Department of Peace and Conflict Research Uppsala University

Humanitarian Intervention as a Weapon1

A qualitative study on the impact geo-strategic interests of veto powers has on the UN decisions to intervene in Libya, and the Non-intervention in Syria.

M. MALIK MOURTADAY

Peace and Conflict Studies C

Bachelor-thesis, 15 Credits

Department of Peace and Conflict Research

Uppsala University, fall of 2016

Consultant: Margareta Sollenberg

Words count: 11,007

1The author thanks Desireé Nilsson, Margareta Sollenberg and Johan Brosché for helpful comments on earlier drafts of the present thesis. Peace and Conflict Research Department, Uppsala University.

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Table of Contents

Abstract ...... 3

1. Introduction ...... 4

2. Theoretical framework ...... 6 Power politics – Correlation Without a Cause ...... 6 Previous Research: Civil War, Economic Ties, Armed Alliences ...... 8 The Gap: Intervention Dilemma ...... 10 Linking Bargains on Business and Security...... 11 Why Economic Ties Matters to Policy-Makers ...... 12 Soft-balancing Theory ...... 13 Conditions Affecting States Geo-strategic Calculus ...... 15 Conclusion from Theory: Potential Causal Mechanism ...... 16

3. Research Design ...... 18 Method of Mechanisms ...... 18 Case Selection and Comparability ...... 21 Operationalization ...... 23 Data Collection and Design Limitations……………………………………...24 Scope Conditions ...... 25

4. Case Studies ...... 26 The Background of Libya ...... 26 The Libyan Civil War (2011) ...... 27 Relations with Libya…………………………………………...……………..28 UNSC Armed Intervention……………………...…………...…………...... 28 The Background of Syria………………………...……………………….…..29 The Syrian Civil War (2011-2016)…………………………………...... …30

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Relations with Syria….………………………………………………….…….31 UNSC Non-Intervention …………………………………...…………………32

5. Analysis ...... 32 Main Findings ...... 33

6. Summary and Conclusions ...... 37

7. Bibliography…………………………………………………………………..39

List of Figures

Figure 1. The correlation to be explained Figure 2. The possible causal pathway Figure 3. The possible causal pathway and mechanisms to be observed Figure 4. The map of world oil reserves (January 2014) according to OPEC

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Abstract

In the first academic statistical search on the power-politic argument, Yukari Iwanami (2011) found a negative correlation between the UN permanent members geo-strategic interests and UN interventions. Following Iwanami’s recommendation, this paper aims to construct theory, by probing into the possible path of this correlation. Previous researches on UN armed intervention are places in a common context where affecting civil wars, economic ties, and military alliances are possible pathways for “veto-holder” members’ influence. In addition, a new suggestion is made, that UN decisions to intervene can be viewed today as the aftermath of veto powers soft-balancing calculus, which merely depends on the extent to which a potential intervention might reform the powers equilibrium in the anarchic international realm. Structured, focused comparison method is used to analyze the cases of Libya and Syria. Lastly, some potential pathways and other recommendations are suggested for future research.

Keywords: Civil wars, UNSC decision to intervene, Libya, Syria, veto powers, soft- balancing calculus, geo-strategic interests.

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1. Introduction

The research question of this thesis is: “Why does the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) intervene in some humanitarian crises but not in others, and under which conditions? “After all, the UN dilemmas of what to do regarding strangers who are surfing nasty aggression by their own states have remained with us since the post World War II (WWII). While the issues did not change, the rational context has reformed significantly (Cooper et al. 2013: 18). As an outcome of the international legal obligations indicated in the UN Charter, well-defined parameters were legalized on how states should treat their people.2 The national behavior of states becomes exposed to check by third parties such as states, international organizations (IO’s), and non-governmental organizations of human rights (NGO’s) for the first time in the modern history of states society (ibid; 26). The UN Charter, however, limits the right to use military force by single states to cases of self-defense, and it was wildly acknowledged during the cold war that the use of military force to protect the casualties of mass humanitarian abuses was not permitted according to international law (Wheeler, 2000: 1). The UNSC is allowed under the chapter VII provisions of the Charter to empower the use of force that supports international peace and security, but there is substantial dispute, regarding how far, thus, it is plausible to authorize the Security Council to empower military interference in order to end civil wars within a sovereign territory (Ibid: 4). In other words, doing something to liberate strangers suffering from human rights abuse is expected to provoke accusations of interference in the domestic affairs of another government, while doing nothing might lead to moral burdens (Wheeler, 2000: 4). Whereas the first logistic analysis 3 , explained in more detail below, has

2 The international legal obligations that protect individuals against the power of the state can be found principlly in the UN charter, the 1948 Universal declaration of Human rights, the 1948 Genocide Convention, and the Nato. 3 Setting the agenda of the UN Security Council, a paper prepared by Iwanami for the 2011 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association. Department of Political Science, University

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indicated that there is, indeed, a negative correlation between UN permanent members geo-strategic interests and UN armed interventions, even when controlling for several relevant factors (Iwanami, 2011: 17). Yet, correlation and isolation alone do not always mean causation. Therefore, the present thesis aspires to contribute to theory development, through searching into the potential causal chain and mechanisms. First, previous researches on UN policy-making which are placed in common framework where affecting the settings of the conflict, economic alliances and foreign policies, constitute possible factors to impact stakeholders’ interests. In addition, a new suggestion is made, which dictates that UN decisions to intervene can be viewed today as the aftermath of veto powers soft-balancing calculus; it merely depends on the extent to which a potential intervention might reform the powers equilibrium in the anarchic international realm. The deducted hypothesis that will be tested next in the analysis is that the more a major power actor geo- strategic interests are risked by a domestic conflict, the less it is expected that the UNSC will intervene. As the whole UNSC policy-making process is expected to revolve around soft-balancing logic, if the theory is valid, the UNSC authorizations of humanitarian interventions today, thus, might exhibit tangible indicators for the smart-modern power balancing. Second, Structured, Focused Comparison (SFC) method is used for two case studies, respectively the crises in Libya and Syria. As the field is new, the most likely academic principles of case selection and sources usage are respected in order to maximize the possibility of finding the proposed causal mechanism. Nevertheless, based on the results, power soft-balancing research on the progress of UN policymaking is a valuable debate, as it represents a basis to study actors’ geo- strategic interests impact on the UNSC humanitarian decisions, which has a direct impact on international peace and security. Lastly, future research recommendations are made.

of Rochester.

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2. Theoretical Framework

This chapter starts with an account to Iwanami’s (2011) statistical analysis to explain the correlation found between geo-strategic interests of veto powers and UNSC humanitarian decisions, and the missing causal explanation. As there is a lack of theory, a framework of a suggestive path is built from previous research on the dependent variable. A lacuna between normative obligations and UN performance mechanisms leads me to propose my own theoretic proposal: that the UNSC authorization for humanitarian intervention might reflect today, eventually, the cost-benefit aftermath of veto powers soft balancing, which depends to a large extent on the magnitude of risks a civil war represents to their core geo-strategic interests, along with certain interplay with humanitarian sentiments. When it comes to my independent variable, recent research on the UN permanent members’ (P5) geo-strategic interests in relation to third-party decision to intervene is used, along with literature on the economic and military ties, to deduct the hypothesis, and the plausible causal model, which will be tested next in the analysis.

