MA, Nachlaß Bauer, Aktenstück Nr. 55, Presseartikel über Oberst Bauer und seine Tätigkeit in China 1928/1930. Max Bauer obviously enjoyed the attention of the German and international press since he collected countless newspaper clippings about his alleged activities. 539 Burden, Allen C. (1972), p. 243 (Footnote 25). 540 Ibid.

146 powers might have been united in their dislike for Weimar Germany, but, in the end, they had little sympathy for each other either. As a consequence, France’s initiative for a formal international protest in Berlin was rejected by Great Britain, most likely because the British preferred German military advisors in Chinese service to French541. After Max Bauer’s untimely death, under Hermann Kriebel and in the relatively peaceful conditions prevalent in the Far East during the late 1920s, the disagreements between the Weimar German authorities, the German chief military adviser and his corps, Chiang Kaishek and the Nanjing government and the rest of the world continued for the time being. In particular, the large-scale hate campaign of the international press against the martial activities of the so-called ‘German military mission’ went on unabatedly, casually forgetting to mention that American, British, French or Japanese officers were equally busy as advisers for the Guomindang government or one of the various other factions of the Chinese civil war542. The Auswärtiges Amt, however, did not care about the business of other nations. It was only concerned about Weimar Germany’s international standing, yet had still only limited and rather unsuccessful legal means or diplomatic influence to stop German citizens from entering Chinese service. All it could do was to try to minimize the impact of each indignant diplomatic note or inflammatory newspaper article and to persuade the rest of the world that the Republican government in Berlin was in no way involved in the entire unpleasant affair. However, soon several smaller and larger wars broke out in the Far East, the German military advisers, as could be expected, got caught up in the conflicts and the diplomatic entanglements surrounding them seemed to get even worse. As soon as the first battles had started, the German diplomats in China alerted Berlin that the continued presence of the German military advisers in the Far East would in the foreseeable future provoke one or the other opposing parties of the renewed civil war to accuse Germany of actively meddling in the Middle Kingdom’s domestic affairs. Indeed, over the following years warlords, Communists and, on the rare occasions when unscrupulous German arms traders had delivered war materials to one of the dissident factions, even the Nanjing government protested that Germany supported their respective enemies, particularly when they thought that embarrassing Berlin could be advantageous for them in one way or the other. The warlord Yan Xishan even went so far to announce on 14 April 1930 that all foreign military advisers serving with Chiang Kaishek’s troops – meaning specifically those coming from Germany – would be executed if they were captured543. This was a threat the Auswärtiges Amt could not ignore, since it had already been confirmed that some of the German military advisers, including Georg Wetzell himself, had been actively

541 Martin, Bernd (1986), p. 346. 542 Ratenhof, Udo (1987), p. 383. 543 PA, R 85699, Abteilung IV – Politische Abteilung, Po. 13 China, Militärangelegenheiten, Band 3. German Embassy Paris to Auswärtiges Amt, Paris, 16 April 1930 (includes the 16 April 1930 article from La Republique).

147 involved in battles on the Lunghai front alongside Nationalist troops544. Furthermore, rumours reaching the Auswärtiges Amt from unnamed sources had it that several German pilots not directly connected to the advisory group, particularly two gentlemen named Lehmann and Moellendorff545, had provided reconnaissance and air support to the ground fighting during the war of 1930546. Some of them might even have flown bombing missions against the city of Zhengzhou547. Besides a diplomatic scandal, the execution of a German citizen in China would cause a storm of protest at home which would more than rival any previous international indignation since it would demonstrate the impotence of the already unpopular Weimar German government and its foreign policy. In addition to some of the Chinese factions, other foreign nations, especially Great Britain, Fance and Japan, continued to observe the wartime adventures of the German military advisers with ‘suspicion and distrust’548, continuously assuming that Berlin must reap benefits of some kind from their activites. Again and again, reacting to the foreign pressure, the Auswärtiges Amt contacted the German military adviser group, especially Georg Wetzell, to stress that they were not to participate in any of Chiang Kaishek’s military operations549. The statements it received in return were usually the same. The former German officers were not involved in any battles. In extreme cases, only single advisers had been sent to areas far behind the frontlines to inspect the fortifications of the Nationalist armed forces550. All in all, it looked like the Auswärtiges Amt, not unlike all other German governmental institutions, was paralyzed in the face of the aggressive foreign criticism, shell-shocked by the fact that, whatever it did, somebody did find a fault in it and heap scorn on the diplomats who tried so desperately to establish friendly relations with all nations across the globe. Although from a casual glance nobody would have suspected it, Chiang Kaishek’s position as Nationalist China’s head of state and as the Guomindang’s political

544 PA, R 85699, Abteilung IV – Politische Abteilung, Po. 13 China, Militärangelegenheiten, Band 3. Ambassador von Borch to Auswärtiges Amt, Beiping, 3 June 1930. 545 Fu, Pao-Jen (1989), p. 219 (Footnote 10). The first names of these gentlemen cannot be found in any of the available sources. 546 Ibid., p. 146. 547 ADAP, Serie B, Band XVI, Document 57. Memorandum of Counsellor Michelsen, Berlin, 15 November 1930. 548 PA, R 31231, Ostasien Allgemein, Geheimakten der Abteilung IV, Band 1. Unknown sender to Colonel von Bredow, Berlin, 10 December 1932. 549 PA, R 31231, Ostasien Allgemein, Geheimakten der Abteilung IV, Band 1. Ambassador Trautmann to Auswärtiges Amt, Nanjing, 24 February 1933. 550 PA, R 31231, Ostasien Allgemein, Geheimakten der Abteilung IV, Band 1. Ambassador Trautmann to Auswärtiges Amt, Nanjing, 25 February 1933.

148 leader was not as secure as he would have liked. As a result, his German military advisers were not only vilified by his enemies on the battlefield, but became pawns in Nanjing’s political infighting as well. It had always been seen as a potential problem by the officials of the Auswärtiges Amt that the former officers had not been employed by the Chinese government per se, but only by Chiang Kaishek the individual, which made them almost look like his personal lackeys in his attempt to establish a dictatorship551. This lack of clarity in regard to the status of the military advisory group indeed became a predicament. In January 1930, , a left-wing Guomindang politician who had been expelled from the party and who was now one of Chiang Kaishek’s most dangerous opponents, publicly accused the German government of being an accomplice of Chiang Kaishek and of actively supporting him through the German military advisers. Furthermore, in an attempt to further his own political standing and without ever presenting a single shred of proof, he alleged that Germany was exporting large amounts of war materials, including tanks and trench mortars, to the Nationalist armed forces. All this, he threatened, would negatively affect the pro-German sentiments of the Chinese people, which were, obviously, represented by Wang Jingwei552. His insinuations were subsequently printed in the Koming Wan Pao, the official publication of Wang Jingwei’s newly-founded Reorganization Party and picked up by the international press, including London’s Daily Telegraph and the New York Times, which elaborated the accusations even further. Apparently nobody cared that none of Wang Jingwei’s charges were actually true, least of all the export of large numbers of tanks and heavy artillery. The German government immediately issued a formal statement, denying all accusations brought up by Wang Jingwei and the international journalists. It emphasized that ‘[it] is untrue that the German Government has sent military officers to China. The German government did not even recommend any. They have been selected by Chiang Kaishek or his deputies in Germany. The German Government, as a matter of priciple, does not favour Germans participating in military action abroad. Germans going abroad to face the risk of warfare, are doing so at their own risk’553. In regard to the purported arms deliveries it added that ‘[it] is untrue that the German Government has any influence on the dispatch of war materials to China. It is well known that war materials have been dispatched from other countries […]. If, however, statements to the contrary are emerging again and again in the Far Eastern press, one may be led to conclude that the newspapers publish them, in order to avert attention from their own country’554. Despite all the official German denials, Wang Jingwei just wouldn’t let go. In another series of articles, once again published in his

551 ADAP, Serie B, Band XVI, Document 186. Ambassador von Borch to Auswärtiges Amt, Beiping, 24 January 1931. 552 PA, R 85699, Abteilung IV – Politische Abteilung, Po. 13 China, Militärangelegenheiten, Band 3. Ambassador von Borch to Auswärtiges Amt, Beiping, 13 January 1930 and 19 March 1930. 553 Bloch, Kurt (1940), p. 14. 554 Ibid.

149 party’s newspaper, he now started to doubt Germany’s sense of morality which during the Great War had brutally violated Belgium and France and was now supporting Chiang Kaishek in his suppression of the Chinese people with the dispatch of military advisers and the export of poison gas555. Although powerless to silence these thoroughly baseless allegations, the Auswärtiges Amt published another official declaration in May 1930. ‘The export of arms for purposes of warfare, ammunition and poison gas from Germany has been prohibited by statute, and such prohibition is strictly enforced. The German military advisers are employed against the wishes of the German Government. The German Government disapproves of their employment […] and has seen to it that the Chinese Government could not possibly doubt that the employment of German citizens for military purposes is deemed undesirable by the German Government.’556 Once again, the German correction was ignored, but luckily the entire affair died down by itself after a while. In hindsight, one cannot escape the suspicion that Germany’s permanent pangs of guilt in the wake of World War I were shamelessly exploited by some of the Chinese civil war factions for their own ends. It is more than doubtful that Wang Jingwei would have protested against the German involvement in the Middle Kingdom had he been the recipient of the support of the German military advisers. Futhermore, the entire incident demonstrated the willingness of the entire world to join in in every opportunity for German-bashing.

4.3 Arms Trade 4.3.1 The Military Advisers and China’s Arms Acquisitions The most significant factors in the military development of the Far East during the 1920s were China’s gradual adoption of Western strategies and tactics and, even more crucial, the influx of modern war materials into the Middle Kingdom. The initial clashes of the warlord era had still often been fought with simple rifles, spears and swords. Yet, by the early 1930s China’s battlefields saw the massive deployment of machine guns, heavy artillery, tanks and aircraft very similar to western Europe’s during World War I. Following the traditional Chinese policy of playing off one foreign barbarian against another557 to reap the biggest benefits, both politically and

555 PA, R 85699, Abteilung IV – Politische Abteilung, Po. 13 China, Militärangelegenheiten, Band 3. Ambassador von Borch to Auswärtiges Amt, Beiping, 28 January 1930. 556 Bloch, Kurt (1940), p. 14. 557 MacNair, Harley F. (1931) China in Revolution; An Analysis of Politics and Militarism under the Republic, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, p. 5.

150 economically, China did not want one nation to monopolize her entire armaments trade and, as a consequence, bought her war materials from all over the world. Depending on its usefulness under certain circumstances, almost every foreign country with ties to the Far East was titled ‘best friend of’ China at one time or another. However, this eclecticism, coupled with a certain curiosity to try everything and an undeniable weakness for plausible and oftentimes unscrupulous salesmen558, repeatedly caused unimaginable waste and confusion during Nationalist China’s ongoing military reforms. Even before the termination of the International Arms Embargo in 1929, Chiang Kaishek’s newly-established Nationalist government had rapidly accelerated its – largely haphazard and unplanned – acquisition of foreign weapons and military equipment. Amalgamated with the war materials already bought or captured during the previous years, this latest purchase resulted in a logistical nightmare, with the majority of units of the Guomindang’s armed forces ending up with different weapons of varying calibres. As soon as Colonel Max Bauer and the first German advisers had entered Chiang Kaishek’s service in late 1928, they recognized and attempted to correct this deplorable and, in the long run, dangerous situation. As a consequence, the ‘amateur diplomats’559, dabbling political and economic reformers and military instructors from Germany became involved in the Far Eastern armaments trade as well. Although the Colonel had initially intended to focus in his job primarily on the improvement of the Chinese state in general, he accepted this additional aspect of his military activities as a ‘necessary evil’560. Even when the German military advisers never were the agents of specific German companies, many industrial magnates back home saw Chiang Kaishek’s new advisory corps as emissaries of Weimar Germany’s, or rather their own, economic interests and firmly expected that they would use their special influence to have Chinese orders predominantly placed with German firms561. It is true that the German military advisers frequently convinced their superiors to order German weapons, but hardly for reasons of economic patriotism. They simply preferred military equipment with which

558 Young, Arthur N. (1963) China and the Helping Hand 1937 – 1945, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, p. 122. 559 Nieh, Yu-Hsi (1982) Zwischen den Kriegen – Ein Neubeginn, in: Machetzki, Rüdiger (Ed.) (1982) Deutsch-chinesische Beziehungen; Ein Handbuch, Hamburg: Institut für Asienkunde, p. 118. 560 Chen, Chi (1973) Die Beziehungen zwischen Deutschland und China bis 1933 [Mitteilungen des Instituts für Asienkunde Hamburg (Number 56)], Hamburg: Institut für Asienkunde, p. 129.

151 they were familiar and with which they could train their Chinese recruits most effectively. In many other cases, the advisers decided to order war materials from the companies of other nations simply because they thought that their products were of a better quality, better suited for Chinese needs or simply cheaper. After Max Bauer had arrived in the Far East, he, too, repeatedly stressed that he now saw himself as an adviser of Chiang Kaishek and the Nanjing government, not as a representative of the German industry. Although he had been working closely with the Junkers company throughout the 1920s, he stopped receiving any wages or commissions after his employment by the Chinese government562. If the German industry wanted to be included in the economic development of Nationalist China, he let its representatives know, they would have to adapt to a new set of rules. In his own notes he remarked that the time of colonialism and arbitrary intervention in the Far East was over. Honesty was now important, not business-minded cunning563. In this spirit, the Nationalist government’s uncoordinated war materials purchases dropped sharply as Max Bauer urged Chiang Kaishek to buy directly from manufacturers all over the world rather than through the import companies in Shanghai. Furthermore, whenever urgently needed equipment, for example armoured cars for the newly-established elite units, was not available on the open market, the Colonel suggested improvisation. Inspired by the Erhard armoured cars used by the German army during the final stages of World War I, he proposed to buy suitable trucks – most appropriate were those from the United States and Germany – and modify them in Chinese workshops in accordance with his specifications564. Given the necessary leeway, Max Bauer proved to be the perfect mister fix-it who had thought of almost everything. He even invited engineers for the construction of armoured trains to China565. Nevertheless, the Nanjing government continued with its spending frenzy, albeit in a more reasonable and purposeful way. To supply Chiang Kaishek’s elite Lehrbrigade with the much-needed effective weapons. Max Bauer ordered, in the name of the

561 Seps, Jerry B. (1972) German Military Advisors and Chiang Kai-Shek, 1927 – 1938, Berkeley: University of California, p. 5. 562 MA, Nachlaß Bauer, Aktenstück Nr. 47, Schriftwechsel mit verschiedenen Firmen betr. Lieferungen für China 1927 – 1929. Colonel Bauer to Lieutenant-Captain Sachsenberg, Potsdam, 14 September 1927. 563 Vogt, Adolf (1974) Oberst Max Bauer; Generalstabsoffizier im Zwielicht; 1869 – 1929, Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, p. 423. 564 MA, Nachlaß Bauer, Aktenstück Nr. 49, Schriftwechsel mit deutschen Mitarbeitern in China 1928/1929. Memorandum of Colonel Bauer, Nanjing, 15 January 1929. 565 MA, Nachlaß Bauer, Aktenstück Nr. 49, Schriftwechsel mit deutschen Mitarbeitern in China 1928/1929. Colonel Bauer to Mister Piegl, Nanjing, 19 January 1929.

152 Nationalist Chinese authorities, weapons from all over Europe, particularly automatic Kiralyi rifles from Hungary, 7.5-centimetre howitzers for infantry support and highly mobile 2-centimetre guns566. Further large shipments of cannons, ranging from 2- centimetre machine cannons to Swedish 8.8-centimetre anti-aircraft cannons to 15- centimetre howitzers, plus other war materials and even a Junkers F 13 aircraft were delivered in January 1929 by the trading firm of F. Feld & Co. in Hongkong567. Deliveries of industrial engines and heavy equipment for factories and mines followed suit, not only from Germany, but also from companies all over Europe. Early international accusations that the Chinese government, instigated by its new military advisers, had ordered weapons and ammunition exclusively from Germany were quickly refuted in various public statements from Nanjing568. From early on, Max Bauer had done everything in his power to try to help in the improvement of Nanjing’s international relations. In March of 1928, the Colonel and a delegation of the Chinese government travelled to Europe to study Western economies at work to establish various political and commercial contacts. The mission even met with President Paul von Hindenburg on 11 July 1928. Responding to Chiang Kaishek’s proposal for cooperation, Germany’s senior politician confirmed that Berlin was indeed interested in close relations with China, but didn’t offer anything specific569. Following his superior’s explicit wishes and in accordance with his own plans for China’s economic revival, Max Bauer also contacted many of Europe’s major industrial corporations, offering them grand business proposals and trying to convince them to invest in China. Until the fall of that year, the Chinese delegation visited the Junkers subsidiary AB Flygindustri in Sweden, the Allgemeene Norit Maatschappij and the HAIHA company in the Netherlands, as well as Dotticon, Oerlikon and the Maschinenfabrik Neuhausen in Switzerland, all known manufacturers of weapons, ammunition and explosives, to negotiate the delivery of industrial equipment and arms. In Germany, Max Bauer and his Chinese associates approached the Junkers company’s main works, the I.G. Farben, MAN in Augsburg, the Gutehoffnungshütte in Oberhausen, the Hanseatische Apparatebaugesellschaft,

566 MA, Nachlaß Bauer, Aktenstück Nr. 49, Schriftwechsel mit deutschen Mitarbeitern in China 1928/1929. Application of Colonel Bauer, Nanjing, 6 December 1928. 567 MA, Nachlaß Bauer, Aktenstück Nr. 49, Schriftwechsel mit deutschen Mitarbeitern in China 1928/1929. Mister Luering to Colonel Bauer, Hongkong, no date. 568 PA, R 94869, Abteilung IV – Wirtschaft, Rohstoffe und Waren, Waffen, Band 14. 17 April 1930 Börsenzeitung article. See also Ratenhof, Udo (1987) Die Chinapolitik des Deutschen Reiches 1871 bis 1945; Wirtschaft – Rüstung – Militär, Boppard am Rhein: Harald Boldt Verlag, p. 384.

153 Stolzenberg in Hamburg, Mannesmann in Düsseldorf, Bayer in Leverkusen, the Friedrich Krupp Gruson-Werk in Magdeburg, the Westdeutsche Waggonfabrik, Demag in Duisburg, Siemens-Halske and Berger Tiefbau in Berlin to win them over for predominantly civilian projects. However, since some of these companies were active in both the civilian and military sectors, the initial aims and actual results of the business visits remain vague. To further streamline China’s international purchases, at least those finalized with German manufacturers or delivered by German trading houses, Max Bauer urged the Nanjing government in the summer of 1928 to authorize the foundation of a dedicated trading department within the Chinese embassy in Berlin. Besides being responsible for the hiring of German military and civilian advisers, this office, headed by Davi Yui570 and controlled by Chiang Kaishek’s Military Commission instead of the Chinese Foreign Ministry571, was primarily tasked with the centralization of all business between the Chinese government and German companies without the costly interference of the established trading houses which had so far acted as intermediaries. Furthermore, in regard to the armaments trade, it was to support the standardization of the the equipment of the reorganized Nationalist armed forces and to stop all Chinese non-governmental factions, like the still existing warlords, from buying war materials from abroad. Contravening established diplomatic protocol, the trading department was created without consulting any of the German governmental authorities whose later frequent objections to its activities were either summarily rejected or ignored outright by Max Bauer and all Chinese officials. As Chiang Kaishek’s chief military adviser, Max Bauer had good reason to attack the German trading companies for delivering overpriced and sometimes even useless war materials to China572. Already in his first letter to the Auswärtiges Amt, the Colonel had announced that, once employed in Chinese service, he would foster Sino- German economic relations by trying to tie direct connections between German

569 Vogt, Adolf (1974), p. 425. 570 Anglo-Cantonese transcription. In Pinyin: Yu Dawei. 571 Schmidt, Burkhard (1989) ‘Die Industrialisierung Chinas’ – Wunschtraum, Berufung, Gefahr; Deutsche und Chinesische Vorstellungen in der Zeit zwischen den Weltkriegen, in: Gransow, Bettina & Leutner, Mechthild (Eds.) (1989) China; Nähe und Ferne; Deutsch-chinesische Beziehungen in Geschichte und Gegenwart; Zum 60. Geburtstag von Kuo Heng-yü, Frankfurt am Main (et al.): Verlag Peter Lang, p. 229. 572 Ratenhof, Udo (1987), p. 380.

154 manufacturers and Chinese customers573. However, due to the interference of some of the more unscrupulous German trading houses, exported goods from Germany – not necessarily weapons and ammunition alone – were sometimes more than twice as expensive as in Germany. Since the law prevented some German producers from offering their goods to their Chinese customers directly for sale, they had to do their business via the established China trading companies like Carlowitz & Co.574. Trade relations of this kind were unacceptable for Max Bauer. ‘This way China is betrayed and exploited. It is […] my intention to stop this.’575 When finally established, the trading department of the Chinese legation in Berlin immediately started to order weapons and other war materials, in accordance with Max Bauer’s exact specifications and on Chiang Kaishek’s authorization, from manufacturers all over Europe and took care of both payment and delivery to the Far East576. Strict price control became one of its standard procedures577. The Colonel also admonished the bureau to get assurances from all German manufacturers that they did not have to pay any provisions to the trading companies since agreements of this kind were only too common578. As a result, the first orders and subsequent deliveries went according to plan. The trading department signed contracts to purchase, amongst other things, Hungarian Kiralyi cannons and rifles, twelve Swiss Oerlikon cannons, including 2-centimetre anti-aircraft guns, two unspecified 7.5- centimetre howitzers, three Junkers A 35 aircraft and an entire aircraft machine shop. Flamethrowers, machine guns, bombing devices, communications and optical equipment, as well as chemical warfare gear like gas masks were also included in these deals579.

573 ADAP, Serie B, Band XI, Document 31. Colonel Bauer to Auswärtiges Amt, Nanjing, 26 February 1929. 574 MA, Nachlaß Bauer, Aktenstück Nr. 44, Schreiben Bauers aus China an die Handelsabteilung der Chinesischen Gesandtschaft in Berlin 1928/1929. Colonel Bauer to Chinese Legation Berlin, Nanjing, 10 February 1929. 575 Ibid. 576 MA, Nachlaß Bauer, Aktenstück Nr. 44, Schreiben Bauers aus China an die Handelsabteilung der Chinesischen Gesandtschaft in Berlin 1928/1929. Chen Yi to Davi Yui and Yi Tan, Berlin, 20 September 1928. 577 MA, Nachlaß Bauer, Aktenstück Nr. 47, Schriftwechsel mit verschiedenen Firmen betr. Lieferungen für China 1927 – 1929. Colonel Bauer to unknown recipient, Nanjing, 27 November 1928. 578 MA, Nachlaß Bauer, Aktenstück Nr. 44, Schreiben Bauers aus China an die Handelsabteilung der Chinesischen Gesandtschaft in Berlin 1928/1929. Colonel Bauer to Chinese Legation Berlin, Nanjing, 10 February 1929. 579 MA, Nachlaß Bauer, Aktenstück Nr. 44, Schreiben Bauers aus China an die Handelsabteilung der Chinesischen Gesandtschaft in Berlin 1928/1929. Chen Yi to Davi Yui and Yi Tan, Berlin, 20 September 1928.

155 Still, the weapons acquisition via the Berlin trading department had no chance for real long-term success without the active support of the German government, which was, not unexpectedly, anything but forthcoming. Also, without governmental pressure, the German trading firms were never prepared to reconsider their trading policies. All too often they simply refused to do business with the Chinese legation so they could preserve their own China trade and continue to fix the prices580. Additionally, the Ostasiatischer Verein, the union of all German trading companies with business interests in the Far East, protested against what it saw as the ‘sovietisation’581 of the China business. Its members were directly and indirectly supported in their stance by various Chinese factions, even within the Guomindang government and the Nationalist army, who strictly opposed any meddling of Chiang Kaishek in what they saw as their private affairs and who wanted to keep on buying from their preferred sources. Ultimately, Max Bauer’s attempts to build fairer and more balanced business relations between Weimar Germany and his Chinese employers created lots of tensions between him and the venerable German China trading houses, yet remained in the end rather unsuccessful. The German military advisory group’s approach to China’s international armaments trade did not change after Max Bauer’s death, under the leaderships of Hermann Kriebel or Georg Wetzell. However, both chief military advisers focussed primarily on training aspect of their activities in Chinese service and largely neglected their influence on the Nationalist army’s weapons acquisition process. This lack of involvement was actually enforced by Georg Wetzell’s enormous dislike of business people. Nevertheless, the Lieutenant General saw himself as an employee of the Chinese government and wanted serve the best interests of his employer whenever he was asked to select new weapons and equipment for the Guomindang army. The retired German Admiral Kinzel, who had travelled to China as a representative of the slowly recovering German armaments industry, complained to German diplomats that an expansion of the Sino-German armaments trade was impossible without the active support of the military advisers582. He particularly lamented that Georg Wetzell, a

580 MA, Nachlaß Bauer, Aktenstück Nr. 49, Schriftwechsel mit deutschen Mitarbeitern in China 1928/1929. Colonel Bauer to Chinese Legation Berlin, Nanjing, 26 March 1929. 581 Martin, Bernd (1986) Das Deutsche Reich und Guomindang-China, 1927 – 1941, in: Kuo, Heng-yü (Ed.) (1986) Von der Kolonialpolitik zur Kooperation; Studien zur Geschichte der deutsch- chinesischen Beziehungen, München: Minerva Publikation, p. 353. 582 PA, R 94872, Abteilung IV – Wirtschaft, Rohstoffe und Waren, Waffen, Band 17. German Embassy Beiping to Auswärtiges Amt, Beiping, 23 June 1933.

156 German citizen, did not necessarily favour the German armaments industry but dealt with the war materials orders of the Chinese government with the utmost objectivity. He selected only weapons which were both good in quality and reasonably priced. Unfortunately, German products were often too expensive583. Privately the Admiral added that the lack of assistance from the German diplomats in the Far East was equally damaging to the Sino-German armaments trade. The representatives of other nations like France, Great Britain and the United States, were tireless in securing Chinese orders for their domestic armaments industries584. The Auswärtiges Amt, however, insisted on the continuation of its established policy585.

4.3.2 The Reichswehr Connection Another party, besides the German armaments industry itself, to have a keen interest in an expansion of the Sino-German weapons trade was the Reichswehr. In contrast to the German government and its Auswärtiges Amt, the Reichswehr had slowly dropped Berlin’s entrenched restraint in regard to a Sino-German military cooperation, initially playing a positively interested waiting game and then adopting an attitude of friendly support of Chiang Kaishek’s German military advisers. The Reichswehr had never willingly and truly accepted Germany’s defeat at the end of World War I. The representatives of the Weimar German Republic might have signed and embraced the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, but the army, seeing itself among the last remaining guardians of the real Germany, never did. In the politically weak post-war Germany, the Reichswehr slowly but surely became a state within the state and started to pursue the reestablishment of Germany’s sovereignty and martial strength with independent policies of its own. It found a willing ally in Weimar Germany’s armaments industry, which was equally reeling from the restrictions imposed on it by the victorious Allies. Already since the early 1920s, German war materials manufacturers had been interested in coordinating their business with the Reichswehr’s at best semi-legal initiatives abroad586. Following plans of Colonel General Hans von Seeckt, the commander-in-chief and great reformer of the

583 Ibid. 584 PA, R 94872, Abteilung IV – Wirtschaft, Rohstoffe und Waren, Waffen, Band 17. Memorandum of Admiral Kinzel, Shanghai, 10 July 1933. 585 PA, R 94872, Abteilung IV – Wirtschaft, Rohstoffe und Waren, Waffen, Band 17. Auswärtiges Amt to German Embassy Beiping, Berlin, 31 August 1933. 586 Chen, Chi (1973), p. 110.

157 Reichswehr, German army units and arms producers became involved in a secret cooperation with the Soviet Red Army, using Russia as a hidden base for military training and the development of banned weapons like tanks and military aircraft587. When relations between Weimar Germany and the Soviet Union started to cool down, the newly-established Nationalist China became more and more interesting for the Reichswehr and the German armaments manufacturers. The Reichswehr and the German industry were indeed very interested in a possible expansion of the Sino-German weapons trade – instigated by Chiang Kaishek’s new military advisers – to exploit the growing Far Eastern market for their own benefit. An increase of arms exports to conflict-ridden China would mean an increase of German war materials development and production, which then again would profit the Reichswehr in its clandestine rearmament. Consequently, in the early 1930s the Reichswehr, with the support of the German industry and assisted by Georg Wetzell, the head of the Chiang Kaishek’s advisory corps at the time, established two liaison offices in Berlin to increase its influence on the selection of military advisers and particularly on China’s international weapons trade588. All involved parties hoped that this new Sino-German connection would develop along the lines of the profitable cooperation between the Reichswehr and the Soviet Union during the 1920s589. It was not to be. The Auswärtiges Amt vehemently rejected this clumsily hidden attempt of the Reichswehr to pursue its own foreign policy in China590 and the German army, losing its nerve under governmental pressure, indeed scaled back its advances into independent politics. Another problem for the German weapons manufacturers was that the Reichswehr’s planned secret rearmament activities and war materials exports could, due to their apparent illegality, not guarantee the industry a steady market to make an increased armament production feasable. Furthermore, an increase of Chinese war materials orders or the active assistance of the German military advisers were not forthcoming. As a result, the actual involvement of the German army and its allies among the German industrialists in the weapons trade with China remained minimal. Still, it had only been the beginning.

4.3.3 The Sino-German Arms Trade during the early 1930s As a result of the mutually beneficial trade agreement591 between Weimar Germany and Nationalist China, signed soon after Berlin’s official recognition of Chiang

587 Chamberlain, Peter & Ellis, Chris (2002) Tanks of the World; 1915 – 1945, London: Cassel & Co., p. 43 588 PA, R 85700, Abteilung IV – Politische Abteilung, Po. 13 China, Militärangelegenheiten, Band 4. Memorandum of Ambassador Trautmann, 26 January 1931. 589 Burden, Allen C. (1972) German Policy toward China and the Chinese Revolution, 1919 – 1931, with Special Reference to the Beginnings of Sino-German Military Cooperation, Edmonton: University of Alberta, p. 304. 590 PA, R 85700, Abteilung IV – Politische Abteilung, Po. 13 China, Militärangelegenheiten, Band 4. Memorandum of Ambassador Trautmann, 3 February 1931. 591 Reichsministerium des Innern (Ed.) (1928) Reichsgesetzblatt; Teil I; 1928, Berlin: Verlag des Gesetzsammlungsamts, pp. 647 ff., and Chen, Chi (1973), p. 319.

158 Kaishek’s government in 1928, the exchange of goods between the two nations began to flourish. Highly sought-after products of Germany’s steel, chemical and textile industries were traded for popular Chinese agricultural goods like soy beans, corn, peanuts, tea, various natural oils or tobacco. The global economic crisis of the early 1930s strengthened the interest of the German industry in the Chinese market even more. Trade opportunities with the Middle Kingdom were seen as almost limitless and offered a way out of the crisis. Study commissions of the various German corporations travelled to the China and returned with anticipations of enormous profits. Encouraged by the Nanjing government to invest in the Far East, the German steel and electrical industry considered getting involved in the large-scale building of a Chinese road and railway network. German mining companies were prepared to help China extract her enormous reserves of raw materials, like tungsten, for export to Germany to boost the domestic economy as well. All these expectations, however, could never be met due to Nationalist China’s continuously unstable political situation and due to a lack of starting capital on both sides. This was unfortunate for the German industry which was, after more than a decade, still reeling under the Treaty of Versailles’ strict limitations and demands for reparations. It was even harder for the German armaments manufacturers. Many former weapons producers were now predominantly producing goods for civilian use rather than for war – within certain limits. Since there was no clause in all post- World War I peace agreements about continuing the manufacturing of weapons through the intermediary of other countries several German companies branched out abroad. In particular, Krupp obtained an important block of shares of the Bofors company in Sweden592, which had already earlier employed Krupp’s patents593, and founded the Siderius company to become an essential part of the Swedish steel industry594. So Germany’s post-war armaments industry as such had not yet sufficently recovered to be able to deliver its goods to China on a large scale, only few smaller items in limited numbers. Still, the employees of Krupp, Mauser and the other German weapons manufacturers continued to hope for a fundamental change of political and economic circumstances. ‘We would rejoice if war broke out in the Far East. Then our workers would again fill their pocket books.’595 However, where Germany’s armaments industry had to bow out, the German trading companies became all the more involved. The trading houses of Carlowitz

592 Stone, William T. (1934) International Traffic in Arms and Ammunition, in: Johnson, Julia E. (Ed.) (1934) International Traffic in Arms and Munitions [Reference Shelf (Volume IX, Number 9)], New York: H.W. Wilson Company, p. 124. 593 Engelbrecht, Helmut C. & Hanighen, Frank C. (1935) Merchants of Death; A Study of the International Armament Industry, London: George Routledge & Sons, p. 204. 594 Moltke, Kai (1953) Krämer des Krieges; Die 5. Kolonne der Monopole, Berlin: Dietz Verlag, p. 10. 595 Engelbrecht, Helmut C. & Hanighen, Frank C. (1934) Don’t Blame the Munition Makers, in: Johnson, Julia E. (Ed.) (1934) International Traffic in Arms and Munitions [Reference Shelf (Volume IX, Number 9)], New York: H.W. Wilson Company, p. 143.

159 & Co., Siemssen & Co., H. Mandl & Sohn, Reimers & Co., Kunst & Albers, Meyer & Co., Arnold Otto Meyer, C. Illies & Sohn and the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation, basically all great and small members of the Germany’s Ostasiatischer Verein, were at one time or another selling or transporting war materials to the Middle Kingdom. Now and then, opportunistic individuals like Artur Günter, also known as Artur Gutermann, and his partner ‘Consul’ Philipp Bierbauer, who fraudulently posed as members of the trading department of the Chinese legation596, tried to profit from China’s desperate need for weapons and ammunition as well. The German government and the diplomats of the Auswärtiges Amt did their best to stop any involvement of German citizens in the Far Eastern armaments trade for political reasons. However, the various arms merchants had only a purely commercial interest in the China business and no political motivations whatsoever. Ultimately, the trade in war materials was only declared illegal by the Weimar German government, not by the Nanjing government which did its best to encourage it. The highest profile, of course, was that of long-established China trade firms like the ubiquitous Carlowitz & Co. trading company. Its representatives in the Far East, like Friedrich Baur, had excellent professional and private relationships with leading members of the Chinese government, including T.V. Soong, the Minister of Finance, and H.H. Kung597, the Minister of Economics, as well as with Chiang Kaishek’s German military advisers598. These kinds of connections enabled Carlowitz & Co. to sell sixty Bofors cannons and forty-eight Solothurn anti-aircraft guns to China in early 1933 alone599. The equally famous trading house of Siemssen & Co., on the other hand, was more interested in the trade with aircraft, with its Shanghai bureau serving as the official branch of the Junkers company in the Far East during the early 1930s600. The Junkers K 47 one-engined two-man fighter aircraft of the Nationalist Air Force had been bought from Sweden’s AB Flygindustri, a business partner and subcontractor of Junkers, and shipped to China by Siemssen & Co. in 1929. The trading house had even invited one of Junkers’ company pilots, Johann Riszticz, to travel to the Far East to demonstrate the aircraft in front of Chinese governmental representatives601. Already in the previous year, Siemssen & Co. had received orders

596 Liang, Hsi-Huey (1978) The Sino-German Connection; Alexander von Falkenhausen between China and Germany 1900 – 1941, Assen/Amsterdam: Van Gorcum, p. 59. 597 Anglo-Cantonese transcription. In Pinyin: Kong Xiangxi. 598 Briessen, Fritz van (1982) Deutsche Institutionen und Persönlichkeiten in China, in: Machetzki, Rüdiger (Ed.) (1982) Deutsch-chinesische Beziehungen; Ein Handbuch, Hamburg: Institut für Asienkunde, p. 44. 599 Ratenhof, Udo (1987), p. 399. See also the Berlin police’s attempt to summarize the involvement of German trading houses in the China weapons trade in PA, R 85559, Abteilung IV – Politische Abteilung, Po. 3 adh China, Waffenlieferungen aus Anlaß des Chinesisch-Japanischen Konfliktes 1931 – 1932, Band 1. Police Department Berlin to Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin, 21 November 1932. 600 Rosholt, Malcolm (1984) Flight in the China Air Space 1910 – 1950, Rosholt: Rosholt House, p. 58. 601 Andersson, Lennart (2002) Chinese Aviation until 1949, [Unpublished].

160 from the Nanjing government for several one-engined two-man Junkers K 53 reconnaissance aircraft, one-engined two-man Junkers W 33 transport aircraft, one- engined two-man Junkers F 13 transport aircraft and Focke-Wulf S.24 Kiebitz one- engined two-man training aircraft. They were promptly delivered with a repair workshop, spare parts and two mechanics, as well as a test pilot, Fritz Horn602. Most of these monoplanes had initially been built for civilian use, but could easily be converted into auxiliary reconnaissance aircraft and light bombers. Always obliging, Siemssen & Co. offered to deliver them from AB Flygindustri already modified as military planes to the Nationalist Air Force603. However, Junkers aircraft were also delivered to Nationalist China by the trading firm of F. Feld & Co. in Hongkong604 and there was a great amount of confusion who was actually the representative for the sale of German aircraft in the Far East. Max Bauer, as chief military adviser, often tried to use his previous relationship with Junkers to arrange favourable deals for his Chinese employers, but various other private individuals were equally involved in Nanjing’s purchase of aircraft. In the end, nobody really knew who had bought planes from whom for whom and on whose orders. Yet, all in all, the lack of a truly established German aircraft industry, as well as faster delivery and better credit terms from American companies605, caused German aviation to remain rather limited in the Middle Kingdom. It soon became apparent that, in contrast to some of the German military advisers, the German trading companies were not motivated by feelings of sympathy for Nationalist China’s cause when they did business with Nanjing. Having become suspicious about irregularities, the trading department of the Chinese embassy in Berlin did some research on the pricing policy of the trading houses and sent the results to the German military advisory group. The advisers were just as outraged as their Chinese employers. The Nationalist army had to pay much higher prices for war materials when it bought them via the German trading firms in Shanghai than it would have had to pay if it had bought them directly from the manufacturer. Grenade launchers, which had been sold by the Daugs company in Berlin for 1,300 American dollars per piece, had been offered to China by the trading company of Steffen &

602 Ibid. 603 Ibid. 604 MA, Nachlaß Bauer, Aktenstück Nr. 49, Schriftwechsel mit deutschen Mitarbeitern in China 1928/1929. Mister Luering to Colonel Bauer, Hongkong, no date.

161 Heymann for 2,000 dollars606. Siemssen & Co. had tried to sell light machine guns, which had originally cost 175 American dollars per piece, for 290 dollars607. The list went on and on. Even with the transport costs from Germany to China included, the prices should never have risen that high. The price of some of the German export firms damaged the image of the usually reputable Germans. However, most of all it damaged the Nationalist Chinese who had only a limited budget to strenghten their armed forces for the battles against their domestic and foreign foes. The fact that their unfair price fixing had tarnished the German trading companies and their quasi-legal (in Nanjing’s understanding, if not in Berlin’s) weapons sales in the eyes of the Chinese didn’t deter them from delving into the downright illegal (in Nanjing’s understanding) armaments trade as well. Not only Nationalist China, but also her sworn enemies, the remaining warlords and the Chinese Communists among them, depended on a constant supply of war materials from abroad. As a consequence, early on the Guomindang, formally recognized as China’s only legitimate government, tried to stop any deliveries of war materials to its domestic opponents and issued a regulation in regard to the international armaments trade in the Far East. Whoever intended to sell or transport weapons and ammunition, regardless of their origin, to China, needed an import permit issued by Nanjing. Governmental representatives threatened to impound any arms deliveries without a valid import permit and to severely punish transgressors according to Chinese law608. Yet, there were such enormous profits to be had in a completely unrestricted armaments trade with the whole of China. Soon the Nanjing government informed the Auswärtiges Amt that more and more German trading firms, among them its own business partners Carlowitz & Co. and Siemssen & Co., were involved in illegal weapons sales to warlords and other insurgents609 and sent, over the following years, entire lists of complaints to the German embassies. While protesting loudly and quite hypocritically in diplomatic circles610 and in the international press against German weapons sales to his enemy, Chiang Kaishek, Yan Xishan, the warlord of Shanxi province, was himself one of the best customers of the German trading houses and acquired much of his military equipment with their help, including three Udet/BFW U-12 Flamingo biplanes and one BFW M-23 biplane611. The dissident regime in Canton also frequently did business with the

605 Walsh, Billie K. (1974) The German Military Mission in China, 1928 – 1939, in: Journal of Modern History (Number 46, September 1974), p. 505. 606 MA, Msg 160/1, Briefe und Berichte des Generals d. Inf. Wetzell, Hauptmann a.D. Krummacher u. a. über die ‘Lehrdivision’ und den Honan-Feldzug. Unsigned memorandum, Berlin, 1 October 1930. 607 Ibid. 608 PA, R 94869, Abteilung IV – Wirtschaft, Rohstoffe und Waren, Waffen, Band 14. Chinese Embassy Berlin to Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin, 23 April 1930, and MA, RW 19 Anhang I/1393, Ostasiatischer Verein, Hamburg-Bremen e.V., Rundschreiben, Protokolle 1931 – 1943. Ostasiatischer Verein to unknown recipient, Hamburg, 7 May 1934. 609 ADAP, Serie B, Band XIV, Document 178. Memorandum of Counsellor von Schoen, Berlin, 27 March 1929. 610 ADAP, Serie B, Band XIV, Document 197. Protocol of an internal meeting within the Auswärtiges Amt on 8 April 1930, Berlin, no date. 611 Ishoven, Armand van (1973) Udet (BFW) U-12 Flamingo Variants [Aircraft Profile (Number 257)], Windsor: Windsor Publishing, p. 118.

162 German export firms and shipping companies to strengthen its armed forces for a seemingly inevitable conflict with Nanjing. In 1929, several Junkers F 13 transport aircraft and Junkers K 53 reconnaissance aircraft, as well as the equipment for a small aircraft factory, were ordered by the Canton Aviation Bureau from Junkers in Germany and from AB Flygindustri in Sweden. The delivery of at least one Junkers K 53 was actually confirmed612. In early 1931, Siemssen & Co. sold three Junkers K 47 fighter aircraft, which had been manufactured by AB Flygindustri, plus weapons and ammunition to Canton613. However, although they were shipped from Hamburg to Canton on the R.C. Rickmers, the planes were confiscated by Shanghai customs and handed over to the Nanjing government614. Intercepting the armaments deliveries to its enemies and putting pressure on shipping lines became standard procedures of the Guomindang. While threatening, for example, the German Rickmers shipping company with dire economic consequences, the Nanjing government promised at the same time to pay for any deliveries intended for Canton, even when the shipments had already been paid in full by its Cantonese opponents615. Some trading houses and shipping companies indeed took these offers, proving once again that they were absolutely apolitical in China’s internal struggle, but also that they were just as opportunistic, profit-oriented and amoral. Yet, depite Nanjing’s and particularly Berlin’s best efforts, the German weapons trade with Chinese rogue factions continued throughout the early 1930s. Only after 1933, National Socialist Germany repressed all material help for China’s petty provincial authorities616.

4.3.4 German and International Reactions By the end of the 1920s and during the early 1930s, the German government and its Auswärtiges Amt were still fighting a vehement yet ultimately losing battle in regard to the various manifestations of the Sino-German armaments trade, both against the German dealers who openly ignored the directions of the German authorities and against the harsh international criticism which resulted from the unchecked activities of these unscrupulous business people. Just as the Auswärtiges Amt could not stop Nanjing’s employment of former German ex-officers as military advisers for its armed forces, it had no legal measures to fence in the participation of German trading houses in China’s armaments trade. The post-war ban on the production and sale of weapons of war, as stipulated in the Treaty of Versailles and laid down in German law, was still

612 Andersson, Lennart (2002). 613 Andersson, Lennart (1990) Svenska Flygplan; Den svenska flygindustrins historia; History of the Swedish Aviation Industry, Stockholm: Förlag Allt om Hobby, pp. 152 ff. All in all, twenty Junkers K 53, six Junkers K 47 and three Junkers W 34, which had all been license-built in Sweden, were sold to China, although the identities of the actual buyers remain in many cases unclear. 614 PA, R 85560, Abteilung IV – Politische Abteilung, Po. 3 adh China, Waffenlieferungen aus Anlaß des Chinesisch-Japanischen Konfliktes 1931 – 1932, Band 2. Siemssen & Co. to Auswärtiges Amt, Hamburg, 1 February 1934. 615 Ratenhof, Gabriele (1984) Das Deutsche Reich und die internationale Krise um die Mandschurei 1931 – 1933; Die deutsche Fernostpolitik als Spiegel und Instrument deutscher Revisionspolitik, Frankfurt am Main (et al.): Peter Lang, p. 33. 616 Liang, Hsi-Huey (1978), p. 52.

