The Rule of Law, the Separation of Powers and Judicial Independence in Canada
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Constitutional Equity and the Innovative Tradition
CONSTITUTIONAL EQUITY AND THE INNOVATIVE TRADITION WILLIAM T. QUILLEN* I INTRODUCTION Lazard Freres & Company ("Lazard") and Dillon Read & Company, Inc. ("Dillon"), the investment bank advisers to the special committee of the board of directors of RJR Nabisco, Inc. ("RJR"), 1 moved to intervene in the recent Nabisco shareholder litigation in the Delaware Court of Chancery.2 The motion presented the court with the stuff of lawyers-personal jurisdiction, subject matter jurisdiction, mandatory counterclaims, mandatory and permissive intervention, declaratory judgments, collateral estoppel-in short, a feast for those of our craft who are determined that the elimination of common law pleading and antiquated bills in equity shall not spoil all the fun.3 The motion to intervene was presented to Chancellor William T. Allen, Chief Judge of the Delaware Court of Chancery. What is striking about the portion of the opinion dealing with subject matter jurisdiction is not its example of a now-rare breed of legal issues (that is, is the declaratory judgment counterclaim, being a strictly legal matter designed to negate liability for negligence, cognizable in a separate court of equity?), nor even the overall issues of the modern uniqueness of the Delaware bifurcated Copyright © 1993 by William T. Quillen * Delaware Secretary of State; Distinguished Visiting Professor of Law, Widener University School of Law, Wilmington, Delaware; former Chancellor, Delaware Court of Chancery; retired Justice, Delaware Supreme Court. This article is largely taken from a longer work. See William T. Quillen, A Historical Sketch of the Equity Jurisdiction in Delaware (1982) (unpublished LL.M. thesis, University of Virginia) [hereinafter Quillen, Historical Sketch]. -
Zeynep Koçak-Şimşek* This Article
M ARSILIUS OF P ADUA : T HE S OCIAL C ONTRACTARIAN Zeynep Koçak - Şimşek * This article aims to demonstrate that Marsilius of Padua' s Defensor Pacis (1324) encompasses the basics of the social contract theory. Marsilius arrives at the social contractarian theory drawing upon both his past and present political engagements, and the theoretical legal - political debates of his time. He reconciles his back ground in the city - state of Padua, which struggled with the Holy Roman Empire to keep its autonomous legal order of republican liberties, with his political tendency to and his engagement with the i mperial order. Yet, in constructing his political thought, he benefits immensely from the legal and political debates that had been going on since the beginning of the 10th century with the emergence of the Bologna law school, as well as the revival of both Aristotelian scholarship and Ulpian ' s contribution to th e Digest. All of this had a decisive impact on the scope of the debates. The legal debates sought the legitimate origin of the Holy Roman Emperor ' s sovereignty . H owever, by breaking sovereignty into parts as executive power and legislative power, Azo Portius introduced the possibility of the separation of powers into the debate. Armed with his engagement with the Aristotelian ' doctrine of the wisdom of the multitude ' and the renaissance of the Codex, Marsilius was able to further what Azo had dismantle d by shifting the power that underlay the sovereignty from a bundle of legislative and executive powers to merely legislative ones. Through a convention that he derived from l ex r egia, he constituted the first version of the social contract . -
The Framers' Constitution: Toward a Theory of Principled Constitutionalism
The Framers’ Constitution: Toward a Theory of Principled Constitutionalism By Geoffrey R. Stone and William P. Marshall September 2011 All expressions of opinion are those of the author or authors. The American Constitution Society (ACS) takes no position on specific legal or policy initiatives. The Framers’ Constitution: Toward a Theory of Principled Constitutionalism Geoffrey R. Stone* & William P. Marshall** For the past forty years, political conservatives have effectively framed the national debate over constitutional interpretation. According to the conservatives’ narrative, their approach to constitutional interpretation adheres to the true meaning of the Constitution and to the Rule of Law, whereas “liberal” jurisprudence is concerned only with achieving specific desired outcomes, without regard to the text, history or meaning of the Constitution. The gains that conservatives have achieved by characterizing the debate in this manner cannot be overstated. Because the public has generally accepted the conservative account, Republican presidents have been much more aggressive than their Democratic counterparts in appointing judges with strongly ideological inclinations, and constitutional doctrine has veered sharply to the right as conservative jurists have become ever bolder in their pursuit of politically conservative results. Meanwhile, at the grassroots level, a new strain of conservative constitutionalism has recently emerged that insists that even such traditional legislative measures as civil rights laws and social welfare programs are unconstitutional, reflecting an even more aggressive conception of conservative judicial ideology. The conservative constitutional narrative is deeply unprincipled and patently wrong, both in its defense of conservative judicial ideology and in its attack on what conservatives deride as a result-oriented “liberal” jurisprudence. -