Power Politics – A Correlation without a Cause

In this research, I refer to the Japanese scholar Yukari Iwanami, who conducted the first quantitative empirical analysis on the whole decision-making process of the Security Council (2011:21). Several analyses of UN peacekeeping in the literature focus on humanitarian crises, and examine when and where peacekeeping missions are more expected to be dispatched (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000; Page Fortna, 2008). Though, peacekeeping is just one measure of UN intervention, and in order to capture a general picture of the Council’s intervention, it is still necessary to analyze other forms of the Council’s decisions to intervene. The power-politics logic is widely discussed in the literature. Yet, very little

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systematic research has been done to test the validity of these explanations in order to advance theory on the field although Iwanami contributed by her findings to the literature on conflict management and civil wars. Since she expanded the scope of the analysis into the Council’s agenda as a whole, and examined several potential factors that influence the Council’s decision-making, relating veto members interest to the UNSC agenda and resolutions. She coded 445 domestic disputes between 1946 and 1999 as entered to the UNSC agenda or not (Iwanami, 2011:13). Besides, the author isolated civil wars from intra-state conflicts that escalated into international wars by involving third parties. While the Council can also ask the General Assembly to hold meetings to discuss certain issues, Iwanami did not include those resolutions. 4 The author derived nine hypotheses on how the interests of the permanent members and international norms affect the Security Council’s agenda setting process. She related the voting patterns of permanent members, the relationship between the states in conflict and the veto powers’ policy preferences, along with how this relationship affects the policy outcome of the Security Council, but this does not automatically denote a causal explanation, as much of the theory remains unspecified. Iwanami, (2011) nevertheless, joins those who claim that permanent members welcome the involvement of the Security Council, because it will reduce the costs of intervention and increase the legitimacy of engagement. Rather, she argues that conflicts in states that are allies and/or former colonies of UNSC permanent members are less expected to be acknowledged, which strongly support the power politics argument; that the UN policy-making is driven by the permanent members geostrategic interest (2011: 21).5 Albeit intuitively easy to undertake, this does not really entail a causal description, as much of the theoretic uncertainty remains: geo- strategic interest is neither precisely detected, nor why are civil wars in alliance partners (or former colonies) of permanent members less expected to come to the

4 The author gathered her dependent variables based on the official documents of the United Nations, accessible at UNBISNET. 5 These effects holds even when controlling for other elements that affects the UN intervention, such as the number of deaths, oil export, permanent member ally, former permanent member’s colony, internationalization of the conflict, actors’ capabilities, and cold war (Iwanami, 2011: 7).

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Council’s agenda? In other words, how does it, in turn, affect the five members geostrategic calculus?

Independent What is the Dependent potential causal P5 Geo-strategic chain and UN Decision to Interests Mechanism? Intervene

Figure 1. The correlation to be explained

Previous Research: Conflict Characteristics, Economic Ties, and Armed Alliances

Although interventions are considered as serious violations of state sovereignty and necessitate frequently expensive foreign-policy measures, states have used interventions to influence civil conflicts (Gleditsch, 2007). The literature has identified a set of characteristics that increase the risk of a third-party intervention, comprising civil war strategic location, capabilities, and existing (or historical) ties of both potential intervener and target state. These characteristics notably form, to a large extent, the decision to intervene as they influence potential interveners’ willingness and opportunity to act.6 First, geographic proximity is an obvious characteristic influencing domestic conflict intervention (Saleyhan and Gleditsch, 2006). Bordering states have a superior opportunity to intervene than most distant states, because the area where

6 Willingness “is related to a decision-maker’s calculations of advantage and disadvantage, cost and benefit, considered on both conscious and unconscious levels” (Siverson and Starr, 1990: 49). In contrast, Opportunity denotes “the possibilities that are available to any entity within any environment, representing the total set of environmental constraints and possibilities” (Siverson and Starr, 1990: 48). The opportunity and willingness to intervene, in tandem, influence the possibility of civil conflict intervention.

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the conflict takes place reduces the costs of involvement (Lemke and Regan, 2004). Furthermore, proximate countries are extremely vulnerable to the costs of a conflict and, thus, concerns of inaction results. These states are motivated to avoid the spillover of the civil war into their lands and mitigate economic, social, and humanitarian consequences of the domestic dispute (Findley and Teo, 2006). 7 Beardsley and Schmidt (2012) look at the determinants of distinct levels of UNSC involvement in global crises, they state that measures of the escalatory potential and severity of a crisis are better explanations for the Council’s intervention than variables that measure the parochial interests of the five permanent “veto-holding” members (P5). Yet, their analysis is restricted to UNSC intervention in inter-state conflicts and does not focus on domestic conflicts where humanitarian disasters are frequently obvious. Second, capabilities of the probable intervener are also key factors of the willingness and opportunity to intervene. As costly efforts, humanitarian interventions need nations to spend assets on meddling the domestic affairs of other nations. Major powers have geo-strategic interests broadening well beyond their borders to regions and states across the globe (Pearson, Baumann and Pickering, 1994). Moreover, powerful states possess a certain level of power projection capabilities essential to execute interventions. Obviously, these countries are among those most repeatedly engaging this foreign policy tactic due to their military superiority (Gent, 2008). Concluded by Fortna (2004), UN peacekeepers are sent to difficult instances for peacekeeping and they are very vigilant when it concerns strong militarily states. According to Mullenbach (2005), The UN peacekeeping is less expected if the armed conflict is located in a superpower state or has strong allies, but more expected to take place if the UNSC has been involved earlier in a domestic conflict. Third, a record of close relations between a conflict state and possible intervener(s) might similarly influence decisions to intervene. Close relations such as alliance partnership and former colonial ties have been perceived to enter the

7 Conflict casualties and refugee flows are the most common instances of social and humanitarian social consequences of civil wars.

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expected interveners geostrategic calculus. Colonial ties include the enmeshing of economic, social, and political relations between the past colony and the colonial power (Lemke and Regan, 2004). Moreover, a risk to the stability of the previous colony as a product of domestic disturbances might increase the enthusiasm to mitigate the unwelcomed possible effects of the civil war on these ties (Kathman, 2010). On the other hand, alliances enhance the capabilities of a state worrying outside threats and, thus, their integrity and stability are vital (Lemke and Regan, 2004). When civil wars menace an ally, it could be in the long-term interest of the possible intervener to shore up the embattled regime through intervention (Findley and Teo, 2006; Fordham, 2008). This is particularly expected since Fordham (2010) finds that asymmetric alliances are more common and more long lasting in the existence of trade. Third-party literature on intervention has detected this relationship. For instance, Pearson (1974: 438) identifies the “protection of economic interests in the target state” as one of the key factors to be taken into consideration when deciding to intervene in a domestic war. More recent research scrutinizes whether or not natural resources heighten the motivation of states to intervene in other states’ domestic conflicts (Ross, 2004; Aydin, 2010). Others suggest that economic interests may enter the calculus of an expected intervener, indicating that economic relations influence the interest and, hence, the willingness of third-party to act (Regan, 1998; Carment and James, 2004). Consistent with this opinion, recent evidence indicates that global trade may increase the willingness and opportunity of states to intervene. Kathman (2011) proves that a state with major trade relations to a particular region is more expected to intervene in a conflict located in that region, than in an economically unimportant territory.

The Gap: Intervention Dilemma

Notably, the chief concern of this paper is to find out specific regions where natural resources and economic ties are more likely to denote serious risks to the core geo-strategic interests of the five major powers (P5). In an attempt to explain why civil wars in alliance partners (or former colonies) of permanent members are less expected to come to the Council’s agenda? What stops them from allowing the

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UNSC to interfere in the domestic affairs of their allies? And what are the possible conditions that make major powers more expected to use their vetoes against the UN humanitarian intervention (Iwanami, 2011: 23).