163 valid and adhered to by the German government. After long deliberations and finally bowing to the pressure of the Western powers who, at the time, still tried to enforce the International Arms Embargo against a politically volatile China, the Reichstag passed the Law against the Weapons Trade with China617 in early 1928, completely banning both the sale and transport of weapons, ammunition or parts of weapons or ammunition, which were intended to be used in China, for a duration of at least one year. In August 1928, however, Germany entered official diplomatic relations with the recently-established Guomindang government in Nanjing and the law banning the weapons trade with an allegedly helplessly unstable China threatened to become a liability in the new Sino-German relations. Consequently it was quite convenient when the law expired on 1 May 1929618. The already existing laws to control the arms exports from Germany once again had to suffice. After the Manchurian Incident of 1931, Great Britain, via the League of Nations, made another attempt to enforce an arms embargo in the entire Far East619. Japan, who had her own factories for manufacturing weapons and ammunition, didn’t care. China, on the other hand, had only limited facilities to war materials and was distressed. She had recognized that another embargo to enforce peace in the Far East would only be effective against the victim of aggression and not against the aggressor620. For this reason Weimar Germany never supported this new embargo, which, in any case, lasted only one month. Regardless of this, within the Weimar German government a Sino-German armaments trade was apparently never judged to be a problem. In the official statistics of the Auswärtiges Amt on the business activities of German trading firms in the Far East, a trade in weapons and war materials was not even mentioned621. It included only the ‘most important goods’, meaning the products of Germany’s chemical, steel and mechanical industry. Investigations of the German police couldn’t find any proof for illegal armaments deals between German manufacturers and China either622, despite the frequent international accusations brought up against Berlin. However, since the regulations of the Treaty of Versailles permitting the transit of war materials through German territory were still in power, the majority of the weapons exports to China still originated from other countries. These shipments destined for the Middle Kingdom, as it had been the case throughout the 1920s, were still sold by various European nations and trans-shipped via German ports or on ships flying the German

617 Reichsministerium des Inneren (Ed.) (1928) Reichsgesetzblatt; Teil I; 1928, Berlin: Verlag des Gesetzsammlungsamtes, p. 149. 618 ADAP, Serie B, Band XIV, Document 219. Unsigned memorandum, Berlin, 25 April 1929. 619 Engelbrecht, Helmut C. & Hanighen, Frank C. (1934), p. 141. 620 Schall, Thomas D. (1934) Embargo on Arms, in: Johnson, Julia E. (Ed.) (1934) International Traffic in Arms and Munitions [Reference Shelf (Volume IX, Number 9)], New York: H.W. Wilson Company, p. 280. Thomas Schall also added that Japan already had all the weapons and ammunition it required – thanks to, among other things, the United States’ extensive raw material deliveries. 621 ADAP, Serie B, Band XXI, Document 140. Memorandum of Consul Gipperich, Berlin, 8 November 1932. 622 Ratenhof, Udo (1987), p. 399. Udo Ratenhof quotes from a letter of the head of the Berlin police force to the German Ministry of the Interior.

164 flag. The nations in question, however, were in no hurry to correct this misconception since Weimar Germany deflected any accusations that might instead be aimed at them. The German police did once again its own investigations into this unfortunate affair and discovered that, behind Germany’s cover, foreigners were extraordinarily active623. For example, the Belgian Grimard corporation sold 6,000 Russian rifles, including ammunition from German World War I stocks. The French company of Louis Dieu sold sixty ex-German Spandau MG 08/15 machine guns and several unspecified cannons. Another Belgian firm, Schröder Freres, sold 2,000 new and 5,000 used Mauser rifles, as well as a large number of automatic rifles from Brünn in Czechoslovakia and several Belgian light machine guns. The British company of Soley Armament & Co. delivered 100,000 steel helmets to the Middle Kingdom via Germany624. The Auswärtiges Amt, too, was aware that the statistics of the Chinese Customs Bureau were still erroneous since they continued to include transit deliveries which had been shipped via German ports625. Still, the international press once again had its field day. In the eyes of many British, French, Japanese or American journalists the Germans, which had ‘earned themselves the contempt of the entire world’ during the Great War, were now continuing their ‘insidious activities’ in China626. Not a week went by without the headline of some newspaper or some investigative booklet accusing Germany of arming one or another faction of the ongoing Chinese civil war. Particularly bizarre were the renewed charges that Germany was shipping large amounts of poison gas to the Far East, to be used, for example, by Chiang Kaishek in his battle against the warlord Feng Yuxiang627. These allegiations, however, were once again unfounded. The alleged source of information about the poison gas deliveries was traced back by the German authorities to some articles in Die Rote Fahne, an extreme left-wing

623 PA, R 85559, Abteilung IV – Politische Abteilung, Po. 3 adh China, Waffenlieferungen aus Anlaß des Chinesisch-Japanischen Konfliktes 1931 – 1932, Band 1. Police Department Berlin to Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin, 21 November 1932. 624 Ibid. 625 PA, R 85559, Abteilung IV – Politische Abteilung, Po. 3 adh China, Waffenlieferungen aus Anlaß des Chinesisch-Japanischen Konfliktes 1931 – 1932, Band 1. Unsigned Memorandum, Berlin, 6 February 1933. 626 Kuo, Heng-yü (Ed.) (1988) Deutsch-chinesische Beziehungen 1928 – 1938; Eine Auswertung deutscher diplomatischer Akten, München: Minerva Publikation, p. 37. 627 ADAP, Serie B, Band XIV, Document 219. Unsigned memorandum, Berlin, 25 April 1929. See also [Anon.] (1934) Arms and the Chinaman, in: Johnson, Julia E. (Ed.) (1934) International Traffic in Arms and Munitions [Reference Shelf (Volume IX, Number 9)], New York: H.W. Wilson Company, p. 156. The anonymous author, however, delivers no proof whatsoever for his allegiations.

165 political newspaper published in Germany628. All in all, the malicious rumours were judged to have been planted by unknown parties within various foreign nations who tried ‘to protect their own booming arms trade from the German competition’629 and who made themselves this way, although unwittingly, the allies of insurgents against the internationally acknowledged Chinese government. The Far Eastern opponents of Chiang Kaishek and the Nanjing government all too often joined in the finger pointing at Weimar Germany. The warlord Yan Xishan even appealed to the signatory powers of the Treaty of Versailles to stop Germany from materially supporting the Guomindang630, while he himself was secretly the recipient of various military equipment, delivered via the German DEFAG agency631. The Auswärtiges Amt neither doubted nor denied that German trading companies were, unfortunately, involved in China’s international arms trade. However, the German diplomats knew, too, that Japan’s accusations that Weimar Germany was China’s main source of war materials were nothing but propaganda632. Everybody in the Far East knew that other nations were at least equally involved in the arms trade and that Japan herself had supplied some 37.5 percent of the weapons used by China’s warring factions in 1930633. The Nanjing government supported the Auswärtiges Amt in its refutation of the most persistent allegation and published statements of its own that Germany was not the only party selling war materials to China. In fact, according to Chinese statistics, the majority of weapons deliveries were made by Great Britain, France and the United States634. The American arms sales were indeed enormous. The DuPont company sold large amounts of explosives, while the Stinson corporation, the Douglas company and the Chance Vought corporation delivered combat aircraft to both the Nanjing government635 and its enemies in Canton636.

628 PA, R 85559, Abteilung IV – Politische Abteilung, Po. 3 adh China, Waffenlieferungen aus Anlaß des Chinesisch-Japanischen Konfliktes 1931 – 1932, Band 1. Ministry of the Interior to Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin, 19 April 1932. 629 Ratenhof, Udo (1987), pp. 396 f. 630 Causey, Beverley D. (1942) German Policy towards China, 1918 – 1941, Cambridge: Harvard University, p. 171. See also ADAP, Serie B, Band XIV, Document 197. Protocol of an internal meeting within the Auswärtiges Amt on 8 April 1930, Berlin, no date. 631 Ishoven, Armand van (1973), p. 118. 632 PA, R 85560, Abteilung IV – Politische Abteilung, Po. 3 adh China, Waffenlieferungen aus Anlaß des Chinesisch-Japanischen Konfliktes 1931 – 1932, Band 2. German Embassy Beiping to Auswärtiges Amt, Beiping, 24 February 1933. 633 Engelbrecht, Helmut C. & Hanighen, Frank C. (1935), pp. 229 f. 634 PA, R 94869, Abteilung IV – Wirtschaft, Rohstoffe und Waren, Waffen, Band 14. 17 April 1930 Börsenzeitung article. 635 Zhang, Xiaoming (1994) Toward Arming China: United States Arms Sales and Military Assistance, 1921 – 1941, n.p.: University of Iowa, p. 71.

166 However, the Guomindang was not always standing by Weimar Germany’s side. Chiang Kaishek repeatedly informed the government in Berlin that any illegal weapons deals with local governments within China were seen as disdain for the sovereignty of the Nanjing government and as direct meddling into the Middle Kingdom’s internal affairs637. The Guomindang were therefore quick to disapprove German armaments deliveries to the warlord Yan Xishan and to rebelling Canton. Yet, at the same time as Weimar Germany was singled out by the Nanjng government as a nation of ruthless weapons peddlers, the French company of Schneider-Creuzot delivered up to thirty-six field guns to the southern Chinese army, while the British Vickers-Armstrong company sold fourteen batteries of 7.5-centimetre anti-aircraft guns via the trading firm of Jardine, Matheson & Co.638. The United States, too, had been instrumental in equipping the Cantonese Air Force. Thanks to the influence of James H. Doolittle of still-to-come World War II fame, Curtiss Hawk biplanes became Canton’s standard combat aircraft639. Over the years, the position of the German government had not changed the slightest. The Auswärtiges Amt denied any official German involvement in the Chinese civil war and rejected all charges, Far Eastern and international, that Weimar Germany tried in some way to get involved in China’s domestic politics. It also reiterated that the German government had nothing to do with the sale of war materials to any party in China640. When representatives of one or the other Chinese factions asked the Auswärtiges Amt to stop what they considered as illegal activities before they saw themselves forced to take measures of their own, the German diplomats promised that they would do whatever they could – well knowing that their hands were still tied and that particularly the Nanjing government was not actually interested in stopping the Sino-German arms trade per se, but only the arming of its enemies all over China641. Lacking the legal means and the necessary authoritiy to stop its citizens from getting involved in the weapons trade, the German government continued to appeal to the reason of the Ostasiatischer Verein642 and the German trading firms and shipping companies643 and asked them not to participate in this unpleasant business. Otherwise, the German authorities were unable to put further pressure on active or prospective

636 Ibid., p. 86. 637 PA, R 31233, Ostasien Allgemein, Geheimakten der Abteilung IV, Band 3. Ambassador Trautmann to Auswärtiges Amt, Nanjing, 15 December 1934. 638 PA, R 94872, Abteilung IV – Wirtschaft, Rohstoffe und Waren, Waffen, Band 17. German Consulate Canton to Auswärtiges Amt, Canton, 2 June 1933. 639 Ibid. 640 Chen, Chi (1973), pp. 126 f. 641 ADAP, Serie B, Band XIV, Document 178. Memorandum of Counsellor von Schoen, Berlin, 27 March 1929. 642 PA, R 33381, Abteilung II F – M (Militär und Marine), Verkauf von Kriegsmaterial nach Asien. Unsigned Memorandum, Berlin, 24 January 1930. 643 PA, R 94869, Abteilung IV – Wirtschaft, Rohstoffe und Waren, Waffen, Band 14. Auswärtiges Amt to Ostasiatischer Verein and Verband Deutscher Reeder, Berlin, 19 April 1930.

167 arms dealers644. They had no longer any contol over their citizens in the Far East since the loss of German extraterritoriality in 1919. Any German arms trader active in China was subject to Chinese laws645. Weimar Germany’s Auswärtiges Amt grew increasingly fatalistic. In the face of the Asian reality, the much-propagated and vehemently-defended German neutrality towards China as a whole was nothing but an illusion. An unpolitical, purely economic and cultural relationship between Weimar Germany and Nationalist China was impossible. Any kind of approach between the two nations was bound to collide either with the interests of one of the various parties involved in China’s ongoing civil war or with the agenda of one of the other foreign nations present in the Far East and to turn against Germany sooner or later.

4.3.5 Weapons Sold and Delivered While the German trading houses – not unlike their international business rivals – peddled predominantly in foreign arms and ammunition or the last remaining German weapons of World War I-vintage left behind in other European countries, the major and minor corporations of the German armaments industry kept a low profile during the final years of the Weimar Republic. The Mauser company continued to manufacture its established range of rifles and automatic pistols within the limitations set by the Treaty of Versailles, regularly developing new and more advanced models to remain competitive with the Chinese and other foreign weapon producers. The Krupp and Rheinmetall companies entered close alliances with arms manufacturers in other European nations, Bofors in Sweden or Solothurn in Switzerland respectively, and moved their own, now prohibited production of cannons, howitzers and mortars abroad646. Other German corporations worked along similar lines. Germany’s aviation industry was similarly afflicted by economic and political circumstances of the post-war years. According to the Treaty of Versailles of 1919 and the Paris Agreement of 1921, Germany was forbidden to manufacture any kind of aircraft or associated equipment. Following negotiations between the German government and the Allies, the Paris Air Accords of 1926 officially lifted some of the strictest limitations imposed earlier. The ban on the production of military aircraft remained, however, the German aircraft industry was allowed to build civil airplanes and experimental types which could be used for international flying competitions and record-breaking purposes – in short, aircraft which posessed, after some minor modifications, all the characteristics of military aircraft, fighters as well as bombers. Only short time later, Weimar Germany was the most air-

644 PA, R 94871, Abteilung IV – Wirtschaft, Rohstoffe und Waren, Waffen, Band 16. Memorandum of Director von Schoen, Berlin, 19 August 1931. 645 Wood, Carlton L. (1934) Die Beziehungen Deutschlands zu China (Eine historische Betrachtung in politischer und ökonomischer Hinsicht vom 19. Jahrhundert bis zum Jahre 1934), Heidelberg: Ruprecht-Karls-Universität, p. 59. 646 Ratenhof, Udo (1987), p. 307.

168 minded nation in Europe647. Still, as a result of the ongoing restrictions, both on the aviation industry and the Reichswehr, German aircaft manufacturers Junkers, Heinkel, Dornier, Focke-Wulf, Udet/BFW and Raab focussed primarily on the various civilian markets. The Junkers company, Germany’s biggest aircraft producer with subsidiaries in Sweden, was particularly dependent on exports abroad to survive. China was a most promising customer, even when some of their transport and passenger planes had to delivered to factions which were considered as enemies by the Nanjing government and nobody could guarantee that the civilian aircraft would not be converted into makeshift fighters and bombers after their arrival in the Far East. The Auswärtiges Amt was unwilling to endorse even the sale of civilian aircraft to China due to their likely use as weapons of war648, but a complete sales ban was impractical, especially if the diplomats wanted to preserve the already depression- weakened German industry. Consequently, just like during the late warlord era, civilian Junkers A 35 training aircraft or Junkers F 13 transport aircraft in Chinese service were converted for military use, even by Chiang Kaishek’s Nationalist Air Force. In the early 1930s, Nanjing had a total of eighty warplanes ready for action, among them, ranked behind fifty American Douglas O-2MC-2 and Vought V-92C Corsair bombers in military usefulness, fifteen unspecified Junkers aircraft649. When Chiang Kaishek fought against the two rebellious northern warlords, Feng Yuxiang and Yan Xishan, his aircraft bombed the enemy headquarters. These aircraft were believed to have been converted Junkers transports and the American bombers650. In the late 1920s, Junkers also started to manufacture its first dedicated military aircraft since World War I, the Junkers K 47 one-engined two-man fighter aircraft. Still, in order to circumvent the restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles and German laws, these planes were assembled by AB Flygindustri in Sweden. When, in the early 1930s, the Nanjing government took steps to expand its air force by importing more aircraft from other countries, it also ordered twenty-six Junkers K 47 besides predominantly American planes651. However, according to Chiang Kaishek’s American aviation advisers, the Junkers K 47 allegedly proved so inferior to the various other, particularly American aircraft that most of the Nationalist pilots were reluctant to fly them. The American assistant military attache in China recorded, perhaps a bit self-righteously, that ‘all the Chinese pilots had become much afraid of the German planes’652. Yet, some of the Junkers K 47 fighters were involved in aerial combat against the Japanese over Shanghai in early 1932653 and were still listed in active service as reconnaissance aircraft as late as

647 Mombeek, Eric (et al.) (1999) Birth of the Luftwaffe Fighter Force [Jagdwaffe (Volume 1, Section 1)], Crowborough: Classic Publications, p. 17. 648 ADAP, Serie B, Band XV, Document 188. Memorandum of Counsellor von Schoen, Berlin, 19 August 1930. 649 Xu, Guangqiu (2001) War Wings; The United States and Chinese Military Aviation, 1929 – 1949 [Contributions in Military Studies (Number 211)], Westport: Greenwood Press, p. 43. 650 Rosholt, Malcolm (1984), p. 25. 651 Ibid., p. 26. 652 Xu, Guangqiu (2001), p. 42. Xu Guangqiu quotes Captain Parker G. Tenney’s report to the United States War Department, written on 2 September 1931. 653 Ibid., p. 50.

169 1936, the only German aircraft in Nationalist Chinese military service at the time654.

4.4 Recapitulation After 1928, Chiang Kaishek’s establishment of a unified Nationalist government in China did not bring the peace and political stability the Chinese people and the international community had hoped for. Several remaining warlords and the Chinese Communists, believed thoroughly defeated after the great anti-Bolshevist purges of 1927, continued the battle for supremacy in the Far East throughout the early 1930s. At the same time, Japan decided to exploit China’s domestic conflicts to expand its own empire on the Asian mainland and invaded Manchuria. Nationalist China, despite Chiang Kaishek’s best efforts, could not stand up against these internal and external threats and had to seek military support overseas once again. Weimar Germany meanwhile had decided to continue her official foreign policy of absolute neutrality in regard to the Far East and was only prepared to maintain diplomatic, economic and cultural relations with China. Yet, the anti-republican forces which had plagued the German government throughout the 1920s had not disappeared and had become better organised and bolder than before. Now they not only included increasingly influential representatives of the German economy, but also the Reichswehr, Germany’s small but efficiently reorganised post-World War I army. Completely ignoring both Berlin’s official foreign policy and brushing aside international criticism, these factions expanded their involvement in Far Eastern military affairs, a commitment which was wholeheartedly embraced by the Chinese government. Following Chiang Kaishek’s wishes, retired German officers created a small German military advisory group for the Guomindang government which, despite Berlin’s protestations, remained in close contact with the Reichswehr and the German armaments industry. Somewhat restrained by their small number, these military advisers began to reorganise and train the Nationalist armed forces and provided some input into the planning and execution of Chiang Kaishek’s various campaigns against China’s internal and external enemies. German trading companies and weapons manufacturers continued their war materials deliveries to the Far East as well, although they were not always as loyal to the official Chinese government as the German military advisory corps under its various chief advisers. Since the government in Berlin refused to support the inofficial Sino-German military relations, their actual impact on China’s wars of the early 1930s was only limited. However, in 1933 the end of the Weimar German Republic and the rise of Adolf Hitler’s National Socialist Party suddenly offered the opportunity to create a military alliance between China and a foreign nation like never before.

654 Langsdorf, W. von (Ed.) (1936) Taschenbuch der Luftflotten 1936, München: J.F. Lehmanns Verlag, p. 18.

170 5. The Third Reich and Nationalist China, 1933 – 1938 5.1 Historical Background 5.1.1 Nationalist China, 1933 – 1938 Even five years after its establishment, the Nationalist Chinese Republic, under the leadership of its supreme political and military leader, Generalissimo Chiang Kaishek, had found neither peace nor stability. Chiang Kaishek’s fierce and prolonged fight against the last warlord remnants of the previous decade had been successful enough, however, his battle against his other domestic enemies, Mao Zedong’s Chinese Communists, had turned into a massive failure. Initially the Generalissimo’s extermination campaigns against what he saw as mere bands of roving Communist bandits had, despite frequent and costly setbacks, looked like a victory, particularly after the Fifth and last Extermination Campaign of 1933 and 1934 had forced the apparently soundly beaten Communists to embark on the famous Long March. Yet, despite being persistently attacked by the Nationalist army all along the way and suffering horrendous losses, Mao Zedong’s Communists ultimately escaped Chiang Kaishek and established a new base of operations in Yan’an in the remote Shaanxi province. Not defeated, not even by a long shot, they continued their resistance against the Nanjing government from there, slowly but steadily propagating their political ideas all across the Middle Kingdom and finding more and more followers among Chinese peasants, workers and intellectuals alike. The Communists had certain advantages in finding support for their ideology among the Chinese people. Over the years, Chiang Kaishek and the Guomindang Party had been unable to modernize China or improve the livelihood of the average citizen, as had been everybody’s hope after the chaos of the warlord era. Consequently, the Chinese were dissatisfied with the economic and social situation, but even more with Nanjing’s inherent corruption, one of the reasons behind China’s stagnantion. Chiang Kaishek had successfully established himself as dictator. ‘[None] dare criticize me. I am the Generalissimo; I do not err; I am China; and China cannot do well without me’655, was one of his principles. Yet, while he indeed tried to strengthen China – or at least China’s military power – Chiang Kaishek never really attempted to improve the nation’s political or social systems. The reason for this was

171 that he was helplessly caught in a system of complex private interests and that his true authority rested on the goodwill of his political, military and economic allies who were not the least interested in change. Even his own family, particularly his wife and her relatives, considered China to be their private property656. So, in the end, Chiang Kaishek became nothing but ‘a holder with no goal but to hold’657. Since all efforts to counter the growing influence of Mao Zedong’s Communists, including the cultural reeducation program of the and a Fascism-inspired leader cult, proved to be unsuccessful in the long run, renewed war was the only way to preserve his and the Nanjing government’s rule over China. All the while Chiang Kaishek was embroiled in his battle against his domentic enemies, Imperial Japan waged a war of conquest against China, ceaselessly occupying one province after another. The Generalissimo’s policy of ‘internal pacification before resistance against external aggression’658 found little understanding among Chinese people of all levels. Among the strongest opponents of this approach was the ‘Young Marshal’ Zhang Xueliang, who had lost control over his home province of Manchuria in 1932, which was turned into the pseudo- independent Japanese vassal state of Manchukuo659 in the same year. Sickened by China’s apparent self-destruction in the face of foreign aggression, Zhang Xueliang established contact with the Communists to possibly create a united front against the Japanese. Finally, on 12 December 1936, seeing no other alternatives, the Young Marshal and a group of co-conspirators kidnapped Chiang Kaishek in Xi’an and forced him to rethink his policy, to stop the unnecessary civil war and to consider an alliance with the hated Communists in order to repel the Japanese invaders. Under duress, Chiang Kaishek agreed to Zhang Xueliang’s demands. The Japanese became more and more alarmed by the emerging, if uneasy coalition between the Nationalist and Communist forces. Throughout the early 1930s, they had exploited China’s internal strife to expand their hold on the Asian mainland without meeting serious resistance. Now things seemed to change. The Middle Kingdom’s increasingly strenghtening military potential, additionally supported by international, particularly German aid, threatened to put an end to Japan’s

655 Wu, Tien-wei (1976) The Sian Incident: A Pivotal Point in Modern Chinese History [Michigan Papers in Chinese Studies (Number 26)], Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, p. 71. Wu Tian-wei quotes from Chiang Kaishek’s speech to his staff, held on 13 December 1936. 656 Utley, Freda (1939) China at War, London: Faber and Faber, p. 11. Freda Utley quotes Eugene Chen, the former Chinese foreign minister. 657 Tuchman, Barbara W. (1978) Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911 – 1945, New York (et al.): Bantam Books, p. 195. 658 Wu, Tien-wei (1976), p. I. 659 Japanese transcription. In Pinyin: Manzhouguo.

172 ambitions for Far Eastern domination. Consequently, on 7 July 1937, before the situation could turn even more against them, Japanese troops provoked a firefight with Nationalist soldiers while allegedly conducting manoeuvres at the Marco Polo Bridge near Beijing. A short time later – without actually being declared – the Sino-Japanese War broke out. Still, the military alliance between Chiang Kaishek’s Nationalists and Mao Zedong’s Communists was not nearly as effective as everybody had expected. The Chinese forces were beaten at almost every occasion and driven south- and westward by the advancing Japanese army. Yet, the Generalissimo was not truly committed to China’s defence. Surrounded by ‘oily politicians’, ‘treacherous quitters’ and ‘selfish, conscienceless, unpricipled crooks’660, Chiang Kaishek’s first and foremost consideration still remained to preserve his own control over the Middle Kingdom. Accordingly, until the outbreak of World War II in the Pacific on 7 December 1941, the Generalissimo’s long-term strategy to resist Japan consisted of three different aspects – first, to prevent a quick Japanese victory through a prolonged war of attrition661, second, to search for an acceptable compromise with Japan, and third, to wait for foreign intervention of any kind662. In 1937, however, the chances for a success of this strategy were slim. The American ambassador to China at the time, Nelson T. Johnson, reported to Washington that ‘[the] present Chinese Government is in no position to make peace and it is not in a position to make determined war’663. The Chinese themselves summed up their situation even more bleakly in a popular saying, ‘Zhan bi da bai, he bi da luan’664, meaning that, if the Nanjing government fought, China could only lose, but if it compromised with the Japanese, China would invite internal tumoil. It indeed became an increasingly difficult task for Chiang Kaishek to prevent both external defeat and internal unrest in this war.

5.1.2 The Third Reich and its China Policy, 1933 – 1936 While Nationalist China had to face the first Japanese incursions into the her territory, after years of insurmountable political instability, economic struggle and social unrest, the Weimar German Republic was coming to a swift and not unexpected end. In January 1933, the extreme right-wing National Socialist Party won the elections and took over the government. Adolf Hitler, the party’s leader, became German chancellor and Führer and established the Third Reich. However, while the National Socialists, immediately after their rise to power, had a definite and primarily Europe-centred concept in regard to their foreign policy, it looked like the Auswärtiges Amt’s long-established East Asian diplomacy, with its

660 Tuchman, Barbara (1978), p. 218. Barbara Tuchman quotes General , the American military attache in China in late 1937. 661 The term ‘war of long-term attrition’ was formally established in the Supreme National Defence Conference on 7 August 1937. However, it had been coined by Chiang Kaishek already in 1933 and had been further developed from then onward. 662 Zhang, Baijia (1989) The German Factor in the Jiang Jieshi’s Government Strategy [sic] to Resist Japanese Aggression, in: [Anon.] (Ed.) (1989) Bulletin Faschismus/Zweiter Weltkrieg; Sonderheft 1989, Berlin: Zentralinstitut für Geschichte, p. 84. 663 Tuchman, Barbara (1978), p. 199. 664 Zhang, Baijia (1989), p. 87.

173 emphasis on absolute neutrality, would continue as before. During his early years in office, Adolf Hitler himself did neither have nor pursue his own Far Eastern policy. He had more than enough domestic and intra-European problems to solve to care about anything else. Yet, there were also no other National Socialist politicians who could take over the functions of the traditionally conservative professional German diplomats665. Consequently, as during the political chaos of the late Weimar Republic, the Auswärtiges Amt – as well as other institutions, interest groups and individuals – could use the relative vacuum of power during the early years of the Third Reich to continue their own, increasingly pro-Chinese Far East policy for the time being. After neutrality had become less and less suitable in the face of Japan’s aggression, the German diplomats, even in Berlin, began to side with the victims. , the head of the Auswärtiges Amt, and Hermann Kriebel, once Chiang Kaishek’s chief military advisor and now consul general in Shanghai, were among the most vocal supporters of a new and extended relationship between Germany and China. Since Hermann Kriebel was a confidant of both Adolf Hitler and the Generalissimo, his influence was essential and, for a certain time, even bigger than Oskar Trautmann’s who was the Third Reich’s highest-ranking diplomat in the Far East at the time666. Lieutenant General of the Wehrmacht667 became an important contibutor to Germany’s China policy as well. The German armed forces were particularly impressed by the Far East’s overabundance of essential raw materials which were also tempting for Germany’s heavy industry, especially after the previously cordial relations with the Soviet Union, which had until then been an important economic partner, started to cool down due to irreconcilable ideological differences between National Socialists and Communists. Adolf Hitler, too, developed an avid interest in a possible economic cooperation with Chiang Kaishek’s China when he saw that the natural resources of the Far East could be an important asset for the Third Reich’s upcoming rearmament. Nationalist China, on the other hand, was one of the few nations where the rise of Adolf Hitler and the National Socialists did not stir up any feelings of antagonism towards Germany. The systematic persecution of Jews was ‘a matter of indifference to most Chinese’ and Germany’s military strengthening was ‘too distant from the Far East to arouse much fear’668. On the contrary, the Third Reich’s totalitarianism seemed to be attractive to Chiang Kaishek and some of his countrymen. Cheng Tianfang, the Chinese ambassador to Berlin between 1936 and 1939, despite admitting in his memoirs that Adolf Hitler had always been ‘half genius, half madman’669 in his eyes, declared enthusiastically that ‘Germany is a model for China’670. By the mid-1930s, the speeches made by German and Chinese politicians frequently emphasized the strong and traditional friendship

665 Döscher, Hans-Jürgen (1987) Das Auswärtige Amt im Dritten Reich; Diplomatie im Schatten der ‘Endlösung’, Berlin: Siedler Verlag, pp. 305 f., and Fabritzek, Uwe G. (1973) Gelber Drache, Schwarzer Adler, München/Gütersloh: C. Bertelsmann Verlag, p. 120. 666 Liu, Frederick Fu (1956) A Military History of Modern China 1924 – 1949, Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 75. 667 On 15 March 1935, the Reichswehr (or the Reichsheer, as it was also sometimes known) of Weimar Germany was renamed the ‘’. 668 Causey, Beverley D. (1942) German Policy towards China, 1918 – 1941, Cambridge: Harvard University, p. 220. 669 Hwang, Shen-chang (1982) Das Deutschlandbild der Chinesen, in: Machetzki, Rüdiger (Ed.) (1982) Deutsch-chinesische Beziehungen; Ein Handbuch, Hamburg: Institut für Asienkunde, p. 21. 670 Causey, Beverley D. (1942), p. 224.

174 between their respective nations. The similarity between the national emancipation movements of Adolf Hitler and Chiang Kaishek, their overcoming of ‘obstacles and hardships, in order to gain freedom within and without, national union and international prestige’671 were among the favourite topics of such speeches. The former left, now right wing of the Guomindang government, led by Wang Jingwei – the same Wang Jinwei who, only a few years earlier, had accused Weimar Germany of meddling in China’s internal affairs through the dispatch of military advisers and through armaments sales – and H.H. Kung, the Chinese Minister of Economics, were particularly busy declaring their friendship with the German government and the German business community. Even a Chinese National Socialist Party was founded, but it found only few followers. Despite the fact that the German military advisers in Chiang Kaishek’s service had not been sent by the German government and their activities had also not officially been endorsed by the National Socialist leadership, Adolf Hitler showed his appreciation for their activities by allowing Lieutenant General Walter von Reichenau to travel to China in May 1936. The Reichenau Mission created new hopes of even closer Sino-German relations, almost identical to the alliance envisioned by Sun Yatsen over a decade earlier, among the Chinese. The ideas of a economically and militarily strong China, developed by Germany, resurfaced again, serving as partner in a union against the hegemony of the Anglo-Saxon powers and the rising Japanese threat. Walter von Reichenau, whose visit to the Far East had also been embraced by the Auswärtiges Amt, the Wehrmacht and the German Ministry of Economics672, approached the Nanjing government with several proposals, among them that the Third Reich could make the Chiang Kaishek’s military advisers an official German military mission and that the German armaments industry could deliver all the war materials needed to arm forty-one Chinese divisions and the entire Chinese navy673. What neither Walter von Reichenau nor the Chinese knew at the time was the fact that the Reichenau Mission did not speak for the National Socialist government. Adolf Hitler was actually already seeking an alliance with Japan. Anyway, Chiang Kaishek’s government was hesitant to accept the proposals of the Reichenau Mission. China was not prepared to antagonize all the other Western powers by establishing an exclusive union with the Third Reich. The pro-American members of the Nanjing government, gathering around Madame Chiang, the Generalissimo’s wife, vehemently opposed such an alliance674. Only the proposals concerning the modernization of the Nationalist armed forces were widely accepted. However, a political and military alliance between Germany and China, both following similar ideologies and both striving for national rebirth and the status of world powers, seemed to be a mere question of time. The global consequences of such a coalition were unforeseeable. Yet, it never became reality.

671 Bloch, Kurt (1940) German Interests and Policies in the Far East, New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, International Secretariat, pp. 30 f. Kurt Bloch quotes from a speech held by , the German Minister of Economics, on 9 June 1937 in honour of a state visit of H.H. Kung, his Chinese colleague. 672 Martin, Bernd (1986) Das Deutsche Reich und Guomindang-China, 1927 – 1941, in: Kuo, Heng-yü (Ed.) (1986) Von der Kolonialpolitik zur Kooperation; Studien zur Geschichte der deutsch- chinesischen Beziehungen, München: Minerva Publikation, p. 358. 673 Ibid. 674 Martin, Bernd (1984) Das deutsche Militär und die Wendung der deutschen Fernostpolitik von China auf Japan, in: Knipping, Franz & Müller, Klaus-Jürgen (Eds.) (1984) Machtbewußtsein in Deutschland am Vorabend des Zweiten Weltkrieges, Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, p, 198.

175

5.1.3 The Japanese Factor By the mid-1930s, the Third Reich’s foreign policy had reached a dead end. For the sake of its nation’s internal and external strengthening, Adolf Hitler’s National Socialist government had left the League of Nations in October 1933, walked out of the Disarmament Conference and unilaterally terminated the Treaty of Versailles. As a result, not unexpectedly, Germany was left in diplomatic isolation and in dire need of strong international associates. Imperial Japan, also no longer a member of the League of Nations and shunned world-wide for her actions in the Far East, presented herself as the Third Reich’s possibly ideal ally. Yet, there was still a great debate among the German authorities over who would be the more suitable partner in the Far East for a union with the Third Reich – Japan with its impressive military capabilities or Nationalist China with its huge and still not fully exploited economic potential. While the Auswärtiges Amt, the Wehrmacht and the German industry preferred China for economic and even moral reasons, the National Socialists only intended to reap the greatest power-political benefits from a potential Far Eastern Union. While China was dismissed as internally too unstable to be a useful ally, Imperial Japan seemed to be perfect for countering the Soviet Union’s increasingly disquieting Bolshevik threat675. The National Socialists were obviously hoping that Japan could tie down the Soviet forces in the Far East, ‘[install] a brake on the Russian steam roller’676, and could put military pressure on Great Britain and the United States in the Pacific area, so that the Third Reich could have its back covered in Europe677. An alliance between Germany and Japan, however, could not be worked out through official diplomatic channels. The Auswärtiges Amt was still known for its rather pro-Chinese neutrality and would never have agreed to negotiations leading to such a blatant military coalition, while the Japanese foreign ministry could not be contacted without the involvement of the Auswärtiges Amt. Therefore the National Socialists themselves, especially , Adolf Hitler’s foreign political adviser, made private contact with sympathetic parties in Japan, mostly in army and navy circles, to work out a

675 Bloß, Hartmut (1980) Die Zweigleisigkeit der deutschen Fernostpolitik und Hitlers Option für Japan 1938, in: Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen (Number 1/1980), p. 67. 676 Dirksen, Herbert von (1949) Moskau Tokio London; Erinnerungen und Betrachtungen zu 20 Jahren deutscher Außenpolitik 1919 – 1939, Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, p. 156. 677 Zhang, Xianwen (1989) Zur Entwicklung der chinesisch-deutschen Beziehungen in den dreißiger Jahren des 20. Jahrhunderts, in: [Anon.] (Ed.) (1989) Bulletin Faschismus/Zweiter Weltkrieg; Sonderheft 1989, Berlin: Zentralinstitut für Geschichte, p. 39, and Fox, John P. (1982) Germany and the Far Eastern Crisis 1931 – 1938; A Study in Diplomacy and Ideology, Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 3 f.

176 German-Japanese alliance. These clandestine negotiations ultimately resulted in the so-called Anti-Comintern Pact, which was signed on 25 November 1936678. However, a closer reading reveals that the contents of the Anti-Comintern Pact between the Third Reich and Japan were anything but sensational and were completely overrated by the National Socialists and the rest of the world. Its articles were generally very vague. The signatories guaranteed to inform each other about what they knew about the activities of the Communist International and to cooperate their respective defense strategies against them. Third parties could be invited to join the Pact. The entire agreement was limited to only five years. However, not even the additional secret articles of the agreement included a dedicated military cooperation between the two nations, but were rather assertions of benevolent neutrality, even in the case of a war between one of the two signatories and the Soviet Union, the driving power behind the Comintern. Once the Anti-Comintern Pact became known across the world, reactions to it were swift. The Chinese, who had believed in Germany’s traditional and never ending friendship with the Middle Kingdom, were particularly shocked. They simply could not believe that the Third Reich would throw in its lot with their arch-enemy. The diplomats of the Auswärtiges Amt were just as surprised by the German-Japanese agreement as anybody else679. Yet, now they were asked to explain to Chiang Kaishek and the Nanjing government that the Anti- Comintern Pact would not change the friendly relations between Germany and China. The agreement did not contain anything that could threaten Chinese interests680. The ‘signing of the treaty between Japan and Germany was aimed solely against the Red Conspiracy’681. Joachim von Ribbentrop even sent orders to Oskar Trautmann, the German ambassador in China, to ‘use all means of demagoguery to prevent any disadvantageous impact on Sino-German relations’682. This, however, became increasingly difficult. Another problem was what the Third Reich actually gained from concluding the Anti-Comintern Pact with Japan. Many factions within Germany rejected it as meaningless, as ‘nothing but a sorry effort of propaganda without any real content’683. Others strongly advised against the treaty since it was hardly advantageous for Germany’s situation in Europe, where its focus should be, but would unnecessarily antagonize important nations, Great Britain and the United States included684. The

678 ADAP, Serie C, Band VI/1, Document 57. German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Pact, Berlin, 25 November 1936.For a translation of the Anti-Comintern Pact, see Presseisen, Ernst L. (1969) Germany and Japan; A Study in Totalitarian Diplomacy 1933 – 1941, New York: Howard Fertig, pp. 327 f. 679 Dirksen, Herbert von (1949), p. 184. 680 ADAP, Serie C, Band VI/1, Document 66. Ambassador von Weizsäcker to German Embassy Nanjing, Berlin, 30 November 1936. 681 Zhang, Xianwen (1989), p. 39. Zhang Xianwen quotes from a telegram sent by , the German Minister of War, to H.H. Kung, the Chinese Minister of Economics. 682 Ruland, Bernd (1973) Deutsche Botschaft Peking; Das Jahrhundert deutsch-chinesischen Schicksals, Bayreuth: Hestia, p. 174. 683 Schenke, Wolf (1971) Mit China allein; Entscheidende Jahre 1939 – 47, Hamburg: Holsten-Verlag, p. 52. 684 Groehler, Olaf (1989) China im Kalkül deutscher Militärpolitik 1933 – 1945, in: [Anon.] (Ed.) (1989) Bulletin Faschismus/Zweiter Weltkrieg; Sonderheft 1989, Berlin: Zentralinstitut für Geschichte, pp. 99 f. Olaf Groehler quotes General Ludwick Beck, the Wehrmacht’s chief of staff.

177 Chinese, hardest hit by the Anti-Comintern Pact, put it most bluntly and concisely. ‘Germany supports Japan without getting anything in return. Only Japan benefits from Germany’s policy and this policy is wrong.’685 Indeed, the Third Reich’s overestimation of the Pact was shamelessly abused by the Japanese who insisted that they actually acted in the spirit of the agreement when they continued, even expanded their occupation of China686. German diplomats in the Far East were the first to recognize the discrepancies between the idea behind the Anti-Comintern Pact and Japan’s actual actions in China. ‘The Japanese attempts to justify their operations […] as fight against Communism as covered by the Anti-Comintern Pact are erroneous. […] [The] treaty does not include the fight against Bolshevism on the territory of others. Japan’s actions can be seen by us as counterproductive to the the Anti- Comintern Pact since they prevent a consolidation of China [and] foster the spread of Communism in China […].’687 Furthermore, ‘[through] their politics of violence, the Japanese create what they pretend to fight against’688. The free hand in China granted to Japan by the agreement also came at the expense of Germany’s very own position in the region. Even the most fervent National Socialist defenders of the Pact soon realized that Japan’s continued, even increasing involvement on the Asian mainland only reduced her worth as an anti-Soviet ally. Repeatedly, the Auswärtiges Amt let the Japanese government know about the Third Reich’s disapproval of Japan’s military actions in China and of the repercussions of these actions on Germany’s situation. The Japanese, however, tried first to charm and later to bully their German treaty partners to increasingly support their war in the Far East without offering anything tangible in return. Although there were no legal obligations which necessitated German compliance with Japanese desires689, Adolf Hitler’s National Socialist government gave in to ’s demands, especially after the Japanese threatened Germany with the outright cancellation of the

685 Peck, Joachim (1961) Kolonialismus ohne Kolonien; Der deutsche Imperialismus und China 1937, Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, p. 134. Joachim Peck quotes from Ambassador Trautmann’s telegraph to the Auswärtiges Amt, sent on 15 December 1937. Oskar Trautmann himself quotes from a newspaper article printed in the Ta Kung Pao. 686 Sommer, Theo (1962) Deutschland und Japan zwischen den Mächten 1935 – 1940; Vom Antikomintern-pakt zum Dreimächtepakt; Eine Studie zur diplomatischen Vorgeschichte des Zweiten Weltkrieges, Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), p. 59. 687 ADAP, Serie D, Band I, Document 472. Ministerial Director von Weizsäcker to German Embassy Tokyo, Berlin, 28 July 1937. 688 ADAP, Serie D, Band I, Document 476. Ambassador Trautmann to Auswärtiges Amt, Nanjing, 1 August 1937. 689 Presseisen, Ernst L. (1969), p. 130.

178 Anti-Comintern Pact in case the Germans did not show more support for Japan’s fight on the Asian mainland690. With only the militarily and politically inadequate Fascist Italy standing by its side, the Third Reich was simply too intimidated by the possibility of losing its only essential ally in an increasingly hostile world.

5.1.4 The Third Reich and its China Policy, 1936 – 1938 With the German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Pact, which was riddled with ‘constant friction, petty jealousy, mutual distrust and open breach of faith’691, the Third Reich, in the long run, had concluded an agreement against herself. Nevertheless, for the next few years, Sino-German relations remained surprisingly harmonious. One proof for the enduring bond between National Socialist Germany and Nationalist China was the continued dynamic implementation of the HAPRO Treaty, which had already been ratified on 23 August 1934 and which regulated the cashless exchange of Chinese raw materials for German industrial products, including weapons and ammunition. The main reason behind this apparent harmony was that the Third Reich had not yet been forced to choose sides. China was, despite the Manchurian Incident, not yet thoroughly anti-Japanese, but mostly involved in domestic anti-Communist campaigns, which suited the National Socialists very well. Still, Germany needed to maintain a delicate balance between Japan and China so that she would not have to discard her relations with either country and could benefit economically and politically from both692. How could this balance be maintained? Should Germany support both parties or no-one? Unfortunately, different policies seemed to be prudent, even necessary at the same time. It was therefore no wonder that there were several quite different German East Asia policies in progress, all more or less with the blessing of, or at least tolerated by, Adolf Hitler, who has fully aware that positive German-Japanese relations would end Germany’s foreign political isolation, while a cordial German relationship with China was essential for the Third Reich’s economy and rearmament693. As a consequence, the ‘Old Guard’ of German politics, including Konstantin von Neurath of the Auswärtiges Amt, Hjalmar Schacht of the Ministry of Economics and Werner von Blomberg of the Ministry of War, were responsible for the Third Reich’s pro-Chinese Asia policy, while the representatives of the new National Socialist Germany, like Hermann Göring, and Joachim

690 Sommer, Theo (1962), p. 59. 691 Ibid., p. 2. 692 Causey, Beverley D. (1942), p. 320. 693 Bloß, Hartmut (1976) Deutsche Chinapolitik im Dritten Reich, in: Funke, Manfred (Ed.) (1977) Hitler, Deutschland und die Mächte; Materialien zur Außenpolitik des Dritten Reiches, Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, p. 412.

