Airpower Journal, Published Quarterly, Is the Professional Journal of the United States Air Force
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Summer Readings • The Leadership Imperative • Precision Weapons i Air Force Chief of Staff Gen Merrill A. McPeak Commander, Air University Lt Gen Jay W. Kelley Commander, Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education Col Gary A. Voellger Editor Lt Col Richard B. Clark Associate Editor Maj Gwendolyn D. Fayne Professional Staff Hugh Richardson, Contributing Editor Marvin W. Bassett, Contributing Editor Steven C. Garst, Director o f Art and Production Daniel M. Armstrong, Illustrator Thomas L. Howell, Prepress Production Man age r The Airpower Journal, published quarterly, is the professional journal of the United States Air Force. It is designed to serve as an open forum for the presentation and stimulation of innova- tive thinking on military doctrine, strategy, tac- tics, force structure, readiness, and other mat- ters of national defense. The views and opin- ions expressed or implied in the Journal are those of the authors and should not be con- strued as carrying the official sanction of the Department of Defense, the Air Force, Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government. Articles in this edition may be reproduced in whole or in part without permission. If they are reproduced, the Airpower Journal requests a courtesy line. JOURNAL Summer 1993, Vol. VII, No. 2 AFRP 50-2 Editorial 2 Impact of Precision Weapons on Air Combat Operations Lt Gen Buster C. Glosson, USAF 4 Air Campaign Planning Lt Col Maris McCrabb, USAF 11 A New Approach to Command and Control: The Cybernetic Design lst Lt Gary A. Vincent, USAF 24 Towards a New Airpower Lexicon— or— Interdiction: An Idea Whose Time Has Finally Gone? Col Phillip S. Meilinger, USAF 39 Deterrence after the Cold War: Conventional Arms and the Prevention of War Maj William S. Huggins, USAF 49 The Ultimate Standoff Weapon Lt Col John R. London III, USAF 58 Ricochets Letters 3 Net Assessment Reviews of Current Literature 74 Contributors 95 EDITORIAL Growing Controversy We must cultivate our garden. —Voltaire, Candide ONTROVERSY. ARGUMENTS. good reasons for the development of PC, Whether in the workplace or with- for often it seems that those people who out, we confront many controversial, do have the courage to voice their strong important issues that twine in and out of opinions about an issue do so in a manner our daily and professional lives. We have which labeis them as irrational, emo- cultural taboos that exclude politics, reli- tional, inconsiderate, ranting fanatics. No gion, or other volatile topics from our doubt, the PC movement was intended to social conversation. Official Air Force curb such diatribes. While it may be bet- publications such as Airpower Journal ter to snip off the growth of some offen- have to be “approved” before they are sive forms of speech for the common published. Is controversy so noxious? good, the PC movement would willingly Why do we labor so diligently to eliminate truncate all divergent views in favor of argumentation? Two factors—fear and some common, “acceptable,” and barren organizationally mandated “political cor- middle view. rectness” (PC)—are at work here. Like the What does all this philosophy have to two blades of a pair of pruning shears, do with you and with APJ? The result of they work together to cut off useful and avoiding controversy is that many issues valuable discussion and argumentation. never have the benefit of a useful pruning Fear keeps us from voicing our opinions through criticai examination and meaning- about a controversial issue. Trained from ful debate. Contrary to what you may childhood to be agreeable, we don’t want believe, and in spite of the required secu- to upset some vague harmonious balance rity and policy review, APJ is not just around us. Or we may worry about mak- another vehicle for communicating “the ing fools of ourselves because we don’t Air Force party line.” Developed as “an know how to express our opinions in a open fórum for presenting and stimulating convincing way. So while we may have innovative thinking,” APJ operates within what at their roots are rational arguments the tenets of academic freedom. The main for holding opinions or beliefs, rather than reason you don’t see more controversial expose ourselves to criticism, we allow articles is that we rarely get well-written only our most comfortable and conform- articles on controversial topics that are ing opinions to blossom. Or like all three germane to our target audience. candidates in the last presidential debates, What are your opinions about the issues we try to avoid saying what we really our Air Force faces today? Have you sown believe about controversial