Linking Bargains on Business and Security

Many studies have found that military alliances have an impact on trade (Mansfield and Bronson, 1997). From a realist standpoint, these studies posit that partners trade more than non-allies, because countries are wary of the security externalities that arise through bilateral economic exports. Trade generates a security externality for nations, because there is no guarantee that the gains from trade will not be used to reinforce military power and, in turn, to menace trade allies. Military relationships indirectly impose collaboration in trade by creating motivations for allied governments to value their exchange partners’ gains. A case in point here is that wealth gained from trade reinforces the potential military power of the alliance. Accordingly, security externalities from trade might change behavior by firms and states. Governments could manage trade policy to direct trade toward allies and away from actual or likely foes. Furthermore, the causal mechanism behind an optimistic relationship between alliances and trade might be a response by multinationals to positive political relationships between states (Long, 2003). When corporations feel secure that conflict among their country and that of their exchange partners is unlikely to occur and that the states will collaborate together to promote trade between their respective businesses, they are more likely to invest in commerce. Investments to serve export markets are often relation-specific, which forces firms to guard against future opportunistic conducted by trading partners. As a result, businesses are more expected to establish trade relations with the multinationals of a state that is allied to their government.8 Allied governments have political-military reasons to enforce trade agreements between their firms, because trade increases the potential military power of the alliance (Gowa and Mansfield,

8 Gowa & Mansfield (2004) point out that this argument applies especially when goods exchanged are subject to increasing returns to scale.

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2004). Many economic relations such as international investments and trade exports progress from difficult negotiations between states. These negotiations take place under international bodies such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), sectoral intergovernmental cartels such as the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), regional incorporation arrangements, and bilateral investment treaties.

Why Economic Relations Matter to Policy-makers

Similar to other ties, trade relations are developed over time and, if solid enough, these relations form a vested interest in the stability of vital economic allies. These partnerships keep states in perpetual communication with each other, developing, to some levels, mutual trust and reciprocal visions of economic welfares. Apart from this, private domestic economic actors are involved in direct cross border business. These private economic actors influence - to a large extent - their governments’ economic negotiations and ensure a place for their preferences. I acknowledge that a decision to intervene is the product of certain interplay of national self-interests and/or humanitarian sentiments along with the nature of the civil war environment. I do, however, perceive bilateral economic relations - precisely natural resources (oil and natural gas) export - as a central factor, which increases the likelihood of third-party negotiating decisions to intervene. Leaders face a direct challenge to their national energy security when a conflict is located in rich oil regions; therefore, such a problem deserves more academic and empirical attention. Potential third-party officials, specifically strong economic and trade associates, are of course, conscious of the civil war costs and assess the charges before making an appropriate response to a civil conflict (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). Reactions might differ from finding alternative markets, mediation, and economic sanctions, to extreme army provision against one side in the battle. Therefore, armed intervention is not the only choice available to third parties, “the idea that states may intervene into a conflict to protect their interests is hardly profound” (Findley and Teo, 2006: 830). However, I argue that economic relations, which are similar to other forms of interstate ties, increase the attention a third-party

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pays to the internal affairs of its substantial partners. This constitutes a paradigm of paramount importance, because national stability is an obligatory condition for promoting and sustaining trade movement and development. Equally, civil armed conflicts incline to cause destruction to infrastructure that supports global export. Such damage of property surely interrupts economic exchange and amplifies insecurity in the market though the infrastructure is constructed by foreign investments. Collier et al., probing some of these unfavorable lucrative concerns, call domestic conflicts “development in reverse” (2003: 1). Likewise, Bayer and Rupert (2004) estimate that civil conflicts, on average, result in roughly a 30% decrease in global commerce. Obviously, domestic wars cause losses to third-party economies. The economic costs of civil wars, however felt globally, are not frequently dispersed equally through the economies of affected stakeholders. Relatively these costs are high in sectoral productions that have some legacy of valuable economic relations with the conflict state. Mitchell (1970) argues that internal socio-economic groups gaining from economic networks within a state that undergoes civil war may appeal for intervention from their respective governments. As utility-maximizing players, these powerful interest groups should seek to lobby their government’s foreign policy positions; whenever the stability of a nation they do business with is at risk of profit-threatening domestic dispute. Still, informed of the likely economic concerns, decision-makers would, thus, decide actions intended to amortize the losses of their national economic constituency, including armed intervention. Liberal understandings of global relations admit the extent to which domestic constituency economic preferences shape decision-makers’ choices (Moravcsik, 1997). The same outcome has been anticipated in civil wars intervention (Aydin, 2012). Although most intervention lobbying attempts are difficult to record and direct lobbying is unlikely to practice out in public and formal circles, existing proof of such phenomenon is usually triangulated from the interests of stakeholders, government officials, and policy outputs (Fagre and Wells, 1982). Cutrone and Fordham (2010: 635), for example, claim that US officials whose constituents “are threatened by imports from other countries may use human rights concerns to justify calls for trade protection”. Several empirical works on lobbying and intervention indicate the role played by powerful domestic interest groups. Getz and Oetzel (2009) identify strategies

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accessible to businesses existing in conflict markets, classifying lobbying as an “indirect intervention strategy”. This demand to defend overseas interests has guided businesses to establish a role in US foreign policy whereby “virtually all major corporations on the Fortune 500 list have some kind of representation in Washington, and a large percentage of them is involved in foreign policy lobbying” (McCormick, 2009: 492). Gibbs (1991), delivering more direct support, detects a set of CIA officials, White House, and State Department, with strong relations to corporations involved in the Democratic Republic of Congo and indicate that decisions about appropriate US officials action were consistent with the interests of these interest groups to a large extent.9

Soft-Balancing Theory

The concept of Soft-Balancing has recently surfaced as a new understanding of states strategies to balance dominant actors, which encourages the use of diplomatic and economic instruments to pressure the most dominant state and delay their effort for power and supremacy. Balancing comportment of states is driven by the structural characteristics of the global equilibrium system of powers itself. Advocates of soft balancing have suggested several mechanisms through which powers engage in this style of balancing, comprising mediation, diplomatic coalitions, agreements and international institutions, statecraft mechanisms such as economic initiatives, as well as territorial denial and multilateral and regional economic activities that ignore the superpower in the process (Paul, 2005: 53). Obviously, leaders resort to balance in order to prevent being controlled by stronger powers (Walt, 1985: 5). It is the concern of states to restrain a potential hegemon before it becomes too powerful, so that they can prevent falling victim to its standards before undergoing the superpower control. It is safer for states to either improve one's own abilities through self-help mechanisms, or form alliances with

9 Gibbs (1991: 114–160) also displays similar government - business relations in Belgian and French policymakers and process traces decisions vis-à-vis the form of intervention action based on these lucrative interests.

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states that cannot readily lead in order to limit and contain the one who might possibly weaken the survival of states and govern the whole system (Nye, 1990: 158). Still, cases of humanitarian crises represent a self-help opportunity for veto powers, given the nature of the anarchic system. If crises happen to be located in the ally’s territory of a veto member, it is estimated as affecting its own power due to globalization and power interconnectivity. The permanent members, therefore, veto any UNSC intervention that might represent a potential regime change, which might denote a risk of downgrade in the global equilibrium of powers (Paul, 2005: 54).