179 von Rippentrop, were behind its parallel pro-Japanese Asia policy. Both policies were running side by side, without coordination and sometimes even without knowledge of the Auswärtiges Amt which was supposed to be the ultimate authority for the implementation of the Third Reich’s foreign policy. Yet, they could not be dismissed as mere duplicity since Germany’s pro-Chinese and pro- Japanese sentiments were both genuine694. After the Xi’an Incident of December 1936 and Chiang Kaishek’s anti-Japanese union with Mao Zedong’s Chinese Communists, the National Socialist government grew increasingly sceptical about its relationship with Nationalist, now apparently semi-Bolshevist China. Finally, when the Sino-Japanese War broke out on 7 July 1937, Japan became more and more insistent that Germany should now show her true colours and openly support Japanese expansion on the Asian mainland by withdrawing the still unofficial military advisers and stop the entire trade with China. The National Socialist government, however, refused to comply. It was too concerned about the repercussions the cancellation of the extensive Sino-German trade relations would have on the German economy – and on Germany’s rearmament. The exchange of German goods, including weapons and ammunition, for Chinese raw materials was too essential for the Third Reich’s industry to simply cancel it out of hand, especially when no back-up plan was available. The sad result of the continuation of Germany’s double-tracked, sometimes even schizophrenic Asia policy was that ‘we seek Japan’s friendship while we arm its enemy, China, at the same time’695. A possible way out of the Sino-Japanese-German dilemma presented itself in late 1937, when the Third Reich suggested that it would be prepared to act as a ‘mailman’696 in a mediation attempt between the two warring nations697. Germany was indeed very interested in a peaceful settlement of the Sino-Japanese War. A compromise between China and Japan could protect German interests in the Far East, could prevent Japan from exhausting its forces in an unnecessary war on the Asian mainland and would help to offset the alarmingly increasing Soviet influence in China which had returned in the wake of the Nationalist-Communist union698. The international prestige gained from a German-brokered peace settlement was also not to be underestimated. However, Japan’s ridiculously exaggerated terms for a cessation of the hostilities were totally inacceptable for the Chinese. Negotiations dragged on until they became irrelevant after a Japanese victory in the second battle for Shanghai and the fall of Nationalist China’s capital, Nanjing, on 13 December 1937. The failure of the German mediation attempt spelled the end of the Third Reich’s moderate Far Eastern policy, which was accelerated even more by the dismissal of most of the remaining pro-Chinese politicians and military leaders in Germany who had all been instrumental in the negotiations between China and Japan. Hjalmar

694 Causey, Beverley D. (1942), p. 318. 695 ADAP, Serie C, Band VI/1, Document 162. Ambassador Trautmann to Auswärtiges Amt, Nanjing, 27 January 1937. 696 Martin, Bernd (1986), p. 365. 697 The German mediation attempt between China and Japan is covered in depth by Nieh, Yu-Hsi (1970) Die Entwicklung des chinesisch-japanischen Konfliktes in Nordchina und die deutschen Vermittlungsbemühungen 1937 – 1938 [Mitteilungen des Instituts für Asienkunde Hamburg (Number 33)], Hamburg: Institut für Asienkunde. 698 Zhang, Baijia (1989), p. 89.

180 Schacht was sacked by Adolf Hitler. Konstantin von Neurath, Werner von Blomberg and Werner von Fritsch, the head of the Wehrmacht at the time, were also fired. They were all replaced by loyal National Socialists. The governmental department of Joachim von Ribbentrop was more and more entrusted with the implementation of Germany’s true foreign policy while the Auswärtiges Amt was increasingly reduced to bureaucratic assignments. On 20 February 1938, Adolf Hitler finally declared pretentiously in regards to German relations with Nationalist China that ‘[in] the future, Germany […] will drop the politics of fantasies it could not distance itself from earlier and will respect the reality’699. During the following months, the German government stopped all deliveries of war materials to China, recalled all German military advisers in Chiang Kaishek’s service and, last but not least, formally recognized the Japanese puppet state of as an independent nation. The Third Reich’s ultimate and disgraceful abandonment of China should never have been a surprise. Already years earlier, in his book Mein Kampf, Adolf Hitler had comprehensively explained that an alliance between Germany and China was impossible even to consider. Being non-Aryans and having, in his racist and social- darwinist point of view, no culture worth speaking about, the Chinese stood on the same level as black people700. The Japanese at least had some kind of culture, even though they were not a ‘culture-creating’701 people like the Germans. Therefore collaboration with them was at least conceivable. Unfortunately for the Third Reich, the cancellation of Sino-German trade relations and the withdrawal of the military advisers from China did not have the expected effect. Neither did Japan give Germany the promised preferred treatment as a trading partner in East Asia nor did it immediately conclude the previously announced military partnership against the Soviet Union. Politically, the alliance between the Third Reich and Imperial Japan remained just ‘loud and shiny propaganda’702 without any real substance. Militarily, diverging overall interests and strategies hampered any kind of meaningful collaboration. Economically, Germany gained nothing due to the Japanese unwillingness to share with anybody.

699 Zhang, Xianwen (1989), p. 41. 700 Hitler, Adolf (1942) Mein Kampf, München: Zentralverlag der NSDAP, p. 428. 701 Ibid., pp. 318 f.

181 5.2 Military Relations 5.2.1 General Hans von Seeckt, 1933 Chiang Kaishek never had a reason to complain about the professional abilities of Lieutenant Colonel Hermann Kriebel and Lieutenant General Georg Wetzell, the successors of his first German chief military advisor, even if they had problems with their interpersonal skills. Yet, while they were quite efficient in reorganising and training the Nationalist Chinese armed forces, both of them lacked the grand vision of Colonel Max Bauer. They also did not have the image or prestige the Generalissimo expected his personal counsellor and the head of his German military advisory group to have. As a consequence, he continued looking for the ideal person to ultimately take over the position. In the end, Chiang Kaishek thought he had found his perfect chief military adviser in General Hans von Seeckt. During World War I, the extremely able, yet inscrutable General Hans von Seeckt, nicknamed the ‘Sphinx’703 by his subordinates and colleagues alike, had served as the chief-of-staff of the Ottoman Turkish army, Germany’s ally, and established a close working relationship with General Alexander von Falkenhausen. Once the Weimar Republic had been established, Hans von Seeckt became the chief-of-staff of its Reichswehr, the 100,000-man peacetime army Germany was allowed by the Treaty of Versailles. A ‘canny innovator who stepped around [Allied restrictions] with consummate ingenuity’704, he created a small elite force, which incorporated both the newest tactical doctrines and the latest technological developments and which could easily be expanded to true army size in times of need. Yet, he was also the grey eminence behind the Reichswehr’s clandestine rearmament projects in the Soviet Union and essential in its transormation into an almost independent political entity within Weimar Germany. Hans von Seeckt’s brilliant career, however, ended in 1926 when he personally allowed the son of the exiled German Crown Prince to participate in Reichswehr manoeuvres705. Forced to resign as a military officer in the wake of

702 Martin, Bernd (1990) Das deutsch-japanische Bündnis im Zweiten Weltkrieg, in: Kreiner, Josef & Mathias, Regine (Eds.) (1990) Deutschland – Japan in der Zwischenkriegszeit, Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, p. 203. 703 Pawly, Ronald (2003) The Kaiser’s Warlords; German Commanders of World War I [Elite (Volume 97)], London: Osprey Publishing, p. 24. 704 Elson, Robert T. (et al.) (1976) Prelude to War [World War II (Volume 1)], Alexandria: Time-Life Books, p. 99. 705 Duden, Wilhelm (1977) Deutsche Militärberater bei Tschiang Kai-schek; Reichswehroffiziere formen die Kuomintang-Armee, in: Damals; Zeitschrift für Geschichtliches Wissen (Number 9, September 1977), p. 782.

182 this faux pas and disgraced in the eyes of Germany’s democratically-minded politicians, his subsequent attempts at a political career failed. Throughout the 1920s, Hans von Seeckt had been approached for several times by the Guomindang to create or head a German military advisory group, but the General had always declined. In the summer of 1932, he also rejected an offer of the semi- independent Canton government to enter its services706. Chiang Kaishek, however, was not easily discouraged. While his current chief military adviser, Georg Wetzell, commuted between the training grounds of the Nationalist army and its various frontlines, he sent another invitation, this time for an informal yet well-paid visit to China, to Hans von Seeckt. Georg Wetzell, the General’s former subordinate, unwittingly endorsed the invitation707. This time Hans von Seeckt accepted. The reasons behind his sudden change of mind remain obscure. Perhaps he was impressed by Chiang Kaishek’s reputation as ‘capable soldier and prudent statesman’708. Perhaps he still suffered from his political failures and his enforced inactivity and simply wanted to do something worthwhile, no matter what or where, particularly when it promised to offer an opportunity to aid Wehrmacht interests709. Perhaps he was forced to accept as a result of his enormous debts which had been caused by the extravagant lifstyle of his wife and which could not be covered by his modest pension710. His subsequent behaviour made people suspect that Hans von Seeckt’s interest in China was probably chiefly ‘’711 and influenced by the lavish salary promised by Chiang Kaishek and the handsome commissions offered by several German firms anxious for Chinese government contracts. Whatever his motivations, sixty-seven years old and sickly, yet full of ‘a thirst for action and a will to take responsibility’712, he welcomed Chiang Kaishek’s invitation to Nationalist China.

706 Schmidt-Pauli, Edgar von (1937) General v. Seeckt; Lebensbild eines deutschen Soldaten, Berlin: Verlag Reimar Hobbing, p. 158. 707 Rabenau, Friedrich von (1941) Seeckt; Aus seinem Leben; 1918 – 1936, Leipzig: v. Hase & Koehler Verlag, p. 678. 708 Schmidt-Pauli, Edgar von (1937), p. 158. 709 Kirby, William C. (1984) Germany and Republican China, Stanford: Stanford University Press, p. 112. 710 Kogelfranz, Siegfried (1989) ‘Die Barbaren – unbedeutend und widerwärtig’; Chinas Demütigun- gen, seine Revolutionen, Reformen und Kriege gegen sich selbst (II), in: Der Spiegel (Number 26/1989), p. 122. 711 Liang, Hsi-Huey (1978) The Sino-German Connection; Alexander von Falkenhausen between China and Germany 1900 – 1941, Assen/Amsterdam: Van Gorcum, p. 94. 712 Rabenau, Friedrich von (1941), p. 678.

183 In early 1933, Hans von Seeckt, accompanied by his wife Dorothee, travelled to the Far East for the first time. He intended this journey to be absolutely private, especially under the watchful gaze of the international press and the German government. However, he was received like a foreign dignitary when he finally arrived in China. Besides having initial confidential talks with several high-ranking Chinese politicians, including Wang Jingwei, Hans von Seeckt spent much time confering with Chiang Kaishek himself. After several lengthy discussions between the two men in the luxurious mountain resort of Guling, both appeared to think on similar levels and to have the same visions for the future of China713. Chiang Kaishek was particularly impressed. While he had truly liked Max Bauer, he respected Hans von Seeckt even more and asked him to go on a fact-finding tour through China, to collect impressions on the economic and military situation and to let him know what improvements he thought could be made. Consequently, the General embarked on a three-month journey of northern China. He travelled on a personal gunboat put at his disposal by the Chinese Navy, was accompanied by the director of Dongji University’s medical department, serving as his personal doctor, and visited the sights of the Middle Kingdom as on a pleasure cruise. However, he did not miss the opportunity to inspect several units of the Chinese army714. Based on what he had seen on his fact-finding mission, Hans von Seeckt wrote his celebrated Memorandum for Marshal Chiang Kaishek715, outlining his thoughts on Nationalist China’s economic and military strengthening, and presented it to his host on 30 June 1933. Basically, the memorandum was a rehash of what Colonel Max Bauer had suggested in his comments for Chiang Kaishek already five years earlier716. This time, however, the same ideas were brought forward not by a wanted political criminal, but by Germany’s most prestigious military thinker.

713 Ibid., p. 679. 714 ADAP, Serie C, Band I/1, Document 412. Ambassador Trautmann to Auswärtiges Amt, Beiping, 26 August 1933. 715 MA, N 62/9, Nachlaß Seeckt, Denkschrift Seeckts für Marschall Tschiang Kaishek 30.6.1933. Memorandum of General von Seeckt, Beiping, 30 June 1933, and Liu, Frederick Fu (1956) A Military History of Modern China 1924 – 1949, Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 93 f. 716 However, there seemed to be only one possible and logical way out of China’s muddled situation. In May 1942, General Joseph Stilwell, Chiang Kaishek’s new American chief military adviser, also made several recommendations in regard to the reorganisation of the Chinese army. They were so awfully familiar that Madame Chiang only dryly commented, ‘Why, that’s what the German advisers had told [my husband]’. See Tuchman, Barbara W. (1978) Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911 – 1945, New York (et al.): Bantam Books, p. 392.

184 The most important ingredients for a successful reorganisation of the Nationalist armed forces – and of China in general – were internal and external peace. It had always been difficult to create a strong army in times of turmoil717, which was why Chiang Kaishek had failed so far, being under pressure from both the Japanese and the Chinese Communists. In any case, it was unwise to create a large army all at once. The Nationalist armed forces, as they were at the time, were too large anyway. What China needed was a small, but modern equipped and efficiently trained army – in other words, a dedicated elite force. Based on his own experiences in Weimar Germany, Hans von Seeckt knew very well how a small army of only 100,000 men could become a force to be reckoned with. In this regard, two tenets were essential – ‘the effectiveness of an army lies in its qualitative superiority’ and ‘the value of an army depends upon the worth of its officer corps’718. To create the nucleus of this new and improved Nationalist army, the expansion of the Lehrbrigade was imperative to familiarize officers of all grades, who had so far only been taught unrealistic theory719, with the most modern military techniques in practice as well. The Lehrbrigade would serve also as the model for the creation of other divisions, which would form the armed forces’ core units and which could be enlarged in times of need720. The training within the framework of the Lehrbrigade, however, not only included the preparation of a new generation of officers, but also the instruction of already serving and established higher ranks and, if necessary, their weeding out. The Chinese army had already suffered enough from incompetence, corruption, favouritism, nepotism and cronyism and unsuitable elements within the military hierarchy had to be sacrificed without consideration for the good of the nation. A large-scale structural and administrative reorganisation, patterned on the German model though adapted for Chinese conditions, would follow suit and include both a centralisation and standardisation of the personnel system and a financial reform721. Hans von Seeckt emphasized that he had the impression that all the German military advisers in Chinese service fulfilled their tasks with dedication. However, their number and their influence were not sufficient to do any real good. To truly translate

717 Rabenau, Friedrich von (1941), p. 681. 718 MA, N 62/9, Nachlaß Seeckt, Denkschrift Seeckts für Marschall Tschiang Kaishek 30.6.1933. Memorandum of General von Seeckt, Beiping, 30 June 1933. 719 Epstein, Julius (1953) Seeckt und Tschiang-Kai-Schek, in: Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau; Zeitschrift für die europäische Sicherheit (Number 11/1953), p. 536. 720 MA, N 62/9, Nachlaß Seeckt, Denkschrift Seeckts für Marschall Tschiang Kaishek 30.6.1933. Memorandum of General von Seeckt, Beiping, 30 June 1933.

185 his memorandum truly into action, he suggested that Chiang Kaishek should continue and expand the employment of German officers under the leadership of a advisor general who was directly subordinated to the Generalissimo himself. This was a point where the existing structure of the armed forces had to be improved as well. Only Chiang Kaishek should be in command, not a number of divisional commanders, since ‘the army is the foundation of the ruling power […]’722. The financial situation of Nationalist China apparently had no influence on its planned military strengthening, which came, as could be expected, at a hefty price. In accordance with Chiang Kaishek’s plans, about two-thirds of the Nanjing government’s expenditures between 1927 and 1937 was allocated for the military and for the payment of debts, most of which had been contracted to pay military outlays723, and did nothing for the livelihood of the Chinese people as such. The anti- Communist extermination campaigns in themselves cost a fortune. Allegedly it cost Chiang Kaishek about 80,000 American dollars to kill just one Communist724. Hans von Seeckt was untouched by all this. Although he found Chiang Kaishek congenial and intelligent, though somewhat utopian, he himself commented that ‘[whether] the Marshal will heed my advice or not doesn’t concern me. I don’t have any hopes in this regard, nor do I care, and I certainly can’t imagine that I can change anything in China or among its people’725. In his private diary, the General added that ‘only through its own strengthts and after its own example there [was] any chance of success [for China]. The recipe [could] not be bought abroad’726. This apparently did not stop him from accepting Chiang Kaishek’s generous payments. After having additionally received two enormous chests full of presents727, Hans von Seeckt and his wife finally returned home later that year. Georg Wetzell, still the head of the

721 Ibid. 722 Ibid. 723 Eastman, Lloyd E. (1991) Nationalist China during the Nanking Decade, 1927 – 1937, in: Eastman, Lloyd E. (et al.) (1991) The Nationalist Era in China 1927 – 1949, Cambridge (et al.): Cambridge University Press, pp. 1ff. and p. 9. 724 Seagrave, Sterling (1996) The Soong Dynasty, London: Corgi Books, p. 290. Sterling Seagrave quotes the American Edgar Snow who accompanied and observed the Chinese Communists at the time. However, Sterling Seagrave’s description of the German advisory group in his book is seriously flawed, frequently confusing dates and persons. 725 MA, Msg 160/4, Briefe General Wetzell an Verbindungsstelle Berlin und Oberst Brinckmann, 1932 – 1934. General von Seeckt to General von Wetzell, Beiping, 30 June 1933. 726 Rabenau, Friedrich von (1941), p. 690, and Haupt, Werner (1969) Deutsche Militärberater in China, in: [Anon.] (Ed.) (1969) Deutsches Soldatenjahrbuch 1969; Siebzehnter Deutscher Soldatenkalender, München: Schild Verlag,, p. 261. 727 Rabenau, Friedrich von (1941), p. 683. Friedrich von Rabenau quotes from Hans von Seeckt’s letter to his sister Marie, written on 2 November 1933.

186 German military advisory group at the time, was more than dissatisfied with the General’s visit to China. He couldn’t stomach that Hans von Seeckt, after only a few weeks of sightseeing in China and ‘from the balcony perspective’728, had the nerve to know everything better than he who had worked in the Far East for several years. ‘On the other hand, my view was free and less sceptical’, was the General’s comment when he became aware of his former confidant’s disapproval. ‘It might be that he is correct in everything, but this doesn’t change my right to say whatever I think.’729

5.2.2 General Hans von Seeckt, 1934 – 1935 Hans von Seeckt had never wanted to take over Georg Wetzell’s position as German chief military adviser in Chiang Kaishek’s service730. The diplomats of the Auswärtiges Amt also disapproved of any further contacts by the General with the Nanjing government. Herbert von Dirksen, the German ambassador to Japan who was widely known for his excessively pro-Japanese sentiments, contacted Konstantin von Neurath, the head of the Auswärtiges Amt, asking him to stop Hans von Seeckt from ever travelling to China again731 since he feared that this could create unnecessary political tensions between Germany and Japan. The General was indeed urged by the Auswärtiges Amt not to accept employment as a military adviser in the Far East. He assured everybody that this was not his intention732. Chinese diplomats in Berlin, however, declared that Chiang Kaishek attached great importance to Hans von Seeckt’s return to China. Georg Wetzell had made himself too many enemies to be able to do his job as chief military adviser properly733 and had severely damaged the prestige of the German advisory group through his handling of affairs. The diplomats also hinted that the Chinese already considered hiring French military advisers if the Germans were no longer forthcoming. The French Marshal Petain had been chosen to become Chiang Kaishek’s new military consultant

728 MA, Msg 160/4, Briefe General Wetzell an Verbindungsstelle Berlin und Oberst Brinckmann, 1932 – 1934. General von Wetzell to Lieutenant-Colonel Brinckmann, Nanjing, 9 November 1933. 729 Rabenau, Friedrich von (1941), p. 690. Friedrich von Rabenau quotes from an entry in Hans von Seeckt’s diary, written on 28 July 1933. 730 Ibid., p. 701. 731 ADAP, Serie C, Band II/1, Document 199. Ambassador von Dirksen to Auswärtiges Amt, Tokyo, 19 January 1934. 732 ADAP, Serie C, Band II/1, Document 16. Memorandum of Counsellor Völkers, Berlin, 19 October 1933. 733 ADAP, Serie C, Band II/1, Document 48. Memorandum of State Secretary von Bülow, Berlin, 8 November 1933.

187 and all German advisers were planned to be substituted by French officers734. When Hans von Seeckt heard about this awkward situation, he was immediately prepared to take over the position of German chief military adviser in China. He contacted Georg Wetzell and asked him to continue serving the Nanjing government as his subordinate. The Lieutenant General, feeling insulted, declined and handed in his resignation on 6 April 1934. He left China soon after Hans von Seeckt arrived. Hans von Seeckt was immediately presented with luxurious accomodations and granted the extremely high salary of 2,000 American dollars per month, which was three times higher than that received by his predecessor and the highest ever paid to a foreign adviser, no matter from which nation, by the Nanjing government. Then Chiang Kaishek put the entire military advisor group under the General’s guidance, who, from that time onward, was known as the ‘Representative of Chiang Kaishek and Advisor General’. Hans von Seeckt now had a position of influence which no other foreign adviser in China had received before or after him735. Even a German diplomat in Nanjing, Heinz Lautenschlager, sent an exited letter to his superiors, claiming that ‘[Hans von Seeckt] enjoys the unlimited trust, even the admiration, of the Marshal and never before had there been so many opportunities to sway the Marshal to Germany’s advantage’736. However, first the General had to reorganize the military advisory corps according to his plans before focussing on turning the reform ideas of his memorandum into reality737. He alone decided which military advisers were to be employed and for what role in the service of the Chinese armed forces. Consequently, the German military advisory group grew to its largest size during its activity in China, with some seventy retired Reichswehr officers contracted in 1935, twenty-two of them for key positions738. Although his Chinese employers considered Hans von Seeckt, as he remarked himself, as the ‘military Confucius’739, he spent hardly any time restructuring or

734 ADAP, Serie C, Band II/2, Document 473. German Embassy Beiping to Auswärtiges Amt, Beiping, 29 May 1934. 735 Bloß, Hartmut (1976) Deutsche Chinapolitik im Dritten Reich, in: Funke, Manfred (Ed.) (1977) Hitler, Deutschland und die Mächte; Materialien zur Außenpolitik des Dritten Reiches, Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, p. 410. 736 Rostek, Horst (1989) Zur Rolle der deutschen Militärberater bei der chinesischen Nationalregierung 1928 bis 1938, in: [Anon.] (Ed.) (1989) Bulletin Faschismus/Zweiter Weltkrieg; Sonderheft 1989, Berlin: Zentralinstitut für Geschichte, p. 119. 737 Rabenau, Friedrich von (1941), p. 706. 738 Liu, Frederick Fu (1956), p. 102. 739 Ibid. (1941), p. 707. Friedrich von Rabenau quotes from Hans von Seeckt’s letter to his sister Marie, written on 28 July 1934.

188 training the Nationalist armed forces. The General wasn’t involved in the strategic and tactical planning or conducting of the anti-Communist extermination campaigns either. He had commented earlier that ‘[nobody], most of all the Chinese, wants me even close to the war zone, not to mention that I myself am not in the mood for such martial activities’740. Consequently, Hans von Seeckt’s economic activities during his tenure as a Chiang Kaishek’s chief adviser became more and more dominant while he transferred most of his military duties to his extremely capable and reliable aide-de- camp, General Alexander von Falkenhausen, whom he had already selected in Germany and who had arrived shortly after him. Not unlike Max Bauer before him, Hans von Seeckt had also concrete plans for the improvement of China’s economy, particularly her military economy, when he wrote his memorandum in 1933. The actual creation of an efficient Chinese army was impossible without the establishment of a Chinese armaments industry, or rather without a previous complete ‘economic development of China in a modern sense’741. He elaborated that, even after years of intensive restructuring, ‘[the] armament of the Chinese army is in an unsatisfactory state. This […] can be […] improved with the acquisition of foreign weapons and foreign ammunition’742. The import of war materials, however, was only a stop-gap solution. The General intended to put China on her feet, therefore he added that ‘[without] secure production capabilities for weapons and ammunition within its own borders for both peacetime training and wartime use, China remains dependent on foreign industries and defenceless in the case of war. The establishment of a Chinese armaments industry is just as important as the raising of the training standards of the army’743. The creation of exactly these weapons-manufacturing capabilities had to be initiated by a reorganisation of China’s economy and by its industrial reconstruction. A possible role for Germany in this process was already hinted at when Hans von Seeckt suggested that the Nanjing government should ask for European support and technical know-how when trying to

740 Ibid. (1941), p. 697. Friedrich von Rabenau quotes from Hans von Seeckt’s letter to his wife, written on 16 May 1933. 741 Drechsler, Karl (1989) Die Chinapolitik der Weimarer Republik und Hitlerdeutschlands 1920 bis 1939 – Grundlinien und Zäsuren, in: [Anon.] (Ed.) (1989) Bulletin Faschismus/Zweiter Weltkrieg; Sonderheft 1989, Berlin: Zentralinstitut für Geschichte, p. 17. Karl Drechsler quotes from Hans von Seeckt’s Memorandum for Marshal Chiang Kaishek. Even he, an outspoken detractor of the German military advisory group as such, must admit that, especially in the ecomomic context, the various advisors were indeed constructive. 742 MA, N 62/9, Nachlaß Seeckt, Denkschrift Seeckts für Marschall Tschiang Kaishek 30.6.1933. Memorandum of General von Seeckt, Beiping, 30 June 1933. 743 Ibid.

189 accomplish this ambitious goal. It is, however, quite probable that Chiang Kaishek already had waited for this offer since he had employed the General as his new chief military adviser because he had always been fully aware of his extraordinarily good and valuable contacts with the German industry. ‘Service to China is service to Germany’744, was an often-repeated motto of Hans von Seeckt. Consequently, China’s expected strengthening was particularly attractive for him when, through the establishment of a close political, economic and military relationship between the Third Reich and and Nationalist China, it could bring benefits for both countries – for example, the rearmament of both nations. As a result, before he even travelled to the Far East for the second time, Hans von Seeckt had already found the support of the Wehrmacht, ‘his’ former Reichswehr, to which he was still loyal and with which his personal contacts had never ended. Influential persons within Germany’s military hierarchy, like Werner von Blomberg of the Ministry of War or Lieutenant General Walter von Reichenau of the Wehrmacht, became the main protagonists behind the German push toward China. However, once again, the endeavour was the solo project of a single, even if very influential, faction of Germany’s govenmental establishment. It remained unknown to the Auswärtiges Amt until much later and was tolerated by the National Socialist government for the time being only because it promised to be profitable for its own ends. After Adolf Hitler and the National Socialists had taken over power in Germany and rejected the limitations of Versailles, the rearmament of the Third Reich’s armed forces accelerated rapidly. As an importer of weapons and ammunition and an exporter of essential raw materials, China had the potential to become enormously important for the German government, the German economy and the German Wehrmacht and fundamental for the creation of an effective, even expanded German armaments industry within only a short period. Therefore the Wehrmacht explicitly granted Hans von Seeckt the authority to purchase weapons of all kind for his Chinese employers from German arms producers745. The General himself also renewed his previous contacts with German weapons traders – the same traders who had helped

744 Rabenau, Friedrich von (1941), p. 704. Friedrich von Rabenau quoes from an unspecified letter written by August von Mackensen to Hans von Seeckt. 745 Seps, Jerry B. (1972) German Military Advisors and Chiang Kai-Shek, 1927 – 1938, Berkeley: University of California, p. 339.

190 him to illegally rearm the so-called ‘Black Reichswehr’746, the part of the German army about which the world had known nothing and which had blatantly contradicted the articles of the Treaty of Versailles. In the Far East, Hans von Seeckt tried to arrange the current and upcoming deliveries between China, the Wehrmacht and the German armaments industry as well as he could. The weapons trade, conducted primarily through military channels in China and Germany, went exceedingly well747. However, to streamline the exchange of merchandise even more, the General, backed up by the Wehrmacht, initiated the creation of a company exclusively dedicated to the current kind of Sino-German trade – the Handelsgesellschaft für industrielle Produkte or ‘Trading Organisation for Industrial Products’, HAPRO for short. It was also Hans von Seeckt who suggested that the HAPRO should be exclusively managed by his close friend Hans Klein748, who had been eminent among the clandestine weapons merchants of the Reichswehr during the 1920s and who immediately became a major shareholder of the HAPRO. Thanks to the trust Chiang Kaishek had in both Hans von Seeckt and Hans Klein, Germany gained a position of economic influence in China no other nation had had before, which, in turn, benefited China as well. Yet, all this had been reached through private initiative since neither the General nor his confidant had ever received a formal order from the German government749. Hans Klein, however, was a dubious and shady character. He could be useful for the economic and military relations between Germany and China, but he was also unable to distinguish between the official orders he had received from Nanjing and his own personal business interests750. To boost the profits of the Wehrmacht and the German armaments industry – and by extension his own – even more, the manager of the HAPRO additionally opened business relations with the semi-independent government of Canton, which was at the time in opposition to Chiang Kaishek and the Guomindang in Nanjing. This had not been his idea alone. On his journey back to

746 Meier-Welcker, Hans (1981) Hans von Seeckt, in: Martin, Bernd (Ed.) (1981) Die deutsche Beraterschaft in China 1927 – 1938; Militär – Wirtschaft – Außenpolitik, Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, p. 117. 747 PA, R 31233, Ostasien Allgemein, Geheimakten der Abteilung IV, Band 3. General von Falkenhausen to Lieutenant-Colonel Brinckmann, Nanjing, 25 December 1934. 748 ADAP, Serie C, Band II/2, Document 473. German Embassy Beiping to Auswärtiges Amt, Beiping, 29 May 1934. 749 MA, Msg 160/59, ‘Die HAPRO in China; Ein Bericht über Entstehung und Entwicklung des deutsch-chinesischen Austauschvertrages 1930 – 1937’ von Walter Eckert 1981, p. 46. 750 Bloß, Hartmut (1976), p. 409.

191 Germany in 1933, Hans von Seeckt had made a stop-over in Canton where he received a lavish reception from the regional political and military leaders who were very interested in the building of arms factories with German help and in the possible creation of their own military advisory group, particularly since they had already established business connections with a certain Major Preu751. Despite having initial misgivings752, Hans von Seeckt decided to get involved in the weapons trade with the southern Chinese although he was also committed to Nanjing at the same time. One year later, Hans Klein took over his friend’s previously established contacts. Hans von Seeckt supported the HAPRO’s Canton project for a while until he realised that his not-so-secret involvement severely damaged his standing with Chiang Kaishek. Then he immediately distanced himself from the activies of his confidant753. Hans Klein, still supported by the Wehrmacht, continued dealing with Canton until, after a personal intervention of Consul General Hermann Kriebel and the Auswärtiges Amt on behalf of Chiang Kaishek, he was forced to stop in late 1935. Since the German military hierarchy was deeply involved in all of the HAPRO’s business dealings in the Far East, yet had not an inkling about Nationalist China’s delicate domestic affairs, it also fostered military contacts with the provincial government of Canton besides supporting it with war materials. Consequently, the Ministry of War sent several German officers to southern China, including the retired General Hans von Sehmsdorf, to create a second military advisor group there, although on a much smaller scale. Nanjing, angered by the German support for its enemies, sent protest notes to the Auswärtiges Amt, but the Ministry of War persevered in its independent relations with Canton754. Hans von Sehmsdorf remained the chief military advisor of General Zhang Zhidong and the Guandong army and aided them in their fight against Communists and other bandits755. Other retired German officers, like Colonel Sachse, Lieutenant Colonel Griepenkerl, Captain Boerner or Lieutenant Roeder, served by his side, gave lectures at the military

751 PA, R 85703, Abteilung IV – Politische Abteilung, Po. 13 China, Militärangelegenheiten, Band 7. German Embassy Beiping to Auswärtiges Amt, Beiping, 18 September 1933. 752 Meier-Welcker, Hans (1981), p. 121. 753 ADAP, Serie C, Band III/2, Document 366. Ambassador Trautmann to Auswärtiges Amt, Beiping, 1 December 1934, and ADAP, Serie C, Band III/2, Document 493. Counsellor Lautenschlager to Auswärtiges Amt, Nanjing, 15 February 1935. 754 ADAP, Serie C, Band III/2, Document 554. Minister of the Reichswehr von Blomberg to Foreign Minister von Neurath, Berlin, 23 March 1935. 755 Ruland, Bernd (1973) Deutsche Botschaft Peking; Das Jahrhundert deutsch-chinesischen Schicksals, Bayreuth: Hestia, pp. 200 f.

192 academy at Yindong756 or oversaw the work in Canton’s various arms and ammunition factories757. Yet, although many of them knew each other from years of sevice in the German army, there was no contact whatsoever between Chiang Kaishek’s military advisers and those active in province. They were also never forced to face each other on the battlefield. Before it even could come to this worst-case scenario, Hermann Kriebel stepped in, just as he had done in the case of the Wehrmacht’s trade relations with Canton758. He contacted Adolf Hitler via the Auswärtiges Amt and asked him to cancel the Wehrmacht’s Canton project to avoid unnecessary tensions with Nanjing. The Führer’s reactions to Hermann Kriebel’s telegram are not known, but the military relations between Germany and the provincial government of Canton were soon brought to an end759. When hostilities between Chiang Kaishek and the dissidents in Canton broke out in the summer of 1936, all German military advisers in southern China took a ‘summer vacation’760, just as it had been previously ordered by their superiors in Berlin, and returned home immediately – except Hans von Sehmsdorf who unexpectedly died on 14 July 1936, only days before the fighting began. Tropical malaria was quoted as the official cause of his death, but some people suspected poison, never being sure whether Japanese agents or Chiang Kaishek and the Guomindang were the instigators761. During his second year of service in the Far East, Hans von Seeckt’s poor health often prevented him from fulfilling his duties as the head of the German advisory corps, both as military economic organisator and as Chiang Kaishek’s personal counsellor. Most of the time, the General was either ill and on convalescence leave in some mountain resort, which created the impression among his many critics that he saw his service for the Nanjing government only as ‘one big Chinese state-sponsored vacation’762. His poor health was also the reason why he ultimately quit his position at Chiang Kaishek’s side and returned to Germany on 5 March 1935. Hans von Seeckt thought at the time that he had done his duty, that he had already finished the

756 PA, R 85705, Abteilung IV – Politische Abteilung, Po. 13 China, Militärangelegenheiten, Band 9. German Embassy Beiping to Auswärtiges Amt, Beiping, 25 . 757 Ibid., p. 206. 758 Bloß, Hartmut (1976), p. 414. 759 ADAP, Serie C, Band IV/1, Document 101. Director Meyer to German Embassy Beiping, Berlin, 24 May 1935. 760 PA, R 104863, Politische Abteilung VIII – China, Po 13, Militärangelegenheiten in China. Lieutenant-Colonel Fischer to Ministry of War, Canton, 17 June 1936. 761 Ruland, Bernd (1973), pp. 208 f. 762 Schmidt-Pauli, Edgar von (1937), p. 159.

193 groundwork for the reorganisation of the Nationalist armed forces and that everything else could be handled by his elected successor, General Alexander von Falkenhausen. However, he intended to continue his support for China’s cause in Berlin763. Indeed, shortly after his return from China, Hans von Seeckt was received by Adolf Hitler in the chancellery. In the presence of Konstantin von Neurath, Hjalmar Schacht and Werner von Blomberg, he tried to promote strong relations between the Third Reich and Chiang Kaishek’s China on all levels. At the time, the General actually believed he had gained the Führer’s understanding, but later developments proved that Adolf Hitler regarded Hans von Seeckt’s suggestions in regard to the Far East only with contempt764. Chiang Kaishek meanwhile continued to count on the General’s lasting commitment for China’s cause. Hoping that he would one day return, he had never officially dismissed Hans von Seeckt as the head of his German military advisory corps and had only allowed him to take unpaid leave. The General retained his post until he died on 27 December 1936. Nobody could understand Chiang Kaishek’s affinity with Hans von Seeckt. Only the political impact of the retired legendary General’s appointment as German chief military adviser outweighed his contribution to the development of China’s armed forces, which was actually far less than Georg Wetzell’s765. It is also difficult to ascertain whether Chiang Kaishek and the other leading Chinese politicians knew about Hans von Seeckt’s less-than-altruistic supplementary business deals at China’s expense. Perhaps they accepted them in silence as long as he gave the Guomindang government the prestige it craved. Hans von Seeckt, however, discredited himself through his pursuit of materialistic goals in the Far East. Particularly the German diplomats of the Auswärtiges Amt and his fellow advisers thought the behaviour of the former head of the Reichswehr as odd since he had always been known as the very model of a correct and steadfast Prussian officer.

5.2.3 General Alexander von Falkenhausen, 1935 – 1938 When General Alexander von Falkenhausen took over the position of Chiang Kaishek’s chief military adviser after Hans von Seeckt’s departure in March 1935, the entire procedure was a mere formality. Due to his predecessor’s various recurring

763 Rabenau, Friedrich von (1941), p. 709. 764 Presseisen, Ernst L. (1969) Germany and Japan; A Study in Totalitarian Diplomacy 1933 – 1941, New York: Howard Fertig, p. 76.

194 ailments and his almost exclusive preoccupation for the military economic aspect of the Sino-German relations, the General had already been the head of the German military advisory group in everything but name for several months. His official employment proved to be stroke of luck for Chiang Kaishek. Over the following years it became increasingly apparent that, with him, the Chinese had obtained the services of a foreign adviser equal to the legendary Charles ‘Chinese’ Gordon766 and to Sir Robert Hart767, ‘as competent in his technical field, as politically talented, as selflessly devoted to the cause’768. Just like Hans von Seeckt, Alexander von Falkenhausen was a strong proponent of an alliance between Germany and China. However, while his predecessor had been motivated mainly by self-interest, Alexander von Falkenhausen was a pro-Chinese idealist through and through. His sense of duty towards Chiang Kaishek and China almost superseded his loyalty to his home country. ‘[A] recognized strategist [and] master of military detail’769, he distinguished himself from all chief military advisors in that he stood completely on the side of the Chinese people in their resistance against Japanese aggression and in that his personal interests were identical with the interests of Nationalist China. Alexander von Falkenhausen had always had a certain connection with the Far East. As a young infantry lieutenant, he had participated in the punitive expeditions in the aftermath of the Boxer Rebellion of 1900 and had later spent some time as the German military attache in Tokyo. During World War I, the General, a staunch monarchist, fought at in France and, alongside the Ottoman Turks, in East Jordania, where he won Germany’s highest military decoration, the Pour le Merite. Highly qualified and far from being a political hothead who might have participated in radical Freikorps activities or political coup attempts, he was allowed to remain in army service after the war and served as the head of the Reichswehr’s infantry school in Dresden. There he worked in close cooperation with Hans von Seeckt and helped to develop the efficient system of specialisation which was essential for the creation of the Reichswehr. In 1930, Alexander von Falkenhausen officially retired from service. Only two years later, the Chinese government tried to employ the General, who had just started working on a political career, to reorganize the withdrawing Manchurian troops for a counter- attack against the invading Japanese, but the Auswärtiges Amt successfully intervened at the time. After Adolf Hitler’s rise to power, he soon began to oppose the new German government, especially after his youngest brother had been murdered during the National Socialists’ party-internal Blood Purge of 30 June

765 Liang, Hsi-Huey (1978), p. 94. 766 During the Taiping Rebellion between 1851 and 1864, Charles Gordon, a British artillery officer, led a mercenary force fighting for the ruling Qing dynasty. 767 In the 1860s, Robert Hart, a retired British civil servant, established the first Chinese maritime customs service for the ruling Qing dynasty. 768 Liang, Hsi-Huey (1978), p. 66. 769 Carlson, Evans F. (1940), p. 17.

195 1934. As a consequence, he was only too happy to join Chiang Kaishek’s military advisory corps. However, to be able to hold his position for China’s best interest and to spare the Chinese government possible diplomatic trouble with the Third Reich, he never critizised the National Socialists openly. Alexander von Falkenhausen did not have a written employment contract with the Chinese, only a simple gentlemen’s agreement. He was prepared to be at Nationalist China’s service for as long as Chiang Kaishek and the Nanjing government deemed necessary, but he also wanted to have the freedom to go back to Germany whenever he thought it to be prudent770. Like Max Bauer and Hans von Seeckt before him, but to a much smaller degree, Alexander von Falkenhausen wrote several memoranda for Chiang Kaishek. One of them, the rather political Thoughts on the Regulation of Executive Authority771, elaborated on what he thought should be the guidelines for authoritarian leaders like the Generalissimo. However, the General’s main concern was the defence of China against an increasingly probable large-scale Japanese invasion. He summed up all his suggestions for the improvement of the Chinese defensive capabilities in another memorandum, titled Basic Principles of China’s National Defence772, which he submitted to Chiang Kaishek and his military commission on 26 January 1935. It was extraordinarily detailed, included elaborate maps and troop staging plans and went even so far as advising the Chinese where to store ammunition for possible worst-case scenarios and how to defend which railway lines with what kind of guns. Initially Alexander von Falkenhausen argued for a rather passive style of defense, proposing to evacuate the entire area north of the Yellow River in the event of a Japanese attack to create a strong yet easily comprehensible defensive line along the Yangzi River with fortified points particularly in Hankou, Nanjing and Shanghai773. In August 1935, however, he slowly started to change his mind and suggested much more aggressive means of defence against the Japanese774. These included drastic methods like destroying the dams of the Yellow River to slow down advancing Japanese army units and the preparation of far-reaching guerilla and sabotage campaigns in the Japanese-occupied areas and even Japan herself775. Whichever way of defence Chiang Kaishek and his army officers were about to chose, it was essential for the Chinese to fight against the invaders for as long as possible. Since it was all too obvious that Japan would not only antagonize China with its aggressive stance, but, sooner or later, the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union as well, the Chinese had only to resist the Japanese until the other powers were equally drawn into the conflict in the Far

770 MA, N 246/137, Nachlaß Falkenhausen, Von Oberst Erwin Topf überarbeitete und erweiterte Fassung der Memoiren von Alexander von Falkenhausen, Band 3: Kapitel 9 – 11, p. 8. This document, however, is contradicted by document MA, N 246/12, Nachlaß Falkenhausen, Schriftwechsel über die Verpflichtung als Militärberater in China 1934. Lieutenant-Colonel Brinckmann to General von Falkenhausen, Berlin, 10 February 1934, which mentions negotiations about a salary. 771 Liang, Hsi-Huey (1978), pp. 97 and 199. 772 MA, N 246/7, Nachlaß Falkenhausen, Dienstliche Unterlagen der Beraterstelle in China, Band 1 (1935 – 1936). Memorandum of General von Falkenhausen, Nanjing, 26 January 1935. 773 Ibid. 774 MA, N 246/7, Nachlaß Falkenhausen, Dienstliche Unterlagen der Beraterstelle in China, Band 1 (1935 – 1936). Memorandum of General von Falkenhausen, Nanjing, 12 August 1935. 775 Liang, Hsi-Huey (1981) Alexander von Falkenhausen (1934 – 1938), in: Martin, Bernd (Ed.) (1981) Die deutsche Beraterschaft in China 1927 – 1938; Militär – Wirtschaft – Außenpolitik, Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, pp. 141 f.

196 East776. Interestingly enough, all of Alexander von Falkenhausen’s memoranda firmly assumed that Chiang Kaishek was able to control any kind of domestic unrest, no matter whether instigated by warlord remnants or Communists. They were also imbued with a deep belief in China’s will and power to resist and with the conviction that the Chinese people could never be defeated if they would just use their own characteristic strengths and moral superiority to counter Japan’s technical supremacy. For the remainder of his activity in Chinese service, Alexander von Falkenhausen never once deviated from his strategic and tactical memoranda. However, just like all his predecessors before him, Alexander von Falkenhausen was plagued by the fact that the Chinese armed forces, despite years of hard work, were still insufficiently armed and equipped. To overcome this fatal weakness, which was bound to make even the most modest of the military goals formulated in his memoranda almost impossible to reach, the General additionally proposed a Five Year Munitions Plan which was designed to make Nationalist China self- sufficient in the production of both arms and ammunition777. Alexander von Falkenhausen urged the Chinese start or increase the production of their own, much-needed light weapons, preferredly after original German designs, such as Spandau MG 08 machine guns, 8.2-centimetre trench mortars and Mauser rifles and pistols778, to counter the effects of a Japanese blockade of China’s sea ports. A self-sufficient Chinese ammunition production was equally essential. In 1935, half of the required rifle ammunition and the entire artillery ammunition had still to be imported from abroad. The General’s Five Year Munitions Plan was also supposed bring about improvements in this area. Optimistic observers were confident that the Chinese armaments industry and with it the Nationalist armed forces would be self-sufficient by the year 1940779. However, the Sino-Japanese War broke out too soon to complete the program. In any case, even the Alexander von Falkenhausen- improved Chinese armaments industry was still unable to meet the demands of the modernizing Chinese army, which remained dependent on foreign imports for the time being, particularly on the HAPRO deliveries, which continued and expanded over the years. Nevertheless, the chief military adviser’s attempt to improve and standardize the Chinese army’s equipment with the help of arms imports from Germany was more a military necessity than a leg-up for the German armaments industry. Alexander von Falkenhausen was wary of the HAPRO’s way of doing business in the Far East. He frequently contacted the more unscrupulous managers of the German armaments industry and warned them not to gamble away China’s sympathies by selling overpriced goods or goods of questionable quality780, which, unfortunatly, happened on a regular basis. Mirroring the patterns of Max Bauer and Georg Wetzell before him, Alexander von Falkenhausen, too, had to distance himself from the economic aspects of his

776 MA, N 246/7, Nachlaß Falkenhausen, Dienstliche Unterlagen der Beraterstelle in China, Band 1 (1935 – 1936). Memorandum of General von Falkenhausen, Nanjing, 26 January 1935. 777 Fu, Pao-Jen (1981) Military Advisers and German Assistance for Chinese Industrialization; An Analysis of Sino-German Economic and Military Collaboration, in: Martin, Bernd (Ed.) (1981) Die deutsche Beraterschaft in China 1927 – 1938; Militär – Wirtschaft – Außenpolitik, Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, p. 199. 778 Fu, Pao-Jen (1989) The German Military Mission in Nanking 1928 – 1938; A Bridge connecting China and Germany, Syracuse: Syracuse University, p. 139. 779 Ho, Feng Shan (1937) China verteidigt sich, Wien/Leipzig: Michael Winkler-Verlag, p. 77. 780 Ratenhof, Udo (1987) Die Chinapolitik des Deutschen Reiches 1871 bis 1945; Wirtschaft – Rüstung – Militär, Boppard am Rhein: Harald Boldt Verlag, p. 332.

