The Rhetoric and Reality of the Nuclear Renaissance

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Much Ado About Nothing?

Shashi van de Graaff

BA, BSocSci, BSocSci (Hons)

A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at

The University of Queensland in 2016

School of Political Science and International Studies

Abstract

Since 2000, swathes of energy experts, government officials, industry representatives and journalists have predicted the emergence of a global ‘nuclear renaissance.’ Nuclear energy was said to be on the precipice of a new era of development, characterised by widespread construction of new nuclear reactors and a concomitant increase in global nuclear capacity. Despite this expectation, there is little evidence to date which suggests that a revival of nuclear power has taken place in the regions of Western Europe and North America in the way that the rhetoric depicted. This thesis therefore seeks to firstly establish that there is a disjuncture between the rhetoric and reality of the nuclear renaissance in Western Europe and North America, and secondly, to explain why this disjuncture exists.

Academic and journalistic debate over recent developments in civil nuclear energy policy has tended to focus on two key reasons for why there has not been a widespread expansion of nuclear energy in these regions. Firstly, that the nuclear disaster at Fukushima in 2011 reignited concerns over nuclear safety, thereby eroding public and political support for nuclear new build. Secondly, that the economic problems facing nuclear development continued to act as a major disincentive to the construction of new nuclear power plants. However, the global applicability of these two issues means that neither of these explanations can explain why the nuclear renaissance appears to have failed in Western Europe and North America, while nuclear new build is expanding in other parts of the world. Moreover, the revival of safety concerns post-Fukushima fails to explain why there was little evidence of a nuclear renaissance taking place prior to March 2011.

This thesis provides a contribution to knowledge by adopting a more holistic and inductive approach for understanding why there is a disjuncture between the expectation and reality of the nuclear renaissance in Western Europe and North America. It challenges existing explanations for the failure of the nuclear renaissance as being simplistic, mono-causal and a-historical. This thesis disputes the idea that the absence of a widespread expansion of nuclear energy and the apparent failure of the nuclear renaissance can be attributed to any one problem or event. Instead, it embraces the simple premise that a broad range of contextual factors must be explored in order to fully understand why the rhetoric of a nuclear renaissance has not become a reality.

An extensive analysis of government, industry and media documents published from 1945 onwards, as well as interviews with experts in nuclear energy policy, was undertaken in order to establish a better understanding of how and why nuclear energy development changes over time. Through this process, it became clear that the reasons typically cited for explaining changes in nuclear development are ‘nuclear-specific factors’. That is, factors relating directly to the construction and operation of nuclear power plants – such as the economics of nuclear energy, the safety of nuclear power plants, and the storage and disposal of nuclear waste. While these factors undeniably play an important role in

ii influencing nuclear new build, focusing solely on these nuclear-specific factors obscures the impact of broader social, political, and contextual changes on nuclear energy development.

This thesis draws upon political science literature to argue that the changing trajectory of nuclear energy development has also been influenced by broader contextual shifts in the post-war era. The impact of four ‘contextual factors’ on nuclear power are examined: the rise of environmentalism, the decline in public trust in government, changes in risk perception, and the rise of neoliberalism. Each of these contextual shifts have changed the way in which agents think about and respond to the issue of nuclear power. Consequently, this thesis argues that both nuclear-specific factors and contextual factors are important in explaining change in civil nuclear energy development. All of these factors are dynamic and interactive, mutually shaping and influencing one another. Moreover, both of these groups of factors have contributed to the failure of the nuclear renaissance in Western Europe and North America. The ongoing presence of these challenges will continue to hamper the future success of civil nuclear energy development, and prevent a nuclear renaissance from taking place.

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Declaration by author

This thesis is composed of my original work, and contains no material previously published or written by another person except where due reference has been made in the text. I have clearly stated the contribution by others to jointly-authored works that I have included in my thesis.

I have clearly stated the contribution of others to my thesis as a whole, including statistical assistance, survey design, data analysis, significant technical procedures, professional editorial advice, and any other original research work used or reported in my thesis. The content of my thesis is the result of work I have carried out since the commencement of my research higher degree candidature and does not include a substantial part of work that has been submitted to qualify for the award of any other degree or diploma in any university or other tertiary institution. I have clearly stated which parts of my thesis, if any, have been submitted to qualify for another award.

I acknowledge that an electronic copy of my thesis must be lodged with the University Library and, subject to the policy and procedures of The University of Queensland, the thesis be made available for research and study in accordance with the Copyright Act 1968 unless a period of embargo has been approved by the Dean of the Graduate School.

I acknowledge that copyright of all material contained in my thesis resides with the copyright holder(s) of that material. Where appropriate I have obtained copyright permission from the copyright holder to reproduce material in this thesis.

Publications during candidature

Technical Reports van de Graaff, S. 2015. ‘Nuclear Energy in Australia’, Briefing Paper written for the Centre for International Minerals and Energy Law, University of Queensland. Available: http://law.uq.edu.au/documents/cimel/Nuclear-Energy-in-Australia.pdf

Conference Presentations van de Graaff, S. 2015. ‘The Global Nuclear Renaissance: Has the expectation become a reality?’. Paper presented at the Political Studies Association Conference 2015, Sheffield, UK. van de Graaff, S. 2015. ‘Much Ado About Nothing? The Expectation and Reality of the Global Nuclear Renaissance’. Paper presented at the Energy Transitions Conference 2015, University of East Finland, Joensuu, Finland.

Book Reviews van de Graaff, S. ‘REVIEW: The National Politics of Nuclear Power’, Political Studies Review (forthcoming).

Publications included in this thesis

No publications included.

Contributions by others to the thesis

No contributions by others.

Statement of parts of the thesis submitted to qualify for the award of another degree

None.

Acknowledgements

My sincere thanks go to my supervisors, Professor Andrew Hindmoor and Dr. Alastair Stark, for their guidance, patience, and general good company over the past four years. Thank you both for your encouragement and support.

I would like to thank the individuals who agreed to participate in an interview and share their views on what continues to be a controversial issue.

To my family and friends, thank you for your constant enthusiasm and encouragement throughout the years.

To Thomas, thank you for always being willing to listen to my frustrations, celebrate my successes, and being there for everything else in-between.

Keywords

Nuclear energy, nuclear renaissance, energy policy, environmental policy, agents in context historical institutionalism

Australian and New Zealand Standard Research Classifications (ANZSRC)

ANZSRC code: 160510, Public Policy, 50%

ANZSRC code: 160507, Environment Policy, 50%

Fields of Research (FoR) Classification

FoR code: 1605, Policy and Administration, 100%

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CONTENTS 1. INTRODUCTION ...... 1

The Nuclear Renaissance ...... 1

Research Objective and Questions ...... 4

Research Approach ...... 4

Analytical Framework ...... 5

Methodology ...... 6

Core Argument...... 7

Contribution to Knowledge ...... 10

Thesis Structure ...... 13

2. THE RISE, FALL AND RENAISSANCE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY ...... 15

Three Phases of Nuclear Energy Development ...... 16

The Rise of Nuclear Energy ...... 17

The Fall of Nuclear Energy ...... 19

The Nuclear Renaissance ...... 22

A Renaissance is Announced ...... 22

Why the Expectation Emerged ...... 26

From Expectation to Reality? ...... 30

The Failed Renaissance ...... 32

3. RESEARCH DESIGN ...... 41

Research Approach ...... 41

Analytical Framework ...... 44

Historical Institutionalism ...... 45

Agents in Context Historical Institutionalism ...... 48

Comparatively Informed Historical Analysis ...... 49

Regions Under Investigation ...... 52

Methods of Data Collection and Analysis ...... 53

Ethical Considerations ...... 57

Conclusion ...... 58

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4. NUCLEAR ECONOMICS ...... 59

Too Cheap To Meter ...... 60

Too Costly To Matter ...... 61

The Nuclear Renaissance: From Peril to Profit? ...... 64

Conclusion ...... 69

5. NUCLEAR SAFETY ...... 72

The Ideational Shift In Nuclear Safety ...... 73

A New Era of Nuclear Safety? ...... 78

Conclusion ...... 83

6. NUCLEAR WASTE ...... 85

The Hazards of Nuclear Waste ...... 86

Nuclear Waste in The Early Development of Nuclear Power ...... 86

The Growing Policy Problem of Nuclear Waste ...... 88

The Renaissance: Resolving the Waste Issue? ...... 92

Conclusion ...... 98

7. ENVIRONMENTALISM ...... 100

The Birth of Environmentalism ...... 102

Environmentalism & Nuclear Power ...... 108

Environmentalism & The Nuclear Renaissance ...... 111

Conclusion ...... 116

8. PUBLIC TRUST IN GOVERNMENT ...... 118

Trust in Government: A Global Decline ...... 119

The Importance of Public Trust in Government For Nuclear Energy...... 122

Implications of the Changing Context of Public Trust for Nuclear Power ...... 124

Conclusion ...... 132

9. RISK PERCEPTIONS ...... 134

The Risk Society ...... 135

Nuclear Energy in the Risk Society ...... 138

Risk & the Nuclear Renaissance ...... 142

Conclusion ...... 148

10. NEOLIBERALISM ...... 149

The Rise of Neoliberalism ...... 150

Neoliberalism & Nuclear Power ...... 155

Neoliberalism & The Nuclear Renaissance ...... 160

Conclusion ...... 168

11. CONCLUSION ...... 171

Answering the Research Questions ...... 171

Reflections on the comparative value of the explanatory factors ...... 175

Contribution to Knowledge ...... 177

Limitations & Future Research Directions ...... 180

Concluding Thoughts ...... 183

REFERENCES ...... 185

APPENDICES ...... 223

Appendix 1: Project Information Sheet ...... 223

Appendix 2: Participant Consent Form ...... 224

Appendix 3: Table of Interviewees ...... 225

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Factors Influencing the Changing Trajectory of Civil Nuclear Power ...... 14 Table 2: The Three Phases of Nuclear Energy Development ...... 16 Table 3: Nuclear-Generated Electricity as a Percentage of Total Electricity Generation by Country, 1985-2013 ...... 36 Table 4: Nuclear Power Policy Position of Green Political Parties throughout Western Europe and North America ...... 115

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Global Nuclear Reactor Construction Starts, 1954-2014 ...... 17 Figure 2: Median Construction Time For Nuclear Reactors Worldwide, 1961-2000 ...... 21 Figure 3: Nuclear Power Reactors Under Construction by Region, 1954-2014 ...... 34 Figure 4: Green Political Party Membership in Western Europe, 1979-2014 ...... 105 Figure 5: Conclusions of the European Council on Environmental Issues ...... 106 Figure 6: US Congressional Hearings on Environmental Issues ...... 107 Figure 7: New York Times articles on Environmental Issues ...... 107 Figure 8: US Trust in Government Index, 1958-2008 ...... 120 Figure 9: UK Government RD&D Expenditure by Energy Technology, 1974-2013 ...... 164 Figure 10: UK Government RD&D Expenditure on Nuclear Power as a Percentage of Total R&D Expenditure, 1974-2013 ...... 166 Figure 11: US Government RD&D Expenditure by Energy Technology, 1974-2014 ...... 167 Figure 12: US Government RD&D Expenditure on Nuclear Power as a Percentage of Total RD&D Expenditure, 1974-2014 ...... 168

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AEC Atomic Energy Commission AiC-HI Agents in Context Historical Institutionalism ARAO Agency for Radwaste Management CAP Comparative Agendas Project CEO Chief Executive Officer DGR Deep Geological Repository EDF Électricité de France EIA Environmental Impact Assessment EU European Union GDF Geological Disposal Facility GHG Greenhouse Gas GW Gigawatt HLW High Level Waste HSE Health and Safety Executive IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency IEA International Energy Agency ILW Intermediate Level Waste LILCO Long Island Lighting Company LILW Low and Intermediate Level Waste LLW Low Level Waste MEP Member of the European Parliament MIT Massachusetts Institute of Technology MWh Megawatt-hours NEA Nuclear Energy Agency NEI Nuclear Energy Institute OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development PAP Policy Agendas Project RSS Reactor Safety Study TMI Three Mile Island UK United Kingdom UKAEA United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority UN United Nations UNECE United Nations Economic Commission for Europe UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change US United States WEC World Energy Council WNA World Nuclear Association

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1. INTRODUCTION

THE NUCLEAR RENAISSANCE

Nuclear energy has immense potential for addressing two of the most pressing policy problems for governments across the globe – ensuring security of energy supply in the face of rising demand and growing geopolitical tensions, and reducing greenhouse gas emissions to combat the onset of global warming. As the need to address these problems has grown, an increasingly favourable political environment for the use and development of nuclear power emerged throughout much of the world. In particular, from the early 2000s onwards, a growth in public and political support for nuclear power led to the emergence of a widespread expectation that a ‘nuclear renaissance’ was about to take place. This was significant given that the construction of new nuclear power plants had experienced a global decline since the mid-1970s.

At first it appeared that the advocates of a nuclear renaissance were correct in their predictions. Throughout Western Europe and North America, governments announced plans to expand their nuclear industries. Several countries which had policies in place to phase-out existing nuclear power plants, or which opposed the development of nuclear power in the country altogether, began to re-evaluate or reverse their policy positions. Figures from the International Atomic Energy Agency (2010) indicated that, in 2010, over forty-five countries worldwide that did not use nuclear energy were seriously considering the development of a domestic nuclear power program. Enthusiasm for the nuclear renaissance grew as numerous political leaders, nuclear industry representatives, and even notable environmental activists, made public statements in support of nuclear new build. In Western Europe and North America, these statements were made by the highest levels of political leaders. The shared political enthusiasm for nuclear energy was a stark contrast to the previous two and a half decades where nuclear energy had largely been kept off the political agenda.

The term ‘nuclear renaissance’ had become commonplace in media reporting by the mid-2000s. However, exactly what the nuclear renaissance was, or what would constitute a renaissance taking place, was rarely – if ever – defined. Rather, the term was broadly used to refer to a change in nuclear energy development that was defined by two key facets:

1. That there would be a significant increase in the number of nuclear power plants being built. 2. That this increase in nuclear power plant construction would be a global phenomenon. New nuclear build would take place in first-timer nuclear countries, as well as in countries with established nuclear programmes, many of which had long-suffered from stagnation and decline.

This second facet is crucial to understanding why the emergence of the expectation of a nuclear renaissance was so significant, but is frequently overlooked in existing discussions and analysis of the nuclear renaissance. The significance of the nuclear renaissance was that much of the new nuclear growth was expected to take place in countries whose nuclear industries were suffering from stagnation and decline. The vast majority of nuclear growth that occurred during the 1980s and 1990s was located in newly established or emerging ‘first-timer’ nuclear industries – countries that were only just beginning their civil nuclear energy programmes. These countries were primarily located in the regions of Asia and Central and Eastern Europe. Meanwhile, nuclear new build in Western Europe and North America – the regions that had driven the early development of nuclear power – was limited. Consequently, the expectation of a nuclear renaissance was significant because it was based not just on the assumption that the growth in Asia and Central and Eastern Europe would continue, but that a rapid expansion of new growth would also occur in Western Europe and North America. This new growth in more well-established nuclear industries that had been suffering from a prolonged decline is what made the expectation of a nuclear renaissance so significant, and a stark turning point from the previous two and a half decades of nuclear history.

Over time, however, it became increasingly clear that the reality of nuclear energy development was a far cry from what the rhetoric of a nuclear renaissance had promised. Already from 2010, social and political commentators began pronouncing the nuclear renaissance to have failed, or to never have existed at all. Headlines described the nuclear renaissance as a “myth” (Financial Chronicle, 2010: 1) and as having “failed to materialize” (Wald, 2010: 1). The World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2013 described the nuclear renaissance as “all in ruins now” (Schneider et al., 2013: 4). A presentation by the International Energy Agency on the World Energy Outlook 2014 declared there is “no nuclear renaissance in sight” (IEA 2014: 11). The World Energy Resources 2013 Survey stated that “globally, the nuclear industry is in decline” (World Energy Council, 2013: 4.6). The 2014 World Energy Resources Issue Monitor highlighted the absence of a nuclear renaissance in the regions of Europe and North America. Specifically, the report noted that “we currently do not see signals for short-term investment in new nuclear projects” for the European region (World Energy Council, 2014: 27), and that the North American region is “unlikely to see new coal or nuclear plants until 2025” (World Energy Council, 2014: 33).

Even though the reality of nuclear development in Western Europe and North America has not reflected the rhetoric of a nuclear renaissance, this should not obscure the fact that some degree of nuclear new build has taken place during the renaissance period. From 2000 to 2015, construction began on 94 new nuclear reactors worldwide (OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, 2015: 17). However, this construction has been heavily concentrated in a small number of countries. In 2014, there were 67 reactors under construction across 14 different countries, but these reactors were predominantly located in the regions of Asia and Central and Eastern Europe. Over 75 percent of the reactors under construction in 2014

2 were located in only five countries – China (28 reactors), Russia (9 reactors), India (6 reactors), the US (5 reactors), and South Korea (5 reactors) (Schneider et al., 2014: 155). While there has been evidence of some new reactor construction starts elsewhere in Western Europe and North America (such as plans for the construction of a reactor at Hinkley Point in the UK), this only accounts for a small portion of global nuclear new build.

The puzzle therefore remains: Why is there a disjuncture between the rhetoric and reality of a nuclear renaissance in Western Europe and North America? Why is there a nuclear expansion taking place in regions such as Asia, Central and Eastern Europe, and the Middle East, but not in the regions of Western Europe and North America, where the rhetoric of a nuclear renaissance was so widespread? The failure of the nuclear renaissance in some regions but not in others is particularly puzzling given that the arguments supporting a nuclear renaissance have global appeal – they are not region-specific. For example, the need for cost-effective, secure, and low-emissions energy sources has underpinned the arguments for new nuclear development across all the regions of the world. Yet it is only the regions of Asia and Central and Eastern Europe that show evidence of large-scale nuclear expansion. So why is there little evidence a nuclear renaissance taking place in Western Europe and North America?

Existing explanations for the disconnection between the rhetoric and reality of the nuclear renaissance tend focus on two main arguments. Firstly, that the nuclear disaster at Fukushima in 2011 reignited concerns over nuclear safety, thereby eroding public and political support for nuclear new build. Secondly, that the economic problems facing nuclear development continued to act as a major disincentive to the construction of new nuclear power plants. However, there has not yet been a systematic analysis into why the renaissance did not amount to what it promised. Assuming that the renaissance has failed in Western Europe and North American simply because of the Fukushima nuclear disaster, or because of the economics of nuclear power, is problematic for several reasons. Firstly, the global applicability of the safety and cost arguments for the failure of the renaissance means that neither argument is sufficient for explaining the regional differences in nuclear energy development since 2000. Neither argument provides sufficient explanation for why some countries – primarily those located in Asia and Central and Eastern Europe – have expanded their civil nuclear energy capacities since 2000, while other countries – primarily those located in Western Europe and North America – have not. The high capital costs required for constructing nuclear power plants is a problem that faces all new nuclear projects, and yet this has not deterred some countries from continuing to expand their civil nuclear energy programmes. News of the Fukushima nuclear disaster reignited public concerns over nuclear safety throughout the globe. Some countries have responded to these concerns by abandoning their plans for nuclear new build, while others have not. Even prior to Fukushima, there was little evidence of widespread construction of new nuclear reactors that would have justified the expectation of a nuclear renaissance. Consequently, an alternative explanation is needed, one that goes beyond simply pointing

3 the finger at finances or Fukushima, for why there is a disconnection between the expectation and reality of the nuclear renaissance in Western Europe and North America.

Furthermore, the safety and cost arguments explaining the absence of a nuclear renaissance are problematic in that they are mono-causal, failing to consider the various causal factors that could potentially influence nuclear energy development. Moreover, these arguments are problematic as they are a-historical, failing to locate recent changes in nuclear development within its broader historical context. The Fukushima argument in particular does not explain why there was so little evidence of countries expanding their civil nuclear energy programmes throughout the globe prior to March 2011. Consequently, neither Fukushima nor the economics explanations for the failure of the nuclear renaissance are sufficient to explain the regional variations in nuclear development since 2000. A systematic analysis into the factors influencing the absence of a nuclear renaissance in Western Europe and North America is therefore required.

RESEARCH OBJECTIVE AND QUESTIONS

The objective of this thesis is therefore to examine why there is a disconnection between the expectation and reality of a nuclear renaissance in the regions of Western Europe and North America. In order to fulfil this objective, this thesis answers two core research questions:

1. What factors have influenced the changing trajectory of civil nuclear energy development in the past? 2. Can the factors which explain the changing fortunes of nuclear energy in the past explain the disconnection between the rhetoric of a nuclear renaissance and the reality of civil nuclear energy development in Western Europe and North America since 2000?

RESEARCH APPROACH

This thesis adopts what is defined by Shapiro (2005) as a “problem-centred” research approach. The core feature of a problem-centred research approach is an absence of commitment to any pre-determined theory or paradigm. The problem-centred approach is unique in that it begins by locating an empirical puzzle, rather than a theoretical framework, as its starting point. In accordance with the problem-centred approach, this thesis has started with the identification of an empirical problem – understanding why there is a disjuncture between the expectation and reality of a nuclear renaissance in the regions of North America and Western Europe. The absence of a renaissance in these regions is an empirical puzzle given that the arguments underpinning the case for nuclear new build appeared to be widely accepted. Governments worldwide are faced with the same problem of needing to ensure security of energy supply in a cost-effective manner, while also needing to reduce their carbon emissions to combat climate

4 change. This meant that the case for new nuclear development had global appeal. The nuclear industry capitalised on this by marketing nuclear power as a secure, cost-effective and low-carbon source of energy. At first, this strategy appeared to have worked, with governments around the world invoking the same energy security and climate change arguments in order to convince the public of the need for nuclear new build. The widespread ambitions for a nuclear renaissance suggested that a resurgence of global nuclear capacity was imminent. Yet an examination of the empirical data on nuclear growth as well as an analysis of nuclear energy policy making in North America and Western Europe since 2000 evinces little evidence of nuclear growth, yet alone a nuclear renaissance. There is a disconnection between the widely-held expectations and ambitions about the prospects of nuclear energy and the reality of what has actually occurred in these regions. Consequently, the failure of the nuclear renaissance in Western Europe and North America remains as an empirical problem, one which is particularly puzzling given that the arguments underpinning nuclear new build appeared to be so widely accepted by policymakers and politicians in these regions.

ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

This thesis adopts ‘Agents in Context Historical Institutionalism’ (AiC-HI) as an analytical framework to help guide the analysis of the research questions. AiC-HI was developed by Bell (2011, 2012) and Bell and Hindmoor (2014) as an expansive and flexible version of historical institutionalism, which integrates a broad range of causal variables. It recognises the importance of formal and informal institutions, agents, ideas, contexts and structures in explaining change over time, but crucially does not privilege any one of these variables over another. This perspective departs from the traditional historical institutionalist assumption that institutions determine the behaviour of agents. Instead, institutionally- situated agents are perceived as being able to actively negotiate and exert influence over their reality, and thereby take part in reproducing or reshaping institutions. Agents and institutions are therefore perceived as “mutually shaping” one another over time, without one ever wholly determining the behaviour or outcomes of the other. The ability for institutions and agents to shape one another is also mediated by ideas, as ideational contexts can shape agents’ interests and preferences, and incentivise particular behaviours and actions. Agents are also seen to be operating within broader contextual and structural environments which can be both constraining and empowering. The broad political, economic or social environment can influence the preferences of agents, the resources and opportunities that are available, and can establish costs and benefits to encourage agents to act in a particular way. Agents in Context Historical Institutionalism therefore rebukes the ‘stickiness’ of earlier institutional theories by incorporating a wider range of potential causal variables into its analysis. AiC-HI is also an appropriate complement to a problem-based approach to research, as it typically focuses on addressing real-world empirical questions that have a practical relevance for policymakers and the general public as well as academia.

METHODOLOGY

The methodology adopted in this thesis is a comparatively informed historical analysis. One of the major strengths of comparative historical analysis is its ability to learn lessons from the past in order to better understand policy problems of the present. It facilitates deeper, empirically-driven insights into issues that are commonly taken for granted or clouded in broad-based assumptions – a problem which plagues existing explanations for the failure of the nuclear renaissance.

Qualitative research methods are employed in order to build an understanding of both how and why nuclear energy development has changed over time. A wide-ranging document analysis of documents relating to nuclear energy policy and development published from 1945 to the present day formed the core data source for this project1. The documents analysed were drawn from a broad range of academic disciplines, including literature from the fields of law, policy, political science, psychology and history. The documents included government policy documents, legislation, parliamentary debates, press releases, political speeches, non-government organisation and industry reports and statements, and newspaper articles from 1945 to the present day. The purpose of the document analysis is two-fold. Firstly, it is used in a purely descriptive manner in order to build a historical narrative of how nuclear energy development had changed over time, from 1945 until the present day. Secondly, the data is analysed thematically in order to allow factors which appeared to influence nuclear energy development and the failure of the nuclear renaissance to emerge inductively through the research. As the potential causal variables emerge, comparisons are drawn between the experiences of individual countries and across the experiences within countries over time.

The data gathered from the document analysis was then supplemented by other quantitative and qualitative data sources. Quantitative data on the construction and operation of nuclear power reactors was referred to in order to better understand the way in which nuclear development has changed at a national, regional, and global scale from 1945 to the present day. Semi-structured interviews were also conducted with experts in nuclear energy development and policy in order to corroborate the findings of the document analysis, and help identify factors which appear to influence the changing trajectory of nuclear energy development over time. The experts interviewed included academics, government officials, and nuclear industry representatives, each of whom were questioned on their views on the outcome of the nuclear renaissance, the reasons for this outcome, the challenges facing nuclear power and the future of civil nuclear energy.

1 While an exact number of documents examined cannot be provided, over one thousand documents relating to civil nuclear energy policy and development were consulted, roughly three-quarters of which were news articles published from 1945 to the present day.

CORE ARGUMENT

This thesis develops two core arguments. Firstly, this thesis argues that there is a disconnection between the expectation of a nuclear renaissance and the reality of nuclear new build in Western Europe and North America since 2000. In short, there has not been a nuclear renaissance in the regions of Western Europe or North America. Secondly, this thesis argues that the failure of the nuclear renaissance in Western Europe and North America cannot be fully understood without considering the way in which broader institutional, structural and ideational contextual shifts affect nuclear energy development.

Argument 1: There has not been a nuclear renaissance in Western Europe or North America.

This thesis argues that the development of civil nuclear energy in the regions of Western Europe and North America since 2000 does not reflect the rhetoric of a nuclear renaissance. This is because:

 there has not been a significant increase in the number of new nuclear reactor construction starts across these regions since 2000;  many of the countries in these regions which showed signs of starting a nuclear power programme or expanding their existing nuclear programmes have failed to undertake real action towards these goals or have reversed their policy positions on the issue;  there has been a distinct absence of nuclear growth in many of the countries in Western Europe and North America which were expected to drive the nuclear renaissance; and  nuclear energy as a share of total electricity produced has decreased throughout many countries in Western Europe and North America from 2000 onwards.

Put simply, the reality of nuclear development in Western Europe and North America since 2000 is far less than what the rhetoric of a nuclear renaissance promised. Instead, the growth that has taken place in nuclear energy industries since 2000 has been focused in a very small number of countries, located primarily in the regions of Asia and Central and Eastern Europe. Consequently, there is a clear disconnection between the expectation and reality of a nuclear renaissance in Western Europe and North America. This argument is constructed by drawing upon the findings of a widespread academic and policy literature review, statistical data on nuclear energy growth and nuclear power construction starts, as well as the findings from expert interviews.

Argument 2: The absence of a nuclear renaissance in Western Europe and North America cannot be fully understood without considering broader institutional, structural and ideational contextual shifts.

This thesis argues that the absence of a nuclear renaissance in Western Europe and North America cannot be fully understood without accounting for broader institutional, structural, ideational and contextual shifts over time. Since the 1980s, there has been a growing recognition in the academic

7 literature that political, social and economic factors are just as relevant as technical factors in explaining why and how nuclear energy development takes place. For example, Rüdig (1987) highlights the influence of political styles on the outcome of nuclear technology policies, Cohen et al. (1995) examine the influence of constitutional structures and electoral systems on nuclear energy policies, and Campbell (1988) focuses on the way in which political and economic institutions have constrained the development of the nuclear energy industry. Jasper (1990) outlines the weaknesses of a purely structural approach to examining nuclear energy by insisting that explanations of nuclear policy outcomes need to account for cultural and ideological factors as well. More recently, Sovacool and Valentine (2012) highlight the influence of the broader social, economic, political and technological environment on nuclear energy development. This thesis builds upon the growing recognition that a broader approach to understanding nuclear energy development is needed.

Existing explanations for the absence of a nuclear renaissance tend to focus on two main arguments. Firstly, that the Fukushima nuclear disaster reignited public concerns over the safety of nuclear energy, and governments – fearful of angering voters – tapered their enthusiasm for nuclear power. Secondly, some commentators have argued that the ongoing financial problems faced by nuclear new build has stopped the expectation of a renaissance from becoming a reality. The high construction costs of nuclear power plants – a problem which has plagued the industry throughout its history – continue to impede new nuclear growth. Both of these explanations for the absence of a nuclear renaissance focus on ‘nuclear-specific’ factors. That is, problems relating directly to the construction, operation and management of nuclear power plants. This thesis acknowledges that nuclear-specific factors – such as cost of construction, the safety of nuclear reactors, and the management of nuclear waste – are important factors influencing the outcome of the nuclear renaissance throughout the globe. However, focusing on these factors alone provides too narrow an interpretation of the reasons why there is so little evidence of a nuclear renaissance. The global applicability of the safety and cost arguments for the disconnection between the rhetoric and reality of the renaissance means that neither argument is sufficient for explaining the regional differences in nuclear energy development since 2000. Neither argument provides sufficient explanation for why some countries – primarily those located in Asia and Central and Eastern Europe – have expanded their civil nuclear energy capacities 2000, while other countries – primarily those located in Western Europe and North America – have not. Consequently, an alternative explanation is needed for why there is a disconnection between the rhetoric and reality of the nuclear renaissance in Western Europe and North America.

This thesis challenges existing explanations for the disconnection between the rhetoric and reality of the nuclear renaissance that are overly concerned with nuclear-specific factors. It argues that the absence of a nuclear renaissance in Western Europe and North America cannot be fully understood without examining broader changes in the institutional, structural and ideational context over time. When a historical perspective is applied to the development of nuclear power, it becomes clear that since the

8 first steps were taken towards establishing civil nuclear energy programmes in the post-war era, there have been broad institutional, structural, ideational and contextual shifts taking place in Western Europe and North America which have created a far more challenging social, political and economic environment for nuclear power development to take place. Many of the factors which supported and encouraged the post-war boom in nuclear energy in these regions have gradually been eroded over time. For example, the emergence of the environmental movement has raised public and political awareness of the environmental hazards associated with the use of nuclear energy and nuclear waste, making it more difficult for governments to convince the public of the need for nuclear energy. The early development of nuclear energy was supported by high levels of public trust in government – but this trust has been gradually eroded over time, resulting in a ‘trust deficit’. This has created a political environment whereby citizens are far more sceptical of government and industry claims about the benefits of nuclear power. Furthermore, in the 1950s and 1960s, the risks associated with nuclear power were largely overlooked, with little public or political concern over the possible dangers. However, the growth of a ‘risk society’, combined with the increasing visibility of the risks associated with nuclear power, has contributed to greater public opposition to nuclear development. Finally, the early development of nuclear energy was facilitated by high levels of direct government involvement in policy development and implementation. Yet the rise of neoliberal ideas have made governments much less willing to directly develop and fund nuclear energy programmes themselves, thereby reducing the support available for nuclear new build. Each of these contextual shifts have contributed to the creation of a political, institutional and ideational environment which is far more problematic for nuclear development.

This thesis argues that the failure of the nuclear renaissance in Western Europe and North America cannot be fully understood without accounting for both nuclear-specific factors (such as cost, safety concerns and nuclear waste), as well as these broad contextual shifts. Both types of factors are mutually dynamic and interactive, and have contributed to the failure of the nuclear renaissance in these regions. This thesis does not claim to have compiled a complete list of reasons for why the nuclear renaissance appears to have failed in Western Europe and North America. Instead, it challenges the existing explanations for the failure of the nuclear renaissance for being a-historical, mono-causal, and overly- concerned with nuclear-specific factors alone. It broadens the debate over the nuclear renaissance by drawing attention to the influence of structural, institutional and ideational contextual shifts on nuclear energy development. It highlights the way in which these shifts have affected the behaviour of agents responsible for nuclear energy development.

Furthermore, this thesis highlights the continuity that exists between the issues that caused the nuclear industries of Western Europe and North America to stagnate and decline in the 1970s and 1980s, and the issues that have hindered the success of a nuclear renaissance in these regions. The idea of a nuclear renaissance was premised upon the claim that the arguments for nuclear power had fundamentally

9 changed – for example, that the policy problems of energy security and climate change were so pressing that policymakers would inevitably support a revival of nuclear power. However, this thesis argues that this expectation failed to recognise that many of the problems which have hindered the construction of new nuclear facilities in the past have not been resolved. Very little has changed in the arguments used to support and oppose nuclear power. Consequently, a nuclear renaissance is unlikely to take place until these issues are resolved.

CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE

This thesis provides several contributions to knowledge. Firstly, this research project contributes to knowledge by addressing the lack of social-science based research investigating nuclear energy policy and development, as well as the lack of social science research investigating energy policy more broadly. In recent years there has been a growing recognition of the valuable contribution that social science theories and methodologies can make to energy policy research (see Sovacool, 2014b; Stern, 2014; Sovacool et al., 2015; Rochlin, 2014; Ryan et al., 2014; Spreng, 2014). Despite this recognition, there continues to be a notable imbalance between social science accounts of energy policy compared to research focusing solely on the economic aspects of energy policy. Sovacool (2014a, 2014b), for example, highlights the lack of diverse approaches to energy studies outside of science, engineering and economics within leading energy journals. This thesis therefore contributes to knowledge by helping to fill the gap in energy policy research that is grounded in social science theories and methodologies.

Secondly, this thesis addresses the existing dearth of academic research into the reasons for the failure of the nuclear renaissance. There is a substantial body of academic work investigating the reasons why nuclear energy development has changed over time in different countries. This work has identified a range of explanatory factors. For example, previous research has investigated the role of different actors in influencing the rise or decline of nuclear energy, such as the role of the state (Camilleri, 1984; Fuhrmann, 2012; Lester and Rosner, 2009), corporate and industry representatives (Hertsgaard, 1983), and the anti-nuclear movement (Herring, 2010; Joppke, 1993; Kitschelt, 1986). Since the late 1980s, there has been a growing recognition that nuclear energy development is influenced by the broader political, economic, social and cultural environment (Cohen et al., 1995; Campbell, 1988; Jasper, 1990; Sovacool and Valentine, 2012; Rüdig, 1987). Other explanatory factors that have been explored in connection to nuclear energy development include the impact of focusing events such as nuclear disasters (Wittneben, 2012; Elliott, 2013; Thomas, 2012c), the evolution of reactor technology (Burn, 1978), and the economics involved in nuclear projects (Mullenbach, 1966).

These studies provide valuable insight into the many different factors that can influence how and why civil nuclear energy programmes are formed and change over time. However, this body of work is limited in two key ways. Firstly, this literature has not yet investigated whether or to what extent these

10 factors have played a role in influencing the failure of the nuclear renaissance in particular. This thesis therefore contributes to knowledge by explicitly investigating which factors have played a direct or indirect role in influencing the failure of the nuclear renaissance. Secondly, the existing body of literature into the factors influencing changes in nuclear energy development over time is limited in that these studies tend to adopt a singular focus on a particular type of explanatory factor which informs their analysis of nuclear industry development. Moreover, these studies are overly concerned with investigating factors specifically related to the construction, operation and management of nuclear power plants. In doing so, much of the existing literature on nuclear energy development fails to account for the many different political, social, cultural, structural, institutional, and ideological factors that are occurring at any one time, and which interplay with one another to influence the development of nuclear energy policy.

This thesis therefore makes a third contribution to knowledge through its use of a problem-centred approach to research, and its application of Agents in Context Historical Institutionalism (AiC-HI). Through adopting a problem-centred approach to research, and thereby foregoing a pre-determined paradigmatic approach, this research expands on previous studies by providing a more holistic and inductive approach to understanding nuclear energy development, using a wide variety of explanatory contexts. This provides a more comprehensive and synthesised explanation for why nuclear energy development changes over time, and why the nuclear renaissance has not materialised in Western Europe and North America. This holistic approach to investigating the reasons for the failure of the nuclear renaissance is further complemented by the use of AiC-HI as an analytical framework. AiC-HI allows for a broad range of causal variables – institutions, agency, ideas, structures, and context – and their interdependencies to be included in the analysis, without privileging any one of these variables over another. This further enhances the holistic and inductive perspective that this thesis adopts to understanding why the nuclear renaissance failed.

While this is the first time that an approach identifying both nuclear-technological specific factors as well as broader contextual factors has been applied specifically to the area of nuclear energy development, a similar approach has been adopted in academic literature investigating the area of sustainability transitions more broadly. For example, Geels and Schot (2007) highlight the importance of recognising the influence of factors ‘internal’ to a particular technology, the ‘external’ contextual factors (such as the socio-technical landscape), as well as the role of individual agency. This research reflects Geels & Schot’s conclusion that the interactions between all of these factors are crucial to understanding how and why technologies and technological policies develop over time.

Furthermore, this thesis provides a contribution to knowledge by challenging existing explanations for the failure of the nuclear renaissance. The failure of the nuclear renaissance is commonly attributed to either the disaster at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant in March 2011, or the high capital costs

11 involved in nuclear new build. Commentators suggest that the Fukushima nuclear disaster eroded public confidence in the nuclear industry, reigniting long-held concerns over safety and regulation. In response, governments abandoned plans for nuclear expansion, evidenced by the introduction of a nuclear phase-out in Germany, and the decisions by the Swiss and Italian governments to ban further nuclear development. An alternative argument is that the high capital costs which have always plagued the nuclear industry have not been resolved, and these costs have prevented new nuclear construction projects from being completed. This thesis disputes this idea that the absence of substantial growth in nuclear energy and the failure of the nuclear renaissance can be attributed to any one action or event, such as the crisis at Fukushima or the high capital costs involved. Instead, it embraces the simple premise that a broad range of contextual factors must be explored in order to fully explain the failed renaissance.

Finally, this thesis provides a contribution to knowledge through developing a rigorously detailed, empirical account of changes in nuclear energy policy from 1945 until the present day, with a particular focus on countries located in the regions of Western Europe and North America. A considerable amount of research has already focused on charting the history of nuclear energy programmes, documenting why and how civilian nuclear energy industries have developed. While some studies have focused on investigating these issues at a global scale (Scurlock, 2010; Walls, 2011; Damian, 1992; Hammond, 1996), the majority have focused on either one or a small number of case-study countries2. However, most of these studies were conducted prior to 1990, and therefore do not consider the many changes in nuclear energy policy that occurred over the past two decades3. One notable exception to this is recent work by Sovacool and Valentine (2012) into a comparative case-study analysis of the nuclear programmes of eight different countries across the globe. However, Sovacool and Valentine have only limited engagement with the nuclear renaissance as a phenomenon. In their aim to identify common factors which facilitate nuclear development, they pay less attention to the factors which contribute to the failure of civil nuclear energy programmes more broadly, or the failure of the nuclear renaissance in particular.

2 Previous research has contributed to charting the history of nuclear energy development in specific countries, such as the UK (Williams, 1980; Hall, 1986; Pocock, 1977; Gowing, 1974a; Gowing, 1974b; Parker and Surrey, 1995), France (Scheinman, 1965; Fagnani and Moatti, 1984), Sweden (Nordhaus, 1997; Kåberger, 2007; James, 1979; Wikdahl, 1991), Germany (Winnacker and Wirtz, 1979), Japan (Tolliday, 2012; Lesbirel, 1990; Pickett, 2002), the US (Campbell, 1988), Turkey (Erdogdu, 2007), Republic of Korea (Park, 1992; Choi et al., 2009), Belgium (Laes et al., 2007), Finland (Litmanen, 2010; Kojo and Litmanen, 2009), and Ireland (Baker, 1988). Others have focused on charting and comparing the history of nuclear power across a small number of case study countries (DeLeon, 1980; Poneman, 1982; Goldemberg, 2009).

3 While there are some exceptions to this, more recent studies have tended to focus on nuclear energy in developing countries and emerging nuclear markets, particularly the Middle East and Asia (Yi-chong, 2008; Ebinger and Squassoni, 2011; Erdogdu, 2007; Choi et al., 2009; Goldemberg, 2009).

This research therefore addresses this knowledge gap by providing an updated account of changes in nuclear energy policy from 1945 until the present day. These changes are primarily documented for the regions of Western Europe and North America, but contrasts are also be drawn with changes in nuclear energy policy over time in recent nuclear growth regions such as Asia and Central and Eastern Europe. In doing so, this thesis develops a more comprehensive understanding of how current nuclear energy policies have been developed and changed over time and between countries.

THESIS STRUCTURE

Following on from the Introduction, Chapter 2 of this thesis provides an overview of the three historical phases of global nuclear energy development. Chapter 3 outlines the research approach, analytical framework, methodology and methods that this thesis is based upon. Chapters 4-6 identify a range of ‘nuclear-specific’ factors that have influenced the changing trajectory of nuclear energy development in the past, and that have contributed to the failure of the nuclear renaissance in Western Europe and North America. These are factors that relate specifically to the way in which agents think about and respond to the generation of nuclear power and the construction, operation and management of nuclear power facilities. For example, Chapter 4 argues that the costs and financial risks involved in constructing, operating and maintaining nuclear power plants has hindered the success of the nuclear renaissance. Chapter 5 argues that the disconnection between the expectation and reality of the nuclear renaissance can be explained by an ideational shift whereby the ideas of nuclear power plant safety have become central to determining agents’ support or opposition for nuclear energy development. Similarly, Chapter 6 argues that an ideational shift in the way in which nuclear waste is perceived and prioritised as a policy problem has contributed to the failure of the nuclear renaissance.

Chapters 7-10 identify a range of broader contextual shifts that help to explain why there has been a disconnection between the expectation and failure of the nuclear renaissance in Western Europe and North America. These contextual shifts do not relate specifically to nuclear development, but are instead broad changes that have fundamentally transformed the way in which agents think about and respond to the world around them. However, as these contextual shifts have shaped the way in which agents think and behave at a broad level, they have also in turn led to a shift in agents’ perceptions and behaviour towards nuclear energy in particular. These contextual shifts are not, however, directly or solely related to or emerging from the issue of nuclear power. While the thesis categorises and separates each explanatory factor for the sake of readability, given the mutually dynamic and interactive nature of both the nuclear-specific and the contextual factors that influence nuclear development, there is some degree of overlap in the content matter of these chapters. Wherever possible, links are drawn within each chapter between the way in which factors influence one another and the overarching trajectory of civil nuclear energy development.

