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The Politics of Roman Memory in the Age of Justinian DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the D
The Politics of Roman Memory in the Age of Justinian DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Marion Woodrow Kruse, III Graduate Program in Greek and Latin The Ohio State University 2015 Dissertation Committee: Anthony Kaldellis, Advisor; Benjamin Acosta-Hughes; Nathan Rosenstein Copyright by Marion Woodrow Kruse, III 2015 ABSTRACT This dissertation explores the use of Roman historical memory from the late fifth century through the middle of the sixth century AD. The collapse of Roman government in the western Roman empire in the late fifth century inspired a crisis of identity and political messaging in the eastern Roman empire of the same period. I argue that the Romans of the eastern empire, in particular those who lived in Constantinople and worked in or around the imperial administration, responded to the challenge posed by the loss of Rome by rewriting the history of the Roman empire. The new historical narratives that arose during this period were initially concerned with Roman identity and fixated on urban space (in particular the cities of Rome and Constantinople) and Roman mythistory. By the sixth century, however, the debate over Roman history had begun to infuse all levels of Roman political discourse and became a major component of the emperor Justinian’s imperial messaging and propaganda, especially in his Novels. The imperial history proposed by the Novels was aggressivley challenged by other writers of the period, creating a clear historical and political conflict over the role and import of Roman history as a model or justification for Roman politics in the sixth century. -
Noted Previously, Was an Archaic Form of Marriage in Which the Woman Passed from Her Natal Family to Her Husband’S
GAIUS’ INSTITUTES – PERSONS – PART 2 – OF ONE’S OWN RIGHT vs. SUBJECT TO THE RIGHT OF ANOTHER (GI.1.48–200) 1. There follows a massive graphic on those of their own right (sui iuris) and those subject to another’s right (alieno iuri subiecti, normally shortened to alieni iuris): B sui iuris 1,13 vs. A alieni iuris 1,8 __________|________________ ________|_________ | | | | | | totally tutela 6,10,11 cura 12 in potestate 6 in manu 7 in mancipio __________|______ _____|_____ ___|______ | | | | | | | | | | testament legit fiduc dat pro min fur dominica patria 2 | 5 | 2 | _______| |____________ |__________________ | | | | | | | | children freedmen wom. litig. sine iust. nupt. mixed adoptivi 3 4 7 8 9 3 4 5 a. The numbers indicate the order in which Gaius takes up the topic. The combination of the Latin and the abbreviations necessary to get this all into one graphic make the specifics hard to follow. The point of the graphic is not the specifics, it’s the structure. b. (On the slide A and B are reversed; this follows the order of the graphic above.) Both sides of the dichotomy have four levels. Levels 1 and 2 deal with categories of persons: level 1 those sui iuris and those alieni iuris, level 2 those totally sui iuris, those in tutelage (tutela), those in another form of guardianship (cura), those in power (in potestate), those literally ‘in hand’ (in manu), those in ‘hand-capture’ (in mancipio). Levels 3 and 4 are mixed dealing sometimes with categories of persons and sometimes with ways of acquiring the status. -
Theory of Separation of Powers
THEORY OF SEPARATION OF POWERS Introduction The three organs of the government—Legislature, Executive and Judiciary— perform the three essential functions of law-making, law-application and law- adjudication. This threefold division of governmental functions is universally accepted as the best way of organizing the government. These three functions are inter-related and inter-dependent. But these are performed by three different organs. The separation of powers is a model for the governance of a state. Under this model, the state is divided into three branches of legislature, executive, and judiciary, each with separate and independent powers and areas of responsibility so that the powers of one branch are not in conflict with other branches. It can be contrasted with the fusion of powers in parliamentary systems where the executive and legislature are unified. Separation of powers, therefore, refers to the division of responsibilities into distinct branches to limit any one branch from exercising the core functions of another. The intent is to prevent the concentration of power and provide for checks and balances. History Aristotle first mentioned the idea of a "mixed government" or hybrid government in his work Politics where he drew upon many of the constitutional forms in the city-states of Ancient Greece. In the Roman Republic, the Roman Senate, Consuls and the Assemblies showed an example of a mixed government according to Polybius. John Calvin (1509–1564) favoured a system of government that divided political power between democracy and aristocracy (mixed government). In order to reduce the danger of misuse of political power, Calvin suggested setting up of several political institutions which should complement and control each other in a system of checks and balances. -
El Dualismo Autoridad-Potestad Como Fundamento De La Organización Y Del Pensamiento
