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The Political Landscape of Sudan: New Realities and the Way Forward

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The Political Landscape of Sudan: New Realities and the Way Forward Presentation at the Peace Research Institute Oslo 8th January 2015 THE POLITICAL LANDSCAPE OF SUDAN: NEW REALITIES AND THE WAY FORWARD Let me begin by expressing my sincere gratitude to the esteemed Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) for having me here today. Moreover, I would like extend my appreciation and gratitude to the Norwegian people, and government, for their active role in the last decades in the humanitarian operations and peace building in Sudan, both Sudan and South Sudan, that saved and continue to save lives, and help preserve human dignity in the harsh days and years of the civil wars in Sudan. NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE IS THE BEST OPTION TO RESTRUCTURE, DEMOCRATIZE AND UNITE SUDAN. 59 years ago, Sudan got its independence, among one of the first African countries to get their independence, but up until today, the Sudanese people have been unable to reach a nation-building project that can bring national consensus, equal citizenship, democracy, sustainable development and stability to Sudan, despite there being numerous windows of opportunities, which were all wasted. The Sudan question, which is in fact an African question, and indeed an international one too, especially in the context of developing countries and beyond, is the question of how to build modern states that embrace diversity, be it religious or ethno-cultural, and cater for social justice within a democratic framework. 29 years ago, when I decide to join the SPLM, what resonated most with me at the time, was the simple, yet powerful vision of the New Sudan; urging us, the Sudanese, to build on our commonality, rather than what divides us, and to unite Sudan by recognizing its diversity. It was a country consisting at the time of more than 570 different tribes with different sets of beliefs, faiths, cultures and social backgrounds, in addition to its historical diversity that goes back to more than 7,000 years. Since we are in Norway, it is worth mentioning that Christianity reached Sudan much earlier than North Europe. There were Christian kingdoms in Sudan for more than 1,000 years. The first non-gentile Christian was in the year 38. Islam then spread through preaching and Sufi sects in Northern Sudan in about 900 years, from 641 till the first Islamic Sultanite, or kingdom, was formed in 1505. It is part of the Nile-Valley great Civilization. Sudan is therefore a country shaped by its historical and contemporary diversities. The governments of the past 59 years failed to recognize these diversities, and have a nation building blue print with the correct parameters. The peak of it all came at the time when the political Islam agenda took over in a coup d’etat in 1989. That marked the total failure to recognize the diversity, even within the Islamic and Arab culture context. What has been taking place in Sudan for the past 26 years is the Sudanese version of daesh (ISIS), which has been ruling Sudan and this has ended up in the division of the country and the committing of Yasir Arman Presentation at the Peace Research Institute Oslo 8th January 2015 genocide in their search for uniformity based on the political Islam agenda. By now, it is clear, even within some circles of the Islamists that this is the wrong path, and ought to be changed. The question still lingering, is what is the best mechanism to change direction on new parameters that will lead to the restructuring, democratizing and preserving the unity of the country on a new basis, one that can bring forth national consensus, and this is our subject matter today. 1983 was the year Dr. John Garang correctly described the problem of South Sudan as the problem of Sudan, and that the only resolution, is for it to be considered in the context of preserving the unity of Sudan, by admitting its national character and the need to have unity on a new basis that reflects on, and respects the diversity. The failures of the Sudanese successive governments to acknowledge this fact led Sudan to the path it is currently on, and more so, to the succession of South Sudan, and failing to recognize the present issues of Darfur, Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile and other marginalized areas in Sudan within the framework of their national dimension will lead to the same result. Ironically, the vision of the New Sudan is needed today more than ever by the two Sudans to preserve their unity, and move into a new path and a democratic era of equal citizenship, development and social justice, and it may be the only game in town. Moreover, the vision of the New Sudan, can still provide a framework to reunite the two Sudans; a “Sudan Union” that is between two independent states as the case of the European Union (EU), mindful of the particularities of each situation. 1984, it was none other than late Dr. John Garang, a thinker and a great Sudanese patriot who proposed to late President Nimeri to hold a national constitutional conference instead of the power sharing formula President Nimeri proposed to him. Since then, this idea is very much alive and kicking, and it may be the best and possibly the only option to bring national consensus. THE NATIONAL DIALOGUE 2014 January: General Bashir called for a National Dialogue between the Sudanese stakeholders; his call was received positively by majority of the political forces and civil societies, as well as goodwill from the regional and international community, despite the fear that it may be a political trick to buy time into the elections. As we speak today, exactly a year later, in 2015, it appears that the worst of this fear is true, unless a dramatic change is to take place on the present political scene. A lot of effort has been exerted by the opposition to move into a genuine National Constitutional Dialogue, which is more or less similar to the historical call for a national constitutional conference, but all efforts exerted by national, regional and international players have been frustrated by the government in Khartoum. Today, there is tremendous support by the opposition forces for the African Peace and Security Council resolutions “456”, which proposed two major steps to pave the way for a credible national dialogue: Yasir Arman Presentation at the Peace Research Institute Oslo 8th January 2015 The first is to hold a preparatory meeting in the head-quarters of the African Union in Addis Ababa under the auspices of the AUHIP to agree on the procedural issues. The second step is to stop the war comprehensively, from the Blue Nile to Nuba Mountains/South Kordofan and Darfur as an entry point for a successful national constitutional dialogue. Despite great efforts exerted by the AUHIP, the AU and the international community, the Sudan government is adamantly obstructing efforts to a genuine national dialogue and continues to prepare for a one-party election, which in essence is just but an extension of the life of its one-party rule/dictatorial regime. The so-called “elections” can only increase violence and growing discontent even among the ruling party‘s circles. NEW REALITIES The political landscape in Sudan has witnessed a lot of change, especially in the camps of the opposition. The marginalized forces forged a united camp in the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF) and they reached out to the Umma Party, with whom the Paris Declaration was signed on the 8th of August 2014. They also reached out to the 7 + 7 pro-government group of the national dialogue and they both signed the road map to the national dialogue with the AUHIP. Again, a major qualitative development took place when the Sudanese opposition core group represented the opposition civil societies, the Umma Party, the national consensus forces and the SRF signed the Sudan Call on 3rd December 2014 with a clear agenda on a comprehensive peaceful settlement by implementing the AUPSC rs 456, in its absence, an uprising to overthrow the regime. A new balance of forces is emerging between the regime and its opposition, and a growing popular discontent triggered by the economic situation and miserable living standards at a time when the government is using around 70% of the annual budget on war, security, and presidential expenditure, and less than 2% on health and education, the same pattern used in the 2015 budget as being discussed now. More resources are being used to recruit hired militias to the war front, with poor results - the only achievement being more genocide and war crimes against the civilian population. More civilians are being displaced; in fact the United Nation’s statistics for 2014 note that half a million civilians were displaced in the three areas of Darfur, Blue Nile and the Nuba Mountains/South Kordofan. It is worth mentioning that this week, General Bashir made a major constitutional amendment, leading to a dramatic change in concentrating the power in his hands and instead of a one-party system, it is now a one-man system. Moreover, he has legalized the Janjaweed and the militias, as part of the regular forces, giving more constitutional powers to the security, making Sudan a true police state. The last nail was put on the coffin of the judiciary. The amendment turned any call for a national dialogue into a futile exercise and Yasir Arman Presentation at the Peace Research Institute Oslo 8th January 2015 shattered any hope for a credible national dialogue. This will lead to a wider discontent even among the ruling circles. DENIAL OF ACCESS AND BOMBARDMENT OF CIVILIAN POPULATION.
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