Chapter 7 examines the rise of environmentalism as a broad contextual shift, and argues that the growing importance of environmental issues has created an ideational and institutional environment which hinders the expansion of civil nuclear energy programmes. Chapter 8 argues that a gradual decline in public trust in government has taken place throughout much of Western Europe and North America in the post-war era, and that this contextual shift has hindered the success of a nuclear renaissance by making it more challenging for governments to gain public approval for the construction of new nuclear reactors. Chapter 9 argues that the disconnection between the expectation and reality of the nuclear renaissance in Western Europe and North American can be explained by an ideational shift whereby agents have become increasingly aware of and averse to the idea of ‘risk’. This has amplified public awareness of and opposition to the risks posed by nuclear power, and made it more difficult for the nuclear industry to gain a social license to operate. Chapter 10 details the growing influence of neoliberalism on government policy-making, and argues that the rise of neoliberal ideas has made governments less willing to directly fund and support nuclear energy development. This has impeded the success of a nuclear renaissance as the financial support that nuclear development has historically depended upon is no longer as forthcoming. Chapter 11 concludes the thesis by restating the major research findings, the limitations of the study, and providing recommendations for future research. Each of the nuclear-specific and contextual factors identified in this thesis as influencing civil nuclear energy development are listed in the table below, in addition to the relevant chapter in which the factor is discussed.

Table 1: Factors Influencing the Changing Trajectory of Civil Nuclear Power

FACTOR CHAPTER

Nuclear-Specific Factors

Economics of Nuclear Power Chapter 4

Safety of Nuclear Power Chapter 5

Nuclear Waste Chapter 6

Contextual Factors

Environmentalism Chapter 7

Public Trust in Government Chapter 8

Risk Perceptions Chapter 9

Neoliberalism Chapter 10

2. THE RISE, FALL AN D RENAISSANCE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY

This thesis develops two core arguments. Firstly, that a nuclear renaissance has not taken place in Western Europe and North America. Secondly, that the failure of the nuclear renaissance in Western Europe and North America cannot be fully understood without examining the influence of wider institutional, ideational and contextual shifts over time. In order to develop both of these arguments, the purpose of this chapter is to provide a historical overview of the way in which civil nuclear energy programmes have been developed over time across the globe.

The chapter begins by providing an overview of how nuclear energy development has changed from 1945 until the present day. It delineates the history of nuclear energy into three phases: a rise, fall and expected renaissance of nuclear energy. Each phase is then explored in detail to examine when and where changes in the growth of civil nuclear energy have taken place. The third phase of nuclear energy development – the nuclear renaissance – is explored to the greatest extent in this chapter. This chapter speaks to the first argument of this thesis by establishing that there was in fact a widespread expectation that a nuclear renaissance would occur from 2000 onwards, and that much of this growth was expected to take place in the regions of Western Europe and North America. This is done by detailing statements made by members of the media, government, and the nuclear industry which indicated that a revival of nuclear power was imminent or already underway. Following this, the factors which caused the widespread belief in a nuclear renaissance to emerge are documented, as well as the changes which suggested that a nuclear renaissance was taking place.

The changing trajectory of nuclear energy development from 2000 onwards is then examined to determine to what extent the rhetoric of a nuclear renaissance has become a reality. From this analysis it becomes clear that there have been significant regional differences in nuclear new build since 2000. In particular, the majority of new nuclear development that has occurred since 2000 has been located in the regions of Asia and Central and Eastern Europe. Meanwhile, the regions that were expected to drive the nuclear renaissance – Western Europe and North America – have experienced only limited new nuclear development since 2000. Consequently, this chapter supports the first argument of this thesis by evidencing the disconnection between the expectation and reality of the nuclear renaissance in Western Europe and North America.

Furthermore, this chapter identifies and challenges the arguments that are often put forward for the reason as to why the nuclear renaissance appears to have failed in Western Europe and North America. Namely, that the Fukushima nuclear disaster in 2011 provoked rising public and political concerns over nuclear safety, or, that the high capital costs involved in developing nuclear facilities have prevented

15 nuclear new build from taking place. This chapter speaks to the second argument of this thesis by identifying the limitations of the existing explanations for the failure of the nuclear renaissance, and establishing the need for a more holistic examination of the nuclear renaissance that considers the influence of wider institutional, ideational and contextual shifts over time.

THREE PHASES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY DEVELOPMENT

The history of civil nuclear energy development can be delineated into three phases: a rise, fall, and expected renaissance of nuclear energy. The first phase, the rise of nuclear energy, began with the end of the Second World War in 1945 and continued to the mid-1970s. The second phase, the fall of nuclear energy, took place from the mid-1970s to the late 1990s. The final stage, the expected renaissance of nuclear energy, has occurred from 2000 onwards. A brief overview of each of these phases is provided in Table 1 below.

Table 2: The Three Phases of Nuclear Energy Development

Phase Year Key Events  Military concerns drive early research into nuclear power  Civil applications of nuclear power gain attention in 1950s  First full-scale commercial nuclear power station opens in UK in The Rise of 1945 – Nuclear 1956 mid-1970s Energy  Widespread expansion of nuclear power begins in late 1950s and continues for two decades  Early expansion driven mainly by nuclear new build in Western Europe and North America  Global nuclear reactor construction starts peak in 1976, then steadily decline for two decades  Several countries in Western Europe implement bans on nuclear construction  Major nuclear disasters occur at Three Mile Island (1979) and The Fall of Mid-1970s – Chernobyl (1986) Nuclear late 1990s Energy  Nuclear reactor construction projects increasingly run over-budget and over-time  Increasing number of temporary suspensions, permanent shutdowns and cancellations of civil nuclear projects  Nuclear new build driven mainly by ‘first timer’ nuclear countries in Asia and Central and Eastern Europe  Predictions of a ‘nuclear renaissance’ become increasingly pervasive in academic, political and journalistic discourse  Political support for nuclear power grows in Western Europe and North America The Nuclear  However, nuclear new build remains concentrated in the regions of 2000 onwards Renaissance Asia and Central and Eastern Europe  Fukushima nuclear disaster occurs in March 2011  Nuclear new build remains limited in Western Europe and North America  Disconnection between rhetoric and reality of a nuclear renaissance

For this thesis, the decision to classify nuclear energy development into the three stages of a rise, fall, and expected renaissance is derived from a wide-ranging literature review of documents detailing broad changes in policies and attitudes towards nuclear energy over time, as well as quantitative data from the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Power Reactor Information System on global nuclear reactor construction starts over time4. As displayed in Figure 1 below, the number of global reactor construction starts from 1954 to 2011 reflects the three phases of a rise, fall, and apparent renaissance of nuclear energy. Each of these three phases are now explored in detail.

Figure 1: Global Nuclear Reactor Construction Starts, 1954-2014

45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5

No. of nuclear reactor construction statrts construction reactor nuclear of No. 0

The rise of nuclear energy The fall of nuclear energy The nuclear renaissance

Chart compiled using data from the IAEA (2014c) Power Reactor Information System

THE RISE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY

The first phase of nuclear energy development, the rise of nuclear energy, began with the detonation of the atomic bomb in 1945, and lasted until the mid-1970s. Although research into nuclear energy had

4 Data on global nuclear reactor construction starts has been chosen as the best indicator to demonstrate when changes in nuclear energy development took place. This is because, of the historical data available for nuclear development, nuclear reactor construction starts most closely represents the point in time at which decisions to build nuclear reactors are made. Alternative measures of nuclear energy development, such as the number of nuclear reactors in operation worldwide, are less effective at demonstrating when changes in nuclear energy development took place due to the significant time lag between the beginning of reactor construction and the point at which a nuclear reactor actually enters operation. This means that many of the nuclear reactors that entered operation in the mid-1980s emerged from policy decisions that had actually been made in the mid-1970s. For this reason, nuclear reactor construction starts has been chosen as the best available indicator for changes in nuclear energy development over time. While other measures of nuclear energy development, such new construction applications or approvals, would be useful in understanding changes in nuclear energy over time, global historical data for these measures is not publically available.

17 taken place since the early twentieth century, the bombing of Hiroshima dwarfed any previous attempt at harnessing the technology, revealing to the world the devastating potential of nuclear power to fundamentally alter human history. Nuclear power quickly became the quintessential symbol of modernity and scientific accomplishment, with governments scrambling to become leaders in nuclear research and technology. These research endeavours initially focused on military applications of atomic energy, with the first nuclear reactors in the US, the UK, China and the Soviet Union all constructed for the purpose of making weapons-grade plutonium used in atomic bombs (Scurlock, 2010: 24). The militaristic origins of nuclear power meant that early nuclear technologies were developed in an environment that was uniquely protected and supported. Countries competed to become world leaders in nuclear technology, in a race to dominate in the terrain of nuclear weapons systems. In the US, for example, the US Navy was committed to developing nuclear powered submarines. This ambition helped nuclear technologies to be developed quickly after the war (Cowan, 1990: 559). This militaristic origin of nuclear power had flow on-effects in terms of achieving technological advancements that would subsequently benefit the development of civil nuclear energy programmes. Only a handful of European countries, including Belgium, Norway, the Netherlands, and Sweden, initiated a nuclear research program without a specific military purpose (Camilleri, 1984: 8).

By the early 1950s, the focus of nuclear power programmes was beginning to shift, with the potential for civil applications of nuclear technology receiving increasing attention. In 1951, the British government announced that it was changing its nuclear research program to emphasise the possibilities of nuclear energy for power generation (The New York Times, 1951: 5). Similar changes began to emerge in the US where, although the vast majority of atomic research was still focused on military applications, the potential for non-violent uses of nuclear power began to gain greater recognition. At the United Nations General Assembly in December 1953, US President Eisenhower delivered a speech on “Atoms for Peace”, urging the international community to switch their focus from military to peaceful uses of atomic energy.

In 1954, the first instance of electricity produced from nuclear power to enter a power grid took place at the Obninsk Nuclear Power Plant in the former Soviet Union. Two years later, the first full-scale commercial nuclear power station, Calder Hall, was opened at Sellafield in England. This was followed by the opening of the first full-scale commercial nuclear power plant constructed purely for civil purposes at Shippingport in the US in 1957. By the end of the 1950s, construction had begun on 43 commercial nuclear power reactors worldwide (IAEA, 2014c). These reactors were primarily located in Western Europe and North America, with commercial reactors under construction in Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, Slovakia, Sweden, the UK, and the US. Nuclear reactors used purely for research purposes were also established in countries such as Denmark and Norway. By the end of the 1960s, the number of nuclear power reactors under construction had more than tripled, with 139 reactor construction starts throughout the decade (IAEA, 2014c). During this time, construction on

18 commercial nuclear power reactors had also begun in Argentina, Armenia, India, Japan, Kazakhstan, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Spain, and Switzerland. Work began on constructing a nuclear power plant in Australia, but the project was abandoned only two years later. The exponential growth in nuclear development continued throughout the 1970s, with another 306 nuclear power reactor construction starts (IAEA, 2014c). This included new commercial nuclear power reactors under construction for the first time in Austria, Brazil, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, Iran, Lithuania, Mexico, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, and the Ukraine (Eskom, 2014; IAEA, 2014c; WNA, 2014c; WNA, 2014d; WNA, 2014f). The number of new reactor starts in a single year peaked at 42 in 1976, before entering a period of prolonged decline, never again coming close to this historical record (IAEA, 2014c). By the end of 1976, of the 186 reactors that were in operation worldwide, 61 were located in the US, 33 in the UK, 16 in Russia, 15 in Germany, 13 in Japan, and 10 in France (IAEA, 2014c)5.

THE FALL OF NUCLEAR ENERGY

From the mid-1970s to the late 1990s, the growth of domestic civil nuclear energy programmes stagnated and declined. During this period, several countries that had been world leaders in developing the first civil nuclear energy programmes stopped approving new reactor construction sites (Küpper, 2006: 156). Austria, Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, and Switzerland decided to abandon their nuclear power programmes altogether, placing bans on new reactor construction, and either phasing out or immediately decommissioning existing reactors (Darst and Dawson, 2010; WNA, 2012b). Spain and the UK placed moratoriums on new reactor construction (Nuclear Industry Association, 2013; WNA, 2013d). Plans for the construction of nuclear reactors and power plants were cancelled in Azerbaijan, Belgium, Cuba, Egypt, Iran, the Philippines, Poland and Syria (WNA, 2013c; Tyler, 2000; Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2014; WNA, 2013a; The Economist, 2014; McGeown, 2011). In 1977, the West German state of North Rhine-Westphalia, implemented the equivalent to a moratorium on the construction of nuclear reactors until a safe method of nuclear waste disposal was discovered (Nossiter, 1977: 21). Following this, the West German Energy Minister, Hans Matthöfer, announced that the country’s nuclear energy programme would undergo a three to five year slowdown (Walter, 1977: 7). In July 1981, the French Government reduced the country’s nuclear power programme by one quarter (Webster, 1981: 5).

The stagnating growth of nuclear energy programmes is evident in the steady decrease in nuclear reactor construction starts worldwide from the mid-1970s until the late 1990s (see Figure 1 above). After the peak of 42 reactor construction starts in 1976, this number steadily declined over the following two

5 The remaining reactors in operation were located in Canada (8), Sweden (5), Belgium (4), India (3), Italy (3), Spain (3), Switzerland (3), Bulgaria (2), The Netherlands (2), Argentina (1), Armenia (1), Kazakhstan (1), Pakistan (1), and Slovakia (1).

19 decades. The first year that construction did not begin on any new nuclear reactors worldwide was in 1995. The total number of nuclear reactors connected to the grid globally from the mid-1980s onwards was only slightly larger than the number of reactors being retired (Walls, 2011: 13). In the US, no construction licenses were granted for nuclear reactors from 1978 until early 2012 (Marshall, 2012). In 1979, the British government announced plans to order ten nuclear reactors over the period from 1982 until 1992. However, the first reactor was not ordered until 1987, and plans to order the remaining reactors were cancelled two years later (Thomas, 2008: 13). From 1988-2002, France was the only country in Western Europe to begin construction on a new nuclear reactor (Darst and Dawson, 2010: 51). The nuclear industry did, however, show some signs of life with construction beginning on the first nuclear reactors in Romania in 1982 and China in 1985 (IAEA, 2014c).

In countries that did continue to maintain some form of nuclear power programme during this period, reactors frequently suffered construction delays and increased project lead times. As displayed in Figure 2 below, the median construction time for nuclear reactors steadily increased from the mid-1960s onwards. Throughout the world, the median construction time of nuclear reactors almost doubled from 57 months (almost 5 years) in the early 1960s, to 121 months (just over 10 years) in the late-1990s. This trend was evident in the US, where the amount of time it took to construct a nuclear reactor increased steadily from the 1970s through to the 1990s (Cooper, 2010: 18). Nuclear power plants constructed in the US that had received permits in the 1960s had an average lead time of roughly 6 years (Campbell, 1988: 5). In comparison, US nuclear power plants that were issued with permits between 1971 and 1974 experienced average lead times of almost 10 years (Campbell, 1988: 5). Examples of nuclear power plants which took far longer to construct than originally expected include the second nuclear unit at the Enrico Fermi Nuclear Generating Station, which was still not finished more than nine years after its scheduled completion date (The New York Times, 1980: D2). In 1968, the Long Island Lighting Company announced that it was applying for a construction permit for its planned Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant. Construction on the plant began five years later, but was not completed until the mid- 1980s – almost two decades after the initial construction application was lodged (Fagin, 2007). Similarly, an operating license was granted for the Seabrook nuclear plant almost seventeen years after utilities first sought permission for construction (Lippman, 1990: A11).

Figure 2: Median Construction Time For Nuclear Reactors Worldwide, 1961-2000

140 121 120 103 99 100 95

80 74

57 60 60 56

Median Construction (months) Span Construction Median Time 20

0 1961-1965 1966-1970 1971-1975 1976-1980 1981-1985 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000

Chart compiled using data from the IAEA (2014c) Power Reactor Information System

In the UK, construction on four nuclear power stations ran a combined total of more than twenty-six years behind schedule (Cook, 1978: 17). The Dungeness B reactor entered commercial operation twenty-four years after construction began (Thomas, 2005: 7). In 1979, the British Government endorsed a plan to build a nuclear reactor at Sizewell, but construction did not begin until 1987, and the plant only entered commercial operation in 1995 (Thomas, 2005: 14). The Kalkar reactor in Germany was meant to be finished in 1979 but was not completed until 1985 (Done, 1982: 3). Even then, the reactor never became fully operational and was subsequently decommissioned (Mez and Doern, 2009: 130). Reactor construction times in France remained at approximately five to six years from 1970 to 1985, but then doubled from the mid-1980s onwards (Cooper, 2010: 18).

Numerous nuclear plants that were under construction or already in operation were affected by temporary suspensions, permanent shutdowns and project cancellations. From 1970 to the late-1990s, more than two-thirds of all nuclear power plant orders were cancelled (Cohn, 1997: 127). The first cancellation of a nuclear reactor in the US took place in 1972 (US Department of Energy, 1983: 4). By 1983, roughly 100 nuclear units had been cancelled at 56 sites – almost half of all orders placed (US Department of Energy, 1983: x). Throughout 1975, for every new reactor order placed in the US, there was the equivalent of approximately 25 cancellations or suspensions of other orders for nuclear projects (Tucker, 1976a: 3). In some instances, reactor orders were cancelled even after construction was more than 90 percent complete (Scurlock, 2010: 30). The Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant was permanently closed only five years after construction was completed, having never started commercial operations (Long Island Power Authority, 2013). After fifteen years of construction and at 85 percent complete, the Midland Nuclear Power Plant was converted to a gas-fired cogeneration plant (Ahearne et al., 2012:

52). In Germany, plans for nuclear reactors at Breisach and Wyhl were abandoned in the face of sustained public opposition (Surrey and Huggett, 1976: 298). The German government abandoned plans to build its first large nuclear fuel reprocessing plant at Wackersdorf in 1989, despite construction on the plant already being half-way completed (New Scientist, 1989). Germany’s Hamm-Uentrop nuclear reactor entered operation in 1983, but was shut down only six years later (Mez and Doern, 2009: 130).

THE NUCLEAR RENAISSANCE

This section establishes that there was a widespread expectation that a nuclear renaissance would occur from 2000 onwards, and that much of this growth was expected to take place in the regions of Western Europe and North America. It details the reasons why this expectation emerged, as well as the changes which suggested that a nuclear renaissance was taking place. Changes in nuclear energy development since 2000 are then examined to illustrate the absence of a nuclear renaissance in Western Europe and North America. Existing explanations for the failure of the nuclear renaissance in these regions are identified and challenged.

A RENAISSANCE IS ANNOUNCED

From 2000 onwards, an expectation emerged across the globe that nuclear energy was on the verge of entering a new phase of development. The potential for a resurgence of interest in nuclear energy was raised in the media intermittently throughout the 1980s and 1990s6. However, it was not until 2000 that the expectation of a nuclear renaissance gained momentum and entered government and industry discourse. The expectation of a nuclear renaissance is evident in statements made by members of the media, industry, government and academia, which increasingly referred to a ‘nuclear renaissance’ that was either about to begin or that was already underway. However, exactly what the nuclear renaissance was, or what would constitute a renaissance taking place, was rarely – if ever – defined in these statements. Rather, the term was broadly used to refer to a change in nuclear energy development that was defined by two key facets:

6 Nuttall (2008: 1) states that the term ‘nuclear renaissance’ was first used in an article by Charles Venyvesi in the US News and World Report in 1990, but that the phrase gained traction after it was used in an article in the Wall Street Journal in 1999. However, the idea of a nuclear renaissance can be traced back further to an article in The New York Times in 1981, which announced the Reagan administration’s plans for a ‘revival of nuclear power’ (Hershey Jr, 1981: A1).

This second facet is crucial to understanding why the emergence of the expectation of a nuclear renaissance was so significant, but is frequently overlooked in existing discussions and analysis of the nuclear renaissance. The significance of the nuclear renaissance was that much of the new nuclear growth was expected to take place in countries whose nuclear industries had been suffering from stagnation and decline. The vast majority of nuclear growth that had occurred during the 1980s and 1990s was located in newly established or emerging ‘first-timer’ nuclear industries – countries that were only just beginning their civil nuclear energy programmes. These countries were primarily located in the regions of Asia and Central and Eastern Europe. Meanwhile, nuclear new build in Western Europe and North America – the regions that had driven the early development of nuclear power – was limited. Consequently, the expectation of a nuclear renaissance was significant because it was based not just on the assumption that the growth in Asia and Central and Eastern Europe would continue, but that new growth would also occur in Western Europe and North America. This new growth in more well- established nuclear industries that had suffered a prolonged decline is what made the expectation of a nuclear renaissance so significant, and a stark turning point from the previous two and a half decades of nuclear history.

The expectation that the nuclear renaissance was a global phenomenon, driven by growth in both first- timer nuclear countries as well as countries with long-established nuclear programmes, was evident in numerous news articles. These articles varied in their assumption that the nuclear phenomenon was either just about to happen, had just started, or had already been underway for some time throughout the world. An article in The Economist (2006: 77) reported that “all over the world governments are rethinking the politics and economics of nuclear power. Energy analysts are speaking of a nuclear renaissance”. Journalists reported that “the world is on the brink of a second nuclear renaissance” (The Japan Times, 2008), that “the nuclear renaissance is spreading across the world” (RIA Novosti, 2008), the “global renaissance in nuclear energy is gaining momentum” (Ritch, 2005: A15), and that “the worldwide nuclear renaissance is gathering steam” (Hore-Lacy, 2006: 25). Others announced the imminent arrival of the nuclear renaissance with headlines such as “a nuclear renaissance dawns” (Business Korea, 2009), the “nuclear renaissance is alive” (Kansler, 2009), and that “nuclear power is ready for take-off” (Warren, 2006).

Other news articles highlighted the presence of a nuclear renaissance in specific regions or countries, particularly in Europe and North America. Headlines announced that “Europe pioneers renaissance of nuclear power” (Emling, 2005) and “European nuclear industry in grip of revival” (Bream, 2009), while another article reported that “there is much evidence of renewed interest in nuclear power throughout the EU” (Berger, 2006). The presence of the renaissance in the UK was noted by headlines such as “Energy worries fuel UK nuclear renaissance” (New Zealand Herald, 2008), “UK’s nuclear renaissance takes another step forward” (ICIS, 2008), and “UK, US both advancing toward nuclear renaissance” (World Gas Intelligence, 2008). Similar statements were made about the renaissance in the US, with

23 headlines such as “Companies in race to provide fuel for US ‘nuclear renaissance’” (San Jose Mercury News, 2008). Articles reported that “the [nuclear] industry is enjoying a renaissance in the United States” (O'Reilly, 2009: 63) and that “the new enthusiasm for building reactors means America’s long- awaited ‘nuclear renaissance’ is about to become reality” (The Economist, 2007: 81). The nuclear renaissance was said to be emerging in Canada, according to headlines such as “Canada is ready to ride the nuclear renaissance wave” (Canada NewsWire, 2009), and statements such as “the first tangible signs of the much-heralded renaissance are appearing in Canada” (Uranium Intelligence Weekly, 2008: 1).

Furthermore, enthusiasm for the nuclear renaissance was driven by numerous political leaders, nuclear industry representatives, and even notable environmental activists who made public statements in support of increased nuclear energy development. In Western Europe and North America, these statements were made by the highest levels of political leaders across the political spectrum. In the UK, successive Prime Ministers across both party lines have spoken in favour of nuclear power since the mid-2000s. Former Prime Minister Tony Blair advised the G8 industrialised nations that a “substantial renaissance of nuclear power” was necessary to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (Del Buono, 2008: 1), while his successor, Prime Minister Gordon Brown, was “convinced that we need a renaissance of nuclear power” (World Nuclear News, 2008: 1). More recently, Prime Minister David Cameron described the development of the Hinkley Point C nuclear power station as “a very big day for our country”, declaring that it would be the first of many new nuclear power stations in the UK (The Daily Mail, 2013: 1). The UK Energy Minister, Charles Hendry, announced that “we are on the brink of the biggest nuclear renaissance since the 1950s” (Department of Energy & Climate Change, 2011: 1). The UK Business Secretary, John Hutton, declared that Britain could become “the gateway to a new nuclear renaissance across Europe” (Sparrow and Wintour, 2008: 1). Elsewhere in Western Europe, the expectation of a nuclear renaissance was evident when French President Nicolas Sarkozy hosted an International Conference on Access to Civil Nuclear Energy in 2010. A conference press release stated that the “international ‘nuclear renaissance’ calls for resolute action by those States who, like France, believe that nuclear energy can provide a sustainable solution for their growing energy needs” (Ministère de l'Écologie du Développement durable et de l'Énergie, 2010).

Similar enthusiasm for the nuclear renaissance was evident in statements made by government representatives and political leaders in North America. During his Presidency, George W. Bush indicated his support for a nuclear renaissance, stating that “nuclear power is going to be an essential source…of future electricity for the United States” (Manor, 2006: 1). Chair of the Senate Energy Committee, Pete Domenici, announced that the “nuclear renaissance is alive in America” (US Senate Committee on Energy & Natural Resources, 2006: 1), while the Chairman of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Dale E. Klein, proclaimed that the “nuclear renaissance is here” (Baltimore, 2007: 1). Dennis Spurgeon, the US Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy stated that “the prospects for nuclear

24 energy are more promising today than at any time since its development” (Lovell, 2007: 1). In a report on Securing America’s Energy Future, the Committee on Government Reform of the US House of Representatives asserted that “nuclear energy must become the primary generator of baseload electricity” (US House of Representatives, 2006: 3). In Canada, the former Natural Resources Minister, Gary Lunn, announced that “we’ve seen a nuclear renaissance around the globe” (Geddes, 2007: 1).

Statements by nuclear industry representatives demonstrated an equal level of enthusiasm for a nuclear renaissance. In 2002, the Chairman of the World Nuclear Association (WNA) stated that “a [nuclear] renaissance has been underway for a year or so” (MacLachlan, 2002: 1). The Chief Executive of France’s AREVA Nuclear Plants asserted that “we are convinced about the nuclear renaissance” (Pagnamenta, 2009: 1), while the President of AREVA UK stated that “the UK is now a key market, both for new build and waste management, as the international nuclear renaissance gets under way” (AREVA, 2008: 1). When discussing the construction of the first Generation III EPR nuclear reactor in Finland, the CEO of AREVA SA stated that the reactor’s construction “turns into reality the nuclear renaissance” (Erkheikki, 2005: 1). The CEO of Duke Energy declared that “we’re going to have a renaissance, no matter what” (Hiltzik, 2012: 1). The President of USEC Inc., a global supplier of nuclear fuel, stated that “a renaissance is underway in the nuclear power industry” (USEC, 2006: 1). The latest reactor design from Westinghouse, the AP1000 nuclear reactor, was marketed with the slogan “the renaissance starts here” (Westinghouse Electric Company, 2007).

The President of the Nuclear Energy Institute proclaimed that “we are in every sense experiencing a nuclear renaissance in the United States” (Nuclear Energy Institute, 2002: 1). The Director General of the World Nuclear Association declared that a “nuclear renaissance is now gearing up everywhere in the world” (Tagliabue, 2007: 1). The Vice President for Business Development at Cameco, the world’s largest publicly traded uranium company, stated that “the nuclear renaissance is gaining momentum” (Broad and Sanger, 2006: 1). The Vice President of the American Nuclear Society asserted that “the renaissance of nuclear power in the United States is inevitable” (Foulke, 2002: 2). The Chairman of the World Association of Nuclear Operators wrote that the “nuclear renaissance is under way” (Cavanaugh, 2006: 10). The President of the Canadian Nuclear Association lobby group stated that “we are seeing a renaissance in the building of nuclear reactors” (McKenna, 1992: B2). Westinghouse, an American nuclear power company, issued a statement announcing its intentions for “playing a major part in the UK’s nuclear renaissance” (Lancashire Evening Post, 2006: 1). A representative for General Electric’s nuclear division in the US stated that the “success of the nation’s current operating fleet is responsible for today’s nuclear renaissance” (Hansen, 2006: 18). The Chief Executive of EDF Energy described the British government’s announcement of a new generation of nuclear power stations as “an opportunity for the UK to be at the vanguard of the nuclear renaissance” (Crooks, 2008: 1).

It is important to note, however, that there was not an entirely universal consensus that a renaissance was going to occur. In 2003, the International Energy Agency produced their World Energy Outlook, which stated that there is “a limited role for nuclear power over the next thirty years” because of “unfavourable economics” and governments unwilling to support nuclear power due to ongoing public opposition (International Energy Agency, 2003: 429). The World Energy Outlook 2004 continued with this prediction, warning that nuclear energy “will decline progressively” because it cannot compete with other energy technologies (International Energy Agency, 2004: 61). A World Nuclear Industry Status Report has been released by independent consultants on a regular basis from 1992 until 2015. Throughout each of these publications, the authors have maintained a consistent argument that the reality of global nuclear energy development does not match the rhetoric of a nuclear renaissance7. The authors cite multiple factors which have prevented a nuclear expansion from taking place, including ongoing public opposition to nuclear power, declining economic conditions, rising costs of constructing nuclear power plants, an inability to compete with other energy sources, reduced electricity demand, and supply chain issues (including manufacturing bottlenecks and lack of a skilled workforce). Yet despite these warnings, media, government and industry discourse was heavily dominated by the assumption that a nuclear renaissance was inevitable.

WHY THE EXPECTATION EMERGED

The expectation of an oncoming nuclear renaissance emerged as a result of several factors which created a more favourable political environment for nuclear energy. These factors were also invoked by advocates of nuclear energy to justify the need for and inevitability of a nuclear renaissance. These factors include:

a) The emergence of climate change onto the global policy agenda and the reframing of nuclear power as a ‘green’ and sustainable source of energy; b) Growing concerns around ensuring security of energy supply; c) Increasing global energy demands; d) Improvements in nuclear reactor designs; e) Sustained improvements in nuclear power plant safety and operating performance; and f) Lobbying and public relation efforts by the nuclear industry to increase public and political support for nuclear energy.

7 The World Nuclear Industry Status Report (1992: 2, 18) predicted that “worldwide nuclear expansion will slow to a trickle”, and that “nuclear power is fading, slowly but surely, as a realistic future energy option”. The World Nuclear Industry Status Report (2004: 9) concluded that there is “still no sign of a ‘nuclear revival’”. The World Nuclear Industry Status Report (2007: 10) predicted that “the number of nuclear power plants operating in the world will most likely decline over the next two decades with a rather shaper decline to be expected after 2020”. The World Nuclear Industry Status Report (2009: 7) stated that “there is as yet no obvious sign that the international nuclear industry could eventually turn the empirically evident decline into a promising future”.

CLIMATE CHANGE AND ‘GREEN’ ENERGY

Since the early 1990s, climate change has emerged as one of the most pressing environmental issues on the global policy agenda, and subsequently became one of the primary justifications for a revival of interest in nuclear energy. The most significant international agreement to combating climate change, the Kyoto Protocol, stipulates mandatory targets for its signatories to reduce their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. With over fifty countries ratifying the protocol, a global demand was created for affordable, low carbon-emitting fuel sources that would still be capable of meeting ever-increasing predictions of energy consumption. Advocates of nuclear energy capitalised on this demand by deliberately reframing and promoting nuclear power as a clean, efficient, and sustainable source of electricity generation (Bickerstaff et al., 2008; Doyle, 2011). In particular, they emphasise the low GHG emissions of nuclear power which can assist governments with meeting their emissions targets. When the entire lifecycle of nuclear power plants is considered, the GHG emissions produced per unit of electricity are at least two orders of magnitude below corresponding emissions from fossil fuel energy chains, and are comparable to most renewables at almost zero (Sims et al., 2003: 1317). The contribution of nuclear power to reducing GHG emissions is said to have already been proven, with the operation of nuclear power plants to date having saved roughly 10 percent of total carbon emissions from world energy use (Adamantiades and Kessides, 2009: 5151). The issue of climate change and the ‘green’ credentials of nuclear power were invoked by governments worldwide as a justification for investment in the nuclear energy sector (see Chapter 7 for a detailed discussion of the statements made by policymakers invoking climate change as a key justification for a nuclear renaissance).

ENERGY SECURITY

A key factor which influenced the emergence of expectations that a nuclear renaissance would occur was a growing concern over security of energy supply. While energy security is by no means a new issue confronting governments, geo-political instability and potential disruption of supply has highlighted the complexity and vulnerability of energy systems when dependent on foreign fuel sources. In particular, the oil crises of 1973 and 1979 caused oil prices to sky-rocket, demonstrating to governments the necessity of diversifying fuel sources and reducing dependence on fuel imports. For countries with limited indigenous energy reserves, such as France and Japan, the oil crises were fundamental to the rapid development of their nuclear industries (Walls, 2011: 10). More recently, political turmoil in Russia and its effects on natural gas imports to Europe has similarly prompted countries to revisit nuclear power as an alternative, more secure form of energy. In 2006 and 2009, fragile relations between Russia and its neighbours resulted in interruptions in the flow of natural gas to several countries in Europe (Pirani et al., 2009: 8). Then, in 2010, Russian gas exports to Europe were again curtailed due to severe cold weather conditions increasing Russia’s domestic demand (Torello and Robinson, 2012). Growing concerns over dependence on Russian gas supplies have since

27 prompted several countries to consider diversifying their energy portfolios by developing their nuclear industries, including Lithuania, Ukraine, Turkey, and Belarus (The Baltic Times, 2012; WNA, 2014k; Peker, 2011; Ram, 2007). In Finland, fears of over-reliance on Russian gas imports led the government to consider plans to double the country’s nuclear capacity (Pohjanpalo and ben-Aaron, 2010). The British Government’s long-term nuclear energy strategy described nuclear power as “vital for our energy security” (Department of Energy and Climate Change [DECC], 2013: 18). In the US, President George W. Bush stated that “for the sake of economic security and national security, the United States must aggressively move forward with construction of nuclear power plants” (Baker and Mufson, 2006).

ENERGY DEMAND

Reports of rising global energy demands contributed to an increasingly favourable political climate for a revival of nuclear energy. In 2001, the US Energy Secretary, Spencer Abraham, warned that the country was “on the brink of the greatest energy crisis we’ve had in the last twenty years” (Elliott, 2001). Global oil and gas giant ExxonMobil (2012: 7) predicted that world energy demand will increase by about 30 percent from 2010 to 2040, with non-OECD energy demand rising by nearly 60 percent. Similar projections have been released by the International Energy Agency (2012: 49), indicating that global energy demand would increase by over one-third by 2035. In the face of escalating demands, countries are considering nuclear power as a source of reliable, large-scale civilian electricity generation. In 2007, Egypt announced that it would build several nuclear power plants to meet the growing energy demands of its citizens (Fleishman, 2007). The British government placed nuclear power at the centre of its plans to solve a looming energy crisis in 2006 (Gardiner, 2006). In a speech outlining the economic and energy challenges facing the country, US President George W. Bush highlighted the need for an expanded role for nuclear power in order to meet growing energy demands, stating that “our Nation will need more electricity—more safe, clean, reliable electricity. It is time for this country to start building nuclear powerplants again” (Bush, 2005b).

NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND REACTOR DESIGNS

Contributing to the growing expectations of a nuclear renaissance were promises of a new range of nuclear reactor designs and technologies that would be safer, more efficient and more affordable than existing models. Nuclear reactor technologies have evolved from Generation I reactors through to Generation IV. The majority of reactors presently in use are either Generation II or III. Generation III+ reactors were developed as an improved version of the Generation III reactors. Generation IV reactors are currently being researched and developed and will not be available for commercial construction at least until 2020-30 (Grimston and Beck, 2002: 191). It is the Generation III+ and IV reactors that multinational nuclear vendors have advertised as being key to the future of nuclear power. These systems are expected to offer a range of advantages over previous generations of reactors through

28 innovations with alternative fuel cycles (Hultman, 2011: 400). It is these potential advantages of a new generation of reactors that have been influential in sparking enthusiasm for a nuclear renaissance, promising to address the health and safety concerns that have plagued the industry since the disasters at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl (Adamantiades and Kessides, 2009: 5157). In 2002, the US government launched its Nuclear 2010 programme on the basis that Generation III+ reactor designs would “result in lower and more predictable construction and operating costs” (Thomas, 2012a: 52). France and the US have plans to construct Generation IV systems (Van Goethem, 2008: 9). Statements made by political leaders in support of a nuclear renaissance on the grounds of improved reactor designs are discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.

The revival of interest in nuclear energy has also been influenced by the development of small and medium nuclear reactors, including small modular reactors. Smaller nuclear reactor units are expected to overcome many of the problems plaguing nuclear energy development through lower capital costs, simpler designs, shorter construction periods, reduced siting costs, and enhanced levels of safety (IAEA, 2014b). Small reactors offer flexibility for smaller or growing electricity grids, as they can be built independently or as modules within a larger complex, where individual reactors can be added incrementally as required (WNA, 2014m).

IMPROVED SAFETY AND OPERATING PERFORMANCE

An increasingly favourable political environment for nuclear energy was created as a result of improved safety and operating performance of nuclear power plants. As a result of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster, the World Association of Nuclear Operators was created to foster a global safety culture, and the International Atomic Energy Agency’s approach to plant safety underwent significant reforms (Adamantiades and Kessides, 2009: 5154). These organisations have since worked to improve plant safety by creating transnational networks and exchanges for continuous and results-oriented peer review of plant safety practices (WNA, 2013h). Significant improvements have also occurred in the operating performance of nuclear reactors, making plants more productive and increasing their annual revenues. US nuclear plants have significantly improved their performance over the past 25 years, achieving record figures for production and efficiency (Howard, 2006). Meanwhile, the average capacity factor (a measure of plant efficiency) for nuclear power plants in the US has risen from 56.3 percent in 1980 to 86.4 percent in 2012 (Nuclear Energy Institute, 2013; WNA, 2014j). In comparison, the leading source of US electricity generation, coal, recorded a capacity factor of 55.3 percent in 2012. These improvements in production and efficiency have contributed to making nuclear power an increasingly attractive energy option.

LOBBYING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS CAMPAIGNS

The expectation of a nuclear renaissance was encouraged by lobbying and public relations campaigning conducted by the nuclear industry. From the late 1990s onwards, pro-nuclear companies and lobby groups invested in extensive marketing campaigns to convince voters and politicians of the need for a nuclear renaissance. The US nuclear industry is reported to have invested over $600m from 2000-2010 in lobbying efforts to convince the government of the need for nuclear energy, in addition to a further $63m spent on campaign contributions (Sovacool, 2011: 259). Energy Solutions, a nuclear waste management companies in the US, ran television advertisements targeted at the general public which portrayed nuclear energy as safe and environmentally friendly (Daley, 2006). In 2006, a ‘nuclear renaissance’ themed advertising campaign was run by the US nuclear industry to support President Bush’s nuclear energy initiative and to increase public support for nuclear new build (Fialka, 2006). The Nuclear Energy Institute launched a newspaper, radio, and web-based campaign to convince the public and politicians of nuclear energy’s economic value, its contribution to the country’s energy security, and its environmental credentials (Nuclear Energy Institute, 2010). In Germany, multiple nuclear companies ran full-page newspaper advertisements to convince voters that the nuclear industry was necessary for Germany’s energy security (Dempsey, 2010).

FROM EXPECTATION TO REALITY?

The idea that a nuclear renaissance was about to become a reality became increasingly credible as political and public support for nuclear energy strengthened. Advocates of the nuclear renaissance pointed to the following changes as indicators that the nuclear renaissance was about to take place:

a) Eleven countries with existing nuclear power programmes set targets to rapidly expand their nuclear power generating capacities; b) Six countries which had previously agreed to terminate their usage of nuclear power began to reconsider or reverse their policy positions; c) At least forty-five countries which did not yet have any operating nuclear reactors demonstrated interest in developing a civil nuclear power programme; and d) Opinion polls suggested possible growth in public support for nuclear power.

EXPANSION OF EXISTING NUCLEAR PROGRAMMES

The expectation of a nuclear renaissance emerged not just from rhetoric, but from countries undertaking steps to increase their civil nuclear energy capacities. Ambitious growth targets and expansion plans were set for several countries with existing civil nuclear power programmes. China expected to extend its nuclear power production from 2 percent of total electricity capacity in 2009 to 5 percent by 2020, and then to 10 percent by 2040 to 2050 (Ebinger and Squassoni, 2011: 105). South Korea planned to

30 increase its nuclear capacity to 59 percent of electricity generation by 2030, with eleven new reactors to come online from 2012 to 2021 (WNA, 2014h). India aimed to grow its nuclear capacities to provide 25 percent of electricity from nuclear power by 2050 (WNA, 2014e). Russia set an ambitious growth target of 50 percent increased nuclear outputs by 2020, with ten reactors currently under active construction (WNA, 2013g). In 2010, the Japanese government planned to build eight new nuclear reactors by 2020 (Cyranoski, 2010). Construction approval was granted for nuclear reactors in several countries where the nuclear industry had been in decline for decades, such as the US, UK, France and Finland (Reuters, 2007; Lester and Rosner, 2009; Erlanger, 2008; BBC News, 2013d). Kazakhstan considered constructing a new nuclear power plant, where the country’s only nuclear plant was closed in 1999 (World Nuclear News, 2012b). In the Ukraine, an intergovernmental agreement was made with Russia to finish construction of a nuclear reactor that had previously been abandoned (WNA, 2014k).

RE-EVALUATION OF ANTI-NUCLEAR POLICIES

From 2000 onwards, several countries which had existing nuclear phase-out policies, or which opposed the development of nuclear power altogether, began to reconsider or reverse their policy positions. Italy, a country which had closed down all its nuclear plants in the aftermath of Chernobyl, witnessed a change in policy direction with the new pro-nuclear government announcing plans for a substantial new nuclear build program in 2008 (WNA, 2012a). In Belgium, a planned phase-out of nuclear energy was postponed for ten years (World Nuclear News, 2009b). Sweden’s parliament voted to overturn a ban on construction of new nuclear power plants which had been in place since 1980 (Harrell, 2010). A moratorium had been placed on new nuclear plants in Spain since 1994, yet license renewals continued to be granted for existing nuclear power plants (WNA, 2013d). The Netherlands had previously decided to close its only nuclear power plant by 2003. However, during 2003, the Dutch government decided to change the plant’s closure date to 2013, effectively abandoning the phase-out plan (WNA, 2012b). Even Germany, which was committed to phasing-out nuclear energy by 2023, looked like it could potentially reverse its position. The German coalition government that was elected in September 2009 was heavily committed to rescinding the existing phase-out policy, and successfully negotiated for license extensions to be granted to the plants currently in operation (Connolly, 2010).