Conditions Affecting States Geo-strategic Calculus

Rationalists claim that in the anarchical international system, lacking an international hegemon or sovereign, countries are locked in a “self-help” system, absorbed in a constant struggle to guarantee their own existence. Neorealism perceives the aftermath of anarchy as mistrust and insecurity whereby states can only ensure their survival by maximizing their power relative to others (Waltz, 1979). Powers, and dynamics relating to power, are the visible data with which to analyze the global system. As Mearsheimer says “the distribution of material capabilities among states is the key factor for understanding world politics” (1995: 91). Neoliberalism, on the other hand, does not suppose that anarchy dictates a focus on relative power, nor does it see the global system as a zero-sum game (Baldwin, 1993: 6; Stein, 1982: 318). Neoliberalism conceives that states have an interest in their position in the international system in absolute terms, focusing on maximizing their well being regardless of other states. Neoliberalism rationalizes cooperative behavior between states and institutions in international relations as a chain of “iterated” interactions, reciprocated in a “tit-for-tat” mode, theoretically in the interests of each (Axelrod, 1984). Notably however “cooperation ensues not because of morality or idealistic motivations, but because it satisfies the long-term interests of power-maximizing rational states” (Hobson, 2000: 98; Keohane, 1984: 65-85). Notwithstanding the above-mentioned differences, both theories stress the

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self-interested identity of the state. Be it absolute or relative gains, welfare or power, “both take the self- interested state as the starting point for theory” (Wendt, 1992: 392).

Conclusion from Theory: Possible Causal Path

In sum, executive politicians are totally aware of security and economy risks of civil war that can disturb their integral interest groups. These representatives, directed by the preferences of national lucrative actors, mostly prone to be disturbed by a domestic war, are more expected to adopt strategies geared to relieve the negative effects of a given domestic conflict, on their national security and economic health. I do not argue that the existence of self-interest in the conflict or even pro-intervention lobbying automatically yields a decision to intervene. Rather, economic reliance is perceived as a decisive variable in any political geo-strategic equation. Therefore, the magnitude of risks to major powers national energy security increases the chances that governments will take actions, involving armed intervention if necessary. The argument asserts that trade ties work in ways similar to existing strategic military coalitions, which foregrounds whether or not motivation to intervene depends, to a large extent, on whether the crises happen to be located in the ally’s territory of a veto member or not, as it is estimated as affecting its own power due to globalization and power interconnectivity. The permanent members, therefore, veto any UNSC intervention that might represent a potential regime change, which might denote a risk of downgrade in the global equilibrium of powers (Paul, 2005: 54-55). All in all, the subsequent hypothesis that will be tested next in the analysis is that:

H: The more a UN permanent member geo-strategic interests are in danger, the less it is expected that the UNSC will intervene.

Based on previous research on the third-party intervention and civil wars, and after assessing conflict characteristics, economic relations, and armed alliances, I, farther, propose that UNSC authorization, or non-authorization for humanitarian intervention, might be regarded eventually today as the aftermath of the veto powers

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soft-balancing calculations, which merely depends on the extent to which a potential intervention might reform the status quo of powers in the anarchic system. In line with this, critics such as Stephen Brooks and William Wohlfort (2008) contend that these actions might not be automatically interpreted as balancing behavior, and that thoughts as of soft balancing are just a weak effort by theorists to defend balance of power theory in an era in which the theoretical assumptions of the theory no longer hold due to variations in norms. However, the present analysis points out in a riposte to Brooks and Wohlfort (2008) that the global system of states is still anarchic, with actors having to rely on self-help to ensure their survival. Moreover, it is not power itself that major powers balance against, but it is the “fear of power generated by the anarchic system that drives states to balance against each other in the system.” (Nye, 1990: 157) If we deem that the assumptions made by balance of power theory still hold true, then it still has explanatory power. The possible causal model to be operationalized next is explained in (Figure. 2) below.

The possible Causal Chain

Independent “Veto-holder” Members Dependent P5 Geo-strategic Soft Balancing UN Decision to Interest Intervene

Figure 2: The possible causal mechanism.

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3. Research Design

This chapter starts with an explanation of the methods adopted for the case studies, a brief discussion about mechanisms in social science, and a description of the aim. The selection of the cases is then specified, with a discussion on their comparability. Main concepts in the likely causal path are operationalized, and lastly, the sources are appraised.

Methods and Causal Mechanism

Teorell and Svensson (2007) stated that extensive studies such as Iwanami’s (2011) are beneficial for finding correlation between the independent and dependent variables, as well as in isolating the influence from that of other elements (2007:270-1). Furthermore, their reliability is often better. Frequently, intensive studies are promising more in terms of validity, as fewer cases permit more profound and focused operationalization, whereas generality is rather established from extensive studies (Teorell and Svensson 2007: 268-269). Teorell and Svensson, therefore, support merging intensive and extensive analyses, and if resources are incomplete to openly bond one's research to preceding investigation (2007:274), a cross case study will allow the current research to check if Iwanami’s correlation effectively denotes causality. Hedström and Svedberg (1998: 5) differentiated between the natural sciences looking after laws to tone the connections among variables, and the research in social sciences seeking causal paths, which fit somewhere between simple explanation – so called middle-range theorizing – and social rules. The undertaking of social disciplines afterwards turns out to find causal devices and determine whether they function under certain conditions or not. A causal mechanism is frequently explained as fragments of theory about entities at a different level than the link we want to clarify (Hedström and Svedberg, 1998: 9). In these terms, the likely causal path sketched in the theory chapter is illustrated in (Figure. 3) below, and could be explained as follows:

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The aforementioned set of characteristics that increase the risk of a third-party intervention, comprising conflict geo-strategic position, capabilities, and existing (or historical) ties of both potential intervener and target state. These characteristics notably form the decision to intervene as they influence potential interveners’ willingness and opportunity to act. Willingness “is related to a decision-maker’s calculations of advantage and disadvantage, cost and benefit, considered on both conscious and unconscious levels” (Siverson and Starr, 1990: 49). In contrast, opportunity denotes “the possibilities that are available to any entity within any environment, representing the total set of environmental constraints and possibilities” (ibid: 48). The opportunity and willingness to intervene, in tandem, influence the possibility of civil conflict intervention. By the same token, interest groups lobby their government’s officials whose beliefs and behavior are affected to some extent when they know the real cost a civil war denotes to their national energy security, especially, in domestic conflicts that imply an interception of energy products flow in the international markets. This could seriously challenge governments leading robust industrial economies such as the “veto-holder” members. Thus, civil wars located in alliance partners (or former colonies) of permanent members implicitly affect collaboration in trade and reduce the military power potential of the existing alliance. To balance against dominant actors, states adopt soft strategies that encourage the use of diplomatic and economic instruments to put pressure on the most dominant state and delay their effort for power and supremacy (Paul, 2005: 53). Therefore, the present paper contend that balancing behavior of states is driven by the structural characteristics of the global equilibrium system of powers itself, which stops them from allowing the UNSC to interfere in the domestic affairs of their allies.

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As far as methodology is concerned, the method that will be used in order to achieve this investigation is structured focus comparison (SFC). This approach is a between-case design, as it necessitates two or more cases to be compared with each other. SFC is used to focus on particular characteristics of the chosen cases in order to assess the hypothesis. The method is structured in a sense that a set of general questions is formulated before gathering the data, which will be asked to each case later in the analysis. This allows the process of data collection to be standardized and only data that is appropriate for the specific variables is collected and questioned. This homogenous gathering of data makes the cases comparable with each other. The method is systematized in a way that it deals only with certain facets of the cases, namely those directly linked to the variables relevant to the formed hypotheses. This is the focused element of SFC (Powner, 2015: 129). What distinguishes this method from the statistical counterpart is the accumulation of a theoretical focus replicating the observation objectives throughout the research.