POLIS. Revista de ideas y formas políticas de la Antigüedad Clásica II, 1999, pp. 85-109 EL DUALISMO AUTORIDADPOTESTAD COMO FUNDAMENTO DE LA ORGANIZACIÓN Y DEL PENSAMIENTO POLÍTICOS DE ROMA F. Javier Casinos Mora Universidad de Valencia En el marco de la constitución política romana resulta de singular interés el concepto romano de auctoritas, pues tal concepto, a diferencia del de «poder» en sus manifestaciones de imperíum o potestas, constituye un caracterismo genuinamente romano'. La presencia en la mentalidad romana desde tiempos remotos de este concepto sustancialmente opuesto al de «poder», aunque com plementario del mismo, que se proyecta en todos los ámbitos de la vida social y política, será el fundamento de una teoría política que al menos hasta la época imperial descansará sobre el dualismo esencial autoridad-potestad. ' Sintomático de la genuinidad romana de la idea de auctoritas es el hecho de que no existe en griego clásico un término al que se pueda verter satisfactoriamente tal idea. Cuando Dión Casio quiso expresar en griego la idea de auctoritas (Dion Cas. 55, 3, 4) no pudo sino hacer una mera transcripción fonética de dicho término. Cfr R. Heinze, «Auctoritas», Herines 60, 1925, 363-364; A. D'Ors, «Auctoritas, ayoentia, authenticum», Apophoreta Philologica, Mantua 1984,375; y G. Nocera, s.v. «Autoritá», Enciclopedia del Diritto IV, 465. También prueba la genuinidad romana de auctoritas la traducción vacilante de dicho término en la versión griega de las Res gestae divi Augusti (Augus. res gestae 8, 12, 20, 28 y 34). 85 El dualismo autoridad-potestad como fundamento de la organización y del pensamiento.. -
An Extended Separation of Powers Model As the Theoretical Basis For
An extended separation of powers model as the theoretical basis for the representation of future generations Professor Joerg Chet Tremmel, PhD, PhD [email protected] Version 26 July 20131 forthcoming in: Birnbacher, Dieter / Thorseth, May (ed.) (2014): Roads to Sustainability. London: Earthscan Abstract The growing library on the representation of future generations provides the interested reader with more and more examples of institutions for intergenerational justice, e.g. the Commission for Future Generations in Israel, the Ombudsman for Future Generations in Hungary or the Parliamentary Advisory Council for Sustainable Development in Germany. However, the long-term success of this institutionalisation remains fragile as long as the classical separation of powers model dividing political power into legislative, executive and judicial branches is not called into question. This article argues that the theoretical starting point for any attempts to institutionalise sustainability should be an extension of the ruling model. The century-old separation of powers into three branches as designed by Montesquieu in 1748 is not fitting for modern times. A new four-powers model must include an institutional level that would bring the interests of posterity into the decision-making processes of today. The present demos of the 21st century can negatively affect the living conditions of future demos much more than in earlier times. In the 18th century in the course of the first introduction of democracy in a country in the modern sense of the word (i.e. a country other than an antique polis) the concept of ‘checks and balances’ evolved in the Federalist Papers. It was designed to protect parts of the population against the “tyranny of the majority”. -
The Rule of Law, the Separation of Powers and Judicial Independence in Canada
Chapter 48 The Rule of Law, the Separation of Powers and Judicial Independence in Canada Warren J. Newman* The Constitution of Canada was modelled on the British tradition of unwritten principles and conventions governing the exercise of legal power to produce a constitutional mon- archy, parliamentary democracy, and responsible government, as well as the American paradigm of constitutional supremacy embodied in written provisions, required in turn by the federal rather than unitary structure of the state. This hybrid model is reflected in the Canadian understanding of the rule of law, which is embodied implicitly in the preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867— Canada was to enjoy ‘a Constitution simi- lar in Principle to that of the United Kingdom’—and explicitly in the preamble to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (itself a part of the Constitution Act, 1982)— ‘Whereas Canada is founded upon principles which recognize the supremacy of God and the rule of law’. The idea of the rule of law is also intrinsic to provisions such as section 7 of the Charter, guaranteeing the right to life, liberty, and security of the per- son and the right not to be deprived thereof ‘except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice’; section 15, protecting and expanding upon Dicey’s1 understanding * BA, BCL, LL.B (McGill), LL.M (Osgoode), Ad E; of the Bars of Quebec and Ontario; Senior General Counsel, Constitutional, Administrative and International Law Section, Department of Justice of Canada. The views expressed in this chapter do not bind the Department. 1 Albert Venn Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 10th ed. -