POTENTIAL DEVELOPMENT OF NEW NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAMMES

The expectation of a nuclear renaissance was also supported by figures from the WNA (2013a) which indicated that over forty-five countries that did not use nuclear energy were seriously considering the development of a domestic nuclear power program. In Asia, plans for the establishment of a civil nuclear power programme were being considered in the Philippines and Thailand (France-Presse, 2010; Thongrung, 2013), and in-principle approval for developing nuclear power was been granted in Malaysia (Nuclear Power Daily, 2010). More definitive plans for the establishment of a civil nuclear

31 energy programme were announced in Bangladesh, Indonesia, Mongolia, and Vietnam (Shen, 2011; Energy Daily, 2007; Antara News, 2011; Dawson, 2011). In South America, the establishment of civil nuclear power was being considered in Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Suriname and Uruguay (Mallén, 2014: 1; Campbell, 2010; Crooks, 2007; Squassoni, 2009a; Reuters, 2009d; Cairo, 2007). Plans for the establishment of nuclear power were announced in Brazil and Venezuela (Xinhua, 2008; Cancel, 2009). In the Middle East, Israel, Jordan and Syria were considering the use of nuclear power (Horner, 2010; Kennedy, 2011; Dahl, 2011). Plans for the construction of the first nuclear reactors were announced in Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Egypt, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia (BBC News, 2006; Bitar, 2010; Reuters, 2011; Inajima and Okada, 2010). In Africa, the use of nuclear power was being considered in Angola, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Libya, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Sudan, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda, and Zimbabwe (Reuters, 2009c; World Nuclear News, 2007b; de Queiroz, 2007; Reuters, 2010; Sisay, 2013; Mushekwe, 2013; Modern Ghana, 2008; Reuters, 2009b; Balile, 2003). Plans for the establishment of a nuclear programme were announced in Algeria and South Africa (Reuters, 2009a; Flak, 2011). In Europe, plans for the establishment of a civil nuclear energy programme were being considered in Moldova (New Europe, 2003), and were announced in Albania, Belarus, Croatia, Estonia, Poland, and Turkey (WNA, 2014g; Tere, 2009; WNA, 2013b; World Nuclear News, 2009a).

INCREASED PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR NUCLEAR ENERGY

Advocates of the nuclear renaissance argued that global opinion polls were demonstrating growing public acceptance and support for nuclear energy (Blowers, 2010: xii). A survey conducted for the International Atomic Energy Agency in 2005 found that the majority (62 percent) of respondents support the continued use of existing nuclear power plants, but an almost equal amount of respondents (59 percent) do not favour new nuclear plants being built (Globescan Incorporated, 2005: 6). A survey conducted in 2009 by the management company Accenture of more than 10,000 people in 20 different countries found that over two-thirds of the respondents believe their countries should start using or increase their use of nuclear energy (Nuclear Energy Institute, 2009: 1). However, attitudes towards nuclear power continue to differ greatly by region and by country, with support for nuclear power increasing over the past decade primarily in Europe, Japan and the United States (OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, 2010c). Public opinion on nuclear power is explored in more detail in Chapters 5, 6 and 8 of this thesis.

THE FAILED RENAISSANCE

While there was clearly a widespread resurgence of interest in nuclear energy from 2000 onwards, interest alone is not enough to constitute a nuclear renaissance taking place. An examination of the degree of growth in nuclear energy development from 2000 onwards suggests that, in spite of the

32 rhetoric, a global nuclear renaissance did not take place. Since nuclear energy was first commercialised, the total installed nuclear capacity worldwide has decreased only six times, and all within the past 15 years (in 1997, 2003, 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2011) (Schneider et al., 2012: 13). Similarly, since the first nuclear plant began operating, 2008 was the only year where there has been no new nuclear power plants connected to the grid (IAEA, 2014c). While there has been some growth in global nuclear capacity, the amount of growth has been marginal at best, and has not reached anywhere near the various optimistic predictions made in the early 2000s. Indeed, the rate of growth has been so small that nuclear energy as a portion of commercial electricity generation worldwide has decreased from 17 percent in 1993 to 11 percent in 2011 (Schneider et al., 2012: 10). In addition, the increase in global nuclear generation has been sustained primarily due to technical alterations, productivity improvements and lifetime extensions at existing nuclear power plants, rather than new reactors entering operation (Schneider et al., 2012: 10, 13; Heffron, 2013: 255).

Furthermore, the growth that has taken place in nuclear energy since 2000 has primarily occurred in the regions of Far East Asia, Central and Eastern Europe, and the Middle East and South Asia. This is illustrated in Figure 3 below, which details the number of nuclear power reactors under construction by region from 1954-2014 (excluding cancelled or suspended projects). As illustrated in Figure 3, the height of civil nuclear expansion occurred in 1979, when there were 185 nuclear reactors under construction worldwide. Of these reactors, 68 were located in Western Europe, and 62 in North America. The remaining reactors were located in Central and Eastern Europe (31), Far East Asia (12), Latin America (5), Middle East and South Asia (5), and Africa (2). However, to date, the construction of nuclear reactors during the renaissance period has not come close to these figures. The highest number of reactors under construction in any one year from 2000 onwards was in 2013, when there were 72 reactors under construction worldwide. Moreover, the regional dispersion of the nuclear new build undertaken in 2013 is far different from the record number of reactors under construction in 1979. More than half of the nuclear reactors under construction in 2013 were located in Far East Asia (38). The remainder were located in Central and Eastern Europe (15), Middle East and South Asia (10), North America (5), Latin America (2), and Western Europe (2).

Figure 3: Nuclear Power Reactors Under Construction by Region, 1954-2014

200 180 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20

(excluding (excluding cancelled or suspended projects) 0 No. No. of Nuclear Reactors Under Construction

Africa America - Latin America - Northern Asia - Far East Asia - Middle East and South Europe - Central and Eastern Europe - Western

Chart compiled using data from the IAEA (2014c) Power Reactor Information System

Several conclusions can be drawn from these figures. Firstly, new nuclear build that has taken place since 2000 has not yet come close to the levels of expansion that were present in the 1960s and 1970s, nor is there little indication that this will occur in future. The International Energy Agency has halved their predictions for the world’s nuclear generating capacity by 2035 (The Economist, 2011a). In spite of all the interest expressed by non-nuclear countries in developing a nuclear program, only one previously non-nuclear country – Iran – has actually started a commercial nuclear power program, with one reactor that had been in construction since 1975 (Schneider et al., 2012: 4). This suggests that the rhetoric of a nuclear renaissance – a widespread expansion of nuclear power akin to that experienced in the early period of civil nuclear energy development – has not become a reality.

Secondly, new nuclear build during the renaissance period has been heavily concentrated in the regions of Far East Asia, Central and Eastern Europe, and the Middle East and South Asia. However, even within these regions, the idea of a widespread nuclear renaissance taking place is problematic. The new reactor construction starts that have begun in these regions since 2000 have been heavily concentrated within a small number of countries. Of the 72 reactors under construction worldwide at the end of 2013 (excluding cancelled or suspended projects), more than three-quarters of them were located in just five countries – China (29 reactors), Russia (10 reactors), India (6 reactors), South Korea (5 reactors) and the United States (5 reactors)8. That said, even South Korea, one of the few countries to have expanded their nuclear programme during the renaissance period, has recently announced that it will significantly

8 The remaining reactors under construction at the end of 2013 were located in Japan (2), Pakistan (2), Slovakia (2), Taiwan (2), Ukraine (2), the UAE (1), Argentina (1), Belarus (1), Brazil (1), Finland (1), and France (1).

34 reduce its planned target for reliance on nuclear energy from a planned 41 percent of total power supply in 2030 to only 29 percent by 2035 (Voice of Russia, 2014).

A third conclusion can be drawn from the data on nuclear reactor construction starts since 2000, which is that a nuclear renaissance has failed to take place in Western Europe and North America. This is particularly significant given that political rhetoric and enthusiasm for the nuclear renaissance was the strongest in these regions, and that a revival of nuclear power in these regions was a key criteria that underpinned the expectation of a nuclear renaissance. However, the reality of the nuclear renaissance in Western Europe and North America is that many plans for nuclear new build have been abandoned. Since 2000, reactor construction projects have been suspended or abolished in the UK, France, Bulgaria, Canada and the US (Findlay, 2010: 12; Schneider et al., 2012: 4). Similarly, several countries in these regions which had earlier showed signs of reversing their anti-nuclear policy positions have chosen not to do so, such as Germany, Switzerland, and Italy (Breidthardt, 2011; Stuart, 2011; WNA 2013e). Belgium has also abandoned its plans for expanding its nuclear industry (WNA 2013c).

The absence of a nuclear renaissance in Western Europe is evidenced by a decline in the share of electricity produced by nuclear power, as opposed to alternative energy sources. From 2000 to 2014, the EU witnessed a net increase in the capacity of power plants driven by renewable energy, such as wind power plants (116.8GW increase) and solar power plants (87.9GW), as well as natural gas power plants (101.6GW) (Schneider et al., 2015: 96). Meanwhile, the net change in capacity of nuclear power plants decreased by 13 GW, as did that of coal and fuel oil (by 25 GW each) (Schneider et al., 2015: 96). Table 3 below details the percentage of electricity generated by nuclear power as a share of total energy production by country from 1985-2013. As can be seen from this table, most countries in Western Europe have witnessed a decrease in the share of electricity generated by nuclear power. The only exceptions to this trend are France and, to a lesser extent, Sweden (where the share of electricity generated by nuclear power in 2013 is only marginally higher than it was in 1985). In North America, both Canada and the US have experienced an increase in the share of electricity produced by nuclear power from 1985-2013. However, looking specifically at the renaissance period (from 2000 onwards), the story changes slightly, with the US instead experiencing a slight decrease in their share of nuclear- generated electricity. On the other hand, most countries with nuclear programmes in the regions of Africa, Central and Eastern Europe, Far East Asia, the Middle East and South Asia, and Latin America have experienced an increase in their share of nuclear-generated electricity from 1985-2013.

Table 3: Nuclear-Generated Electricity as a Percentage of Total Electricity Generation by Country, 1985-2013 #? 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2012 2013 Africa South Africa 4.2 5.6 6.5 6.6 5.5 5.2 5.1 5.7 Latin America Argentina 11.7 19.8 11.8 7.3 6.9 5.9 4.7 4.4 Brazil 1.6 1 1 1.9 2.5 3.1 3.1 2.8 Mexico NA 2.6 6 3.9 5 3.6 4.7 4.6 North America Canada 12.7 14.8 17.3 11.8 14.5 15.1 15.3 16 United States 15.5 20.6 22.5 19.8 19.3 19.6 19 19.4 Far East Asia China NA NA 1.2 1.2 2 1.8 2 2.1 Japan 22.7 27.1 33.4 33.8 29.3 29.2 2.1 1.7 Republic of Korea 23.2 49.1 36.1 40.7 44.7 32.2 30.4 27.6 Taiwan 52.4 38.3 28.8 21.2 17.9 19.3 18.4 19.1 Middle East and South Asia India 2.2 2.2 1.9 3.1 2.8 2.8 3.6 3.5 Iran NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.6 1.5 Pakistan 1 1.1 0.9 1.6 2.8 2.6 5.3 4.4 Central and Eastern Europe Armenia NA NA NA 33 42.7 39.4 26.6 29.2 Bulgaria 31.6 35.7 46.4 45 44.1 33.1 31.6 30.7 Czech Republic NA NA 20 18.7 30.5 33.3 35.3 35.9 Hungary 23.6 51.4 42.3 40.6 37.2 42.1 45.9 50.7 Kazakhstan NA NA 0.1 0 NA 0 NA NA Lithuania NA NA 86.1 73.9 70.3 0 0 NA Romania NA NA NA 10.9 8.6 19.5 19.4 19.8 Russia NA NA 11.8 15 15.8 17.1 17.8 17.5 Slovakia NA NA 44.1 53.4 56.1 51.8 53.8 51.7 Slovenia NA NA 39.5 37.4 42.4 37.3 36 33.6 Ukraine NA NA 37.8 47.3 48.5 48.1 46.2 43.6 Western Europe Belgium 59.8 60.1 55.5 56.8 55.6 51.2 51 52.1 Finland 38.2 35 29.9 32.2 32.9 28.4 32.6 33.3 France 64.8 74.5 76.1 76.4 78.5 74.1 74.8 73.3 Germany 31.2 33.1 29.6 30.6 26.6 22.6 16.1 15.4 Italy 3.8 0 NA 0 NA NA NA NA Netherlands 6.1 4.8 4.9 4.3 3.9 3.4 4.4 2.8 Spain 24 35.9 34.1 27.6 19.6 20.1 20.5 19.7 Sweden 42.3 45.9 46.6 39 44.9 38.1 38.1 42.7 Switzerland 39.8 42.6 39.9 38.2 38 38 35.9 36.4 United Kingdom 19.6 19.7 25.4 21.9 20 15.5 18.7 18.3 Table compiled using data from the IAEA (2014c) Power Reactor Information System

Over time, however, it became increasingly clear that the reality of nuclear energy development was not reflecting the rhetoric of a nuclear renaissance. Already from 2010, political commentators began pronouncing the nuclear renaissance to have failed, or to never have existed at all. Headlines described the nuclear renaissance as a “myth” (Financial Chronicle, 2010: 1) and as having “failed to materialize” (Wald, 2010: 1). An article in The Economist branded nuclear energy as “the dream that failed”, concluding that “the promise of a global [nuclear] transformation is gone” (The Economist, 2012: 1). An article in The Telegraph described the nuclear renaissance as “heading the same way as Thatcher’s nuclear rebirth – down the drain” (Warner, 2012). Another headline affirmed that “North America’s ‘nuclear renaissance’ grinds to a halt”. The Australian Broadcasting Corporation (2012: 1) reported that “a so-called nuclear renaissance seems further away than ever”. The nuclear renaissance was described as “just a fairy tale” that was “based on rhetoric” (Bradford, 2013: 1), while others stated that the “nuclear industry ‘rebirth’ is instead stillborn” (Becker, 2012). In a report to their investors, analysts from the US investment research firm, Morningstar, professed that “we think new-build nuclear in the West is dead” (McMahon, 2013). Former Nuclear Regulatory Commissioner Peter Bradford stated that “two forthcoming projects are all that remain of a 31-reactor fantasy fleet that was said to constitute the real nuclear renaissance as recently as early 2009” (Hiruo, 2012: 13).

The failure of the nuclear renaissance was further confirmed by the conclusions of several high-profile international energy reports. The World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2013 described the nuclear renaissance as “all in ruins now” (Schneider et al., 2013: 4). A presentation by the International Energy Agency on the World Energy Outlook 2014 stated that there is “no nuclear renaissance in sight” (IEA 2014: 11). The World Energy Council’s (WEC) World Energy Resources 2013 Survey stated that “globally, the nuclear industry is in decline” (World Energy Council, 2013: 4.6). This was followed by the 2014 World Energy Resources Issue Monitor, which highlighted the absence of a nuclear renaissance in Europe and North America. The report noted that “we currently do not see signals for short-term investment in new nuclear projects” for the European region (World Energy Council, 2014: 27), and that North America is “unlikely to see new coal or nuclear plants until 2025” (World Energy Council, 2014: 33).

In the US, government rhetoric supporting nuclear energy became more muted after the Fukushima disaster. Several representatives made statements declaring that the nuclear renaissance had failed. US Senator Jim Inhofe (2014) stated in a committee hearing that “We thought a nuclear renaissance was coming. It did not”. When discussing the state of nuclear energy development in America, former NRC commissioner Peter Bradford stated that “two forthcoming projects are all that remain of a 31-reactor fantasy fleet that was said to constitute the real nuclear renaissance as recently as early 2009” (Hiruo, 2012: 13). The US State of the Union (SOTU) addresses, wherein the incumbent President provides a keynote speech outlining the government’s political and legislative agenda for the upcoming year, made by President George W. Bush in 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008 and made by President Barack Obama in

2010 and 2011 all contained positive statements about the continued use of nuclear energy for civil purposes (Bush, 2005a; 2006; 2007; 2008; Obama, 2010; 2011). However, civil nuclear energy has received no mention whatsoever in the SOTU addresses post-Fukushima.

Journalists and political commentators have attributed the failure of the nuclear renaissance to the events at Fukushima, Japan on 11 March 2011. Following a 9.0 magnitude earthquake, a 15-metre tsunami struck the east coast of Japan, causing extensive damage to the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant. The tsunami crippled the plant’s power and cooling systems, causing full meltdowns in three of the plant’s six reactors (CNN, 2011). Prior to Fukushima, there had never been any member of the general public killed as a direct result of a nuclear reactor in an OECD country (Australian Broadcasting

Corporation, 2011). While there have not yet been any deaths as a direct result of radiation exposure from the accident, it has been reported that at least six workers have been exposed to radiation levels that exceed the lifetime legal limits (Vergano, 2011). Meanwhile, the World Health Organization released a draft report in November 2011 which concluded that there will be no significant increases in cancer cases as a result of radiation from the Fukushima disaster (Oiwa, 2012). In December 2011, Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda announced the power plant had successfully been stabilised, although it would take up to forty years to completely decontaminate the plant and surrounding areas (BBC News, 2011b).

Despite these assurances, Fukushima reignited fears over nuclear safety and prompted governments to conduct safety reviews into their nuclear programmes (Elliott, 2013). The case of Germany is typically cited as evidence of how Fukushima was the ultimate downfall of the nuclear renaissance. Following the Fukushima disaster, the German government declared an immediate three-month moratorium on any nuclear power plans. All seven nuclear power plants that had begun operating prior to 1980, in addition to another plant that began operations in 1984, were temporarily shut-down (Kanter and Dempsey, 2011: 1). In May 2011, the Reactor Safety Commission concluded that all of Germany’s nuclear reactors were safe. In spite of this, and in the face of growing pressure from large-scale public demonstrations and from anti-nuclear federal states, the government reinstated the previous nuclear phase-out policy to close all reactors by 2022. The eight reactors that were already temporarily closed as part of the moratorium were declared as permanently closed. Chancellor Angela Merkel defended her decision by arguing that her views on nuclear safety had changed since Fukushima, which she described as a “turning point in the history of the industrial world” (The Economist, 2011b).

Governments elsewhere followed the German example by announcing their decision to abandon nuclear expansion plans as a result of Fukushima. Two months after Fukushima, Switzerland suspended the approvals process for new reactors, which then became a permanent ban on nuclear development. Italy held a referendum on nuclear power in June 2011 which forced the government to abandon plans for future nuclear development (BBC News, 2011a). In 2012, the Belgian government announced the

38 accelerated closure of two nuclear reactors (Levitan, 2011). The Japanese government announced in 2012 that it would phase-out all of its operating nuclear reactors by 2040 (although this decision has since been overturned) (McCurry, 2013). Nuclear development plans were delayed in Indonesia and Thailand, and abandoned in Kuwait and Bahrain as a result of Fukushima (TradeArabia, 2012: 10; The Japan Times, 2012; Phetcharatana, 2011). Even though the US government continued to affirm its support for nuclear power, several nuclear projects were delayed or cancelled in the wake of Fukushima (Elliott, 2013: 56). For example, NRG Energy announced that it would abandon plans for the development of two new nuclear units at the South Texas Project as a result of Fukushima (Business Wire, 2011).

The Fukushima crisis was heralded in the media as the ultimate downfall of the nuclear renaissance. A headline in the German newspaper Der Spiegel read “Fukushima Marks the End of the Nuclear Era”, likening the events to the “9/11 of the nuclear industry” (Der Spiegel, 2011: 1). An article in the Energy Economist stated that Fukushima may be the “end of the nuclear renaissance in the West” (Thomas, 2012b: 6). The resurgence of interest in nuclear power was said to have “ended as soon it started, completely buried by the disaster at the Fukushima 1 nuclear power plant” (The Voice of Russia, 2011: 1). Fukushima was described as the “coup de grâce” for the renaissance (Quiggin, 2012: 1), with others declaring that the “era of nuclear renaissance is over. The Fukushima shock marks the beginning of the ‘nuclear ice age’” (Takahashi, 2011: 1). An article in The Japan Times stated that “the triple meltdown at Fukushima…has set in motion the renaissance of nuclear power in reverse” (Chellaney, 2014).

A second argument that has been put forward to explain the absence of a nuclear renaissance is the financial problems faced by nuclear new build. The World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2013 stated that “the nuclear promoters’ invention that a global nuclear renaissance was flourishing until 3/11 is equally false: Fukushima only added to already grave problems, starting with poor economics” (Schneider et al., 2013: 6). Senior Research Fellow at Vermont Law School, Mark Cooper (2013: 2), argues that “the ‘nuclear renaissance’ never got off the ground in the United States because the cost of power from nuclear reactors is substantially higher than other low carbon alternatives available”. Professor Stephen Thomas at the University of Greenwich argues that “the Fukushima disaster serves to underline the problems the nuclear industry was already facing” such as the industry “failing to deliver the promises made” about new reactor designs that “would be cheaper and easier to build than their predecessors” (Thomas, 2012a: 54). Peter Bradford, former US Nuclear Regulatory Commissioner, stated that “the fundamental problem was the renaissance was always economically unsound” (Smith, 2013a). Christopher Paine, the nuclear program director at the US Natural Resources Defence Council, has stated that, for the nuclear renaissance, the “primary obstacle has been and remains the financial cost” (James, 2010).

However, there has not yet been a systematic analysis into why there is a disjuncture between the rhetoric and reality of the nuclear renaissance. Assuming that the renaissance has failed in Western Europe and North American simply because of the Fukushima nuclear disaster, or because of the challenging economics of nuclear power, is problematic for several reasons. Firstly, while Fukushima undoubtedly reminded the global public of the dangers associated with nuclear power, the events at Fukushima fail to explain why there was so little evidence of growth or real action towards expanding nuclear power programmes prior to 2011. The lack of growth in nuclear energy prior to 2011 is difficult to explain given that the arguments for reinvesting in nuclear energy (primarily the need to address climate change and the need to improve energy security) were so widely accepted. These policy problems that had originally underpinned government justifications for expanding their nuclear energy programmes prior to 2011 have not become any less salient. Consequently, the lack of growth in nuclear energy development prior to 2011 remains unexplained.

Secondly, the global applicability of the safety and cost arguments for the failure of the renaissance means that neither argument is sufficient for explaining the regional differences in nuclear energy development since 2000. Neither argument provides sufficient explanation for why some countries – primarily those located in Asia and Central and Eastern Europe – have expanded their civil nuclear energy capacities 2000, while other countries – primarily those located in Western Europe and North America – have not. The high capital costs required for constructing nuclear power plants is a problem that faces all new nuclear projects, and yet this has not deterred some countries from continuing to push on with expanding their civil nuclear energy programmes. News of the Fukushima nuclear disaster reignited public concerns over nuclear safety throughout the globe. Some countries have responded to these concerns by abandoning their plans for nuclear new build, while others have not. Consequently, an alternative explanation is needed, one that goes beyond simply blaming finances or Fukushima, for why there is a disconnection between the expectation and reality of the nuclear renaissance in Western Europe and North America.

Furthermore, the safety and cost arguments for the failure of the nuclear renaissance are problematic in that they are mono-causal, failing to consider the various causal factors that could potentially influence nuclear energy development. These arguments are also problematic as they are a-historical, failing to locate recent changes in nuclear development within its broader historical context. Consequently, neither the Fukushima nor the economics explanations for the failure of the nuclear renaissance are sufficient to explain the regional variations in nuclear development since 2000. A systematic analysis into the factors influencing the failure of the nuclear renaissance in Western Europe and North America is therefore required.

3. RESEARCH DESIGN

This chapter details the research design of this thesis. This study is founded upon a problem-centred approach to research which places an empirical puzzle, rather than a theoretical framework, as its starting point. The empirical puzzle that this thesis examines is to understand why the expectation of a nuclear renaissance has failed to produce a widespread expansion of civil nuclear energy development in the regions of Western Europe and North America. A problem-centred approach to research informs all aspects of the research design. Agents in Context Historical Institutionalism is used as an analytical framework to understand how a broad range of factors – including agents, contexts, structures, institutions and ideas – influence civil nuclear energy development and nuclear energy policy decisions. Comparatively informed historical analysis is used as the methodology to inform the research strategy. Comparatively informed historical analysis is undertaken to examine the way in which processes unfold over time, and the way in which the uniqueness of different eras can impact upon the variables and outcomes under examination. Data collection and analysis are conducted using qualitative research methods. The data is collected primarily from a wide-ranging document analysis, and is supplemented by semi-structured interviews with experts in the area of civil nuclear energy development. This chapter provides a more detailed account of each of these components of the research design.

RESEARCH APPROACH

This thesis adopts what Shapiro (2005) defines as a “problem-centred” approach to research. Problem- centred research begins by identifying a problem or puzzle that exists. Previous attempts to explain the problem are canvassed, including any gaps, limitations or inconsistencies within the pre-existing body of research. Based on this information, a decision is then made as to whether further study should be undertaken. If further study is undertaken, the parameters of the research problem under investigation are determined, and the most appropriate methods to best analyse the problem are chosen. The methods of data collection that are chosen can be drawn from any discipline, as a problem-centred approach is not bound to any particular body of theory. What is most important is that each stage of the research process is tailored to the nature of the question under investigation.

The problem-centred approach differs from the more traditional research approaches which are driven by a pre-determined theory or paradigm. Scholars who begin their research with a pre-determined theory are guided by a specific set of a priori assumptions that underpin their research questions, methods, analysis and interpretation of their findings. The use of a single theoretical lens to examine an issue can result in problems being excessively simplified or framed to fit with the theory’s predefined principles

41 and argument. This approach is problematic because it can produce ‘blind spots’, where findings or alternative explanations that do not conform to the chosen paradigm are typically marginalised or ignored. In their work on analytic eclecticism, Sil and Katzenstein (2010: 2) take issue with the dangers of paradigm-bound research, warning that “scholarly discourse risks becoming dominated by self- referential academic debates at the expense of addressing the complexities and messiness of everyday problems”.

The problem-centred approach, on the other hand, avoids these limitations by locating a problem, rather than a theory, as its starting point. Following this, the most appropriate theory or selection of theories can be chosen that are best suited to the nature of the problem under investigation. In doing so, the problem-based approach does not automatically prioritise one theoretical or methodological approach as fundamentally superior to another. It is not limited by the a priori constraints and assumptions of a particular paradigm. Instead, it allows for connections to be made between theories, narratives and ideas that are normally considered and applied separately from one another. This counters the weaknesses apparent in any one paradigm, while allowing for a broader range of possible explanations to be considered. By focusing on a problem rather than strengthening or discrediting any one theory, problem- centred research tends to prioritise the practical, ‘real world’ relevance of an empirical puzzle, and avoids engaging in purely abstract, theoretical debates (Katzenstein and Okawara, 2002: 183). As a result, problem-centred research is more likely to produce research findings and conclusions that are practically relevant for policymakers. Problem-based research develops empirically-grounded and evidence-based insights that can help policymakers to negotiate the complex political and social challenges that they face. Consequently, a problem-centred approach is well-suited for making sense of the complexities of nuclear energy policy, and for understanding why there is a disconnection between the rhetoric and reality of a nuclear renaissance in Western Europe and North America.

In accordance with the problem-centred approach, this thesis has started with the identification of an empirical problem – to understand why there is little evidence to suggest that the rhetoric of a nuclear renaissance has generated a widespread expansion of civil nuclear power in Western Europe and North America. Following this, existing explanations for the research problem under investigation were canvassed. Two explanations were identified as being commonly cited for the failure of the nuclear renaissance: firstly, that the Fukushima nuclear disaster eroded public and political support for nuclear power, and secondly, that the renaissance failed due to the ongoing financial problems faced by nuclear new build. These explanations are explored in more detail in Chapter 2. However, in canvassing the existing explanations for the failure of the nuclear renaissance, it became clear that a systematic analysis into the disconnection between the expectation and reality of the nuclear renaissance had not yet been undertaken. Such an analysis is necessary given that simply blaming Fukushima or the economic problems of nuclear power does not explain the regional variation in nuclear development during the

42 renaissance period. The global applicability of the safety and cost arguments for the failure of the renaissance means that neither argument provides sufficient explanation for why some countries – primarily those located in Asia and Central and Eastern Europe – have expanded their civil nuclear energy capacities 2000, while other countries – primarily those located in Western Europe and North America – have not. Moreover, the events at Fukushima fail to explain why there was so little evidence of growth or real action towards expanding nuclear power programmes prior to 2011. The lack of growth in nuclear energy prior to 2011 is difficult to explain given that the policy problems that had originally underpinned government justifications for expanding their nuclear energy programmes prior to 2011 have not gone away. Consequently, the lack of growth in nuclear energy development prior to 2011 remains unexplained. In addition, both the Fukushima and the economic explanations for the failure of the nuclear renaissance are problematic in that they are mono-causal (failing to consider the various causal factors that could potentially influence nuclear energy development) and a-historical (failing to locate recent changes in nuclear development within its broader historical context). Consequently, a systematic analysis is needed to explain why there is a disconnection between the expectation and reality of the nuclear renaissance in the regions of Western Europe and North America since 2000.

Western Europe and North America have been chosen as the regions under investigation for this thesis for several reasons. Firstly, they are the regions where statements about the need for and inevitability of a nuclear renaissance were made by the highest level of political leaders, and therefore where the expectation of a nuclear renaissance taking place was greatest. Secondly, these regions contain most of the longest-standing nuclear industries, and it is these very industries which were meant to be revived in order to bring about a “renaissance” of nuclear power. Thirdly, these regions were chosen as academic and journalistic discussion to date has tended to focus on the reasons why the nuclear renaissance has been successful in a small number of countries – with little academic discussion taking place as to why the expectation of a nuclear renaissance has been unsuccessful in regions such as Western Europe and North America. The reasons for choosing Western Europe and North America as the focus of this study are discussed in greater detail further in this chapter, in ‘Regions Under Investigation’.

In taking a regional approach to investigating nuclear energy development, there is an inevitable trade- off in terms of the depth of the information that would be gathered in adopting a country specific approach. That is, by focusing on the regions of Western Europe and North America, this study is unable to take into account all of the individual nuances of the different experiences of nuclear development that has occurred within the individual countries within these regions. This limitation has, wherever possible, been negated by highlighting individual country experiences and also by recognising instances where individual countries within these regions have had experiences of nuclear development that differ from the broader regional experience. However, the regional focus of this study has meant

43 that it has not been able to comprehensively capture the reasons why some countries (such as Germany) have recently adopted staunchly anti-nuclear policy position, while other countries (such as France and the UK) continue to maintain a much more pro-nuclear policy position. Moreover, it does not capture all the country-specific historical differences, such as the extent to which different countries have historically relied upon nuclear power and the path dependency that this can create for contemporary nuclear policy9.

Despite the regional approach, two countries in Western Europe and North America have been explored in greater detail than any other – the UK and the US. There are several reasons for this emphasis. The political rhetoric of a nuclear renaissance was strongest in these two countries, where political leaders at the highest level of government across multiple administrations and competing political parties made public statements in support of a nuclear renaissance. Furthermore, the existing body of literature discussing nuclear energy development focuses largely on the experiences of the US and the UK – and as such, the greatest amount of information for analysis was available for these two countries, particularly for historical information on nuclear development in the 1950s and 1960s.

ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

In order to investigate the empirical puzzle at the heart of this research project – understanding the disjuncture between the rhetoric and reality of the nuclear renaissance in Western Europe and North America – an analytical framework was needed that would facilitate the development of a broader perspective on the nuclear renaissance than is currently present in the nuclear debate. As explained in Chapter 2, existing explanations for the failure of the nuclear renaissance have tended to argue either that the Fukushima nuclear renaissance reignited public and political concerns over nuclear safety (thereby prompting governments to waver in their support for nuclear new build), or, that the ongoing problems of high capital costs and financial risks involved in new nuclear projects has prevented a renaissance from taking place. These explanations are problematic as they are mono-causal, a-historical, and fail to explain regional variation in nuclear development. Consequently, an analytical framework is needed that helps to facilitate the identification of a broader range of factors that can affect nuclear energy development and nuclear energy policy decisions, as well as recognising the interactions and interdependencies between these factors. An analytical framework was also needed that would complement the holistic and inductive nature of problem-centred research, by recognising that history matters – that nuclear energy development in its present state cannot be analysed in isolation from its

9 For example, France has long adopted one of the most enthusiastic nuclear policy positions throughout Western Europe. While it has recently set a target to reduce its dependence on nuclear power from 75% to 50%, the country’s high reliance on nuclear power over the past several decades means that achieving this target may prove challenging. Nevertheless, the regional focus of this thesis means that it cannot comprehensively engage with or consider these country-specific developments.

44 long and turbulent past. With these considerations in mind, an expansive version of historical institutionalism that was developed by Bell (2011, 2012) and Bell and Hindmoor (2014), known as ‘Agents in Context Historical Institutionalism’ (AiC-HI) was chosen to guide the analysis of the research questions. The following section provides an overview of historical institutionalism, demonstrate how historical institutionalism supports the examination of the research questions, and describes the way in which historical institutionalism is used for this research project.

HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM

Historical institutionalism was chosen as an appropriate analytical framework for understanding the disjuncture between the rhetoric and reality of the nuclear renaissance in Western Europe and North America. In particular, the work by Bell (2011, 2012) and Bell and Hindmoor (2014) on historical institutionalism has been central to the development of the analytical framework used in this thesis. Historical institutionalism emerged as one of three major variants of ‘new institutionalism’. Whereas ‘old’ versions of institutional theory had focused on examining the role of formal and established political, legal and administrative organisations, new institutionalism adopts a broader interpretation of what constitutes an ‘institution’. While still recognising the importance of formal institutions and organisations, new institutionalists focused more on the way in which rules, norms, conventions and procedures shape agents’ preferences, interests and behaviour (Cairney, 2012: 69-70). Therefore, within this thesis, an institution is defined as “the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction” (North, 1990: 3). In accordance with this new approach to institutional theory, historical institutionalism seeks to understand the relationship between institutions and the way in which they structure behaviour and influence policy outcomes. This is an objective shared with other branches of new institutionalism such as rational choice and sociological institutionalism (Steinmo, 2008: 126). There are, however, several key features of historical institutionalism which differentiate it from other institutional approaches. Pierson and Skocpol (2002) identify three of these features, including a focus on analysing “real-world” problems, an explicit recognition that “history matters”, and an appreciation of the influence of contextual conditions.

One of the key features of historical institutionalism is a tendency to analyse “big” and “real-world” empirical problems and questions (Ma, 2007: 63). Consequently, historical institutionalism works well with the problem-centred research approach used in this thesis and the “real-world” nature of the problem under investigation. Historical institutionalists usually begin the research process by identifying a rare or unexplained event or outcome that is “puzzling” in some way (Pierson and Skocpol, 2002: 696; Steinmo, 2008: 134). One way in which these puzzles are identified is by noting flaws or inconsistencies in existing academic or popular explanations for the phenomenon (Pierson and Skocpol, 2002: 697). The types of empirical puzzles that historical institutionalists seek to explain also tend to be of interest beyond the academic realm. Historical institutionalists try to avoid engaging in academic

“navel gazing” by instead focusing on research problems that are of practical relevance to policymakers and the general public as well as to their academic cohort (Pierson and Skocpol 2002: 697). This focus on real world problems makes historical institutionalism well-suited for examining patterns and variations of policy development over time and across countries (Thelen and Steinmo 1992: 10), and is therefore particularly well suited for examining the changing trajectory of civil nuclear energy development.

The second key feature of historical institutionalism is the explicit recognition that “history matters” when analysing processes and outcomes of institutional change. Historical institutionalists see politics and history as an evolving, dynamic process, and are therefore interested in the way in which history itself shapes institutional change and policy outcomes (Steinmo, 2008: 135). Consequently, policy development must be examined as an “unfolding historical process”, where the reasons for why and how policy decisions are made are more complex than a simple isolated “moment of policy choice” (Pierson, 2005: 36, 42). When a policy choice is examined at a singular point in time, it produces a “snapshot” perspective that typically emphasises the immediate and short-term triggers for why that particular decision was made (Pierson 1994: 4). In doing so, a snap-shot perspective of policy development risks ignoring the influence of factors whose influence only becomes evident over a longer time period. As Pierson (2005: 40) argues, snap-shot interpretations of policy events overlook the fact that “long, slow erosion of the status quo may be a crucial factor in generating policy change. What may seem like a relatively rapid process of reform is in fact only the final stage of a process that has in fact been under way for an extended period”. A snapshot perspective also overlooks the impact of previously enacted policies and their legacies, or ‘path dependency’, whereby previous policy choices can create ‘increasing returns’, ‘self-reinforcing sequences’ or ‘positive feedback’ processes that make it increasingly difficult over time to change the policy course (Pierson, 2000; Mahoney, 2000). Therefore, by placing “politics in time”, historical institutionalists recognise the continuing influence of past events on current issues. This idea has informed the development of this research project in its recognition that the outcome of the nuclear renaissance cannot be understood without appreciating the ongoing influence of historical developments specific to nuclear power, as well as broader contextual changes over time.

The third core feature of historical institutionalism identified by Pierson and Skocpol (2002: 706) is an appreciation of contextual conditions. Rather than focusing on a single institution or process to explain change, historical institutionalists argue that “institutional arrangements cannot be understood in isolation from the political and social setting in which they are embedded” (Thelen, 1999: 384). Tilly and Goodin (2006: 4) note that political behaviour and production of policy outcomes “depend heavily on the contexts within which they occur”. Context can refer to a wide range of variables, including political, social, economic, cultural, structural, historical, discursive, and institutional context. This thesis acknowledges the importance of context in understanding policy change by examining the

46 influence of four broad post-war contextual shifts on the changing trajectory of nuclear energy development, as illustrated in Chapters 7-10. Recognising the importance of contextual influences on institutional change is, however, a relatively new development in historical institutionalist theory.

Earlier versions of institutional theory and historical institutionalism in particular have been criticised for portraying institutions as overly constraining, deterministic and resistant to change (Schmidt, 2010: 2; Blyth, 1997: 230; Bell, 2011; Bell and Feng, 2014; Bell and Hindmoor, 2014). Thelen and Steinmo (1992: 16) argue that a “critical inadequacy of institutionalist analysis has been a tendency towards mechanical, static accounts that largely bracket the issue of change and sometimes lapse inadvertently into institutional determinism”. Such accounts portray institutions as overly “sticky” and resistant to change, even when critical changes in external conditions take place (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992: 18). Bell (2011: 890) criticises sticky institutional theory for being overly structuralist, and relying excessively on concepts of path dependency and exogenous shocks when explaining institutional stasis and change. The new-found appreciation for contextual conditions influencing institutional change has therefore been a step in the right direction towards developing a broader and more flexible version of historical institutionalism. However, scholars have identified several other considerations which have been overlooked by overly sticky versions of historical institutionalism.

One of the major criticisms of sticky versions of historical institutionalism is that it obscures the role of individual agency. Steinmo (2008: 133) argues that one major weakness of institutional theory is its tendency to portray agents as “simple hostages of the institutions they inhabit”. In doing so, historical institutionalism assumes that individual agents will unquestioningly abide by the institutional constraints imposed upon them (Peters, 2012: 83). While agents are shaped and constrained by institutions, this assumed view overlooks the fact that agents also actively negotiate, influence and reconfigure the institutions themselves (Bell, 2002). Schmidt (2008: 314) criticises historical institutionalism for subordinating agency to structure, arguing that this perspective ignores the ability of agents to “think, speak, and act outside their institutions even as they are inside them, to deliberate about institutional rules even as they use them, and to persuade one another to change those institutions or to maintain them”. These criticisms highlight the need for a more expansive version of historical institutionalism which accounts for considerations of agency.

Early versions of historical institutionalism have also been criticised for failing to systematically and comprehensively acknowledge the role of ideas in shaping political and policy decisions (Campbell, 1998; Hay and Wincott, 1998; Blyth, 2001; Béland, 2005; Béland, 2007; Béland, 2009; Amenta and Ramsey, 2010: 24; Immergut and Anderson, 2008: 357). Fortunately, more recent institutionalist scholarship has begun to give greater recognition to the role of ideas in producing political outcomes. Ideas can broadly refer to policy paradigms, world views, ideologies, frames, normative frameworks, beliefs, visions and traditions (Cairney, 2012: 223). Ideas can influence the decisions of policy-makers,

47 but policy-makers can also actively promote and strengthen ideas. Béland (2009) identifies three ways in which ideas can influence the policy-making process, and which must therefore be incorporated into historical institutional approach. Firstly, ideational processes can influence which issues make it on the policy agenda. Ideas can then be highly influential in limiting the range of options of solutions that are available to policy-makers. Finally, policy actors can use ideas to ‘frame’ policy decisions and persuade the public of their legitimacy. Blyth (2001: 4) characterises ideas as “weapons” which agents can deploy in order to “restructure existing institutional arrangements by defining not only the causes of a perceived…problem but also the solutions for dealing with it”. Having recognised the importance of ideas in influencing crucial aspects of policy development, Béland (2005: 2) argues that in order to “address the theoretical limitations of historical institutionalism…researchers should put together a coherent model aimed at understanding the specific role of policy ideas while acknowledging the impact of policy legacies and formal political institutions”. This thesis explicitly recognises the importance of ideas when examining the way in which both ‘nuclear-specific’ factors (Chapters 4-6) and broader contextual shifts (Chapters 7-10) have influenced the changing trajectory of civil nuclear energy development.

AGENTS IN CONTEXT HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM

A more expansive version of historical institutionalism has been developed by Bell (2011, 2012) and Bell and Hindmoor (2014). Bell and Hindmoor are critical of excessively sticky or deterministic interpretations of historical institutionalism, which overlook the role of agency in influencing institutional and political change. They have therefore developed a more flexible version of historical institutionalism that integrates a broader range of causal variables. More specifically, they have developed a version of historical institutionalism that examines the impact of formal and informal institutions, agents, ideas, context and structures, but which crucially does not privilege any one of these variables over another. Rather, Bell (2011: 899) sees these variables as “operating in a dialectical, mutually constitutive relationship over time”. This perspective departs from the traditional historical institutionalist assumption that institutions determine the behaviour of agents. Rather, institutionally- situated agents are perceived as being able to actively negotiate and exert influence over their reality, and thereby take part in reproducing or reshaping institutions. Agents and institutions are therefore perceived as “mutually shaping” one another over time, without one ever wholly determining the behaviour or outcomes of the other. The ability for institutions and agents to shape one another is also mediated by ideas, as ideational contexts can shape agents’ interests and preferences, and incentivise particular behaviours and actions. Agents are also seen to be operating within broader contextual and structural environments which can be both constraining and empowering. The broad political, economic or social environment can influence the preferences of agents, the resources and opportunities that are available, and can establish costs and benefits to encourage agents to act in a particular way. This

48 expansive version of historical institutionalism therefore rebukes the ‘stickiness’ of earlier institutional theories by incorporating a wider range of potential causal variables into its analysis.