issues for fear any good arguments lately? Perhaps you that others will reject us at the same time have an innovative way of looking at an they reject our opinions. Fear simply will old issue. What are you really talking not allow divergent opinions to grow. about around the flight line or the office Unlike fear, PC is mandated from with- coffeepot? Can you cultivate your ideas out—by societal institutions that seek to into a well-researched, well-written, ratio- place restrictions on our freedom of nal article? If you can, we’d like to read it. speech. Originally, there may have been GDF 2 Letters to the editor are encouraged. A ll corre- IGNORANCE spondence should be addressed to the Editor, I'm writing in response to the article in the Airpovver Journal, 401 C hennault Circle, Winter 1992 edition entitled “Ignorance Is Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6428. We reserve the Risk: The Big Lesson from Desert Storm Air right to edit the material for overall length. Base Attacks.” The article—which implies that the B-52, F- 111, Royal Air Force, and Royal Saudi Air CLUB CONTENTION Force crews who flew the opening night air- It was with a great deal of interest that I read field attacks in Operation Desert Storm did not Capt Clay K. Culver’s article, “O Clubs: contribute significantly to protecting the lives Tradition or Contradiction?” (Winter 1992). If of fellow coalition aircrews or to achieving his purpose in penning this monograph was to coalition objectives—is an insult to the brave stimulate discussion, he certainlv achieved his airmen who carried out these missions. objective. If, on the other hand, his proposed As a planner who worked directly for the agenda for improving O club attendance is sin- Director for Campaign Plans (DCP) at cere, one must wonder what type of future Air Headquarters US Air Forces, Central Command Force he envisions. To his credit, there are (USCENTAF) Forward during Desert Storm, 1 current problems, both institutional and socio- can assure you that ignorance is indeed the logical, that he correctly identifies and theme of this article— ignorance of the facts of describes as contributing to falling member- the Desert Storm campaign plan. Here are a ship in Air Force clubs. But to suggest a rever- few facts that may serve to clear up some of the sion to the “old-school” officer evaluation misconceptions created by “Ignorance Is Risk”: report and associated additional duty emphasis • T h e e x a m p l e o f D e s e r t S t o r m a i r b a s e is flat wrong. To apply this "solution” solely attack inefficiency cited in the article is incor- to cure flagging club membership is even rect. It assumes that the objective of the first- vvorse. night RAF Tornado/JP233 runway-denial attack After years of suffering through inflation of was the permanent shutdown of enemy air- duties not related to training for combat, most fields—when in fact the objective was to limit members eagerly embraced the new officer the number of enemy takeoffs by impeding evaluation system. No longer were officers access to runways. The DCP’s stated objective promoted based on achievements in nonmis- for attacking the seven key airfields that were sion-related areas. No longer could sênior well equipped enough or close enough to pose raters/supervisors coerce junior officers in the a threat to coalition forces on the first night of name of “career enhancement" to participate in the war was to slow down enemy operations nonmission-oriented social activities at the for 18-30 hours—and to preclude operations expense of their most important duty—training during the two- to three-hour periods when to excel in applying force to win wars. coalition attackers were most vulnerable. No If and when I get the chance to be on the mission was disrupted on the first night as a pointy end of the sword, it’d better be with a result of aircraft originating from these air- wingman who is damn good at what he’s fields. trained to do. not the finest Boy Scout • First-night attacks also successfully cut the leader/Little League coach in the tri-state area! enemy off from effective command and con- Community involvement and other “broaden- trol—making independent, uncoordinated ing” activities can be a "good thing,” but not “islands” out of the so-called fortress air- when mandated. Let’s keep the proper per- spective. fields. As a result, we “metered the flow” of enemy takeoffs, feeding the enemy to coalition Capt David S. l.eonard, USAF Fort Lewis, Washington continued on page 69 3 IMPACT OF PRECISION WEAPONS ON AIR COMBAT OPERATIONS Lt Gen Bust er C. G l osson, USAF* NUMBER OF pivotal lessons came from Operation Desert Storm, but few were as impor- tant to our profession as the Apotential of stealth and precision guided weapons.