Fusion of Powers? Building Connections Between the Public Service and the Legislative Branch
Feature Fusion of Powers? Building Connections Between the Public Service and the Legislative Branch As a former legislative intern, the author has had the opportunity to employ the knowledge of the legislative process he gained through his internship to great effect in his current role as a policy analyst with the federal public service. In this article he suggests this type of experience, if more widely available to public servants, could reinforce a sense of appreciation for the principle of parliamentary review, provide insight into how the legislative process can impact policy development, and allow them to develop their political acuity. Adam Walter rom January to June of 2014, I had the unique the non-partisan, professional public service.1 In my opportunity to be part of the British Columbia experience, the knowledge of the legislative process FLegislative Internship Program (BCLIP). This that I gained as a legislative intern has provided six-month program included five weeks working significant value in my career as a policy analyst in the in a Ministry in the British Columbia (BC) Public public service. The purpose of this article is to identify Service, one week working in the constituency office why and how knowledge of the legislative branch of a Member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA), and can be beneficial to public servants, and to identify over four months working within the Legislative opportunities in which current and aspiring public Assembly performing research and analysis for MLAs servants can increase their understanding of it. during the spring legislative session. As a result, I was able to observe the inner workings of the legislature, First, I outline the institutional relationship that the including Question Period, legislative committee legislative and executive branches of government have hearings, and debates on legislation. -
Judicial Review in Kingdom and Dominions the Historical Foundations of Judicial Review in the U.K., Canada, and New Zealand
University of Pennsylvania Judicial Review in Kingdom and Dominions The Historical Foundations of Judicial Review in the U.K., Canada, and New Zealand Abstract: Judicial review, whatever else it may be, provides a mechanism by which the judiciary can affect the implementation, contours, and the formulation of policy. As such, it provides a possible avenue of access to a variable ‘open’ state. Westminster democracies have historically avoided judicial review in order to concentrate policymaking authority in the legislature and responsible executive. In recent years a number of Westminster polities have incorporated and expanded judicial review. This paper explores how this occurred in three Westminster states, arguing that long-run processes shaped the conceptions of judges of their role in the constitutional order, affecting their willingness to assert powers of review. Importantly, structures of imperialism and federalism provided varying opportunities for the judiciary to assert this power. A full account of the emergence of judicial review needs to take account of these structural/institutional factors— the available resources of judges to assert a power to invalidate legislation and their institutionally shaped willingness to do so. I conclude with a discussion of how the different constructions of judicial review at the different moments in each state’s history affected the mobilization strategies of indigenous peoples, and the varying imposition of control by the state. David Bateman Doctoral Fellow – Penn Program in Ethnic Conflict -
Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers [1967]
The Online Library of Liberty A Project Of Liberty Fund, Inc. M.J.C. Vile, Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers [1967] The Online Library Of Liberty This E-Book (PDF format) is published by Liberty Fund, Inc., a private, non-profit, educational foundation established in 1960 to encourage study of the ideal of a society of free and responsible individuals. 2010 was the 50th anniversary year of the founding of Liberty Fund. It is part of the Online Library of Liberty web site http://oll.libertyfund.org, which was established in 2004 in order to further the educational goals of Liberty Fund, Inc. To find out more about the author or title, to use the site's powerful search engine, to see other titles in other formats (HTML, facsimile PDF), or to make use of the hundreds of essays, educational aids, and study guides, please visit the OLL web site. This title is also part of the Portable Library of Liberty DVD which contains over 1,000 books and quotes about liberty and power, and is available free of charge upon request. The cuneiform inscription that appears in the logo and serves as a design element in all Liberty Fund books and web sites is the earliest-known written appearance of the word “freedom” (amagi), or “liberty.” It is taken from a clay document written about 2300 B.C. in the Sumerian city-state of Lagash, in present day Iraq. To find out more about Liberty Fund, Inc., or the Online Library of Liberty Project, please contact the Director at [email protected]. -
Futility of Resort to Roman Law for Interpretation of Statutes on Adoption J