Bell (2011, 2012) and Bell and Hindmoor’s (2014) Agents in Context Historical Institutionalism (AiC- HI) provides the appropriate analytical tools for developing an understanding of why the expectation of a nuclear renaissance has failed to produce a widespread expansion of civil nuclear energy development in the regions of Western Europe and North America. This thesis uses AiC-HI as a lens through which to understand the way in which policymakers shape and are shaped by the wider institutional, structural, and ideational context in which they operate. The aim here is to tease out distinctions between agents, institutions, and contexts in order to study the way mutually-shaping interactions through time in order to help explain why there is a disconnection between the rhetoric and reality of the nuclear renaissance in Western European and North American countries. As was discussed earlier in this section, an analytical framework was needed to overcome the mono-causal, a-historical, and empirical failings of pre-existing explanations for the failure of the nuclear renaissance. Agents in Context Historical Institutionalism meets these criteria by adopting a more expansive and inclusive approach to institutional change. It overcomes the dualism between agency and structure which has characterised earlier historical institutionalist debates. In doing so, it allows for a broad range of causal variables – institutions, agency, ideas, structures, and context – and their interdependencies to be included in the analysis, without privileging any one of these variables over another. Finally, historical institutionalism fits well with a problem-based approach to research, as it typically focuses on addressing real-world empirical questions that have a practical relevance for policymakers and the general public as well as academia.

COMPARATIVELY INFORMED HISTORICAL ANALYSIS

In order to answer the research questions, this thesis employs a comparative historical research methodology. Specifically, it employs a particular version of comparative historical analysis which Hacker (2002: 65) terms a “comparatively informed historical analysis”. Comparative historical analysis is a social science research methodology that is not bound to any one particular theory or method (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2003: 10). Rather, the methodology is characterised by three core concerns (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2003). Firstly, comparative historical analysts are concerned with establishing causal analysis between variables. This can be achieved using either qualitative or quantitative research methods. Second, comparative historical analysts examine the way in which processes unfold over time. They seek to understand the uniqueness of different eras and how this can impact upon the variables and outcomes under examination. Finally, comparative historical analysts engage in systematic and contextualised comparison in order to establish causation between variables.

Within a comparative historical analysis, comparisons can be drawn between earlier and later events, between broad trends and specific phenomena, across different geographical locations, and across different time periods (Haupt, 2007: 2). The overarching purpose of comparative historical analysis is to identify the causes of behaviour and outcomes, and to evaluate, critique, and develop theories that are relevant across time and cases (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2003: 12). One of the major strengths of the methodology is its ability to learn lessons from the past in order to better understand policy problems of the present. It facilitates deeper, empirically-driven insights into issues that are commonly taken for granted or clouded in broad-based assumptions. As Green (2004: 42) states, “a comparative approach helps render the invisible visible”, and in doing so, “it aids us in questioning our own generalizations”.

A comparative historical analysis fits well with both the historical institutionalist analytic framework, as well as the problem-centred research approach that this thesis adopts. Both problem-centred research and historical institutionalism focus on exploring real-world empirical problems. This focus is shared by comparative historical analysis, which is typically used by researchers seeking to address “big” questions which are of relevance to both a specialist and a non-specialist audience (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2003: 7). The selection of methods within a comparative historical analysis also parallels with a problem-centred research approach. As previously discussed, problem-centred research allows the researcher to draw upon methods of data collection and analysis from any discipline. Similarly, comparative historical analysts are typically “eclectic in their use of methods”, and are able to employ and combine whichever tools best enable them to address the nature of the research question under investigation (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2003: 12). In addition, Mahoney and Rueschemeyer (2003: 11) argue that the nature of comparative historical analysis means that “all comparative historical works fit comfortably within the field of historical institutionalism”.

Comparative historical analysts typically conduct their research through a comparison of a small number of case studies within a set historical timeframe. However, in his seminal work on the US social welfare system, Jacob Hacker (2002) extends the comparative historical analysis literature by undertaking a comparative historical analysis that moves beyond a standard case study design. In doing so, Hacker (2002: 65) adopts a particular kind of comparative historical methodology which he terms a “comparatively informed historical analysis”. This methodology aligns with the standard format of a comparative historical analysis in that it focuses on causal analysis, examines the way in which processes unfold over time, and engages in systematic and contextualised comparisons. Where Hacker differs from the standard comparative historical approach is that he does not utilise a strict case study format. Hacker focuses on the social welfare system and policies of a single country – the United States – but does not treat the country as a self-contained case. Rather, Hacker engages in comparative historical analysis by drawing comparisons between phenomena and events within the US across time, as well as by comparing the US experience with that of other countries. Therefore, while Hacker’s

50 comparatively informed historical analysis does not follow a strict definition of a comparative case study, the process of analysis that he undertakes is still inherently comparative. As Hacker (2004: 65- 6) states, “the method is explicitly comparative, in short, but the subjects of comparison are change over time and divergent policy paths as much as contrasting national experiences”. By deviating from the standard case study format, Hacker is not limited to discussing only the key country, or small group of countries, under investigation. Rather, he is able to draw upon the experiences of other countries when necessary in order to further strengthen his analysis, without being obliged to dedicate an equal amount of time to analysing other countries as dedicated and stand-alone “cases”.

This thesis adopts Hacker’s version of a comparatively informed historical analysis for its methodology. A comparatively informed historical analysis is appropriate for addressing this study’s research questions, as it allows for a broad narrative and explanation for the failure of the nuclear renaissance in Western Europe and North America to be developed. In accordance with both comparative historical analysis and Hacker’s version of this, this research focuses on causal analysis, examines the way in which processes unfold over time, and engages in systematic and contextualised comparisons. However, as with Hacker’s comparatively informed historical analysis, this research does not use a standard comparative case study format. Rather, it engages in a comparative historical analysis of countries in Western Europe and North America which were expected to experience a nuclear renaissance, but have demonstrated little growth in nuclear development during the renaissance period (that is, from 2000 onwards). The disconnection between the rhetoric and reality of nuclear energy development in these regions is inherently ‘puzzling’ given the widespread acceptance of the arguments over climate change and energy security that supported the claims that a nuclear renaissance was imminent.

The application of comparative historical research methods to the study of nuclear energy development is not new. DeLeon (1980) conducted a comparative investigation of the way in which institutional actors influence the development of nuclear power technology across the US, the Soviet Union, the UK, Germany, Canada and France. Poneman (1982) examined the factors influencing the development of nuclear power in the developing world, comparing the experiences of Indonesia, Argentina, and Iran. Camilleri (1984) conducted a comparative historical analysis of the role of the advanced capitalist state in the development of the nuclear industry in the US, France, West Germany, the UK, Sweden and Brazil. Jasper (1990) conducted a comprehensive comparative analysis of nuclear energy policies in France, Sweden and the US from the 1960s through to the 1990s, focusing on the role of cultural factors. These studies have offered valuable insights into the way in which nuclear energy programmes develop over time and the reasons for this. However, more than two decades have elapsed since these texts were written, and as such, they do not consider the recent developments in contemporary nuclear history, including the nuclear renaissance.

There have been several more recent studies which compare the civil nuclear energy programmes of multiple countries (Sovacool and Valentine, 2012; Wiliarty, 2013). However, these studies devote limited attention to the historical development of nuclear energy programmes, and how this history continues to impact upon the current and future trajectory of the civil nuclear energy programmes. While most contemporary texts on nuclear energy development include some recognition of the importance of history, this is generally limited to a small portion of the entire work, rather than being treated as a central element necessary to the overall analysis of nuclear energy development. The one exception to this is the work by Yi-chong (2008), who undertakes a comprehensive comparative analysis of why and how nuclear energy programmes have been established and evolved in five Asian countries (China, India, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan). This study seeks to overcome the limitations of previous academic work on nuclear energy by undertaking a comparatively informed historical analysis of nuclear energy development from the establishment of the first civil nuclear energy programmes through to the present day. It places the importance of history in influencing nuclear energy development at the centre of its analysis, and therefore argues that the disconnection between the rhetoric of a nuclear renaissance and the reality of contemporary nuclear energy development can only be understood through a historical contextual lens.

REGIONS UNDER INVESTIGATION

As discussed in Chapter 2, the nuclear renaissance that was expected to take place from 2000 onwards was meant to be a global phenomenon. This expectation was reflected in statements made by journalists, political commentators and political leaders which referred to the renaissance as being a global event, as opposed to being a development that was limited to first-timer nuclear countries. However, data from the International Atomic Energy Agency on nuclear energy development since 2000 demonstrates that, while growth in nuclear energy development is taking place in a small number of countries located mainly in the regions of Far East Asia, Central and Eastern Europe, and the Middle East and South Asia, the regions of Western Europe and North America remain largely unchanged in terms of their levels of nuclear energy development since 2000 (see Chapter 2 for further details). Furthermore, the growth in nuclear reactor construction taking place in Western Europe and North America is not necessarily an absolute growth for these nuclear industries, given that many existing nuclear power plants are planned for closure around the same time that these new nuclear plants will be coming online. The World Nuclear Association estimates that, in the period up until 2030, the nuclear capacity that will be lost due to the closure of existing nuclear reactors will be greater than the nuclear capacity gained from new nuclear reactor builds (WNA 2014i). Consequently, this research project focuses on answering the core research question of why the expectation of a nuclear renaissance has failed to result in a widespread expansion of nuclear energy development in the regions of Western Europe and North America since 2000.

The regional classification used in this thesis is drawn from the regional classification used by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)10. This research project focuses on the regions of Western Europe and North America for several reasons. Firstly, in both these regions, statements about the need for and inevitability of a nuclear renaissance were made by the highest level of political leaders (see Chapter 2 for a detailed overview of these statements). Secondly, these regions both play an important role in the story of the nuclear renaissance, as both these regions have lengthy histories of nuclear energy development. One key reason for why the expectation of a nuclear renaissance was so significant was that the expectation was based on the belief that a new era of growth would take place in countries where nuclear energy had been stagnating and declining for several decades. This primarily refers to the regions of Western Europe and North America. Consequently, the absence of evidence of a nuclear renaissance taking place in these regions to date is both surprising and in need of investigation. Furthermore, this thesis focuses upon the failure of the nuclear renaissance in these regions as much of the literature to date focuses instead on the reasons why the nuclear renaissance has been successful in a small number of countries – with little academic discussion taking place as to why the expectation of a nuclear renaissance has been unsuccessful in regions such as Western Europe and North America.

METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

The selection of a historical institutionalist analytical framework and a comparative historical methodology highlighted the need for methods of data collection and analysis which would:

a) Provide rich empirical detail on nuclear energy development; b) Situate recent nuclear energy development in its historical context; c) Allow for causal variables which may potentially influence nuclear energy development to emerge inductively; and d) Allow for comparisons to be drawn between countries and over time.

With these considerations in mind, qualitative research methods were chosen to build an understanding of both how and why nuclear energy development has changed over time. Qualitative research methods were chosen as they are typically used to investigate such “how” and “why” questions by generating rich, detailed descriptions of the social world (Denzin and Lincoln, 2011: 9; Hageman, 2008: 17). Qualitative methods are also well-suited for inductive research, and research that is concerned with understanding contextual influences on phenomena (Babbie, 2010: 51; Sallee and Flood, 2012: 139). The particular qualitative research methods used for this project’s data collection were document

10 In accordance with the IAEA (2003) classification, the region of Western Europe that is referred to in this thesis consists of the countries of Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Gibraltar, Greece, Greenland, Holy See, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Spain, Svalbard and Jan Mayen Islands, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and the United Kingdom. The region of North America includes Canada and the United States of America.

53 analysis and semi-structured interviews. The data collected via these methods were then analysed thematically11. The data collected from the documentary analysis and the semi-structured interviews were used to build an understanding of the way in which agents have perceived and understood nuclear energy from the post-war era up until the present day.

Document analysis is a qualitative research method which involves locating, retrieving, reviewing, and synthesising data contained in documents in order to construct understanding and empirical knowledge (Bowen, 2009). The data can then be organised into major themes and categories through thematic analysis (Bowen, 2009: 32). Thematic analysis is a process whereby the researcher reads and searches through the data in order to identify emerging and recurrent themes relating to the issue under investigation (Fereday and Muir-Cochrane, 2006: 4). The researcher aims to be as systematic as possible, but also flexible enough to engage in “constant discovery” and allow for new themes to emerge as the research progresses (Altheide et al., 2008: 128). Document analysis is a highly effective method for allowing the researcher to build a ‘history of the present’ (Rapley, 2007: 119). That is, to develop an understanding of the historic origins of particular issues or events, to track change in the phenomenon over time, and to develop an understanding of how past events and changes continue to impact upon the phenomenon in the present day. Document analysis allows the researcher to plot a trajectory of how ideas, perceptions, institutions and context emerge and evolve over time (Rapley, 2007: 119). It is also well-suited for historical research as documents may be the only available source of evidence of events, policies, and decision-making procedures (Bowen, 2009: 31).

The research process began by locating and retrieving a wide-range of documents related to nuclear energy development. This included government policy documents, legislation, parliamentary debates, press releases, political speeches, non-government organisation and industry reports and statements, and newspaper articles from 1945 to the present day. These documents were located and accessed manually (at university and public libraries) and electronically (for example, via global internet search engines, electronic archives and databases, and individual company and organisation websites). Over one thousand documents relating to civil nuclear energy policy and development were consulted, roughly three-quarters of which were news articles published from 1945 to the present day. While there is of course an inherent limitation in relying upon media accounts of historical events (as the reporting may be biased or inaccurate), media reports were drawn upon extensively in this thesis as they provided one of the richest data sources for information on historical developments in nuclear power, particularly in the earlier periods of the 1950s and 1960s, for which other data sources are limited. Moreover, as the document review and analysis was conducted, emphasis was placed on gathering first-hand accounts of nuclear energy policy decisions, the reasons given for these decisions, and the responses to these

11 The data was categorised into themes using Microsoft Word (no dedicated qualitative research software package was used). Each factor that was identified as potentially influencing civil nuclear energy development was listed. These factors were then categorised as either ‘nuclear-specific’ or ‘contextual’ factors.

54 decisions. Doing so gave insight into the way in which agents’ thoughts and perceptions of nuclear energy have changed over time. Media reports were extensively drawn upon as a result of this emphasis on first-hand accounts, as they provided one of the richest data sources for gathering first-hand accounts of government and industry decisions, arguments and justifications throughout the historical and contemporary period. This information was then supplemented by other data sources, including quantitative data on nuclear energy growth and development, accessed from the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Power Reactor Information System. Public opinion surveys were accessed to identify how public perceptions and attitudes towards nuclear energy changed over time.

Semi-structured interviews with key experts were undertaken to expand upon the findings of the document analysis by developing an understanding of current expert opinion on civil nuclear energy policy and development. Interviews were conducted with sixteen experts on nuclear energy development. Experts included government officials, academics, and nuclear industry representatives that have expertise in the area of civil nuclear energy development or nuclear energy policy. Each interviewee was questioned on their views on the outcome of the nuclear renaissance, the reasons for this outcome, the challenges facing nuclear power and the future of civil nuclear energy. These questions were asked in an open-ended and inductive manner. That is, interviewees were not explicitly asked about their views on any of the nuclear-specific or broader contextual factors identified in the document analysis as influencing civil nuclear energy development. Rather, interviewees were asked broadly about what factors they thought had influenced civil nuclear energy development in the past and whether these factors have had an influenced on the outcome of the nuclear renaissance in Western Europe and North America. This meant that interviewees were not ‘led’ towards identifying any particular factor that they believed to be influencing civil nuclear energy development. In conducting the interview questions in this way, the interviews served to canvass current expert opinion on civil nuclear energy development, which was used to build on the findings of the document analysis. The interviews were not used to ‘test’ any of the factors identified in the document analysis. Interviews were conducted in the period from September 2014 to February 2015. Each interview lasted between fifteen minutes to two hours, and were conducted in person wherever possible. When an interview could not be conducted in person, the interview was conducted via the telephone instead.

Participants were recruited using purposive and snowballing sampling techniques. An initial relevant set of participants was identified through the document analysis stage of the research. Organisations and individuals that could provide expertise on the topic of nuclear energy development were identified. These organisations and individuals were then contacted directly and invited to participate in the research study. Participants were emailed a letter of introduction and a Project Information Sheet. Research participants who took part in the study were also asked if they could provide recommendations for other experts in the field who may be able to contribute their expertise to the project. When participants consented, the interview audio was electronically recorded. Hand-written notes were also

55 taken during the interviews. After the interview, the hand-written research notes and electronic audio recordings were stored in a secure location and de-identified. Interviewees were invited to recommend other potential interview candidates, which were then contacted and invited to participate in an interview.

The purpose of this data collection was two-fold. Firstly, the data collected from the document analysis was used in a purely descriptive manner in order to build a historical narrative of how nuclear energy development had changed over time, from 1945 until the present day. As this research focuses on understanding the temporal dimension of nuclear energy development and policy change, an accurate and extensive chronology of events was necessary to understand how agents (such as policymakers, political leaders, industry representatives, political commentators, voters, activist and lobby groups) responded to changes in the institutional, ideational, structural, and contextual context. Secondly, the data from both the document analysis and the interviews were analysed thematically in order to allow factors which appeared to influence nuclear energy development and nuclear energy policy decisions to emerge inductively through the research. As the potential causal variables emerged, comparisons were drawn between the experiences of individual countries and across the experiences within countries over time. However, while the processes of data collection and data analysis are described here in a linear manner, in reality they were undertaken as a concurrent and iterative process as new data sources were located and analysed.

As the data from the document analysis and interviews were analysed, it became clear that existing explanations for changes in nuclear energy development heavily focus upon ‘nuclear specific factors’. That is, factors that are specific to the construction, operation and decommissioning of nuclear power plants. While nuclear-specific factors are of course important to understanding how and why nuclear energy development changes over time, this thesis argues that nuclear-specific factors are not the only factors that explain the changing trajectory of nuclear power. The very premise of this thesis – that a broader, more holistic explanation is needed to understand the failure of the nuclear renaissance – suggests that there must be other factors at play that influence nuclear energy development.

The problem-based research approach that this thesis is based upon allows for any theoretical or methodological framework to be used that is considered by the researcher to be the most relevant to the research problem under investigation. Consequently, to develop a more comprehensive understanding of civil nuclear energy development that goes beyond focusing solely on nuclear-specific factors, this thesis draws upon a wide-range of political science literature and theories in order to answer the research questions. In particular, four major contextual shifts have been identified in the political science literature as appearing to be directly relevant to the topic of civil nuclear energy development. These four contextual shifts are the rise of environmentalism, the decline of public trust in government, the emergence of a ‘risk society’, and the growing influence of neoliberalism. Each of these issues are

56 widely discussed in the political science literature as representing a major contextual shift in the post- war era. Each individual contextual chapter engages with core academic texts to demonstrate the significance of these contextual shifts as major topics of investigation and debate within the discipline of political science. There are, of course, many other major contextual shifts that are discussed in the political science literature as having taken place in Western democratic societies since 1945 (such as the rise of the welfare state, the growth of consumerism, globalisation, and so on). These contextual shifts could have been examined in regards to their potential impact on the development of civil nuclear energy. However, the four contextual shifts that are discussed in this thesis (environmentalism, declining public trust, risk society, and neoliberalism) were chosen as they each appear to have a direct relevance to the changing trajectory of civil nuclear energy development. This decision was consistent was a problem-based research approach, which allows the researcher to choose the most appropriate methods and theories based on the nature of the empirical problem under investigation.

ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

This research project adheres to the guidelines of the ethical review process of The University of Queensland. For the semi-structured interviews, informed consent was obtained from all participants prior to the commencement of their involvement in the research process. To ensure full disclosure of all aspects of the research project, participants were provided with a Project Information Sheet (PIS) when they were first contacted to be invited to participate in an interview (see Appendix 1). The PIS outlined the nature of the study and the participant’s role should they choose to participate. Participants were also provided with a Participant Consent Form (PCF), which they were required to sign before participating in the study to indicate that they had read and understood the information sheet (see Appendix 2). When interviews were conducted via the telephone, the PCF was emailed to participants prior to the interview commencing. Participants had to indicate their agreement either verbally or in written form to the conditions on the PCF before their involvement in the research project could begin. It was clearly stated in the PIS and the PCF that participants could freely withdraw their involvement in the study at any time without providing a reason and without penalty. This was also verbally reiterated at the commencement of the focus groups. Participants were informed that their participation in the interview would be anonymous and confidential. A guarantee of anonymity was particularly important for this research project given the controversial nature of nuclear power. Participants were also informed that the interview, or part of the interview, could be ‘off-the-record’ if they chose, with no information gained being used in the study. It was also made clear to the participants prior to the commencement of the interviews that the purpose of the research project was not to advocate for or against nuclear power, but rather, to be as objective as possible in developing a better understanding of how and why civil nuclear energy development has changed over time.

Furthermore, the hand-written research notes, electronic audio recordings, and Participant Consent Forms were all stored securely in a location only accessible to the researcher. The electronic audio files of the interview recordings were stored on a password-protected computer. All identifying information was kept separate from the written research notes, and all of the data were de-identified for the process of data analysis.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has detailed the research design of this thesis. It has described the problem-centred approach to research that informs all aspects of the research design, the use of Agents in Context Historical Institutionalism as an analytical framework used, and the methodology of comparatively informed historical analysis. The choice of regions under investigation for this research project have been explained and justified. The methods of data collection and analysis have been described, as well as the ethical considerations that have underpinned the research design.

4. NUCLEAR ECONOMICS

This chapter examines the first of three ‘nuclear-specific’ factors and their influence on the outcome of the nuclear renaissance. It argues that the disjuncture between the rhetoric and reality of the nuclear renaissance can be explained by the economics of nuclear power. More specifically, the absence of a nuclear renaissance can be attributed to the way in which agents perceive and prioritise the economics of nuclear power. In the 1950s and 1960s, the early development and expansion of the first civil nuclear energy programmes was facilitated by an ideational context in which the economics of nuclear power were perceived by policymakers and industry representatives as a non-issue. This meant that nuclear reactors could be built with little concern over the costs involved. This ideational context was shaped by the overly optimistic projections for nuclear power that were being put forth at the time, as well as the generous financial support that governments were willing to give to ensure nuclear power was developed successfully.

However, a shift occurred from the 1970s onwards, whereby the economics of nuclear power became an increasingly important concern for policymakers and industry representatives in determining whether nuclear reactors would be built. Several factors contributed to this shift, including the increasing visibility and frequency of reactors construction projects that were still under construction years past their original completion dates, at more than double their original cost estimates. Moreover, the rise of neoliberal ideas and a decline in state interventionism meant that states were less willing to provide the financial support that had been necessary for nuclear new build to succeed. The ongoing economic problems facing nuclear power – such as the high capital costs involved, the inability to compete with cheaper alternative energy sources, and the financially risky nature of investing in nuclear power – contributed to the stagnation and decline of nuclear industries throughout Western Europe and North America from the mid-1970s onwards, with numerous nuclear construction projects being delayed, suspended or cancelled as a direct result of economic difficulties.

When the rhetoric of a nuclear renaissance began to gain momentum in the 2000s, one of the key reasons underpinning the expectation of a revival of nuclear power was a belief that the economic problems inherent to nuclear development had been resolved. Nuclear industry representatives promised that new reactor designs would be simpler, easier and therefore cheaper to construct. As a result, nuclear power would be able to compete with alternative energy sources, particularly if a price on carbon was implemented to combat climate change. Government representatives appeared to accept the argument that a fundamental turning-point had been reached in the economics of power, and were soon reiterating the argument that nuclear power was a cheap source of energy production as a key reason for why voters should support a revival of nuclear power.

However, despite this rhetoric, nuclear power during the renaissance period continues to face the same economic problems that has previously hindered its development. Numerous reactor projects that were announced from 2000 onwards have since been cancelled because of economic difficulties. The nuclear reactor construction projects that have proceeded – such as the Generation III+ reactors in Finland and France – have faced the same economic challenges that plagued nuclear development in the past, far exceeding their original construction cost and time estimates. Consequently, there is little evidence to suggest that the economic challenges hindering nuclear power have been resolved. Despite the rhetoric of a nuclear renaissance taking place, nuclear new build continues to be impeded by high construction costs, an inability to compete with alternative energy sources, and the financial risks involved. The ideational shift that has taken place from the mid-1970s onwards means that these economic challenges facing nuclear power can not be overlooked by government actors or industry representatives. The disconnection between the rhetoric and reality of the nuclear renaissance can therefore be explained, in part, by the economics of nuclear power. Moreover, until the economic challenges facing nuclear power are resolved, a nuclear renaissance is unlikely to take place in the future.

TOO CHEAP TO METER

The absence of a nuclear renaissance can be explained by an ideational shift in the way in which policymakers perceive and prioritise the economics of nuclear power. From the mid-1970s onwards, the economic issues afflicting the construction and operation of nuclear power plants has become a central concern for nuclear power decision-makers. This shift stands in stark contrast to the ideational context in which civil nuclear power programmes were first being established in the 1950s and 1960s. During these first two decades of development, political, rather than economic, concerns dominated government decision-making processes in establishing nuclear power programmes. In many countries throughout Western Europe and North America, nuclear power in the post-war period occupied a unique position as a project of national significance. The development of nuclear power in the post-war era was widely seen as the quintessential symbol of modernity and scientific accomplishment, with governments scrambling to become leaders in nuclear technology. The advancement of civil nuclear technologies was also propelled by its close connection with potential military applications. For governments seeking to advance their nuclear capabilities in the post-war era, cost was only a minor consideration. For countries such as Germany and France, the early development of civil nuclear power was closely linked to the government’s ambition to elevate their country’s stature in international politics following the embarrassments of war time defeat and occupation. In the US, investment in civil nuclear energy research was seen as necessary to preserve its position as a world leader in scientific advancement. When extensive government funding was approved for the construction of the country’s first nuclear reactors, supporters of the bill argued that the funds were necessary to win the race with the Soviet Union for world leadership in development of nuclear energy (The New York Times, 1956:

3). To a large extent, the decision to fund nuclear energy development and establish a civil nuclear energy programme in the post-war era was driven dominated by political, rather than economic, concerns.

Moreover, a widely held belief existed amongst government and industry representatives that the economics of nuclear power would be an asset, rather than an impediment, to its development. This belief was epitomised by the promise made by the Chair of the US Atomic Energy Commission, Lewis L. Strauss, that nuclear power would produce “electrical energy too cheap to meter” (IAEA, 2004a: 1). This claim was reiterated by the President of the American Nuclear Society, Alvin M. Weinberg, who declared that nuclear power “appear[s] to be the cheapest of all sources of energy” (Weinberg and Young, 1967: 1). Nuclear energy was expected to be highly competitive with the costs of alternative sources of energy generation. The Director of the industrial division of the UK Atomic Energy Authority predicted that, by 1980, energy produced by nuclear power would be half the cost of using coal and oil (The New York Times, 1957: 18). The British General Electric Company promised in the mid-1950s to build a nuclear plant that would generate electricity at less than half the present cost of conventionally-produced electricity (Hailey, 1956: 21). An article published in the New York Times in 1954 reported that nuclear power could offer a potential saving of $1bn per year in operating costs for electrical utilities (Egan, 1954: 56).

The apparent economic advantages of nuclear power made for an attractive investment for countries such as France and the UK which were dependent on imported coal and oil. In the UK, parliamentary discussions on nuclear energy focused on the cost benefits of investing in domestically-produced nuclear energy rather than importing fossil fuels. The Director of the UK Atomic Energy Program, Lord Cherwell, justified the government’s nuclear investment to the House of Lords on the grounds that “the more expensive coal gets, the more attractive will the nuclear energy become” (The New York Times, 1952: E9). Lord Percy Mills defended nuclear power development with the argument that “since we already spend some £250m per annum on importing fuel, chiefly oil, and this burden on our balance of payments will continue to grow, the importance of our need to develop nuclear power as a source of energy cannot be in doubt” (House of Lords, 1957: 184).

TOO COSTLY TO MATTER

However, starting in the mid-1970s, a combination of factors coalesced which resulted in the economics of nuclear power becoming a far more salient issue for government and industry representatives. This ideational shift in the way in which agents perceived and prioritised the economics of nuclear power acted as an impediment to the construction of new nuclear facilities. As nuclear power programmes were established and expanded, the realities of nuclear power construction costs far exceeded their initial estimates. This was evident in the US, where cost overruns on nuclear power projects from 1966

61 to 1977 averaged 207 percent (Ahearne et al., 2012: 15). Numerous examples emerged of US nuclear projects which far surpassed their original cost estimates, leading the director of the Massachusetts Energy Policy Office to conclude that “nuclear power is no longer capable of even coming close to its promise of cheap energy” (Kifner, 1976: 54). Some of the projects which experienced extensive cost overruns include:

 The Clinch River Breeder Reactor Project was estimated in 1973 to cost $700m, but reached $1.7bn two years later. The cost of the project continued to rise to $3.5bn in 1982, at which point Congress stopped funding the project (Joppke, 1993: 62).  The Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant was initially estimated to cost $75m when the project was announced in 1966, but ended up costing $5.5bn by the time the project was abandoned (Ross and Staw, 1993: 708). When the plant was being constructed, the builders of the plant - the Long Island Lighting Company (LILCO) – said that interest costs were adding $1.2m a day to the construction price (The New York Times, 1983: B8). LILCO eventually sold Shoreham to the State of New York in 1992 for a grand total of $1 (The New York Times, 1994: B6).  The Hanford Nuclear Reservation was originally estimated to cost $6.5bn, but experienced a cost overrun of almost 300 percent, to reach $23.8bn (Mathews, 1981: A1).  In 1973, the South Texas Nuclear Project was originally expected to cost $1bn, but by 1981 the project had cost over $4.5bn (Balz, 1981: A7).  The total cost of the Marble Hill Nuclear Power Plant rose from an initial estimate of $1.4bn to over $7bn, after which the project was abandoned (The Pittsburgh Press, 1984: A8).  The second nuclear reactor at the Beaver Valley Nuclear Power Station was estimated to cost $686m, but ended up with a final cost of $3.145bn (McCallion, 1995: 181).

A similar pattern of construction cost and time overruns unfolded throughout Western Europe. In the UK, construction began on the Dungeness B nuclear reactor in the mid-1960s with an estimated cost of £89m, but by 1982 the project was still under construction at an estimated cost of £530m (Dickson, 1982: 24). Project costs for the Hinkley Point B reactor rose from an original £95m to £160m (Wright, 1980: 3), while costs for the Hartlepool nuclear power station rose from an estimated £92m in 1968 to £520m in 1982 (Dickson, 1982: 24). The Heysham nuclear power station rose from an estimated £142m in 1968 to £396m in 1980 (Wright, 1980: 3). Capital costs for the Sizewell B nuclear reactor increased from £1691m to £3700m, while construction costs for a nuclear reactor at Torness increased from £742m to £2500m (Thomas et al., 2007: 11). In Germany, construction of the SNR-300 nuclear reactor near Kalkar resulted in a cost overrun from original project estimates of almost 380 percent (The Wall Street Journal, 1982). An investigation by Grubler (2010) into the projected and actual costs of the French Pressurized Water Reactor nuclear power programme demonstrated that the costs of

62 constructing nuclear reactors in France steadily escalated from the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s, although these costs were consistently underestimated in formal cost projections.

The disconnection between the original estimates and actual costs of constructing nuclear plants can be explained by several factors. Firstly, the original cost estimates of nuclear power plant construction were largely based on speculation, but presented as systematic economic calculations (Jasper, 1990: 5). Engineering estimates were calculated by “scaling up” the costs of constructing much smaller experimental reactors. These estimates failed to recognise the differences in individual reactor designs and construction sites which required specialised components and highly-skilled engineers, all of which increased the cost of reactor construction (Davis, 2011: 5). Cost increases also resulted from unfinished reactor designs being released, causing contracts to be modified when construction was already underway (Squassoni, 2009b: 4). Delays in licensing approval processes and reactor construction increased project lead times, exposing nuclear plants to more stringent and expensive regulatory requirements and higher interest rates (Campbell, 1988: 5). Lengthy construction periods often meant that equipment installed in the first phase of construction had deteriorated and needed to be refurbished, escalating total construction costs (The Guardian, 1978: 13). A growing awareness of the safety risks of nuclear power led to the added cost of increased regulatory requirements, particularly after the events at Three Mile Island (Squassoni, 2009b: 4). As a result, the early promises made by the nuclear industry of low running costs and price stabilisation never came to fruition (Hertsgaard, 1983: 62).

The poor economic performance of nuclear power plants during this period was also caused by the sensitivity of the price of nuclear-generated electricity to changes in the ‘load’ or ‘capacity’ factor of the plant. Given that the cost of uranium is so low relative to other fuel costs, the price of nuclear- generated electricity is determined largely by the load factor of nuclear power plants. A nuclear power plant’s load factor is the ratio of its actual output over a period of time, compared to its potential output if it were continuously operating at full capacity over the same time period. The load factors of operating nuclear power plants have tended to be much lower than their original forecasts. For example, in the early 1980s, nuclear power plants worldwide had an average load factor of approximately 60% - far lower than their expected load factors of 85-95% (Thomas, 2010: 24). The low load factors of nuclear power plants meant that the cost of nuclear-generated electricity was much higher than originally expected during this time period.

The result of the ongoing construction cost and time overruns was that the myth of nuclear energy being ‘too cheap to meter’ could not be perpetuated. The result was an ideational shift whereby the economics of nuclear power became central to government and industry decision-making processes over whether nuclear reactors should be built. As the actual cost of constructing nuclear power plants became more visible, governments and utilities in Western Europe and North America increasingly chose to suspend or cancel many of their plans to build new nuclear power plants. For example, when plans to build a

63 nuclear plant in Pennsylvania were suspended in 1975, the reactor manufacturer cited construction costs being “way beyond what was initially projected” as the reason for the contract being broken (The New York Times, 1975b: 63). When Middle South Utilities cancelled the construction of two nuclear units, the president of the company stated that the cancellation was “simply a question of our ability to finance them…and we figured they got too expensive” (Stuart, 1975: 167). The Houston Power and Lighting Company cancelled plans to build several nuclear power plants because of its inability to finance increased construction costs (Stuart, 1975: 167), while rising costs caused the Delmarva Power and Lighting Company to shelve plans for constructing a nuclear power plant (The Washington Post, 1975: B6). In 1974, the Consumers Power Company of Michigan cancelled plans for two reactors as lengthy construction times meant that they could not continue to raise sufficient capital to finance the project costs (Smith, 1974: 1). When the Northern Indiana Public Service Company announced in 1981 that they were abandoning plans for their Bailly Nuclear Power Plant, this marked the first time in the US that a nuclear project was cancelled after construction had already begun. The plant had initially been expected to cost $187m, but later estimates revised the cost to $2.3bn (Omang, 1981: A6). The utility’s CEO explained that the project was cancelled “due wholly to the effect of inflation and the time-cost of money,” and that “cost increases of this magnitude are simply not bearable” (Omang, 1981: A6). The widespread belief held by agents in the 1950s and 1960s that nuclear power would be ‘too cheap to meter’ was, from the mid-1970s onwards, gradually replaced by a view that nuclear energy was instead ‘too costly to matter’.

THE NUCLEAR RENAISSANCE: FROM PERIL TO PROFIT?

When the rhetoric of a nuclear renaissance emerged, economics continued to feature heavily in the nuclear debate. One of the key reasons underpinning why the expectation of a nuclear renaissance emerged was because industry representatives promised that many of the economic problems that had previously plagued nuclear power had been resolved. In particular, they promised that technological advancements and new reactor designs, such as Generation III+, would make nuclear reactors cheaper to construct (Thomas, 2012a). The growing political concern over the need to reduce carbon emissions to combat climate change was also expected to create a more favourable economic environment for nuclear energy, particularly if governments chose to put a price on carbon. Nuclear industry representatives promoted the idea that nuclear power was a highly cost-competitive form of electricity generation. For example, Vincent de Rivaz, the CEO of EDF Energy, described nuclear power as “the cheapest, large-scale, low-carbon electricity source” (Crooks, 2010: 2).

By the late 2000s, it became clear that government and political leaders were accepting the nuclear industry’s promises that a turning point in the economics of nuclear power had been achieved. There appeared to be a genuine belief shared amongst government representatives that the financial problems

64 plaguing the nuclear industry had been resolved, to the extent that government representatives began to invoke the argument that nuclear power was a cheap source of energy as a key justification for why a revival of nuclear power should take place. The US Energy Secretary, Spencer Abraham, justified the government’s proposed budget for nuclear development on the grounds that nuclear was an “affordable source of energy” (Power Engineering, 2003). The UK Minister for Energy, Malcolm Wicks, stated that “the economics have moved in favour of new nuclear because of the relatively high price we have seen recently of oil and gas” (Select Committee on Trade and Industry, 2006). The UK Government agreed to support an expansion of nuclear power on the grounds that it would be entirely funded by the private sector. This decision was initially welcomed by the nuclear industry, which was adamant that the economics of nuclear power had become so favourable that the decades of state aid that had been provided to support civil nuclear power would no longer be necessary (see Chapter 10 for more detail on the rise of neoliberalism and the implications this has had for reducing state aid for nuclear energy).

However, as plans for a nuclear renaissance unfolded, it became clear that the economic problems which had plagued nuclear construction in the past remained unresolved. Despite claims by the nuclear industry that new generations of reactor designs would resolve many of the financial troubles that had historically afflicted nuclear power, there is little evidence of such improvements being made. The construction of nuclear reactors in Western Europe and North America since 2000 has occurred in a manner consistent with construction of nuclear reactors in the past – over-budget, over-time, and heavily dependent on state aid. One of the key claims underpinning the expectation of the nuclear renaissance was the promise made by the nuclear industry that a Generation III+ reactor could be built at an overnight cost of approximately $1000/kW (Thomas, 2012a: 52). However, recent cost estimates have raised this figure five-fold (Thomas, 2012a: 52).

The construction of Generation III+ reactors in Europe are clear examples of the ongoing financial problems that nuclear new build has faced during the renaissance period. Construction approval was granted for a new reactor at the Finnish Olkiluoto Nuclear Power Plant in 2002, with an estimated construction time of 4 years at a cost of €3bn (Schneider et al., 2013: 49). By 2015, however, construction was still unfinished. Revised estimates increased the expected construction time to at least 11 years and at almost triple the original cost estimate (YLE, 2014). This was the same nuclear reactor that had previously been praised by the CEO of AREVA SA for making “into reality the nuclear renaissance” (Erkheikki, 2005: 1). A similar story has unfolded with the first construction start in France in fifteen years, at the Flamanville Nuclear Power Plant. Construction was originally expected to cost €3.3bn and be completed by 2012 (World Nuclear News, 2007a), but this has been revised to completion in 2016, at an estimated cost of €8bn (World Nuclear News, 2012a).

The high costs and financial risks involved with constructing nuclear facilities has caused nuclear power to struggle to compete with the growing affordability of alternative energy sources, such as shale and

65 liquid gas. In the mid-2000s, the US witnessed a sudden expansion in the production of shale gas. The expansion occurred as a result of advancements in drilling and extraction methods, with both horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing being deployed together for the first time. In the years that followed, shale gas production exceeded even the most optimistic estimates. The US Energy Information Administration (EIA) calculates the average annual growth rate in shale gas production to be 51 percent over the period of 2008-2011 (EY, 2013: 1). Total dry natural gas production in the US increased by 35 percent from 2005-2013, mainly because of expanded production of shale gas (US Energy Information Administration, 2015: 20). The EIA’s Annual Energy Outlook predicts that shale gas production will double in the years 2013-2040 (EY, 2013: 1).

The US shale gas boom has lowered the price of natural gas, making nuclear power a less attractive investment option. The CEO of NRG Energy estimated that new gas-fired generation costs $0.04/kWh, compared with at least $0.10/kWh for nuclear power (The Economist, 2013). The impact of shale gas on new nuclear build during the renaissance period is evident in statements made by US nuclear industry representatives, many of which have blamed shale gas for the closure of nuclear reactors or the cancellation of nuclear expansion plans. The CEO of General Electric highlighted the inability of nuclear power to economically compete with natural gas, stating that “it's just hard to justify nuclear. Gas is so cheap and at some point, economics rule” (Gloystein, 2012). In 2012, Dominion Resources announced that it would close its Kewaunee nuclear plant because of the low price of natural gas (diSavino, 2012). Low gas prices caused Constellation Energy to abandon plans for a nuclear plant at Calvert Cliffs, and were cited as one factor (combined with growing pressure post-Fukushima) which caused NRG to abandon plans for two nuclear units in Texas in 2011 (Plumer, 2013). The CEO of NRG Energy described shale gas as “killing off new nuclear” (Smith, 2012). Joseph Dominguez, Exelon’s senior vice president for government and regulatory affairs and public policy, described the recent growth of shale gas and the subsidies provided for renewable energy projects as “game changers” which have been starting to “seriously impact the economics of plants” (Malik and Polson, 2015). In 2012, Exelon stated that the “low natural gas prices and economic and market conditions…have made construction of new merchant nuclear power plants in competitive markets uneconomical now and for the foreseeable future” (Exelon, 2012). EDF withdrew from the US nuclear power market because the drop in gas prices caused by the shale gas boom meant that nuclear power was no longer an attractive investment option (Amiel, 2013). The International Atomic Energy Agency reported that “very low natural gas prices, particularly in the USA, caused by a rapid shale gas expansion, have fundamentally transformed the energy economy. They have reduced the competitiveness of commercial nuclear power” (IAEA, 2014a: 4).

While cost overruns is an issue that is commonplace amongst energy infrastructure projects more broadly (rather than being a problem inherent to nuclear power alone), recent research suggests that cost overruns may be more common amongst nuclear power construction projects than other energy

66 technologies. A study by Sovacool et al. (2014) into the construction costs of 401 electricity infrastructure projects constructed worldwide between 1936 and 2014 found that nuclear reactors and hydroelectric dams have historically suffered from the greatest amount and frequency of cost overruns, even when normalised to overrun per installed megawatt of electricity. That said, the argument that nuclear power suffers more from construction cost overruns remains contested. A study by Lovering et al. (2016) concluded that there is no intrinsic cost escalation associated with nuclear power. Instead, Lovering et al. (2016) argue that the costs associated with nuclear power vary depending on different contextual and institutional factors, which result in large variance in the costs of nuclear over time. Lovering et al. (2016: 379) also note that in some instances, such as in South Korea, the cost of constructing nuclear reactors has decreased over time. It is important to note, however, that Lovering et al. (2016) do not cite or engage with the Sovacool et al. (2014) study in their paper.

Industry representatives have increasingly acknowledged that economic issues are preventing nuclear new build from proceeding. When announcing the closure of Entergy’s Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station, the President of Entergy Wholesale Commodities stated that “the decision was solely based on economics” (Smith, 2013b). Entergy announced that it would close a nuclear power station in New York because of falling plant revenues, unfavourable market conditions and high operational costs (World Nuclear News, 2015b). German utilities RWE and E.ON originally planned to construct nuclear reactors at Wylfa and Oldbury in the UK, but abandoned their plans over financing and the expected cost increases as a result of the Fukushima nuclear disaster (Milmo and Harvey, 2012). E.ON has announced closure of two reactors in Sweden because “there are no prospects of generating financial profitability” (World Nuclear News, 2015c). The Court des Comptes, France’s audit court, calculated the cost of generating nuclear power to have increased from €49.6/MWh in 2010, to €59.8/MWh in 2013 – an increase of 20.6 percent (Reuters, 2014). In March 2015, Standard & Poor’s downgraded the credit rating of the world’s largest nuclear company, Areva, to BB-, or ‘junk’ status (Reuters, 2015).