197 task as chief military adviser, which had been revived by Hans von Seeckt, and had to focus once more on his purely military duties as an outright war with Japan was becoming more and more inevitable. The General realized that the Chinese troops were, despite every effort having been made, inferior to the Japanese in weapons and equipment. They had to use the Middle Kingdom’s vast space as a weapon of its own, withdrawing into the interior to draw the enemy deeper into hostile territory and to overextend his lines of supply while never ceasing to fight him at every opportunity. Therefore, in addition to fortifying the planned strongpoints along the potential Yellow River Front, Alexander von Falkenhausen prepared the Chinese troops under his tutelage for mobile warfare. Highly mobile Nationalist army units, based on Hans von Seeckt’s Reichswehr concepts, were drilled in the use of automatic weapons and mortars. Several artillery regiments with heavy howitzers and an armoured brigade were organized independently to support the operations of the infantry units. To defend northern China according to the principles of his memorandom, Alexander von Falkenhausen then planned to station these troops at several strategic key points along the Chinese railway network to enable them to be moved to possible hotspots as fast as possible. It was, at the time, en vogue among foreign observers, especially among the Americans, to laugh about this planned defence technique. Only later, during World War II, would they admit that Chiang Kaishek couldn’t have done anything else against the better-equipped Japanese781. As was to be expected, Alexander von Falkenhausen’s reforms of China’s homeland defence met the opposition of the older, traditionally-oriented members of the Nationalist armed forces’ officer corps. However, unlike some of his predecessors, the General was fully aware of the sensitive Chinese ego and used patience and tact to get his views adopted. Although he always had the courage to tell the brutal truth782, ‘[he] would never say, ‘I think this ought to be done.’ He would say, ‘I think the best strategy would be the plan you suggested a week or two ago,’ and then proceed to outline his own plan.”783 Still, it would be inaccurate to say that Alexander von Falkenhausen and the other German military advisers were actually planning all of Chiang Kaishek’s defence strategies. German advice carried great weight, especially when it coincided with the Generalissimo’s own plans, but, more often than not and to the military advisers’ disappointment, it was completely ignored. Some German suggestions, on the other hand, were surprisingly quickly put into action, particularly the creation of an air defence network for China’s most important cities from scratch784. Alexander von Falkenhausen devised an intricate plan where the different anti-aircraft batteries, sorted by the size of the calibres of their guns, had to be located to cover the presumably most threatened areas of Chinese airspace with the highest efficiency. Early warning systems, communications networks and searchlight batteries were also put into position,

781 Hahn, Emily (1955) Chiang Kai-shek; An Unauthorized Biography, New York: Doubleday & Company, p. 217. 782 Schenke, Wolf (1971) Mit China allein; Entscheidende Jahre 1939 – 47, Hamburg: Holsten-Verlag, p. 38. 783 Utley, Freda (1939) China at War, London: Faber and Faber, p. 9. Freda Utley quotes Walter Stennes, a German officer in Chiang Kaishek’s service. 784 MA, N 246/7, Nachlaß Falkenhausen, Dienstliche Unterlagen der Beraterstelle in China, Band 1 (1935 – 1936). Memorandum of General von Falkenhausen, Nanjing, 28 June 1935, and MA, N 246/8, Nachlaß Falkenhausen, Dienstliche Unterlagen der Beraterstelle in China, Band 2 (1937). Memorandum of General von Falkenhausen, Nanjing, 21 July 1937.

198 while training under the guidance of Major General Alfred Streccius, the dedicated Adviser for Air Affairs785, was sped up. The air defence program was a complete success. By 1937, Nanjing alone was defended by thirty-two 7.5- and 8.8- centimetre anti-aircraft cannons, sixty smaller-calibre anti-aircraft cannons and ninety-six anti-aircraft machine guns786. When, in August of that year, Japanese bombers attacked Nanjing for the first time, fifteen out of twenty-four Japanese aircraft were shot down by the Chinese anti-aircraft batteries787. Many Chinese and foreign observers were in agreement that, in several instances, Alexander von Falkenhausen ‘had done wonders. […] That was an example of the right man in the right place, a real imperturable philosopher. […] [You] never saw him ruffled or angry though, Heaven knows, he had plenty of cause to be’788.

5.2.4 The German Military Advisory Group of the 1930s Alexander von Falkenhausen’s small steps of progress during the modernisation of Nationalist China’s armed forces, however, had not been possible without the constant work of his subordinates from the German military advisory group. Its composition had only slightly changed since Colonel Max Bauer had helped to create it in the late 1920s. In the years after the National Socialists’ rise to power, the Wehrmacht expanded rapidly and, as a result, able officers were in great demand to take command of the newly-created German army units. Consequently, the military advisers leaving Chinese service could no longer be substituted by other German officers and the size of Chiang Kaishek’s advisory corps slowly but steadily shrunk to some sixty members in 1936 and to forty-five members in 1937. However, the disillusioned Great War veterans and right-wing anti-Weimar Republicans among the German military advisers had become fewer and fewer. Many, if not most of them, were in China because they had been in trouble at home. Some had Jewish ancestry, some had been suspected of left-wing leanings or had spoken against the new government, while others had probably incurred the enmity of some powerful National Socialist Party member789. Since Hans von Seeckt had alone decided which military advisers were to be elected for service in China when he was still the head of the advisory corps790, some people actually assumed that he intentionally chose non-Aryan officers to protect them from the ever-increasing anti-

785 Andersson, Lennart (2002) Chinese Aviation until 1949, [Unpublished]. 786 Iwaki, Hitoshi (Ed.) (1993) Chūgoku-Tairiku no 1914 – 1945 Kikaikasensō to Heiki, Tokyo: Delta Publishing, p. 102. 787 MA, N 246/137, Nachlaß Falkenhausen, on Oberst Erwin Topf überarbeitete und erweiterte Fassung der Memoiren von Alexander von Falkenhausen, Band 3: Kapitel 9 – 11, p. 42, and Schenke, Wolf (1940) Reise an der Gelben Front; Beobachungen eines deutschen Kriegsberichterstatters in China, Oldenburg/Berlin: Gerhard Stalling Verlagsbuchhandlung, p. 58. 788 Drage, Charles (1958) The Amiable Prussian, London: Anthony Blond, p. 117. Charles Drage quotes Walter Stennes, a German officer in Chiang Kaishek’s service. 789 Ibid., p. 118. 790 Bloß, Hartmut (1976), p. 410.

199 Semitism of the Third Reich791. Among them were Major Robert Borchardt, who organised the training of the first motorised units of the Nationalist army and fought alongside his troops against the Japanese, and Second Lieutenant Klaus von Schmeling-Diringshofen. Both, being of Jewish descent, had been discharged from the Wehrmacht due to the recently-enacted racial laws792. However, most military advisers were still retired senior officers living off a small pension, impressed by the generous salaries offered by the Nanjing government for their professional knowledge. Unmarried staff officers could earn between 500 and 550 Shanghai dollars. When they were accompanied by their wives, they received another 100 Shanghai dollars more793, which was a small fortune in Germany at the time. Living quarters and domestic services were free for unmarried officers and heavily subsidized for officers with wives. Housed in a separate colony in Nanjing, built for them specifically on the orders of Chiang Kaishek, the military advisers and their families kept to themselves and hardly mingled with other German expatriates794. However, as could be seen from the reports about property losses after the Japanese occupation of Nanjing in 1938, most of the officers had also acquired private houses and automobiles. The German military advisers’ employment contracts, issued in the name of ‘[the] Chinese government, represented by the Marshall and the Head of the Military Committee’795, had basically remained the same, but still contained several important clauses. Article 2 stated that the employee ‘[committed] himself, in accordance to his knowledge and abilities, to work for China’s benefit for as long as this contract [was] valid, to obey the orders of the advisor general or his representative and not to abuse the position of trust embodied by his engagement neither during nor after his employment’, while Article 10 added that the employee ‘[was] not allowed to receive commisions or payments from industrial or trading companies, neither abroad nor in China, which have business relations with the Chinese government. The acceptance of

791 Rigg, Bryan Mark (2003) Hitlers jüdische Soldaten, Paderborn (et al.): Ferdinand Schöningh, p. 121, footnote 65. 792 Ibid., p. 121. Strangely enough, many of the Jewish military advisers returned to Germany in 1938 and were reintegrated into the Wehrmacht without any kind of discrimination. 793 MA, Msg 160/10, Anstellungsverträge des General (a.D.) Wilk als Militärberater in der chinesischen Regierung, 1932 und 1935. 794 Rabe, John (et al.) (2000) The Good Man of Nanking; The Diaries of John Rabe, New York: Vintage Books, p. xi. 795 MA, Msg 160/10, Anstellungsverträge des General (a.D.) Wilk als Militärberater in der chinesischen Regierung, 1932 und 1935.

200 payments for private activities, which [were] in relation to the employment, [were] equally prohibited’796. According to their contracts, the main tasks of the German military advisers were still the instruction of Chinese officers, the training and equipping of combat-ready army units , not only the elite Lehrbrigade, and the reform of the Chinese military system in general. Their activities were strictly limited to the offering of advice. They were in no position to give Chinese troops any orders797. Only a handful of the German military advisers had at least cursory knowledge of China, her people or her political and military situation when they had accepted their new jobs. Yet, all of them considered it as a professional challenge to help the Chinese build a strong and modern army to defend their homeland against internal and external foes. It became a challenge indeed. The British military attache to China, Lovat Fraser, pointed out that the German military advisers – true specialists with a typically German predilection for absolute perfection – ‘too easily forgot that they were dealing with Chinese rather than German troops’798 when they tried to train them in accordance with the newest Wehrmacht training manuals which had been ordered by Alexander von Falkenhausen on Chiang Kaishek’s request799. Consequently, the general simplicity of the common Chinese soldier became a huge obstacle in the creation of a effective and modern army. It was strenuous to train troops to fight when they could not read and did not not have the most basic understanding of how, for example, their rifles worked. Even officers of the highest ranks, particularly the older ones, were lacking important technical knowledge and, more often than not, had absolutely no clue of how the combustion engines and cannons of the tanks in their own units worked800. Sometimes, however, the German military advisers had to face ridiculous situations when they tried to train their entrusted officers and troops. An almost unbelievable example of the prevalent unworldliness and awkwardness of some Chinese military leaders was an attempt by

796 Ibid. 797 MA, Msg 160/5, Einleitende Besprechungen des Generalberaters, General von Seeckt, mit Marschall Chiang Kaishek. Memorandum of Colonel-General von Seeckt, no place, no date. 798 Sutton, Donald S. (1982) German Advice and Residual Warlordism in the Nanking Decade: Influences on Nationalist Military Training and Strategy, in: China Quarterly (Number 91, 1982), pp. 407 f. 799 PA, R 31234, Ostasien Allgemein, Geheimakten der Abteilung IV, Band 4. General von Falkenhausen to unknown recipient, Nanjing, 5 February 1935. 800 Abegg, Lily (1940) Chinas Erneuerung; Der Raum als Waffe, Frankfurt am Main: Societäts-Verlag, p. 282. The American Major General Claire Chennault, who helped to train the Chinese Air Force around the same time, had to cope with similar problems. See Chennault, Claire L. (1949) Way of a

201 the advisers to practice nocturnal anti-aircraft defense with their unit. Initially, the Chinese officers could see absolutely no sense in doing such a thing, but then agreed to the proposal. Promptly, the next day, at nine o’ clock in the morning, the entire company was assembled with their anti-aircraft guns and searchlights for practice. All officers and troops were wearing dark sunglasses to simulate night conditions801. Yet, despite occasional setbacks, the German military advisers, not unlike most foreign observers, had many positive things to say about the typical Chinese soldier. ‘[He] readily absorbs instruction. He is resourceful and possesses initiative. […] [He] is faithful to the point of death to a leader who treats him with consideration. […] He appears to lack nerves. He is inured to privation and physical hardship, and he meets death with the same philosophical realism with which he faces life.’802 Unfortunately, the potential greatness of the Chinese soldiers was all too often offset by the inadequacy and miserable selfishness of their most senior officers and political leaders. Over the years, however, the German military advisers in Chinese service became more and more confused by and concerned about the dual Far East policies of the pro- Chinese Auswärtiges Amt and Wehrmacht and the pro-Japanese National Socialist government, especially after the signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact of 1936. They were basically training the armed forces of one treaty partner, China, to potentially fight against the armed forces of another treaty partner, Japan, and knew that this unfortunate situation could not go on forever. Sooner or later, Germany – and the advisers with her – had to make a definite and ultimate decision. One German officer in Chinese service, Captain Walter Stennes, had made up his mind already the moment he had travelled to the Far East. Walter Stennes, ‘[the] perfect type of adventurer, absolutely fearless, intelligent, physically a splendid specimen, and with an attractive personality’803, was never an actual member of the immediate German military advisory group. Instead, the Captain was attached to Chiang Kaishek’s personal staff and led his 400-man bodyguard, as well as a 3,000-man elite regiment which was responsible for the defense of the Generalissimo’s headquarters804. Later he also became the CGATS, the Chief of

Fighter; The Memoirs of Claire Lee Chennault, Major General, U.S. Army (Ret.), New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, p. xix. 801 MA, Msg 160/35, Ausbildungstätigkeit und soziale Verhältnisse in China. Unsigned memorandum (presumably written by Lieutenant-General Starke), no place, no date, and Abegg, Lily (1940), p. 283. 802 Carlson, Evans F. (1940) The Chinese Army; Its Organization and Military Efficiency, Westport: Hyperion Press, p. 11. 803 Utley, Freda (1939), p. 9. 804 Ruland, Bernd (1973), p. 195.

202 the Generalissimo’s Air Transport Squadron805, and commanded in this position Chiang Kaishek’s personal ten-plane air fleet. Walter Stennes had been a highly decorated World War I veteran and had founded the Freikorps Hacketau to fight against Russian Bolsheviks, German Communists and French-supported Rhineland separatists during the early years of the Weimar Republic806. Later, he became a member of the National Socialist Party and head of Berlin’s SA division. Disillusioned by Adolf Hitler’s policies, he participated in an early coup against the Führer, was arrested and deported instead of being executed, probably thanks to the intervention of friends in high places. In 1934, Walter Stennes finally entered Chiang Kaishek’s service and remained at his side until 1949, primarily because he never ceased to have ‘a deep and steadfast loyalty to the new China’807 and an admiration for the Generalissimo. ‘[Chiang Kaishek] was the greatest man I have ever known. Greater than Hitler? Yes, every time!’808

5.2.5 Nationalist China’s Military Situation Shortly before the outbreak of the actual Sino-Japanese War in July 1937, many foreign observers, especially journalists and other people with only superficial knowledge of military affairs, were convinced that Chiang Kaishek’s German military advisers had given him ‘one crack army […], completely equipped down to coal- scuttle helmets and goose step’809. However, for the various military attaches and officers of the armies of the colonial powers stationed in China it was quite evident that the Nationalist armed forces, as they were at the time, were only ‘good enough to make provincial warlords think twice about a break with [Nanjing] but […] hardly sufficient to tackle with the well-equipped conscript millions of Japan’810. Yet, the available numbers and statistics were indeed impressive. Between 1932 and 1937 alone, some 15,000 Chinese staff officers had listened to the lectures given by the German military advisers at the Nanjing War Academy. Including all the non- commisioned officers who frequently joined the German-supervised training units, around 90,000 Chinese military leaders had received at least parts of their martial

805 Drage, Charles (1958), p. 115. Charles Drage, a British Navy officer, worked for British intelligence in China between 1932 and 1936 and was a personal acquaintance of Walter Stennes. See also Elphick, Peter (1997) Far Eastern File; The Intelligence War in the Far East, 1930 – 1945, London: Coronet Books. 806 Venner, Dominik (1989) Ein Deutscher Heldenkampf; Die Geschichte der Freikorps 1918 – 1923; Söldner ohne Sold, Kiel: Arndt Verlag, pp. 257 f. and p. 307, and Thomas, Robert & Pochanke, Stefan (2001), Handbuch zur Geschichte der Deutschen Freikorps, München: MTM Verlag, p. 158. 807 Drage, Charles (1958), p. 12. 808 Ibid. 809 Chennault, Claire L. (1949), p. 40. The popular term ‘coal-scuttle’ referred to the particular shape of the German World War I and World War II helmets. 810 Ibid.

203 knowledge from the German military advisers811. These officers now partially commanded China’s more than 2 million men under arms, which had been split up into some 200 divisions812. The actual troop strength of these divisions frequently varied. While Chiang Kaishek’s modern divisions usually had 15,000 men under arms, others had only between 2,000 and 10,000 men813. This enormous army was roughly divided into two different parts – governmental and provincial troops. The governmental troops included the so-called central divisions, all those units which had been created by Chiang Kaishek and which had been trained and equipped according to modern guidelines, as well as those units which had been integrated into the Guomindang army since, for example, the Northern Campaign. According to official sources from 1937814, there were hardly any provincial troops left. All had allegedly been disbanded or equally integrated into the Nationalist army. The truth, however, was that a large part of Chiang Kaishek’s armed forces still came from provinces like Guangdong, Shandong, Sichuan or and regarded itself as semi-independent. It was therefore quite obvious that, at a closer look, there were huge discrepancies, even contradictions in the organisation of the Nationalist army. Still, too many internal reports glossed things over so that in the end nobody truly knew how many troops were available, how well they were trained and how reliable they were. In 1937, the reorganisation the ‘Generalissimo’s Own’815 within the Nationalist armed forces, forty divisions with some 300,000 soldiers, had been finalized after the German model816. Eight of these divisions had been directly trained by the German military advisers and equipped with weapons delivered by the HAPRO817. Among these eight units was also the original Lehrbrigade, which had been expanded to regimental size and, in 1930, renamed First Training Division. A Second Training Division was later formed from the instructional corps of the Nanjing War Academy. Later redesignated as 87th and 88th Divisions, these two units were the elite of the Nationalist army. Accompanied by German military advisers on a regular basis, their

811 Martin, Bernd (1986) Das Deutsche Reich und Guomindang-China, 1927 – 1941, in: Kuo, Heng-yü (Ed.) (1986) Von der Kolonialpolitik zur Kooperation; Studien zur Geschichte der deutsch- chinesischen Beziehungen, München: Minerva Publikation, p. 363. 812 Abegg, Lily (1940), pp. 148 f. 813 The actual troop number of the Nationalist army is all too often hard to establish since many commanders exaggerated the size of their units to receive more pay from Nanjing which then promptly disappeared into their own pockets. 814 Abegg, Lily (1940), p. 148. 815 Carlson, Evans F. (1940), p. 30. 816 Liu, Frederick Fu (1956), pp. 99 ff. 817 Liang, Hsi-Huey (1978), p. 90.

204 soldiers were, however, not parade ground troops intended to impress visiting foreign dignitaries, but actually Chiang Kaishek’s best and most loyal fighters. The forty core divisions of the Nanjing’s armed forces had the best and most modern weapons and equipment. Each squad of their infantry units, for example, had several 6.5-millimetre automatic rifles and 7.9-millimetre machine guns, imported from Germany, Denmark, Great Britain, Russia, Czechoslovakia or the United States, and provided its own light artillery support with 3.7-centimetre cannons and trench mortars818. To improve cooperation between the various army units, considerable attention had also been devoted to the development of radio communication. Each division now had its own radio net, as had each potential war zone. The heavy artillery of the immediate Guomindang forces consisted of cannons and howitzers which ranged in calibre from 7.5 to 15.5 centimetres, while various types of highly-mobile 3.7-centimetre guns were used for anti-tank warfare819. Still, artillery, or rather its continued relative lack, remained one of the biggest weaknesses of the Chinese army. Although Chiang Kaishek had acquired a large number of modern cannons during the previous years, the artillery, compared to the infantry, had generally been neglected. The few existing artillery units, somehow misconceived as an elite by the military leadership, had not been incorporated into the regular divisions of the Nationalist army, as this was done in other armed forces around the world, but were treated as separate units. As a result, artillery units became too independent and were not available when they were most urgently needed during the Japanese invasion. Compared to Chiang Kaishek’s elite, the provincial troops, which made up the remaining 160 divisions of the Nationalist armed forces, were only slightly better armed and equipped than the warlord armies of the early and mid-1920s. Corruption was ever-present within their upper ranks and all too often the money provided to pay the soldiers or buy their military equipment was diverted into the pockets of their officers. Consequently, besides an incompetent and dishonest leadership, the provincial troops had low moral and hardly any discipline. Not only was their combat usefulness considered to be minimal by the German military advisers, it was even expected that the provincial troops would be a hindrance and counterproductive to any upcoming military operation. Indeed, looking back in the years to come, many foreign

818 Carlson, Evans F. (1940), pp. 26 ff. 819 Ibid.

205 observers remarked that the Chinese armies could have been more successful against the Japanese ‘if they only had had half their size’820. However, outsiders usually forgot that Chiang Kaishek, when he started to create the modern Nationalist armed forces after the establishment on the Nanjing government, had to start almost from scratch. He had to tackle most trivial problems, problems which seldom occurred in Western armies, like largely uneducated, even illiterate recruits. All too often the Generalissimo had also to face internal opposition coming from the traditional military establishment which disliked change, especially to its own positions of power, and which prevented any attempt to disband redundant units or to dismiss incompetent officers. Its inflexible old generals, remnants from the earliest days of the Guomindang, still enjoyed a certain influence which Chiang Kaishek could not dare to ignore. Therefore he was forced to accept the status quo they demanded, even ignore their pathological corruption and cronyism, so they would not withdraw their support for him and his cause. Furthermore, the Nationalist army had been engaged in some sort of battle against warlords or Communists almost continuously from 1928 until 1936. Even with the help of his German military advisers, Chiang Kaishek could not work miracles. After years of civil war, China needed at least one or two decades of true peace to get its political situation organized, to regain its economic strength and to gather its military power. Yet, after the Xi’an Incident of December 1936 and the tenuous armistice between the Guomindang and the Communists, China would only get half a year.

5.2.6 The Military Advisers at War Since Alexander von Falkenhausen had entered Chinese service as head of the German military advisory group, he had known that the outbreak of a large-scale conflict between China and Japan was only a question of time. In one of his earliest memoranda for Chiang Kaishek he had already issued a stern warning. ‘The Chinese leadership will not be in the position to choose the moment of conflict. Therefore it is necessary to prepare oneself to be able to resist at any time with the means available for as long as possible and to use every spare moment to strengthen the power to resist.’821 Nevertheless, the longer outright war could be avoided, the better for China.

820 Abegg, Lily (1940), p. 147. 821 MA, N 246/7, Nachlaß Falkenhausen, Dienstliche Unterlagen der Beraterstelle in China, Band 1 (1935 – 1936). Memorandum of General von Falkenhausen, Nanjing, 12 August 1935.

206 Chiang Kaishek knew only too well that he had to wait a few years and get his forces ready if he was going to resist Japan successfully. ‘That’s why he gave way to them time and again until he should have built up his military strength.’822 Yet, the unexpeced events at Xi’an forced the Generalissimo to sign a ceasefire with Mao Zedong’s Communists to create a unified front to drive the Japanese invaders from the Chinese mainland. Seeing both their military accomplishments so far and their future offensive plans under serious threat, the Japanese instigated an incident on 7 July 1938 which would soon grow into the Sino-Japanese War. Immediately after the Japanese attack commenced, Chiang Kaishek dispatched his chief military adviser to northern China to oversee defensive operations. However, Alexander von Falkenhausen arrived too late and the Japanese had already been able to occupy Beijing and Tianjin with hardly any Chinese resistance. Initially the Generalissimo had doubted that his German military advisers would be willing to stay in Chinese service now that a war with an ally of the Third Reich was on. Alexander von Falkenhausen, however, gathered the entire advisory group for a discussion and received a declaration that every member was prepared to stay823. Then the military advisers returned to their staff duties or continued the training of their recruits at the various military academies. Only a few of them travelled to the combat areas to assess the situation and judge the performance of the Chinese troops. Alexander von Falkenhausen meanwhile, on orders of Chiang Kaishek, worked single-mindedly on a defence strategy. For the time being, he preached restraint to the Chinese military leaders until they saw the right opportunity to strike at the Japanese most effectively. In addition, the General proposed the idea of ‘trading space for time’824, trying to combine China’s vast territory with the Max Bauer- and Hans von Seeckt-taught concept of mobile warfare. Since the Japanese military forces were strong, but lacked long-term potential, they had to adopt the strategy of a quick and hopefully decisive war. The Chinese modus operandi was therefore intended to offset this strategy by dragging them into a prolonged war of attrition. China’s immense

822 Utley, Freda (1939), pp. 9 f. Freda Utley quotes Walter Stennes, a German officer in Chiang Kaishek’s service. 823 MA, RH 2/2939, Persönlicher Schriftwechsel. Military Attache Ott to Lieutenant-General von Tippelskirch, Tokyo, 6 November 1937. quotes from a conversation he had with Hans-Erich Nolte, one of the German military advisers. 824 Zhang, Baijia (1989) The German Factor in the Jiang Jieshi’s Government Strategy [sic] to Resist Japanese Aggression, in: [Anon.] (Ed.) (1989) Bulletin Faschismus/Zweiter Weltkrieg; Sonderheft 1989, Berlin: Zentralinstitut für Geschichte, p. 85. Frederick Fu Liu, however, attributes this slogan to General Bai Zhongxi. See Liu, Frederick Fu (1956), p. 104.

207 open battlefield indeed favoured evasion rather than direct confrontation. While the Nationalist army withdrew more and more into the country’s interior and the Japanese had to occupy an increasingly large territory with a limited number of troops, small and independent Chinese units could hit the enemy at any time and withdraw again, ‘accumulating minor successes into major victory’825. Critics of Chiang Kaishek and Alexander von Falkenhausen’s strategy of restraint, however, protested vehemently that the Chinese had already relinquished too much territory to the Japanese too quickly826 and that the time of shameful retreats was now finally over. Mao Zedong’s ubiquitous Communist agitators went even so far to interpret the Generalissimo’s entire plan of military operations as mere ‘cowardice’827. Contrary to what all detractors claimed, the Nationalist armed forces’ strategy for the defence of China required courage. Yet, ultimately it needed focus and discipline even more. Alexander von Falkenhausen and the other Geman military advisers had always advocated a war of movement and had trained the Chinese troops under their supervision exactly for this kind of warfare. However, eager to oppose the invaders and ignoring all what they had learned, units of Nanjing’s central divisions all too often clung to untenable positions in which they were decimated by superior Japanese firepower and in which they not only lost their best soldiers but also their most modern weapons and equipment. Troops and war materiels were almost impossible to replace. Furthermore, after the outbreak of hostilities certain semi-independent provincial units, especially those from Shandong and Sichuan, refused to obey orders from Chiang Kaishek’s headquarters828. Many of their soldiers deserted, while others, lacking decisive leadership, efficient training and adequate armaments, ran en masse into Japanese artillery barrage and machine gun fire and suffered horrendous losses. The situation started to look bleaker and bleaker for China. On 13 August 1937, the Japanese, in an attempt to escalate the conflict on the Asian mainland even further, opened a second front in Shanghai by launching a large- scale attack similar to their amphibious landing of 1932. Chiang Kaishek immediately decided to shift the major battleground of the war against the Japanese from northern China’s plains to the port city. Shanghai, he thought, was more suited for combat with the Japanese army than the wide-open spaces of northern China because the constricted area of the city would nullify the Japanese superiority in tanks, artillery

825 Liu, Frederick Fu (1956), p. 104. 826 Abegg, Lily (1940), p. 174. Lily Abegg was a correspondent for the Frankfurter Zeitung and a close observer of the early years of the Sino-Japanese War. 827 Schenke, Wolf (1937) Kampfplatz Ostasien; Politik und Soldaten an den Ufern des Gelben Meeres, Berlin: Verlagsanstalt Otto Stollberg, p. 90. 828 Abegg, Lily (1940), p. 148.

208 and logistical capabilities829. Furthermore, a Chinese attack on the Japanese settlement in Shanghai would divert Japanese attention from the north, enabling the Nationalist army there to strengthen its defences. For once, the Chinese people stood solidly behind their leader. Now China was fighting against an external enemy, struggling for her sovereignty and the freedom of her people. Swept up in a wave of patriotism, demonstrators chanted that ‘it is better to be broken Jade than whole tile’ and Chinese newspapers called out to ‘stand and fight; an end to compromise’830. Equally eager to fight, Chiang Kaishek dispatched seventy-one infantry divisions of Nanjing’s finest troops, numbering some 460,000 soldiers, to Shanghai to confront 200,000 Japanese army and navy troops and their 200 tanks and tankettes831. For the first time, Nationalist armed forces were ordered to fight the Japanese at close quarter and without any regard for losses. Chiang Kaishek was even prepared to sacrifice his best units, including his German-trained elite divisions, in this battle. This decision, which was very un-Chinese, was made for several reasons, including political ones. On the one hand, the Generalissimo wanted to overwhelm his enemy with sheer numbers and fierce determination to stop any further aggression. On the other hand, he wanted draw the attention and sympathy of the world, which witnessed the entire conflict from the safety of Shanghai’s foreigner quarters, and prove to the Western powers that the Chinese were serious in their fight for their freedom and worthy of international support. His gamble, however, did not pay off and the battle for Shanghai grew into the bloodiest struggle since Verdun832. Over the following three months, the soldiers of the Nationalist army, who had almost no heavy or aerial support of their own, repeatedly attacked the Japanese soldiers and marines who enjoyed, depite blatant numerical inferiority, a superiority in artillery, tanks and aviation. However, what the Japanese lacked, and the Chinese definitely had, was offensive power in hand-to-hand combat. The heroism and determination of the Nationalist troops surprised foreign observers present at the fierce street battles who had judged the combat efficiency of the Chinese soldiers solely based on their previous performance during the battles of the warlord period.

829 Eastman, Lloyd E. (1991) Nationalist China during the Sino-Japanese War, 1937 – 1945, in: Eastman, Lloyd E. (et al.) (1991) The Nationalist Era in China 1927 – 1949, Cambridge (et al.): Cambridge University Press, p. 119. 830 Chennault, Claire L. (1949), p. 42. 831 Tomczyk, Andrzej M. (2002) Japońska Broń Pancerna; Japanese Armor Volume 1 [Tankpower (Volume 9)], Gdansk: AJ-Press, p. 105. 832 Liu, Frederick Fu (1956), p. 104.

209 Even the Japanese superiority in tanks and armoured cars became negligible – at least initially – since the Chinese made good use of their German-delivered 3.7-centimetre anti-tank guns and of carefully placed mines833. In stark contrast to Georg Wetzell’s inactivity of 1932, Alexander von Falkenhausen and his military advisory group tried to directly aid the Nationalist armed forces during the second battle of Shanghai. The personal support of the German officers, wearing Chinese uniforms834, gave the Chinese soldiers the moral boost they so desperately needed. Since most of the troops fighting in Shanghai had been trained by them and many of the operational plans had been partially devised by Alexander von Falkenhausen and his colleagues, the military advisers felt obliged to at least supervise the battle. They were employees of the Nanjing government and were paid to work for China’s best interests. Orders from Germany not to participate in any military action or possible international criticism were only secondary. Joachim von Ribbentrop of the National Socialist government had indeed prohibited the military officers from being actively involved at the frontlines. The military advisers, however, agreed that, being privately employed, they would stand by the side of their Chinese friends835. Alexander von Falkenhausen himself said, ‘I sent my people to the various fronts and was myself busy for a while on the Northern Front’836. Consequently, although the military advisory staff had officially been relocated to Nanchang, eighty-seven German officers837 were present at the various battles, sometimes actively participating or allegedly even leading Chinese troops. These included General Alfred Streccius, Captain Oscar von Boddien, Major General Hermann Starke and Captain Wilhelm Lorenz in the combat zones along the Jinpu and Pinghan railway lines and Brigadier Kurt Spemann and Second Lieutenant Franz Hummel at the Shanxi front838. At least five German officers were active in Shanghai.

833 MA, RH 2/1848 Fremde Staaten: Allgemeines, Gesamtstreitmacht des Auslandes, Fremde Staaten, Heere und Flotten – Organisation, Gliederung, Stärke, Ausbildung und dgl. der Streitkräfte des Auslandes, Chinesisch-japanischer Krieg. Memorandum of the Army High Command, Berlin, 15 March 1938. 834 Liang, Hsi-Huey (1978), p. 93. 835 MA, N 246/137, Nachlaß Falkenhausen, Von Oberst Erwin Topf überarbeitete und erweiterte Fassung der Memoiren von Alexander von Falkenhausen, Band 3: Kapitel 9 – 11, p. 47. 836 Walsh, Billie K. (1974) The German Military Mission in China, 1928 – 1939, in: Journal of Modern History (Number 46, September 1974),, p. 509. Billie Walsh quotes from Alexander von Falken- hausen’s mimeographed autobiographical notes, Von Falkenhausen 1922 – 45. 837 ADAP, Serie D, Band I, Document 487. Ambassador von Dirksen to Auswärtiges Amt, Tokyo, 21 September 1937. 838 MA, N 218/1, Nachlaß Starke, Mein Kommando zur Kampfzone I in China (Mittelgruppe der Nordfront) 22. 9. 1937 – 17. 10. 1937. Memorandum of Lieutenant-General Starke, no place, no date.

210 Alexander von Falkenhausen himself served as an observer behind Shanghai’s frontline839, offering tactical advice and and helping planning military operations there, but two military advisers had allegedly been seen fighting in Shanghai’s frontline840. One of the many offensives against the Japanese was directed by Walter Stennes, the ‘strapping’841 commander of Chiang Kaishek’s bodyguard. He and his soldiers attacked Japanese positions by night, so the Japanese would not be able to use their heavy artillery. However, due to a lack of troop reserves and ammunition, this Chinese offensive failed after some initial success842. Walter Stennes and another German military adviser went on to direct limited Chinese artillery fire from a observation post on the roof of the Palace hotel in Shanghai’s international settlement. Yet, after vociferous Japanese protests, the topmost level of the hotel had to be closed843. Foreigners in Shanghai were indeed caught in a bizarre world. Safe in their secluded and protected quarters, they could visit restaurants and bars and watch how Japanese and Chinese soldiers killed each other in the rest of the port city. Hans-Otto Meißner, a German diplomat in Shanghai at the time, witnessed that on some evenings German officers, clad in Chinese uniforms, visited a certain dance cafe in the international settlement for a drink before returning to the frontlines where they fought side by side with the soldiers they had trained844. However, if the German military advisers were indeed present in the frontlines, this did not automatically mean that they were actually participating in the battle. Most of the time their presence in the combat zone was rather part of their task as supervisors of the Chinese troops they had instructed and additionally served to gather essential information to deliver objective reports back to Chiang Kaishek845. The military advisers could influence the actual decision-making process only on a small scale. Alexander von Falkenhausen and some of his colleagues were present at all of

839 MA, N 246/137, Nachlaß Falkenhausen, Von Oberst Erwin Topf überarbeitete und erweiterte Fassung der Memoiren von Alexander von Falkenhausen, Band 3: Kapitel 9 – 11, p. 43. 840 ADAP, Serie D, Band I, Document 487. Ambassador von Dirksen to Auswärtiges Amt, Tokyo, 21 September 1937. 841 Chennault, Claire L. (1949), p. 58. 842 Ibid. 843 Drage, Charles (1958), p. 125. 844 Ruland, Bernd (1973), pp. 180 f. Bernd Ruland quotes from Hans-Otto Meißner’s autobiography, So schnell dreht sich die Welt. 845 Chen, Chern (1996) Die Beziehungen zwischen China und Deutschland in den dreißiger Jahren unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Perzeptions-, Interessen- und Aktionsstrukturen der nationalchinesischen Regierung, München: Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität, p. 111.

211 the Generalissimo’s staff meetings where they could make suggestions. Still, the ultimate decisions were made by Chiang Kaishek alone. Alexander von Falkenhausen tried, in vain of course, to keep his and his advisory group’s activities as secret as possible from the German authorities and the rest of the world. Strangely enough, Ambassador Oskar Trautmann, wittingly or unwittingly, helped to cover up the German officers’ presence in Shanghai in various press statements and reports to the Auswärtiges Amt846. ‘The German advisers have never joined the fighting and will not join in the future.’847 Yet, the involvement of the German officers in the battle for Shanghai was simply too well known848. The Japanese even tried to stop Alexander von Falkenhausen from aiding the Chinese by trying to kill him. Usually the General drove to the frontlines around nine o’ clock in the morning, but one day he had gone there earlier. Precisely at nine o’ clock, several Japanese fighter planes strafed a car on the road he commonly used, but its passenger was actually the British ambassador who was wounded in the attack. The Japanese military apologized profusely, stating openly that they had mixed up the British car with Alexander von Falkenhausen’s849. However, if Alexander von Falkenhausen was able to contribute some strategic advice to the battle of Shanghai, his tactical advice, based on his observations at the frontline, was largely disregarded850. Some of his suggestions, for example that the Nationalist artillery divisions should try to neutralize the Idzumo and other Japanese warships anchored along the Yangzi River, which were used as floating artillery batteries to pound the Chinese positions, were simply ignored851. The officers of the non-integrated Nationalist artillery units stationed their 15-centimetre howitzers wherever they wanted and withdrew at the first sign of danger. Although one side of the river was firmly in Chinese hands, they did not dare to shoot so as to avoid any return fire which could have damaged or destroyed their cannons852. The best Nationalist artillery unit, the fully-motorised 13th Heavy Artillery Regiment, had only ten casualties during the entire Shanghai campaign853, a fact which proves how little action it saw despite the desperate need for artillery support.

846 ADAP, Serie D, Band I, Document 490. Ambassador Trautmann to Auswärtiges Amt, Nanjing, 23 September 1937. 847 PA, R 104863, Politische Abteilung VIII – China, Po 13, Militärangelegenheiten in China. Ambassador Trautmann to Auswärtiges Amt, Nanjing, 24 September 1937. 848 Fox, John P. (1982) Germany and the Far Eastern Crisis 1931 – 1938; A Study in Diplomacy and Ideology, Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 244. John Fox also states that ‘Alexander von Falkenhausen’s command of operations on the Shanghai front was well known in British circles’, but, unfortunately, does not deliver a source. 849 MA, N 246/137, Nachlaß Falkenhausen, Von Oberst Erwin Topf überarbeitete und erweiterte Fassung der Memoiren von Alexander von Falkenhausen, Band 3: Kapitel 9 – 11, pp. 47 f. 850 Kirby, William C. (1984), p. 222. 851 MA, N 246/8, Nachlaß Falkenhausen, Dienstliche Unterlagen der Beraterstelle in China, Band 2 (1937). Memorandum of General von Falkenhausen, Nanjing, 21 July 1937. 852 Abegg, Lily (1940), p. 152. 853 Schenke, Wolf (1940), p. 28.

212 In the long run, despite extensive training and modern armament, Nanjing’s central divisions could not stand up against the Japanese army. This was not the fault of the regular soldiers, who demonstrated true fighting spirit and a willingness to make sacrifices, but of the upper echelons of the Chinese military’s leadership854. Too many Nationalist officers, both young and experienced ones, lost their nerve and made fatal mistakes. Often fighting troops were withdrawn without reason and, as a result, many important positions were lost to the Japanese. In other cases, soldiers in untenable and absolutely irrelevant positions were not allowed to retreat and died useless deaths. The ultimate Chinese losses exceeded everyone’s worst expectations. Between 13 August and 15 December 1937, the day of the Nationalist army’s defeat, at least one third of the central divisions was lost, with some estimates ranging as high as sixty percent855, including ten percent of the entire German-trained officer corps856. While Japan’s casualties, both dead and wounded, numbered about 40,000 men, the Chinese casualties, however, ran well over 100,000857. Shanghai witnessed the destruction of the majority of Chiang Kaishek’s elite units, among them the famous 88th Division. It was a true tragedy. In a matter of three months, the work of almost ten years and five heads of the German military adviser group to strengthen China’s armed forces had been undone. Still, Nanjing’s Minister of Finance, T.V. Soong, commented defiantly that ‘fortunately, if it proved anything, the grim struggle at Shanghai has shown that Chinese soldiers can fight against great odds and that for national independence they know how to die’858, while Alexander von Falkenhausen received the Order of the Cloud Flag, Second Class, with Grand Cordon for his participation in the battle for Shanghai859. Walter Stennes and four other German military advisers also received medals for their accomplishments860. Chiang Kaishek soon began to withdraw the remnants of his best units to China’s interior, including those troops whose equipment, like anti-tank guns, was essential to continue the fight against the Japanese861. This was all part of the Generalissimo’s

854 Ibid., p. 190. 855 Falkenhausen, Alexander von (1974) Memoires d’ outre-guerre; Comment j’ai gouverné la Belgique de 1940 à 1944, : Lucien de Meyer, pp. 73 f. 856 Tuchman, Barbara (1978), p. 214. 857 Carlson, Evans F. (1940), p. 18. Other sources estimate Chinese losses to have reached an almost unbelievable 270,000. See Tomczyk, Andrzej M. (2002), p. 105. 858 Ibid., p. 18. 859 Liang, Hsi-Huey (1978), p. 127. 860 ADAP, Serie D, Band I, Document 487. Ambassador von Dirksen to Auswärtiges Amt, Tokyo, 21 September 1937. 861 Schenke, Wolf (1940), p. 46.

213 plan to bring soldiers and war materials to a safe place, way out of range of the Japanese Air Force’s bombers, where they would wait for a better opportunity to face their superior enemy. Their slow retreat was covered by the less important provincial troops. Demoralised and insufficiently armed as they were, these troops were in no condition to attack the Japanese army’s vulnerable southern flank when it continued on its winning streak after its victory at Shanghai and advanced against the capital Nanjing, although the German military advisers had urged Chiang Kaishek to do so. They hardly put up any resistance during the defense of Nanjing either. In the meantime, the Third Reich had offered to mediate a peace agreement between China and Japan. As additional support for this difficult undertaking, the National Socialist government wanted to use the prestige and influence the German military advisers enjoyed in the Far East862. Chiang Kaishek’s German officers were ordered to convince the Chinese leaders that their armed forces were in no way prepared for a prolonged war and that continued resistance against Japan was futile863. Alexander von Falkenhausen, however, was afraid that any kind of peace negotiations could weaken the Chinese people’s determination to save their country from Japanese aggression and lead them to accept the all-too-humiliating peace terms864. Then again, he also thought that the time could be right to conclude an armistice with Japan. Under the prevalent circumstances, any continuation of resistance was suicide. In the end, having the bigger picture in mind, Alexander von Falkenhausen hoped to use the peace to regroup the Nationalist army and resume the fight against the Japanese aggressors at a later date865. In their present condition, he stated, the Chinese only could continue the war for another six months – with the right tactics, sufficient supplies and as long as the morale of their troops could be kept up866. Oskar Trautmann and the other German diplomats in China were not nearly as optimistic867. Nevertheless, particularly after the Sino-Japanese peace negotiations had ended without tangible results, Chiang Kaishek was prepared to keep up China’s resistance

862 Presseisen, Ernst L. (1969), p. 131. 863 Dirksen, Herbert von (1949) Moskau Tokio London; Erinnerungen und Betrachtungen zu 20 Jahren deutscher Außenpolitik 1919 – 1939, Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, p. 191. 864 Fu, Pao-Jen (1989), p. 184. 865 Peck, Joachim (1961) Kolonialismus ohne Kolonien; Der deutsche Imperialismus und China 1937, Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, p. 107. Joachim Peck quotes from Ambassador Trautmann’s telegraph to the Auswärtiges Amt, sent on 18 November 1937. 866 ADAP, Serie D, Band I, Document 548. Ambassador Trautmann to Auswärtiges Amt, Hankou, 31 December 1937. 867 Ibid.