CORE Metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk Provided by Marquette University Law School Marquette Law Review Volume 9 Article 3 Issue 4 June 1925 Futility of Resort to Roman Law for Interpretation of Statutes on Adoption J. Gilbert Hardgrove Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr Part of the Law Commons Repository Citation J. Gilbert Hardgrove, Futility of Resort to Roman Law for Interpretation of Statutes on Adoption, 9 Marq. L. Rev. 239 (1925). Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol9/iss4/3 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. FUTILITY OF RESORT TO ROMAN LAW FOR INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES ON ADOPTION J. GILBERT HARDGROVE* SN a case recently presented to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, it was held that a child adopted under the statutes of Wisconsin would not take by descent from a brother of the adoptive parent.' An argu- ment was made to the effect that adoption, being unknown to the com- mon law, must be presumed to have been taken from the Roman Law, that under the Roman Law, adoption carried with it the right of col- lateral inheritance and that the same result should follow when we pro- vide for adoption. The court, in its opinion, very properly, it is thought, did not discuss this argument, treating the case as turning upon a correct interpretation of the statute involved. -
The Constitutional Imbalance
Volume 37 Issue 1 Winter Winter 2007 The Constitutional Imbalance Richard Albert Recommended Citation Richard Albert, The Constitutional Imbalance, 37 N.M. L. Rev. 1 (2007). Available at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nmlr/vol37/iss1/3 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by The University of New Mexico School of Law. For more information, please visit the New Mexico Law Review website: www.lawschool.unm.edu/nmlr THE CONSTITUTIONAL IMBALANCE RICHARD ALBERT* I. INTRODUCTION The modem American judiciary bears little resemblance to the institution created by the Founding Fathers at the Constitutional Convention of 1787. Alexander Hamilton-a leading spokesperson for the Federalist forces that emerged victorious from the founding debates-famously predicted that thejudiciary would be the least dangerous of the three branches of government. We know now that Hamilton and the Federalists were wrong on this forecast. We also know that the Anti-Federalists were right. Indeed, the Anti-Federalists-an influential group of American founding statesmen who withheld their assent from the Constitution for various reasons - correctly presaged the future path of the American judiciary. Contemporary thinkers have echoed the cautionary words of the Anti-Federalists, arguing that the modern American judiciary has upset the constitutional balance that sustains the American project of democracy. According to one scholar, the judiciary has freely inserted itself into the political thicket, eroding the political question doctrine that once ensured that the voice of the people would be heard.2 According to another scholar, the judiciary has mooted popular discourse on important issues of conscience before those deliberations have even begun to bud.3 Still another argues that the judiciary has commandeered public institutions to substitute the people's judgment with its own.4 These and other increasingly frequent detours * J.D., B.A., Yale University. -
Chapter 4: House, Government and Opposition
A knowledge of the structure of the House of Representatives is important to an understanding of its mode of operation. The components or groups which make up the House and which are described in the text that follows are common to most parliamentary systems based on the Westminster model. The relationship and interaction between these components is at the heart of parliamentary activity. The nature of the relationships between the groups largely determines the operational effectiveness of the Parliament, particularly in relation to the Executive Government. The relationship between the groups is governed by a combination of constitutional provisions, convention and political reality, which can be simplified as follows: • Members are individually elected to represent constituents within each electoral Division and collectively form the House of Representatives.' ® In most cases Members belong to and support a particular political party.2 • The party (or parties'') having the support of the majority of Members becomes the • The party or the parties opposed to the party supporting the government form the • The party having the support of the majority of Members elects one of its members as leader, who is commissioned by the Governor-General as Prime Minister to form a Government. • The party supporting the Government may elect4, or the Prime Minister may appoint, a specified number of its members to be Ministers of State (the Ministry) who form the Federal Executive Council (the body which, in a formal sense, advises the Governor-General in the executive government of the Commonwealth) and who administer the Departments of State of the Commonwealth. © The full Ministry5, or a selected group from within the Ministry, becomes the principal policy and decision-making group of government which is commonly known as the Cabinet.