Numerous reports released by energy analysts have concluded that the rhetoric of a new era of economically competitive nuclear power has not materialised. Many of the financial problems that caused nuclear industries to stagnate and decline from the mid-1970s onwards continue to afflict nuclear industries throughout Western Europe and North America today. Even as early as 2003, a report released by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) on the future of nuclear power concluded that “nuclear power is not an economically competitive choice” (MIT, 2003: 3). An update of the MIT report released in 2009 found that, since the release of the 2003 report, “the overnight cost of building a nuclear power plant has approximately doubled”12 (Du and Parsons, 2009: 2). The New Economics Foundation, a British think tank, released a report in 2005 which argued that the calculated cost of new nuclear build was based on “voodoo economics” and underestimated by a factor of three (BBC News,

12 The overnight cost of a power plant refers to the cost that would be incurred if the plant was built at once.

2005). Christopher Pain, the nuclear program director at the US Natural Resources Defence Council, stated that for nuclear new build, “the primary obstacle has been and remains the financial cost” (Paine, 2010: 1). In 2008, a representative of Moody’s Investors Service described cost estimates released by major nuclear operators such as NRG Energy, Exelon, and Southern Company, as “having blown by our highest estimates” of projections that were made just eight months earlier (Smith, 2008: 1).

The interviews conducted as part of this research project further support the findings from the literature review that the cost of constructing nuclear power plants remains a significant impediment to the success of the nuclear renaissance and the future of the nuclear industry. The importance of economics in facilitating or hindering nuclear development was by far the most extensively cited and discussed issue amongst the interview participants. Every participant interviewed identified the economics of nuclear power as a major obstacle to the success of the nuclear renaissance in Western Europe and North America. The economics of nuclear power was widely identified as the “biggest obstacle” to the success of a nuclear renaissance, with one energy analyst concluding that “ultimately it all comes down to cost” (Interview with Director of an Energy Research Consultancy, 13/10/2014). This interviewee also identified the failure of the nuclear industry to fulfil its promise of developing and implementing a more efficient and cost-effective design of nuclear power plant as a key reason for the failure of the nuclear renaissance in regions such as Europe, stating that the nuclear industry “wasn’t ready to slap down on the table a really modern new design that could be pumped out cookie-cutter style at a low cost” (Interview with Director of an Energy Research Consultancy, 13/10/2014). Another academic interviewed described the economics of nuclear power as a “catastrophe” that poses an immense challenge to nuclear new build, given that “cost means everything” to determining the fate of nuclear power (Interview with University Research Fellow, 23/01/2015). A representative of a national nuclear science and technology organisation identified the “huge” capital costs for constructing nuclear power plants, combined with the current economic conditions facing many OECD countries, as undermining the success of the nuclear renaissance (Interview with Government and International Relations Advisor for a National Nuclear Science Research Organisation, 2/10/2014). Moreover, this interviewee attributed the failure of the nuclear renaissance to the fact that nuclear energy is still not cost competitive with other sources of energy, stating that: “while the operating cost is quite low, extremely low compared to other [energy] sources, the capital cost is significantly higher. Being able to fund new build is a challenge” (Interview with Government and International Relations Advisor for a National Nuclear Science Research Organisation, 2/10/2014).

Two conclusions can be drawn from this combined evidence. Firstly, the financial problems which have hindered the development of nuclear power from the 1970s onwards remain unresolved. Nuclear power plants are still inherently expensive to build, and this acts as a considerable barrier to the establishment and expansion of civil nuclear energy industries. The promise that the nuclear renaissance would be driven by new era of nuclear power plants that were cheaper to construct, or that would overcome the

68 financial problems of the past, have been unfulfilled. The accurate forecasting of costs of power produced by a nuclear power plant continues to be difficult to achieve during the period of an expected renaissance. Thomas (2010) identifies several reasons why this continues to be the case. Cost estimates continue to be based on ‘overnight costs’ of construction, which ignore issues of inflation and financing, such as the cost of interest incurred on borrowings during the construction of the plant. Several of the processes involved in the nuclear fuel cycle have still not been proven on a commercial scale, and could therefore result in far higher costs than originally estimated. Similarly, modern designs of nuclear technologies are untested, and could therefore incur far higher costs than initially expected. There is also a lack of reliable and current data on the actual costs of nuclear power plants, a problem that is compounded by the continued secrecy of utilities in terms of the actual costs which they incur.

Consequently, the failure of the nuclear renaissance can be explained, in part, by the poor economic performance of nuclear power plants. This conclusion is affirmed by findings of both the document analysis and the interviews conducted for this research. The second conclusion that can be drawn from this chapter is that the idea of cost has remained at the forefront of debates about nuclear power during the nuclear renaissance. The ideational prominence of the costs of constructing and operation nuclear power that first emerged in the mid-1970s remains unchanged today. Both policymakers and industry representatives continue to perceive cost as a fundamental issue in determining whether nuclear power development should take place.

The economic challenges inherent to nuclear development are arguably even more of a problem for nuclear new build now than they were in the 1970s, as governments are becoming less willing to provide the financial support and subsidisation that has historically been required for nuclear new build to take place. As discussed in much greater detail in Chapter 10, a broad contextual shift has taken place from the 1970s onwards whereby neoliberal ideas have become increasingly influential over the decision- making processes of government. The rise of neoliberal ideas has created a new institutional and ideational environment that has heavily shaped the behaviour of policymakers and their approach to civil nuclear energy development. Within the US and the UK in particular, the rise of neoliberalism has contributed to a decline in state interventionism, an aversion to subsidies and a growing preference for market mechanisms. This has meant that governments are now less willing to provide the same extent of direct financial support than they have in the past. This is problematic for the expansion of civil nuclear power, which has historically relied upon extensive state subsidies in order for new nuclear reactors to be built.

CONCLUSION

Two conclusions can be drawn from this chapter. Firstly, there has been an ideational shift in the way that agents perceive and prioritise the economics of nuclear power. In the 1950s and 1960s the

69 economics of nuclear power were largely viewed as a non-issue. However, from the mid-1970s onwards, the economics of nuclear power have become central to the nuclear debate. Any decision to construct a nuclear reactor is now dependent on the economic estimates and actual costs involved. This ideational shift has been driven by several factors including a greater realisation of the actual costs involved in constructing nuclear power plants, the increasing frequency and visibility of construction time and cost overruns in nuclear construction projects, as well as a broader contextual shift in the degree to which governments are willing to provide financial support for nuclear new build.

Secondly, the economic problems that have historically plagued nuclear new build have not been resolved, despite promises made by the nuclear industry which suggested that a turning point was reached in the economics of nuclear power. Nuclear power plants are still inherently expensive to build, and pose a risky investment option for financiers. The nuclear reactor construction projects that have begun in Western Europe and North America since 2000 have been a clear example of history repeating itself, with the projects far exceeding their original construction cost and time estimates. The ongoing financial problems facing nuclear new build have contributed to the failure of the nuclear renaissance as they have caused many private companies to withdraw their plans for new reactors to be constructed.

Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) are one of the nuclear industry’s latest proposed solutions to the economic challenges facing nuclear power. SMRs are meant to defy the conventional economic logic of nuclear power which has typically been to achieve economic competitiveness through economics of scale. SMRs, on the other hand, are meant to achieve economic competitiveness through “economies of serial production” (Glaser et al., 2015: 20). That is, unit costs are decreased by being able to build larger numbers of identical smaller modular reactors within a single production facility. This is meant to reduce unit costs through a learning process, or the “learning rate” (the relative reduction in cost of construction accompanying every doubling of the cumulative number of units). SMRs are expected to be easier to finance, given that the absolute cost of one SMR is less than that of a large reactor. While there is great hope amongst the nuclear industry for SMRs to be the future of an economically competitive nuclear power, the economic effectiveness of SMRs is yet to be proved on a large scale. Large initial orders of SMRs are needed to begin the serial production process. Moreover, SMRs will continue to be subject to the same broader set of challenges that face all nuclear reactors in terms of siting and public acceptance for nuclear new build.

Clearly, the economics of nuclear power continue to be fundamental to determining whether nuclear new build will take place. The nuclear renaissance has failed, in part, because nuclear development is still financially risky, struggles to compete with alternative energy sources, and requires massive capital investment. Governments are now also less willing to provide the same levels of mass subsidisation that nuclear power has historically depended upon in order to succeed. Moreover, the ideational shift that has taken place means that these financial problems cannot be overlooked by policymakers or the

70 nuclear industry. There is a disjuncture between the rhetoric and reality of a nuclear renaissance because agents now perceive the cost of nuclear build as a defining consideration in whether or to what extent they will support nuclear development. It is highly unlikely that an ideational shift will take place whereby the economics of nuclear power will become less central to the nuclear debate. Therefore, a nuclear renaissance is unlikely to take place unless the economic problems plaguing nuclear power can be resolved. To date, there is little evidence to suggest that this is going to happen. Consequently, the economics of nuclear power appear to have contributed to the failure of the nuclear renaissance thus far in Western Europe and North America. Moreover, nuclear new build is unlikely to take place in these regions unless the financial problems that have historically plagued nuclear development are resolved.

5. NUCLEAR SAFETY

This chapter argues that the disconnection between the expectation and reality of the nuclear renaissance can be explained by a shift in the way in which agents perceive and prioritise the safety of nuclear power. While the degree to which nuclear power plants can be operated safely is important to determining the policy and investment decisions around nuclear power, what matters just as much to determining the success of nuclear development is the extent to which agents perceive nuclear power as safe. The degree to which agents (primarily voters) perceive nuclear power as safe is important as it determines how much political capital politicians are willing to invest in trying to overcome public opposition. The establishment and expansion of the first civil nuclear power programmes in the 1950s and 1960s was facilitated by a lack of concern over the potential hazards of nuclear energy. Little consideration was given by policymakers, industry representatives, the media or the general public to the risks posed by the construction, operation or closure of nuclear power plants. This is evident in a distinct absence of consideration over the safety of nuclear power plants in political debates and media reporting during the 1950s and 1960s.

However, from the 1970s, nuclear safety began to feature more prominently in public and political discourse over whether civil nuclear programmes should be established or expanded. This shift was driven by the increasing visibility and severity of accidents at nuclear power plants, exemplified by the disasters at Three Mile Island (TMI) in 1979 and Chernobyl in 1986, which have undermined government and industry promises that any risks posed by nuclear power can be safely managed through regulation and technological advancements. As a result, nuclear power has increasingly been perceived by large segments of the public as an unsafe and inherently risky technology with potentially catastrophic consequences. Moreover, broad contextual shifts – such as the growth of environmentalism and the emergence of a ‘risk society’ – have served to further heighten public awareness of and concern over the dangers posed by nuclear power. This changing perception of nuclear power and nuclear safety has contributed to an increase in public opposition to the construction and operation of nuclear facilities.

When the rhetoric of a nuclear renaissance emerged in the early 2000s, one of the key promises made by the nuclear industry was that new reactor designs would be safer to operate than ever before. As a result, there would be little reason to oppose nuclear power on the grounds that it is unsafe. Moreover, nuclear industry representatives pointed to the impressive safety track-record of nuclear power plants throughout the globe since the Chernobyl nuclear disaster in 1986 as further evidence that nuclear power poses no threat to society or the environment. It was expected that these two factors would allay any remaining public concerns over the safety of nuclear power, thereby reducing public opposition to nuclear new build and pave the way for a revival of nuclear power to take place.

However, there is little evidence to suggest that such a transformation in public perceptions of nuclear safety has occurred. Rather, public opinion polling from 2000 onwards suggests that the perception of nuclear power as an inherently unsafe or risky technology continues to remain entrenched. Opposition to nuclear new build has continued to take place during the renaissance period on the grounds that nuclear power poses unacceptable risks to humans and their environment. Consequently, the nuclear renaissance has failed, in part, because of the widespread and sustained perception that nuclear power is unsafe.

THE IDEATIONAL SHIFT IN NUCLEAR SAFETY

When civil nuclear energy programmes were first established in the 1950s and 1960s, there appeared to be little consideration given to the potential safety issues associated with nuclear power. While public opinion data on nuclear power in the 1950s and 1960s is not readily available, the lack of concern for nuclear safety issues is nevertheless evidenced by the distinct lack of consideration in debates over nuclear energy’s role in society as to the potential environmental and human health hazards associated with nuclear power plants. One reason for this absence of concern was that the scientific community reassured the public that the problems associated with radioactive materials could be safely managed through technical and engineering solutions, and therefore did not pose a significant environmental or safety threat (North, 1998: 123). As a result, the potential risks that nuclear power poses to human safety were largely dismissed on the grounds that the statistical probability of a serious nuclear incident occurring was very low (Scurlock, 2010: 31). Yet, in contrast to this belief, accidents were already taking place at nuclear power plants during this time. For example, in 1957, thirty-five men were exposed to “substantial airborne contamination” in a radiation leak caused by a fire at Britain’s Windscale Piles (The New York Times, 1974: 4). Radiation was released across Cumbria, and spread further throughout the UK and Europe. There were fears that the radioactive material would contaminate the milk produced in the surrounding area, causing health problems in children such as Thyroid Cancer. In response, locally produced milk within a radius of 500km2 of the Windscale Piles was destroyed for several weeks (Awosika, 2008: 4). The Chalk River Nuclear Laboratories in Canada suffered serious nuclear accidents in 1952, when a reactor core was destroyed, and in 1958, when a partial meltdown caused masses of contaminated water to leak into the reactor building (Cross, 1980; Milnes, 2011). Similar events occurred at the Enrico Fermi Nuclear Generating Station in the US, when a partial meltdown occurred in 1966 (Kavanagh, 2011). Despite the severity of these accidents, media reporting on nuclear incidents remained limited and generated minimal public interest or concern (Camilleri, 1984: 75). This suggests that the safety of nuclear power did not register as a significant issue for agents during the initial two decades of civil nuclear energy development.

In the 1970s, however, an ideational shift began to take place in the way that agents (policymakers, industry representatives, the media and the general public) perceived and prioritised the safety of nuclear power plants. Prior to this period, the military origins of nuclear power had kept the industry shrouded in secrecy. However, from the 1970s onwards, a number of events took place to erode this secrecy and place nuclear power increasingly in the public spotlight. Accidents at nuclear power plants became increasingly severe and visible to the public. The first fatalities to take place at a nuclear facility in West Germany occurred in 1975, when two workmen died from burns inflicted by escaping steam at the Gundremmingen Nuclear Power Plant (The New York Times, 1975a: 7). There were numerous reports of workers being seriously injured or exposed to excessive levels of radiation at nuclear power plants across the US (The New York Times, 1979: 30; Bertini, 1980: 66-7; Daytona Beach Morning Journal, 1977: 5C; Lewiston Morning Tribune, 1979: 2A). At the same time, media reporting on nuclear accidents became more widespread. This made it increasingly difficult for the nuclear industry to perpetuate the idea that nuclear power was an entirely safe source of electricity generation. As the potential dangers of nuclear power became more visible, members of the public became increasingly critical of the government and the nuclear industry’s ability to ensure that the risks of nuclear power were contained. Public scepticism over the safety of nuclear power was further heightened by broader contextual shifts occurring at the time. For example, the environmental movement emerged in the mid- 1970s, which publicised the dangers of nuclear power to the general public (see Chapter 7 for a more detailed examination of the impact of environmentalism on public perceptions of nuclear power). The environmental movement contributed to the increasing visibility of nuclear issues by forcing them into sight through public hearings and demonstrations. Similarly, Beck (1992) argues that a ‘risk society’ has emerged from the late 1970s onwards, whereby individuals have become increasingly concerned about the risks resulting from technological advancements, such as nuclear power. The impact of a risk society on public and political perceptions of nuclear power is explored in further detail in Chapter 9.

Governments tended to respond to the growing scepticism over the safety of nuclear power by promising more stringent regulatory requirements and safety standards. However, in doing so, government representatives also served to confirm and legitimise the public’s concerns that nuclear power plants were unsafe in the first place. By taking active and visible measures to allay public concerns over nuclear safety, government actors also contributed to a shift in the political agenda whereby safety considerations have become intrinsic to the nuclear debate. Both the rise in public concern over nuclear safety, and the government discourse and actions responding to and legitimising these concerns, has resulted in the issue of nuclear safety becoming a central discussion point in any debate over the value or future of nuclear power.

Attempts by the nuclear industry to improve public perceptions of nuclear safety proved largely unsuccessful, and in some instances, even served to worsen the industry’s public image. The nuclear industry initially responded to the increasing concerns over nuclear safety by staunchly defending the

74 industry’s safety record. They argued that the probability of a major reactor accident taking place was no more than 1 in 100,000 reactor years (Camilleri, 1984: 81). The chairwoman of the US Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), Dixie Lee Ray, defended nuclear power plants on the grounds that they were “infinitely safer than eating” (Walker, 2009). In order to allay public fears over nuclear reactors, the AEC commissioned a study to provide a realistic estimate of the risks to the public should an accident take place at a nuclear power plant. The Reactor Safety Study was completed in 1975 and concluded that “the risks to the public from potential accidents in nuclear power plants are comparatively small” (US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1975: 1). However, rather than restoring public faith in the nuclear industry, the report came under extensive criticism for its methods and conclusions (Office of Technology Assessment, 1984: 218-9). In 1978, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission withdrew its endorsement of the report’s findings (Office of Technology Assessment, 1984: 219). By the late 1970s, the nuclear industry had little choice but to accept that public concerns over nuclear safety were going to remain a central issue for determining the future success of the nuclear industry.

The shift in public perceptions of nuclear safety became even more firmly entrenched after the disasters at Three Mile Island (TMI) in 1979 and Chernobyl in 1986. The severity of these two nuclear disasters appeared to confirm the public’s fears that nuclear power could not be managed safely by governments and the nuclear industry. The partial meltdown of a reactor at the TMI nuclear station in Pennsylvania on the 28th March 1979 was described by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (2013: 1) as the “most serious accident in US commercial nuclear power plant operating history”, even though the meltdown did not result in any fatalities. Approximately 144,000 residents evacuated the area, even though a mandatory evacuation was never called (Observer-Reporter, 1979: A6; Scurlock, 2010: 31). The damaged reactor took almost twelve years to clean up, at a cost of roughly US$973m (WNA, 2012c).

The impact of the TMI disaster on agents’ perceptions of nuclear safety was significant. In the US, public opposition to nuclear energy experienced an immediate and sustained increase in the wake of TMI (Office of Technology Assessment, 1984: 211). Several factors surrounding the TMI disaster in 1979 amplified the public and political attention that the event received, leading Mazur (1990: 299) to suggest that “had the accident at Three Mile Island occurred in 1976, it might also have been ignored, at least initially…It happened at the right time and place to make it the centre of attention”. One factor which amplified the attention that TMI received was what Dubner and Levitt (2007) term the “Jane Fonda effect”. Twelve days prior to the meltdown at TMI, a film starring Jane Fonda, The China Syndrome, was released. The movie depicts a journalist (Fonda) discovering the cover-up of a near- miss safety accident at a nuclear power plant. Despite the fictional nature of the film, it nevertheless served to highlight the risks associated with nuclear energy, and cast doubts on the ability of government and industry to safely operate nuclear power plants. Even before TMI occurred, newspapers were

75 publishing articles about the film, posing questions as to whether the fictional plot could become a real- life scenario, questioning the ability of regulators to ensure the safety of nuclear power plants, and reminding the public of other accidents which had previously occurred at nuclear facilities. An executive from Westinghouse described the film as “an overall character assassination of an entire industry” (Burnham, 1979b: D1). The film stoked “widespread panic” about the nuclear industry, and placed the dangers of nuclear power at the forefront of public consciousness (Dubner and Levitt, 2007).

The TMI disaster contributed to the change in public perceptions of nuclear power and nuclear safety. The coincidental release of the film so close to the disaster taking place contributed to the extensive news coverage that TMI received – far greater than the news coverage of any previous nuclear accidents taking place in the US or elsewhere. Governments responded to the heightened public concerns over nuclear safety by revising their nuclear programmes and strengthening their institutional regimes for ensuring nuclear safety. The Swedish government responded to public concerns over nuclear safety by holding a national referendum on the future of nuclear power, which resulted in a plan to phase-out all nuclear power stations in the country by 2010 (Nohrstedt, 2005: 1042). In the US, TMI prompted a widespread overhaul in reactor safety management, with greater attention paid to the “human factors” that can contribute to safety incidents (Walker and Wellock, 2010: 57). The Institute of Nuclear Power Operations was established by the nuclear industry in the months after TMI as an industry watchdog. While these actions were undertaken in an attempt to improve public confidence in nuclear safety, they also served to legitimise public fears by suggesting that nuclear power in its current form was unsafe, and that actions needed to be taken to address this. Furthermore, by making public announcements about their efforts to improve nuclear safety, government representatives contributed to the shift in discourse whereby issues of safety became inextricably linked to any discussion of nuclear power and its future.

Public concerns over the safety of nuclear power were further reinforced by the Chernobyl nuclear disaster. On the 26th April 1986, an explosion destroyed one of four reactors at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant in the Ukraine (then Soviet Union). The explosion caused massive amounts of radioactivity to become airborne and eventually fall over large areas of Belarus, Russia, and the Ukraine. However, it was not until two days after the event – when radiation levels ten times higher than normal were detected in Sweden, Denmark, and Finland – that the Soviet Union revealed that the explosion had taken place. Even then, the Soviet Union did not initially disclose which nuclear plant was affected or where the plant was located, nor did they reveal whether there were any injuries or deaths caused (Williams, 1986). The extent of the impact of Chernobyl continues to be debated today. While less than fifty deaths were directly caused by radiation from the disaster, predictions over total deaths attributable to Chernobyl range from 4,000 to half a million (Vidal, 2010). Over 100,000km2 of land was significantly contaminated (Marples, 1996: 24), and almost 350,000 people were evacuated or resettled

(UNDP/UNICEF, 2002: 66). There have also been widespread mental health impacts and elevated incidence rates of childhood thyroid cancer in the affected region (Chernobyl Forum, 2006).

Chernobyl has arguably done more to damage the public image of the nuclear industry and reinforce the stereotype that nuclear power is unsafe than any other event in the history of the technology. As news of the damage at Chernobyl spread, public and political confidence in the safety of nuclear power collapsed. The secrecy surrounding the Soviet Union’s reluctance to admit that a nuclear accident had taken place, or to disclose the scale of its impact, fuelled public concerns about transparency in the nuclear industry. Government and industry officials in Western Europe and North America attempted to reassure the public about the safety of nuclear power by highlighting the difference in Soviet and Western reactor designs. The Chairman of the Central Electricity Generating Board argued that nuclear safety standards were significantly higher in Great Britain than in the Soviet Union, and as such, it was impossible for a disaster like Chernobyl to take place in the UK (Thorson, 1986). The Vice-President of the Canadian Nuclear Association described the possibility of a core meltdown in Canadian reactor designs as “inconceivable” (Wilson, 1986: A21). However, the detection of elevated radiation levels across Europe following the disaster also illustrated to the public the trans-boundary effects of a nuclear accident. It became clear that the effects of sub-standard reactor designs were not limited to the country operating the nuclear power plant.

The impact of Chernobyl on the global nuclear industry was immediate and long-lasting. In the months after the meltdown, new reactor starts ground to a halt worldwide, several operating reactors were shut down prematurely, and many of the reactors that were planned or already under construction were cancelled (Darst and Dawson, 2010: 56). The impact of Chernobyl on nuclear policy was particularly dramatic in Western Europe. In the year following Chernobyl, the Italian government held a referendum on nuclear energy, the result of which was to phase-out the country’s entire use of nuclear power (Nuclear Information and Resource Service, 2011: 2). Opposition political parties in Germany and the UK announced that they would phase out nuclear energy if they were elected (Renn, 1990: 151). The Swedish government brought forward the implementation start-date for its planned nuclear phase-out (Bergenäs, 2009). Finland postponed new orders for nuclear reactors, while Greece decided that it would not pursue the development of a nuclear programme (Renn, 1990: 154). Public opposition to nuclear power immediately after the accident increased in Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Spain, Sweden, The Netherlands, the UK and Yugoslavia (Renn, 1990: 155).

By the 1990s, the issue of nuclear safety had become central to the debate over nuclear power. The increasing severity and visibility of accidents at nuclear facilities has meant that nuclear power is now widely viewed as a source of potentially catastrophic danger to society and the environment. The public is now less willing to unquestioningly accept industry claims that nuclear power is one of the safest sources of energy production available. As a result, nuclear industry representatives and pro-nuclear

77 government officials now have to work much harder to convince the public that nuclear power plants can be operated safely. An ideational shift had occurred whereby public perceptions of nuclear power have been altered to give much greater consideration to the technology’s potential risks and hazards.

A NEW ERA OF NUCLEAR SAFETY?

A key factor contributing to the expectation of a nuclear renaissance was the promises made by the nuclear industry that new reactor designs would be safer than ever before. Consequently, there would be little reason for the public to be worried about the safety of nuclear power, or to oppose nuclear power on the grounds that it is unsafe. Moreover, the nuclear industry pointed to its impressive safety record over the past two decades as evidence that there was no longer any reason for the public to be concerned about the potential dangers of nuclear power.

The expectation of a nuclear renaissance was driven by representatives from the nuclear industry who announced the development of new nuclear reactor designs that would be safer than ever before (Power, 2004: 7). Specifically, the nuclear industry claimed that new Generation III+ advanced nuclear reactor designs were far safer than previous models as they incorporated passive safety features, rather than requiring active intervention to prevent a nuclear accident from taking place as a result of a malfunction (WNA, 2014a). Highlighting these design improvements, Westinghouse described its Generation III+ nuclear reactor, the AP1000, as the safest nuclear power plant available worldwide (Westinghouse, 2015a). AREVA described its European Pressurised Reactor as having “an unequalled safety level thanks to a drastic reduction of the probability of severe accidents” (AREVA, 2015). GE Hitachi (2014) described its Generation III+ Economic Simplified Boiling Water Reactor as “the world’s safest reactor”. A spokesman for Entergy described the nuclear industry as “by far the safest industry in the world” (Dennehy, 2005). A report released by the OECD’s Nuclear Energy Agency concluded that the “theoretically calculated frequency of a severe nuclear power plant accident” had been reduced by a factor of 1600 between the Generation I and the Generation III/III+ nuclear reactor designs (OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, 2010a: 7). These claims, that nuclear power was safer than ever before, were expected to drive a nuclear renaissance by improving public and political confidence in the safety of power, thereby increasing popular support for nuclear new build.

Public perceptions of nuclear safety were also meant to have become more favourable as a result of sustained improvements in the nuclear industry’s safety record over the past two decades. The Chernobyl disaster prompted numerous institutional responses which sought to improve both the safety of nuclear power plants, as well as the public perception of nuclear power as safe. The World Association of Nuclear Operators was created after Chernobyl in order to foster a global nuclear safety culture, while the IAEA’s approach to plant safety was reformed (Adamantiades and Kessides, 2009: 5154). These organisations have since worked to improve plant safety by creating transnational

78 networks and exchanges for continuous and results-oriented peer review of safety practices (WNA, 2013h). Plants in the US have fared particularly well, with nuclear facilities in 2011 achieving near- record levels of reliability and safety performance (Nuclear Energy Insitute, 2012). Moreover, since Chernobyl, there has not been a single fatality as a result of exposure to radiation from a commercial nuclear reactor (WNA, 2014l). The nuclear industry expected that this impressive track record would improve public perceptions of the safety of nuclear energy, and convince the public that nuclear energy was a safe form of energy production.

However, public concerns over nuclear safety were renewed afresh when a nuclear disaster occurred at Fukushima, Japan in March 2011. The events at Fukushima reignited fears over nuclear safety and prompted countries worldwide to review and revise their nuclear energy programmes (Elliott, 2013). In the months following the Fukushima disaster, the governments of Germany, Switzerland, Italy, Mexico, Belgium, Japan, Kuwait, and Bahrain abandoned plans for future nuclear energy development. Nuclear development plans were delayed in Indonesia and Thailand, and temporarily suspended in China. The US undertook safety reviews of all its nuclear power plants, with several reactor construction plans delayed or abandoned. The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission responded to Fukushima by ordering $100m worth of safety enhancements at existing nuclear power plants (WNA, 2014l). These decisions seemed to confirm public fears that nuclear power was unsafe and that government and industry regulation of the technology could not be trusted.

The revelation of further safety incidents in the months following the meltdowns have continued to erode public confidence in the ability of the nuclear industry to safely and effectively respond to a nuclear disaster. It has since been revealed that hundreds of tonnes of highly radioactive water have leaked from storage tanks at the Fukushima Daiichi plant, and that contaminated water has also started leaking into the sea (The Telegraph, 2013a; Yamaguchi, 2013). The Fukushima disaster effectively overrode any earlier promises made by the nuclear industry that nuclear accidents were a relic of the past. It served to highlight the ongoing ideational importance of nuclear safety, and the centrality of the idea of nuclear safety to determining the success of the nuclear renaissance.

Yet even in the face of Fukushima, nuclear energy still holds a far more impressive safety record than any form of fossil fuels (OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, 2010a). Despite the severity of the nuclear incident at Fukushima, the fact that not a single death has been attributable to the nuclear accident could arguably serve as a further justification that nuclear power remains safe even under severe and highly improbable conditions. However, the idea that nuclear is an unsafe technology has continued to dominate agents’ perceptions of nuclear power, and influence their degree of support for the technology. In addition to longer-standing concerns around accidents at nuclear power plants and radiation releases, growing fears around terrorism and the possibility of an attack at a nuclear facility have added a new layer of public concern that the nuclear industry has to contend with if they are to convince agents that

79 nuclear power is safe. For example, a report released in 2013 by the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Project concluded that more than 100 nuclear reactors across the US are inadequately prepared in the case of an attempted terrorist attack (Gardner, 2013).

The issue of nuclear safety continues to be a key justification underpinning the arguments put forward by large-scale organisations and localised anti-nuclear groups alike for why nuclear power should not be utilised. Friends of the Earth describes nuclear power as one of the “most dangerous” sources of energy, evidenced by the history of accidents and leaks at nuclear power plants (Friends of the Earth, 2013a: 1). Greenpeace International (2014b) describes nuclear power as “inherently dangerous” and claims that “safe reactors are a myth”. The ‘Stop Hinkley’ campaign, which aims to stop the construction of the Hinkley Point C nuclear reactor in the UK – opposes the construction on the grounds that “nuclear power stations risk a catastrophic accident”, and that they are a “prime target for a terrorist attack” (Stop Hinkley, 2014: 1). In Germany, the leaders of the Green political party stated that Fukushima demonstrated “that nuclear power is an uncontrollable, highly dangerous technology” (Deutsche Welle, 2011). The German environmental group, BUND (Friends of the Earth Germany), opposed nuclear power on the grounds that “we can no longer afford bearing the risk of a nuclear catastrophe” (Associated Press, 2011). The French anti-nuclear group, Sortir du nucléaire, argues that nuclear power should be phased-out on the grounds that “a nuclear accident provokes countless victims and leaves vast tracts of land uninhabitable for thousands of years” (Sortir du nucléaire, 2015). This disconnect between the measured level of nuclear safety, versus what the public perceives to be the level of nuclear safety, highlights the central importance of safety as a social construction.

When the European Commission called for stress testing of nuclear power plants in the wake of Fukushima, several Members of the European Parliament (MEP) stated their opposition to nuclear power on the grounds of safety concerns. For example, MEP Margrete Auken, declared that “the only thing that is safe and secure about nuclear is that our grandchildren will hate us” (Skelton, 2012). MEP Jo Leinen, warned that “the inherent risk of a commercial nuclear power station is there…you cannot avoid the [possibility that the] biggest nuclear accident would happen” (Skelton, 2012). In the US, the Sierra Club – a nationwide environmental organisation – opposes nuclear energy on the grounds that it is “a uniquely dangerous energy technology for humanity” (Sierra Club, 2015). Similarly, the Sierra Club in Canada opposes nuclear power on the grounds that “contrary to nuclear industry advertisements, nuclear power is neither clean nor safe. We cannot afford to forget the devastation of a nuclear catastrophe” (Campaign for Nuclear Phaseout, 2006). The Green Party of the United States advocates for a complete phase-out of nuclear power because “all processes associated with nuclear power are dangerous” (Green Party, 2012).

The nuclear industry has continued to perceive nuclear safety as a matter of risk, rather than uncertainty. They have attempted to improve public confidence in nuclear power through a measured, empirical

80 approach. They publish factsheets and reports measuring and testing the degree of safety at nuclear power plants, and provide the public with detailed reports of the engineering measures that are in place to prevent any kind of nuclear accident from taking place. The numerous safety reviews and stress tests that were conducted at nuclear power plants post-Fukushima were expected to reassure the public that nuclear power is being safely and competently managed and regulated. However, the idea of nuclear power as an unsafe technology remains largely unchanged in the public’s mind. If the public is unconvinced by the nuclear industry’s guarantees of nuclear power as a safe source of energy production, then governments are unlikely to support nuclear energy development, for fear of public opposition. Therefore, what matters most is what agents believe to be the case when it comes to nuclear safety, rather than what the industry or government objectively measures the safety of nuclear power to be.

The failure of the nuclear industry to convince the public of the safety of nuclear power is evidenced by opinion polls conducted during the renaissance period. A poll conducted for the International Atomic Energy Agency in 2005 found that only 28 percent of respondents believed nuclear power to be a safe and important source of electricity (OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, 2010b: 34). Another study conducted by Globescan in 2011 investigated public perceptions of nuclear power in twelve countries that were currently operating nuclear power plants (Globescan, 2011). Only 22 percent of the respondents agreed with the statement that “nuclear power is relatively safe and an important source of electricity, and we should build more nuclear power plants” (Globescan, 2011). The 2010 Eurobarometer report on Europeans and Nuclear Safety investigates public opinion on issues of nuclear energy and nuclear safety from the 27 EU Member States. The survey found that in 18 out of the 27 countries surveyed, an absolute or relative majority of respondents believed that nuclear risks are being underestimated (Eurobarometer, 2010: 46). Furthermore, 52 percent of respondents surveyed believed that nuclear power plants are not sufficiently secured against terrorist attacks, 49 percent do not believe that radioactive waste disposal can be carried out safely, and 45 percent of respondents believed that nuclear materials are not sufficiently protected against malevolent use (Eurobarometer, 2010: 52)13.

A survey of British public perceptions of climate change and energy conducted in 2010 found that only 39 percent of respondents thought that the nuclear industry could be trusted to run nuclear power stations safely (Spence et al., 2010: 13). A study conducted by MIT in 2007 into the US public’s perceptions of nuclear power found that 69 percent of respondents disagreed with the statement that “nuclear waste can be stored safely for many years” (MIT, 2011: 129). Another study of US public

13 It is important to note that there are also significant variations in how safe nuclear power is perceived to be by the public across different countries in the region of Western Europe. For example, in the 2007 Eurobarometer report on Europeans and Nuclear Safety, 61% of respondents from Sweden and 50% of respondents from the Czech Republic believed that the advantages of nuclear power as an energy source outweighs the risks it poses (Eurobarometer, 2007b: 18). On the other hand, only 13% of respondents from Ireland and 13% of respondents from Greece agreed with this statement (Eurobarometer, 2007b: 18).

81 opinion conducted in 2011 asked participants to provide the first word that came to mind when they thought of “nuclear power”. Participants were significantly more likely to associate nuclear power with being bad, dangerous or scary, or associate it with images of “disaster”, than they were in a previous version of the study conducted in 2005 (Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies, 2015). Similarly, a study conducted in the weeks after the Fukushima nuclear disaster of the Canadian public’s opinion of nuclear power generation found that 43 percent of respondents agreed with the statement that “the safety of nuclear power is now in question and we should hold off building new plants”, compared with only 22 percent of respondents who agreed that “nuclear power is a safe source of energy and Canada should continue to build more plants” (Abacus Data, 2011: 6). The 2012 Canadian National Nuclear Attitude Survey found that 55 percent of respondents thought that the word “dangerous” describes nuclear power extremely or very well (Innovative Research Group, 2012: 17) 14. The findings of these many opinion polls suggest that despite the strong safety record of the nuclear industry, and the many claims made by the industry of new and safer reactor designs, public opinion on the safety of nuclear power remains divided.

The interviews conducted for this thesis confirm the important role that public perceptions of nuclear safety have played in influencing the success of the nuclear renaissance in Western Europe and North America. One academic interviewed argued that the failure of the nuclear renaissance in OECD countries was partly a result of the inability of the nuclear industry to convince the public of the safety of nuclear energy. More specifically, the interviewee argued that the nuclear industry has been unable to convince the public of the safety of nuclear power, and that this has prevented the nuclear industry from successfully generating a nuclear renaissance. The interviewee stated that “the engineering, science and the industry sector must not be telling the story well enough, because the reality is that it has proven itself to be perhaps the safest energy or electricity supply system available to us. Yes there have been some incidents, but the number of incidents of death is still way shorter than any other energy system” (Interview with Director of Energy Research Centre, 17/09/2014).

Another academic interviewed highlighted the ongoing public fear over radiation from nuclear power plants as a barrier to the expansion of nuclear power development. In particular, the interviewee highlighted the intangible and imperceptible nature of radiation as a core element underpinning public fears over nuclear power, as compared with other forms of energy electricity, describing this as “the

14 It should be noted that there is not a universal consensus amongst public opinion studies that nuclear power is unsafe. There have been contradictions in findings of public opinion on nuclear safety between studies, and even within studies themselves. For example, the 2010 Eurobarometer report on Europeans and Nuclear Safety also found that 59 percent of respondents were confident that nuclear power plants can be operated safely (Eurobarometer, 2010: 53). This finding somewhat contradicts the report’s other findings on perceptions of nuclear safety, and demonstrates the complexity and variability in public perceptions on nuclear power and the influence of survey design on responses.

82 fear of the unknown” (Interview with University Research Fellow, 5/09/2014). The interviewee argued that:

“The problem is people would rather see a coal-fired power plant and all the black smoke coming out. That’s OK, that doesn’t kill people. We see it there, that’s fine. Radiation you can’t see and people are afraid of things you can’t see. So essentially you’ve got a major kind of reputation issue in Europe, say Western Europe, where because of what’s happened in Chernobyl, now reinforced by Fukushima, the population is just allergic to it in some way. They don’t want nuclear power. I don’t know how you can bypass that problem in any shape or form” (Interview with University Research Fellow, 5/09/2014).

Agents and their ideas about nuclear safety matter. What counts is not simply whether or not nuclear power plants can be operated safely and that the nuclear industry can objectively measure and demonstrate this, but whether or not the public believe that nuclear power is safe. While the nuclear industry argues that it has an impressive safety track record when compared with other forms of fossil fuel energy generation, this argument remains contested (see, for example, Wheatley et al., 2015). Moreover, the nuclear industry’s insistence that their risk assessments are ‘objective’ fail to recognise that accidents and human error are an inevitable property of complex systems (Perrow, 1984), such as those involved in nuclear power plants. Clearly, the nuclear industry’s argument that nuclear power is safe has failed to be widely accepted by the public. Public opinion poll data indicates that the renaissance period has not witnessed a shift towards greater public confidence in the safety of the nuclear industry. Critics of nuclear power cite the safety risks associated with nuclear energy as a core reason for their opposition. The events at Fukushima in 2011 have cemented fears already held as a result of previous nuclear accidents, and illustrated the inevitability that accidents will happen within complex systems. This finding has been reaffirmed through the interviews conducted with experts in nuclear energy. Regardless of the objective measures provided by the nuclear industry on the safety of nuclear power, what matters for explaining why a renaissance has not taken place is understanding that the public continues to believe that nuclear power is unsafe. This belief acts as a significant barrier to nuclear energy development in Western Europe and North America, as governments are often unwilling to publicly support nuclear power in the face of public opposition. Consequently, the socially constructed nature of safety will continue to act as a hindrance to any future attempts at creating a nuclear renaissance in Western Europe and North America.

CONCLUSION

In accordance with an Agents in Context Historical Institutionalist perspective, this chapter has argued that the ideational context in which agents operate is central to understanding the changing trajectory of nuclear energy development over time. It argues that there has been a collective change in public

83 perceptions of the importance of nuclear safety, and to the ability of governments and the nuclear industry to safely manage nuclear power. Furthermore, it argues that this ideational shift has contributed to the disconnection between the expectation and reality of the nuclear renaissance. The early rise of nuclear power in the 1950s and 1960s was made possible, in part, by a widespread lack of concern over the safety of nuclear power plants. However, the increasing visibility and severity of accidents at nuclear power plants - highlighted by the events at Three Mile Island, Chernobyl and Fukushima – has inflamed public fears over the safety of nuclear power. It has also led to a growing public scepticism over the ability of governments and the nuclear industry to safely operate and manage nuclear power plants.

The growth in public concern and scepticism over nuclear safety has served as a barrier to the development of nuclear power. Governments and the nuclear industry have responded to these concerns through an institutional change – by increasing the regulatory and safety standards that are imposed on nuclear power plants to a degree that far surpasses the requirements of any other form of energy production. As a result, one of the key justifications for the nuclear renaissance was that the safety problem had been ‘fixed’ through the development of new reactor designs that were far safer than the models currently in operation. The industry’s strong track record in nuclear safety post-Chernobyl, particularly when compared to the safety records of other fossil fuels, was meant to further reinforce the industry’s claims that nuclear power was now safe. Yet despite these promises, public opinion poll data indicates that large segments of the public still perceive nuclear power to be unsafe. Agents’ ongoing concerns over nuclear safety make it considerably difficult for governments to gain public support for nuclear energy development, and make it difficult for the nuclear industry to gain a social license to operate within a country. Consequently, this chapter concludes that the disconnection between the expectation and reality of the nuclear renaissance can be explained, in part, by an ideational shift in the way that agents perceive and prioritise the issue of nuclear safety. It is unlikely that a nuclear renaissance will take place for as long as the public continues to believe that nuclear power is unsafe – and objective measures and calculations of safety undertaken by the nuclear industry are not enough to sway public perceptions of the dangers posed by nuclear power.

6. NUCLEAR WASTE

This chapter argues that the failure of the nuclear renaissance can be explained by an ideational shift in the way in which nuclear waste is perceived and prioritised as a policy problem. An inevitable by- product of the generation of electricity by nuclear power plants is highly radioactive waste. This waste can pose immense risks to both human and environmental health. However, the degree to which agents have perceived the issue of nuclear waste as a problem in need of an effective solution has changed significantly over time. During the early development of civil nuclear power in the 1950s and 1960s, the issue of nuclear waste was paid little attention by policymakers, and even less by the general public. While policymakers were aware that nuclear waste was a dangerous substance, it did not register as a problem that was in need of an immediate solution. Little effort or consideration was invested in developing a long-term solution to the management of nuclear waste.