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One has to keep in mind that all sides of an event cannot be tackled in a single analysis, and, thus, it is significant to keep the focus limited to the exact aspect selected for the study (George & Bennett, 2005: 69f). The present case studies focus on “those aspects that have been identified as relevant in the previously established theoretical framework” (Söderberg Kovacs, 2007:49). More precisely, the present paper is a comparative study of policymakers' approaches to strategy and tactics toward political opponents in the international arena.

Case Selection and Comparability

When merging extensive and intensive analyses, Teorell and Svensson (2007: 277) instruct selecting a case that fits into the general correlation to scrutinize the causal mechanism or prove certain correlation; it is one that does not request new explanatory variables to reinforce the validation. As the objective is to progress theory, I will choose one of each of the following aforementioned instructions. Also, I will define each phase of the sequence choices. The first delimitation is centered on the dependent variable variation; it is viable to select one case where the UNSC passed a resolution to intervene and one where it did not. The cases are divided into those where the UNSC intervened as a response to a humanitarian crisis, and those where it failed to provide aid, to study one of each. The second delimitation involves selecting cases in non-democratic governments, as Iwanami (2011:19) coefficient estimates of democracy is statistically significant, indicating that the Security Council tends to become involved in non-democracies crises than democracies. The third delimitation is about the internationalization of the conflict, as it was also statistically indicative in Iwanami’s regression. The fourth is based on the independent variable, geo-strategic significance, only crises that are located within territories, rich in natural resources – such as oil and natural gas, or brothering significant petroleum proven reserves – based on data10 from BP, at the end of 2009 – territories, in which an intensified conflict means significant potential oil trade interruption (see figure 4). The late economist

10 Three countries dominated gas reserves: Iran, Russia, and Qatar, which together held nearly half of the world's proven reserves.

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E.F. Schumacher once mused that energy was “not just another commodity, but the precondition of all commodities, a basic factor equal with air, water, and earth”. But because of its ubiquitous nature, the welfares of superior energy security are often non-excludable and non-rivalrous, similar to other public goods like clean air or national defense. Thus a paradox arises: energy security is vital to modern society, yet its very ubiquity makes it prone to market under-distribution and failure (1980; 1–2). For instance, if we look at the entire wealth of mankind, the value of oil reserves in place is estimated around 17 trillion US dollars, which is the most valuable commodity currently priced on earth (Dannreuther and Ostrowski, 2013). Therefore, much of the geo-strategy motivations for major economic forces revolve around the structure of global energy markets. Iwanami (2011:17) denoted a strong effect on UN interventions, implying that major powers are very concerned when their national energy interests are in jeopardy. As control over the structure of energy markets, cannot be done in a smooth transition, it ultimately requires mobilizing military troops to secure access to these energy supplies abroad. The fifth and the last delimitation is concerned with the high number of atrocities in the ground where only armed conflicts that the UN classified as (L3) humanitarian emergencies11 are selected. The last step is mainly practical, after these delimitations, there are ten cases left, two of which fit into the correlation and eight do not.12 I opt for two cases that are sound, with great significance in terms of energy traffic (See the figure 4). That left me with Libya (UNSC decision to intervene) and Syria (No-intervention decision yet), both with escalating figures of aggression and atrocities since the start of the crises in 2011. Accordingly, the research focuses on the UNSC armed intervention in Libya (2011), and the Russian and Chinese vetoes against the UNSC mandates in Syria (2011-16). Although a variation in the UN policy-making is obvious, a comparative study of policymakers' approaches to strategy and tactics toward political opponents in the international arena is needed.

11 Level 3 (L3) Emergency is a sudden major-onset humanitarian emergency instigated by conflict or natural catastrophes that demands system-wide mobilization. The calculations before the declaration of an (L3) emergency is centered on an analysis of five criteria – urgency, complexity, scale, capacity and reputational risk (UN, 2013: 12). 12 Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, Syria, Palestine, Iraq, Somalia, Sudan

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Figure. 4: A map of world petroleum reserves according to OPEC, January 2014.

Operationalization

What is the role-played by National Geo-strategic Interest? National interests defined in strategic, economic, and political terms have always been regarded as the principle determinants of decisions to intervene (Wight, 1978; 138). The view taken here is that state interests are what states “think them to be” and that they depend on the set of constraints and opportunities that states face at any given time (ibid; 95). What is the utility and role of natural resources such as energy for advancing one's interests? How are the risks of political action best calculated, controlled, and accepted? (George and Bennett, 2005: 88). Do states practice the values that they advocate? The sources used in this research comprise original UN reports, archival materials, memoirs, oral histories, newspapers, and new interviews. What is the best approach for major powers selecting goals or objectives for political action and Decision-making (Veto or Not)? How are the goals of action pursued most effectively? What is the best timing of action to advance one's interests? (George & Bennett, 2005:89). Governments are unlikely to intervene

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unless the chance of success can analytically be divided into two sets of considerations, which focus on the practical problems of executing the intervention successfully at an acceptable cost. The perceived chance of success is here a function of the conflict characteristics, the economic-military strength and nature of alliances. What are the objectives states perused in their policy-making to balance dominate actors? How do states make use of diplomatic and economic instruments to apply pressure on the most dominant states and delay their effort for power and supremacy? What is the mechanism that drives states soft balancing comportment in the global equilibrium system of powers itself? The political considerations associated with intervention decisions focus on determining their objective and the level of costs. Therefore, energy imports, energy production, and trade infrastructure such as ports and energy pipelines will serve as indicators to measure the magnitude of risk a civil war might represent to major powers geo-strategic interest. Answers to these questions should provide a parsimonious but at the same time satisfactory explanation for why civil wars in alliance partners (or former colonies) of permanent members are less expected to be dealt with within the Council’s agenda? And what are the possible conditions that make major powers more inclined to use their vetoes against the UN humanitarian intervention (Iwanami, 2011: 23).

Data Collection and Design Limitations

The material used to study the national geo-strategic interests of the major powers will mainly be based on material and data collected from the UN13, CIA, EIA and BP websites, which should be regarded as a trustworthy source. The data is further backed-up with academic articles, reports, and analyses of professional newspapers, including expert journals and approved political divisions direct statements of (and interviews with) military personnel, politicians, and witnesses of the processes from open media sources. Since this primary data is valuable for verifying the theoretical framework of the research, the aim is to shape a deeper explanation of the context and not just conduct a presentation of facts and numbers.

13 (HDI) Human Development Index.

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Although one can rise the reliability by being transparent on how the author have examined the material and provide enough information to replicate the study (George & Bennett 2005: 105-106). A challenge with this sort of qualitative analysis is its reliability; in other words, the lack of random wrongdoings and the possibility to repeat the study and come to the same conclusion (Esaiasson et al. 2013: 63). This is challenging with studies where the data is vulnerable for interpretations and bias.

Scope Conditions

First of all, this analysis is geared towards the examination of only domestic conflicts and not international conflicts. Since the dynamics of these wars often differ to a great extent, it is hard to generalize the findings from one category of the conflict to the other. Secondly, The discussion on UN humanitarian intervention in general is intensive and widespread in conflict management and civil war literature. However the concluded intervention in Libya and the ongoing conflict in Syria lack these detailed academic sources, measuring the decision-making developments that led to different conducts by UN in dealing with both crises in Libya and Syria. As it is noticeable in the map of world petroleum reserves (Figure.4), Syria does not have much oil reserves, but located next to the center of world energy production. In addition, it has been argued14 that the control over the geographic region of proven oil reserves overlaps with the power base of much of the Salafi- jihadist hub. This creates a link between oil sources and the U.S long war against “terrorism”. And as it is perceived, many UNSC meetings and consultations are undertaken behind closed doors, which make the gatherings of all pieces forming this puzzle impossible. Therefore, I acknowledge the likelihood that the dataset might not reflect, to some extent, the true stimuli of the veto powers. Therefore, when examining major allies economic and military support to the actors, only international materialistic support is included. It would, however, be extremely motivating to further include civilian support in the analysis. Nevertheless, this might unfortunately not be made, because of the difficulty with measuring civilian support and the absence of data.

