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Sudan: Major Reform Or More War

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Sudan: Major Reform Or More War SUDAN: MAJOR REFORM OR MORE WAR Africa Report N°194 – 29 November 2012 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1 II. THE QUEST FOR NATIONAL CONSENSUS ............................................................. 2 A. THE BEGINNINGS: THE 1947 JUBA CONFERENCE ......................................................................... 2 B. THE 1965 ROUND-TABLE CONFERENCE ....................................................................................... 3 C. THE KOKA DAM DECLARATION, 1986 ......................................................................................... 4 D. THE 1995 ASMARA DECLARATION AND NCP PEACE AGREEMENTS ............................................. 5 III. MULTIPLE CHALLENGES ........................................................................................... 6 A. A COLLAPSING ECONOMY ........................................................................................................... 6 B. DISCORD IN THE NCP .................................................................................................................. 9 1. Growing calls for reform ............................................................................................................. 9 2. Divisions on how to deal with revolts and South Sudan ............................................................ 12 3. Maintaining the status quo ......................................................................................................... 13 C. DEEPENING RELIGIOUS POLARISATION ...................................................................................... 14 D. A GROWING IF DIVIDED OPPOSITION ......................................................................................... 16 1. The National Consensus Forces ................................................................................................. 17 2. A new consensus in the wake of burgeoning protests? .............................................................. 18 E. THE NEW SOUTH AND THE SUDAN REVOLUTIONARY FRONT (SRF) ........................................... 20 1. The emergence of the SRF ......................................................................................................... 20 2. The Role of South Sudan ........................................................................................................... 21 3. The humanitarian consequences ................................................................................................ 22 4. The end of the rainy season ....................................................................................................... 23 IV. THE DANGERS OF VIOLENT REGIME CHANGE ................................................ 23 A. IS THE SAF CAPABLE OF A RELATIVELY PEACEFUL COUP? ....................................................... 23 B. REGIME CHANGE BY THE SRF ................................................................................................... 24 V. MANAGED TRANSITION AND PRESIDENTIAL RETIREMENT ....................... 25 A. WHY NOT WAIT FOR THE 2015 ELECTIONS? .............................................................................. 25 B. ARTICLE 16 DEFERRAL? ............................................................................................................ 25 C. A TRANSITIONAL COUNCIL/GOVERNMENT AND ROADMAP ........................................................ 27 D. SPACE FOR NEW VOICES AND ACTORS....................................................................................... 27 VI. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 28 APPENDICES A. MAP OF SUDAN ................................................................................................................................ 29 B. OVERALL SPENDING, SUDAN STATES .............................................................................................. 30 C. GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ORGANISATIONS ..................................................................... 31 D. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .................................................................................... 33 E. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON AFRICA SINCE 2009 ..................................................... 34 F. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES ................................................................................................ 36 Africa Report N°194 29 November 2012 SUDAN: MAJOR REFORM OR MORE WAR EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS The “Sudan Problem” has not gone away with the South’s outside of Khartoum that would seek to take advantage of secession. Chronic conflict, driven by concentration of turmoil in the capital to create facts on the ground diffi- power and resources in the centre, continues to plague the cult for a new regime to reverse. country. The solution is a more inclusive government that addresses at least some of the peripheries’ grievances, but Bashir and the NCP likely recognise that the dangers of pledges to transform governance remain unfulfilled. A the present phase are greater than the social and economic key hurdle – though not the only one – is President Bashir, troubles they have survived in the past. Their instincts are who has further concentrated authority in a small circle of to cut a deal with the fractured opposition (ceding some trusted officials and is unwilling to step aside. Many hope power and resources to one or two of the political parties for regime change via coup but have not considered the and/or a major armed group) and take advantage of the dangers. The goal should be managed transition to a gov- partial settlement with South Sudan to get the oil flowing ernment that includes, but is not dominated by his Nation- again. But that can only buy more time, not resolve the al Congress Party (NCP). He might be willing to go along causes of chronic conflict or stop the spreading civil war. if he concludes greater disorder or even a coup is growing more likely, but only if the right incentives are in place. The international community should learn the lessons of The international community should contribute to these pro- past failed settlement initiatives: Sudan needs a truly com- vided a credible and inclusive transitional government, a prehensive peace agreement, not a partial settlement that meaningful national dialogue on a new constitution and a serves the government’s divide-and-rule tactics and per- roadmap for permanent change in how Sudan is governed petuates the unacceptable status quo. At the same time, are first put firmly in train. the NCP needs to be part of any transition. Leaving it out in the cold would be costly. Its elites are too powerful to The regime in Khartoum is in crisis, faced with multiple ignore, and the opposition is too divided and inexperienced challenges that, combined, profoundly threaten its exist- to rule alone. A comprehensive solution and genuine po- ence and Sudan’s stability. The economy is in a freefall litical reform including national reconciliation acceptable that any oil deal with South Sudan will only slow, not ar- to all, with the NCP on board, is the only way out of the rest. NCP members are deeply unhappy with the leader- trap of endless conflict. ship, its policies and massive corruption. Feuding factions within the ruling party and the Islamic movement are jock- The president and his colleagues will have to reach their eying to present an acceptable alternative to the NCP own conclusion that the present crisis requires more radical government. At the same time, political opposition forces adjustments than those they used for survival previously. are growing more assertive, and the war with the Sudan If they do, however, the international community, by Revolutionary Front (SRF) is slowly expanding, bleeding providing incentives, can help them to act on that conclu- the military dry and draining the treasury. sion consequentially and responsibly. These should be carefully tied to Bashir and the NCP meeting specific, irre- Many hope a coup, or popular uprising, could force Bashir versible benchmarks, such as those Crisis Group set out and the NCP regime out, but there is a great risk that either as early as 2009, and verifiably continuing the transition event could trigger more violence. Since he came to power process. Such cooperation might be unpalatable to many in a military coup in 1989, he has deliberately fragmented who hold Bashir responsible for atrocity crimes, but it would the security services and frequently rotated commanders be necessary to prevent further conflict and continued to make an army takeover more difficult. Unless com- humanitarian crises in Sudan as well as South Sudan. He manders are united, the army could easily split into com- is crucial to a managed transition that incorporates both peting factions. There are also a host of other security the NCP and opposition leaders – civil and armed – and that services and armed militias loyal to different NCP leaders. could put Sudan on a more inclusive, sustainable path. The Added to this combustible mix are numerous armed tribes alternative would be continuation of the status quo, with the NCP desperately clinging to power at whatever human- Sudan: Major Reform or More War Crisis Group Africa Report N°194, 29 November 2012
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