However, over time, the issue of nuclear waste has become a much more visible policy issue. This visibility has been driven by the increasingly negative media coverage on the topic of nuclear waste, reports of leaks and mismanagement at nuclear facilities storing radioactive waste, and the emergence of the environmental movement in the 1970s. These factors have highlighted to the public the dangers associated with nuclear waste, and the risks that could result from mismanagement of radioactive substances. Growing public attention to the problem of nuclear waste has led to the issue becoming a central discussion point in debates over nuclear energy development. And yet, despite the increasing ideational prominence of nuclear waste to debates over nuclear energy development, a long-term solution for the storage and disposal of nuclear waste remains elusive. At present, there are no long- term nuclear high-level waste storage and disposal facilities operating anywhere in the world. Many of the attempts by governments and the nuclear industry to site and construct a High Level Waste (HLW) disposal facility have been thwarted by the rise of public opposition to the development of such a facility, given the risks that nuclear waste poses to human and environmental health. This opposition indicates that nuclear waste continues to be a highly problematic issue for the future development of nuclear energy programmes worldwide.

However, the issue of nuclear waste was largely overlooked by advocates of the nuclear renaissance. The expectation of a nuclear renaissance was based partly on the assumption that technological advancements in nuclear reactor design would result in nuclear power plants producing far less radioactive waste than existing designs. In addition, any remaining public fears over nuclear waste were meant to be eased and public opposition to the construction of nuclear waste facilities reduced through the adoption of more democratic procedures for nuclear waste management. However, the development

85 of advanced nuclear reactor designs does not address the ongoing problem of HLW that continues to sit in temporary storage across the globe. The adoption of more democratic procedures for siting nuclear waste facilities also proved to have mixed results. In the UK, the adoption of democratic siting procedures has failed to secure a site for a long-term nuclear waste disposal facility. Consequently, the issue of nuclear waste continues to pose a challenge to nuclear energy development throughout Western Europe and North America. The unresolved nature of this issue suggests that the expectation of a nuclear renaissance was never likely to become a reality. Governments need to find a politically palatable solution to the long-term storage and disposal of nuclear waste in order for nuclear energy development to be successful.

THE HAZARDS OF NUCLEAR WASTE

There are three categories of radioactive waste generated as a result of operating nuclear power plants. Low level waste (LLW) includes items that have become contaminated and emit radiation at low levels, and therefore require only minimal shielding for transport and storage. LLW represents 90 percent of the total volume of radioactive wastes produced worldwide, but contain only 1 percent of the total radioactive content of the waste (WNA 2013f). Intermediate level waste (ILW) represents 7 percent of the total volume of radioactive waste, and represents 4 percent of the radioactive content (WNA 2013f). High level waste (HLW) consists of used nuclear fuel and separated waste from the reprocessing of used nuclear fuel. HLW amounts to only 3 percent of the total volume of nuclear waste, but is responsible for 95 percent of all radioactive content. Final disposal of HLW is delayed for 40-50 years to allow its radioactivity to decay to a level where it can be handled more easily (WNA 2012d). HLW contains highly radioactive elements which can remain hazardous for up to thousands of years (Greenberg, 2013: 24). HLW poses the greatest risk to human health, as even short periods of direct exposure to radioactive elements can prove fatal (Adeola, 2011: 52). Nuclear waste leakage can enter ground water or waterways, contaminating food chains and causing long-term environmental damage (US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2011). Nuclear waste poses a further safety risk in regards to weapons proliferation, as nuclear waste can be reprocessed and then re-used for the production of ‘dirty bombs’ (Medalia, 2011: 60).

NUCLEAR WASTE IN THE EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR POWER

When civil nuclear energy programmes were first being developed in the 1950s and 1960s, little consideration was given to the waste that such programmes would generate (Litmanen, 1996: 524). This lack of attention is evident on both an international and a domestic level. The International Atomic Energy Agency, established in 1957 to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy, did not hold any

86 meetings on developing permanent storage solutions for nuclear waste until 1973 (Walls, 2011: 28). In Sweden, only limited attention was paid to the issue of radioactive waste management up until the early 1970s (Thegerström and Laârouchi Engström, 2013: 359). Nuclear scientists and politicians alike assumed that technology would eventually be developed to eliminate the nuclear waste issue (Anshelm and Galis, 2009: 272). Meanwhile, any discussion over nuclear waste was limited to political and academic circles, with no space for public involvement. Information leaflets produced by the nuclear industry made no mention of the risks associated with nuclear waste (Anshelm and Galis, 2009: 273). In Belgium, decisions regarding investment in nuclear energy were made with little thought given to the issues arising from nuclear waste (Schröder et al., 2015: 141). In the US, neither the original Atomic Energy Act of 1946 nor its 1954 amendments explicitly addressed the regulation and disposal of nuclear waste. The lack of consideration over the issue of nuclear waste during the early period of nuclear development was evident when, in 1967, the British Government tasked the Select Committee on Science and Technology with producing a comprehensive report examining the UK nuclear reactor programme in general. The completed report made no mention of the radioactive waste being produced at existing nuclear reactor sites, nor of the waste which would accumulate over time as the country’s nuclear programme expanded (Chandler, 1997: 53). An examination of Hansard, the transcripts of British parliamentary debates, reveals that nuclear waste was mentioned only twice in passing in the 1950s (in 1953 and in 1958), and three times in the 1960s (in 1967, 1968 and 1969).

Several factors can explain the distinct lack of public or political concern over the issue of nuclear waste. Firstly, the amount of HLW that a nuclear power plant generates is physically quite small, and can therefore be temporarily stored at the site where the waste was being produced. The ability to store waste on-site meant that governments and the nuclear industry had little incentive to develop a longer- term strategy for storing and disposing of HLW. In the UK, untreated nuclear waste was generally kept at the site where it was produced, such as at Sellafield, where nuclear waste was stored in cooling ponds and silos without any strategy for how the waste would be treated or removed (Sellafield Ltd., 2012: 5). French officials planned on reprocessing their nuclear waste, which meant that little consideration was given to developing a long-term HLW storage plan (Palfreman, 2014). However, this assumption ignored the fact that reprocessing spent nuclear fuel would still result in a smaller amount of leftover HLW that would need to be stored and disposed of. The lack of concern over nuclear waste during this time can also be attributed to the fact that the civil and military nuclear facilities were only recently constructed, and it was expected that the leftover HLW would not accumulate into larger bodies of waste for several decades – at which point it was assumed that longer-term waste storage facilities would have been developed elsewhere (Stewart and Stewart, 2011: 22). Consequently, the problem of how to dispose of HLW from nuclear facilities was largely overlooked by policymakers throughout the first two decades of nuclear energy development. The issue of nuclear waste did not feature in public

87 or political debates over whether nuclear reactors should be constructed. Put simply, political leaders and nuclear advocates did not consider nuclear waste to be a problem.

THE GROWING POLICY PROBLEM OF NUCLEAR WASTE

While nuclear waste had always been a problem in need of a solution, it was not until the mid-1970s that the idea of nuclear waste began to become problematic. Following the initial public and political indifference towards nuclear waste, the management and risks associated with radioactive materials began to be treated more seriously as a policy problem. The ideational shift in agents’ perceptions of nuclear waste can be attributed to growing media interest in issues associated with nuclear waste. In the 1950s and 1960s, newspaper coverage of issues relating to nuclear waste was limited. Yet by the early 1970s, provocative headlines such as “The deadly waste of nuclear power”, “Nuclear waste fears”, and “Nuclear waste can kill us all” became more frequent, alerting the public to the potential hazards of nuclear waste. Newspaper articles increasingly reported on mismanagement and waste leakages at nuclear reactors and waste storage sites (Blau, 1977: 27; Los Angeles Times, 1973: A6; Dye, 1973: A1), and warned that utilities were rapidly running out of space to store the accumulating waste (Rattner, 1978: D3; Sinclair, 1979: A2; Omang, 1977: A10). When British Nuclear Fuels announced plans to build a nuclear waste reprocessing plant at Windscale in Cumbria, the plans received little public or political attention until the Daily Mirror released a front page story in October 1975 that warned the construction of the plant would make Britain “the world’s nuclear dustbin” (Harris, 2005: 1).

The effect of this increasingly negative media coverage was that public opinion towards nuclear energy and the waste it produces became increasingly negative from the 1970s onwards (Rosa and Freudenburg, 1993) (see Chapter 5 for more detail on declining public opinion towards nuclear power). In 1979, an article in the New York Times stated that “so widespread is public concern about the lack of a solution that it has become a major barrier…to the continued development of nuclear power in the United States” (Burnham, 1979a: A1). The issue of nuclear waste began to feature more prominently in political debates, and be treated as much more of a serious problem by political leaders. Whereas nuclear waste was raised in British parliamentary debates only twice in the 1950s and three times in the 1960s, it was discussed in parliament in every year throughout the 1970s (except for 1971), 1980s and 1990s.

The increasing visibility of nuclear waste as an issue was also driven by the emergence of the environmental movement in the 1970s, and the sustained growth of this movement over the following decades. As described in more detail in Chapter 7, the storage, transportation and disposal of nuclear waste is a major concern for environmentalists, given that radioactive waste remains toxic for thousands of years. The environmental movement has actively campaigned to raise public awareness of the

88 dangers associated with nuclear waste, and the risks that could result from mismanagement of radioactive substances. The growth of the environmental movement has also contributed to institutional changes in the way in which nuclear waste is managed. For example, the actions of environmental organisations led to the implementation of a ban on the practice of sea dumping of nuclear waste in the 1980s. These two factors – widespread media reporting on the issue of nuclear waste, and the growth of the environmental movement and its campaign against nuclear power – contributed to the increasing public recognition of the risks posed by nuclear waste.

Governments throughout Western Europe and North America responded to escalating public concerns over the dangers of nuclear waste by adopting a more purposive stance towards the issue. Political leaders began to acknowledge that nuclear waste was a problem that needed to be solved. In order to be seen as actively working towards a waste solution, governments began commissioning reports and investigations into nuclear waste and the best approach for its management. The outcome of this process was that, by the late 1970s, an almost global consensus had emerged that burying HLW in a deep geological repository (DGR) was the best long-term solution (Solomon et al., 2010: 17; IAEA, 1990: 7). This involves isolating nuclear waste in a stable geological formation deep underground, and is expected to offer the safest and most secure outcome for human and environmental health in the long- term. However, as governments began commissioning work into the identification of potential sites for construction of a DGR, they encountered widespread public opposition from local residents and landowners, as well as from the anti-nuclear movement more broadly. In most instances, this opposition severely delayed the siting process, or caused the siting process to be abandoned altogether.

For example, in Germany, the process of site selection for a HLW disposal facility began in 1972, but the search was abandoned only four years later after the site investigations generated fierce local opposition (Hocke and Kallenbach-Herbert, 2015: 183). In France, investigations for an appropriate site for a HLW repository were conducted in the 1980s. However, local opposition that emerged in response to the site investigations caused the government to declare a one year moratorium on the search for an appropriate site in 1990 (Poisson, 2013: 495). In the US, Congress passed the first piece of legislation governing the management and disposal of waste – the Nuclear Waste Policy Act – in 1982. This legislation declared the use of DGR as the official strategy for storing and disposing of nuclear waste in the US. From 1984-86, a range of potential sites for the first and secondary repositories were identified across thirteen states (Hancock, 2010: 5). Public opposition emerged towards the potential sites in every state, with citizens forming a National Nuclear Waste Task Force to oppose the entire program (The New York Times, 1986: A22). As a result, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act was amended to make Yucca Mountain the only site under consideration for the first nuclear waste repository. Since the decision to site a repository at Yucca Mountain was made, members of the public, politicians, and anti-nuclear organisations have protested against the development, arguing that the site was chosen for

89 political reasons and challenging the scientific statements about the suitability of the location (Endres, 2009: 50).

The British government’s response to the rise in public concern about nuclear waste is yet another example of the state adopting a more purposive approach to solving the nuclear waste dilemma. In 1976, the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution released a report on Nuclear Power and the Environment. The Commission created the report in response to “signs of increasing anxiety in many countries about projected growth in nuclear power and about the environmental risks that this might imply for the future” (Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, 1976: 1). In its discussion over the dangers of nuclear waste, the report concluded that,

“radioactive waste management is a profoundly serious issue, central to the environmental evaluation of a nuclear power programme. There must be a clear, identifiable, policy centre and a means to ensure that the issues posed by waste management are fully considered at the outset of a nuclear programme, not dealt with many years after the decisions on developments that lead to the wastes have been made and when options may have been effectively foreclosed” (Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, 1976: 164).

The report also concluded that nuclear new build should not proceed until a viable solution to the issue of radioactive waste management had been designed and implemented. The report’s release generated widespread media interest, further inflaming public concerns over the environmental and safety risks posed by nuclear waste. The British government released an official response to the Commission’s report in which it was announced that the Secretary of State for the Environment would become responsible for implementing a nuclear waste management policy (Department of the Environment, 1977: 7). As part of this policy, the UK Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA) identified a range of sites that would be assessed for their feasibility as a location for nuclear waste disposal (Rüdig, 1990: 187). However, when news emerged that the feasibility of sites for test drilling was being assessed, public opposition to the siting of nuclear waste disposal facilities escalated quickly. In 1992, the Nuclear Industry Radioactive Waste Management Executive (NIREX, the British organisation responsible for storage of nuclear waste) announced plans to build a Rock Characterisation Facility (RCF) at Sellafield, which was meant to demonstrate the practicability of a deep underground radioactive waste repository. However, critics of the RCF project (such as Cumbria County Council, Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace) argued that the RCF was really a “Trojan horse” for the construction of a full-scale deep waste repository (McDonald, 1996). In 1997, a local planning inquiry was undertaken into the RCF, which led to Environment Secretary John Gummer rejecting the plans for the RCF. The perceived under-handedness of NIREX’s actions in planning the construction of a nuclear waste facility has contributed to a legacy of perceived poor governance of nuclear waste issues in the UK.

In Wales, the potential siting of nuclear waste facilities in the area was opposed by local residents, farmers, the Welsh Anti-Nuclear Alliance and the People Against Nuclear Dumping on Rural Areas (The Guardian, 1980: 2; Lewis, 1980: 2), the result of which was that the government chose not to lodge any formal application for test drilling in Wales. The UKAEA lodged an application to conduct test drilling at Cheviot Hills in Northumberland in 1978, but it was rejected in the wake of opposition by the Cheviots Defence Action Group (Greenpeace, 2003: 1). Another application was lodged for test drilling at Mullwharchar Hill near Loch Doon, but was opposed by the Campaign Opposing Nuclear Dumping, the Scottish Conservation Society, and the Scottish Campaign to Resist the Atomic Menace (The Glasgow Herald, 1978: 8). These groups successfully mobilised public opinion against drilling in the area via protests, public meetings and petitions, which ultimately led to the application being withdrawn (Watson, 2007). The only successful application for drilling was at Altnabreac in Caithness. However, two months later, in the wake of sustained public opposition, the government cancelled the entire test drilling program for storing high level nuclear waste (Hetherington, 1981: 1). Instead, most of the HLW in the UK continues to be held in temporary storage at the Sellafield site (Nuclear Decommissioning Authority, 2014).

As the experiences of these countries illustrate, the siting of deep geological repositories throughout Western Europe and North America has taken decades to finalise and, in many cases, has been abandoned as a result of public opposition. By the 1990s, there was still no clear long-term solution in sight for the management of nuclear waste anywhere in the world. The governmental failure to secure a site for a HLW facility further strengthened the anti-nuclear movement’s argument that governments were unable to safely manage nuclear waste or its associated risks. The problem of nuclear waste continued to be used as a core argument underpinning the anti-nuclear movement.

The history of nuclear energy in Western Europe and North America demonstrates that public and political perceptions of nuclear power have become increasingly tied to the issue of nuclear waste, with some notable exceptions such as in France. Prior to the mid-1970s, nuclear waste was broadly overlooked on the assumption that a long-term solution for nuclear waste would eventually be developed through advancements in science and engineering. Until then, the HLW produced by nuclear reactors could be placed in temporary storage at existing nuclear sites. However, a shift in agents’ perceptions of nuclear waste, and the treatment of nuclear waste as a policy problem, becomes clear from the mid-1970s onwards. Increasingly negative media coverage of nuclear waste issues raised the public profile of nuclear waste and heightened public concerns over how nuclear waste was being managed. The growth of the environmental movement during this time further contributed to escalating public concerns over the human and environmental health risks of nuclear waste specifically, as well as the risks associated with nuclear energy more broadly. Governments responded to these rising concerns by commissioning investigations and developing strategies for the long-term management of nuclear waste. However, sustained public opposition to these efforts have meant that the problem of HLW

91 disposal remains largely unresolved. Nuclear waste became an increasingly salient issue amongst the anti-nuclear lobby, with critics using the ongoing failure to develop a nuclear waste solution as a central argument for why expansion of nuclear energy should not take place, and why existing nuclear reactors should be phased out. Consequently, by the time the discourse of a nuclear renaissance had begun to emerge in the early 2000s, nuclear waste had become central to debates over whether or to what extent nuclear energy development should take place.

THE RENAISSANCE: RESOLVING THE WASTE ISSUE?

The idea of nuclear waste and the hazards that it represents have remained central to the debate over nuclear energy during the renaissance period. In the early 2000s, the problem of how to dispose of nuclear waste remained unresolved. After three decades of trying to site a HLW disposal facility, little concrete action had been made on making the plan of a HLW disposal facility a reality. However, when the rhetoric of a nuclear renaissance began to gather momentum, one of the arguments put forward by nuclear advocates for why a renaissance was going to take place was that the problem of nuclear waste was close to being resolved. Darst and Dawson (2010: 51) identify nuclear waste as a central factor explaining why the expectation of a nuclear renaissance emerged, arguing that “were it not for the growing perception that this problem now has a solution, the prospects for a climate change-driven nuclear renaissance would now be significantly reduced”. A combination of political and technical solutions were expected to change agents’ perceptions of the waste issue by restoring public confidence in the ability of governments and the nuclear industry to safely store and dispose of nuclear waste. Technological advancements and new reactor designs were meant to help overcome the nuclear waste issue by generating only minimal amounts of radioactive waste (US Department of Energy Nuclear Energy Research Advisory Committee, 2002: 6). SKB, the company responsible for nuclear waste management in Sweden, had developed a new storage method called KBS-3, which was meant to increase the number of locations that would potentially be suitable for construction of a deep geological repository (Darst and Dawson, 2010: 52).

In addition to the technological advancements, there was also an expectation that governments would be able to address the social barriers to nuclear waste through political solutions. In particular, public fears over nuclear waste were meant to be eased and public opposition to the construction of nuclear waste facilities reduced through the adoption of more democratic procedures for nuclear waste management. Starting in the 1990s, there has been an almost universal shift by governments towards more participatory methods for developing a nuclear waste management strategy (Bergmans et al., 2014). This institutional contextual shift has taken place in response to the sustained public opposition to nuclear waste management, and public criticism of the top-down and technocratic procedures that had been used to identify and develop potential nuclear waste facilities. Rather than identifying sites

92 based on technical or scientific criteria, governments have increasingly chosen to allow communities to volunteer their regions for the construction of a nuclear waste facility. In return, communities would receive generous financial incentives. Increasing public participation in the nuclear waste decision- making process was expected to improve the legitimacy of the decisions being made, reduce public opposition to the siting and creation of nuclear waste facilities, and reduce public opposition to nuclear energy more broadly.

However, neither the technical or political solutions have proved as successful in allaying public fears over nuclear waste as their advocates had hoped. While the development of new reactor designs which would produce less waste than existing reactors may help to address the nuclear waste problem in the future, it does not alleviate the ongoing problem of HLW that continues to sit in temporary storage across the globe. There are currently fifty countries across the globe which have HLW that requires disposal in a long-term facility. This amounts to almost 270,000 tonnes of spent nuclear fuel currently sitting in ‘temporary’ storage, ninety percent of which is stored at cooling ponds at existing nuclear reactor sites (Sato, 2011). Storage of HLW at such interim facilities presents neither a sustainable, safe nor a cost-effective solution for the long-term. Most of the HLW in the UK is currently held in temporary storage at the Sellafield site, which the National Audit Office has recently warned poses “intolerable risks to people and the environment” (BBC News, 2012b: 1). In the interviews conducted for this research project, one academic described Sellafield as a “symbol – especially for anti-nuclear people – of what is wrong with nuclear power” (Interview with Director of a Research Centre, 14/01/2015). In 2001, it was discovered that radioactive waste had leaked into the groundwater under the site at Sellafield (Brown, 2002: 6). The cost for cleaning-up Sellafield was estimated in 2013 to be over £70bn, with the most costly component being the clean-up of the nuclear waste stored at the site (Macalister, 2013b). The issue of nuclear waste continues to be further complicated by the nuclear industry’s decision not to legally classify plutonium as nuclear waste. Clearly, the promises made by advocates of the nuclear renaissance that the waste issue would be resolved through new reactor designs has not yet come to fruition. The success of the nuclear renaissance will continue to be challenged in Western Europe and North America by the nuclear waste issue until governments and the nuclear industry can convince the public that they can manage, store and dispose of nuclear waste safely.

The institutional contextual shift towards the greater use of democratic procedures as a political solution to improving public confidence in nuclear waste management has produced mixed results, with some success in Finland and Sweden, but less so in countries such as the UK and Slovenia. To date, the country which has come closest to securing a long-term solution for its HLW is Finland. This success has been achieved through a shift to more participatory and inclusive decision-making processes. Research into the development of an underground repository for HLW in Finland has been underway since the 1980s. However, the management of radioactive waste in Finland has experienced a “participatory” or “deliberative turn” since the mid-1990s, particularly in regards to the way in which

93 plans for an underground repository for HLW have been developed (Lehtonen, 2010a: 181; Strauss, 2010: 213). In their process of identifying a possible location for a repository in Finland, Posiva (the Finnish nuclear waste management company) undertook an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) that featured extensive levels of public engagement. Throughout 1997, Posiva held over fifty meetings with citizens in four potential regions (Auffermann et al., 2015: 241). Information was made available at Posiva’s local offices and distributed directly to individual households. Focus groups, interviews, exhibitions, workshops and public hearings were also held, providing citizens with an opportunity to ask questions and share their views about Posiva’s plans. In 1999, Posiva announced that it considered Eurajoki to be the most appropriate location for a HLW facility. Local residents strongly supported the proposal, as did the Eurajoki Council, which chose not to exercise their right to veto the entire project. However, the degree to which the processes used by Posiva actually qualify as being truly deliberative or participatory has been questioned. Critics have argued that Posiva’s interaction with the Finnish public has not been truly deliberative given that Posiva set the terms of public engagement and limited the debate so that discussions could not take place over whether alternative disposal options would be more appropriate, or whether nuclear energy should be used in Finland more broadly (Lehtonen, 2010b: 152). Despite these critiques, what is clear is that Finland has been the most successful country so far across the globe in developing a long-term strategy for HLW disposal. Finland appears to have overcome the problems of public opposition that have prevented nuclear waste facilities being constructed in other parts of the world. As a result, the Finnish experience now offers a case study which other countries can learn from to improve their own procedures for securing a HLW site.

Sweden is another example where an institutional shift has occurred towards the increased use of participatory methods to improve public acceptance for the siting of a nuclear waste facility. The Swedish government identified three suitable municipalities for a HLW facility – Östhammar, Tierp and Oskarshamn. Each of the municipalities were free to withdraw their community from consideration as a possible construction location. Tierp chose to withdraw from consideration, leaving only Östhammar and Oskarshamn as the remaining options. In March 2011, Svensk Kärnbränslehantering AB (SKB, the Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company) applied for a license to construct the repository at Forsmark in Östhammar - a decision that was made on the basis of strong local community support.

The process by which Forsmark was chosen as the location for a geological waste repository has been characterised as adopting a “bottom-up perspective” (H. Keskitalo et al., 2015). Similarly, Lidskog and Sundqvist (2004: 258) describe the Swedish process of identifying a HLW repository site as one which “puts stakeholder involvement, public participation and transparency at the centre”. A consultation process was initially undertaken with the county administrative board and local residents, which was then widened to include consultation with the general public, municipal councils, other government agencies, and non-governmental organisations. There were multiple opportunities for different

94 stakeholders to oppose the construction of a HLW facility. For example, the Swedish municipalities held strong self-governing rights, with the ability to refuse to have a HLW facility constructed in their region. Environmental organisations that had existed for at least three years and that had a minimum of 2000 members were able to appeal decisions being made, as were local residents (H. Keskitalo et al., 2015). The Swedish Government made funding available for municipalities, county administrative boards, and non-government organisations to follow the process of siting a nuclear waste repository as it unfolded. The use of participatory methods for determining the site of the HLW facility appears to have been highly successful in quelling the problems of public opposition that have been experienced elsewhere. In 2008, an independent poll found that 77 percent of residents in the municipality of Östhammar supported the construction of a nuclear waste repository being constructed in their region (WNA, 2015).

However, despite the apparent success experienced by Finland and Sweden in using democratic procedures to improve public acceptance for the construction of a HLW facility, the participatory turn in siting nuclear waste facilities has not been universally successful. The case of HLW disposal in the UK is a prime example of this. In the mid-2000s, the British Government showed signs of developing a more democratic approach to HLW management. An independent Committee on Radioactive Waste Management was established, which was tasked with investigating the best options for nuclear waste management in the UK. The Committee presented its findings to the government in 2006, recommending that a geological disposal facility (GDF) should be constructed in partnership with local communities and authorities in order to bury nuclear waste deep underground (Committee on Radioactive Waste Management, 2012: 4). In accordance with these recommendations, the government began a process whereby communities could express their interest in housing the GDF in their local area. This was expected to reduce the public opposition that had thwarted previous attempts at siting a HLW facility.

However, the outcome of the volunteer process has proved just as unsuccessful as the past several decades of attempts to construct a nuclear waste facility in the UK. Copeland and Allerdale Borough Councils, both located in Cumbria, submitted expressions of interest in hosting the facility (Nuclear Industry Association, 2014). In response, hundreds of demonstrators gathered in Cumbria to protest the potential development (BBC News, 2013f). In January 2013, the Cumbria County Council over-ruled the boroughs’ expressions of interest, effectively stopping the sites from being considered as hosts for the disposal facility (BBC News, 2013a). The Department for Energy and Climate Change responded to the county council’s actions by proposing to revise the search process to prevent county councils from overruling district council decisions (BBC News, 2013e). The Cumbria Trust – a pressure group established solely to oppose construction of a waste repository in Cumbria – has labelled the Department’s actions as “astonishingly undemocratic” (BBC News, 2013c). No other community or council in the UK has since submitted an expression of interest in hosting the GDF (Moss, 2013). In

April 2015, the British government abandoned their democratic approach to siting a HLW facility and instead returned to a hierarchical process for site selection. Parliament passed legislation which stated that sites for nuclear waste facilities would now be considered as “nationally significant infrastructure projects”, and would be chosen by the Secretary of State for Energy (Jowit, 2015). Local councils and community members can object to site developments, but are unable to stop the construction of waste facilities altogether.

Slovenia is another example of an institutional shift towards participatory mechanisms for siting a radioactive waste facility. Slovenia has one operating nuclear power reactor – the Krško Nuclear Power Plant - which was constructed in the mid-1970s and is jointly owned with Croatia. When Krško was being constructed, little consideration was given to the nuclear waste that the plant would produce. It was expected that more nuclear power plants would be constructed throughout Yugoslavia in the coming years, and as such, one centralised disposal facility for radioactive waste produced by all nuclear reactors in the region would eventually be developed (Polič et al., 2012: 8). However, when this regional expansion of nuclear power reactors did not take place, Slovenia was left without a solution for radioactive waste disposal. In the mid-1980s, Slovenia began searching for a suitable site for the construction of a low and intermediate level radioactive waste (LILW) facility. A technocratic approach was adopted, whereby thirty-nine possible locations were identified based on geological, social and technical criteria (Polič et al., 2012: 8). This was then narrowed down to five possible sites, the announcement of which generated strong opposition from local communities in these regions. In response to this public opposition, the siting process was suspended and then abandoned.

In 1997, the Agency for Radwaste Management (ARAO) proposed a new ‘mixed mode’ approach for identifying a potential LILW site, which would grant local municipalities a central role in determining where in Slovenia the waste facility would be constructed (Polič et al., 2012: 10). In 2004, local communities nationwide were invited to volunteer their location for the construction of a LILW facility. Financial compensation would be given to whichever community housed the facility. Eight of the almost two hundred communities in Slovenia volunteered to host the facility, although three of these subsequently withdrew. The search was then narrowed to three possible locations – Sevnica, Krško and Brežice. Local partnerships were established in all three municipalities, and an independent mediator was used to facilitate negotiations between the various stakeholders. These local partnerships were intended to improve communication and strengthen trust between the local communities and government representatives (Bergmans et al., 2014: 354). In 2006, mounting public opposition led the local council of Sevnica to withdraw from consideration (Polič et al., 2012: 37), leaving only two potential sites remaining. In 2009, the site of Vrbina was chosen as the final site for the LILW facility.

The institutional shift towards participatory mechanisms for siting a LILW facility in Slovenia appears to have worked, given that an appropriate site was successfully chosen and finalised. However, an

96 investigation that has since been undertaken by researchers from the University of Ljubljana into the nature of public participation in the siting process has revealed several problems with the way in which the process was undertaken, and which have continued to negatively impact public opinion and trust (Polič et al., 2012). In Krško, local residents felt that their requests were ignored, the opportunities for genuine participation in the decision-making process were limited, and social acceptance for the project had not been achieved (Polič et al., 2012: 43). In Brežice, local residents argued that the siting process had not been conducted in a fair and transparent manner (Polič et al., 2012: 43). Non-government organisations questioned the credibility of the supposedly ‘independent’ studies that were conducted for the siting process (Polič et al., 2012: 44). ARAO, on the other hand, asserted that the process was transparent and that a relationship of trust was established with the local communities (Polič et al., 2012: 44). However, public opinion surveys indicate that citizens have “extremely negative attitudes” towards radioactive waste in Slovenia (Polič et al., 2012: 46). This suggests that the use of participatory mechanisms has done little to improve public trust in nuclear waste management and the actors responsible for this. Furthermore, LILW facilities are typically much easier to site than HLW facilities – evident in the fact that while there are several LILW facilities operating worldwide, there is not yet a single HLW facility that has entered operation. The fact that only two of Slovenia’s almost two hundred local communities was ultimately willing to host a LILW facility demonstrates that even the promise of participatory mechanisms is not enough to overcome widespread public distrust and opposition towards nuclear facilities.

The increasing democratisation of nuclear waste management appears to have overcome some of the siting issues that have hindered the development of a long-term nuclear waste solution. However, the cases of the UK and Slovenia suggest that this approach is not guaranteed to be universally successful. Furthermore, the positive signs indicating that a HLW facility will be constructed in Finland, and potentially in Sweden as well, has had little effect on improving the public acceptance of developing nuclear waste facilities outside of these countries.

The anti-nuclear movement has drawn on the continued failure of governments to develop a long-term solution to the problem of HLW, as well as the dangers posed by radioactive waste in general, as a key reason for why nuclear energy development should not be pursued. Greenpeace, a leader of the anti- nuclear movement, continues to oppose nuclear energy development on the grounds that even if a deep geological repository is constructed and enters operation, there is no guarantee that such a repository would contain the hazards associated with nuclear waste. Greenpeace argues that “whether the storage containers, the store itself, or the surrounding rocks will offer enough protection to stop radioactivity from escaping in the long term is impossible to predict” (Greenpeace, 2014b). On this basis, Dr. Doug Parr, the Chief Scientist at Greenpeace, has argued that “new nuclear should not go ahead until we have sorted out the waste problem” (Pfeifer, 2013). The lack of progress towards a safe solution for nuclear waste storage and disposal has continued to be a key concern in the nuclear debate. A representative of

97 the Union of Concerned Scientists has labelled the current practice of temporarily storing HLW at existing nuclear facilities as extremely dangerous, describing the temporary storage pools as “essentially loaded guns aimed at neighbouring communities” (Sforza, 2013). There continues to be a widespread fear amongst the public about the dangers associated with nuclear waste, with large segments of the population refusing to believe the government and nuclear industry’s promises that waste can be safely and securely disposed of with no harm to human or environmental health.

CONCLUSION

Nuclear waste is now widely perceived by public and political actors alike to be a much greater problem than it was in the 1950s and 1960s. From the time that the first commercial nuclear power plants were first entering operation in the mid-1950s, the highly radioactive waste produced by these plants has always needed to be stored and disposed of in some way. And yet, the question of what should be done with this waste in the long-term was broadly overlooked during the early growth of civil nuclear energy programmes. This is evidenced by the lack of public or political debate over the dangers posed by nuclear power, or how the issue of nuclear waste storage and management should best be addressed. However, a shift is evident from the 1970s onwards in the way in which nuclear waste is perceived and prioritised as a policy problem.

While the radioactive waste produced by nuclear facilities has always been a problem in need of a solution, the idea of nuclear waste is now much more of a challenge to the future of nuclear power than it was in the 1950s and 1960s. This shift has been driven by increasingly negative media coverage on the topic of nuclear waste, reports of mismanagement and leaks at nuclear facilities storing nuclear waste, and the emergence of the environmental movement in the 1970s. These factors have led to growing public awareness about the hazards and dangers associated with the highly radioactive waste produced at nuclear power plants. As a consequence, government and industry attempts to site and construct nuclear power plants and nuclear waste storage facilities have often been hampered by members of the public who oppose the construction of these facilities due to the risks that nuclear waste represents.

One of the key drivers underpinning the expectation of a nuclear renaissance was that the problems associated with nuclear waste would be overcome. This would be achieved through advancements in reactor designs which produce less nuclear waste, as well as an institutional shift towards more participatory methods in gaining public acceptance for the construction of nuclear waste facilities. These two developments were meant to facilitate a nuclear renaissance by improving public acceptance for the construction of nuclear waste facilities. However, the reality of the nuclear renaissance thus far indicates mixed results. New reactor designs do not negate the ongoing problem of the existing HLW that continues to be kept in temporary storage worldwide. While participatory methods have been

98 successful in aiding the siting of a HLW facility in Sweden and Finland, countries such as the UK and Slovenia indicate that participatory methods will not necessarily guarantee public support for construction of nuclear waste facilites. The failure to construct a long-term HLW storage facility continues to be invoked by anti-nuclear activists as evidence of the government and the nuclear industry’s inability to safely manage and dispose of nuclear waste. Given the ideational shift that has taken place, whereby nuclear waste is now widely perceived to be a far more problematic issue, the problems of nuclear waste cannot be ignored by policymakers in the way that were in the 1950s and 1960s. The failure of governments and the nuclear industry to convince the general public that nuclear waste can be managed effectively and safely, and that it does not pose a risk to human or environmental health, has contributed to the ongoing public opposition to nuclear energy development. Consequently, the nuclear renaissance has failed, in part, because of the ideational shift in the way that nuclear waste is perceived by the public, and the opposition to nuclear power that results from public concerns over nuclear waste.

7. ENVIRONMENTALISM

This chapter presents the first of the ‘contextual’ factors that help to explain the disjuncture between the rhetoric and reality of the nuclear renaissance. As discussed in Chapter 1, this thesis argues that nuclear-specific factors can not solely explain the disjuncture between the rhetoric and reality of the nuclear renaissance in Western Europe and North America. Rather, the absence of a nuclear renaissance in these regions cannot be fully understood without considering broader institutional and ideational contextual shifts that have influenced the changing trajectory of civil nuclear energy development. Both the nuclear-specific and the broader contextual shifts identified in this thesis are mutually dynamic and interactive. Consequently, having examined the influence of three nuclear-specifics factors on the outcome of the nuclear renaissance in Chapters 4-6, the impact of broader context factors on the nuclear renaissance are now explored in Chapters 7-10. In doing so, this thesis develops a more expansive and holistic understanding of the reasons for changes in civil nuclear energy development over time and the disjuncture between the rhetoric and reality of the nuclear renaissance in Western Europe and North America.

This chapter argues that the disconnection between the expectation and reality of the nuclear renaissance can be explained by a shift in the way in which agents perceive and prioritise issues relating to the natural environment. In accordance with an Agents in Context Historical Institutionalist perspective, this study recognises that both individual agents, and the institutions within which agents operate, play a key role in determining policy change. Consequently, when examining the changing trajectory of nuclear power, the decisions and thought processes of individual agents, as well as the institutions within which these agents operate, must be considered. One of the major ideational and institutional shifts that has taken place in the post-war period is the growth of environmentalism. From the 1960s onwards, public and political leaders alike have become far more aware and concerned about issues that impact upon the natural environment. By the time that talk of a nuclear renaissance began emerging in the early 2000s, environmental issues had already become firmly entrenched on the global policy agenda.

The growth of environmentalism has had significant implications for the way that agents perceive and respond to the use of nuclear power. The birth of the environmental movement was driven partly by concerns over the use of nuclear power and the environmental dangers it posed. From the late 1960s onwards, environmental organisations actively campaigned to raise public awareness of the dangers associated with nuclear power. These actions contributed to an ideational shift whereby nuclear power has come to be widely perceived as a danger to both human and environmental health. The growing

100 perception that nuclear power was an environmental hazard meant that members of the public were now more likely to oppose the construction of new nuclear power plants on environmental grounds.. This meant that governments had to work harder to gain public support for new nuclear build, or risk facing a backlash from voters. Consequently, the growth of environmentalism has created a more challenging political environment for the construction of new nuclear power plants.

However, when talk of a nuclear renaissance began, nuclear advocates drew upon environmental discourse as a key argument for why a revival of nuclear power was necessary. By the early 2000s, climate change had become firmly entrenched as a key policy priority on the global political agenda. Nuclear advocates capitalised on this by reframing nuclear power as an environmentally-friendly energy source. While some political leaders and even several high-profile environmentalists have accepted the environmental argument for nuclear power, large segments of the environmental movement continue to remain deeply opposed. Moreover, the construction of new nuclear facilities during the renaissance continues to encounter extensive opposition based partly on environmental grounds. This suggests that the ideational shift in agents’ perceptions of nuclear power that occurred in response to the growth of environmentalism from the 1970s onwards – whereby nuclear power is perceived as an environmental hazard – continues to hold sway. The ongoing environmental opposition to nuclear power during the renaissance period indicates that, while there has been some shift towards nuclear power being accepted by some actors for its environmental credentials, this ideational shift has not been as widespread or transformative as the nuclear industry may have hoped for.

Consequently, the disconnection between the expectation and reality of the nuclear renaissance can be explained, in part, by the high level of public and political concern for environmental issues. Agents now operate in a vastly different political context than was present in the 1950s and 1960s, when low levels of environmental concern meant that nuclear power plants could be developed with virtually no environmental opposition. The growth in environmental concern at an individual and societal level from the late 1960s onwards has influenced agents’ perceptions of nuclear power as an environmental hazard. Agents have responded to this ideational shift by implementing a wide range of environmental regulatory institutions designed to reassure the public that the environmental impacts of nuclear power can be contained. Nevertheless, opposition to nuclear power on environmental grounds continues to be present, even during the renaissance period. This opposition has made it difficult for governments and the nuclear industry to secure the public support that is necessary for a nuclear renaissance to take place.

This chapter begins by providing an overview of the growth of environmentalism from the late 1960s until the present day. It identifies the implications that the growth of environmentalism has had on the development of nuclear energy. It describes the ideational shift in public perceptions of nuclear power that can be attributed to the environmental movement, whereby agents were made more aware of the environmental dangers of nuclear power. It also describes the institutional shift that has occurred as a

101 result of this ideational shift, whereby governments have implemented a range of environmental regulatory institutions, as well as nuclear-specific environmental institutions. The ongoing impact of this ideational and institutional shift during the renaissance period is then discussed. The chapter concludes by arguing that in spite of the attempt made by the nuclear industry to reframe nuclear power as environmentally-friendly in order to encourage a nuclear renaissance, widespread public concern over the environmental dangers of nuclear power continue to pose a challenge to nuclear new build and to the success of the nuclear renaissance. Consequently, the disconnection between the expectation and reality of the nuclear renaissance can be explained by the ongoing influence of environmentalism.

THE BIRTH OF ENVIRONMENTALISM

Evidence of widespread public concern for the environment began to emerge in the 1960s, but it was in the early 1970s that the birth of an environmental movement gained momentum. Prior to this period, few environmental organisations existed (van Leeuwen, 2010: 57), let alone any kind of widespread “green ideology” or environmentally-focused social movement (Carter, 2007: 5). As Dauvergne (2009: xliii) explains, “before the 1960s, the word environment, in the relatively rare instances when it appeared in print, referred primarily to the home or work environment, not to nature, ecosystems, or the earth”. It therefore represented a significant ideational shift when agents began perceiving the environment as a bigger, interconnected system that had an inherent value and was in need of protection. This more modern understanding of the environment brought to light a vast range of ecological issues that had never before received much, if any, public or political attention. Issues such as overpopulation, habitat destruction, water scarcity, land degradation, waste disposal and pollution became the topic of political debate throughout much of Western Europe and North America from the 1970s onwards.

Several factors contributed to the growth in environmental concerns at this time. Environmental concerns became prominent through the publication of a range of works in the 1960s and 1970s that drew attention to the fragility of the natural environment, and the irreparable damage that human actions were inflicting on it. One of the most influential books for the birth of the environmental movement was Rachel Carson’s (1962) Silent Spring, which warned of the dangers present in the use of pesticides and synthetic chemicals. Others included The Limits to Growth (1972), which argued that economic and population growth would deplete earth’s finite resources, and The Population Bomb (1968), which argued that immediate action was necessary to prevent overpopulation from causing mass human starvation in the coming decades. Newspapers and television programs increasingly reported on environmental issues, forcing them onto the political agenda. In an article published in February 1970, Time magazine declared that “the environment may be the gut issue that can unify a polarized nation in the 1970s” (Time, 1970). Two months later, twenty million US citizens, including several politicians, participated in the first ‘Earth Day’ - a nationwide demonstration held to promote environmental reform.

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Events such as the accident at the Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Plant in 1979, the Union Carbide toxic gas release in Bhopal in 1984, the Chernobyl disaster in 1986, and the Exxon Valdez oil spill in 1989 all received widespread media coverage and further alerted the public to the human and environmental dangers associated with industrial development.

The 1970s witnessed the establishment of a vast suite of environmental institutions. The first United Nations Conference on the Human Environment was held in Stockholm in 1972, a milestone indicating that the environment had now reached international political importance. It has been estimated that 100,000 government and non-government environmental organisations were established in the twenty years following the UN’s 1972 Stockholm conference (Chasek et al., 2014: 31). Environmental policy became institutionalised through the establishment of dedicated government departments and agencies. Environmental groups and organisations sprung up at a local, regional, national and international scale. Some of the largest and most influential of these groups included Friends of the Earth, formed in the US in 1969, and Greenpeace in 1971. Environmentally-focused political parties were formed for the first time. Between 1970 and 1990, green political parties were established in Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain and the UK. This widespread emergence of environmental institutions is evidence of an ideational shift in the way in which agents perceive and prioritise environmental issues.