214 against Japan. Walter Stennes informed the German embassy that ‘the Marshal follows Japan’s internal and financial situation and tries to drag out the war due to the high financial costs it poses for Japan’868. To Oskar Trautmann, Chiang Kaishek himself said that he had to fight on869. One of the Chinese armed forces’ very few battlefield victories in the continuing Sino-Japanese War occurred at the small town of Taierzhuang in Shandong province on 7 April 1938. In accordance with the tactical plans of the German military advisers870, Taierzhuang’s desperate defence against two advancing Japanese heavy divisions was turned into a furious coordinated counterattack, with General Li Zongren’s numerically superior army of reinforcements called in to cut off the enemy in the rear. First utilising night attacks to nullifiy Japanese air supremacy and pounding Japanese troops with their German 15-centimetre howitzers, the Chinese soldiers continued surrounding and destroying the Japanese divisions’ forty tanks and seventy armoured cars with their German 3.7-centimetre anti-tank guns. Finally the remaining Japanese troops were defeated after fierce hand-to-hand fighting during which both sides used every weapon at hand, even swords871. The Japanese left some 16,000 casualties on the battlefield872. Alexander von Falkenhausen wrote an enthusiastic report on the Battle of Taierzhuang. ‘Despite material inferiority, the Chinese succeeded in defeating the Japanese in a devastating fight. Once again the Japanese had declared, as often before, that they would deliver a virtual Tannenberg873. Once again they failed. The impact of this battle is more far-reaching than just militarily. It was the first devastating battle in this war and the first clear defeat of the Japanese army since its creation.’874 The Chinese people, understandably, were equally overjoyed. They recognized that Japanese were not invincible after all. New hope swept away the previous pessimism875.

868 Peck, Joachim (1961), p. 110. Joachim Peck quotes from Secretary Fischer’s telegraph to Ambassador Trautmann, sent on 29 November 1937. 869 Peck, Joachim (1961), p. 137. Joachim Peck quotes from Ambassador Trautmann’s telegraph to the Auswärtiges Amt, sent on 21 December 1937. 870 MA, N 246/9, Nachlaß Falkenhausen, Dienstliche Unterlagen der Beraterstelle in China, Band 3 (1938). Memorandum of General von Falkenhausen, Hankou, 1 April 1938. 871 Schenke, Wolf (1940), pp. 251 ff., and Bonavia, David (1995) China’s Warlords, Hongkong (et al.): Oxford University Press, p. 125. Wolf Schenke was an eyewitness of the Battle of Taierzhuang. 872 Tuchman, Barbara (1978), p. 236. 873 The Battle of Tannenberg in August 1914 was an almost legendary and highly glorified victory of the German army over numerically superior Russian forces. 874 MA, N 246/9, Nachlaß Falkenhausen, Dienstliche Unterlagen der Beraterstelle in China, Band 3 (1938). Memorandum of General von Falkenhausen, Hankou, 11 April 1938. 875 Tuchman, Barbara (1978), p. 236.

215 Having witnessed the Japanese army in action for an extended period of time, Alexander von Falkenhausen developed an extremely low opinion of its actual fighting strength. ‘I do not exaggerate […] when I say that I’m convinced that two or three German divisions could drive the Japanese out of China within only short time.’876 He also added that ‘there can be no doubt that the fighting abilities of the Chinese soldier are far superior to the Japanese soldier’s’877 and was absolutely convinced of China’s ultimate victory. The General’s beliefs were shared by the majority of the German military advisers. An unnamed German officer proclaimed in an interview with the Hankow Herald on 28 August 1938 that ‘the Japanese invasion of China is similar to Napoleon’s advance on Moscow and will bring forth the same inglorious results. Japan will neither win this war nor will it gain the peace it hopes for because China will never accept any other conditions than its own’878. However, the Chinese had lost their first real advantage by failing to pursue their beaten enemies. Alexander von Falkenhausen was tearing his hair in frustration. ‘I tell the Generalissimo to advance, to attack, to exploit his success. But nothing is done.’879 Neither Chiang Kaishek nor the other Chinese military leaders had learned the lesson of their victory and immediately reverted to the apparently proven tactic of winning against the Japanese by outlasting them. “We can afford to lose four men if the Japanese lose one,’ [one high-ranking Chinese officer said], adding that Chinese losses would be of ‘no significance’ until they passed 50 million’880’. The German military advisers frequently objected to this approach to warfare881. Yet, the lack of a concerted defence policy continued, as did the vain sacrifice of Chinese troops, for example at Tongzhou and Langfang, where one of Chiang Kaishek’s elite units surrounded a Japanese brigade and attacked it repaetedly, but, having no proper artillery support, was repelled each and every time. ‘The time must come’, Chiang

876 MA, N 246/9, Nachlaß Falkenhausen, Dienstliche Unterlagen der Beraterstelle in China, Band 3 (1938). Memorandum of General von Falkenhausen, Hankou, 1 February 1938. Strangely enough, during an off-the-record talk to the San Francisco Press Club in late 1940, General Joseph Stilwell gave a similar comment. See Tuchman, Barbara (1978), p. 273. 877 MA, N 246/9, Nachlaß Falkenhausen, Dienstliche Unterlagen der Beraterstelle in China, Band 3 (1938). Memorandum of General von Falkenhausen, Hankou, 1 February 1938. 878 Groehler, Olaf (1989), p. 106. 879 Tuchman, Barbara (1978), p. 236. 880 Ibid., pp. 236 f. 881 Liu, Frederick Fu (1956), p. 163.

216 Kaishek affirmed again and again, ‘when Japan’s military strength will be exhausted thus giving China the ultimate victory’882. Whatever happened on the frontlines all over northern and middle China or in the backrooms of the escaped Nanjing government, no matter how discouraged they felt, Alexander von Falkenhausen and the other German military advisers returned to doing their jobs as instructors of the Chinese armed forces883. ‘They were professional soldiers and they worked at their profession as a doctor or a lawyer works.’884 The Nationalist army, especially Chiang Kaishek’s elite units, had suffered incredible losses. These losses had to be replaced within the shortest time possible, but the efficiency of these divisions could not be restored to its former high mark with only a few hurried training sessions885. The troops which had actually been instructed by the German military advisers became fewer and fewer until they were a minority even within the elite units. Max Bauer and Hans von Seeckt’s initial plans of a small and effective Chinese army with only some thirty divisions had to be dropped under the pressure of China’s dire situation. Nationalist generals all over the country built new Nationalist armed forces of 120 divisions and none of them were good886. Yet, even the tragic losses of Shanghai and Nanjing had tactical and strategic benefits. After both cities had been given up, the Chinese were no longer forced to defend large cities under conditions in which the Japanese were better equipped. The Chinese could now truly turn the vastness of their country and their numerical supriority to their own advantage, avoiding open battle with the Japanese but constantly harrassing them with guerilla-style attacks887. Walter Stennes was once again optimistic. ‘In China your views must be synthetic and not analytical. Look at things in detail, it is all a mess and you would throw in your hand. Look at the whole picture and then you see that, after all, they are giving the Japanese an awful headache.’888 Alexander von Falkenhausen himself continued to write memoranda for Chiang Kaishek and the Chinese Supreme

882 Tuchman, Barbara (1978), p. 226. Barbara Tuchman quotes from Chiang Kaishek’s speech, held on 17 December 1937. 883 Chiang Kaishek continued to have the highest respect for the German military. He even sent his second son to Germany for his officer’s training where he served as second lieutenant in the 98th Jäger Regiment and participated in the occuption of Sudetia in October 1938, wearing a German uniform. See Seagrave, Sterling (1996), p. 320. 884 Drage, Charles (1958), p. 118. 885 Carlson, Evans F. (1940), p. 23. 886 Drage, Charles (1958), p. 129. 887 MA, Msg 160/8, Der chinesisch-japanische Krieg 1937 – 1938. Memorandum of General von Falkenhausen, Hankou, 6 April 1938. 888 Drage, Charles (1958), pp. 139 f.

217 Army Command, analyzing the military situation in every minute detail, trying to find patterns in the Japanese operations and suggesting countermeasures889, even when Chinese voices critical about the avtivities of the German military advisers were getting louder. ‘The German advisers erred [in various areas]. […] They were good drill sergeants, but this is not what we wanted and their conceptions and tactics were unsuitable in China.’890 In the meantime, the Sino-Japanese War was continuing unabated. Yet, with the Chinese being so weak, it was not a real war, but merely an ‘armed occupation’891. The Japanese army finally stopped its invasion of the Asian mainland not because it was met with fierce Chinese resistance, ‘but because it ran out of objectives’892. The battle for China remained a strictly one-sided war until the Japanese surrender to the Allies in the August of 1945893.

5.2.7 German and International Reactions In the early 1930s, the Auswärtiges Amt in Berlin, slowly and quite unvoluntarily, started to accept the fact that German military advisers were working for the Chinese government, most probably because its diplomats had realized that they had no authority whatsoever to stop their activities anyway. After Adolf Hitler and the National Socialists had risen to power in Germany and the economic relations between China and the Third Reich had expanded even further with the help of the HAPRO company, the Auswärtiges Amt carefully welcomed Chiang Kaishek’s employment of retired German officers like Hans von Seeckt since it was ‘in the interest of German policy’894. Pro-Chinese and, consequently, pro-military advisers sentiment grew even more after the escalation of Imperial Japan’s aggression towards her neighbour on the Asian mainland from 1932 onward. Well-informed by the daily newspapers and by various books, like those written by Lily Abegg, Roland Strunk or Wolf Schenke, the German population had always been

889 MA, N 246/9, Nachlaß Falkenhausen, Dienstliche Unterlagen der Beraterstelle in China, Band 3 (1938). Memorandum of General von Falkenhausen, Hankou, 30 May 1938. 890 Utley, Freda (1939), p. 8. Freda Utley quotes Eugene Chen, the former Chinese foreign minister. Still, Freda Utley was quite critical of Eugene Chen and his opinions. In her own words, ‘[he] felt he could run China much better than Chiang Kai-shek and was annoyed at what he considered the incompetence and the stupidity of the ruling Kuomintang group’. See Utley, Freda (1939), p. 13. 891 Tomczyk, Andrzej M. (2002), p. 104. Andrzej Tomczyk quotes Stefan Mossor, a Polish military theoretician of the time. 892 Ibid. 893 Sakai, Saburo (et al.) (2001) Samurai!, New York: ibooks, p. 47. 894 Rostek, Horst (1989), p. 119. Horst Rostek quotes Konstantin von Neurath, the head of the Auswär- tiges Amt.

218 outspokenly pro-Chinese, even when the issue of tangible German support for China, like the military advisers or arms deliveries, was hardly covered by the media. Indeed, one of the strongest German champions of China was the journalist and author Wolf Schenke895, who worked as Far East correspondent for the Völkischer Beobachter, the National Socialist Party’s own newspaper. Things gradually started to change after the signing of the German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Pact in late 1936. China, under attack by Japan, turned into an uncomfortable topic in the Third Reich. Among Germans, a certain irresoluteness developed about which side should be favoured in the conflict between the two nations. ‘[We] Germans admire the heroic and martial soul of the Japanese. […] For China, perhaps purely on an emotional level, one has more sympathies because, until today, it is still the weakest player in the power game in the Far East and it has to endure, without any defense, the strangers’ violations.’896 Yet, increasingly subjected to the control of the National Socialist government, journalists and other writers were soon no longer able to write objectively about China, Japan or the war. Germans, now unable to find out the truth about the Far East, were systematically bombarded with pro-Japanese propaganda. The pro-Japanese glossing-over of reality culminated in Minister of Propaganda Joseph Goebbels’ public accusation of China for practicing ‘barbaric warfare’ after the Nationalist army had been forced to destroy the Yellow River dykes to stop the merciless advance of the Japanese897, who were, in contrast, described as a ‘generically-related heroic people’898. Around the same time, the National Socialist government, particularly Adolf Hitler’s foreign political adviser, Joachim von Ribbentrop899, began to put pressure on the German military advisers in Chinese service. Compared to earlier years, there was hardly any international protest against the German military advisers in the Far East any more, most probably because any open criticism of their activities in Chiang Kaishek’s service would have indirectly

895 Wolf Schenke was also accused of being the ‘highest-paid Shanghai agent’ of the Third Reich’s secret service, the . See Wasserstein, Bernard (1999) Secret War in Shanghai; Treachery, Subversion and Collaboration in the Second World War, London: Profile Books, p. 228. 896 Wagner, Hans (1935) Die Brandfackel im Fernen Osten, Oldenburg/Berlin: Verlagsbuchhandlung Gerhard Stalling, pp. 7 f. Strangely enough, Hans Wagner ignores any military connection between Germany and China, just as he refuses to write about the already recognizable approach between the National Socialist government and Japan. France, on the other hand, is accused of being a friend of the Japanese, because of its ‘profitable arms dealings’ with Japan. See Wagner, Hans (1935), p. 24. 897 Briessen, Fritz van (1982) Deutsche Institutionen und Persönlichkeiten in China, in: Machetzki, Rüdiger (Ed.) (1982) Deutsch-chinesische Beziehungen; Ein Handbuch, Hamburg: Institut für Asienkunde, p. 78. 898 Schenke, Wolf (1971), p. 140. 899 MA, N 246/137, Nachlaß Falkenhausen, Von Oberst Erwin Topf überarbeitete und erweiterte Fassung der Memoiren von Alexander von Falkenhausen, Band 3: Kapitel 9 – 11, p. 47.

219 and unintentionally supported the Japanese aggressors and obstructed China’s fight for freedom. Nevertheless, these activities, albeit often misjudged, were well known in foreign governmental, diplomatic and military circles. As one British report put it, ‘Not only is Germany supplying arms and ammunition more abundantly than any other country but her military advisers are virtually running the war’900. Others were less gracious. The French government repeatedly contacted the Chinese embassy in Berlin and lamented the presence of the German officers in the Far East. It regretted China’s decision to employ German military advisers instead of French ones, allegedly primarily because the German advisers could be ‘very dangerous since they know all of China’s military secrets’901. However, many foreign newspapers and books, sometimes grudgingly, had to acknowledge the modest achievements of the German military advisers in China. Authors like Eric Teichman and Freda Utley, who was known for her leftist leanings902, even wrote quite positive comments on their activities. ‘No country could help China more than Germany. German military advisers, German patience and efficiency and technique, would perhaps be of greater assistance to China than the trickle of American and British credits which is all the help she has so far received.’903 The lack of international support for the Chinese people’s fight against the Japanese invaders was a particularly sore subject among foreign observers of the events in East Asia, especially each time Chiang Kaishek had complained about the little assistance China had received from the ‘’ during all the years of fighting, in spite of the fact that she had placed herself openly and irrevocably on their side904. The only nation to openly and fiercely attack Germany and the German military advisers was Japan, since she was also the only country to have – in her own eyes – a legitimate reason to do so. Early on the Japanese embassy in Berlin had pressured the Auswärtiges Amt to justify the fact that retired German officers like Hans von Seeckt had allegedly travelled to China to train the Nationalist army for a war against Japan905. Japanese protestations grew louder and more frequent after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, when the support of the German military advisers for the Chinese cause became increasingly apparent. Due to Alexander von Falkenhausen’s activities in Shanghai, the Japanese went even so far to dub the conflict on the Asian mainland as the ‘German War’906. Nevertheless, all Japanese accusations were categorically rejected by the Auswärtiges Amt and its diplomats907, even when they knew them to be true, since they stood in close contact with Chiang Kaishek’s military advisory corps. The German diplomats in China, most of all Ambassador Oskar Trautmann, had long ceased to be neutral

900 Fox, John P. (1982), p. 244. John Fox, unfortunately, does not deliver the source of this quote. 901 PA, R 85705, Abteilung IV – Politische Abteilung, Po. 13 China, Militärangelegenheiten, Band 9. Memorandum of Counsellor von Erdmannsdorff, Berlin, 4 December 1934. Counsellor von Erdmannsdorff quotes from a conversation he had with a Chinese diplomat. 902 Freda Utley, more commonly known as ‘Miss Ugly’ among her writer colleagues, was often harshly critisized for being a naive, almost servile Communist sympathiser. 903 Utley, Freda (1939), p. 294. 904 Causey, Beverley D. (1942) German Policy towards China, 1918 – 1941, Cambridge: Harvard University, p. 384. 905 ADAP, Serie C, Band II/2, Document 323. Memorandum of State Secretary Bülow, Berlin, 13 March 1934. 906 Fox, John P. (1982), p. 247. John Fox quotes from Ambassador von Dirksen’s telegram to the Auswärtiges Amt, sent on 27 October 1937. 907 ADAP, Serie D, Band I, Document 490. Ambassador Trautmann to Auswärtiges Amt, Nanjing, 23 September 1937.

220 and uninvolved observers of the war between China and Japan. Most of them, particularly those present in Nanjing during its occupation and subsequent Rape in late 1937908, had personally seen the Japanese invasion of China for what it was – an almost undescribable orgy of looting and unchecked brutality. There were several open and loud confrontations between German diplomats stationed in the Far East and the Japanese military authorities of the occupied territories. During a conversation with a Japanese general, a secretary of the German legation in Nanjing, Georg Rosen, deliberately used the phrase, ‘Since your troops so obviously got out of control…’ The general immediately flew into a rage, shouting ‘How dare you say so! We have the best-disciplined troops in the world!’ Georg Rosen, however, only dryly replied, ‘Oh, you mean to say they did that on orders?’909 Nevertheless, in regard to China, the Japanese in the end got whatever they wanted from Germany. Adolf Hitler’s National Socialist government, without even thinking, simply played into their hands.

5.2.8 The Recall of the German Military Advisory Group Ultimately, the almost schizophrenic dualism of the Third Reich’s Far East policy could no longer be sustained. The continued activities of China’s military advisers, who had come from a proclaimed and allegedly steadfast ally of Japan, caused more and more bad blood among the Japanese. However, the Japanese could also no longer tolerate the presence of German officers in Chiang Kaishek’s service for military reasons. They put the blame for the casualty-plagued battle for Shanghai in 1937 and the shameful loss at Taierzhuang in 1938 on the Germans as well, since they Germans had trained the Chinese army and had equipped it with modern weapons. Germany was increasingly frequently and insistently urged to withdraw the military advisers – as a ‘friendly gesture’910. The mood of many influential Chinese had also began to turn against the German advisers. They included Madame Chiang who had no longer great sympathy for Germany since it had concluded the Anti-Comintern Pact with Japan two years earlier911. Alexander von Falkenhausen and his colleagues were already quietly blamed for the continuing Chinese defeats912. Adolf Hitler realized that he had to choose between ‘losing China as a market and losing Japan as a military ally’913. In the end, he decided to sacrifice the Third Reich’s

908 MA, Msg 160/9, Büroangelegenheiten der Beraterschaft in Nanking, später Hankow, 1936 – 1938. German Embassy Hankou to Military Advisor Group, Hankou, 27 , and Rabe, John (et al.) (2000), p. 74. 909 Rabe, John (et al.) (2000), p. 211. 910 Presseisen, Ernst L. (1969), p. 130. Ernst Presseisen quotes Major General Eugen Ott, the German military attache to Japan. 911 Rabe, John (et al.) (2000), p. 8. 912 ADAP, Serie D, Band I, Document 564. Ambassador von Dirksen to Auswärtiges Amt, Tokyo, 26 January 1938. 913 Utley, Freda (1939), p. 8. Freda Utley quotes Eugene Chen, the former Chinese foreign minister.

221 interests in China, which had been only economic anyway, for its power-political and military interests in Japan. There was no dissent within the German governmental authorities. All pro-Chinese sympathizers in the Auswärtiges Amt and the Wehrmacht had already been dismissed after the failed attempt to mediate between warring China and Japan. Joachim von Ribbentrop, now promoted to German foreign minister, immediately issued a statement that ‘in regards to the Sino-Japanese conflict the Führer had decided […] to discontinue everything which could disrupt or encumber Japanese objectives’914. On 13 May 1938, he also sent a telegram to Hankou, stating that the German government expected the military advisers still present in China to return ‘with the quickest possible speed’915. Ambassador Oskar Trautmann was to inform the Chinese government that the fact that the presence of the German officers in the Far East created the impression that Germany was ‘actively involved in China’s warfare’916 was now no longer compatible with the Third Reich’s need for neutrality in the Sino-Japanese War. In view of the traditional friendship between China and Germany, it was expected that the Chinese government would follow the German request to send Alexander von Falkenhausen and his colleagues home. The German military advisers, however, refused to comply. Within days after receiving Joachim von Rippentrip’s instructions, Alexander von Falkenhausen informed the German embassy in Hankou of the position of the German military advisory group917. The military advisers neither could nor wanted to return to Germany since their employment contracts were still valid until at least 1939 or 1940 and could not simply be cancelled by them or a third party, in this case the National Socialist government918. Furthermore, they all saw their continued activity as a matter of professional honour and would also not know what to do at home since employment by the Wehrmacht had been rejected already years earlier919. Alexander von Falkenhausen had also explicitely assured Chiang Kaishek that he intended to

914 Sommer, Theo (1962) Deutschland und Japan zwischen den Mächten 1935 – 1940; Vom Antikomintern-pakt zum Dreimächtepakt; Eine Studie zur diplomatischen Vorgeschichte des Zweiten Weltkrieges, Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), p. 66. 915 ADAP, Serie D, Band I, Document 583. Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop to German Embassy Hankou, Berlin, 13 May 1938. 916 Ibid. 917 ADAP, Serie D, Band I, Document 580. Ambassador Trautmann to Auswärtiges Amt, Hankou, 30 April 1938. 918 Fu, Pao-Jen (1989), p. 206. 919 ADAP, Serie D, Band I, Document 580. Ambassador Trautmann to Auswärtiges Amt, Hankou, 30 April 1938.

222 fulfill his contract920. The Generalissimo, too, intended to keep the German military advisers in his service, not only because he was satisfied with their achievements so far, but also because other foreign nations, their own interests in the Far East not really threatened by the Japanese921, were apparently not prepared to sufficiently support China in this time of desperate need. Annoyed by Chiang Kaishek and the German military advisers’ hesitancy and stalling tactics, Joachim von Ribbentrop sent more and more telegrams over the following weeks, each time requesting the immediate return of the obstinate officers. Oskar Trautmann, in return, asked the Foreign Minister to relent and to show more tact. The German recognition of Manchukuo, which also was already a fact, had been hard to digest for the Chinese. A withdrawal of the military advisers would now be further proof for Germany’s unconcealed support for Japan922. Joachim von Ribbentrop, however, completely lost his patience. On 20 June 1938, he sent a personal telegram to Alexander von Falkenhausen via the German embassy and commanded all German military advisers to leave China ‘as quickly as possible, even against the will of the Chinese government’923. Every military adviser resisting this direct order would be regarded as a traitor to the Fatherland, would lose the German citizenship and would have his personal property back home confiscated. There would also be serious reprisals against the families of military advisers who chose to remain in Chinese service924. The German foreign minister even dared to threaten China. ‘Whether Sino-German relations will continue or be cancelled by us depends on the solution of the military adviser problem.’925 Bullied into submission by the threat of unbearable repercussions against them and their families, Alexander von Falkenhausen and the other German military advisers ultimately obeyed the German government’s order. Chiang Kaishek understood and respected their decision. Since China wanted to continue friendly relations with the Third Reich, she would not insist on a continuation of the employment of the military

920 Ibid. 921 PA, R 104815, Politische Abteilung VIII – China, Po 2, Politische Beziehungen Chinas zu Deutschland, Band 2. Ambassador Trautmann to Auswärtiges Amt, Hankou, 20 January 1938. 922 ADAP, Serie D, Band I, Document 585. Ambassador Trautmann to Auswärtiges Amt, Hankou, 21 May 1938. 923 ADAP, Serie D, Band I, Document 564. Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop to German Embassy Hankou, Berlin, 20 June 1938. 924 Ibid. 925 Ibid.

223 advisers926. H.H. Kung, the Chinese Minister of Economics, organized a farewell dinner party for the German advisory corps and thanked the assembled officers for their years of service for China. Alexander von Falkenhausen added in a speech of his own that the military advisers ‘had done their best for the strengthening of the Chinese army, convinced that, by doing this, they would also serve the German Fatherland. We can look back with pride and contentment on our work and our achievements. It is not the Chinese government that dismisses us. Quite on the contrary, political reasons beyond our influence force us to return. Nevertheless, the fact that all Chinese governmental authorities and particularly the great leader of China, Marshal Chiang Kaishek, show us their respect and their gratitude and only let us go under coercion is the highest reward for our work, for the fulfillment of our duties and for our loyalty until the very end’927. On 5 July 1938, the last German military advisers left China on a train specially lent to them by the Chinese government – twenty-five advisors altogether, plus their families and servants. Nobody failed to see the irony that, having gone to China of their own free will and against the wishes of the German government, the German military advisers were now forced against their will and on orders of their government to leave China. Alexander von Falkenhausen928 took additional precautions that no German military adviser returned home via Japan929 to avoid them being forced or enticed to divulge sensitive information about China’s military affairs to Germany’s Japanese allies930. As a final farewell, he said, ‘I am convinced that China can gain the final victory if it stands united behind its leader, Chiang Kaishek, and keeps up its discipline’931. The Chinese media, too, tried to give the withdrawal of the advisory

926 ADAP, Serie D, Band I, Document 599. Ambassador Trautmann to Auswärtiges Amt, Hankou, 23 June 1938. 927 MA, Msg 160/9, Büroangelegenheiten der Beraterschaft in Nanking, später Hankow, 1936 – 1938. Memorandum of General von Falkenhausen, Hankou, 24 June 1938. 928 Alexander von Falkenhausen rejoined the Wehrmacht and became the military governor of Belgium and northern France during World War II. He participated in the unsuccessful assassination attempt against Adolf Hitler on 20 July 1944, was caught and sent to a concentration camp. He barely survived, only to be persecuted as a war criminal. Throughout all these years, Chiang Kaishek never lost contact with his last military adviser. 929 Liu, Frederick Fu (1956), p. 164. 930 Japan’s other ally, Fascist Italy, betrayed China without ever feeling guilty. In contrast to the German military advisers, the members of Chiang Kaishek’s small Italian aviation mission, which served in China at the same time, ‘did all they could to sabotage China’. When Benito Mussolini, too, submitted to Japan’s demands and withdrew the aviation advisers, they took with them all the aerial pictures they had taken of China for the Nationalist army and handed them over to the Japanese. See Chennault, Claire L. (1949), pp. 37 f. 931 PA, R 104863, Politische Abteilung VIII – China, Po 13, Militärangelegenheiten in China. German Consulate Hongkong to Auswärtiges Amt, Hongkong, 9 July 1938.

224 group a positive spin. ‘The parting of the German advisers will not have any negative repercussions on the Chinese military. It is war now, and it would not be proper to ask the advisers to participate in the operations.’932 Seven German military advisers – Major Walther Lindemann, Captain Walter Stennes, Captain Albrecht von Lamezan, Captain Bodo von Stein, Second Lieutenant Erich Stölzner, Second Lieutenant Wilhelm Zimmermann and Karl-Theodor Martin – chose to remain in China though. These men were either of Jewish descent or had Jewish wives, were still afraid of political persecution at home or had simply nothing or nobody to return to. They followed Chiang Kaishek to his provisional capital of in China’s interior and joined his slowly-emerging new American military advisory corps in more subordinate positions. Yet, in stark contrast to their earlier vociferous protestations, both the Japanese government and the Japanese press hardly registered the withdrawal of the German military advisers. In a few short reports in Japanese newspapers ‘no allusions to the necessity for the Japanese to return this favour could be found’933. A report of the German embassy in Tokyo, sent to the Auswärtiges Amt, summed up the sad state of relations between Germany and Japan. After the Third Reich had finally fulfilled all of Japan’s demands in regard to the Far East, ‘[it] is to be regretted that there are no indications of an attempt on Japan’s side to express her thanks practically. […] No privileges in the interest of Germany in connection with her [political and economic] losses in China [as previously promised by Japan] have so far been perceived’934.

5.3 Arms Trade 5.3.1 The Sino-German Arms Trade, 1934 – 1935 After Adolf Hitler and the National Socialists’ rise to power in 1933, the German army, then still called Reichswehr but on 15 March 1935 renamed Wehrmacht, could give up its countless small and clandestine weapons development and acquisition projects of the 1920s and expand its rearmament in the open, on a large scale and under the benevolent eye of the government. The German heavy industry, cooperating closely with the armed forces in some areas, also intended to use the fundamental

932 MA, N 246/9, Nachlaß Falkenhausen, Dienstliche Unterlagen der Beraterstelle in China, Band 3 (1938). Memorandum of General von Falkenhausen, Hankou, 26 May 1938. Alexander von Falkenhausen quotes from an unspecified article of the Ta Kung Pao. 933 PA, R 85697, Abteilung IV – Politische Abteilung, Po. 13 China, Militärangelegenheiten, Band 1. Counsellor Noebel to Auswärtiges Amt, Tokyo, 31 May 1938.

225 political change to regain and futher develop the position it had in the global economy before the Great War. Germany, however, was not, and would never be, self- sufficient but would have to acquire many essential raw materials on the international market. Some eighty-five percent of petroleum, eighty percent of iron ore, seventy percent of copper, ninety percent of tin, ninety-five percent of nickel and almost ninety percent of tungsten, which was particularly important for arms manufacturers to harden gun barrels, had to be imported from various sources abroad935. Yet, after more than a decade of economic depression and war reparations payments, the newly established Third Reich, and with it its army and industry, lacked money. There were simply not enough funds available for the government’s extraordinarily ambitious plans to rebuild, restructure and strengthen the whole of Germany. War-ravaged China, too, was in dire economic straits. Unable to improve its people’s livelihood without internal and external peace, Chiang Kaishek’s government laid out enormous sums each year, usually an average of forty-one percent of its annual budget936, for military purposes. To pay for these expenses, the Guomindang borrowed heavily by issuing bonds that paid investors a high rate of interest, however, more often than not it was unable to meet its debt obligations937. Still, China had some of the world’s richest deposits of internationally-demanded raw materials, including manganese ore, tin, tungsten and antimony, and soon she was exporting as much as she could to pay off her debts and to provide new means of payment for the acquisition of arms and ammunition. Only too aware of this unfortunate situation, individuals and institutions, both in Germany and China, tried to work out ways to solve the problems of the two nations as effectively and mutually beneficially as possible. The Ministry of the Reichswehr, backed up by the German industry, thought it best to create a dedicated umbrella corporation which could manage a cashless exchange of goods between Germany and China. German industrial products so desperately needed in the Far East, including war materials, would be delivered to China in return for various

934 Presseisen, Ernst L. (1969), p. 147. 935 Kirby, William C. (1984) Germany and Republican China, Stanford: Stanford University Press, p. 106. 936 Sheridan, James E. (1975) China in Disintegration; The Republican Era in Chinese History, 1912 – 1949, New York: Free Press, p. 222. 937 Ibid.

226 Chinese raw materials required for the expansion of the German industry, which then could increase the manufacture of weapons for the German army938. During a speech on 23 March 1933, Adolf Hitler emphasized that the Third Reich’s international trade had to have a ‘decidedly military economic character’939 to once gain strengthen Germany’s position within Europe. One of the priorities was to be ‘the acquisition of goods from abroad which were not or only insufficiently available’940 within the Third Reich. In support of this economic policy, Hjalmar Schacht, the German Minister of Finance, introduced his so-called ‘New Plan’ on 2 August 1934. To avoid Germany having to pay in cash, he proposed a foreign trade with ‘bilateral settlement’941, focussing on exporting German goods particularly to countries which had rich natural resources and on using the principles of barter trade and revolving credits. Hjalmar Schacht already had several possible business partners in mind, especially in Latin America and southeast Europe. The German army’s own plans in regard to China independently had followed this line of thinking. Remaining in close contact to ‘his’ Wehrmacht, which had expressly urged him to encourage Chinese purchases of German products942, General Hans von Seeckt, Chiang Kaishek’s chief military adviser, had already prepared the way. In his very first memorandum written for the Generalissimo, Hans von Seeckt had proposed detailed plans for the comprehensive reorganisation and modernization of China’s economy and military and had hinted at the possibility of German assistance. Since he was realistic enough to realize that the development of the necessary Chinese economic foundation would take years, he suggested German imports as a temporary solution, offering twice a market for the German industry coincident with Chinese requirements. Coupled with the needs of the Wehrmacht and the German industry and the lack of funds in both nations, Hans von Seeckt’s scheme once again dictated the creation of some kind of liaison company with the aim to centralise, streamline and further promote the exchange of goods between Germany and China, simply circumventing the established trading houses which still controlled and consequently obstructed large-scale Sino- German trade943. Thus, to ultimately create a ‘unified representation’944 on the

938 Drechsler, Karl (1989) Die Chinapolitik der Weimarer Republik und Hitlerdeutschlands 1920 bis 1939 – Grundlinien und Zäsuren, in: [Anon.] (Ed.) (1989) Bulletin Faschismus/Zweiter Weltkrieg; Sonderheft 1989, Berlin: Zentralinstitut für Geschichte, p. 18. 939 Volkmann, Hans-Erich (1975) Außenhandel und Aufrüstung in Deutschland 1933 bis 1939, in: Forstmeier, Friedrich & Volkmann, Hans-Erich (Eds.) (1975) Wirtschaft und Rüstung am Vorabend des Zweiten Weltkrieges, Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, p. 84. 940 Ibid. 941 Ibid., p. 90. 942 Seps, Jerry B. (1972) German Military Advisors and Chiang Kai-Shek, 1927 – 1938, Berkeley: University of California, p. 339. 943 Years later, the Auswärtiges Amt was not too unhappy about the exclusion of the trading companies since it had always tried to stop them, albeit unsuccessfully, from getting involved in the international armaments trade with China. See ADAP, Serie C, Band V/2, Document 495. Counsellor Fischer to Emissary von Erdmannsdorff, Nanjing, 4 August 1936.

227 German side, the Handelsgesellschaft für industrielle Produkte, HAPRO for short, was established on 24 January 1934. While Werner von Blomberg, the Minister of War, as well as Lieutenant General Walter von Reichenau and Colonel Georg Thomas of the Wehrmacht were the main protagonists behind the German army’s approach to China, the HAPRO as such was mainly the brainchild of Hans Klein, who had close contacts to many influential people in Berlin. Hans Klein was also a close acquaintance of Hans von Seeckt, who had initially suggested that his associate from the Reichswehr’s past secret rearmament projects should spearhead more intimate economic relations between China and the German industry and armed forces. Since Hans Klein owned ninety- nine percent of the HAPRO, it was legally a private enterprise and nobody on the outside, not even the ever-sceptical diplomats of the Auswärtiges Amt, could assume that its dealings with China had anything to do with the German army. From these relatively inconspicuous beginnings, the HAPRO soon became the chief agent of the Sino-German arms trade, not only supplying first-class German weapons and ammunition to Chiang Kaishek’s armies, but also armaments factories, engineers to supervise the installation of the necessary machinery and technical advisers who, alongside the military advisers, would instruct the Chinese soldiers how to use their new equipment. All this had been reached through private initiative, without any formal order from the Third Reich’s National Socialist government945. For once there was a harmonious cooperation between various factions within Germany in their economic and military relations with China. However, it was quite clear from the beginning that the de facto alliance between the Wehrmacht and the German industry – indirectly supported by Hjalmar Schacht’s Ministry of Economics – was only tolerated by Adolf Hitler and his National Socialist government for as long as they deemed it useful for their very own goals. Until the creation of the HAPRO, the trade with China had been a strictly private affair of German business people. However, from now on officials within Germany’s various governmental authorities took over the initiative and conducted Sino-German economic relations at least on a pseudo-official level. The result was a feverish expansion of the trade between the two nations. To develop this prosperous

944 Kirby, William C. (1984), p. 120. William Kirby quotes Colonel Georg Thomas, the head of the Wehrwirtschaftsamt, the Wehrmacht’s internal War Economics Office. 945 MA, Msg 160/59, ‘Die HAPRO in China; Ein Bericht über Entstehung und Entwicklung des deutsch-chinesischen Austauschvertrages 1930 – 1937’ von Walter Eckert 1981, p. 46.

228 commercial relationship even further, Chiang Kaishek decided, after long discussions, including with his chief military adviser Hans von Seeckt, to endorse the so-called HAPRO Treaty, also known as the ‘Trade Agreement on the Exchange of China’s Raw Materials and Agricultural Products for Germany’s Industrial and Other Products’946, which had been presented to him by the company. The treaty was signed by H.H. Kung, the Chinese Minister of Economics, and Hans Klein, the German delegate, on 23 August 1934. In it, both signatory parties agreed that ‘China and Germany were equally willing to cooperate closely and in friendship, as well as to strive together for the economic revitalisation of their respective nations and for the promotion of their trade’947. They also emphasized that ‘according to the goals of the agreement, the delivery of Chinese agricultural products and raw materials on the one hand and the delivery of German industrial and other various products on the other hand should foster the political growth of both countries and the flourishing of both nations and peoples’948. Also, as stipulated in the agreement, Germany offered Chiang Kaishek’s government a credit of 100 million Reichsmarks949, with which China was now able to buy various products from the German industry, including heavy machinery and railroad supplies, as well as weapons and other military equipment. China would instantly repay the credit by delivering raw materials, like copper, antimony or tungsten, and agricultural products, like wool or soy-based oils and fats950, to Germany. Several organisations in the respective countries were responsible for the implementation of the treaty – the HAPRO itself in Berlin and the Export Organisation of the Central Trust of China and the Import Organisation of the Office for Raw Materials of the Nationalist government in Nanjing.

946 PA, R 31249, Ostasien: China, Handel II No.3, Austauschgeschäfte und Wirtschaftsabkommen: Projekte Klein. Trade Agreement on the Exchange of China’s Raw Materials and Agricultural Products for Germany’s Industrial and Other Products, 23 August 1934. 947 Ibid. 948 Ibid. 949 The credit of 100 million Reichsmarks had been taken from the funds of the Wehrmacht. See Martin, Bernd (1984) Das deutsche Militär und die Wendung der deutschen Fernostpolitik von China auf Japan, in: Knipping, Franz & Müller, Klaus-Jürgen (Eds.) (1984) Machtbewußtsein in Deutschland am Vorabend des Zweiten Weltkrieges, Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, p. 196. Hartmut Bloß, however, states that the 100 million Reichsmarks were provided by Hjalmar Schacht. See Bloß, Hartmut (1976) Deutsche Chinapolitik im Dritten Reich, in: Funke, Manfred (Ed.) (1977) Hitler, Deutschland und die Mächte; Materialien zur Außenpolitik des Dritten Reiches, Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, p. 416. 950 The humble Chinese soybean had gained an enormous importance for the German economy since the end of World War I. It was used to produce margerine and cooking oil, while its husks were used as food for cattle or as fertilizer. See Mohr, F.W. (1920) Gedanken zur neudeutschen Chinapolitik, Neuwied am Rhein: Verlag der Strüderschen Buchdruckerei, p. 115.

229 Representatives and business people in Germany and China were euphoric about the trade agreement. Hjalmar Schacht sent a telegram to Chiang Kaishek, calling the treaty ‘the foundation for the creation of ever-lasting close relations between Germany and China’951. H.H. Kung told his German colleague that he would ‘use his full strength’ to ‘fulfil [the treaty] in [its] entirety’952. Nevertheless, the HAPRO Treaty remained classified as top secret. On the one hand, both the Chinese and German governments – Adolf Hitler had actually embraced the entire idea – did not want other nations to know about their rearmament efforts. On the other hand, the Wehrmacht, which was still the prime instigator behind the agreement, tried to hide the exchange of Germany’s war materials for China’s natural resources from the Auswärtiges Amt, whose outright condemnation would have been assured. ‘When pursuing Klein’s projects, every attempt must be made to avoid the impression that Mister Klein acts on official or semi-official orders. Any kind of political complication and endangering of the regular economic relations between Germany and China have to be avoided.’953 Sun Yatsen would indeed have been proud of the HAPRO Treaty. It was a continuation of the ideas he had voiced in the early 1920s, even though it was less the cordial alliance he had envisioned and more a utilitarian business relationship. Still, the Chinese undoubtedly saw the entire agreement as Germany’s full commitment to their cause, failing to realize that it had only been negotiated by the Wehrmacht and a group of private individuals within the German industry and not by Adolf Hitler and his National Socialist government. Unaware of and unconcerned with Chinese perceptions, the German armaments industry hoped for massive Chinese orders to arrive in the near future. According to a representative of the Swiss Solothurn company, ‘Chiang Kaishek has decided that the military authorities of the Nanjing government will in the future only buy German weapons and that [Hans von] Seeckt and [Davi Yui, the Chinese Chief of Ordnance] are to determine the content of the orders’954. Indeed, the first order of the newly signed treaty was for twenty-four Rheinmetall 15-centimetre howitzers with one

951 Zhang, Xianwen (1989) Zur Entwicklung der chinesisch-deutschen Beziehungen in den dreißiger Jahren des 20. Jahrhunderts, in: [Anon.] (Ed.) (1989) Bulletin Faschismus/Zweiter Weltkrieg; Sonderheft 1989, Berlin: Zentralinstitut für Geschichte, p. 34. 952 Ibid. 953 PA, R 31249, Ostasien: China, Handel II No.3, Austauschgeschäfte und Wirtschaftsabkommen: Projekte Klein. Unsigned memorandum, Berlin, 20 February 1935. 954 ADAP, Serie C, Band II/2, Document 454. Ambassador Trautmann to Auswärtiges Amt, Nanjing, 17 May 1934.

230 thousand rounds of ammunition each, worth some 9 million Reichsmarks955. Later in 1934, China also bought from Germany, among other things, twenty 3.7-centimetre anti-tank guns, twenty Rheinmetall 7.5-centimetre mortars, several thousand Mauser rifles, communications equipment and thirty-six armoured cars956. An essential and popular aspect of the HAPRO arrangement was, however, that the company did not simply deliver individual pieces of military hardware. All deliveries arrived as total- unit packages. An artillery regiment of the Nationalist army, for example, received its complete supply in one shipment, including cannons, replacement parts, maintenance facilities and communications equipment. The Chinese themselves had only to provide the trained crews to have the unit ready for action957. Entire divisions were equipped by the HAPRO this way, their German-manufactured war materials of the same high quality as the weapons and equipment of the Wehrmacht958. Yet, the HAPRO not only shipped ready-made weapons and ammunition, but also built arsenals for the Chinese in which they could manufacture their own war materials and sent experts to China to teach the Chinese how to use the industrial equipment it had delivered959. Over the previous years, the Chinese had already manufactured several types of German small arms in the Chinese arsenals, albeit on a limited scale. However, under Hans von Seeckt’s guidance and after the installation of Davi Yui as Chief of Ordnance in 1934, China’s existing arms factories, like the Nanjing and Gongxian arsenals, were expanded, while new arsenals, ammunition plants and even research facilities were built with German help960. Nevertheless, even the increased Chinese armaments production could not cope with the wartime demands of the Nationalist army divisions and the Chinese had to fall back on imports once again. Hans von Seeckt, besides serving as Chiang Kaishek’s chief military adviser, helped to calculate the monthly requirements of weapons and ammunition

955 Rostek, Horst (1989) Zur Rolle der deutschen Militärberater bei der chinesischen Nationalregierung 1928 bis 1938, in: [Anon.] (Ed.) (1989) Bulletin Faschismus/Zweiter Weltkrieg; Sonderheft 1989, Berlin: Zentralinstitut für Geschichte, p. 120. 956 PA, R 85705, Abteilung IV – Politische Abteilung, Po. 13 China, Militärangelegenheiten, Band 9. Ministry of War to Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin, 6 June 1935. 957 Walsh, Billie K. (1974) The German Military Mission in China, 1928 – 1939, in: Journal of Modern History (Number 46, September 1974), p. 508. 958 Schenke, Wolf (1971) Mit China allein; Entscheidende Jahre 1939 – 47, Hamburg: Holsten-Verlag, p. 36. 959 Chen, Chern (1996) Die Beziehungen zwischen China und Deutschland in den dreißiger Jahren unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Perzeptions-, Interessen- und Aktionsstrukturen der nationalchinesischen Regierung, München: Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität, p. 78. 960 Kirby, William C. (1984), p. 218.