14 Based on U.S. Army-funded RAND report (2008) “Unfolding the Future of the Long War”.

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In addition, data on energy imports, energy production, and trade infrastructure has all been collected from primary sources available such as CIA, EIA and BP reports. Except some data regarding intelligence services and energy agreements that was only available in professional newspapers – such as the Guardian, CNN, Al Jazeera, ANSA, and European Jewish Press – which represent a risk of bias and error when converting reality to data.

4. Case Studies:

The background of Libya

The country, situated in North Africa, shares its borders with the two foremost “Arab-Spring” countries, Tunisia and Egypt, along with Chad, Sudan, Algeria and Niger. It is also not too distant from Europe; Italy is located in its north just across the Mediterranean. Libya is the fourth largest country in Africa (with an area of 1.8 million sq. km), more than 90% of the country is desert or semi desert, and its populace is one of the lowest in Africa, as only around 6,541,948 million 15 , immigrants make up over 12% of the total population, according to UN data 16 where 96.6% are officially Muslims, virtually all Sunni (CIA, 2017). A large oil rich desert, with an ancient history, has more recently been well known for the 42 years regime of Col. Gaddafi and the chaos that followed his murder. Consequently, Libya’s natural gas and oil prices are highly unstable, because of continuing protests and other disruptions across the country. With soundly good revenue per capita of 14000 $, Libya also had the highest HDI (Human Development Index, 2011) in the continent. However, the rate of unemployment is high at 30 percent, taking some shine off its solid economic credentials (CIA, 2017).

15 July 2015 EST. 16 July 2016 EST.

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The Libyan Civil War (2011)

In early 2011, after the civil war started, the anti-Gaddafi forces formed a committee called the National Transitional Council (NTC), on 27 February 2011. It was intended to work as a provisional authority in the rebel-controlled zones. Both sides committed a number of killings after the Libyan government initiated to roll back the rebels (Crawford, 2011; Fahim, 2011; Smith, 2011). On 19 March 2011, a multilateral NATO-led alliance initiated a military intervention in Libya, obviously to apply the adopted UNSC Resolution 1973. The United Nations voting an intent was to have “an immediate ceasefire in Libya, including an end to the current attacks against civilians, which constitute crimes against humanity/... /imposing a ban on all flights in the country's airspace – a no-fly zone – and tightened sanctions on the Gadhafi regime and its supporters” (UN, 2011).

The resolution was adopted in response to violent events during the Libyan Civil War (UN, 2011), where military operations began, with British and American marine forces firing over 110 Tomahawk boat missiles (Al Jazeera, 2011), the British Royal Air Force, French Air Force, and Royal Canadian Air Force (BBC News, 2011) starting maneuvers across Libya and a naval blockade by Alliance forces (CNN, 2011) French airplanes launched air attacks against Libyan Army tanks and vehicles (Gibson, 2011). Soon thereafter, on 27 June 2011 the International Criminal Court (ICC) released an arrest demand against Gaddafi and his entourage. Col. Gaddafi was overthrown from power after the fall of Tripoli to the rebel forces on 20 August 2011, which culminated with the killing of Gaddafi to end the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya regime (Batty, 2011; European Jewish Press, 2011).

Relations with Libya

Libyan trades to Europe are mainly energy products, which in 2010 was 97.1 percent of the whole Libyan exports. Libya worries Western political heads, their energy strategy, and military advisers (Kovacs, 2007:48-50). Libya has considerable

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reserves of petroleum along with Algeria, which represents a position of strategic counterbalance to reliance on energy, in particular natural gas piped from Russia to Europe. In addition to solar, geothermal, and wind sources of energy are also promising within its enormous territory. This makes Libya strategically significant in the international race for energy resources. Henceforth, Europe’s dependence on Libya’s petroleum and natural gas is expected to increase given the aforementioned reasons. Gaddafi, on the other hand, has opponents around the globe, especially in his own region. Therefore, Western interference would not almost indisputably have happened if the Arab League had not supported it. Only Venezuela spoke out strongly in Gaddafi's defense, while Zimbabwe was one of the few states thought willing to give him safe haven if he stepped down (CNN, 2011). Libya was limited, with few friends, sandwiched between two countries that have experienced their own democratic revolution and had no sympathy for Gaddafi.

UNSC Armed Intervention

From the start of the interference, the early alliance of US, France, UK, Italy, Norway, Qatar, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, and Spain extended to nineteen states, with newer states mainly imposing the no-fly zone and naval blockade or delivering military logistical support. France and the United Kingdom initially led the effort, sharing the control with the U.S; NATO took over commands of the arms embargo on 23 March, so-called Operation Unified Protector. The warfare in Libya was over in late October following the killing of Col. Gaddafi, but Libya has become a failed state par excellence. The new Libyan regime invited the NATO to extend its presence to the end of the year (BBC, 2011), but on 27 October, the UNSC voted to terminate NATO's military intervention in Libya by the 31 October (UN, 2011).

In addition to its strategic position, the country is relatively an important petroleum exporter, making 2% of the planet total production and still maintaining proven reserves of around 50 billion barrels. Other significant features of Libya’s oil incorporate its lower cost of refining, lightness, the obvious security of its petroleum supply and transport systems, and proximity to Europe (EIA, 2017). Libya also has a huge potential for other sources of energy, and might deliver these

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sources for the region and Europe. Beside its large proven oil reserves, Libya also has the potential for the detection and exploitation of shale oil and gas refineries, with its reserves ranking fifth in the planet (EIA, 2017), Which represents a significant potential investment for big international corporations.

The Background of Syria

The Syrian Arab Republic is a state in Western Asia with a population of approximately 17,185,170, neighboring Lebanon and the Mediterranean Sea to the west, Iraq to the east, Turkey to the north, Jordan to the south, and Israel to the southwest. Syria's capital and major city is Damascus (CIA, 2017). A country of fertile plains, deserts, and high mountains, Syria is home to multi religious and ethnic groups, including Syrian Arabs, Kurds, Armenians, Greeks, Assyrians, Mandeans, Circassians and Turks (Liliane, 2011; 64). When it comes to religion, the majority are Muslims 92.1% including 75% Sunnis, but Assad belongs to the minority Alawite group who govern Syria's security apparatus, estimated 12% of the total population, 3% Druzes, 7.8% Christians and 0.1% Jews (CIA, 2017).

Syrian Civil War (2011-2016)

The Syrian crises developed out of the flux of the “Arab Spring” and intensified to armed conflict after President Bashar al-Assad's regime aggressively intimidated protests yelling for his departure (Ibid). The Syrian regime has since then rejected efforts to negotiate with what Assad describes as “foreign-armed terrorist groups” (Assad, 2012). The warfare is being battled by several groups: the Syrian Government and its diverse factions, a movable coalition of Sunni Arab rebel factions – comprising the Free Syrian Army – the majority-Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces, Salafi jihadist groups – comprising al-Nusra Front – who frequently collaborate with the Sunni rebels, and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria called (ISIS). Syrian opposition factions created the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and seized control of the part nearby Aleppo and some southern areas. Over time, groups of the

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Syrian opposition fragmented from their original reasonable position to follow an Islamist vision for Syria, as ISIS and Al-Nusra Front (Wyre, 2012:41). In the north, Syrian regime army largely revoked to combat the FSA, permitting the Kurdish YPG to step-in and announce de facto independence (CNN, 2011). In 2015, the YPG united forces with Assyrian, Arab, Armenian and some Turkmen factions, starting the Syrian Democratic Forces, whereas most Turkmen groups stayed with the FSA (Sayginer, 2012: 17). Many governments and international organizations have blamed the Syrian regime, rebel groups and ISIS for severe human rights violations (UN, 2012). The conflict holds the record for the biggest sum ever demanded by UN organs for a single humanitarian crisis, 6.5bn U.S Dollars worth of needs till December 2013 (UN, 2013).