In the 1980s, the membership numbers of environmental groups grew, as did the number of protests that these groups carried out. While 134 non-government environmental organisations participated in the 1972 Stockholm conference, over 1400 groups participated in the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development (Conca and Dabelko, 2010: 5). In the UK, environmental group membership doubled in size between 1981 and 1991 (Dryzek et al., 2002: 676). Environmental organisations were increasingly perceived as a legitimate political actor, and were able to work within the policy-making process by being granted greater access to government elites. Organisations became increasingly professionalised and less radical, with larger budgets provided by their membership base and various fundraising activities (Carter, 2007: 146). The UN established the World Commission on Environment and Development in 1982 to address the lack of action that had been taken to combat growing environmental challenges worldwide. The commission produced a report that was instrumental in bringing the idea of ‘sustainable development’ – the need to preserve earth’s resources for future generations – to the forefront of environmental debate (Chasek et al., 2014: 32).

The 1990s saw the rise of corporate environmentalism, the integration of environmental and economic goals. Over the previous two decades, corporations had tried to refute environmental criticisms of their business practices, and fought the implementation of potentially costly environmental regulations. In the US, corporations fought the growth of environmental regulations by financing and lobbying political parties, funding industry scientists to cast doubt on environmental science, and even taking legal action

103 against the US Environmental Protection Agency (Dauvergne, 2009: lviii). However, by the late 1980s, corporations began to change their tactics to adopt a more constructive approach to environmental regulation of the private sector. Businesses began to develop partnerships and voluntary agreements with environmental organisations and government departments (Levy, 2011: 109). International organisations such as the World Bank and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development adopted ‘eco-modernist’ policy positions (Hajer, 2015). The concept of ‘corporate social responsibility’ also took hold – the idea that corporations are social institutions which are endowed with specific ethical responsibilities (Dillard and Murray, 2012: 12).

By the early 1990s, environmentalism had become institutionalised throughout Western Europe and North America (Carter, 2007: 148). Environmental issues became a permanent fixture on the global political agenda. In particular, the issue of global warming and climate change became a major focus for the environmental movement, to the extent whereby considerations of climate change have almost ‘trumped’ all other concerns related to environmentalism. As part of this shift, climate change has become a major policy priority for governments around the world. US President Barack Obama described climate change as the issue that “will define the contours of this century more dramatically than any other” (Office of the Press Secretary, 2014). British Prime Minister David Cameron stated that “man-made climate change is one of the most serious threats that this country and this world faces” (The Guardian, 2014). Opinion polling also demonstrates the perceived importance of climate change to members of the public. The 2014 Eurobarometer survey on Climate Change found that 90 percent of respondents perceived climate change to be either a serious or a very serious problem (European Commission, 2014a: 21).

The growth of environmentalism as a political concern is evident in the growing membership of green political parties over time. Figure 4 below illustrates the membership numbers in various green political parties in Western Europe from 1979 to 201415. Most notable here is Germany, where membership to the Die Grünen (The Greens) has increased from 11,156 members in 1979 to 61,359 members in 2013.

15 The green political parties for which membership data is charted here includes the Green Party of England and Wales (UK), Die Grüne (Germany), Europe Écologie - Les Verts (France), Miljøpartiet De Grønne (Norway), Miljöpartiet de Gröna (Sweden), GroenLinks (The Netherlands), Groen (Belgium).

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Figure 4: Green Political Party Membership in Western Europe, 1979-2014

70000

60000

50000

40000

30000

20000 Number Number Members of 10000

1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 United Kingdom Germany France Norway Swden The Netherlands Belgium

Chart compiled using data from the Members & Activists of Political Parties (2015) database16

Another way in which the growth of environmentalism as a political issue in the post-war era can be visualised is through empirical data on changes in issue attention over time. The Comparative Agendas Project (CAP)17 is an empirical research project studying changes in issue attention over time. The CAP developed out of the Policy Agendas Project (PAP), established by US scholars Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones in 1993. The PAP sought to establish a reliable measure for tracing changes in policy activity within particular policy areas over long periods of time. A coding scheme was developed to classify policy issues into 19 major topics (such as environment or energy), which then contain over 200 sub-topics (such as recycling or nuclear energy). This coding scheme was then applied to a wide range of policy activities, such as Congressional hearings, public laws, President State of the Union Speeches, Supreme Court cases, and a sample of New York Times news articles, from 1945 to the present day. The CAP then built on the PAP by applying the same coding scheme to policy activities in several countries across the globe. The use of a standardised coding scheme means that issue attention to particular policy areas can be compared over time and across countries. In this instance, data from the CAP is drawn upon to better understand attention to environmental issues across countries in the post-war period.

Three datasets developed as part of the CAP are drawn up here to illustrate the growing salience of environmental issues since 1945: Conclusions of the European Council, US Congressional Hearings,

16 Specific datasets drawn upon from the database include Bennie (2014), Bolin (2015), Delwit (2015), Jupskås et al. (2014), Spier (2014), Van Haute (2014) and Van Holsteyn et al. (2014). 17 For further information and access to individual country projects and their datasets, see the Comparative Agendas Project website at www.comparativeagendas.info

105 and a sample of articles from the New York Times18. Figure 5 below illustrates the number of conclusions made by the European Council on environmental issues from 1978 to 2012. There is a clear and steady increase in the number of conclusions being made on environmental issues from the late 1970s through to 2009, supporting the claim that the environment has become an increasing salient issue over this time period.

Figure 5: Conclusions of the European Council on Environmental Issues

200

180

160

140

120

100

No. of of No. conclusions the of European 20 Council Council relating to Environmental Issues

1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 1978

Chart compiled using data from the EU Policy Agendas Project, see Alexandrova et al. (2014)

A similar trend of growing attention towards environmental issues can be seen in the US. Figure 6 below illustrates the number of US Congressional Hearings relating to environmental issues from 1946 to 2012. From 1946 to 1968, few congressional hearings on environmental issues took place. This was followed by a steady increase in the number of hearings on environmental issues until 1990. From 1990 onwards, the number of congressional hearings on environmental issues has gradually decreased.

18 Each dataset was accessed via the individual country project datasets available via the Comparative Agendas Project website (http://www.comparativeagendas.info/). Individual references for each dataset are provided in- text.

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Figure 6: US Congressional Hearings on Environmental Issues

200

180

160

140

120

100

60 Environmental Environmental Issues 40

20 No. of of No. Congressional US Hearings on

1948 1950 1952 1954 1956 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 1946

Chart compiled using data from the US Policy Agendas Project, see Jones and Baumgartner (2013)

Figure 7 below charts the attention to environmental issues in a systematic random sample of articles published in the New York Times from 1946 to 2008 (a total of 49,201 records). It demonstrates a sudden increase in the number of articles on the environment in 1970. Since then, attention to the environment has steadily decreased, but still remains far higher than attention paid in the early post-war years (from 1947 until 1969).

Figure 7: New York Times articles on Environmental Issues

Environmental Environmental Issues 10

5 No. of New of No. New York Times news articles on 0

Chart compiled using data from the US Policy Agendas Project, see Jones and Baumgartner (2013)

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ENVIRONMENTALISM & NUCLEAR POWER

One of the major concerns of the environmental movement has been the use of nuclear power. For decades, environmental activists have actively campaigned against the use of nuclear power for either military or civilian purposes. Indeed, in Europe, the creation of some of the first green political parties occurred largely as a response to concerns over nuclear power development. For example, the first green political parties formed in Belgium and Germany in the 1970s emerged largely from the anti-nuclear movement, and were established with a primary goal of opposing the use of nuclear power for either military or peaceful purposes (Sauer, 2013: 32; Joppke, 1993: 118). Similarly, in Austria, Finland, France, Luxembourg and Sweden, green political parties were formed as a direct response to referendums that were being held on the use of nuclear power (Carter, 2007: 96). Moreover, many environmental NGOs, such as Greenpeace, emerged largely in response to issues of nuclear weapons testing, with campaigns against nuclear weapons testing in the south pacific becoming a crucial issue contributing to the rise of environmentalism.

Through their campaigning, the environmental movement raised the public and political profile of nuclear power by highlighting the human and environmental dangers associated with its use. In doing so, the environmental movement has contributed to an ideational shift whereby nuclear power is increasingly perceived as an unsafe or ‘risky’ technology. At the same time, the growth of the environmental movement has also contributed to an institutional shift in the way that nuclear power is governed. Governments have responded to growing public concern over the environmental impacts of nuclear power by implementing a range of new institutions to ensure the environment is protected from the hazards of nuclear power. Some of these institutions have stemmed from broader institutional shifts in environmental governance, while others have been developed in response to the specific potential environmental impacts of nuclear power.

Prior to the emergence of the environmental movement in the late 1960s and early 1970s, little consideration was given to the environmental consequences of constructing and operating nuclear power plants. Decisions over whether or where to build nuclear power plants were driven primarily by technical and financial considerations. There was a noticeable lack of legislation governing the environmental impacts of nuclear energy during the 1950s and 1960s. The two major pieces of international legislation that governed liability for nuclear accidents prior to 1997 were the Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy (1960) and the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage (1963). Within these two documents, only personal injury and property damage were considered in relation to the impacts of a nuclear accident taking place (Emmerechts, 2008: 91). No mention was made of liability resulting from environmental damage caused by nuclear accidents. The absence of concern or debate over the environmental impact of nuclear energy is also evident in the way in which nuclear waste was managed throughout the first two decades

108 of civil nuclear energy development. As described in more detail in Chapter 6, despite the highly toxic and long-lasting composition of radioactive waste, governments throughout Western Europe and North America did not begin to formulate strategies or legislation to govern the storage and disposal of nuclear waste until the early 1970s.

The growth of environmentalism drew attention to the impact of all forms of industrial development on the earth’s natural resources. The construction and operation of nuclear power plants was no exception to this. The environmental movement actively campaigned to raise public awareness of the dangers associated with nuclear power. In particular, environmentalists warn of the dangers of a nuclear accident causing radioactive substances to leak into the natural environment. The storage, transportation and disposal of nuclear waste is a major concern for environmentalists, given that radioactive waste remains toxic for thousands of years. Environmentalists are also concerned about the potential for nuclear materials designated for civil energy production to instead be used for the manufacture of nuclear weapons.

In addition to campaigns against nuclear power conducted by environmental organisations, many of the organisations that labelled themselves specifically as ‘anti-nuclear’ used environmental concerns to justify their opposition to nuclear power. Protests against nuclear power occurred at a local, regional and national scale. In the US, the community-led Clamshell Alliance was formed to oppose the development of the Seabrook Station Nuclear Power Plant. In their mission statement - the Declaration of Nuclear Resistance – the Clamshell Alliance described nuclear power as “dangerous to all living creatures and to their natural environment” (Clamshell Alliance, 1977). The Clamshell Alliance organised the first large-scale anti-nuclear site occupation in the US, with almost 2000 people refusing to leave the Seabrook site (The Washington Post, 1977). In Germany, citizen action groups formed to oppose the construction of reactors at Breisach and Whyl, which were then united as the International Committee of Baden-Alsace Citizen Initiatives – a network concerned about the pollution and safety problems caused by nuclear power plants (Karapin, 2007: 118, 127). In the US, environmental organisations that mobilised to oppose nuclear development included the Sierra Club, Friends of the Earth and the Natural Resources Defense Council (Camilleri, 1984: 89). In the UK, environmental groups such as Friends of the Earth, the Conservation Society and the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds persistently opposed the government’s nuclear programme (Rüdig, 1994: 77). The French Federation of Nature Protection Societies consisted of over 150 environmental organisations who collectively conducted petitions calling for the French government’s nuclear program to be abandoned (Topçu, 2008: 229).

Plans for new nuclear plants were often delayed, suspended or abandoned because of environmental opposition. For example, the emergence of the environmental movement in Ireland was partly driven by the proposed construction of a nuclear power plant in Carnsore Point. Leonard (2008) describes the

109 effectiveness of environmental and anti-nuclear protestors in campaigning against the proposed nuclear development at Carnsore since the plans were first announced in 1968. Protestors opposed the plant on environmental grounds, including the impact of the plant on disrupting the local bird sanctuary, depleting fresh water supplies, the long-term effects of radiation on the local ecosystem, and the risks associated with radioactive waste. The Council for Nuclear Safety and Energy Resource Conservation was established in 1975, which worked together with regional branches of Friends of the Earth to oppose the plant. In 1978, the Carnsore Collective was formed with plans to occupy the land at Carnsore earmarked for development. An anti-nuclear festival was held at Carnsore which received national and international media attention. Confronted by ongoing pressure from the environmental and anti-nuclear movement throughout the 1970s, the Irish government eventually abandoned their plans for the Carnsore nuclear power plant in 1981. Elsewhere, in the US, environmental opposition led the Baltimore Gas and Electric Company to cancel plans to construct two nuclear units in November 1972 (Ripley, 1972: 1). In 1975, the Nuclear Research Centre Jülich in Germany released plans for 350 nuclear power plants to be built by 2000. However, opposition from environmental groups led to the plans being revised to have only 33 nuclear power stations constructed by 2000 (Papadakis, 1996: 16).

The growth of environmentalism has also resulted in an institutional shift in the way in which nuclear power is governed. In some instances, these institutional changes were a direct result of campaigning by the environmental movement. For example, opposition from environmental groups compelled the British government to change the way in which nuclear waste is disposed of. The UK had been dumping radioactive waste at sea since 1949 (IAEA 1999: 53). In February 1983, a proposal was submitted at the 7th Consultative Meeting of the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter to prohibit sea dumping on all radioactive wastes. The UK government opposed the proposal on the basis that there was insufficient scientific evidence demonstrating the need for such a ban (Gündling, 1984: 95). In response, Greenpeace collaborated with trade unions such as the National Union of Seamen, the Transport and General Workers’ Union, and the Associated Society of Locomotive Steam Enginemen and Firemen to encourage their members to refuse to work on any vessel used for the disposal of nuclear waste at sea (Ardill, 1983: 30). The trade unions’ actions received broad media coverage and widespread domestic and international support (Rüdig, 1994: 84). In December 1983, the Environment Minister, Patrick Jenkin, conceded that there was “substantial public disquiet about nuclear waste disposal” (Tucker, 1983: 1). The practice of dumping nuclear waste at sea was then suspended and has not resumed since.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) responded to the growing public concern about environmental issues by implementing a range of new institutions designed to reassure the public that nuclear power is safe for both humans and the natural environment. The Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency (1986) was introduced in the aftermath of Chernobyl for the purpose of minimising harm to individuals, society and the environment in the case

110 of a nuclear emergency (IAEA 1986). The Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage was amended in 1997 to broaden the term “nuclear damage” to cover damage to the environment (IAEA 1998). The IAEA introduced the Convention on Nuclear Safety in 1994, which required signatories to “establish and maintain effective defences in nuclear installations against potential radiological hazards in order to protect individuals, society and the environment” (IAEA 1994: 2). The IAEA also introduced the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the safety of Radioactive Waste Management (1997), the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources (2004) and the Code of Conduct on the Safety of Research Reactors (2004), all of which are designed to protect people and the environment from the hazards of radiation (IAEA 1997; 2004b; 2004c).

The effect of this combined ideational and institutional shift, whereby agents are increasingly aware of and concerned about environmental issues, has created a more challenging political environment for the construction of nuclear reactors. The growth in public concern over environmental issues makes it more difficult for governments to convince their citizens that nuclear energy can be generated safely. Any proposal to build a new nuclear facility is likely to face opposition from environmental groups, as well as opposition from local residents opposing the development for its environmental impact. The growth of environmental institutions means that environmental considerations now influence the decisions made in all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle. Consequently, nuclear power plant operators need to invest larger amounts of time and resources in order to comply with increasingly stringent environmental regulations. For example, an Environmental Impact Assessment must now be completed when selecting an appropriate site for a new nuclear facility. Environmental protection considerations may influence the choice of reactor technology used. The operation of a nuclear power plant must comply with national and international regulatory frameworks and safety standards that aim to protect both society and the natural environment. Governments and the nuclear operators need to ensure that emergency planning is undertaken to limit environmental damage in the case of a nuclear accident. The storage, transport and disposal or nuclear waste needs to be undertaken in a way that minimises the risk to the natural environment. For these reasons, the growth of environmentalism appears to have increased the costs and challenges involved in successfully developing and expanding civil nuclear energy programmes.

ENVIRONMENTALISM & THE NUCLEAR RENAISSANCE

When talk of a nuclear renaissance began in the early 2000s, nuclear advocates drew upon the importance of environmentalism as a global policy priority as a justification for why an expansion of nuclear power was necessary. More specifically, representatives from the nuclear industry capitalised on the international community’s growing awareness that greenhouse gas emissions needed to be rapidly reduced in order to address threats posed by climate change. When over fifty countries ratified the Kyoto Protocol and committed to reducing their greenhouse gas emissions, a global demand was

111 created for affordable, low carbon-emitting fuel sources that would still be capable of meeting ever- increasing predictions of energy consumption. Advocates of nuclear energy – journalists, scientists, industry lobbyists and politicians alike – responded to this demand by deliberately reframing and promoting nuclear power as a clean, efficient, and sustainable source of electricity generation (Bickerstaff et al., 2008; Doyle, 2011). Specifically, they emphasised the low greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions associated with the technology that can assist governments with meeting their emissions targets in the context of climate change. When the entire lifecycle of nuclear power plants is considered, the GHG emissions produced per unit of electricity are at least two orders of magnitude below corresponding emissions from fossil fuel energy chains, and are comparable to most renewables at almost zero (Sims et al., 2003: 1317). The contribution of nuclear power to reducing GHG emissions is said to have already been proven, with the operation of nuclear power plants to date having saved roughly 10 percent of total carbon dioxide emissions from world energy use (Adamantiades and Kessides, 2009: 5151).

The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), one of the major nuclear lobby groups in the US, describes nuclear power as having “one of the lowest impacts on the environment of any energy source” (Nuclear Energy Institute, 2015). The NEI launched a multimillion-dollar campaign to improve public and political support for nuclear energy development by reframing it as an environmentally friendly source of electricity, using the slogan “Nuclear: Clean Air Energy” (Farseta, 2008: 38). The IAEA produced a report on climate change and nuclear power, which stated that “nuclear power has the potential to continue to play a significant role in the effort to limit future GHG emissions while meeting global energy needs” (IAEA 2012: 5). The World Nuclear Association describes nuclear power as “the single most significant means of limiting the increase in greenhouse gas concentrations while enabling access to abundant electricity” (World Nuclear Association, 2015). The Clean and Safe Energy Coalition, a nuclear advocacy group, states that nuclear power has “perhaps the lowest impact on the environment of any other energy source, as it produces zero carbon emissions” (CASEnergy Coalition, 2015). Westinghouse, one of the major suppliers of nuclear technology, advertises nuclear power as having “no adverse effects to water, land, habitat, wildlife, or air resources” (Westinghouse, 2015b).

The nuclear industry’s framing of nuclear power as a solution for combating climate change appears to have convinced many governments of the need for nuclear power. In the 2000s, governments throughout the world began to incorporate nuclear power into their climate change strategies. Many government representatives also made public statements in support of the environmental benefits of nuclear power, and the need for greater investment in the nuclear energy sector in order to reduce GHG emissions. The US government under President George W. Bush promoted greater investment in nuclear technologies as a potential solution to reducing GHG emissions and mitigating climate change (AFX Asia, 2005). President Bush described nuclear energy as “one of the safest, cleanest sources of power in the world and we need more of it in America” (Gawenda, 2005). This sentiment continued

112 through a change of government, with President Barack Obama declaring that to “prevent the worst consequences of climate change, we’ll need to increase our supply of nuclear power. It’s that simple’’ (Office of the Press Secretary, 2010b: 1). In 2004, UK Prime Minister Tony Blair informed a committee of senior members of parliament that nuclear power was a necessary component of the policy agenda “if you are serious about the issue of climate change” (Wintour and Brown, 2004: 1). Blair’s Chief Scientific Adviser, Sir David King, argued that “we have no alternative to nuclear power” if Britain seriously wants to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions (King, 2006). Germany’s economics minister, Michael Glos, warned that it would be “impossible to fulfil the Kyoto objectives without using nuclear energy” (Bilefsky, 2007: 1).

The reframing of nuclear power as a solution to climate change appears to have contributed, in some countries, to an increase in the social “acceptability” of nuclear power. In the UK, for example, the reframing of nuclear power as a solution to climate change mitigation appears to have led to a growing “reluctant acceptance” of nuclear power – a resignation amongst citizens who might not see nuclear power as an ideal energy solution, but who believe that nuclear power is necessary to combat global warming (Bickerstaff et al., 2008). However, in other countries, such as Germany, the idea of environmentalism continues to have a much broader conceptualisation than focusing solely on the issue of climate change. As a result, there has been less of a shift towards a reluctant acceptance of nuclear power.

Nuclear power’s new environmentally-friendly image was further reinforced when several prominent environmentalists, many of whom had been notoriously anti-nuclear in the past, began to speak publically of the need for more nuclear power plants in order to combat climate change. British journalist and environmentalist Mark Lynas, who had previously campaigned against the use of nuclear power, published an article in 2012 defending nuclear energy, stating that “without nuclear, the battle against global warming is as good as lost” (O'Hehir, 2013). Armond Cohen, the executive director of the Clean Air Task Force (an environmental organisation campaigning for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions), stated that “I can tell you it wasn't easy for me — who, as a lawyer back in the '80s, started my career fighting nuclear power — to come around to the view that it actually may be one of the things in the portfolio that may be necessary to save us… But that's where the facts lead you" (Harris, 2013). George Monbiot, a British journalist and environmentalist who had stated that in 2000 that is “time to shut nuclear power down” (Monbiot, 2000), changed his position when he began advocating for an expansion of nuclear power in 2011. Monbiot became especially critical of the anti-nuclear movement for having “misled the world about the impacts of radiation on human health” (Monbiot, 2011). Ralph Cavanagh, the co-director of the energy program for the environmental advocacy group, the Natural Resources Defense Council, stated that “there is no credible path to climate stabilization that does not include a substantial role for nuclear power” (Patterson, 2013). Prominent environmentalist James Lovelock described nuclear power as the “only green solution” to global

113 warming, and criticised opposition to nuclear power as being based on “irrational fear” (Lovelock, 2004). More than seventy ecologists signed a letter urging anti-nuclear environmentalists to reconsider their opposition and embrace nuclear power to combat climate change (Mooney, 2014). In 2013, the documentary Pandora’s Promise was released which framed nuclear power as an environmentally- friendly energy source. The film contained interviews with key figures who were once well-known anti- nuclear activists, but who have since changed their positions and have begun supporting the use of nuclear power as a low-carbon energy source. At the United Nations Conference on Climate Change in Paris in December 2015, four leading climate scientists argued that nuclear power holds immense potential for reducing carbon emissions (World Nuclear News, 2015a).

However, the newfound enthusiasm for nuclear power has not been universally adopted by the environmental movement. Numerous environmental groups continue to oppose nuclear power on the grounds that it is not sustainable (given that the nuclear fuel production cycle still involves the emission of some GHGs, and given that uranium reserves are limited); that sufficient nuclear power plants cannot be built in time in order to have a significant impact on reducing climate change; that the costs involved with constructing nuclear power plants are far greater than the costs of renewable energies such as wind and solar; that there is no long-term environmentally-friendly solution to the disposal of nuclear waste; and that nuclear power continues to present unacceptable risks to humans and the environment. Consequently, the ideational shift in agents’ perceptions of nuclear power and its relationship with the environment does not appear to be as all-encompassing as dialogue from the nuclear industry suggests. While certain political representatives seem to have accepted the environmental argument for nuclear power, by and large, the environmental movement has not shifted in its opposition to nuclear power. Even during the renaissance period, large segments of the environmental movement continued to campaign against nuclear power as a hazard to people and the environment.

For example, Greenpeace continues to oppose nuclear power on the grounds that it poses an “unacceptable risk to the environment and to humanity” (Greenpeace International, 2014a). Friends of the Earth continues to oppose the construction of new nuclear reactors, arguing that they are “not needed to contribute to carbon pollution reductions” (Friends of the Earth, 2013b). Green political parties also remain unconvinced of the environmental argument for nuclear power. As illustrated in Table 4 below, an examination of the policy positions of green political parties throughout Western Europe and North America reveals that almost all of them continue to oppose the use of nuclear power1920.

19 This table has been constructed by examining the policy manifestos made available on each of the green political parties’ websites. Each of the green political parties listed in this table have stated a clear position within their policy manifestos that they oppose the use of nuclear power. 20 While this chapter does consider the views of green political parties, it does not assess the views and opinions of mainstream political parties.

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Table 4: Nuclear Power Policy Position of Green Political Parties throughout Western Europe and North America

Country Green Political Party Support/Oppose Nuclear Power

Die Grünen – Die Grüne Alternative Austria Oppose https://www.gruene.at/

Groen Belgium Oppose https://www.groen.be/home

Green Party of Canada Canada Oppose http://www.greenparty.ca

Vihreät - De Gröna Finland Oppose https://www.vihreat.fi/

Europe Écologie – Les Verts France Oppose http://eelv.fr/

Bündnis 90/Die Grünen Germany Oppose https://www.gruene.de/

Miljøpartiet De Grønne Norway Oppose https://www.mdg.no/

Os Verdes Portugal Oppose http://www.osverdes.pt/

EQUO Spain Oppose http://partidoequo.es/

Miljöpartiet de Gröna Sweden Oppose http://www.mp.se/

Les Verts Switzerland Oppose http://www.gruene.ch/gruene/fr.html

GroenLinks The Netherlands Oppose https://groenlinks.nl/

Green Party UK Oppose https://www.greenparty.org.uk/

Green Party of the United States US Oppose http://www.gp.org/

Proposals for nuclear new build have also continued to face opposition on environmental grounds during the renaissance period. Environmentalists have protested against the construction of the first nuclear power plant in Turkey (Deutsche Welle, 2015), and against the construction of nuclear power plants in the US (Winslow, 2014). In Canada, environmental groups opposed the construction of a geological repository for nuclear waste in Ontario because the facility could cause irreversible environmental devastation (Pignataro, 2015). In 2011, approximately 150 political parties and

115 environmental organisations participated in Switzerland’s biggest anti-nuclear demonstration for more than twenty-five years (SwissInfo, 2010). Environmental protestors continue to block and delay trains carrying nuclear waste throughout France and Germany (RFI, 2012). In the UK, the construction of the Hinkley Point C nuclear reactor continues to be opposed because of the environmental dangers that it poses. Allan Jeffrey, a representative of the Stop Hinkley campaign, argues that nuclear power is “not a sustainable [energy] source” as it “indirectly generate[s] greenhouse gases…significantly more than sustainable renewable energy sources such as solar, wind, hydro and tidal” (Jeffery, 2014).

CONCLUSION

This chapter has argued that the growth of environmentalism has contributed to the disconnection between the expectation and reality of the nuclear renaissance. The growth of environmentalism has created a new ideational context in which agents are more concerned about protecting the natural environment. The environment is no longer seen as a natural resource which humans should utilise for their own benefit, but rather, as having its own intrinsic value that needs to be protected for future generations. Agents in Context Historical Institutionalism recognises that agents and institutions are mutually interactive. Thus, while agents have been shaped by this changing ideational context, they have also responded to these changes by creating a new environmentally-focused institutional context. For example, as public concern over environmental issues has grown, governments and international organisations have responded by implementing numerous environmental laws and regulations. These actions have further reinforced the new-found importance of the environment as a policy issue. The importance of environmental issues on the global political agenda is most recently illustrated by governments around the world acknowledging the need to combat climate change.

At the same time, the ideational and institutional focus on environmental issues has generated greater public awareness of and opposition to the environmental impacts of nuclear energy. The early development of civil nuclear energy programmes in the 1950s and 1960s took place in an ideational context whereby environmental issues were generally not considered to be a priority. The limited public or political concern for the environment meant that nuclear construction projects could be undertaken with limited public opposition. However, the actions of the environmental movement from the 1970s onwards placed the environmental risks of nuclear power under a spotlight. Government and industry proposals for the construction of new nuclear facilities became the target of local, regional and state- wide environmental protests. These protests were widely covered by television and print journalists, encouraging even greater public awareness of the environmental risks of nuclear power. The perception that nuclear energy was an environmental hazard became widespread. The growth of environmentalism in the 1970s contributed to the stagnation and decline of civil nuclear energy by creating a more

116 challenging political environment for nuclear power. Plans for the construction of nuclear facilities were increasingly delayed, suspended or abandoned as a result of environmental opposition.

Consequently, when nuclear advocates began invoking environmental justifications for the inevitability of a nuclear renaissance, it suggested that a new ideational shift was taking place that would overcome the challenges that environmentalism had historically posed for nuclear energy. Nuclear advocates argued that the immense potential of nuclear power as a low-carbon energy solution meant that any environmentalist that was serious about addressing climate change would be compelled to embrace the technology. Governments throughout Western Europe and North America appeared to accept this argument, publically supporting nuclear power as a strategy to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. However, by and large, the environmental movement remains committed to its opposition to nuclear power. Prominent environmental organisations such as Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth remain committed to opposing nuclear energy, as they have done for almost half a decade. Green political parties throughout Western Europe and North America also remain firmly opposed to nuclear energy development. Proposals for the construction of new nuclear facilities continue to be opposed on the ground that they threaten the safety of humans and the natural environment alike. Consequently, the effectiveness of the reframing of nuclear power as an environmentally-friendly energy source remains limited.

The ideational and institutional contextual shift towards environmentalism that emerged in the 1970s has not been undone. The rise of environmentalism contributed to the stagnation and decline of civil nuclear energy industries in the 1970s and 1980s, and this same issue has continued to hinder the success of the nuclear renaissance from 2000 onwards. Nuclear energy development during the renaissance period continues to be challenged on environmental grounds. Governments and the nuclear industry have been unable to convince the public that nuclear power is necessary even in the fight against climate change. Consequently, the growth of environmentalism, and the ideational and institutional shifts that have resulted from this, have contributed to the disconnection between the expectation and reality of the nuclear renaissance in Western Europe and North America.

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8. PUBLIC TRUST IN GOVERNMENT

In accordance with an Agents in Context Historical Institutionalist perspective, this chapter argues that the behaviour and decisions made by agents is heavily shaped by the social and political context in which they operate. More specifically, it argues that the degree to which agents trust their government and political institutions in general contributes to a political environment which can constrain or enable nuclear energy development. Public trust in government is necessary for the development and implementation of effective and legitimate policy decisions. This is especially the case for controversial policy areas such as civil nuclear energy development. Governments need to establish a relationship of mutual trust with the public if they wish to effectively regulate or promote nuclear energy. Therefore, the extent to which agents trust their governments is one factor which has influenced the changing trajectory of nuclear power over time.

The chapter begins by first tracing the decline of public trust in government that has taken place throughout much of Western Europe and North America from 1945 through to the present day. This illustrates that levels of public trust in government have remained low even during the years when the nuclear renaissance was meant to take place. It then explains the reasons why public trust in government plays an important role in facilitating the development of nuclear energy, and outlines the implications of declining levels of public trust for nuclear energy development.

The key argument made in this chapter is that when nuclear power experienced its initial period of expansion in the 1950s and 1960s, this expansion was facilitated by a particular political context characterised by high levels of public trust in government and political institutions. These high levels of public trust in government meant that there was little opposition towards the pro-nuclear policies that were being implemented at the time. Agents tended not to question government decisions to invest in nuclear energy development, and accepted government claims that nuclear energy development was needed for the good of the country. However, a contextual shift began to take place from the 1970s onwards, whereby public trust in government began to decline. This decline created a more challenging political environment for nuclear power. Nuclear policies and development proposals became the subjects of much greater media scrutiny. The desirability of specific nuclear power construction plans, as well as the use of nuclear power in general, was increasingly questioned by the public, community organisations and lobby groups. Consequently, governments had to expend larger amounts of political and financial capital in order to convince agents of the benefits and necessity of nuclear power. Low levels of public trust in government also meant that when a nuclear accident did happen, political leaders had to work harder to convince the public that the issue was an isolated event and that it had been

118 resolved. Consequently, low levels of public trust in government has created a more challenging political context for agents that support nuclear energy development.

Low levels of public trust in government continue to challenge the success of the nuclear renaissance. The optimistic rhetoric of the nuclear renaissance made no mention of the ongoing challenge of low levels of public trust in government, either on a broad level or in regards to nuclear energy in particular. However, public opinion polling conducted since 2000 continues to demonstrate that public trust in government generally, as well as specifically in relation to nuclear energy development, remains low. Levels of public trust in government show no signs of returning to the heights that characterised the 1950s and 1960s, and which facilitated the expansion of nuclear energy during this time. Consequently, the expectations of a nuclear renaissance were unlikely to become a reality because of a challenging political environment characterised by low levels of public trust in government. Promises made by political leaders and the nuclear industry about a widespread expansion of nuclear power were always unlikely to become a reality, given that agents remain sceptical of the credibility and trustworthiness of government and the nuclear industry to safely manage and regulate nuclear power.

TRUST IN GOVERNMENT: A GLOBAL DECLINE

Public trust in government appears to be under threat. There are an increasing number of claims that a “crisis of trust” (O'Neill, 2002), an “age of distrust” (Hardin, 2006), or a “deficit of trust” has emerged in modern society (Misztal, 2001). This crisis of trust appears to have affected the broad spectrum of society, with voters, community organisations, lobby groups, and the media all becoming increasingly sceptical and challenging the decisions made by governments. Denhardt (2009: xviii) asserts that “trust in government, trust in business and indeed trust in all major social institutions has declined dramatically in the past several decades”. In recent years, news headlines have warned that “Trust in Government Nears All-Time Low” (Dutton, 2010), “a Trust Deficit is Hurting the Economy” (Hilsenrath, 2013), and “Europe’s public trust in government plunges” (Silverman, 2014). In his first State of the Union address as President, Barack Obama warned that “we face a deficit of trust – deep and corrosive doubts about how Washington works that have been growing for years” (Office of the Press Secretary, 2010a). In 2014, the Edelman Trust Barometer recorded that trust in government across the globe declined to a historic low, making it the least trusted of any institution (Edelman, 2014: 3).

Public opinion data from across the globe supports the assertion that there has been a gradual erosion of public trust in government and public institutions over time. More specifically, there has been a gradual decline in public trust in government throughout much of the world from the late 1960s and early 1970s until the present day. This is a marked shift from the post-war era which was characterised by strong levels of public faith in government and political institutions to serve the public interest. For example, various studies conducted in the 1950s and 1960s recorded high levels of public trust in

119 government and political authorities in the US (Feldman, 1983: 341; Lane, 1965: 895). However, by the late 1960s and early 1970s, these elevated levels of public trust began to decline in almost all advanced industrialised countries in the world (Dalton, 2005: 133; Blind, 2006: 8). Public opinion towards government in the US provides a clear illustration of this trend. The American National Election Studies is a survey of voters that is conducted before and after every presidential election, and has taken place from 1945 until the present day. The survey contains several questions to measure public trust in government, which are then used to create a ‘trust in government’ index, the results of which is displayed in Figure 8 below.

Figure 8: US Trust in Government Index, 1958-2008

government always or most of timeof the most or always government Percentage of respondents who trust the US US the trustwho respondents of Percentage 0

Chart compiled using data from American National Election Studies (2010)

As can be seen in Figure 8 above, public trust in government declined steadily from 1966 until 198021. Public trust increased during the first half of the Reagan administration (1980-86), and again from 1994 to 2002, but neither of these increases have been sustained. The high levels of public trust in the US government that characterised the 1950s and early 1960s have not been repeated. A similar trend of declining public trust in government since the late 1960s and early 1970s is evident elsewhere in the world. Public trust in politicians and political institutions has been steadily declining in Sweden and Germany from the late 1960s (Listhaug and Wiberg, 1998: 306; Holmberg, 1999: 105; Dalton, 1999: 36), and in the UK from the mid-1970s onwards (Bromley et al., 2004: 7). Falling levels of public confidence in government institutions have also been recorded in Norway and Belgium from the early 1980s onwards (Listhaug and Wiberg, 1998: 306). Public trust in government has declined in New Zealand from the mid-1980s until the late 1990s (Barnes and Gill, 2000: 4). In South Korea, public trust

21 It should be noted that the point in time at which public trust in government in the US begins to decline (that is, in 1966) does not exactly correlate with the point in time at which this thesis argues that the fall of nuclear power began (the mid-1970s). Nevertheless, a broad trend in declining public trust in government over the period of the fall of nuclear power is still observable.

120 in government declined from 1981 through to 2001 (Kim, 2010: 802). In Japan, public trust in government and bureaucracy has declined from the mid-1980s onwards (Kikuchi, 2008: 208).

More recently, public trust in government has continued to show evidence of decline during the renaissance period. The Gallup World Poll found that public confidence in national governments dropped throughout OECD member countries from an average of 45 percent of respondents in 2007 reporting that they had confidence in their national government, to 40 percent in 2012 (OECD, 2013: 40). The 2014 Eurobarometer on Public Opinion in the European Union found that public trust in national political institutions has decreased in the period from 2004 to 2013. For example, public trust in the European Union has decreased from 50 percent of respondents reporting that they tended to trust the European Union in 2004, to 37 percent of respondents in 2014 (European Commission, 2014b: 8). Similarly, the Eurobarometer revealed that public trust in national parliaments has decreased from 38 percent of respondents reporting that they tended to trust their national parliament in 2004, to 30 percent in 2014 (European Commission, 2014b: 8). The amount of respondents reporting that they tended to trust their national governments also decreased from 34 percent in 2004 to 29 percent in 2014 (European Commission, 2014b: 8).

A wide body of academic literature has been dedicated to examining the reasons for this ongoing decline in public trust in government. A range of political, economic and socio-cultural factors have been identified as contributing to lower levels of public trust in government. These include deteriorating government performance, increasing frequency of and greater public attention to political scandals, deteriorating economic performance, an increasingly adversarial media, and declining social capital (Hetherington, 1998; Bowler and Karp, 2004; Levi and Stoker, 2000: 481; Hetherington, 2005: 16). However, while these factors have been effective in explaining short-term fluctuations in public trust, they have been criticised for failing to explain why the decline in trust in government has been sustained for so long, and what structural factors have contributed to the decline (Hetherington and Rudolph, 2008: 498; Bovens and Wille, 2008: 291). Hetherington and Rudolph (2008) provide an alternative explanation for why the decline in public trust has been sustained for so long. They argue that rather than the post-1960 levels of public trust being unusually low, it is the high levels of public trust in government in the 1950s and 1960s that present an anomaly. The 1950s and 1960s were characterised by a combination of factors which created anomalously high levels of public trust in government. These factors included heightened public perceptions of foreign security threats, exceptionally strong economic performance across a range of industries and indicators, and diminished public perceptions of domestic issues such as crime. The political environment created by this particular combination of factors facilitated unusually high levels of public trust in government. Moreover, this particular combination of factors has not been repeated since its erosion in the late 1960s, and as a result, Hetherington and Rudolph (2008: 510) conclude that “there is little to suggest that low to moderate levels of trust will not persist well into the future”.

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The implications of low levels of public trust in government for public policy-making are significant. Governments need to establish a relationship of mutual trust with their citizens in order to be perceived as legitimate and to be able to govern effectively (Gilson, 2003). Higher levels of trust in government typically lead the public to voluntarily cooperate and comply with the development and implementation of laws, regulations and other policy decisions made by government (Levi, 1998: 88; Fard and Rostamy, 2007: 331). Voluntary public compliance with government decisions is important because it typically leads to more successful policy implementation than when governments try to manipulate citizen behaviour through incentives or intimidation (Tyler, 1998: 271). Similarly, public trust can assist governments to develop long-term and binding policy decisions in the face of limited public opposition (Chanley et al., 2000: 240). This means that when governments are supported by high levels of public trust, they have greater leeway to propose and implement policy solutions, particularly solutions which might be controversial or unpopular (Hetherington, 2005: 8). In contrast, low levels of public trust poses a more difficult political climate for an activist government (Hetherington, 2005: 8). This is because low levels of public trust in government can cause citizens to adopt pre-determined prejudices towards government policy decisions (Kim, 2005: 628), become antagonistic towards government or actively resist policy decisions (Levi, 1998: 88). This makes it increasingly difficult for governments to assemble resources to push through policy proposals and implement solutions (Hetherington, 1998: 792). Securing public trust is therefore particularly important when the government wants to develop and implement policies that are controversial or pose potential risks to the public (Kim, 2005: 629), as is the case with nuclear energy policy. Finally, low levels of public trust are significant as “distrust breeds conditions for the creation of further distrust” (Gamson, 1968: 43). This suggests that governments will find it more and more difficult to rebuild public trust to the levels that existed in the 1950s and 1960s.

THE IMPORTANCE OF PUBLIC TRUST IN GOVERNMENT FOR NUCLEAR ENERGY

The relationship between trust in government and the ability of governments to establish or expand their nuclear industries has been given only limited consideration in the existing academic literature on nuclear energy development22. However, in accordance with an Agents in Context Historical Institutionalist approach, this thesis argues that the context in which agents operate affects the way in

22 One example of academic literature which explicitly highlights the importance of public trust to ensuring the successful development of civil nuclear energy programmes is the work by He et al. (2013) on the role of public participation and trust in nuclear power development in China. They argue that “one of the key challenges around nuclear power in OECD countries has been (lack of) trust in the regulators, governments and industries promoting nuclear power” (He et al., 2013: 2). Similarly, Pidgeon et al. (2008: 7) argued that “the acceptability of nuclear power and radioactive waste is closely related to levels of institutional trust”. A study into the narratives of long- term anti-nuclear activists found that “untrustworthy officials” and “lack of trust for the industry and its regulators” were cited by respondents as key problems associated with nuclear power (Culley and Angelique, 2010: 238).

122 which government decision-making takes place, and the way in which these decisions are accepted or challenged by the public. Therefore, in order to fully understand the nuclear debate, the political environment in which it has taken place, and the way in which this environment has changed, needs to be recognised. Clearly, the context in which government actors make policy decisions on behalf of their citizens has fundamentally changed over time. A new political and social context has emerged that is characterised by much lower levels of public trust in government than was present in the aftermath of the Second World War. A gradual shift has taken place whereby agents are increasingly sceptical of governments, and are less likely to unquestioningly accept government policies, particularly when it comes to complex or controversial policy matters. This structural shift places important constraints on the agency of government actors and key decision-makers, which need to be considered in order to fully understand the changing nature of the nuclear energy debate.

The broad trend of declining trust in government has implications for governments that wish to establish a domestic civil nuclear energy industry and for governments that wish to expand their existing nuclear power programmes. Governments are typically responsible for both promoting and regulating nuclear energy development, and establishing a relationship of mutual trust with the public is necessary for governments to be able to successfully carry out these functions. Governments can promote nuclear energy by providing incentives for investment in nuclear energy, modifying electricity market regulation to encourage nuclear development, providing research and development support for nuclear technologies and reactor designs, and encouraging public support and acceptance for nuclear power. Government regulation of the nuclear industry involves ensuring that nuclear power plant operators protect human and environmental health from the potential risks and negative effects associated with nuclear energy production and the management of radioactive waste (International Atomic Energy Agency, 2002: 56). Nuclear regulatory agencies fulfil this responsibility by creating safety policies and principles which provide a foundation for regulatory action and intervention (International Atomic Energy Agency, 2002: 56). While nuclear regulatory organisations are often established as ‘independent’ bodies that function separately from government, it is nevertheless governments that are responsible for creating and, if need be, dismantling these regulatory bodies. Ineffective action by nuclear regulatory agencies can be perceived by the public as constituting ineffective action by government.