231 production and coordinated them with both the manufacture capabilities of the domestic industry and the imports from overseas. The massive military orders, however, frequently create the wrong impression that the HAPRO was exclusively concerned with the trade in weapons and ammunition. Additionally, it delivered industrial equipment for purely civilian use, entire factories and steel works, plus locomotives, trucks and passenger aircraft. Germany covered 49 percent of China’s paint imports and 31 percent of all industrial chemicals bought abroad by China as well961. German help was also instumental in the construction of the Canton-Hankou and Hangzhou-Nanchang-Pingxiang-Zhuzhou railways, to name but a few examples. All major companies of Germany’s heavy industry, who had always regarded China as the land of great profit opportunities962, became sooner or later involved in the HAPRO-managed Far Eastern trade. The Otto Wolf Konzern, the Ferrostahl Aktiengesellschaft in Essen, Krupp, the Stahlunion Export Gemeinschaft in Düsseldorf, the August Thyssen Hütte, the Bochumer Verein, the Deutsche Maschinenfabik Duisburg, better known as DEMAG, sold their products. The I.G. Farben, AEG, the Siemens-Schuckert Werke, Daimler-Benz, MAN and Büssing-NAG firmly counted on the Chinese demand for chemical and electrical goods, as well as for automobiles and trucks. In exchange, in October 1934, the first shipment of Chinese manganese ore arrived in the Third Reich963. Many shipments with other raw materials essential for the German industry were soon to follow.

5.3.2 The Military Advisers and the HAPRO After Hans von Seeckt’s final return to Germany in 1935, General Alexander von Falkenhausen took over the position as head of Chiang Kaishek’s military advisory group and became, as a result, involved in the Sino-German armaments trade as well. Alexander von Falkenhausen, however, had not been informed by his predecessor and former superior about role of the HAPRO in China’s arms acquisition process. He often did not know about the weapons deals Hans Klein concluded with the Nanjing government and was completely unaware that the initial credit for the barter trade had

961 Ruland, Bernd (1973) Deutsche Botschaft Peking; Das Jahrhundert deutsch-chinesischen Schicksals, Bayreuth: Hestia, p. 196. 962 Drechsler, Karl (1964) Deutschland – China – Japan 1933 – 1939; Das Dilemma der deutschen Fernostpolitik, Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, p. 13. 963 ADAP, Serie C, Band III/2, Document 508. Foreign Minister von Neurath to Finance Minister Schwerin von Krosigk, Berlin, 27 February 1935.

232 come from the German army964. Later, despite the fact that the HAPRO was backed by the Ministry of War, the Ministry of Economics and, along the line, by the National Socialist government, the General still disapproved of its basic concept since he saw it as harmful to China’s cause, which was, in his eyes, clearly subordinated to the HAPRO’s very own profit interests. Since neither he nor his fellow military advisers were in any position to oppose Hans Klein’s pet project, one of the most useful additional services performed by them became the thorough inspection of all orders for and deliveries of weapons and other war materials. Usually the German military advisers showed a certain preference for German war materials, mostly because they were most familiar with them and could therefore use them to train their Chinese troops more efficiently. It was, however, not imperative for the military advisers to propose orders exclusively from manufacturers of their own home country. Alexander von Falkenhausen was frequently consulted during the arms acquisition process. Besides urging his employer to standardize weapon types and calibres, he always advised Chiang Kaishek not to buy arms which were not needed at the moment. He also suggested to exclusively buy weapons which were most suitable for the Nationalist army and the surroundings it was supposed to fight in965. Consequently the General often rejected sales propositions of the Wehrmacht, the HAPRO or the German armaments industry when he thought the war materials in questions were not suited for the East Asian battlefield966. He knew only too well that the full-scale rearmament of the Wehrmacht led the German armaments industry to overproduce certain weapons, which it tried to get rid off in the Far East. He was also aware that some weapons which had been found unsuitable for service with the Wehrmacht or were no longer needed were simply shipped to China. Instead, Alexander von Falkenhausen became increasingly selective when he presented his own suggestions for the most-suitable weapons and equipment for the modernisation of the Nationalist army. His first list of 1934 included British light tanks for the Chinese armoured units and, ironically enough, several types of Japanese infantry

964 ADAP, Serie C, Band V/1, Document 44. Memorandum of Counsellor von Erdmannsdorff, Berlin, 10 March 1936. 965 PA, R 31233, Ostasien Allgemein, Geheimakten der Abteilung IV, Band 3. General von Falkenhausen to Lieutenant-Colonel Brinckmann, Nanjing, 20 October 1934. 966 PA, R 104863, Politische Abteilung VIII – China, Po 13, Militärangelegenheiten in China. General von Falkenhausen to Lieutenant-Colonel Brinckmann, Nanjing, 22 March 1937.

233 firearms available on the open market967. Still, often enough the HAPRO delivered weapons and equipment to China which the Nationalist army had not ordered, did not need and could not use. Hans Klein dismissed every criticism. It might be true that the motorized artillery units couldn’t tow their heavy cannons on China’s simple dirt tracks, but the Nanjing government only had to build better roads to fix this predicament968. There were also other problems with the HAPRO, like its disproportionally high prices. Hans Klein, however, simply stated that the Nationalist army had to pay the same prices as the German Wehrmacht969. Alexander von Falkenhausen therefore supported the Chinese decision to buy, for example, armoured cars from other foreign manufacturers when the German equivalents cost some forty percent more970. He was not willing to pressure his employers into buying German war materials simply because he was a German. On several occasions some rather unscrupulous German arms manufacturers tried to cheat their Chinese customers which had been firmly incorporated in the HAPRO’s barter trade system971. Even renowned companies like Mauser delivered faulty goods or products of low quality. Each time Chinese authorities confronted German diplomats in China with their complaints, they passed the protests on to the Auswärtiges Amt972. Despite their continued rejection of the armaments trade, the German diplomats took the complaints seriously and stood up for a fairer treatment of Germany’s Chinese business partners. The German military advisers in China were even more resolute. Shipments of faulty goods were sent back immediately, for example 2500 unusable pistols and a batch of damaged infantry rifles, delivered from Mauser in Oberndorf973. It went against their professional honour and their patriotism to accept anything but the best weapons and equipment, particularly since products ‘Made in Germany’ had always been known for their quality.

967 Wang, Zheng-hua (1987) Kang Zhan Shiqi Waiguo dui Hua Junshi Yuanzhu, Taipei: Huan Qiu Shuju, p. 53. 968 ADAP, Serie C, Band VI/1, Document 7. Ambassador Trautmann to Emissary von Erdmannsdorff, Nanjing, 3 April 1937. 969 Ibid. 970 PA, R 31234, Ostasien Allgemein, Geheimakten der Abteilung IV, Band 4. General von Falkenhausen to Lieutenant-Colonel Brinckmann, Nanjing, 26 April 1935. 971 MA, N 246/137, Nachlaß Falkenhausen, Von Oberst Erwin Topf überarbeitete und erweiterte Fassung der Memoiren von Alexander von Falkenhausen, Band 3: Kapitel 9 – 11, pp. 32 f. 972 PA, R 31234, Ostasien Allgemein, Geheimakten der Abteilung IV, Band 4. Ambassador Trautmann to Auswärtiges Amt, Nanjing, 1 June 1935. 973 PA, R 31234, Ostasien Allgemein, Geheimakten der Abteilung IV, Band 4. General von Falkenhausen to Lieutenant-Colonel Brinckmann, Nanjing, 29 May 1935.

234 Alexander von Falkenhausen also tried to help his Chinese employers in other ways. Via Lieutenant Colonel Rolf Brinckmann, his confidant in Berlin, he often attempted to convince German manufacturers be more generous, to lower their prices and to deliver, now and then, free goods to create good will. Simple gestures of this kind would help to improve the general relations between Germany and China as well. Under the present circumstances a delivery of armoured cars was much more practical than the tour of ‘a second-class, slightly strange Wagner singer as propagator of German culture’974. Benito Mussolini, for example, was much more magnanimous, presenting Chiang Kaishek with a passenger airplane and a wide selection of products from Italy’s armaments industry to secure orders for Italian companies975. Often enough, the relevant German authorities took the General’s hints. In December 1935, Werner von Blomberg, the Minister of War, proudly informed the Auswärtiges Amt that, following Alexander von Falkenhausen’s suggestions to improve Sino-German relations, two armoured cars had been sent to Chiang Kaishek as presents, plus a Mercedes all-terrain vehicle, ‘similar to the one driven by [Adolf Hitler]’976. However, through his influence on China’s arms acquisition process the General made enemies of some industrial leaders who actively tried to exclude him from the HAPRO’s business activities, convinced that he, in China’s interest, would more often than not oppose the delivery of German war materials977.

5.3.3 The Sino-German Arms Trade, 1936 – 1938 Hans Klein had never been popular with everybody. As soon as he had heard about the various activities of the head of the HAPRO, Oskar Trautmann, the German ambassador in Nanjing, denounced him in a private letter as a ‘large-scale pusher’978 who was out to ‘play big politics in China’979. Judging from his past, Hans Klein’s reputation was indeed questionable. In the short run, he was undoubtedly useful for

974 PA, R 31234, Ostasien Allgemein, Geheimakten der Abteilung IV, Band 4. General von Falkenhausen to Lieutenant-Colonel Brinckmann, Nanjing, 30 August 1935. 975 PA, R 31249, Ostasien: China, Handel II No.3, Austauschgeschäfte und Wirtschaftsabkommen: Projekte Klein. General von Falkenhausen to Lieutenant-Colonel Brinckmann, Nanjing, 13 August 1935. 976 PA, R 31234, Ostasien Allgemein, Geheimakten der Abteilung IV, Band 4. Minister of War von Blomberg to Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin, 14 December 1935. 977 MA, N 246/137, Nachlaß Falkenhausen, Von Oberst Erwin Topf überarbeitete und erweiterte Fassung der Memoiren von Alexander von Falkenhausen, Band 3: Kapitel 9 – 11, p. 31. 978 ‘Schieber’, the original German word used by Ambassador Trautmann, can mean everything from ‘black marketeer’ to ‘gun runner’ and ‘drug pusher’. 979 Rostek, Horst (1989), p. 120.

235 certain parts of the German economy, however, in the long run his activities were too much influenced by own personal business interests980. Consequently, he became became a serious hazard for the Sino-German relations. The actual predicament had started with the Wehrmacht and German industry’s insatiable demand for strategically important raw materials which could hardly be covered, not even by the HAPRO’s trade connections with the Nanjing government. Further sources had to be found in the Far East. However, the location of some of the the urgently-needed natural resources created a problem. Huge amounts of tungsten, for example, were mined in the hotly-contested border area between Canton’s semi-independent provincial government and Nationalist China. Since the German army had no clue about China’s domestic affairs – and Hans Klein, as its associate, apparently did not care – it nevertheless decided to establish military and industrial contacts with Canton’s regional governor. Covered by the Reichswehr’s ignorance and desperate need for raw materials, Hans Klein approached the Canton government with another HAPRO-style business proposal. Once again, the entire project had been initiated by Hans von Seeckt who had made a stopover in Canton on his way back from his first visit to China in 1933, had been received by the regional government and had attentively listened to Canton’s hopes for German support for its military expansion981. One year later his confidant, Hans Klein, took over and signed several agreements with the dissident Canton authorities, assuring them that the Wehrmacht and the German armaments industry would deliver war materials, build arsenals and send military advisers in return for raw materials shipments. As was to be expected, the Nanjing government found out only short time later. Shocked by his open breach of trust between Germany and Nanjing China, Chinese diplomats immediately sent protest notes to the Auswärtiges Amt, which was thoroughly embarrassed since it had never even heard of Hans Klein’s Canton project. However, despite the German foreign office’s repeated admonitions, the Ministry of War declared it would persevere in its independent economic and military relations with Canton982. Many people suspected that ‘[Hans von] Seeckt’s shadow [lurked] behind everything’983 and that Chiang Kaishek’s chief military advisers had convinced the German army to continue its double-dealing with both Nanjing and Canton. Yet, Hans von Seeckt, probably seeing his position threatened by these not completely unfounded allegiations, had already changed his mind. In talks with the German embassy in Nanjing, he rejected the entire affair and advised the Third Reich to defer all military projects with Canton for the time being, since Chiang Kaishek did not approve of them984. The Auswärtiges Amt wholeheartedly agreed with him and tried everything to stop the armaments deliveries to Canton, but the Ministry of

980 Bloß, Hartmut (1976), p. 409. 981 PA, R 85703, Abteilung IV – Politische Abteilung, Po. 13 China, Militärangelegenheiten, Band 7. German Embassy Beiping to Auswärtiges Amt, Beiping, 18 September 1933. 982 ADAP, Serie C, Band III/2, Document 554. Minister of the Reichswehr von Blomberg to Foreign Minister von Neurath, Berlin, 23 March 1935. 983 PA, R 31249, Ostasien: China, Handel II No.3, Austauschgeschäfte und Wirtschaftsabkommen: Projekte Klein. Ambassador Trautmann to Auswärtiges Amt, Beiping, 23 May 1935. Even the Chinese embassy suspected that the Canton project had the tacit support of Hans von Seeckt. See ADAP, Serie C, Band II/1, Document 235. Memorandum of Counsellor Altenburg, Berlin, 2 February 1934. 984 ADAP, Serie C, Band III/2, Document 493. Counsellor Lautenschlager to Auswärtiges Amt, Nanjing, 15 February 1935.

236 War – or rather Hans Klein and his HAPRO – were still not prepared to give up their lucrative and, in their eyes, important business. From the very beginning, Alexander von Falkenhausen had disapproved of the illegitimate German armaments deals with Canton985. When he became the head of the German military advisory group on 19 March 1935 after Hans von Seeckt’s departure, he, too, joined in in Nanjing’s massive protests against the German army’s two-faced military economic activities. The Chinese also received the support of Hermann Kriebel, the former chief military adviser who was now Germany’s consul general in Shanghai. As a close friend of Adolf Hitler, he appealed directly to the Führer to put an end to the entire Canton enterprise. Somehow he succeeded where the Auswärtiges Amt and everybody else had failed. By the end of 1935, the economic and military relations between Germany, that is the German Ministry of War and Hans Klein, and the provincial government in Canton had ended. The German Ministry of War and the Wehrmacht had been disgraced by their own ruthless modus operandi to get strategic raw materials at any price and from every possible source. Even the most casual observer was reminded of the colonialism of an era everybody had thought was long over986. Hans Klein, too, had been unmasked in Berlin as ‘an arrogant man who saw China only as the object of colonial exploitation’987. Oskar Trautmann furthermore reported to his superiors in the Auswärtiges Amt that Chiang Kaishek himself had told him that ‘[Hans] Klein had been recommended to him by [Hans von] Seeckt, therefore he had trusted him. He had, however, betrayed him and therefore he didn’t trust him any longer’988. Since the head of the HAPRO had become persona non grata both in China and Germany, he was now a liability for the continued existence of the HAPRO, for Sino-German trade and for the otherwise favourable relations between Nanjing and Berlin. Konstantin von Neurath, the head of the Auswärtiges Amt, and Werner von Blomberg, the Minister of War, met to discuss how the unfortunate Hans Klein problem could be solved. As a result of this meeting, on 8 April 1936, Hans Klein had to hand over all his HAPRO shares to the Ministry of War, which now officially took total control of

985 ADAP, Serie C, Band III/2, Document 366. Ambassador Trautmann to Auswärtiges Amt, Beiping, 1 December 1934. 986 Martin, Bernd (1986) Das Deutsche Reich und Guomindang-China, 1927 – 1941, in: Kuo, Heng-yü (Ed.) (1986) Von der Kolonialpolitik zur Kooperation; Studien zur Geschichte der deutsch- chinesischen Beziehungen, München: Minerva Publikation, p. 357. 987 Rostek, Horst (1989), p. 120. 988 ADAP, Serie C, Band V/1, Document 156. Ambassador Trautmann to Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin, 19 March 1936.

237 the company and pledged to continue, even intensify its political and economic cooperation with the Nanjing government. After lengthy negotiations concerning an expansion of the economic cooperation between Germany and China –on exactly the same day the HAPRO became an instrument of the Wehrmacht – Hjalmar Schacht and representatives of the Nanjing government signed the so-called ‘Additional Credit Agreement’989. As a result of this second HAPRO treaty, which had been made possible with the help of Werner von Blomberg, Walter von Reichenau, Georg Thomas and Hans von Seeckt990, the Chinese had their credit of 100 million Reichsmarks reconfirmed for the next five years to be able to place further orders with the German industry. This revolving credit was renewable after the completion of each transaction, meaning that after a delivery of Chinese raw materials to Germany, equivalent in value to the German industrial products and war materials shipped to China, the credit could be renewed again. Since the German army was covering some eighty percent of the credit, it was now virtually in control of Sino-German trade. Immediately the imports of Chinese ores important for its rearmament program started to rise rapidly, while the export of German industrial goods, weapons and ammunition followed suit. China and its perpetual conflicts against interior and exterior enemies soaked up German war materials deliveries like a sponge. Despite the Nanjing government’s virtual demotion to a mere business partner in the wake of the German-Japanese Anti- Comintern Pact of 25 November 1936, the barter trade between China and Germany continued exceedingly well. The exchange of goods actually reached its pinnacle shortly before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War on 7 July 1937. Germany purchased, among other things, 8073 tons of tungsten from China, which constituted seventy-two percent of the Middle Kingdom’s overall production of the valuable ore991. At the same time, China had become the Third Reich’s primary weapons and ammunition customer, buying thirty-seven percent of the entire German war materials sales. The value of German arms deliveries to the Far East alone increased from 23 million Reichsmarks in 1936 to almost 83 million Reichsmarks in early 1937992.

989 ADAP, Serie C, Band V/1, Document 270. Additional Credit Agreement, Berlin, 8 April 1936. 990 Liu, Frederick Fu (1956) A Military History of Modern China 1924 – 1949, Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 101 f. 991 Martin, Bernd (1986), p. 359. 992 Ruland, Bernd (1973), p. 196.

238 According to the annual report993 of the Ausführgemeinschaft für Kriegsgerät, the German export cooperation for war materials, deliveries made by the German armaments industry in 1936 included machine guns and machine cannons of calibres up to 2 centimetres, cannons of calibres up to 15.5 centimetres, anti-tank guns, anti- aircraft guns, largee amounts of rifle ammunition, aerial bombs, optical devices, searchlights, armored cars and combat aircraft. In 1937, German weapons manufacturers sold even more merchandise to China, this time infantry rifles with ammunition, 2-centimetre machine cannons, cannons and howitzers calibres up to 15.5 centimetres, anti-tank guns, anti-aircraft guns, aerial bombs, optical devices, communications equipment, searchlights, light tanks, armoured cars and combat aircraft. The unfortunately incomplete statistics994 of the Nationalist Government’s Office for Raw Materials for 1936 also describe several major building projects undertaken with support of the HAPRO. German industrial machinery deliveries enabled the construction of several ordnance factories for the production of machine gun ammunition, 2-centimetre anti-aircraft gun ammunition and artillery shells of calibres between 7 and 15 centimetres. Furthermore the Chinese built several other industrial complexes with HAPRO help, including the steel works of Changsha and Zuzhou, the copper smelting plant of Yangxin, the lead smelting plant and zinc works of Shuikoushan, the tungsten works of Nanshang, the oil refineries of Ba Xian, Daxian, Luxi, Yanchuan and Yangchang, the coal mines of Gaokeng, Xiangtao and Yuxiang, the alcohol factory of Neijiang, the gas works of Zunshou and the engine factories of Changsha and Zhoushoujiang, as well as a cable factory, a lightbulb factory, a battery factory and a wireless factory, all located in Wuchang. The expanded military economic cooperation between Germany and China made a huge impression on foreign observers. German 8.8-centimetre anti-aircraft guns manned by Chinese soldiers in German-style helmets were seen in fortified positions around Nanjing. German 7.5-centimetre howitzers, towed by German Henschel and MAN tractors, paraded through the streets of the Chinese capital995. Imperial Japan’s ever-increasing aggression on the Asian mainland forced Chiang Kaishek and the Nanjing government to request more and more German weapons and ammunition deliveries within the framework of the HAPRO Treaty. This

993 ADAP, Serie D, Band I, Document 576. Memorandum of Director Wiehl, Berlin, 23 April 1938. The document unfortunately delivers neither the exact numbers of the weapons delivered nor their makes and models. 994 Zhang, Xianwen (1989), pp. 35 f. 995 Liu, Frederick Fu (1956), p. 102.

239 became an increasing source of irritation for the Japanese and also had, as a direct consequence, a disturbing effect on their allies, Germany’s National Socialist government. On 1 October 1937, two months after the outbreak of open hostilities between China and Japan, when China was more than ever dependent on German support, the character of the HAPRO Treaty suddenly changed. Hermann Göring, the Minister of Aviation and coordinator of the Third Reich’s massive economic expansion, took over the leadership of the HAPRO and subordinated it to his Four- Year Plan996. Without a warning or further explanation, he unilaterally terminated the Sino-German barter trade agreement and insisted on Chinese cash payments for German armaments deliveries. Grudgingly, the Nanjing government accepted Hermann Göring’s new interpretation of the HAPRO Treaty to avoid losing an essential source of war materials in this time of desperate need. Yet, ultimately the Third Reich’s close military alliance with Japan and its continuing economic relationship with China became mutually exclusive. Athough the Sino-German exchange of goods had already dropped some thirty percent after the outbreak of the war between China and Japan, the Japanese demands that Germany should cancel its trade relations with the Middle Kingdom altogether continued. Yet, still dependent on raw materials deliveries from abroad, Germany intended to continue the shipping of war materials to China in exchange for essential ores, particularly since Japan was not willing or able to offer something that could make up the losses the German economy would suffer from a withdrawal from the Far Eastern market. Adolf Hitler himself had decided to continue the import of natural resources. In a memorandum to Werner von Blomberg and Konstatin von Neurath, he stated that ‘deliveries, as agreed on in the [HAPRO Treaty], should be continued as long as they are covered by cash payments or appropriate deliveries of raw materials, although clandestinely, if possible. If possible, no further Chinese orders of war materials should be accepted’997. In consideration of Chiang Kaishek’s need for German military support, the latter was not possible though. Both the Auswärtiges Amt and the National Socialist government tried to evade this precarious issue as long as they could. They promised to stop further arms deliveries to China without actually doing so until Japan, wearied by the stalling tactics, threatened to withdraw from the German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Pact. This was completely unacceptable for the National Socialist government for political as well as military reasons and they bowed to Japanese pressure. On 18 October 1937, Hermann Göring commanded, on behalf of Adolf Hitler, that all weapons deliveries to China had to be stopped998. However, since the Chinese had already paid for their orders, the production to fulfill these orders had started, too, and the HAPRO and the Wehrmacht were generally unwilling to stop the continued import of indispensable raw materials, the command was cancelled only two days later. It was decided that the

996 Ratenhof, Udo (1987), p. 477. 997 ADAP, Serie D, Band I, Document 478. Memorandum of Foreign Minister von Neurath, Berlin, 17 August 1937. 998 ADAP, Serie D, Band I, Document 499. Memorandum of State Secretary von Mackensen, Berlin, 19 October 1937.

240 trade with China should continue, at least for the next six months. Still, the Wehrmacht was instructed to carry out all weapons deliveries in secret999. After major administrative changes in the wake of the failed mediation attempt between China and Japan, during which the last Sinophiles in the Auswärtiges Amt and the Wehrmacht had been replaced with loyal National Socialists, and after renewed Japanese threats, the Third Reich’s government made its final decision in regard to its relationships to both China and Japan. On 27 April 1938, Hermann Göring once again prohibited the export of war materials to China, ‘effective immediately’1000. This renewed ban ultimately closed down the HAPRO’s trade relations with Nanjing for good and included unfulfilled Chinese orders for weapons and ammunition worth over 282 million Reichsmarks1001. Yet, Nationalist China suffered only temporarily from the cancellation of the Sino- German barter trade. The loss of German war materials deliveries was a setback, but other nations soon took over the void left behind by the forced withdrawal of the Wehrmacht and the German armaments industry. The Soviet Union had already started to send military help to China in 1934 and 1935, albeit on a very small scale, since the Sino-Soviet relations had only just begun to improve after their sudden breakdown in the late 1920s. However, after 21 August 1937, the day of the signing of the Sino-Soviet Non-Aggression Treaty, Russia started to send larger amounts of war materials, including combat planes, as well as pilots and technical personnel. For the time being, China could not and did not expect any real support coming from the United States and Great Britain who had remained largely neutral throughout the early stages of Japanese expansion on the Asian mainland since their own interests had not yet been threatened. Still, American support was forthcoming, primarily focussed on the field of military aviation, but it was still very limited, so as to meet American security needs in the Asian-Pacific area and to check Japan’s expansion. Once the had started in December 1941 with attacks on American bases throughout Asia, however, the United States started to support Nationalist China with weapons, ammunition and other military equipment on a scale unimagined before. The Third Reich hurt itself most by giving in to Japan’s virtual blackmail, breaking off its political, economic and military relations with Nationalist China and relying

999 ADAP, Serie D, Band I, Document 504. Memorandum of Counsellor von der Heyden-Rynsch, Berlin, 22 October 1937. 1000 ADAP, Serie D, Band I, Document 579. Memorandum of Director Wiehl, Berlin, 28 April 1938.

241 exclusively on Japan in the Far East. The signs of such a move had always been there. German diplomats personally witnessing the development of affairs in Asia, particularly Ambassador Oskar Trautmann, were convinced that, despite talks of ideological affinities and common military goals, Japan’s policy toward Germany was actually one of animosity, based on the idea that ‘white is white’1002. Indeed, there was never a preferred treatment for Japan’s German allies. From the beginning of Japan’s expansion on the Asian mainland there were methodic and systematic Japanese proceedings to persecute, curtail and oust the economic interests in China of countries other than Japan1003. This included the Third Reich as well. The entire Chinese export was taken over by the Japanese and all Western companies, even German firms who had been definitely assured preferred positions in the Japanese- occupied territories, were humiliated and systematically pushed out of business1004. Furthermore, Japan refused persistently to provide the Third Reich with the urgently needed and initially agreed on amounts of raw materials, like rubber or tungsten. When the Japanese occupied Indochina and the Dutch Indies, they even withheld the deliveries of raw materials Germany had acquired in the region for years1005. Consequently, in the wake of the Sino-Japanese War Germany lost more China trade than did either the United States or Great Britain1006. Hence the Axis with Japan was anything but advantageous for the Germans. Quite on the contrary, it only meant that the Japanese could be even less considerate since they had their alleged allies already on their side. Japanese authorities simply explained this unpleasant situation by stating that there were still harsh feelings among the Japanese since the Germans had sold too many weapons to the Chinese which had been used against Japan1007. Nationalist China had been absolutely essential for the German economy. Neither the Third Reich, nor its allies, Japan and Italy, had sufficient supplies of rubber,

1001 Ibid. 1002 Presseisen, Ernst L. (1969) Germany and Japan; A Study in Totalitarian Diplomacy 1933 – 1941, New York: Howard Fertig, p. 143. 1003 Ahlers, John (1940) Japan closing the ‘Open Door’ in China, Shanghai (et al.): Kelly & Walsh, p. 26. 1004 Beutler, Heinz (1946) Hundert Jahre Carlowitz & Co. Hamburg und China; Ein Beitrag zur wirt- schaftsgeschichtlichen Entwicklung des deutschen China-Handels, Hamburg: Universität Hamburg, p. 86. 1005 Sommer, Theo (1962) Deutschland und Japan zwischen den Mächten 1935 – 1940; Vom Antikomintern-pakt zum Dreimächtepakt; Eine Studie zur diplomatischen Vorgeschichte des Zweiten Weltkrieges, Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), p. 14. 1006 Ahlers, John (1940), p. 121. 1007 ADAP, Serie D, Band IV, Document 5405. Memorandum of Director Wiehl, Berlin, 21 December 1938.

242 cotton, oil, wool, tin, nickel or the other non-ferrous metals so indispensable for the German armaments industry. None of the the Axis nations was even able to mine enough iron ore and coal to cover its needs. Still, these hard facts were simply ignored by Adolf Hitler and the other National Socialists when they re-oriented their Far East policy from China to Japan for some vaguely defined and primarily ideological reasons. There were always popular stories about kingdoms lost for want of a nail. While the reality was perhaps less drastic, they still contained contained a kernel of truth. Tungsten had always been the key raw material for German cannon manufacturers. For this reason, the HAPRO imported up to seventy percent of China’s annual production of tungsten ore, usually between 7,000 and 8,000 tons, throughout the mid-1930s1008. To secure these deliveries, the HAPRO even initiated the construction of ferrotungsten works in the Far East with the help of Krupp and Siemens technicians and German-trained Chinese engineers1009. However, without the continued shipments from China and under the wartime blockade of the Allies, the last German reserves of tungsten were used up in 19421010. As a result, the production of the Wehrmacht’s revolutionary and potentially war outcome-changing taper-bore anti-tank guns, like the 7.5-centimetre Panzerabwehrkanone (Pak) 41, simply ceased.

5.3.4 German and International Reactions Throughout the early 1930s, the Auswärtiges Amt, following its long-established policy, still continued to refuse any kind of support for the Sino-German arms trade. The German diplomats, both in Berlin and Nanjing, had sympathy for China’s plight. They could also understand that, in the prevalent global economic situation, the German industry and trading companies sought to gain at least some profits in the sale of weapons. They even acknowledged that deliveries of war materials to China might perhaps be in the Third Reich’s best political or military interest. Nevertheless, due to the armament trade’s negative effects on Germany’s international standing in the past,

1008 Bloch, Kurt (1940) German Interests and Policies in the Far East, New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, International Secretariat, p. 28. 1009 Fu, Pao-Jen (1989) The German Military Mission in Nanking 1928 – 1938; A Bridge connecting China and Germany, Syracuse: Syracuse University, p. 157. 1010 Hogg, Ian V. (1997) The Military Book Club Encyclopedia of Infantry Weapons of WWII, London: Saturn Books, p. 129.

243 it was not prepared to change its policy and would continue to oppose any German involvement in the sale of war materials to the Far East1011. Consequently, it became a total embarrassment for the Auswärtiges Amt, until then under the impression that it was the only German governmental institution responsible for its nation’s foreign policy, when Hans Klein of the HAPRO showed up in China to finalize his barter trade agreement with the Nanjing government, allegedly with the blessing of the German authorities, and the German diplomats had never even heard of him1012. Indeed, from the very beginning, the Auswärtiges Amt had been completely ignorant of the Wehrmacht and German industry’s negotiations with China and only heard of them after their successful completion. The German diplomats remained sceptical about the entire barter trade agreement. They didn’t doubt Germany’s armaments industrial capabilities, even when they still rejected them, but for them Nationalist China seemed to be unrealiable when it came to repaying German deliveries with shipments of raw materials1013. The establishment of a dedicated organisation to centralize and regulate the exchange of goods was also greeted with doubt by the Auswärtiges Amt. However, since Chiang Kaishek and the Nanjing government, as well as Hjalmar Schacht of the Ministry of Economics and leading representatives of the Wehrmacht had already agreed to this proposal, the German diplomats slowly gave up their policy of restraint toward China1014. Their own growing pro-Chinese feelings in the face of Japan’s unchecked aggression on the Asian mainland also played an important role in their decision. However, the Auswärtiges Amt still intended to limit its agreement to the Sino- German armaments trade exclusively to the Nanjing government and actively opposed Hans Klein and the Wehrmacht’s not-so-clandestine deals with the semi-autonomous Canton government. Due to their continued rebukes, the German diplomats themselves had to cope with severe criticism. Relying on war materials deliveries from the whole of China, the German army contacted the Auswärtiges Amt and stated that it was ‘absolutely necessary that [Ambassador Oskar Trautmann] and the

1011 ADAP, Serie C, Band I/1, Document 357. Memorandum of Counsellor Michelsen, Berlin, 10 July 1933. 1012 PA, R 31249, Ostasien: China, Handel II No.3, Austauschgeschäfte und Wirtschaftsabkommen: Projekte Klein. Ambassador Trautmann to Auswärtiges Amt, Nanjing, 11 February 1936. 1013 ADAP, Serie C, Band III/1, Document 180. Ambassador Trautmann to State Secretary von Bülow, Beiping, 28 August 1934, and PA, R 31249, Ostasien: China, Handel II No.3, Austauschgeschäfte und Wirtschaftsabkommen: Projekte Klein. Ambassador Trautmann to Foreign Minister von Neurath, Shanghai, 22 February 1935. 1014 Bloß, Hartmut (1980), pp. 58 f.

244 advisory staff support the [Canton] affair by every means possible and stop deprecating [Hans] Klein in the presence of Marshal Chiang Kaishek’1015. Yet, the Auswärtiges Amt was not swayed and remained loyal to the Nationalist government until the day Adolf Hitler and the National Socialists changed their Far East policy and removed all remaining pro-Chinese diplomats from positions of power. In the Far East, due to the obvious presence of German weapons and military equipment, the expanded Sino-German arms trade of the mid-1930s was not so secret anymore1016. Foreign observers usually knew more about what and how many German weapons were in use with the Chinese armed forces than the Auswärtiges Amt1017. Furthermore, many French, British or Americans, unashamedly pro-Chinese and anti-Japanese in the sentiments, saw nothing wrong with German war materials deliveries, particularly since their own governments were apparently not prepared to support the war-plagued Chinese themselves. The only ones to vehemently oppose the Third Reich’s armaments shipments to the Far East were the Japanese and, due to their constant diplomatic pressure on the National Socialist government, they stopped German military support for China once and for all.

5.3.5 Weapons Sold and Delivered From the very beginning, Nationalist China had a small domestic armaments industry for the manufacture of some basic hand weapons and the most common calibres of ammunition. After the installation of Davi Yui as Nanjing’s Chief of Ordnance in 1934, China’s arms factories and ammunition plants expanded rapidly with technical support provided by the HAPRO and intensified the production of weapons after German designs1018, among them Mauser-style rifles, carbines and pistols, copies of the World War I-vintage Spandau MG 08 heavy machine gun and 7.5-centimetre cannons influenced by the proven Krupp Feldkanone 96/16. However, since even the increased Chinese armaments production could not cover the wartime needs of the Nationalist armed forces, large amounts of additional weapons and ammunition had to

1015 ADAP, Serie C, Band V/1, Document 2174. Minister of War von Blomberg to Foreign Minister von Neurath, Berlin, 25 March 1936. 1016 Utley, Freda (1939) China at War, London: Faber and Faber, p. 4. 1017 ADAP, Serie D, Band I, Document 467. Memorandum of Director von Weizsäcker, Berlin, 22 July 1937. 1018 Briessen, Fritz van (1982) Deutsche Institutionen und Persönlichkeiten in China, in: Machetzki, Rüdiger (Ed.) (1982) Deutsch-chinesische Beziehungen; Ein Handbuch, Hamburg: Institut für Asienkunde, p. 64.

245 be imported from abroad. This was once again where the HAPRO came in. The major corporations of the German armaments industry, like Krupp, Mauser, Rheinmetall, Borsig, Junkers, Henschel and Heinkel, were delighted to use Hans Klein and the Wehrmacht’s HAPRO as an intermediary to deliver their products quickly and easily to the Far East and get valuable natural resources in return. Still, the amount of exported German weapons and other war materials, as well as their exact typess are difficult to determine. The Chinese government discontinued the publication of import figures in 19331019 and both the Wehrmacht and the German armaments industry kept information about their arms sales largely secret. What is known is that, between 1932 and 1937, the published figures on all German exports to China, war materials included totaled 610 million Reichsmarks1020. The amount of war materials within these exports must have been substantial, even when the weapons actually delivered were much less than the ones ordered by the Chinese and arms deliveries from other foreign nations, including Great Britain, Italy and the United States, contributed substantially to the Nationalist armed forces’ stocks. According to Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft editions of the 1930s, which listed the combat planes of every nation’s air force in every possible detail, German aircraft played only a minor part in China’s military aviation. Chiang Kaishek himself refused to order larger numbers of military aircraft from Germany. He preferred American and Italian planes, which were much better at the time and much better suited for wartime service in the Far East, and he suspected, most probably believing rumours spread by the international competition, that the Junkers company had tried to sell him outdated aircraft types over the previous years1021. Furthermore, until the summer of 1938, when the position was taken over by T.V. Soong, Madame Chiang, the Generalissimo’s pro-American wife, was the general secretary of the Commission for Military Aviation. As such, she was responsible for the acquisition of military aircraft and for the general modernisation of the Chinese Air Force. Although some people admired her for her alleged abilities in this field1022, others were much more honest.

1019 Causey, Beverley D. (1942) German Policy towards China, 1918 – 1941, Cambridge: Harvard University, p. 274. 1020 Bloch, Kurt (1940), p. 27. 1021 MA, Msg 160/5, Einleitende Besprechungen des Generalberaters, General von Seeckt, mit Marschall Chiang Kai-shek. Colonel-General von Seeckt to Ministry of the Reichswehr von Blomberg, Nanjing, 28 January 1935. 1022 Abegg, Lily (1940) Chinas Erneuerung; Der Raum als Waffe, Frankfurt am Main: Societäts- Verlag, p. 271, and Rabenau, Friedrich von (1941) Seeckt; Aus seinem Leben; 1918 – 1936, Leipzig: v.

246 ‘She had good intentions, but she was just a well-meaning girl who knew nothing about the subject.’1023 Consequently, during Madame Chiang’s time in office, the Chinese Air Force was judged to be more danger to itself than to any enemy1024. Its pilots had learned their craft from a motley crew of English, Russian, American and Italian1025 flying teachers, among them the retired U.S.A.A.C. Major General Claire Chennault, and were derided by their Japanese opponents for their ‘surprisingly bad flying’1026. Even worse, when the Sino-Japanese War broke out in 1937, only ninety- one of the Chinese Air Force’s more than 500 military planes were fit for combat or even in flying condition1027. This disgraceful ‘hodgepodge outfit’1028 was the result of the usual erratic Chinese shopping sprees among countless aircraft manufacturers and the typical corruption among Guomindang officials1029. Still, it was understandable why German military planes were underepresented in the Chinese Air Force. Hampered for more than a decade by the Treaty of Versailles, only by the mid- and late 1930s did the German aircraft industry reach a level on which it could compete with the manufacturers of other nations. By that time, however, the rearmament of the German air force, the Luftwaffe, had priority over foreign sales. Still, Chiang Kaishek was not entirely wrong when he rejected the sales offers of the Junkers company. By that time, Junkers aircraft were indeed unsuited for aerial combat. The company manufactured outstanding transport aircraft, like the famous Junkers Ju 52, but its fighter planes were no longer up-to-date. Consequently, the only Junkers aircraft sold to China under the HAPRO agreement were about a dozen Junkers Ju 52/3m three-engined seventeen-passenger transport planes. Most were used by China’s two civilian airlines, but one was used by Chiang Kaishek as his own personal VIP transport1030 until he switched over to an American Ford 3AT Tri- Motor after the relationship between Germany and China had broken down. Allegedly the Chinese Air Force also acquired an unspecified number of twin-engined Junkers

Hase & Koehler Verlag, p. 693. Friedrich von Rabenau quotes from an entry in Hans von Seeckt’s diary, written on 31 July 1933. 1023 Utley, Freda (1939), p. 8. Freda Utley quotes Eugene Chen, the former Chinese foreign minister. 1024 Seagrave, Sterling (1996) The Soong Dynasty, London: Corgi Books, p. 360. 1025 Frey, Paul W. (1997) Faschistische Fernostpolitik; Italien, China und die Entstehung des weltpolitischen Dreieckes Rom – Berlin – Tokio, Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, p. 80. 1026 Sakai, Saburo (et al.) (2001) Samurai!, New York: ibooks, p. 43. 1027 Chennault, Claire L. (1949) Way of a Fighter; The Memoirs of Claire Lee Chennault, Major General, U.S. Army (Ret.), New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, p. 38. 1028 Davies, John Paton Jr. (1972) Dragon by the Tail; American, British, Japanese, and Russian Encounters with China and one another, New York: W.W. Norton & Company, p. 192. 1029 Chennault, Claire L. (1949), p. 31.

247 Ju 86 heavy bombers1031, however, these aircraft had been confused by witnesses with the civilian Junkers Ju 86 variants sold to Manchukuo in the late 1930s. The twenty Junkers Ju 86, which had been ordered by the Chinese via the HAPRO, were never delivered due to the Sino-Japanese War. In 1936, a batch of twelve Heinkel He 66bCH one-engined two-man light bombers, export versions of the Luftwaffe’s Heinkel He 50 specifically converted for service in China, was shipped to Hongkong1032. The aircraft had been ordered two years earlier, when a Chinese delegation had toured Germany with the intention of buying weapons and equipment for the Nationalist armed forces. However, the Japanese spared no effort in trying to prevent German armaments sales to China, so it took a long time until the order could finally be fulfilled1033. For unknown reasons, the twelve biplanes were forgotten for almost a year before they were finally assembled and assigned to Chinese Air Force units in July 19371034. After only two months of undistinguished service the aircraft were relegated to training duties. Around the same time, another Chinese delegation, invited to the Third Reich to inspect the German armaments industry, ordered twelve Henschel Hs 123A-1 one- engined one-man fighter aircraft from the Henschel company in Berlin-Schönefeld for a price of 2,018,000 Reichsmarks1035. The aircaft were shipped by the HAPRO1036 via Venice and Hongkong to Hankou, together with a team of engineers who assembled the somewhat outmoded biplanes after their arrival. Nine of the Henschel Hs 123A-1s were assigned to the 15th Squadron of the Nationalist Air Force and were used – with rather limited success – to dive-bomb Japanese warships on the Yangzi River1037. After only a handful of sorties, the surviving aircraft were withdrawn from active service and used by the 6th Squadron for training purposes. To successfully attack Japanese forces who had already established a firm foothold in the north of China, the Chinese Air Force also needed multi-engined heavy

1030 Andersson, Lennart (2002) Chinese Aviation until 1949, [Unpublished]. 1031 Ruland, Bernd (1973), p. 213. 1032 Hotte, Christian (1998) Chinese He 66, in: SAFO (Small Aircraft Observer) (Volume 22, Number 4/1996). 1033 Louie, D.Y. (1996) He 66 and Hs 123A-1 in Chinese Service, in: SAFO (Small Aircraft Observer) (Volume 20, Number 3/1996). 1034 Hotte, Christian (1998). 1035 Birkholz, Heinz (2001) Schlächter, in: Jet & Prop (Number 4, April 2001), p. 45. 1036 Wartmann, Klaus (2001) Hs 123 in China, in: Jet & Prop (Number 6, June 2001), p. 8. 1037 Chen, Ying-ming (et al.) (1991) Kang Ri Zhanzheng Shiqi 1937 – 1945; Zhongguo Kongjun Feiji; The Aircrafts [sic] of the Chinese Air Force in the Sino-Japan War [Zhongguo Zhi Yi (Special 1)], Taipei Chungho: Tongwei Yinshua, p. 91, and Louie, D.Y. (1996).

248 bombers which would be capable of long-range bomb deliveries. For this reason, besides buying six Italian Savoia Marchetti S.M. 72 three-engined bombers and nine American Martin 139 WC two-engined bombers, the Nanjing government also acquired six1038 German Heinkel He 111 A-0 two-engined bombers. The Wehrmacht and the HAPRO had originally sold the aircraft, which had actually been designated as pre-production models rejected by the German Luftwaffe because of their insufficient engine performance, to the dissident government of Canton in early 1936. However, in mid-1936, Chiang Kaishek re-occupied the wayward province. The captured bombers were simply integrated into the Nationalist Air Force and assigned to the newly-established 8th Bomber Group1039 whose three squadrons consequently used three completely different and incompatible models of aircraft. Accompanied by the faster Martin 139 WC bombers and an escort of Boeing 281 fighter planes1040, five of the six Heinkel He 111 A-0s were sent into action for the first time in August 1937 to attack a convoy of Japanese supply ships anchored near Shanghai in the mouth of the Yangzi River1041. Due to their weaker engines and the fact that the inexperienced Chinese bomber crews had forgotten to lift the aircrafts’ unstreamlined ventral machine gun positions, the Heinkel He 111 A-0s soon fell behind the other airplanes. While the Martin 139 WC squadron cowardly jettisoned all its bombs and returned to the air base without ever coming close to the enemy, the Heinkel He 111 A-0 squadron, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Shih, continued its bombing run and sank two smaller Japanese vessels. However, having been deserted by their escorts, three of the German bombers were shot down by Japanese interceptors on their way back1042. Another Heinkel He 111 A-0 was lost during a later sortie when a Chinese fighter plane shot it down by mistake. The surviving bombers ended their disappointing careers in the Far East as civilian transport aircraft. By the end of 1937, the chaotic mixture of American, Italian, German and French aircraft the Chinese had bought throughout the 1930s had already been lost in the fierce aerial battles over China. Many of the Chinese Air Force’s best pilots were dead too. Yet, soon after a new generation of Chinese air crews was trained by Soviet aviation advisers and flew Russian fighter aircraft and bombers, which had

1038 However, some sources state that the entire production run of ten Heinkel He 111 A-0s was bought by China. See Chen, Ying-ming (et al.) (1991), p. 103. 1039 Herold, Miroslav (2002) Les He 111 et Martin 139 dans le Ciel de Chine, in: Air Magazine (Number 7, March/April 2002). 1040 The Boeing 281 one-engined one-man fighter aircraft was a dedicated export version of the Boeing P-26A Peashooter of the Air Corps. 1041 Chennault, Claire L. (1949), pp. 75 f. 1042 Herold, Miroslav (2002).