Relations with Syria

Both the Syrian regime and its opposition have received diplomatic and militarily provision from external states, making the conflict portrayed often as a proxy war. The key actors assisting Assad’s regime are Iran and Hezbollah. Both are involved in the conflict both diplomatically and logistically by delivering military training, equipment and combat troops. The Syrian regime has also received weapons from Russia and SIGINT 17 support directly from GRU 18 , in addition to substantial political backing up from Russia (O’Toole, 2012; 81). The leading Syrian opposition group (the Syrian coalition) obtains diplomatic, logistic and armed funding from the U.S., France and Britain (Galpin, 2012; 11). Some Syrian insurgents get training from the CIA at bases in Jordan, Qatar19 and Saudi Arabia (Sayginer, 2012: 33). Under the sponsorship of operation Timber Sycamore20 and other secret activities, the CIA has armed and trained nearly 10,000 rebel combatants at a cost of $1 billion a year since 2012 (CNN, 2012). The Syrian

17 Intelligence derived from electronic signals and systems used by foreign targets, such as communications systems, radars, and weapons systems. 18 Main Intelligence Agency abbreviated (GRU) is the foreign military intelligence main agency of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. 19 Where the largest U.S. military base oversees is located. 20 Timber Sycamore is a classified weapons supply and training program run by the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and supported by various Arab intelligence services (Katz, 2012).

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coalition also gets logistic and governmental support from Sunni countries, most remarkably Qatar, Turkey and Saudi Arabia; all the three major supportive countries have not, however, given any troops for direct contribution in the war, although Turkey was involved in border confrontations with the Syrian Military forces. The Independent and The Financial Times reported that Qatar had funded the Syrian uprising by as much as $3 billion. Saudi Arabia has appeared as the leading group to finance and arm the rebels (2011). The Turkish regime has also been blamed of serving ISIS by turning a blind eye to illegal transport of armaments, battalions, stolen antiquities and oil within its southern borders (Sayginer, 2012: 36). As of 2015, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Turkey are openly supporting the Army of the opposition group. On 1 February 2016, an official beginning of the mediated Geneva Syria peace talks was proclaimed by the United Nations but the war continues (UN, 2016).

UNSC Non-Intervention

There are a number of plausible political, and economic strategic reasons for Russian and Chinese interests on the Syria crises. Russia has three causes to continue to support al-Assad’s regime. First, Syria is a key player in the Russian foreign policy; Syria has permitted for the past 40 years a naval station at Tartus to the Russians. It is the only peripheral maritime port Moscow has, a base in the Mediterranean region, which is a key passage for intra-European business and oil influx from the Middle East (Sayginer, 2012; Kramer, 2012). Second, Moscow’s backing of the al-Assad government is part of a strategy against what it seems as unwarranted Western interference in sovereign nations’ internal affairs. Syria is Moscow’s last existing ally in the Arab region; if Damascus falls, Putin could lose much of its impact in the area (Katz, 2012: 4). Furthermore, Russia has a noteworthy economic concern worth roughly 20 billion US Dollars, important armaments contracts and energy assets that might be gone if al-Assad’s government falls (O’Toole, 2012: 99; Galpin, 2012: 13). With great strategic significance, the planned Qatar-Turkey pipeline of natural gas is going from the Qatari-Iranian biggest world field of natural gas to Turkey, where it can link with the Nabucco pipeline to supply European necessities as well as Turkey. The only

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road leading to Turkey traverses Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Syria (Nafeez, 2013). Syria's logic for declining the Qatari plan was interpreted as “to protect the interests of its Russian ally, who is Europe's top supplier of natural gas” (Ibid, 73). Beijing’s calculations are overlapping those of Moscow’s to a large extent, but in a more complex way. Unlike Russia, China had until recently waited quite distant from local politics while it almost exclusively concentrated on economy growth. Further, Beijing does not have any extensive economic or military stakes in Syria. For instance, Syria–China trade in 2010 was estimated at only 2.48 billion U.S. dollars, accounting for only 0.08 % of Beijing’s total foreign trade. Meanwhile, China’s imports from Syria were estimated only around 40 million U.S. Dollars including nearly no gas or oil commodities (Xing, 2012). China has strategic and commercial welfares in the region that call for supporting Syria. Commercially, if Damascus was to fall, Iran might lose a crucial ally and a source of regional influence, and the next to fall would be Iran, where Beijing does have significant economic interests (Wexler, 2012). Besides, if Tehran were also to fall, China’s dependency on Russian oil imports might rise, and confuse further Sino-Russian affairs. Moreover, the longer the Syrian conflict lasts, the longer the likelihood of intensification with Tehran might be postponed, which means Beijing’s will not have to worry about the issues of energy supply. Strategically, the Chinese veto helped to reinforce relations with Moscow, whose sustenance to Beijing is more considerable than that of the Arab world.

5. Analysis

Main Findings

Throughout the case studies I discovered significant evidence that both conflicts represent a geostrategic interest for UN permanent members but to different extents. While Libya is exporting almost all its energy production 97,1% to Europe, which denotes a counterbalance for its dependency on the Russian piped energy, Syrian is located next to the hub of the world petroleum exporters, namely the Persian Golf region, but particularly, neighboring the world's largest gas field,

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shared between Qatar and Iran21 (IEA, 2017). It’s not by chance that the largest U.S. military base22 overseas is located in the state of Qatar. In 2012, ANSA Mediterranean23 indicated that Qatar's connection with the Syrian conflict was mostly centered on its aim to construct a pipeline to Turkey across Syria (see figure 7 bellow), “Pipelines are in place already in Turkey to receive the gas. Only Al-Assad is in the way. Qatar along with the Turks would like to remove Al-Assad...” (ANSA, 2012; My translation).

Iran-Iraq-Syria Pipeline (Russia-backed)

Qatar-Turkey Pipeline (US-backed)

Figure 5: Syria War Fueled By Competing Gas Pipelines. )

21 According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), the field holds an estimated of 51 trillion cubic meters (50 billion barrels of natural gas condensates). 22 The largest US base in the Middle East accommodating approx. 10 000 troops is located at the “Al Udeid” Air Base in Qatar (Lostumbo, 2013). 23 The Agenzia Nazionale Stampa Associata (ANSA) is the leading wire service in Italy.

