Humanitarian Intervention As a Weapon1
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Department of Peace and Conflict Research Uppsala University Humanitarian Intervention as a Weapon1 A qualitative study on the impact geo-strategic interests of veto powers has on the UN decisions to intervene in Libya, and the Non-intervention in Syria. M. MALIK MOURTADAY Peace and Conflict Studies C Bachelor-thesis, 15 Credits Department of Peace and Conflict Research Uppsala University, fall of 2016 Consultant: Margareta Sollenberg Words count: 11,007 1The author thanks Desireé Nilsson, Margareta Sollenberg and Johan Brosché for helpful comments on earlier drafts of the present thesis. Peace and Conflict Research Department, Uppsala University. 0 of 46 Department of Peace and Conflict Research Uppsala University Table of Contents Abstract ................................................................................................................... 3 1. Introduction ........................................................................................................ 4 2. Theoretical framework ...................................................................................... 6 Power politics – Correlation Without a Cause ................................................... 6 Previous Research: Civil War, Economic Ties, Armed Alliences .................... 8 The Gap: Intervention Dilemma ...................................................................... 10 Linking Bargains on Business and Security..................................................... 11 Why Economic Ties Matters to Policy-Makers .............................................. 12 Soft-balancing Theory ..................................................................................... 13 Conditions Affecting States Geo-strategic Calculus ........................................ 15 Conclusion from Theory: Potential Causal Mechanism .................................. 16 3. Research Design ............................................................................................... 18 Method of Mechanisms .................................................................................... 18 Case Selection and Comparability ................................................................... 21 Operationalization ............................................................................................ 23 Data Collection and Design Limitations……………………………………...24 Scope Conditions ............................................................................................. 25 4. Case Studies ...................................................................................................... 26 The Background of Libya ................................................................................ 26 The Libyan Civil War (2011) .......................................................................... 27 Relations with Libya…………………………………………...……………..28 UNSC Armed Intervention……………………...…………...………….........28 The Background of Syria………………………...……………………….…..29 The Syrian Civil War (2011-2016)…………………………………...........…30 1 of 46 Department of Peace and Conflict Research Uppsala University Relations with Syria….………………………………………………….…….31 UNSC Non-Intervention …………………………………...…………………32 5. Analysis ............................................................................................................. 32 Main Findings ....................................................................................................... 33 6. Summary and Conclusions ............................................................................. 37 7. Bibliography…………………………………………………………………..39 List of Figures Figure 1. The correlation to be explained Figure 2. The possible causal pathway Figure 3. The possible causal pathway and mechanisms to be observed Figure 4. The map of world oil reserves (January 2014) according to OPEC 2 of 46 Department of Peace and Conflict Research Uppsala University Abstract In the first academic statistical search on the power-politic argument, Yukari Iwanami (2011) found a negative correlation between the UN permanent members geo-strategic interests and UN interventions. Following Iwanami’s recommendation, this paper aims to construct theory, by probing into the possible path of this correlation. Previous researches on UN armed intervention are places in a common context where affecting civil wars, economic ties, and military alliances are possible pathways for “veto-holder” members’ influence. In addition, a new suggestion is made, that UN decisions to intervene can be viewed today as the aftermath of veto powers soft-balancing calculus, which merely depends on the extent to which a potential intervention might reform the powers equilibrium in the anarchic international realm. Structured, focused comparison method is used to analyze the cases of Libya and Syria. Lastly, some potential pathways and other recommendations are suggested for future research. Keywords: Civil wars, UNSC decision to intervene, Libya, Syria, veto powers, soft- balancing calculus, geo-strategic interests. 3 of 46 Department of Peace and Conflict Research Uppsala University 1. Introduction The research question of this thesis is: “Why does the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) intervene in some humanitarian crises but not in others, and under which conditions? “After all, the UN dilemmas of what to do regarding strangers who are surfing nasty aggression by their own states have remained with us since the post World War II (WWII). While the issues did not change, the rational context has reformed significantly (Cooper et al. 2013: 18). As an outcome of the international legal obligations indicated in the UN Charter, well-defined parameters were legalized on how states should treat their people.2 The national behavior of states becomes exposed to check by third parties such as states, international organizations (IO’s), and non-governmental organizations of human rights (NGO’s) for the first time in the modern history of states society (ibid; 26). The UN Charter, however, limits the right to use military force by single states to cases of self-defense, and it was wildly acknowledged during the cold war that the use of military force to protect the casualties of mass humanitarian abuses was not permitted according to international law (Wheeler, 2000: 1). The UNSC is allowed under the chapter VII provisions of the Charter to empower the use of force that supports international peace and security, but there is substantial dispute, regarding how far, thus, it is plausible to authorize the Security Council to empower military interference in order to end civil wars within a sovereign territory (Ibid: 4). In other words, doing something to liberate strangers suffering from human rights abuse is expected to provoke accusations of interference in the domestic affairs of another government, while doing nothing might lead to moral burdens (Wheeler, 2000: 4). Whereas the first logistic analysis 3 , explained in more detail below, has 2 The international legal obligations that protect individuals against the power of the state can be found principlly in the UN charter, the 1948 Universal declaration of Human rights, the 1948 Genocide Convention, and the Nato. 3 Setting the agenda of the UN Security Council, a paper prepared by Iwanami for the 2011 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association. Department of Political Science, University 4 of 46 Department of Peace and Conflict Research Uppsala University indicated that there is, indeed, a negative correlation between UN permanent members geo-strategic interests and UN armed interventions, even when controlling for several relevant factors (Iwanami, 2011: 17). Yet, correlation and isolation alone do not always mean causation. Therefore, the present thesis aspires to contribute to theory development, through searching into the potential causal chain and mechanisms. First, previous researches on UN policy-making which are placed in common framework where affecting the settings of the conflict, economic alliances and foreign policies, constitute possible factors to impact stakeholders’ interests. In addition, a new suggestion is made, which dictates that UN decisions to intervene can be viewed today as the aftermath of veto powers soft-balancing calculus; it merely depends on the extent to which a potential intervention might reform the powers equilibrium in the anarchic international realm. The deducted hypothesis that will be tested next in the analysis is that the more a major power actor geo- strategic interests are risked by a domestic conflict, the less it is expected that the UNSC will intervene. As the whole UNSC policy-making process is expected to revolve around soft-balancing logic, if the theory is valid, the UNSC authorizations of humanitarian interventions today, thus, might exhibit tangible indicators for the smart-modern power balancing. Second, Structured, Focused Comparison (SFC) method is used for two case studies, respectively the crises in Libya and Syria. As the field is new, the most likely academic principles of case selection and sources usage are respected in order to maximize the possibility of finding the proposed causal mechanism. Nevertheless, based on the results, power soft-balancing research on the progress of UN policymaking is a valuable debate, as it represents a basis to study actors’ geo- strategic interests impact on the UNSC humanitarian decisions, which has a direct impact on international peace and security. Lastly, future research recommendations are made. of Rochester.