Guantanamo, Boumediene, and Jurisdiction-Stripping: the Mpei Rial President Meets the Imperial Court" (2009)
University of Minnesota Law School Scholarship Repository Constitutional Commentary 2009 Guantanamo, Boumediene, and Jurisdiction- Stripping: The mpI erial President Meets the Imperial Court Martin J. Katz Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Katz, Martin J., "Guantanamo, Boumediene, and Jurisdiction-Stripping: The mpeI rial President Meets the Imperial Court" (2009). Constitutional Commentary. 699. https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm/699 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Constitutional Commentary collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Article GUANTANAMO, BOUMEDIENE, AND JURISDICTION-STRIPPING: THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENT MEETS THE IMPERIAL COURT Martin J. Katz* INTRODUCTION In Boumediene v. Bush,1 the Supreme Court struck down a major pillar of President Bush's war on terror: the indefinite de tention of terror suspects in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The Court held that even non-citizen prisoners held by the United States government on foreign soil could challenge their confinement by seeking a writ of habeas corpus in federal court, and that the procedures the government had provided for such challenges were not an adequate substitute for the writ." As a habeas corpus case, Boumediene may well be revolu tionary.3 However, Boumediene is more than merely a habeas * Interim Dean and Associate Professor of Law. University of Denver College of Law; Yale Law School. J.D. 1991: Harvard College. A.B. 1987. Thanks to Alan Chen. -
Religion in the Public Schools November 2019
Religion in the Public Schools Published online in TASB School Law eSource TASB Legal Services Texas Association of School Boards 512.467.3610 • 800.580.5345 [email protected] Religion in the Public Schools TASB Legal Services Legal Background Several federal and state laws form the foundation that guides public school districts in navigating the complex area of religion in schools. First Amendment The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech . .” U.S. Const. amend. I. The First Amendment applies to school districts as political subdivisions of the state through the Fourteenth Amendment. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). Together, these laws protect private religious expression but prohibit government action to advance, coerce, or endorse religion in the public schools. Plaintiffs may sue the government for violations of the First Amendment through 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Section 1983). Establishment Clause The First Amendment Establishment Clause, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion . ,” prohibits school districts and their employees from establishing religion. U.S. Const. amend. I. Schools must not advance, coerce, or endorse a particular religion or religion over non-religion. Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573 (1989). The U.S. Supreme Court has exercised special vigilance over compliance with the Establishment Clause in elementary and secondary schools because “families entrust public schools with the education of their children, but condition their trust on the understanding that the classroom will not purposely be used to advance religious views that may conflict with the private beliefs of the student and his or her family.” Edwards v. -
The Parliament
The Parliament is composed of 3 distinct elements,the Queen1 the Senate and the House of Representatives.2 These 3 elements together characterise the nation as being a constitutional monarchy, a parliamentary democracy and a federation. The Constitution vests in the Parliament the legislative power of the Common- wealth. The legislature is bicameral, which is the term commoniy used to indicate a Par- liament of 2 Houses. Although the Queen is nominally a constituent part of the Parliament the Consti- tution immediately provides that she appoint a Governor-General to be her representa- tive in the Commonwealth.3 The Queen's role is little more than titular as the legislative and executive powers and functions of the Head of State are vested in the Governor- General by virtue of the Constitution4, and by Letters Patent constituting the Office of Governor-General.5 However, while in Australia, the Sovereign has performed duties of the Governor-General in person6, and in the event of the Queen being present to open Parliament, references to the Governor-General in the relevant standing orders7 are to the extent necessary read as references to the Queen.s The Royal Style and Titles Act provides that the Queen shall be known in Australia and its Territories as: Elizabeth the Second, by the Grace of God Queen of Australia and Her other Realms and Territories, Head of the Commonwealth.* There have been 19 Governors-General of Australia10 since the establishment of the Commonwealth, 6 of whom (including the last 4) have been Australian born. The Letters Patent, of 29 October 1900, constituting the office of Governor- General, 'constitute, order, and declare that there shall be a Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief in and over' the Commonwealth. -
Tribunal Independence and Impartiality: Rethinking the Theory After Bell and Ocean Port Hotel—A Call for Empirical Analysis ∗ Laverne A