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The purple line indicates the planned Qatar-Turkey Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) pipeline and all of the states highlighted in red, which denote a new alliance gathered quickly after Turkey finally – in exchange for NATO’s consent on Erdogan’s politically driven war with the PKK24 – decided to permit the US to fly combat missions against ISIS targets from Incirlik. Bashar al-Assad refused to participate in the projected U.S backed pipeline and now we are seeing what happens when you’re a Middle-East powerful-man and you choose not to help something the U.S and Saudi Arabia want to get done (Barry, 2007). Knowing Syria was a critical piece in its energy strategy, Turkey struggled to influence President Bashar Assad to change this Iranian pipeline, and to labor with the wished-for Qatar-Turkey pipeline, which would eventually please Turkey and the GCC states’ mission for control over gas supplies, who are the U.S’s allies. But after Assad denied Turkey’s proposal, Turkey and its allies turn out to be the major architects of Syria’s “civil war” (Kepel, 2014). The Russian and Chinese’s experience with the Libyan emergency had direct effects on their choices to veto resolutions that might permit Western military involvement in Syria. In the beginning of the conflict in Libya, both powers refused any Western intervention. However, in February 2011, Russia and China voted in favor of the UN request of sanctions against the Libyan regime, implicating a travel ban on Qaddafi and his entourage, freezing the assets of the Colonel, an arms embargo and a recommendation of the situation to the International Criminal Court (ICC). Successively, in the March vote on air strikes against the Libyan regime at the Security Council, and China abstained from vetoing authorization of the strikes (Buckley, 2012). This decision was perceived as deviant and perhaps a shift in both Russia and China’s attitudes regarding the Westphalian non-interference doctrine. NATO’s fighting against Libya moved far beyond their predictions. Therefore, the Libyan tragedy assisted as a good sample of the Security Council resolutions being surpassed. The two powers felt that the West violated the terms of the resolution 1973 by pioneering actions that were never projected when they

24 The Kurdistan Workers' Party or PKK in Kurdish: Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanêis a left-wing organization based in Turkey andIraq. Since 1984 the PKK has waged an armed struggle against the . Turkish state for equal rights and self-determination for the Kurds in Turkey (Hussein, 2007; 232)

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approved the resolution (Yun, 2012; 15). After having been misleaded once, they could not afford to be deceived again by the West into authorizing the Council sanctions or intervention against Syria (Chaziza, 2013; 78). China and Russia noticed that by abstaining from the Libya resolution, the West gained all and lost nothing, meanwhile, they got nothing but lost everything. For both states, soft-balancing behavior is a vital policy to counter any further effort of Western armed intervention in the region, and further escalation of the crises in Syria. Moscow and Beijing’s soft-balancing conduct incorporates diplomatic cooperation and their coordination at the Council, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS); they supported the Syrian military forces by logistical army backing; and delivered technical support and financial assistance to survive the international sanctions (Matar, 2012; My translation). The two permanent members defended their vetoes as measures of avoidance; yet, another Western military involvement and more intensification of the chaos in the region might fortify further U.S hegemony and deteriorate the Sino-Russian allies in the Middle East. For example, the Chinese deputy UN envoy Wang Min advocated that pressurizing only the Syrian government will “cause further escalation of the turmoil and let the crisis spill over to other countries in the region” (Arab News, 2012). Furthermore, Moscow’s strategic sustenance might also be prolonged to East Asia while the Arab world has no such power (Yu, 2012). Russia and China might benefit from the conditions in Syria. First, The Chinese and Russian vetoes permit them to develop more political leverage and trade with governments, like Iran for instance. Second, delaying the crises in Syria decreases the risk and the chance of war over Iran’s nuclear program. By protecting the Syrian government and stopping a pro-Western substitute, China and Russia are in fact safeguarding that Iran holds its regional backing up and will not become a prey to another Western-led attack. Lastly, it might be in Russia and China’s interest to practice their right of veto to force the international community to acknowledge and regard its role in the UN Security Council (Yan, 2012). Thus, the examples could be observations of the Sino-Russian soft balancing strategy, to support instead their ally gas pipeline proposal, named the “Islamic gas pipeline” by

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some Western sources, and the “Friendship Pipeline” by the regimes involved25. The Iran-Iraq-Syrian natural gas pipeline26 was previously proposed by the National Iranian Gas Export Company (NIGEC) to supply the European markets via Iran, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon as well as the road markets involving Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon (UPI, 2011). The project was abandoned after the Swiss energy company Elektrizitätsgesellschaft Laufenburg terminated its contract with Iran in October 2010 due to the US sanctions against Iran (Jerusalem Post, 2011; SRF Tagesschau, 2010). In July 2011 Iran, Syria and Iraq discussed a plan to sign a contract worth round 6bn U.S Dollars to build a pipeline going from South Pars to the European market, through these states and Lebanon and then under the Mediterranean, with a refinery and related infrastructure in Damascus (Jerusalem Post, 2011). One interpretation is that the geo-strategic interest of permanent members was stronger in the Syrian case. An explanation could be that conditions in the Libya case did not affect much the Sino-Russian geo-strategic interests, but represented a huge energy issue to the West that could disturb the powers equilibrium. It might be explained also that the power vacuum after the death of Gadhafi served the Russian interest. As The Libyan petroleum represent concurrence to Moscow in the European markets. A destabilized Libya means less export of oil to Europe, which will directly affect the oil price in favor of Russia as a major alternative supplier to Europe. This goes hand in hand with previous research and the foundation of the realist school, which shows that states behave as unites driven by the reason of state “La raison d’état” to pursuit their national interest, and self- help, which is identified as the action code of all states under the anarchic system (Waltz, 1979: 111). In sum, the findings might be understood as supporting to the thesis hypothesis, which thus can represent at least one rationalization to the statistical correlation found by Iwanami (2011), between veto powers geo-strategic interests and the UNSC interventions.

25 Naturalgaseurope.com, 2011 26 The pipeline was planned to be 5,600 km (3,500 mi) long and have a diameter of 142 cm (56 inches) (UPI, 2011).

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6. Summary and Conclusions

In this thesis, I have attempted to answer the research question: Why does the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) intervene in some humanitarian crises, but not in others, and under which conditions? My proposal described the negative correlation revealed by Iwanami (2011). In theory, the analysis sought for answers by studying the main factors that affect the likelihood of third-party decision to intervene, as suggested in the literature on conflict management and civil war. To explain this variation in the UNSC response to humanitarian crises, the paper looked at the aftermath of veto powers soft balancing, which depends mostly on the magnitude of risk to great powers geo-strategic interests, and any potential reforms in the international equilibrium of powers. Farther, the analysis presented the protection of economic interests in the target state as one of many factors considered when deciding to intervene in a domestic war. While not denying the role of other dynamics motivating the opportunity and willingness of UN permanent members to intervene in the civil wars of other states, the study sought to situate energy trade ties in the context of civil conflict intervention. I do not claim that the existence of self-interest in the conflict or even pro-intervention lobbying automatically yields a decision to intervene. Rather, policy makers perceive energy reliance as an important variable in any political geo-strategic equation. Therefore, the magnitude of risks to major powers national energy security increases the chances that governments will take actions, involving armed intervention if necessary. The empirical findings offer support to the main argument that trade ties work in ways similar to existing strategic military coalitions – where the motivation to intervene or not, depends, to a large extent, on prudence in the geostrategic cost- benefit calculus, regarding national and alliances energy security, along with some interplay with international norms. The paper further contends that such involvements to defend existing economic ties are more likely when the location of the domestic conflict is geo-strategically significant, in terms of energy exports and

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infrastructure investments. In addition, a new suggestion is made, that UN decisions to intervene can be viewed today as the aftermath of veto powers soft-balancing calculus, which merely depend on the extent to which a potential intervention might reform the powers equilibrium in the anarchic international realm. Thus, the main contribution of the present research underlines the role of energy ties in predictions of which states are expected to interfere in domestic conflicts of other states. This implication may seem to validate the self-centered nature of international relations. However, it should also be noted that gathering information about who is engaged in specific conflict resolution might serve as an early warning system. This may help counteract conflicts from escalating, and, if so, assemble coalitions of interested actors ready to bear the cost of preventing the violence. In other words, the selfish nature of the international relation might also serve in the greater peace work.

*****

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7. Bibliography

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