249 been delivered by the reconciled Soviet Union. Finally, in mid-1942, the United States also started to send American planes to China under a lend-lease agreement. The tanks and other armoured vehicles of the Nationalist armed forces, due to their small numbers, made virtually no impact on the early course of the Sino-Japanese War1043. However, the rarity of Chinese tanks was not the only problem. Tanks were offensive weapons and their effective deployment required considerable mechanical and tactical skills which hardly any Chinese officer, despite extensive training, had at the time. Consequently, there was never an opportunity for true tank-to-tank battles like the ones to be fought in Europe during World War II. The Japanese used their numerically superior tanks predominantly as close support weapons for their infantry units1044 and therefore for the Chinese, usually on the defensive, anti-tank warfare was more important than armoured counter-attacks. Quite similar to the Chinese Air Force’s haphazard airplane shopping, the tank acquisition process of the Nationalist army’s tank units was random and without any previously worked-out concept. General Xu Tingyao’s first two armoured battalions, both stationed in Shanghai to defend the port city against a Japanese amphibious landing, were equipped with twenty British Vickers-Armstrong 6-Ton E medium tanks, twenty-nine British Vickers-Carden-Loyd Model 1931 amphibious tankettes and four British Vickers-Carden-Loyd Model 1936 light tanks. Later a third armoured battalion was formed in Nanjing which received twenty Italian Fiat CV33 tankettes and ten German Panzerkampfwagen I Ausführung A light tanks, as well as several German armoured cars, as its heavy weapons complement. The ten German light tanks ordered by the Chinese via the HAPRO had arrived unexpectedly quickly. After more than a decade of the Treaty of Versailles’ production ban for armoured combat vehicles, the large-scale development of German panzers had only recently truly restarted. Since the initial design and preliminary manufacturing of armoured vehicles was slow and the final production versions of Germany’s medium and heavy battle tanks were still years away, easy-to-construct interim types had to be developed in the meantime. The Panzerkampfwagen IA was one of these makeshift tanks. It was crewed by only two men, armed with two turret- mounted 7.62-millimetre machine guns and powered by a 57-horsepower Krupp M305 engine. The performance of this engine, however, was deemed to be unsatisfactory by the Wehrmacht1045 and therefore a new, stronger model of the light

1043 Zezschwitz, G.P. von (1938) Heigl’s Taschenbuch der Tanks; Teil III: Der Panzerkampf, München/Berlin: J.F. Lehmanns Verlag, p. 175. 1044 Tomczyk, Andrzej M. (2002) Japońska Broń Pancerna; Japanese Armor Volume 1 [Tankpower (Volume 9)], Gdansk: AJ-Press, p. 88. 1045 Perrett, Brian (et al.) (1998) German Light Panzers 1932 – 1942 [New Vanguard (Volume 26)], London: Osprey Publishing, p. 4.

250 tank, the Panzerkampfwagen IB, was produced. Unwanted in Germany, ten of the weaker Panzerkampfwagen IAs were passed on to China1046. Additionally, an unknown number, probably a few dozen1047, of German SdKfz. 221 and SdKfz. 222 armoured cars1048 was exported to Nationalist China in 1937 and 1938. These light and fast three-man armoured vehicles, armed either with single 7.92-millimetre machine guns or single 20-millimetre machine cannons1049, became the most numerous armoured car types of the Chinese armed forces before the United States started to deliver war materials on a large scale after 1941. The HAPRO’s delivery of German military vehicles only added to the logistical nightmare incessantly plaguing the Nationalist army’s armoured batallions both in peace and wartime and further aggravated all the strategic and tactical problems where armoured vehicles of so many different makes and combat capabilities should be sent into action. Ultimately, the Chinese used the tanks of the First and Second Armoured Brigades during 1937’s Battle of Shanghai to break through or run down Japanese barricades and machine gun positions to clear a route for their attacking infantry. However, the few successes achieved did not make up for the heavy losses suffered1050. Later that year, the Third Armoured Brigade with its German Panzerkampfwagen IAs and German SdKfz. 221 and SdKfz. 222 armoured cars created even less of an impression during the fighting in and around Nanjing. Badly handled and even worse led, many armoured vehicles were either destroyed or claimed as war trophies by the Japanese soldiers1051. Indeed, most Chinese tanks and armoured cars were lost during the early months of the Sino-Japanese War. Yet, soon more military vehicles of all types were delivered from overseas, primarily from the United States of America and the Soviet Union. The Chinese armed forces additionally bought an unspecified number of unarmoured vehicles, mostly trucks and artillery tractors, from German manufacturers, for example from Daimler Benz. Once again sales through the

1046 Zaloga, Steven J. (1983) Armour in China 1920 – 1945, URL: http://members.tripod.com/ ~france40/ temp/chinese.html (Access Date: February 11, 2002). 1047 Ibid. 1048 ‘SdKfz.’ was the official German abbreviation for ‘Sonderkraftfahrzeug’, meaning ‘motor vehicle for special purposes’. 1049 Scheibert, Horst (1984) Deutsche Leichte Panzerspähwagen [Waffen Arsenal (Volume 86)], Dornheim: Podzun-Pallas Verlag, p. 10. 1050 MA, Msg 160/33, ‘Die Schlacht von Shanghai’ – Denkschrift des OKW mit Karten 1939. 1051 Zaloga, Steven J. (1995) Tank Battles in the Pacific War 1941 – 1945 [Armor at War (Volume 4)], Hongkong: Concord Publications, p. 12, and Iwaki, Hitoshi (Ed.) (1993) Chūgoku-Tairiku no 1914 – 1945 Kikaikasensō to Heiki, Tokyo: Delta Publishing, pp. 10 and 14.

251 HAPRO were high, since Chinese governmental officials and army officers were convinced of the supriority of German diesel trucks over American gasoline-powered trucks because of the general lack of refined petrol in China1052. Also through the HAPRO, the BMW company tried to sell some 400 motorcycles with and without sidecars the Chinese army, probably of the R11, R12, R15 or R61 types. It is not known how many were actually purchased by Nanjing, however, the ones with sidecars which did reach the Far East during the 1930s were converted almost beyond recognition and served as heavily armoured three-wheeled pseudo-tanks with Maxim machine guns in their metal plate-clad sidecar turrets1053. Initially the artillery section of the Nationalist army consisted of an odd assortment of old German Krupp cannons already bought in Imperial times, Japanese copies of Krupp cannons and other obsolete guns of all makes and sizes, imported from all over the world. Yet, with German help, coming from Chiang Kaishek’s military advisers, the HAPRO and the German armaments industry, the Chinese artillery was soon modernized. Consequently, its light and heavy cannons were up-to-date, even superior to the ones used by the Imperial Japanese army1054, but their total numbers still remained almost insignificant compared to Japan’s military strength, even though the HAPRO had delivered significant numbers of cannons of all types and calibres to the Nanjing government. German arms manufacturers like Krupp and Rheinmetall indeed did brisk business with the Chinese. Rheinmetall 3.7-centimetre Panzerabwehrkanone (Pak) 35/36 anti-tank guns, Krupp 7.5-centimetre Feldkanone (Fk) 16 n.A. cannons, Krupp 7.5-centimetre Leichtes Infanteriegeschütz (leIg) 18 cannons, Rheinmetall 10.5-centimetre Leichte Feldhaubitze (leFh) 18 howitzers and Rheinmetall/Krupp 15- centimetre Schwere Feldhaubitze (sFh) 18 howitzers were continuously shipped to the Far East for return deliveries of ores and other raw materials1055. Despite legitimate fears that most Chinese roads were unable to cope with an artillery train of unwieldy 15-centimetre cannons, the guns were nevertheless ordered because they were superior to anything the Japanese had in their arsenals at the time1056. Chiang Kaishek and his government were firm in their belief that the entire Chinese military

1052 Fu, Pao-Jen (1989), p. 145. 1053 Zaloga, Steven J. (1983). 1054 MA, Msg 160/8, Der chinesisch-japanische Krieg 1937 – 1938. Memorandum of General von Falkenhausen, Hankou, 1 February 1938. 1055 PA, R 102173, Politische Abteilung I – Militär und Marine, Die Chinesische Kriegswehrmacht. Unsigned memorandum, no place, 2 December 1941.

252 equipment had to be superior to all Japanese weapons since Nanjing could only afford limited amounts of new equipment at any given time. For this reason they also chose to acquire German-made or at least German-inspired anti-aircraft cannons, although they had tested models from various nations before ultimately deciding for thr products of German manufacturers. The HAPRO company promptly fulfilled the various Chinese orders for Rheinmetall 2-centimetre Flugzeugabwehrkanone (Flak) 30 anti-aircraft guns, Rheinmetall 3.7-centimetre Flugzeugabwehrkanone (Flak) 18 anti-aircraft guns and Krupp 8.8-centimetre Flugzeugabwehrkanone (Flak) 18 anti- aircraft guns1057. These light and heavy cannons served alongside Swedish Bofors 7.5-centimetre Model 1929 anti-aircraft guns and Bofors 8-centimetre Model 1930 anti-aircraft guns which had been designed during the 1920s, at a time when the Bofors company had been working in close cooperation with the Krupp corporation to circumvent the limitations of the Treaty of Versailles1058. However, the Nanjing government and particularly Chiang Kaishek had a problem with the heavy armament of their own armed forces. It was a prevalent philosophy within the Chinese leadership to hoard any kind of equipment for some future crisis and, consequently, many of the best and most urgently-needed weapons were actually never used in combat due to the Guomindang politicians’ fear they might get damaged or lost to the enemy. Uncertainty about the’ loyalty of various Nationalist army units1059 and pure acquisitiveness were also relevant factors. As a result, most of the Chinese artillery, both regular and anti-aircraft, remained stationed in and around thw capital of Nanjing1060. Some Chinese artillery pieces bought in Germany indeed did see some action during the Sino-Japanese War. Although they had no impact on the Japanese advance during the initial skirmishes1061, Rheinmetall 3.7-centimetre Panzerabwehrkanone (Pak) 35/36 anti-tank guns were successfully used in many later battles. Light and easy to move around, they helped the Nationalist army to defend Shanghai in 1937 until it was ultimately overwhelmed by the more experienced

1056 MA, Msg 160/5, Einleitende Besprechungen des Generalberaters, General von Seeckt, mit Marschall Chiang Kai-shek. Colonel-General von Seeckt to Colonel Heins, Nanjing, 29 May 1934. 1057 Iwaki, Hitoshi (Ed.) (1993), p. 102. 1058 Bishop, Chris (Ed.) (2000) WWII: The Directory of Weapons, London: Greenwich Editions, p. 151. 1059 Tuchman, Barbara W. (1978) Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911 – 1945, New York (et al.): Bantam Books, p. 251. Barbara Tuchman quotes from General Joseph Stilwell’s private notes. 1060 MA, Msg 160/55, Quellen zur deutschen Militärberaterschaft in China (Kopien aus Beständen des National Archives). G-2 Report No. 8512, no place, 10 November 1936. 1061 Iwaki, Hitoshi (Ed.) (1993), p. 13.

253 Japanese troops. Yet, some sixty-five Japanese tanks fell victim to the German anti- tank guns in the streets of the port city and usually only an attack by Japanese planes could break the well-fortified Chinese anti-tank positions1062. The anti-tank guns were also instrumental in the Nationalist army’s victory at Taierzhuang in 1938, where their relatively small calibre proved to be perfectly suited against the thinly-armoured Japanese tanks. Nevertheless, many cannons of all types and calibres were simply withdrawn into China’s interior during the Nationalist army’s general retreat. Some of them, probably never having fired a single shot, were eventually captured by Mao Zedong’s Communists after the end of the Chinese Civil War in 19491063. Besides rapid-firing infantry guns, the hand grenade was the essential weapon for the kind of warfare Chiang Kaishek and his German military advisers had envisioned for the Chinese battlefield and for which especially the elite units had been trained. Since they were so easy to manufacture, most hand grenades were produced directly in China and did not have to be imported from abroad. The arsenals in northern Shanxi alone manufactured some 30,000 hand grenades per month1064. Biased by the general German prestige and probably based on actual combat experience, the majority of Chinese-manufactured hand grenades were of the so-called ‘potato masher’ type. In German World War I service, these grenades had been designated as Stielhandgranate StG 24 and consisted of a cylindrical metal head with high explosive filling, screwed to a wooden handle. There were so many photos showing Nationalist soldiers with what were apparently German stick grenades tucked into their belts that these weapons became almost as iconic as the ubiquitous Mauser pistols. Yet, the German military influence on Chiang Kaishek’s troops was not only limited to weapons. Steel helmets had became more and more common in China during the 1930s and came in a variety of types, including French Adrian helmets and British and American World War I models. However, the most widely-worn form of head protection was the German M1935 coal-scuttle helmet1065 with the Nationalist sun emblem painted on the left side or front of the helmet. These steel helmets had

1062 MA, Msg 160/33, ‘Die Schlacht von Shanghai’ – Denkschrift des OKW mit Karten 1939. 1063 Jowett, Philip S. (1997) Chinese Civil War Armies 1911 – 1949 [Men-at-Arms (Volume 306)], London: Osprey Publishing, p. 47. In the photograph on this page, Mao Zedong is seen parading in front of a battery of Rheinmetall 3.7-centimetre Flak 18 anti-aircraft guns. 1064 Carlson, Evans F. (1940) The Chinese Army; Its Organization and Military Efficiency, Westport: Hyperion Press, p. 63. 1065 Chennault, Claire L. (1949), p. 40.

254 been imported in enormous numbers via the HAPRO and were still worn during the final stages of the Chinese Civil War in the late 1940s.

5.4 Recapitulation Although Nationalist China and the rest of the world expected it throughout the 1930s, the large-scale military alliance between the Middle Kingdom and the Third Reich never came to pass. Adolf Hitler and his government surely recognized the advantages of a close military and economic cooperation between Germany and China, yet, their foreign political aims were too much focussed on Europe to pursue this option any further. It remained the duty of the same German factions which had upheld the Sino-German military relations over the previous years, the German army and the German industry, to keep them alive in the years to come, while Adolf Hitler tolerated their activities and indirectly profited from them. Without any interference from the National Socialist government – at least for the time being – the Wehrmacht, the newly-renamed German army, and the German industry could expand their still-unofficial military and economic relations to a level never contemplated before. The German military advisory group in Chinese service grew in size, prestige and influence, while representatives of the German economy, in close cooperation with their Chinese counterparts, created the HAPRO, a company dedicated to the exchange of German industrial goods, including weapons and ammunition, for Chinese raw materials. The close relationship between Nationalist China and the Third Reich, however, never reached their full potential since the National Socialist government, meanwhile working on a true military alliance with China’s arch-enemy, Japan, never intended to fully commit itself to the Chinese cause. Yet, the Chinese never realised that their relationship with Germany, even on this large scale, remained more or less private. The unofficiality of the Sino-German military and economic relationship was also the reason why the National Socialist government simply cancelled its friendly relations with China soon after the signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact with Japan in 1936 and the ultimate outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, although the German military advisers and the German arms manufacturers actively and extensively supported the Chinese war effort. Completely disregarding what had been accomplished over the previous years, Adolf Hitler recalled all German military

255 advisers in Chinese service against their will and stopped all war materials deliveries to the Far East only a short time later. Nevertheless, the Chinese, still hoping for a German change of mind, upheld its relationship with the Third Reich after 1938. Yet, when the Germans officially recognized a pro-Japanese puppet government in occupied northern China in mid- 1941, the Chinese severed all diplomatic relations with the Third Reich. Finally, when World War II spread from Europe to Asia in December of the same year, Nationalist China, not unexpectedly, declared war on Germany, too.

6. Conclusion There is a dictum that says that time grants a certain perspective to the historian that it withholds from the people who are actually involved in the process of history-making. Yet, there are some fields in where this saying seems to lose some of its validity. The Sino-German military relations of the 1920s and 1930s are with certainty among them. They are neither easy to describe nor to explain and, in some cases, they are even difficult to comprehend in their entirety. This may indeed be the reason why there are many so thoroughly different approaches to this topic. Many scholars describing the events of these two decades, both contemporary and more recent, see what they want to see rather than what really happened back then in China and Germany. Some prefer to completely ignore the presence of German military advisers or war materials in the Far East. Judging Germany by what had happened during World War I and by what would subsequently occur during the late 1930s and 1940s, they want to play down any benefits German military support might have had for conflict-ridden China. Others, however, tend to overemphasise the impact of German military advice and weapons deliveries on the Far East during that time, following motivations similar to those of the afore- mentioned scholars or trying to give Germany a disproportionately positive image in a time which all too often brought out the worst in this nation. Still, like in so many cases, the actual truth lies somewhere between these extremes. As a matter of fact, although the years between 1919 and 1938 can, in hindsight, be judged as a ‘Golden Age’ of Sino-German relations, a truly official relationship between the two nations never really existed. The lack of substantial political relations between Germany and China, besides the signing of the Sino-German Friendship Treaty of 1921, made the work of the foreign ministries of the two countries more and

256 more irrelevant. Consequently, the actual relations between Germany and China, which were rather military and economic than diplomatic, were conducted on different, far less official levels. Germany’s political and social situation in the post- World War I era essentially encouraged independent foreign political forays. Bearing the burden of a lost war, a harsh peace treaty and an economy in tatters, the Weimar Republic was, not unexpectedly, politically and socially fragmented and in a virtual state of anarchy. The government in Berlin, usually consisting of a coalition of convenience of an almost incomprehensible number of political parties, changed on a regular basis. In the meantime, various other factions – the remnants of the old political, military and economic elites of the deposed German Empire, as well as newly-emerging splinter groups embracing the most extreme fringes of ideology – joined the battle for supremacy in civil unrest-ridden Weimar Germany. Everybody pursued their own interests and agendas, while nobody was truly in control of the German nation or, in particular, its foreign policy. As a result, these different factions decided to establish their own international relations with countries of their choosing. Although of extraordinary and undeniable importance, China was actually only one of several other nations, predominantly in Latin America and Southeast Europe, in Weimar Germany’s network of parallel and unofficial, preferrably economic and military alliances. Yet, while this state of affairs was nothing unusual during the days of the Weimar Republic, Germany’s foreign political fragmentation continued well into the Third Reich. For the first couple of years after their rise to power in 1933, Adolf Hitler and his National Socialists were so focussed on consolidating their power base, first in Germany and then in Europe, that they never supported but merely tolerated the independent foreign policy approaches of private German citizens and members of the German armed forces and industry – particularly after they recognized that the national strengthening of the Third Reich profited enormously from them. However, as soon as it had stabilised its rule, the National Socialist government took complete control of Germany’s foreign policy. It replaced the previous protagonists of Germany’s unofficial pro-Chinese foreign policy in the Auswärtiges Amt, the Wehrmacht and, to a lesser degree, in the German economy with loyal followers of the official party line and changed the Third Reich’s foreign relations from top to bottom. This also included the creation of an intimate military coalition with Imperial Japan and the complete abandonment of China, which until then had put so much faith in its supposed German ally.

257 However, until then, several factions within Germany used the political weakness of the Weimar Republic and the initial lack of interest of the National Socialist government to create and pursue their own pro-Chinese foreign policy. Ever-present among them were the representatives of the German armaments industry and the German trading houses. Driven predominantly by their greed for profits in a time of global depression, yet completely indifferent to actual China politics, they sold and shipped weapons and other war materials to the Far East until they largely subordinated their previously unorganized and individual unofficial business relations with the Chinese to those of the equally unofficial HAPRO umbrella corporation which, until the very end of the Sino-German partnership, helped to reasonably coordinate the German influence on Chinese military affairs. Still, the main protagonists of Germany’s military approach to the Middle Kingdom were the various military and techological advisers in Chinese service. The motives of the various advisers to accept employment in the Far East differed from individual to individual. The only thing they had in common was that they all tended to be conservative, even reactionary. Some were former imperial officers who could neither find a position in the strongly downsized armed forces of the Weimar Republic nor a job in the economically weak post-war Germany. Some were starry-eyed idealists on a personal crusade or fierce anti-Bolsheviks who fought their Comintern enemies wherever they could find them. Some were politically active National Socialists who were wanted by the German authorities before 1933. Some had to leave Germany for being dissidents or for being of Jewish descent after Adolf Hitler’s rise to power1066. Finally, some were mere adventurers who were drawn to the Far East by the promises of exoticism, excitement and money. This plethora of individual motivations was mirrored even by the individual heads of Chiang Kaishek’s German military advisory group. Colonel Max Bauer was an enthusiastic and almost unrealistic visionary who wanted to do his part in making China a better place with the help of his self-constructed ideology and his grand plans. General Hans von Seeckt was a shameless and unscrupulous opportunist who exploited the prestige he enjoyed in Germany and the Far East to make as much money as possible with relatively little effort. General Alexander von

1066 It is paradoxical and quite ironic that the German military advisory group in Chinese service was for a certain part composed of National Socialist sympathizers in the years before the fall of the Weimar Republic while apparently after 1933 many anti-fascists joined its ranks.

258 Falkenhausen was a thoroughly honest and professional soldier who did the job he was hired for with heart-felt devotion and typical German efficiency. Yet, in the end, efforts have to be combined with results to mean something. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, as well as in subsequent years, the reputation of the German military mission was larger – both in negative and positive terms – than its actual achievements, although the individual advisory group’s high quality per se cannot be denied. As a result, the question about the actual impact of the German influence on Chinese military affairs still remains. The individual military and technical advisers active during the early post-World War I years were never in a position to make any serious difference in conflict-ridden China. With only some 130 members in its ten years of service, the German military advisory group was also fairly small and limited in its area of activity. Furthermore, despite the indisputable importance of German weapons and equipment deliveries for the Chinese armed forces, Germany was neither the only nor the biggest arms supplier for China. Nevertheless, now and then the few German military advisers and the German war materials had a certain influence on important events – the various campaigns against warlord remnants and the Chinese Communists, as well as the initial battles against the Japanese around Shanghai and at Taierzhuang displayed some modest results of German military support. Still, looking at China’s deplorable overall situation during the 1920s and 1930s, there was too much to do in too little time and, as a consequence, many efforts came to nought. Maybe a real and recognisable difference could have been made if there had indeed been an official governmentally sanctioned military cooperation between Germany and China instead of all the more-or-less private and semi-legal affairs. Yet, then again, the Middle Kingdom had always been simply too big and too complex for any foreign nation to make any kind of real and long-lasting impact. Even with state support, the Soviet mission of Mikhail M. Borodin and Marshal Vasili K. Blyuker had only limited success with its political and military activities in China during the 1920s. During World War II, the United States of America’s military advisory group, led by General Joseph Stilwell and General Albert C. Wedemeyer, had, despite personnel and material efforts on a scale never witnessed before, to cope with the same disappointments as the German officers only a few years earlier. In a China plagued both by external threats and internal strife, a handful of German military advisers and a few shiploads of German war materials were merely a drop in the ocean. The conflicts continuously raging in the Far East throughout the first half of the twentieth century were so immense that German-trained units were wiped out within a matter of days and the majority of German-supplied weapons was lost in only a few battles. All this does not mean that the German military advisers and weapons suppliers did a bad and ultimately ineffectual job. It also does not mean that they did an exceptionally good job which was rendered futile only by the inadequacies of China’s situation. It simply means that the German military advisers and weapons suppliers did whatever they did. They – just like the Russians, British, French, Italians and Americans before, beside and after them – came to the Far East, offered their military know-how and material support and left again. Yet, none of them could solve China’s conflicts, not even marginally. In the end, only the Chinese people themselves could do what they thought best ‘for China’s benefit’.

259 Appendix 1: A List of German Military Advisory Group Members in Nationalist Chinese Service between 1928 and 19381067:

• Aderholdt, Paul [Lieutenant Colonel], 1937 – 1938 • Alten, ??? von [Colonel, retired], 1930 – ??? • Anselt, ???, 1929 – 1930 • Arnade, ??? [Captain, retired], 1936 – ???= • Bade, ??? [Colonel, retired], 1931 – 1935 • Balk, ???, 1929 – 1936 • Bauer, Max [Colonel, retired], 1928 – 1929= • Bauer, Otto [Lieutenant, retired], 1930 – 1938 • Baumann, ??? [Lieutenant Colonel], 1933 – ??? • Baumbach, Wilhelm [Major, retired], 1933 – 1938 • Baumgärtner, ???, 1939 – 1933 • Bautz, Adolf [???, retired], 1932 – 1938 • Beelitz, ??? [Major, retired], 1929 – 1932 • Bernhardt, August [???, retired], 1932 – 1938 • Bloedhorn, Erich [Captain, retired], 1931 – 1936 • Blume, Gustav [Second Lieutenant, retired], 1929 – 1938 • Bock, ??? von [Lieutenant, retired], 1929 – 1931= • Boddien, Oskar von [Captain, retired], 1931 – 1938 • Boegel, Gustav [Lieutenant, retired], 1932 – 1938 • Böhler, Friedrich, 1929 – 1938 • Borchardt, Robert [Major or Second Lieutenant, retired], 1935 – 1938 • Braun, Wilhelm [Lieutenant, retired], 1934 – 1936 • Brose, ??? [Captain, retired], 1932 – 1934 • Bruendel, Karl [Major, retired], 1933 – 1938 • Busekist, Erich von [Lieutenant, retired], 1932 – 1934 • Czerniewitz, ??? [Second Lieutenant, retired], 1932 – 1934

260 • Damerau, Ulrich von der [Captain, retired], 1931 – 1936 • Darmer, ??? [Navy Captain, retired], 1929 – 1930 • Dulheuer, ???, 1932 – 1935 • Eberbeck, ??? [???, retired], 1932 – 1934 • Egidy, ??? von [Captain, retired], 1929 – 1934= • Erdniss, ??? [???, retired], 1933 – 1936 • Ertner, ???, 1931 – 1932 • Fabiunke, ??? [Major], 1935 – 1936 • Falkenhausen, Alexander von [General, retired], 1934 – 1938 • Fehrmann, ??? [Major], 1929 – 19331068 • Fischer, ??? [Lieutenant Colonel, retired], 1929 – 1931 • Fremery, ??? de [Colonel], 1929 – 19351069 • Fuchs, ???, 1929 – 1931 • Gilbert, Gottfried [Captain, retired], 1931 – 1934 • Glitz, Erhard [Captain, retired], 1934 – 1936 • Gudowius, ??? [Brigadier, retired], 1929 – 1935 • Guse, ??? [Lieutenant Colonel, retired], 1930 – 1935 • Haase, ??? [Major General, retired], 1935 – 1936 • Harnisch, ??? [Captain, retired], 1933 – 1936 • Hartmann, Heinrich, 1930 – 1934 • Hartmann, Walter [Major, retired], 1932 – 1933 • Hartung, ??? [Lieutenant, retired], 1931 – 1932= • Haubs, ??? [Lieutenant Colonel, retired], 1930 – 1933 • Heinrich, Paul [???, retired], 1934 – 1938 • Heinrichs, Konrad [Major, retired], 1934 – 1938 • Heins, ??? [Colonel, retired], 1932 – 1934 • Heise, Erich [Captain, retired], 1929 – 1933 • Held, ??? [Brigadier, retired], 1934 – 1936 • Henning, ??? von, 1929 – 19331070

1067 MA, Nachlaß Schmidtmann, Aktenstück Nr. 14, Korrespondenz mit Krummacher. List of German military and civilian advisers in Nationalist Chinese service. There are some amendments from other sources, however, in some cases the full names, ranks or exact dates of service remain unknown [Ed.] 1068 Major Fehrmann was actually a Swiss citizen [Ed.]. 1069 Colonel de Fremery was actually a Dutch citizen [Ed.].

261 • Hermann, Karl-Otto [Captain, retired], 1934 – 1936 • Hornhardt, ??? von [???, retired], 1929 – 1930= • Hotz, Franz [???, retired], 1932 – 1935 • Hummel, Franz [Second Lieutenant, retired], 1928 – 1938 • Hunolstein, ??? von [Captain, retired], 1930 – 1936 • Kaiser, ??? [Captain, retired], 1931 – 1933 • Karlewski, ??? [Major General, retired], 1933 – 1934 • Keiper, ???, 1929 – 1932 • Knobelsdorff, ??? von [Major, retired], 1930 – 1934 • Koeppen, ???, 1929 – 1932 • Koerner, ??? [???, retired], 1929 – 1931 • Kotz, Richard [Major, retired], 1929 – 1934 • Kriebel, Hermann [Lieutenant Colonel, retired], 1929 – 1930 • Krug, Hans-Jürgen [Major, retired], 1930 – 1933 • Krummacher, ??? [Captain, retired], 1929 – 1938 • Kubik, Rudolf, 1932 – 1938 • Lamezan, Albrecht von [Captain, retired], 1932 – 1937 • Landauer, ??? [???, retired], 1929 – 1930= • Langer, ??? [???, retired], 1932 – 1934 • Lassen, Ernst-Albrecht [Colonel, retired], 1929 – 1936 • Leber, ??? [???, retired], 1931 – 1934 • Lehmann, Ottfried [Lieutenant, retired], 1929 – 1933 • Lindemann, Fritz [Major General, retired], 1929 – 1932 • Lindemann, Walther [Major, retired], 1934 – ??? • Link, ??? [Brigadier, retired], 1932 – 1933= • Lohmann, Otto, 1933 – 1938 • Lorenz, Wilhelm [Captain, retired], 1931 – 1938 • Lucht, Walter [Colonel, retired], 1933 – 1936 • Martin, Karl-Theodor [???, retired], 1929 – 1938 • Metzner, Walter, 1929 – 1936 • Meyer, Constantin [Captain, retired], 1929 – 1938

1070 Mister von Henning was actually an Austrian citizen [Ed.].

262 • Moellenhoff, Friedrich [Lieutenant, retired], 1929 – 1932 • Moltke, ??? [Lieutenant, retired], 1929 – 1930 • Moritz, ??? [Lieutenant, retired], 1931 – 1933 • Muck, ???, 1931 – 19321071 • Müller, ??? [Captain, retired], 1933 – 1934 • Neidholt, ??? [Lieutenant Colonel, retired], 1935 – 1937 • Neumaier, ???, 1932 – 1936 • Neunzert, ??? [Lieutenant, retired], 1929 – 1930 • Newiger, Albert [Lieutenant Colonel, retired], 1935 – 1938 • Nolte, Hans-Erich [Colonel, retired], 1931 – 1938 • Oehme, Hans-Georg [Captain, retired], 1933 – 1937 • Piegl, ???, 1929 – 19311072 • Pirner, Hanns [Major, retired], 1931 – 1937 • Pohle, Franz [Corporal, retired], 1931 – 1938 • Rave, Ortwin [Navy Captain, retired], 1932 – 1936 • Rubens, ???, 1929 – 1932 • Rueff, Hans [Lieutenant, retired], 1930 – 1935 • Schaumburg, Otto [Major, retired], 1930 – 1932 • Schimmelfennig, ??? [Major, retired], 1933 – 1936 • Schindler, ??? [Lieutenant Colonel], 1931 – 19321073 • Schmeling-Diringshofen, Klaus von [Second Lieutenant, retired], 1934 – 1938 • Scholz, Arthur [???, retired], 1937 – 1938 • Schubart, ???, 1929 – 1930 • Schulz, ??? [???, retired], 1932 – 1934 • Seeckt, Hans von [General, retired], 1934 – 1935 • Senczek, Erich, 1934 – 1938 • Simon-Eberhard, Max [Captain, retired], 1929 – 1931 • Spemann, Kurt [Brigadier, retired], 1931 – 1938 • Spieß, ??? [Lieutenant, retired], 1930 – 1931 • Starke, Hermann [Major General, retired], 1933 – 1938

1071 Mister Muck was actually an Austrian citizen [Ed.]. 1072 Mister Piegl was actually an Austrian citizen [Ed.]. 1073 Lieutenant Colonel Schindler was actually an Austrian citizen [Ed.].

263 • Stein, Bodo von [Captain, retired], 1931 – ??? • Stennes, Walter [Police Captain, retired], 1933 – 1949 • Stölzner, Erich [Second Lieutenant, retired], 1928 – ??? • Streccius, Alfred [Major General, retired], 1934 – 1938 • Streppel, Kurt [Lieutenant, retired], 1930 – 1934 • Techel, ??? [Lieutenant, retired], 1929 – 1930 • Vetter, Hans [Colonel, retired], 1933 – 1937 • Voight-Ruscheweyh, Hermann [Colonel, retired], 1933 – 1938 • Wahlen, ???, 1931 – 19321074 • Wangenheim, Eberhard von [Major, retired], 1928 – 1935 • Weber, Fritz [Second Lieutenant, retired], 1929 – 1935 • Welkoborski, ??? [Lieutenant, retired], 1929 – 1932 • Wendt, ??? [Police Major], 1929 – 1930 • Wetzell, Georg [Lieutenant General, retired], 1930 – 1934 • Wilck, Hermann [Colonel, retired], 1932 – 1938 • Zanthier, ??? von, 1929 – 1931 • Zimmermann, ???, 1929 – 1933 • Zimmermann, Wilhelm [Second Lieutenant, retired], 1930 – 1938

1074 Mister Wahlen was actually a Swiss citizen [Ed.]

264 Appendix 2: A List of German Military Hardware Exports to Warlord China and Nationalist China between 1921 and 19381075

Aircraft: • Focke-Wulf FW 44 Stieglitz One-Engined Two-Man Training Aircraft • Focke-Wulf FW 58 Weihe Two-Engined Four-Man Multi-Purpose Aircraft • Focke-Wulf S.24 Kiebitz One-Engined Two-Man Training Aircraft • Fuetterer Schoettler I1076 One-Engined Two-Man Multi-Purpose Aircraft • Heinkel He 111 A-0 Two-Engined Five-Man Heavy Bomber • Heinkel He 66bCH One-Engined Two-Man Reconnaissance Aircraft/Bomber • Henschel Hs 123 A-1 One-Engined One-Man Fighter Aircraft/Bomber • Junkers A 20 One-Engined Two-Man Multi-Purpose Aircraft • Junkers A 35 One-Engined Two-Man Training Aircraft • Junkers F 13 One-Engined Two-Man Transport Aircraft • Junkers Ju 52/3m Three-Engined Four-Man Transport Aircraft • Junkers K 47 One-Engined Two-Man Fighter Aircraft • Junkers K 53 One-Engined Two-Man Reconnaissance Aircraft • Junkers W 33 One-Engined Two-Man Transport Aircraft • Udet/BFW U-12 Flamingo One-Engined Two-Man Training Aircraft

Tanks, Armoured Cars and other Vehicles: • Panzerkampfwagen I Ausführung A (SdKfz. 101) Light Tank • Leichter Panzerspähwagen (SdKfz. 221) Armoured Car • Leichter Panzerspähwagen (SdKfz. 222) Armoured Car • Unspecified Truck1077 • Unspecified Tank Truck1078 • Unspecified Artillery Tractor1079

1075 This list was compiled from a wide range of sources, including the analysis of photographs, but can, by its very nature, not be complete. 1076 In 1924, an unknown but apparently very small number of Fuetterer Schoettler aircraft was built from scratch at the Longhua aerodrome. See Langsdorf, W. von (Ed.) (1927) Jahrbuch 1927 – 28 [Fortschritte der Luftfahrt (Number 14)], Frankfurt am Main: Bechhold Verlag, p. 209. 1077 The German military truck in question could be the Krupp Kfz. 81 or the Opel Blitz.

265 • BMW Motorcycle with Sidecar • Zündapp Motorcycle with and without Sidecar1080

Cannons, Anti-Tank Guns and Anti-Aircraft Guns: • Krupp 7.5-Centimetre Feldkanone (Fk) 16 n.A. Cannon • Krupp 7.5-Centimetre Leichtes Infanteriegeschütz (leIg) 18 Cannon • Rheinmetall 10.5-Centimetre Leichte Feldhaubitze (leFh) 18 Howitzer • Rheinmetall/Krupp 15-Centimetre Schwere Feldhaubitze (sFh) 18 Howitzer • Unspecified Heavy Coastal Artillery Cannon • Rheinmetall 7.5-Centimetre Minenwerfer 18 Mortar • Rheinmetall 8.1-Centimetre Schwerer Granatwerfer (sGw) 34 Mortar • Rheinmetall 3.7-Centimetre Panzerabwehrkanone (Pak) 35/36 Anti-Tank Gun • Rheinmetall 2-Centimetre Flugzeugabwehrkanone (Flak) 30 Anti-Aircraft Gun • Rheinmetall 3.7-Centimetre Flugzeugabwehrkanone (Flak) 18 Anti-Aircraft Gun • Krupp 8.8-Centimetre Flugzeugabwehrkanone (Flak) 18 Anti-Aircraft Gun • Unspecified 12.7-Centimetre Anti-Aircraft Gun

Rifles and Pistols: • Mauser 7.92-Millimetre Gewehr 98 Rifle • Mauser 7.92-Millimetre Karabiner 98k Carbine • Bergmann 9-Millimetre MP 18/20 Submachine Gun • Bergmann 9-Millimetre MP 28 Submachine Gun • Mauser 7.65- and 9-Millimetre C 96 Pistol

1078 The German tank truck in question could be a variant of the Opel Blitz. 1079 The German artillery tractors in question were manufactured by the Daimler-Benz, Henschel and MAN companies, but their exact models remain unknown. 1080 The BMW motorcycles in question could be R11, R12, R15 or R61 models.

266 Literature List (Bibliography)

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267 Politische Abteilung VIII – China R 104814 Po. 2, Politische Beziehungen Chinas zu Deutschland, Band 1 (7. 36 – 12. 37) R 104815 Po. 2, Politische Beziehungen Chinas zu Deutschland, Band 2 (1. 38 – 6. 39) R 104863 Po. 13, Militärangelegenheiten in China (5. 36 – 12. 38)

Unpublished Documents – German Military Archive [MA], Freiburg: Nachlaß Bauer Aktenstück Nr. 39 Berichte Bauers über seine Reisen nach China 1927 – 1929 (1930) Aktenstück Nr. 41 Denkschriften zum militärischen und politischen Aufbau Chinas 1928/1929 (1930) Aktenstück Nr. 42a Denkschriften für den waffentechnischen Aufbau des Heeres und den Aufbau des Bahnwesens in China, Band 2, 1928 – 1929 Aktenstück Nr. 44 Schreiben Bauers aus China an die Handelsabteilung der Chinesischen Gesandtschaft in Berlin 1928/1929 Aktenstück Nr. 45 Geschäftlicher Schriftwechsel mit dem Sohn Ernst (bei der Handelsabteilung der chinesischen Gesandtschaft in Berlin) 1928/1929 Aktenstück Nr. 46 Bernhard Waurick (Handelsabteilung der Chinesischen Gesandtschaft in Berlin) 1928/1929 Aktenstück Nr. 47 Schriftwechsel mit verschiedenen Firmen betr. Lieferungen für China 1927 – 1929 Aktenstück Nr. 49 Schriftwechsel mit deutschen Mitarbeitern in China 1928/1929 Aktenstück Nr. 50 Schriftwechsel mit Bewerbern für eine Mitarbeit in China (fortgesetzt von Ernst Bauer) 1928 – 1934 Aktenstück Nr. 55 Presseartikel über Oberst Bauer und seine Tätigkeit in China 1928/1930 Nachlaß Falkenhausen N 246/7 Dienstliche Unterlagen der Beraterstelle in China, Band 1 (1935 – 1936) N 246/8 Dienstliche Unterlagen der Beraterstelle in China, Band 2 (1937) N 246/9 Dienstliche Unterlagen der Beraterstelle in China, Band 3 (1938) N 246/10 Dienstliche Unterlagen der Beraterstelle in China, Band 4 (1935 – 1938) N 246/12 Schriftwechsel über die Verpflichtung als Militärberater in China 1934 N 246/137 Von Oberst Erwin Topf überarbeitete und erweiterte Fassung der Memoiren von Alexander von Falkenhausen, Band 3: Kapitel 9 – 11 Nachlaß Seeckt N 247/133 Beratertätigkeit von Seeckts in China N 62/9 Denkschrift Seeckts für Marschall Tschiang Kai-shek 30.6.1933 Nachlaß Schmidtmann Aktenstück Nr. 14 Korrespondenz mit Krummacher

268 Nachlaß Starke N 218/1 Mein Kommando zur Kampfzone I in China (Mittelgruppe der Nordfront) 22. 9. 1937 – 17. 10. 1937 Bestand Deutsche Beraterschaft in China Msg 160/1 Briefe und Berichte des Generals d. Inf. Wetzell, Hauptmann a.D. Krummacher u. a. über die ‘Lehrdivision’ und den Honan-Feldzug Msg 160/2 Nachrichten, Denkschriften Msg 160/3 Schriftwechsel Beraterbüro Nanking mit General Wetzell Msg 160/4 Briefe General Wetzell an Verbindungsstelle Berlin und Oberst Brinckmann, 1932 – 1934 Msg 160/5 Einleitende Besprechungen des Generalberaters, General von Seeckt, mit Marschall Chiang Kai-shek Msg 160/8 Der chinesisch-japanische Krieg 1937 – 1938 Msg 160/9 Büroangelegenheiten der Beraterschaft in Nanking, später Hankow, 1936 – 1938 Msg 160/10 Anstellungsverträge des General (a.D.) Wilk als Militärberater in der chinesischen Regierung 1932 und 1935 Msg 160/13 Situation der Beraterschaft in China Msg 160/14 Übersicht über Stärke und Tätigkeitszeitraum der Mitglieder der beraterschaft (Reste) o.D. Msg 160/16 Die deutsche Beraterschaft in Kanton 1934 – 1935 Msg 160/33 ‘Die Schlacht von Shanghai’ – Denkschrift des OKW mit Karten 1939 Msg 160/34 Politische Entwicklung in China bis 1927 Msg 160/35 Ausbildungstätigkeit und soziale Verhältnisse in China Msg 160/53 Papiere zur deutschen Militärberaterschaft in China Msg 160/55 Quellen zur deutschen Militärberaterschaft in China (Kopien aus Beständen des American National Archive) Msg 160/59 ‘Die HAPRO in China; Ein Bericht über Entstehung und Entwicklung des deutsch-chinesischen Austauschvertrages 1930 – 1937’ von Walter Eckert 1981 Miscellaneous RH 2/1440 Fremde Staaten: Allgemeines, Gesamtstreitmacht des Auslandes, Fremde Staaten, Heere und Flotten – Organisation, Gliederung, Stärke, Ausbildung und dgl. der Streitkräfte des Auslandes, Band 3a (1937) RH 2/1441 Fremde Staaten: Allgemeines, Gesamtstreitmacht des Auslandes, Fremde Staaten, Heere und Flotten – Organisation, Gliederung, Stärke, Ausbildung und dgl. der Streitkräfte des Auslandes, Band 3b (1938) RH 2/1811 Fremde Staaten: Allgemeines, Gesamtstreitmacht des Auslandes, Fremde Staaten, Heere und Flotten – Organisation, Gliederung, Stärke, Ausbildung und dgl. der Streitkräfte des Auslandes, Chinesisch-japanischer Krieg RH 2/1822 Fremde Staaten: Allgemeines, Gesamtstreitmacht des Auslandes, Fremde Staaten, Heere und Flotten – Organisation, Gliederung, Stärke, Ausbildung und dgl. der Streitkräfte des Auslandes, Band 3a (1928 – 1929) RH 2/1848 Fremde Staaten: Allgemeines, Gesamtstreitmacht des Auslandes, Fremde Staaten, Heere und Flotten – Organisation, Gliederung,

269 Stärke, Ausbildung und dgl. der Streitkräfte des Auslandes, Chinesisch-japanischer Krieg RH 2/2939 Persönlicher Schriftwechsel, Band 1 (1936 – 1938) Schriftwechsel des Chefs der 3. Abt. des Generalstabs des Heeres/ Oberquartiermeisters IV (Generalleutnant von Tippelskirch, Generalmajor Matzky) mit den einzelnen Militärattaches und sonstigen deutschen Auslandsvertretungen RW 19 Anhang I/845 IG Farbenindustrie, Wirtschaftstruktur und Wirt- schaftslage in China, 1. August 1938 RW 19 Anhang I/1393 Ostasiatischer Verein, Hamburg-Bremen e.V., Rundschreiben, Protokolle 1931 – 1943

Unpublished Documents –Miroslav Herold Collection [MH], Cologne: Nachlaß Brammen, Frommherz und Ruef