Tribunal Independence and Impartiality: Rethinking the Theory after Bell and Ocean Port Hotel—A Call for Empirical Analysis ∗ Laverne A. JACOBS Introduction............................................................................................... 45 I. Tribunal Independence and Impartiality: the New Procedural Fairness....................................................................... 47 A. The Doctrines of Tribunal Independence and Impartiality....... 47 B. Challenges to Independence and Impartiality........................... 49 II. Critiques of the Positive Law on Tribunal Independence and Impartiality.................................................................................... 51 III. Ocean Port and Bell: Piecing together the latest Supreme Court of Canada developments of the tribunal independence doctrine ......................................................................................... 55 Conclusion ................................................................................................ 59 Endnotes.................................................................................................... 61 44 ESSAYS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND JUSTICE (2001–2007) TRIBUNAL INDEPENDENCE AND IMPARTIALITY 45 Introduction In the 1980s, the decision of Nicholson v. Haldimand-Norfolk Regional Police Commissioners1 stirred a significant debate in administrative law theory. At issue was whether the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision to extend the requirements of procedural fairness to decision-making processes beyond -
Judicial Non-Delegation, the Inherent-Powers Corollary, and Federal Common Law
Emory Law Journal Volume 66 Issue 6 2017 Judicial Non-Delegation, the Inherent-Powers Corollary, and Federal Common Law Alexander Volokh Emory University School of Law Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/elj Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Alexander Volokh, Judicial Non-Delegation, the Inherent-Powers Corollary, and Federal Common Law, 66 Emory L. J. 1391 (2017). Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/elj/vol66/iss6/3 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Emory Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Emory Law Journal by an authorized editor of Emory Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. VOLOKH GALLEYPROOFS3 6/19/2017 10:58 AM JUDICIAL NON-DELEGATION, THE INHERENT-POWERS COROLLARY, AND FEDERAL COMMON LAW Alexander Volokh* ABSTRACT On paper, the non-delegation doctrine, with its demand that congressional delegations of power be accompanied by an “intelligible principle,” looks like it might impose some constraints on Congress’s delegations of power. In practice, it looks like it doesn’t. But this disconnect isn’t as stark as it appears: a longstanding but often ignored branch of the doctrine provides that the intelligible-principle requirement is significantly relaxed, or even dispensed with entirely, when the delegate has independent authority over the subject matter. I call this the “Inherent-Powers Corollary.” Not only that: even when the delegate lacks independent authority over the subject matter, the intelligible-principle requirement is still relaxed when the subject of the delegation is interlinked with an area where the delegate has independent authority. -
SUBMISSION to the HOUSE of COMMONS STANDING COMMITTEE on PROC Thursday, April 23, 2020
131.194 SUBMISSION TO THE HOUSE OF COMMONS STANDING COMMITTEE ON PROC Thursday, April 23, 2020 Gregory Tardi, DJur. Executive Director, Institute of Parliamentary and Political Law Executive Editor, Journal of Parliamentary and Political Law MANDATE FOR THE PROC STUDY The House of Commons of Canada’s Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs would like to invite you to appear before the Committee in view of its study of Parliamentary Duties and the COVID-19 Pandemic. The House of Commons has instructed the committee to study ways in which members can fulfill their parliamentary duties while the House stands adjourned on account of public health concerns caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, including the temporary modification of certain procedures, sittings in alternate locations and technological solutions including a virtual Parliament Le Comité permanent de la procédure et des affaires de la Chambre des communes du Canada souhaite vous inviter à comparaître dans le cadre de son étude sur les fonctions parlementaires et la pandémie de la COVID-19. La Chambre des communes a donné instruction au comité d’entreprendre une étude sur la façon dont les députés peuvent exercer leurs fonctions parlementaires alors que la Chambre est ajournée pour des raisons de santé publique reliées à la pandémie de la COVID-19, y compris des modifications temporaires à certaines procédures, des séances en différents lieux et des solutions technologiques, dont l’idée d’un parlement virtuel. The following text was prepared by its author alone. No member of the Government of Canada or of the House of Commons of Canada was consulted. -
Theory of Separation of Powers
THEORY OF SEPARATION OF POWERS Introduction The three organs of the government—Legislature, Executive and Judiciary— perform the three essential functions of law-making, law-application and law- adjudication. This threefold division of governmental functions is universally accepted as the best way of organizing the government. These three functions are inter-related and inter-dependent. But these are performed by three different organs. The separation of powers is a model for the governance of a state. Under this model, the state is divided into three branches of legislature, executive, and judiciary, each with separate and independent powers and areas of responsibility so that the powers of one branch are not in conflict with other branches. It can be contrasted with the fusion of powers in parliamentary systems where the executive and legislature are unified. Separation of powers, therefore, refers to the division of responsibilities into distinct branches to limit any one branch from exercising the core functions of another. The intent is to prevent the concentration of power and provide for checks and balances. History Aristotle first mentioned the idea of a "mixed government" or hybrid government in his work Politics where he drew upon many of the constitutional forms in the city-states of Ancient Greece. In the Roman Republic, the Roman Senate, Consuls and the Assemblies showed an example of a mixed government according to Polybius. John Calvin (1509–1564) favoured a system of government that divided political power between democracy and aristocracy (mixed government). In order to reduce the danger of misuse of political power, Calvin suggested setting up of several political institutions which should complement and control each other in a system of checks and balances. -
Challenging the Validity of an Act of Parliament: the Effect of Enrolment and Parliamentary Privilege." Osgoode Hall Law Journal 14.2 (1976) : 345-405
Osgoode Hall Law Journal Article 5 Volume 14, Number 2 (October 1976) Challenging the Validity of an Act of Parliament: The ffecE t of Enrolment and Parliamentary Privilege Katherine Swinton Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj Article Citation Information Swinton, Katherine. "Challenging the Validity of an Act of Parliament: The Effect of Enrolment and Parliamentary Privilege." Osgoode Hall Law Journal 14.2 (1976) : 345-405. http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol14/iss2/5 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Osgoode Hall Law Journal by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons. CHALLENGING THE VALIDITY OF AN ACT OF PARLIAMENT: THE EFFECT OF ENROLMENT AND PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGE By KATHERINE SWINTON* A. INTRODUCTION Parliamentary sovereignty has proved a topic of fascination to scholars of constitutional law for many years, as the volume of literature on the subject well demonstrates. Admittedly, the interest has been greater in Commonwealth countries other than Canada. In this country, students of constitutional law have focussed their attention on the division of powers between federal and provincial governments, since federalism has presented problems requiring immediate solution. Yet even here, the question of parliamentary sovereignty has been given consideration, and it is increasingly attracting discussion as interest increases in the patriation of the constitution and statutory protection for individual and minority rights. Within a study of parliamentary sovereignty, reference is normally made to the enrolled bill principle or rule. This precept, regarded by some as an aspect of sovereignty and by others simply as a rule of evidence, states that the parliamentary roll is conclusive - an Act passed by Parliament and en- rolled must be accepted as valid on its face and cannot be challenged in the courts on grounds of procedural irregularity. -
The Normative Cycle of Shaping Judicial Independence in Domestic
Chicago Journal of International Law Volume 10 Number 1 Article 13 6-1-2009 The Normative Cycle of Shaping Judicial Independence in Domestic and International Law: The Mutual Impact of National and International Jurisprudence and Contemporary Practical and Conceptual Challenges Shimon Shetreet Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cjil Recommended Citation Shetreet, Shimon (2009) "The Normative Cycle of Shaping Judicial Independence in Domestic and International Law: The Mutual Impact of National and International Jurisprudence and Contemporary Practical and Conceptual Challenges," Chicago Journal of International Law: Vol. 10: No. 1, Article 13. Available at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cjil/vol10/iss1/13 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago Journal of International Law by an authorized editor of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact [email protected]. The Normative Cycle of Shaping Judicial Independence in Domestic and International Law: The Mutual Impact of National and International Jurisprudence and Contemporary Practical and Conceptual Challenges Shimon Shetreet* I. INTRODUCTION The creation of the culture of judicial independence has been a combined process of national and international developments. The process consists of a cycle of normative and conceptual impact of national law on international law and later, of international law on national law. In the cycle's first phase, which began in 1701 with England's enactment of the Act of Settlement,' judicial independence was conceived domestically. In the second phase, which began shortly thereafter, this domestic development crossed national boundaries and impacted the thinking of scholars and political leaders in the international community.