Published Documents: [Anon.] (Ed.) (1987 ff.) Akten zur Deutschen Auswärtigen Politik [ADAP] 1918 – 1945; Serie A: 1918 – 1925; Band V – Band XIII, Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht [Anon.] (Ed.) (1970 ff.) Akten zur Deutschen Auswärtigen Politik [ADAP] 1918 – 1945; Serie B: 1925 – 1933; Band IV – Band XXI, Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht [Anon.] (Ed.) (1971 ff.) Akten zur Deutschen Auswärtigen Politik [ADAP] 1918 – 1945; Serie C: 1933 – 1937; Band I/1 – Band VI/2, Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht [Anon.] (Ed.) (1950 ff.) Akten zur Deutschen Auswärtigen Politik [ADAP] 1918 – 1945; Serie D: 1937 – 1945; Band I – Band IV, Baden-Baden: Imprimerie Nationale Horne, Charles F. (Ed.) (1927) Source Records of the Great War, Washington: National Alumni Leutner, Mechthild (Ed.) (1998) Deutschland und China 1937 – 1949; Politik – Militär – Wirtschaft – Kultur; Eine Quellensammlung, Berlin: Akademie Verlag Reichsministerium des Innern (Ed.) (1920) Reichsgesetzblatt 1920, Berlin: Verlag des Gesetzsammlungsamts Reichsministerium des Innern (Ed.) (1921) Reichsgesetzblatt 1921, Berlin: Verlag des Gesetzsammlungsamts Reichsministerium des Innern (Ed.) (1927) Reichsgesetzblatt; Teil I; 1927, Berlin: Verlag des Gesetzsammlungsamts Reichsministerium des Innern (Ed.) (1928) Reichsgesetzblatt; Teil I; 1928, Berlin: Verlag des Gesetzsammlungsamts

Encyclopedias: Bishop, Chris (Ed.) (2000) WWII: The Directory of Weapons, London: Greenwich Editions Chamberlain, Peter & Ellis, Chris (2002) Tanks of the World; 1915 – 1945, London: Cassel & Co. Grey, C.G. (Ed.) (1920 ff.) All the World’s Aircraft, London: Sampson Low, Marston & Company

270 Grey, C.G. & Bridgman, Leonard (Eds.) (1926 ff.) All the World’s Aircraft, London: Sampson Low, Marston & Company Grey, C.G. & Bridgman, Leonard (Eds.) (1930 ff.) Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft, London: Sampson Low, Marston & Company Historische Kommission bei der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (1953) Neue Deutsche Biographie; Erster Band; Aachen – Behaim, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot Historische Kommission bei der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (1961) Neue Deutsche Biographie; Fünfter Band; Falck – Fyner (Voran: Faistenberger), Berlin: Duncker & Humblot Hogg, Ian V. (1997) The Military Book Club Encyclopedia of Infantry Weapons of WWII, London: Saturn Books Killy, Walter (Ed.) (1995) Deutsche Biographische Enzyklopädie (DBE); Band 1; Aachen – Boguslawski, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft Killy, Walther (Ed.) (1996) Deutsche Biographische Enzyklopädie (DBE); Band 3; Ebinger – Gierke, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft Killy, Walther & Vierhaus, Rudolf (Eds.) (1998) Deutsche Biographische Enzyklopädie (DBE); Band 9; Schmidt – Theyer, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft Langsdorf, W. von (Ed.) (1927) Jahrbuch 1927 – 28 [Fortschritte der Luftfahrt (Number 14)], Frankfurt am Main: Bechhold Verlag Langsdorf, W. von (Ed.) (1936) Taschenbuch der Luftflotten 1936, München: J.F. Lehmanns Verlag Novarra, Heinz J. (1993) Die deutsche Luftrüstung 1933 – 1945; Band 1: Flugzeugtypen AEG – Dornier, Koblenz: Bernard & Graefe Verlag Novarra, Heinz J. (1993) Die deutsche Luftrüstung 1933 – 1945; Band 2: Flugzeugtypen Erla – Heinkel, Koblenz: Bernard & Graefe Verlag Novarra, Heinz J. (1993) Die deutsche Luftrüstung 1933 – 1945; Band 3: Flugzeugtypen Henschel – Messerschmitt, Koblenz: Bernard & Graefe Verlag Novarra, Heinz J. (1993) Die deutsche Luftrüstung 1933 – 1945; Band 1: Flugzeugtypen MIAG – Zeppelin, Koblenz: Bernard & Graefe Verlag Stützer, Helmut (1984) Die deutschen Militärflugzeuge 1919 – 1934, Herford: Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn

Books: Abegg, Lily (1940) Chinas Erneuerung; Der Raum als Waffe, Frankfurt am Main: Societäts-Verlag Adolphi, Wolfram (1989) Die Chinapolitik des faschistischen Deutschland 1937 bis 1945; Thesen zu einigen Forschungsergebnissen, in: [Anon.] (Ed.) (1989) Bulletin Faschismus/

271 Zweiter Weltkrieg; Sonderheft 1989, Berlin: Zentralinstitut für Geschichte, pp. 128 – 140 Ahlers, John (1940) Japan closing the ‘Open Door’ in China, Shanghai (et al.): Kelly & Walsh Anderson, Duncan (2003) The Times; War; A History in Photographs, London: Times Books Andersson, Lennart (1990) Svenska Flygplan; Den svenska flygindustrins historia; History of the Swedish Aviation Industry, Stockholm: Förlag Allt om Hobby Andersson, Lennart (2002)1081 Chinese Aviation until 1949, [Unpublished] [Anon.] (1934) Arms and the Chinaman, in: Johnson, Julia E. (Ed.) (1934) International Traffic in Arms and Munitions [Reference Shelf (Volume IX, Number 9)], New York: H.W. Wilson Company, pp. 156 – 158 [Anon.] (1934) Secret International, in: Johnson, Julia E. (Ed.) (1934) International Traffic in Arms and Munitions [Reference Shelf (Volume IX, Number 9)], New York: H.W. Wilson Company, pp. 167 – 184 Archer, C.S. (1950) Hankow Return, Toronto: W.M. Collins Sons & Co. Ballantine, Joseph W. (1970) International Settings: A Study of Strained Relationships between China and Foreign Powers, in: Sih, Paul K.T. (Ed.) (1970) The Strenuous Decade: China’s Nation-Building Efforts, 1927 – 1937 [Asia in the Modern World (Number 9)], Kingston: St. John’s University Press, pp. 1 – 31 Bates, Gill & Kim, Taeho (1995) China’s Arms Acquisitions from Abroad; A Quest for ‘Superb and Secret Weapons’ [SIPRI Research Report (Number 11)], Oxford (et al.): Oxford University Press Bergère, Marie-Claire (1998) Sun Yat-sen, Stanford: Stanford University Press Bloch, Kurt (1940) German Interests and Policies in the Far East, New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, International Secretariat Bloß, Hartmut (1976) Deutsche Chinapolitik im Dritten Reich, in: Funke, Manfred (Ed.) (1977) Hitler, Deutschland und die Mächte; Materialien zur Außenpolitik des Dritten Reiches, Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, pp. 407 – 429 Bonavia, David (1995) China’s Warlords, Hongkong (et al.): Oxford University Press Borke, Kurt von (1938) Deutsche unter fremden Fahnen, Berlin: Schlieffen-Verlag Braun, Otto (1973) Chinesische Aufzeichnungen (1932 – 1939), Berlin: Dietz Verlag Brendon, Piers (2000) The Dark Valley; A Panorama of the 1930s, London: Jonathan Cape

1081 Since this book is still a work in progress and has not yet been published, excerpts of some of its chapters were e-mailed by its author on 20 December 2002 for use in this thesis.

272 Briessen, Fritz van (1977) Grundzüge der deutsch-chinesischen Beziehungen [Grundzüge (Volume 32)], Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft Briessen, Fritz van (1982) Deutsche Institutionen und Persönlichkeiten in China, in: Machetzki, Rüdiger (Ed.) (1982) Deutsch-chinesische Beziehungen; Ein Handbuch, Hamburg: Institut für Asienkunde, pp. 37 – 91 Bull, Stephen (1999) Stormtrooper; Elite German Assault Soldiers, London: Publishing News Carlson, Evans F. (1940) The Chinese Army; Its Organization and Military Efficiency, Westport: Hyperion Press Cecil, Viscount (1934) Who Should Make War Munitions?, in: Johnson, Julia E. (Ed.) (1934) International Traffic in Arms and Munitions [Reference Shelf (Volume IX, Number 9)], New York: H.W. Wilson Company, pp. 161 – 167 Chan, Anthony B. (1982) Arming the Chinese; The Western Armaments Trade in Warlord China, 1920 – 1928, Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press Chang, Iris (1998) The Rape of Nanking; The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II, Ringwood: Penguin Books Chen, Chi (1973) Die Beziehungen zwischen Deutschland und China bis 1933 [Mitteilungen des Instituts für Asienkunde Hamburg (Number 56)], Hamburg: Institut für Asienkunde Chen, Ying-ming (et al.) (1991) Kang Ri Zhanzheng Shiqi 1937 – 1945; Zhongguo Kongjun Feiji; The Aircrafts [sic] of the Chinese Air Force in the Sino-Japan War [Zhongguo Zhi Yi (Special 1)], Taipei Chungho: Tongwei Yinshua Chennault, Claire L. (1949) Way of a Fighter; The Memoirs of Claire Lee Chennault, Major General, U.S. Army (Ret.), New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons Chiang, Kai-shek (1985) China’s Destiny, Westport: Greenwood Press Chi, Hsi-sheng (1969) The Chinese Warlord System: 1916 – 1928, Washington: American University; Center for Research in Social Systems Davies, John Paton Jr. (1972) Dragon by the Tail; American, British, Japanese, and Russian Encounters with China and one another, New York: W.W. Norton & Company Dirksen, Herbert von (1949) Moskau Tokio London; Erinnerungen und Betrachtungen zu 20 Jahren deutscher Außenpolitik 1919 – 1939, Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag Djang, Feng Djen (1936) The Diplomatic Relations between China and Germany since 1898, Shanghai: Commercial Press

273 Domes, Jürgen (1969) Vertagte Revolution; Die Politik der Kuomintang in China, 1923 – 1937 [Beiträge zur auswärtigen und internationalen Politik (Volume 3)], Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co. Dong, Stella (2001) Shanghai; The Rise and Fall of a Decadent City, New York: Perennial Döscher, Hans-Jürgen (1987) Das Auswärtige Amt im Dritten Reich; Diplomatie im Schatten der ‘Endlösung’, Berlin: Siedler Verlag Drage, Charles (1958) The Amiable Prussian, London: Anthony Blond Drechsler, Karl (1964) Deutschland – China – Japan 1933 – 1939; Das Dilemma der deutschen Fernostpolitik, Berlin: Akademie-Verlag Drechsler, Karl (1989) Die Chinapolitik der Weimarer Republik und Hitlerdeutschlands 1920 bis 1939 – Grundlinien und Zäsuren, in: [Anon.] (Ed.) (1989) Bulletin Faschismus/ Zweiter Weltkrieg; Sonderheft 1989, Berlin: Zentralinstitut für Geschichte, pp. 12 – 14 Dreyer, Edward L. (1995) China at War, 1901 – 1949, London/New York: Longman Dülffer, Jost (1984) Kolonialismus ohne Kolonien: Deutsche Kolonialpläne 1938, in: Knipping, Franz & Müller, Klaus-Jürgen (Eds.) (1984) Machtbewußtsein in Deutschland am Vorabend des Zweiten Weltkrieges, Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, pp. 247 – 270 Dupuy, Trevor N. (1969) The Military History of the Chinese Civil War, New York: Franklin Watts Eastman, Lloyd E. (1991) Nationalist China during the Nanking Decade, 1927 – 1937, in: Eastman, Lloyd E. (et al.) (1991) The Nationalist Era in China 1927 – 1949, Cambridge (et al.): Cambridge University Press, pp. 1 – 52 Eastman, Lloyd E. (1991) Nationalist China during the Sino-Japanese War, 1937 – 1945, in: Eastman, Lloyd E. (et al.) (1991) The Nationalist Era in China 1927 – 1949, Cambridge (et al.): Cambridge University Press, pp. 115 – 176 Elleman, Bruce A. (2001) Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795 – 1989, London/New York: Routledge Elphick, Peter (1997) Far Eastern File; The Intelligence War in the Far East, 1930 – 1945, London: Coronet Books Elson, Robert T. (et al.) (1976) Prelude to War [World War II (Volume 1)], Alexandria: Time-Life Books Engelbrecht, Helmut C. & Hanighen, Frank C. (1934) Don’t Blame the Munition Makers, in: Johnson, Julia E. (Ed.) (1934) International Traffic in Arms and Munitions [Reference Shelf (Volume IX, Number 9)], New York: H.W. Wilson Company, pp. 132 – 149 Engelbrecht, Helmut C. & Hanighen, Frank C. (1935) Merchants of Death; A Study of the International Armament Industry, London: George Routledge & Sons

274 Etherton, Percy T. (1927) The Crisis in China, Boston: Little, Brown, and Company Fabritzek, Uwe G. (1973) Gelber Drache, Schwarzer Adler, München/Gütersloh: C. Bertelsmann Verlag Falkenhausen, Alexander von (1974) Memoires d’ outre-guerre; Comment j’ai gouverné la Belgique de 1940 à 1944, Brussels: Lucien de Meyer Felber, Roland (1989) Forschungen zur Geschichte der deutsch-chinesischen Beziehungen in der DDR – Ergebnisse, Probleme, Perspektiven, in: [Anon.] (Ed.) (1989) Bulletin Faschismus/Zweiter Weltkrieg; Sonderheft 1989, Berlin: Zentralinstitut für Geschichte, pp. 64 – 83 Fochler-Hauke, Gustav (1938) Der Ferne Osten; Macht- und Wirtschaftskampf in Ostasien, Leipzig/Berlin: B.G. Teubner Fox, John P. (1982) Germany and the Far Eastern Crisis 1931 – 1938; A Study in Diplomacy and Ideology, Oxford: Clarendon Press Fox, John P. (1990) Japan als Machtfaktor in Deutschlands Europa- und Fern-Ost Politik von Versailles bis Locarno, in: Kreiner, Josef & Mathias, Regine (Eds.) (1990) Deutschland – Japan in der Zwischenkriegszeit, Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, pp. 61 – 90 Frey, Paul W. (1997) Faschistische Fernostpolitik; Italien, China und die Entstehung des weltpolitischen Dreieckes Rom – Berlin – Tokio, Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang Friend, Vita & Friend, Joseph (1934) How the Arms Makers Work, in: Johnson, Julia E. (Ed.) (1934) International Traffic in Arms and Munitions [Reference Shelf (Volume IX, Number 9)], New York: H.W. Wilson Company, pp. 185 – 198 Fu, Pao-Jen (1981) Military Advisers and German Assistance for Chinese Industrialization; An Analysis of Sino-German Economic and Military Collaboration, in: Martin, Bernd (Ed.) (1981) Die deutsche Beraterschaft in China 1927 – 1938; Militär – Wirtschaft – Außenpolitik, Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, pp. 187 – 200 Furuya, Kenji (Ed.) (1981) Chiang Kai-shek; His Life and Times, New York: St. John’s University Geyer, Michael (1981) Motive und Bedingungen einer aktiven Fernostpolitik des deutschen Militärs (1928 – 1936), in: Martin, Bernd (Ed.) (1981) Die deutsche Beraterschaft in China 1927 – 1938; Militär – Wirtschaft – Außenpolitik, Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, pp. 54 – 71 Gilbert, Rodney (1926) What’s wrong with China, London: John Murray Gillin, Donald G. (1967) Warlord; Yen Hsi-shan in Shansi Province; 1911 – 1949, Princeton: Princeton University Press

275 Groehler, Olaf (1989) China im Kalkül deutscher Militärpolitik 1933 – 1945, in: [Anon.] (Ed.) (1989) Bulletin Faschismus/Zweiter Weltkrieg; Sonderheft 1989, Berlin: Zentralinstitut für Geschichte, pp. 96 – 111 Hahn, Emily (1955) Chiang Kai-shek; An Unauthorized Biography, New York: Doubleday & Company Haupt, Werner (1969) Deutsche Militärberater in China, in: [Anon.] (Ed.) (1969) Deutsches Soldatenjahrbuch 1969; Siebzehnter Deutscher Soldatenkalender, München: Schild Verlag, pp. 256 – 261 Hitler, Adolf (1942) Mein Kampf, München: Zentralverlag der NSDAP Ho, Feng Shan (1937) China verteidigt sich, Wien/Leipzig: Michael Winkler-Verlag Hwang, Shen-chang (1982) Das Deutschlandbild der Chinesen, in: Machetzki, Rüdiger (Ed.) (1982) Deutsch-chinesische Beziehungen; Ein Handbuch, Hamburg: Institut für Asienkunde, pp. 13 – 24 Iriye, Akira (1965) After Imperialism; The Search for a New Order in the Far East 1921 – 1931, Cambridge: Harvard University Press Ishoven, Armand van (1973) Udet (BFW) U-12 Flamingo Variants [Aircraft Profile (Number 257)], Windsor: Windsor Publishing Iwaki, Hitoshi (Ed.) (1993) Chūgoku-Tairiku no 1914 – 1945 Kikaikasensō to Heiki, Tokyo: Delta Publishing Jaenicke, Wolfgang (1963) Das Ringen um die Macht im Fernen Osten; Vorgeschichte des Chinesisch- Japanischen Krieges 1937 auf politischem und wirtschaftlichem Gebiet und Auswirkung auf die Gegenwart, Würzburg: Holzner Verlag Johnson, Julia E. (1934) Introduction, in: International Traffic in Arms and Munitions [Reference Shelf (Volume IX, Number 9)], New York: H.W. Wilson Company, pp. 3 – 25 Jowett, Philip S. (1997) Chinese Civil War Armies 1911 – 1949 [Men-at-Arms (Volume 306)], London: Osprey Publishing Kaim, Julius R. (1963) Damals in Schanghai; Kaiser, Kaufleute und Kommunisten, München: Prestel- Verlag Kirby, William C. (1981) Developmental Aid or Neo-Imperialism? German Industry in China (1928 – 1937), in: Martin, Bernd (Ed.) (1981) Die deutsche Beraterschaft in China 1927 – 1938; Militär – Wirtschaft – Außenpolitik, Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, pp. 201 – 215 Kirby, William C. (1984) Germany and Republican China, Stanford: Stanford University Press

276 Kirby, William C. (1994) Intercultural Contacts and International Relations: China’s Relations with Germany, the Soviet Union and the United States, 1927 – 1944, in: Kuo, Heng- yü & Leutner, Mechthild (Eds.) (1994) Deutschland und China; Beiträge des Zweiten Symposiums zur Geschichte der deutsch-chinesischen Beziehungen Berlin 1991, München: Minerva Publikation, pp. 225 – 252 Koo, Madame Wellington & Taves, Isabella (1975) No Feast lasts forever, New York: Quadrangle/The New York Times Book Co. Kordt, Erich (1950) Nicht aus den Akten, Stuttgart: Union Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaften Kotenev, Anatol M. (1937) The Chinese Soldier; Basic Principles, Spirit, Science of War, and Heroes of the Chinese Armies, Shanghai (et al.): Kelly and Walsh Krarup-Nielsen, Aage (1928) The Dragon Awakes, London: Bodley Head Kreitner, Gustav Ritter von (1932) Hinter China steht Moskau, Berlin: Verlag von E.S. Mittler & Sohn Kuck, Fritz (1938) Deutsche in Fernost, Leipzig: Verlag Lühe & Co. Kuo, Heng-yü (1986) Deutschland und China im Jahre 1927 aus der Sicht deutscher Diplomaten, in: Kuo, Heng-yü (Ed.) (1986) Von der Kolonialpolitik zur Kooperation; Studien zur Geschichte der deutsch-chinesischen Beziehungen, München: Minerva Publikation, pp. 293 – 324 Kuo, Heng-yü (Ed.) (1988) Deutsch-chinesische Beziehungen 1928 – 1938; Eine Auswertung deutscher diplomatischer Akten, München: Minerva Publikation Lamont-Brown, Raymond (2000) Kempeitai; Japan’s Dreaded Military Police, Phoenix Mill: Budding Books Leutner, Mechthild (1986) Deutsche Vorstellungen über China und Chinesen und über die Rolle der Deutschen in China, 1890 – 1945, in: Kuo, Heng-yü (Ed.) (1986) Von der Kolonialpolitik zur Kooperation; Studien zur Geschichte der deutsch- chinesischen Beziehungen, München: Minerva Publikation, pp. 401 – 442 Liang, Chin-Tung (1970) Comments (1), in: Sih, Paul K.T. (Ed.) (1970) The Strenuous Decade: China’s Nation-Building Efforts, 1927 – 1937 [Asia in the Modern World (Number 9)], Kingston: St. John’s University Press, pp. 26 – 28 Liang, Hsi-Huey (1978) The Sino-German Connection; Alexander von Falkenhausen between China and Germany 1900 – 1941, Assen/Amsterdam: Van Gorcum Liang, Hsi-Huey (1981) Alexander von Falkenhausen (1934 – 1938), in: Martin, Bernd (Ed.) (1981) Die deutsche Beraterschaft in China 1927 – 1938; Militär – Wirtschaft – Außenpolitik, Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, pp. 135 – 146 Liu, Frederick Fu (1956) A Military History of Modern China 1924 – 1949, Princeton: Princeton University Press

277 Machetzki, Rüdiger (1982) Das Chinabild der Deutschen, in: Machetzki, Rüdiger (Ed.) (1982) Deutsch- chinesische Beziehungen; Ein Handbuch, Hamburg: Institut für Asienkunde, pp. 3 – 12 MacNair, Harley F. (1931) China in Revolution; An Analysis of Politics and Militarism under the Republic, Chicago: University of Chicago Press Martin, Bernd (1976) Die deutsch-japanischen Beziehungen während des Dritten Reiches, in: Funke, Manfred (Ed.) (1977) Hitler, Deutschland und die Mächte; Materialien zur Außenpolitik des Dritten Reiches, Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, pp. 454 – 470 Martin, Bernd (1981) Die deutsche Beraterschaft – Ein Überblick, in: Martin, Bernd (Ed.) (1981) Die deutsche Beraterschaft in China 1927 – 1938; Militär – Wirtschaft – Außenpolitik, Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, pp. 15 – 53 Martin, Bernd (1984) Das deutsche Militär und die Wendung der deutschen Fernostpolitik von China auf Japan, in: Knipping, Franz & Müller, Klaus-Jürgen (Eds.) (1984) Machtbewußtsein in Deutschland am Vorabend des Zweiten Weltkrieges, Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, pp. 191 – 207 Martin, Bernd (1986) Das Deutsche Reich und Guomindang-China, 1927 – 1941, in: Kuo, Heng-yü (Ed.) (1986) Von der Kolonialpolitik zur Kooperation; Studien zur Geschichte der deutsch-chinesischen Beziehungen, München: Minerva Publikation, pp. 325 – 375 Martin, Bernd (1990) Das deutsch-japanische Bündnis im Zweiten Weltkrieg, in: Kreiner, Josef & Mathias, Regine (Eds.) (1990) Deutschland – Japan in der Zwischenkriegszeit, Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, pp. 199 – 221 McCormack, Gavan (1977) Chang Tso-lin in Northeast China, 1911 – 1928; China, Japan, and the Manchurian Idea, Folkestone: Dawson Meier-Welcker, Hans (1981) Generaloberst Hans von Seeckt, in: Martin, Bernd (Ed.) (1981) Die deutsche Beraterschaft in China 1927 – 1938; Militär – Wirtschaft – Außenpolitik, Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, pp. 116 – 134 Menz, Gerhard (1936) Der Kampf um Nordchina, Leipzig (et al.): Wilhelm Goldmann Verlag Michalka, Wolfgang (1980) Ribbentrop und die deutsche Weltpolitik 1933 – 1940; Außenpolitische Konzeptionen und Entscheidungsprozesse im Dritten Reich, München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag Mohr, F.W. (1920) Gedanken zur neudeutschen Chinapolitik, Neuwied am Rhein: Verlag der Strüderschen Buchdruckerei Moltke, Kai (1953) Krämer des Krieges; Die 5. Kolonne der Monopole, Berlin: Dietz Verlag Mombeek, Eric (et al.) (1999) Birth of the Luftwaffe Fighter Force [Jagdwaffe (Volume 1, Section 1)], Crowborough: Classic Publications

278 Moser, Don (et al.) (1978) China – Burma – India [World War II (Volume 9)], Alexandria: Time-Life Books Näth, Marie-Luise (1976) Chinas Weg in die Weltpolitik; Die nationalen und außenpolitischen Konzeptionen Sun Yat-sens, Chiang Kai-sheks und Mao Tse-tungs [Beiträge zur auswärtigen und internationalen Politik (Volume 7)], Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter Nieh, Yu-Hsi (1970) Die Entwicklung des chinesisch-japanischen Konfliktes in Nordchina und die deutschen Vermittlungsbemühungen 1937 – 1938 [Mitteilungen des Instituts für Asienkunde Hamburg (Number 33)], Hamburg: Institut für Asienkunde Nieh, Yu-Hsi (1982) Zwischen den Kriegen – Ein Neubeginn, in: Machetzki, Rüdiger (Ed.) (1982) Deutsch-chinesische Beziehungen; Ein Handbuch, Hamburg: Institut für Asienkunde, pp. 113 – 120 Nish, Ian (1990) Germany, Japan and the Manchurian Crisis: Dr. Heinrich Schnee and the Lytton Commission, in: Kreiner, Josef & Mathias, Regine (Eds.) (1990) Deutschland – Japan in der Zwischenkriegszeit, Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, pp. 91 – 104 Osterhammel, Jürgen (1986) Semi-Colonialism and Informal Empire in Twentieth-Century China: Towards a Framework of Analysis, in: Mommsen, Wolfgang J. & Osterhammel, Jürgen (Eds.) (1986) Imperialism and After; Continuities and Discontinuities, London (et al.): Allen & Unwin, pp. 290 – 314 Pawly, Ronald (2003) The Kaiser’s Warlords; German Commanders of World War I [Elite (Volume 97)], London: Osprey Publishing Peck, Joachim (1961) Kolonialismus ohne Kolonien; Der deutsche Imperialismus und China 1937, Berlin: Akademie-Verlag Perrett, Brian (et al.) (1998) German Light Panzers 1932 – 1942 [New Vanguard (Volume 26)], London: Osprey Publishing Peters, Helmut (1989) Einige Anmerkungen zu Otto Braun und seiner revolutionären Tätigkeit in China, in: [Anon.] (Ed.) (1989) Bulletin Faschismus/Zweiter Weltkrieg; Sonderheft 1989, Berlin: Zentralinstitut für Geschichte, pp. 173 – 190 Pletschacher, Peter (1992) Die Königlich Bayerischen Fliegertruppen 1912 – 1919, Planegg: Aviatic Verlag Pollard, Robert T. (1933) China’s Foreign Relations; 1917 – 1931, New York: Macmillan Company Presseisen, Ernst L. (1969) Germany and Japan; A Study in Totalitarian Diplomacy 1933 – 1941, New York: Howard Fertig Rabe, John (et al.) (2000) The Good Man of Nanking; The Diaries of John Rabe, New York: Vintage Books

279 Rabenau, Friedrich von (1941) Seeckt; Aus seinem Leben; 1918 – 1936, Leipzig: v. Hase & Koehler Verlag Ratenhof, Gabriele (1984) Das Deutsche Reich und die internationale Krise um die Mandschurei 1931 – 1933; Die deutsche Fernostpolitik als Spiegel und Instrument deutscher Revisionspolitik, Frankfurt am Main (et al.): Peter Lang Ratenhof, Gabriele (1990) Das Deutsche Reich, Japan und die internationale Krise um die Mandschurei 1931 bis 1933, in: Kreiner, Josef & Mathias, Regine (Eds.) (1990) Deutschland – Japan in der Zwischenkriegszeit, Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, pp. 105 – 127 Ratenhof, Udo (1987) Die Chinapolitik des Deutschen Reiches 1871 bis 1945; Wirtschaft – Rüstung – Militär, Boppard am Rhein: Harald Boldt Verlag Rigg, Bryan Mark (2003) Hitlers jüdische Soldaten, Paderborn (et al.): Ferdinand Schöningh Rostek, Horst (1989) Zur Rolle der deutschen Militärberater bei der chinesischen Nationalregierung 1928 bis 1938, in: [Anon.] (Ed.) (1989) Bulletin Faschismus/Zweiter Weltkrieg; Sonderheft 1989, Berlin: Zentralinstitut für Geschichte, pp. 112 – 127 Rosholt, Malcolm (1984) Flight in the China Air Space 1910 – 1950, Rosholt: Rosholt House Ruland, Bernd (1973) Deutsche Botschaft Peking; Das Jahrhundert deutsch-chinesischen Schicksals, Bayreuth: Hestia Sakai, Saburo (et al.) (2001) Samurai!, New York: ibooks Sampson, Anthony (1977) The Arms Bazaar; The Companies, the Dealers, the Bribes: From Vickers to Lockheed, London (et al.): Hodder and Stoughton Schall, Thomas D. (1934) Embargo on Arms, in: Johnson, Julia E. (Ed.) (1934) International Traffic in Arms and Munitions [Reference Shelf (Volume IX, Number 9)], New York: H.W. Wilson Company, pp. 280 – 282 Scheibert, Horst (1984) Deutsche Leichte Panzerspähwagen [Waffen Arsenal (Volume 86)], Dornheim: Podzun-Pallas Verlag Schenke, Wolf (1937) Kampfplatz Ostasien; Politik und Soldaten an den Ufern des Gelben Meeres, Berlin: Verlagsanstalt Otto Stollberg Schenke, Wolf (1940) Reise an der Gelben Front; Beobachungen eines deutschen Kriegsbericht- erstatters in China, Oldenburg/Berlin: Gerhard Stalling Verlagsbuchhandlung Schenke, Wolf (1971) Mit China allein; Entscheidende Jahre 1939 – 47, Hamburg: Holsten-Verlag Schmidt, Burkhard (1989) ‘Die Industrialisierung Chinas’ – Wunschtraum, Berufung, Gefahr; Deutsche und Chinesische Vorstellungen in der Zeit zwischen den Weltkriegen, in: Gransow, Bettina & Leutner, Mechthild (Eds.) (1989) China; Nähe und Ferne; Deutsch-chinesische Beziehungen in Geschichte und Gegenwart; Zum 60.

280 Geburtstag von Kuo Heng-yü, Frankfurt am Main (et al.): Verlag Peter Lang, pp. 211 – 237 Schmidt-Pauli, Edgar von (1937) General v. Seeckt; Lebensbild eines deutschen Soldaten, Berlin: Verlag Reimar Hobbing Schmokel, Wolfe W. (1964) Dream of Empire: German Colonialism, 1919 – 1945, New Haven/London: Yale University Press Seagrave, Sterling (1996) The Soong Dynasty, London: Corgi Books Seel, Wolfgang (1988) Mauser; Von der Waffenschmiede zum Weltunternehmen, Dietikon-Zürich: Verlag Stocker-Schmid/Motorbuch Verlag Seldes, George (1934) Iron, Blood and Profits; An Exposure of the World-Wide Munitions Racket, New York (et al.): Harper & Brothers Publishers Seps, Jerry. B. (1981) General Georg Wetzell, in: Martin, Bernd (Ed.) (1981) Die deutsche Beraterschaft in China 1927 – 1938; Militär – Wirtschaft – Außenpolitik, Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, pp. 106 – 115 Sheridan, James E. (1966) Chinese Warlord; The Career of Feng Yü-Hsiang, Stanford: Stanford University Press Sheridan, James E. (1975) China in Disintegration; The Republican Era in Chinese History, 1912 – 1949, New York: Free Press Sommer, Theo (1962) Deutschland und Japan zwischen den Mächten 1935 – 1940; Vom Antikominternpakt zum Dreimächtepakt; Eine Studie zur diplomatischen Vorgeschichte des Zweiten Weltkrieges, Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck) Spence, Jonathan (1980) To Change China; Western Advisers in China 1620 – 1960, New York (et al.): Penguin Books Stahmer, Heinrich Georg (1952) Japans Niederlage – Asians Sieg; Aufstieg eines Größeren Ostasien, Bielefeld: Deutscher Heimat-Verlag Stone, William T. (1934) International Traffic in Arms and Ammunition, in: Johnson, Julia E. (Ed.) (1934) International Traffic in Arms and Munitions [Reference Shelf (Volume IX, Number 9)], New York: H.W. Wilson Company, pp. 113 – 132 Strunk, Roland & Rikli, Martin (1934) Achtung! Asien marschiert! Ein Tatsachenbericht, Berlin: Volksverband der Bücherfreunde/Wegweiser Verlag Teichman, Eric (1938) Affairs of China; A Survey of the Recent History and Present Circumstances of the Republic of China, London: Methuen Publishers Thomas, Robert & Pochanke, Stefan (2001) Handbuch zur Geschichte der Deutschen Freikorps, München: MTM Verlag

281 Tomczyk, Andrzej M. (2002) Japońska Broń Pancerna; Japanese Armor Volume 1 [Tankpower (Volume 9)], Gdansk: AJ-Press Tuchman, Barbara W. (1978) Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911 – 1945, New York (et al.): Bantam Books Ungern-Sternberg, Leonie von (1933) Krieg in China; Der Bürgerkrieg in China und der chinesisch-japanische Konflikt, Berlin: Junker und Dünnhaupt Verlag Urach, Fürst Albrecht (1940) Ostasien; Kampf um das kommende Grossreich, Berlin: Steiniger-Verlage Utley, Freda (1939) China at War, London: Faber and Faber Valone, Stephen J. (1991) ‘A Policy calculated to benefit China’; The United States and the China Arms Embargo, 1919 – 1929 [Contributions to the Study of World History (Number 25)], New York (et al.): Greenwood Press Venner, Dominik (1989) Ein Deutscher Heldenkampf; Die Geschichte der Freikorps 1918 – 1923; Söldner ohne Sold, Kiel: Arndt Verlag Vogt, Adolf (1974) Oberst Max Bauer; Generalstabsoffizier im Zwielicht; 1869 – 1929, Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag Vogt, Adolf (1981) Oberst Max Bauer, in: Martin, Bernd (Ed.) (1981) Die deutsche Beraterschaft in China 1927 – 1938; Militär – Wirtschaft – Außenpolitik, Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, pp. 95 – 105 Volkmann, Hans-Erich (1975) Außenhandel und Aufrüstung in Deutschland 1933 bis 1939, in: Forstmeier, Friedrich & Volkmann, Hans-Erich (Eds.) (1975) Wirtschaft und Rüstung am Vorabend des Zweiten Weltkrieges, Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, pp. 81 – 131 Wagner, Hans (1935) Die Brandfackel im Fernen Osten, Oldenburg/Berlin: Verlagsbuchhandlung Gerhard Stalling Waldron, Arthur (1995) From War to Nationalism; China’s Turning Point, 1924 – 1925, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Wasserstein, Bernard (1999) Secret War in Shanghai; Treachery, Subversion and Collaboration in the Second World War, London: Profile Books Wei, William (1981) The Role of the German Advisers in the Suppression of the Central Soviet: Myth and Reality, in: Martin, Bernd (Ed.) (1981) Die deutsche Beraterschaft in China 1927 – 1938; Militär – Wirtschaft – Außenpolitik, Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, pp. 175 – 186 Whitson, William W. & Huang, Chen-hsia (1973) The Chinese High Command: A History of Communist Military Politics, 1927 – 1972, New York: Praeger

282 Wou, Odoric Y.K. (1978) Militarism in Modern China; The Career of Wu P’ei-Fu, 1916 – 39, Canberra: Australian National University Press Wünsche, Renate (1962) Einige Bemerkungen zur Kolonialpolitik des deutschen Imperialismus in der Endphase der Weimarer Republik, gezeigt am Beispiel seiner Beziehungen zu China, in: [Anon.] (Ed.) (1962) Nationaler Befreiungskampf und Neokolonialismus; Referate und ausgewählte Beiträge, Berlin: Akademie- Verlag, pp. 180 – 185 Xu, Guangqiu (2001) War Wings; The United States and Chinese Military Aviation, 1929 – 1949 [Contributions in Military Studies (Number 211)], Westport: Greenwood Press Young, Arthur N. (1963) China and the Helping Hand 1937 – 1945, Cambridge: Harvard University Press Zaloga, Steven J. (1983) Armour of the Pacific War [Vanguard (Volume 35)], London: Osprey Publishing Zaloga, Steven J. (1995) Tank Battles in the Pacific War 1941 – 1945 [Armor at War (Volume 4)], Hongkong: Concord Publications Zezschwitz, G.P. von (1938) Heigl’s Taschenbuch der Tanks; Teil III: Der Panzerkampf, München/Berlin: J.F. Lehmanns Verlag Zhang, Baijia (1989) The German Factor in the Jiang Jieshi’s Government Strategy [sic] to Resist Japanese Aggression, in: [Anon.] (Ed.) (1989) Bulletin Faschismus/Zweiter Weltkrieg; Sonderheft 1989, Berlin: Zentralinstitut für Geschichte, pp. 84 – 95 Zhang, Xianwen (1989) Zur Entwicklung der chinesisch-deutschen Beziehungen in den dreißiger Jahren des 20. Jahrhunderts, in: [Anon.] (Ed.) (1989) Bulletin Faschismus/Zweiter Weltkrieg; Sonderheft 1989, Berlin: Zentralinstitut für Geschichte, pp. 25 – 45

Dissertations: Adolphi, Wolfram (1988) Die Chinapolitik des faschistischen Deutschland 1937 – 1945, Berlin: Humboldt-Universität Arendt, Brian B. (1993) Germany and the National Revolution in China, 1925 – 1928, Washington: Georgetown University Beutler, Heinz (1946) Hundert Jahre Carlowitz & Co. Hamburg und China; Ein Beitrag zur wirtschaftsgeschichtlichen Entwicklung des deutschen China-Handels, Hamburg: Universität Hamburg Burden, Allen C. (1972) German Policy toward China and the Chinese Revolution, 1919 – 1931, with Special Reference to the Beginnings of Sino-German Military Cooperation, Edmonton: University of Alberta Causey, Beverley D. (1942) German Policy towards China, 1918 – 1941, Cambridge: Harvard University

283 Chen, Chern (1996) Die Beziehungen zwischen China und Deutschland in den dreißiger Jahren unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Perzeptions-, Interessen- und Aktionsstrukturen der nationalchinesischen Regierung, München: Ludwig- Maximilians-Universität Chen, Tsun-kung (1983)1082 Lieqiang dui Zhongguo de Junhuojinyun (Minguo Ba Nian – Shiba Nian) [Monograph (Number 47)], Taipei: Academia Sinica, Institute of Modern History Ch’i, Hsi-Sheng (1976) Warlord Politics in China; 1916 – 1928, Stanford: Stanford University Press Fu, Pao-Jen (1989) The German Military Mission in Nanking 1928 – 1938; A Bridge connecting China and Germany, Syracuse: Syracuse University Glaim, Lorne E. (1973) Sino-German Relations, 1919 – 1925: German Diplomatic, Economic, and Cultural Reentry into China after World War I, n.p.: Washington State University Mehner, Karl (1961) Die Rolle deutscher Militärberater als Interessenvetreter des deutschen Imperialismus und Militarismus in China (1928 – 1936), Leipzig: Karl-Marx- Universität Mende, Gunter S. (1975) The Image of China in Germany, 1919 – 1939, Irvine: University of California Pause, Hans (1978) Militärischer Regionalismus in China von 1928 – 1936, München: Ludwig- Maximilians-Universität Seps, Jerry B. (1972) German Military Advisors and Chiang Kai-Shek, 1927 – 1938, Berkeley: University of California Wang, Zheng-hua (1987) Kang Zhan Shiqi Waiguo dui Hua Junshi Yuanzhu, Taipei: Huan Qiu Shuju Wood, Carlton L. (1934) Die Beziehungen Deutschlands zu China (Eine historische Betrachtung in politischer und ökonomischer Hinsicht vom 19. Jahrhundert bis zum Jahre 1934), Heidelberg: Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Wu, Tien-wei (1976) The Sian Incident: A Pivotal Point in Modern Chinese History [Michigan Papers in Chinese Studies (Number 26)], Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Zhang, Xiaoming (1994) Toward Arming China: United States Arms Sales and Military Assistance, 1921 – 1941, n.p.: University of Iowa

Articles: Benz, Martin & Hugo, Martin (1990) Für Kaiser, Gott und Vaterland, in: Visier (Number 12, December 1990), pp. 12 – 23

1082 Although written in Chinese, this book can also be found under the English title The China Arms Embargo (1919 – 1929).

284 Birkholz, Heinz (2001) Schlächter, in: Jet & Prop (Number 4, April 2001), pp. 43 – 45 Bloß, Hartmut (1980) Die Zweigleisigkeit der deutschen Fernostpolitik und Hitlers Option für Japan 1938, in: Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen (Number 1/1980), pp. 55 – 92 Casper, Karl (1937) Deutschland und China im gegenseitigen Warenaustausch, in: Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv; Zeitschrift des Instituts für Weltwirtschaft an der Universität Kiel (Volume 45, 1937 I), pp. 409 – 442 Chan, Anthony B. (1983) The Chinese Air Force during the Warlord Era 1916 – 1928, in: Army Quarterly (Number 1/1983), pp. 81 – 89 Duden, Wilhelm (1977) Deutsche Militärberater bei Tschiang Kai-schek; Reichswehroffiziere formen die Kuomintang-Armee, in: Damals; Zeitschrift für Geschichtliches Wissen (Number 9, September 1977), pp. 775 – 792 Düring, Henry William von (1977) Krupp-Kanonen für das kaiserliche China, Teil I; 20 Jahre als deutscher Kaufmann im Reich der Mitte, in: Damals; Zeitschrift für Geschichtliches Wissen (Number 4, April 1977), pp. 345 – 354. Düring, Henry William von (1977) Krupp-Kanonen für das kaiserliche China, Teil II; 20 Jahre als deutscher Kaufmann im Reich der Mitte, in: Damals; Zeitschrift für Geschichtliches Wissen (Number 5, May 1977), pp. 409 – 418. Düring, Henry William von (1977) Krupp-Kanonen für das kaiserliche China, Teil III; 20 Jahre als deutscher Kaufmann im Reich der Mitte, in: Damals; Zeitschrift für Geschichtliches Wissen (Number 6, June 1977), pp. 507 – 516. Epstein, Julius (1953) Seeckt und Tschiang-Kai-Schek, in: Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau; Zeitschrift für die europäische Sicherheit (Number 11/1953), pp. 534 –543 Hellmer, [Diplom-Volkswirt] (1939) Grundlagen, Entwicklung und Vergleich der Kriegswirtschaft Japans und Chinas im Fernost-Konflikt, in: Militärwissenschaftliche Rundschau (Volume 4, Number 1/1939), pp. 96 – 124 Herold, Miroslav (2002)1083 Les He 111 et Martin 139 dans le Ciel de Chine, in: Air Magazine (Number 7, March/April 2002), pp. 30 – 39 Hotte, Christian (1998) Chinese He 66, in: SAFO (Small Aircraft Observer) (Volume 22, Number 4/1996) Kogelfranz, Siegfried (1989) ‘Die Barbaren – unbedeutend und widerwärtig’; Chinas Demütigungen, seine Revolutionen, Reformen und Kriege gegen sich selbst (II), in: Der Spiegel (Number 26/1989), pp. 114 – 134 Kotzel, Uwe (1996) Zeittafel der deutsch-chinesischen Beziehungen, in: China Aktuell (Number 9, September 1996), pp. 878 –896

1083 Due to the unavailability of the original article, an English translation, e-mailed by its author on 2 September 2002, was used in this thesis.

285 Louie, D.Y. (1996) He 66 and Hs 123A-1 in Chinese Service, in: SAFO (Small Aircraft Observer) (Volume 20, Number 3/1996) Misselwitz, Henry F. (1928) The Chinese Soldier, His Equipment and Activities, in: China Weekly Review (Volume XLV, Number 6, July 1928), pp. 191 – 192 Patten, Robert E. van (1993) Before the Flying Tigers, in: Air Force Magazine (Number 6/1999), pp. 72 – 77 Schiller, David T. (1992) Retour-Kutsche, in: Visier (Number 12, December 1992), pp. 30 – 33 Schiller, David T. (1995) Chinakracher, in: Visier (Number 12, December 1995), pp. 114 – 119 Sommer, Walter (1971) Zur Rolle deutscher Berater in den Einkreisungs- und Vernichtungsfeldzügen gegen die südchinesische Sowjetrepublik, 1930 – 34, in: Zeitschrift für Politik (Number 3, September 1971), pp. 269 – 304 Sutton, Donald S. (1982) German Advice and Residual Warlordism in the Nanking Decade: Influences on Nationalist Military Training and Strategy, in: China Quarterly (Number 91, 1982), pp. 386 – 410 Walsh, Billie K. (1974) The German Military Mission in China, 1928 – 1939, in: Journal of Modern History (Number 46, September 1974), pp. 502 – 513 Wartmann, Klaus (2001) Hs 123 in China, in: Jet & Prop (Number 6, June 2001), p. 8 Wimmel, Walter E. (1995) Shansi-C96 in .45 ACP, in: Internationales Waffen-Magazin (Number 10, October 1995), pp. 586 – 590

Websites: Zaloga, Steven J. (1983)1084 Armour in China 1920 – 1945 URL: http://members.tripod.com/~france40/temp/chinese.html (Access Date: February 11, 2002)

1084 This article was originally published in the Military Modelling Manual, which in some bibliographies is also quoted as Military Manual. Its exact publication details, however, remain unknown.

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