Public trust in government to advocate and regulate nuclear energy is important, but also difficult to achieve and maintain, for three key reasons: Firstly, nuclear energy is a highly complex and technologically sophisticated policy issue. This makes it harder for governments to communicate to the public about nuclear energy policy matters, and, more importantly, to convince the public that nuclear technology is safe and beneficial to the public interest. Secondly, the time-horizons associated with nuclear energy development are extensive. The average construction time for a nuclear reactor is between five to seven years, compared with approximately four years for the construction of a large

123 coal-fired power plant or three years for a natural gas fired plant (OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, 2012). Consequently, the public needs to trust government promises that the far-off benefits of nuclear energy will be worth the long-term investment required. Finally, public trust in government is necessary due to the low-probability but high-consequence risks associated with nuclear power. When an incident occurs at a nuclear power plant, the ramifications are potentially catastrophic, as was displayed to the world with the nuclear disasters at Chernobyl and Fukushima. The severity of these risks is one of the key reasons why nuclear energy is so politically unpopular. The public therefore needs to trust their government to keep them safe from the potential dangers of nuclear energy production, primarily through effective regulation.

These three features inherent to nuclear energy highlight the need for governments to gain their citizens’ trust if they are going to be able to push through pro-nuclear energy policies. This is supported by empirical research studies into the connection between public trust in government and public perception of the risks associated with nuclear energy. Several studies have found that the degree of public trust in the actors responsible for managing high-level radioactive wastes can influence public perceptions of and attitudes towards the risks associated with nuclear energy (Flynn et al., 1992; Slovic et al., 1991; Kunreuther et al., 1990). More specifically, lower levels of public trust in government can result in higher perceptions of the risks and potential negative impacts associated with nuclear energy and nuclear waste, and lower levels of perception of the potential benefits of nuclear power (Lee et al., 2012: 21; Costa-Font et al., 2008: 1276, 1284). Similarly, the degree of trust in government can influence the public’s support for construction of nuclear energy facilities. This is evident in a study by Hine et al. (1997), which found that higher levels of trust in nuclear regulators led to stronger support for the construction of a proposed nuclear waste repository in Canada.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE CHANGING CONTEXT OF PUBLIC TRUST FOR NUCLEAR POWER

High levels of public trust in government are therefore an important contributing factor to governments’ ability to develop pro-nuclear policies and construct nuclear energy facilities. Consequently, the contextual shift of declining public trust in government over time has implications for nuclear energy development. As previously discussed, the 1950s and 1960s was a period broadly characterised by high levels of public trust in government. This trust appears to have helped to facilitate the early development and expansion of civil nuclear energy programmes23. Agents tended not to question government

23 It should be noted that public opinion data on public trust in government specifically over issues of nuclear power is not available as early as the 1950s and 1960s. Other sources of evidence, such as news articles and historical texts on nuclear development during this time, make little mention or have no record of public scepticism or opposition towards nuclear policy-making in this early stage of nuclear development. There is, of course, a possible alternative explanation that public distrust towards government over nuclear power was voiced during

124 decisions to invest in nuclear energy development, and accepted government rhetoric that nuclear energy development was needed for the good of the country. As discussed in Chapter 5, the lack of public concern over the safety issues associated with nuclear energy suggests that agents believed the claims of nuclear scientists and government representatives that nuclear power was a safe and effective source of energy production. As a result, governments did not need to expend much in the way of political capital to convince the public of the need for nuclear energy, or to be able to implement their pro-nuclear policies successfully. No wide-ranging debate around the complex issues of nuclear safety or its associated environmental or public health impacts took place during this time (Camilleri, 1984:

75), despite the fact that safety incidents at nuclear power plants were already taking place. The limited opposition that did emerge during this period was largely confined to academic journals, small-scale publications, and intermittent localised concerns (Herring, 2010: 46). These arguments also tended to focus on technological and economic considerations, rather than opposition to the utilisation of nuclear energy per se. For example, in the UK, debates took place over what the scale of the nuclear programme should be, which type of reactor technology should be utilised, who should be responsible for financing the nuclear programme, and the potential impact on other energy industries, such as coal (Williams, 1980: 17). However, the safety or general desirability of nuclear power was rarely questioned by the public. Governments did not have to contend with widespread or highly visible opposition to nuclear power. As a result, the high levels of public trust in government that characterised the 1950s and 1960s created a political environment that facilitated the ability of governments and the nuclear industry alike to site and construct nuclear power facilities.

However, the erosion of public trust in government that began to take place in the 1970s created a more challenging political context that constrained the ability of agents to establish and expand civil nuclear power programmes. As public trust in government wanes, agents (such as voters, community organisations, and the media) have become increasingly sceptical of the claims and promises that governments and political representatives make. More specifically, agents increasingly began to question and challenge government plans for nuclear development. Opposition to the siting of nuclear facilities became more prevalent, while opposition to nuclear energy in general became more widespread. Grass-roots activist groups began to form at the local, regional, and national level to oppose specific nuclear construction projects as well as the use of nuclear power in general. News articles increasingly reported on escalating construction costs and project delays at nuclear power plants (Ripley, 1972: 1; McElheny, 1973: 57; O'Toole, 1973: A1), the dangers and mismanagement of nuclear wastes (Los Angeles Times, 1973: A6; Anderson, 1974: B13; Gillette, 1975: E4; Hawkes, 1975: 11; Rodgers, 1976: 1; Hillmore, 1976: 1; Van Ness, 1976: 365; Willard, 1976: B18; Buschschluter, 1977:

this period but was simply not recorded. However, based on the evidence that is available, the conclusion is drawn here that public distrust towards nuclear policy-making did not pose a significant challenge for the development of nuclear power during the 1950s and 1960s.

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10; Omang, 1977: A10), growing environmental concerns over the impact of nuclear energy (Hill, 1975: NES58), and severe safety incidents, including radiation leakages, at nuclear power plants (The New York Times, 1975a: 7; The Observer, 1975: 1; Tucker, 1976b: 4; Blau, 1977: 27). The process of granting permits and licenses for nuclear power development was placed under greater scrutiny and increasingly challenged by members of the public, affected residents, local organisations and anti- nuclear campaigners. From 1967 to 1971, 32 percent of applications for nuclear power plant license applications in the US were contested, but this rose to 73 per cent of applications being challenged from 1970-72 (Joppke, 1993: 31).

Clearly, a shift was taking place whereby public trust in government was declining at a broad level, while public trust in government over matters of nuclear power more specifically was also eroding. However, a two-way relationship existed between public trust in government and nuclear power. As described in more detail in Chapter 5, the emergence of increasingly severe nuclear accidents in the 1970s and 1980s – typified by Three Mile Island and Chernobyl – further reinforced the perception that governments could not be trusted to keep their citizens safe from the potential dangers of nuclear power. The increasing scepticism over government claims about the desirability or safety of nuclear energy – evidenced by the increasing negative media coverage and the growth of an anti-nuclear movement – meant that governments had to expend larger amounts of financial and political capital to convince agents that nuclear development should take place. For example, in the mid-1970s, the Danish government responded to the emergence of a domestic anti-nuclear movement by funding and running a public information campaign about energy problems (Jelsøe, 2000: 201). In Sweden, the government held public meetings to try and reduce opposition to nuclear power by educating citizens of its benefits (Jahn, 1992: 401). Such government initiatives were largely non-existent in the 1950s and 1960s. The need for such efforts indicates that governments could no longer facilitate the siting and construction of nuclear power plants with the relative ease that they had experienced in the 1950s and 1960s.

The structural shift towards lower levels of public trust in government that began in the 1970s has continued throughout the following decades, even during the period of the expected nuclear renaissance. This thesis therefore argues that the political context of lower levels of public trust in government was always going to pose a challenge to the expectation of a nuclear renaissance, and meant that these expectations were unlikely to become a reality. Public trust in government over issues of nuclear energy remained low during the renaissance period – even prior to the Fukushima nuclear disaster taking place. The 2007 Eurobarometer study titled Europeans and Nuclear Safety investigated public opinion towards nuclear energy and its associated risks amongst the 27 member states of the European Union. The study asked respondents who they considered to be the most trustworthy source of information about nuclear safety. Only 17 percent of respondents indicated that they trusted their national governments for information (Eurobarometer, 2007b: 51). Another Eurobarometer study into Energy Technologies found that only 29 percent of respondents trusted their government for information about

126 energy related issues either ‘totally’ or ‘a lot’ (Eurobarometer, 2007a: 99). A 2010 Eurobarometer study on nuclear energy found that only 51 percent of respondents trusted their national nuclear safety authorities to ensure the safe operation of nuclear power plants (Eurobarometer, 2010: 53). These figures indicate that there has continued to be a dearth of public trust in government over issues of nuclear energy during the renaissance period.

Consequently, the period of time that was meant to see a nuclear renaissance take place has continued to be characterised by low levels of public trust in government more broadly, as well as low levels of public trust in government specifically in regards to the issue of nuclear energy. The same problem that contributed to the decline of nuclear power in the 1970s continued to problematize nuclear development during the supposed renaissance period. However, the discourse surrounding the nuclear renaissance did not recognise this context of low levels of public trust in government as an issue or challenge for a revival of nuclear power. No mention was made in government or industry discourse of the need to improve public trust in government in order to ensure the nuclear renaissance became a reality.

There are several factors which have contributed to the ongoing low levels of public trust in government over issues of nuclear energy during the renaissance period. One of these factors is that there have been numerous other reports of mismanagement, collusion and regulatory failure at nuclear facilities across the globe since 200024. In 2007, presidential candidate Barack Obama declared that the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission had “become captive of the industries that it regulates” (Elliott, 2011). These reports have contributed to a public image of governments and the nuclear industry as being untrustworthy and incapable of safely managing the risks associated with nuclear power. This image has been reinforced by anti-nuclear advocates, who have capitalised on events such as Fukushima to reinforce their message that nuclear energy is an inherently risky technology and that governments are incapable of protecting the public from the dangers of nuclear power.

Public trust in government over issues of nuclear energy in particular has also continued to be challenged during the renaissance period by the competing discourses of government rhetoric and the anti-nuclear movement. While pro-nuclear governments have continued to frame nuclear power as a safe and cost-effective source of energy production, anti-nuclear advocates such as Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth challenge government reassurances over the need for nuclear energy by framing nuclear energy as an “unacceptable risk to the environment and to humanity” which needs to be

24 In 2007, pipes at the Byron Nuclear Generating Station were found to have corroded, causing shutdowns at two nuclear reactors for repairs. The plant owner, Exelon Corporation, was aware that the pipes were corroding, but repeatedly lowered the minimum thickness that it deemed safe (eventually reducing the standards to one-tenth the original minimum thickness), rather than fixing the pipes. While the Nuclear Regulatory Commission had inspected the site, there was no record of inspection of the pipes themselves for at least eight years prior to the leak occurring (Zeller Jr., 2011). A study released by the Union of Concerned Scientists found that a lack of regulatory oversight had led to fourteen serious ‘near-miss’ safety incidents at US nuclear plants in 2010 alone (Clayton, 2011).

127 abandoned altogether (Greenpeace International, 2014a). The damage that these challenges can cause to government legitimacy when trying to encourage nuclear energy development was clearly displayed in the recent controversy over the UK Government’s Energy Review. In 2005, the UK government launched a review into the energy challenges facing the nation and to identify strategies for responding to these challenges. Critics claimed that the review was merely a smokescreen for the government’s already-made decision to support nuclear power (Lovell, 2005)25. The Energy Review Report, completed in 2006, gave backing to a new generation of nuclear power plants, but asserted that it would be up to the private sector to fund any new developments (HM Government, 2006: 17, 124-5). These conclusions soon became the subject of widespread controversy. In 2007, Greenpeace challenged the legality of the Government’s conclusion that nuclear power had a “role to play” in the UK’s energy future. In particular, they argued that the government had failed to fulfil its promise to conduct “the fullest consultation” with stakeholders before arriving at its conclusions, and had failed to present adequate information on ongoing issues of cost and nuclear waste disposal (Summers, 2007). Greenpeace was subsequently successful in winning a High Court ruling against the government that deemed the pro-nuclear decision to be “unlawful”, and the consultation process to be “seriously flawed” and “manifestly inadequate and unfair” (Greenpeace, 2007). The British government announced that it would launch a new consultation, however, Tony Blair declared prior to the commencement of the new consultation that the process “won’t affect policy at all” (Geels, 2013: 17). Moreover, as the second nuclear consultation process unfolded, environmental organisations criticised the process as a “nothing more than an expensive sham”, having many of the same flaws that were inherent to the first consultation, and ultimately abandoned the process (see, for example, Greenpeace, 2008; Vidal, 2007).

The impact of this incident on public trust in government over issues of nuclear energy in the UK has been dire. In 2012, the House of Commons Science and Technology Committee concluded that the public does not trust the government to be objective and independent when developing policy on nuclear power. The Committee stated that “the government’s position as an advocate for nuclear power makes it difficult for the public to trust it as an impartial source of information” (House of Commons Science and Technology Committee, 2012: 17). Public trust in the independence of nuclear regulation in the UK was further undermined when, in 2014, The Independent revealed that the nuclear regulatory agency in the UK, the Office of Nuclear Regulation (ONR), was receiving technical advice from the same private companies that it was meant to be regulating (Leftly, 2014). The ONR Chairman, Nick Baldwin,

25 Prior to the 2005-06 Energy Review, there had also been a 2003 energy review entitled Our Energy Future, which drew upon the work of the Performance and Innovation Unit and was conducted using more transparent and participatory methods. This was meant to be the first time that an independent transparent energy review was conducted in the UK. The outcome of the Review was that nuclear power was not necessary. However, at the same time, Tony Blair enlisted a small team in the cabinet office that worked ‘behind closed doors’ to develop a secret report on the UK’s energy and environment (Taylor, 2016: 59-63). The conclusion of this report was that nuclear power was the only realistic solution to securing sufficient affordable, carbon-free energy. Following the release of this report, the decision from the 2003 Energy Review that nuclear power was not needed was then reversed in the 2005-06 Energy Review.

128 admitted later that there was only a “small gene pool” of companies that could provide the technical advice which the ONR needed to carry out its role (Leftly, 2014). These developments all contribute to the creation of a political environment that discourages public trust in government and the nuclear industry to be able to safely and effectively manage the construction and operation of nuclear power plants. They suggest to the public and the media alike that the government lacks independence and cannot be trusted to be honest and open about their dealings with the nuclear industry, and that the state’s relationship with the nuclear industry undermines government assurances about nuclear power being a safe source of energy production.

Public protests that have taken place during the renaissance period against the development of nuclear power also reflect the ongoing assumption that governments and the nuclear industry cannot be trusted. When protesting against the construction of the Hinkley Point nuclear power station in the UK, the spokesman for the Stop New Nuclear alliance accused the government of having “hoodwinked the public into believing that we need nuclear power to keep the lights on. But this is totally untrue” (The Guardian, 2011). Similarly, when planning permission was granted to EDF for the construction of the new Hinkley Point reactor, a spokesperson for the Stop Hinkley campaign described the decision as “a rubber-stamping exercise”, and that “the public consultation last year was…an elaborate, undemocratic sham” (Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, 2013). Furthermore, one of the sites identified by the British government as a potential location for the construction of a new nuclear power station is Bradwell. An anti-nuclear group opposed to the construction of a nuclear reactor at the site has raised concerns that the government-run consultation process about the development was not being run in a democratic and transparent manner. The Chairman of The Blackwater Against New Nuclear Group stated that “there is a real concern the consultation process is being pursued in a hurry and out of public view, in order to reach a predetermined conclusion to develop at Bradwell” (Daily Gazette, 2009).

The ability of government to generate and retain public trust over issues of nuclear energy has also continued to be hampered by revelations of regulatory failure, corruption and collusion among government and the nuclear industry during the renaissance period. This was most clearly displayed in the case of the Fukushima nuclear disaster in March 2011. An independent investigation into the cause of the Fukushima disaster was undertaken by the Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission (NAIIC) in 2011. The investigation found that the Nuclear and Industry Safety Agency (NISA) and the Japanese Nuclear Safety Commission (NSC, the regulators), the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI, the government ministry responsible for promoting nuclear power) and the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO, the operator of the nuclear power plant) had all failed to adequately develop and implement “the most basic safety requirements” (NAIIC 2012: 16). These revelations about the effectiveness of nuclear regulation in Japan were not entirely new or surprising. Since the 1980s, NISA has repeatedly failed to respond to warnings about the structural resilience of nuclear reactors and power plants and their inability to withstand earthquakes or

129 tsunamis (Kaufmann and Penciakova, 2011). Furthermore, the NAIIC report found that the Japanese government, regulators and TEPCO had not undertaken adequate preparation for responding to a nuclear accident like the one at Fukushima (NAIIC 2012: 18). The government organisations that were tasked with responding to nuclear accidents did not respond effectively or as planned (NAIIC 2012: 33), and were slow to inform municipalities that the nuclear accident had taken place or how severe the accident was (NAIIC 2012: 19). The regulators did not have adequate expertise to ensure the safety of nuclear power, nor did they adequately monitor or supervise the nuclear industry (NAIIC 2012: 20). The regulators did not enforce safety requirements, instead allowing nuclear operators to implement safety regulations on a voluntary basis (NAIIC 2012: 20). Government and regulatory independence from stakeholders with a vested interest in promoting nuclear power was described in the report as a “mockery” (NAIIC 2012: 20). Rather, there existed a “cozy relationship between the operators, the regulators and academic scholars that can only be described as totally inappropriate. In essence, the regulators and the operators prioritized the interests of their organizations over the public’s safety, and decided that Japanese nuclear power plant reactor operations ‘will not be stopped’” (NAIIC 2012: 43).

The revelations of mismanagement and regulatory failure in Japan surrounding the Fukushima nuclear accident have had severe implications for public trust in government over nuclear energy and public support for nuclear energy development in general. In August 2011, a public opinion poll conducted by the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research of 1,000 Japanese residents found that almost 60 percent of respondents had either little or no confidence in the safety of Japan’s nuclear power plants (Aldrich, 2012: 7). A study conducted by the Pew Research Center in 2012 found that 80 percent of respondents in Japan disapproved of the government’s handling of the Fukushima crisis, and 70 percent of respondents thought that nuclear power in Japan should be reduced (Pew Research, 2012).

Moreover, in the months following the Fukushima nuclear disaster, revelations about the actions of government and nuclear industry actors immediately after the disaster further served to erode public trust over issues of nuclear energy. A report by The Guardian revealed that a public relations campaign was launched in the wake of Fukushima to protect the UK civil nuclear energy programme from any potential fallout. Only two days after the tsunami hit, and before the extent of the radiation leak was known, British government officials contacted nuclear companies (such as EDF Energy, Areva and Westinghouse), requesting them to develop a coordinated public relations strategy that would “play down” the Fukushima nuclear accident and protect plans for nuclear new build in the UK (Edwards, 2011). One official from the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, wrote that the Fukushima nuclear disaster “has the potential to set the nuclear industry back globally”, and that “We need to ensure the anti-nuclear chaps and chapesses do not gain ground on this. We need to occupy the territory and hold it. We really need to show the safety of nuclear” (Edwards, 2011).

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Clearly, despite all the talk of a nuclear renaissance and an expected growth in public support for nuclear energy development, public trust in government over issues of nuclear energy remained low during the renaissance period – even prior to the Fukushima nuclear disaster taking place. This, combined with the broader decline in public trust in government and political institutions, makes for a challenging political environment for nuclear energy development to occur. Governments faced with lower levels of public trust are likely to find it more difficult to convince the public that the creation or expansion of a civil nuclear energy programme is in the national interest. Similarly, low levels of public trust in government are also likely to make it more difficult for governments to identify and secure sites for construction of nuclear power plants or nuclear waste storage and disposal facilities. However, trust in government has not been recognised by the nuclear industry as a problem for the nuclear renaissance. In the discourse purporting the benefits and inevitably of a nuclear renaissance, no mention has been made of the ongoing challenge of public trust in government, or the need to resolve this issue in order to facilitate the expansion of civil nuclear industries. This lack of recognition suggests that the nuclear renaissance was always going to be constrained by the political context of the time. The nuclear renaissance is unlikely to be successful unless public trust in government at a general level, as well as public trust in government specifically over issues of nuclear energy, improves.

There are, however, some exceptions to the trend of eroding levels of public trust in government, which provide an interesting comparison in terms of successful nuclear power development throughout the renaissance period. Finland and Sweden are both countries which have continued to maintain high levels of public trust in government at a time when public trust has been eroding elsewhere. The 2014 Eurobarometer on Public Opinion found that 47 percent of respondents in Finland and 54 percent of respondents in Sweden tended to trust their national government (European Commission, 2014c: 67). These figures far exceed the EU average of 29 percent of respondents tending to trust their national government (European Commission, 2014c: 65). Finland and Sweden have also had much greater success in establishing nuclear energy and nuclear waste facilities than other countries, particularly during the renaissance period. As described in Chapter 6, Finland is the first country to have begun construction on a high-level nuclear waste storage and disposal facility, in the form of a deep geological repository. This is a significant achievement, given that most other countries that have planned on creating a HLW facility have made little progress, largely as a result of public opposition to the siting of a facility, and public concern over the hazards associated with nuclear energy more broadly. Finland is also one of only two Western European countries (the other being France) to have begun construction on a new nuclear reactor during the renaissance period. Similarly, Sweden has managed to secure a site for the construction of a high-level nuclear waste facility. It is likely that the success of Sweden and Finland to date in developing a nuclear waste facility can be attributed, in part, to the higher levels of public trust in government. In a political environment where the public tends to trust their government, agents are more likely to accept government proposals for constructing controversial developments,

131 such as a nuclear waste facility. This suggests that public trust continues to be an important factor in facilitating or hindering nuclear energy development.

CONCLUSION

Agents in Context Historical Institutionalism argues that structure, context, institutions and ideas all play a key role in explaining change. Therefore, in order to understand the changing trajectory of nuclear energy development, the structural context in which this development takes place needs to be examined. The early expansion of nuclear power which took place in the 1950s and 1960s was embedded in a structural context characterised by high levels of trust in government. This structural context helped to facilitate nuclear energy development as agents are less likely to challenge government decision-making when they have higher levels of trust in government and political institutions. However, starting in the 1970s, public trust in government entered a period of gradual and sustained decline. This decline has created a more challenging structural context for the development of nuclear energy. When agents do not trust their government, they are more likely to question and challenge the policy decisions being made, particularly when it comes to controversial policy areas such as nuclear power. Governments faced with lower levels of public trust are likely to find it more difficult to convince the public that the creation or expansion of a civil nuclear energy programme is in the national interest. Similarly, low levels of public trust in government also make it more difficult for governments to identify and secure sites for construction of nuclear power plants or nuclear waste storage and disposal facilities. Consequently, low levels of public trust in government makes for a challenging political environment for the implementation of pro-nuclear policies.

When claims of a nuclear renaissance began to emerge in the early 2000s, opinion poll data indicates that public trust in government still remained low throughout Western Europe and North America. Public trust in government over issues relating specifically to nuclear energy also remained low. While advocates of the nuclear renaissance argued that the strong safety record of nuclear power had made the general public become more supportive of nuclear energy, media reports of collusion, mismanagement and regulatory failure at nuclear facilities throughout the 2000s – such as in the response to the Fukushima nuclear accident – suggested to the public that governments and the nuclear industry could not be trusted to safely manage and operate nuclear power facilities. These revelations did little to improve agents’ confidence in governments or the nuclear industry over issues of nuclear energy. The ongoing crisis of public trust in government, both in general and in relation to nuclear energy specifically, creates a challenging political environment for governments wishing to implement pro- nuclear policies. This suggests that the expectations of a nuclear renaissance was always going to be challenged by a lack of public support and confidence in new nuclear build. As a result, the nuclear renaissance was never likely to become a reality. The promising signs of nuclear development in

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Finland and Sweden also support this assertion, by suggesting that nuclear development is more likely to be successful in countries characterised by high levels of public trust in government.

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9. RISK PERCEPTIONS

This chapter develops a further explanation for why the expectation of a nuclear renaissance has failed to produce widespread nuclear growth in Western Europe and North America. It argues that the disconnection between the expectation and reality of the nuclear renaissance can be explained by an ideational shift in the way that agents perceive and respond to the idea of risk. In accordance with the analytical framework that guides this research project – Agents in Context Historical Institutionalism (AiC-HI) – a key aim of this research is demonstrate the way in which the interaction between agents and context is central to understanding why and how nuclear energy development changes over time. A core assumption of AiC-HI is that broad contextual shifts will shape the way in which agents think and behave. Consequently, a shift in the ideational context of risk poses significant implications for the way in which agents perceive and respond to the risks associated with nuclear energy.

This chapter argues that there have been two major shifts which have contributed to an ideational shift in the way in which agents perceive the risks associated with nuclear power. In the 1950s and 1960s, the risks associated with nuclear power were largely overlooked. Public awareness or apprehension over the risks of nuclear power was limited – no wide-ranging debate about the risks of nuclear power took place during this time. However, starting in the late 1960s and continuing on from the 1970s, two key shifts took place that contributed to a shift in the ideational context of risk. Firstly, Beck (1992) argues that a ‘risk society’, or a collective ‘risk consciousness’, has emerged in Western capitalist societies whereby public and political decision-making processes have become dominated by considerations of how to identify, respond to, and prevent risks. This has led to a broad attitudinal shift in way in which agents are aware of and adverse to the risks posed by industrial development, such as the use of nuclear power. Secondly, the increasing visibility of risks associated with nuclear power from the mid-1970s onwards has led to a more specific attitudinal shift towards the risks associated with nuclear power. The combination of these two shifts is the creation of an ideational context whereby agents are now more concerned about the risks associated with nuclear power. Nuclear advocates now have to work harder to convince citizens that the risks associated with nuclear power are minimal, and that the use of nuclear power will not harm society or the environment.

Consequently, when the expectation of a nuclear renaissance emerged in the early 2000s, pro-nuclear advocates had to convince agents of the manageability and low probability of the risks associated with nuclear power. One of the key arguments put forth by advocates of the nuclear renaissance was that the renaissance was bound to take place as the public had become more convinced of the safety of nuclear power, given nuclear power’s impressive safety record that had been sustained since Chernobyl and the development of new, safer reactor designs. This is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5. Nuclear

134 engineers and industry representatives presented facts and figures arguing that nuclear power was a virtually ‘risk free’ technology. However, public opinion polling since 2000 demonstrates that widespread concerns about the risks of nuclear power remain present in society. The ideational shift in risk has contributed to extensive opposition to nuclear energy development, even as the rhetoric of a nuclear renaissance gained momentum.

This chapter contributes to knowledge by drawing upon this broad range of risk theory to better understand the reasons for the apparent failure of the nuclear renaissance. It expands upon existing debates over the failure of the nuclear renaissance by highlighting the centrality of agent-context interactions in determining public perceptions and acceptance of nuclear energy development. It draws upon various theoretical and research perspective on risk perception – such as the risk society thesis, as well as psychological and psychometric research on cognitive processes – to provide further insight into why nuclear power continues to be perceived as inherently risky, despite repeated claims by the nuclear industry that nuclear power is safe. In doing so, it broadens the existing debate over the reasons for why the expectation of a nuclear renaissance has failed to generate widespread nuclear growth in Western Europe and North America.

THE RISK SOCIETY

One of the most influential theoretical frameworks for understanding risk that has emerged from social science literature is Ulrich Beck’s (1992; 1999; 2006; 2009; 2008) theory of the “risk society”. Beck argues that there has been an ideational shift in the way that risks are perceived over time throughout society. Beck’s conceptualisation of risk refers to “hazards and insecurities induced and introduced by modernization itself” (Beck, 1992: 21). Beck’s argument of the emergence of a risk society has become influential in debates over social issues as diverse as environmental politics, technology and culture, crime, social inequality, and law and justice (Beck, 2014: xiii-xiv). The idea of a risk society has become closely linked to debates over the growing threats of climate change, terrorism, pesticides and food safety (Mythen and Walklate, 2006; Jensen and Blok, 2008; Bulkeley, 2001; Smith, 2007). Similarly, the multiple-disciplinary nature and appeal of Beck’s work is evident in its influence over academic debates in the areas of sociology, political science, cultural studies, geography and environmental studies (Mythen, 2004: 4-6). In short, Beck’s risk society thesis continues to retain its position as a highly influential framework for understanding the role of risk in contemporary society.

The core assumption underpinning Beck’s argument is that a fundamental transformation has taken place in the nature and perception of risks confronting humanity since the end of the Second World War. This transformation has led to the emergence from the late 1960s onwards of what Beck terms the ‘risk society’. Beck argues that Western societies were, until recently, purely industrial societies. They were built upon industrial class divisions, and concerned themselves with the production of wealth and

135 other material goods within broader conditions of scarcity. Within these societies, risks were understood as being produced through industrialisation processes, and could therefore be predicted, managed and insured against through scientific expertise and calculations. As these industrial societies have progressed and modernised, technological and scientific advancements have successfully reduced the basic threats to human survival, such as famine, epidemics, poverty and natural disasters. However, these techno-scientific developments designed to combat the problems of industrial societies have also produced various unexpected ‘latent’ or ‘hazardous’ side-effects (Beck, 1992: 20).

The side-effects of industrial progress and modernisation represent a new type of “manufactured uncertainties” or “manufactured risk” which have emerged from the late 1960s onwards, the nature of which is unprecedented in human history (Beck, 2009). This is not to say that the amount of risk prevalent in society has increased, but rather, that the risks present in contemporary society are qualitatively different from those faced in previous eras (Giddens, 2006: 119). The risks are manufactured in that they are a result of human decisions and creation (Beck, 2009: 293). Manufactured risks are “global dangers” (Beck, 1992: 21), in that they are no longer constrained by boundaries of time, space or tradition - everyone is vulnerable to their effects (Beck, 1999: 36, 142). Manufactured risks can impact the lives of individuals across generations, class and social distinctions, or geographical locations (Beck, 2006: 334). They are unable to be detected by physical human senses and therefore cannot be predicted, calculated or insured against, nor can the people impacted by these risks be properly compensated for the damage caused (Beck, 2006: 334; Beck, 1992: 21-2; Beck, 1999: 8). No single government can regulate manufactured risks, nor can any one individual, group or authority be held responsible for the risks or their widespread impacts (Beck, 1999: 36). Consequently, the very nature of these manufactured risks means that they can no longer be effectively managed or controlled by the institutions of industrial society.

The emergence of these manufactured risks has also resulted in a widespread transformation in the way that risks are perceived and understood. At first, the global dangers of the risk society are unseen and avoid social recognition (Beck, 1992: 34). However, as the impacts of the manufactured risks become increasingly visible, a ‘risk consciousness’ develops, whereby considerations of risk become an intrinsic part of everyday life. Decision-making processes on an individual, local, national, or global scale have come to be dominated by considerations of risk management and mitigation (Tulloch and Lupton, 2003: 1; Elliott, 2010: viii; Wilkinson, 2010: 7; Beck, 2006: 332). The growing awareness of risk throughout society has been influenced by the development of digital media technologies, which have made information and knowledge about risks increasingly accessible to the public (Mythen, 2004: 3). For example, the media plays a central role in the risk society by heightening public awareness of risk through extensive coverage of high-profile scientific and technologically induced catastrophes. This is evident in the cases of the pollution and health effects resulting from buried toxic waste at Love Canal in New York, toxic waste contamination at Times Beach in Missouri, the gas leak at Bhopal in 1984,

136 the Chernobyl nuclear disaster in 1986, and the explosion of the Challenger space shuttle. Each of these events captured the attention of the global news media, and communicated to the public the dangers associated with technical and scientific progress. As a result of these catastrophes, the institutions of science and technology that were once esteemed for making the world a safer place, are now seen as the very source of risk itself (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982: 10; Beck, 2006: 336).

As with any influential theory, Beck’s argument has been subject to various criticisms. Beck’s risk society thesis operates primarily at the level of ‘grand theory’ by attempting to provide a universal explanation for changes in the nature and perception of risk. Consequently, one of the primary criticisms of the risk society argument is that the evidence provided by Beck is anecdotal and in need of empirical validation (Dingwall, 1999: 476; Lupton and Tulloch, 2002: 319; Alexander, 1996: 134; Dryzek, 1995: 237; Matten, 2004: 372; Lupton, 1999: 6). Furthermore, while Beck claims that a “world risk society” has emerged, several scholars have taken issue with the apparent global application of Beck’s work, arguing that Beck primarily draws upon examples from Western democratic and capitalist countries, particularly Germany, and therefore does not properly account for the evolution of risk in other cultural contexts and geographic locations (Dingwall, 1999: 236; Nugent, 2000; Bujra, 2000: 63). While Beck does discuss trends in risk transformation in South America and Africa, these examples are said to be insufficient evidence for the claim that a truly global risk society has emerged (Mythen, 2007: 801).

Despite these criticisms, Beck’s theory of the risk society continues to provide a significant contribution to furthering contemporary understanding of the changing nature and societal response to risk. For example, a growing body of empirical research into risk perception appears to support the broad claims of Beck’s argument, such as that there has been a growth in public awareness and aversion to risk over time, and that this growing awareness has influenced the behaviour and thought-processes of individuals in society (Mythen, 2007: 802; Taylor-Gooby and Cebulla, 2010). Furthermore, such criticisms overlook the inherent value of ideas as grand theories. Grand theories do not attempt to predict the minutiae of everyday life, but seek to understand major social changes and trends (Alaszewski, 2009: 490). Savage and Burrows (2007: 895) argue that the value of social theorists such as Beck lie in their ability to engage with social processes and phenomenon, and that their theoretical contributions were “not intended to be ‘tested’ by empirical research”. Matten (2004: 372) makes a similar claim, arguing that “Beck’s ideas are more of a provocative and conceptual nature rather than a minute empirical proof of certain social changes”. Furthermore, while Beck’s theory may overlook the localised nature and experience of risk, applications of his theory can overcome this limitation by recognising the importance of individual societal and historical contexts. Similarly, while Beck’s theory may overemphasise the ability of risk to cross class boundaries or affect populations in a manner never seen before, this does not detract from his core argument that society is increasingly preoccupied with mitigating risk, regardless of what the exact nature of those risks might be. Consequently, in spite of the various

137 criticisms, the risk society continues to be a useful framework for understanding agents’ increasing preoccupation with risk in contemporary societies.

A core objective of this thesis is to highlight the way in which interactions between agents and context are central to explaining the reasons for changes in nuclear energy development. Agents in Context Historical Institutionalism argues that the thought processes and behaviour of agents – such as members of the public, policymakers, and nuclear industry representatives – are enabled or constrained by the ideational, institutional, and structural contexts in which they are located. The emergence of a risk society, or a collective risk consciousness, is one example of a fundamental ideational shift that has taken place in the post-war era, and which has heavily shaped the way in which agents think about and respond to the idea of risk. The implications of this contextual shift for the way in which agents perceive and respond to the issue of nuclear power and its associated risks are discussed next.

NUCLEAR ENERGY IN THE RISK SOCIETY

An Agents in Context Historical Institutionalist perspective suggests that the emergence of a risk society poses significant implications for the way in which agents think about and respond to the issue of nuclear power. More specifically, the growth of a risk society has resulted in an increasing awareness of and opposition to the risks associated with nuclear power. Beck identifies nuclear power as one of the many manufactured risks that are characteristic of a risk society (Beck, 1992: 22). Nuclear power fulfils the criteria of a manufactured risk in that it is a man-made invention that was developed to address an ongoing problem facing industrial societies – the need for cheap and plentiful energy. Nuclear power is now also seen as a solution for addressing the problem facing industrial societies of how to tackle global warming and climate change. However, the utilisation of nuclear energy has also resulted in various latent side effects, the most notable of which are the risks associated with radiation releases from nuclear accidents and nuclear waste. Radiation poses potentially disastrous risks for both human and environmental health. These latent side effects align with Beck’s description of the nature of manufactured risks in several ways. The risks associated with nuclear power can be considered to be a “global danger”, as they transcend boundaries of space and time. For example, the global nature of the risks associated with nuclear power became evident in the aftermath of the Chernobyl disaster, when radioactive fallout caused by the explosion at the nuclear power plant in the Ukraine was subsequently found in the neighbouring countries of Belarus and Russia. Lighter radioactive material, also originating from Chernobyl, had spread even further afield throughout Europe and the UK (WNA 2014b). The long-term nature of the risks associated with nuclear power was also made evident by Chernobyl. Shortly after the Chernobyl disaster took place, the UK government implemented restrictions on farming practices in England and Wales to protect against radioactive fallout from Chernobyl. These restrictions were only completely lifted in 2012 (BBC News, 2012a). The impact of Chernobyl’s

138 radioactive fallout is expected to continue to affect individuals born several generations from now (Mythen, 2004: 19). Furthermore, nuclear power constitutes a manufactured risk as no single person or authority can be held accountable for the risks posed by nuclear energy, nor can the risks of nuclear energy be comprehensively calculated or insured against. This is partly because the risks posed by radiation are largely invisible, and cannot be easily detected by physical human senses.

Beck’s theory of the risk society provides useful insights into understanding the way in which ideational contextual changes can influence the thought-processes and behaviour of actors. In particular, the emergence of a risk society suggests that there has been a general shift in agents’ (such as voters and policymakers) attitudes towards risk. People have become far more aware of and adverse to risk, both at an individual level and at the level of political decision-making. There is an increasing aversion to man-made risks, such as nuclear power, which pose potentially unpreventable, uncontrollable and devastating dangers to society. Consequently, the emergence of a risk society can help to explain why nuclear power has come to be seen as an inherently risky technology.

However, in addition to this broad ideational shift in attitudes towards risk, there has also been a more specific shift in attitudes towards the risks posed by nuclear power in particular. This shift resulted from the increasing visibility of the risks associated with nuclear power. In the 1950s and 1960s, the risks associated with nuclear power were largely hidden from public view. Rather than having the risky connotations that are now inherent to the nuclear debate, nuclear power in the 1950s and 1960s was lauded as a panacea for meeting societal needs and raising the living standards of citizens throughout the entire world (Walker and Wellock, 2010: 3). It was widely believed that nuclear power would provide cheap and virtually limitless amounts of electricity, revolutionise the transportation system through nuclear powered planes and trains, and even fix the problem of world hunger by using nuclear technology to genetically modify crops to survive in extreme environmental conditions (Hillaby, 1955: 6; Bodansky, 2004: 18). This idealistic view of nuclear power remained largely unchallenged for the first two decades of civil nuclear energy development.

Meanwhile, the risks associated with nuclear power were largely overlooked. As described in Chapter 5, prior to the 1970s, there was a distinct lack of consideration in debates over nuclear energy’s role in society as to the potential environmental and human health hazards associated with nuclear power plants. The early development of reactor designs did not include quantitative measures of risk or reliability (Keller and Modarres, 2005: 273). No wide-ranging debate around the complex issues of nuclear safety or its associated environmental or public health impacts took place during the 1950s and 1960s (Camilleri, 1984: 75), despite the fact that safety incidents at nuclear power plants were already taking place. Any concerns that were raised about nuclear power and the risks involved during this time were largely confined to academic journals, small-scale publications, and intermittent localised concerns (Herring, 2010: 46). This suggests that agents perceived the risks of nuclear power as being

139 concentrated at a local level, rather than as a potential issue that could cause widespread damage across the boundaries of countries or regions.

However, from the late 1960s and early 1970s onwards, several factors coalesced which served to increase public awareness of the risks associated with nuclear power and eroded public confidence in the early promises of the technology. Information and evidence about the dangers and risks associated with nuclear power became available to the general public during the early 1970s (Downey, 1986: 400). In response, anti-nuclear movements began to emerge and mobilise throughout Western Europe and North America. These groups publicised the dangers associated with nuclear energy in order to oppose both specific nuclear development projects as well as the use of nuclear energy in general (see Chapter 5). Furthermore, the first major nuclear accident took place at Three Mile Island in 1979, which captured the global mass media’s attention and fuelled public fears over the safety of nuclear power and the risks it poses to human and environmental health. These fears were then exacerbated by the catastrophic disaster at Chernobyl in 1986. The result of these nuclear accidents was that public perceptions of nuclear energy in general became increasingly negative over the following decades (Rosa and Dunlap, 1994).

The combination of these two shifts has meant that from the mid-1970s onwards, nuclear power was increasingly viewed as posing inherent and unacceptable risks to society. The emergence of a risk society, whereby there has been a growing awareness of and aversion to the idea of risk, represented a major ideational contextual shift in which agents (members of the public and policymakers alike) paid more attention to the ‘side effects’ of industrial development, such as the use of nuclear power for electricity production. At the same time, the increasing visibility of the potential dangers posed by nuclear power eroded early idealistic views of nuclear power as a panacea for humanity, and instead contributed to and reinforced the perception that nuclear powered electricity generation was a dangerous and risk-prone technology.

The emergence of a preoccupation with the risks of nuclear power is evident in government and nuclear industry decision-making processes. In the late 1960s, the US Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) became increasingly interested in the idea of risk and the ways in which risk could inform nuclear energy decision making (Perkins, 2014: 278). Risk assessment methods began to be adopted by nuclear decision-makers and integrated into nuclear engineering and regulatory procedures. In 1972 and 1973, members of the AEC began investigating risk and safety issues at several nuclear power plants in the US using past incident reports that had been produced (Keller and Modarres, 2005: 274). In order to allay growing public fears over nuclear power, the AEC commissioned a study that would provide a realistic estimate of the potential risks to the public should an accident take place at a commercial nuclear power plant. The “Reactor Safety Study” (RSS) was completed in 1975, and concluded that “the risks to the public from potential accidents in nuclear power plants are comparatively small” (US

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Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1975: 1). The study has since been described as “the first highly visible effort of the federal government in risk analysis” (Perkins, 2014: 279). Following the release of the RSS in 1975, there was an “explosive increase” in the number of nuclear risk and safety assessments conducted up until 1990 (Hayns, 1999: 139). The President of the National Academy of Sciences commissioned a review of the RSS, which resulted in the release of a report detailing the “Risks Associated with Nuclear Power” in 1979 (National Academy of Sciences, 1979). In 1983, based on a recommendation from the American Nuclear Society and the Institute for Electrical and Electronics Engineers, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission began developing documents to provide formal guidance on how to conduct probabilistic risk assessments (Keller and Modarres, 2005: 281). In 1986, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission announced that it was considering the development of its first qualitative safety goals to ensure that the risks associated with nuclear power could not significantly influence an individual’s risk of accidental death or injury (The New York Times, 1982: D15).

Between 1983 and 1985, a public inquiry was conducted into the proposal to construct a nuclear power station at Sizewell, Suffolk in the UK. In 1986, the final report of the inquiry was released by the chief inspector, Sir Frank Layfield. The report concluded that the British Government’s Health and Safety Executive (HSE) should “formulate and publish guidelines on the tolerable levels of individual and social risk to workers and the public from nuclear power stations” (Tromans, 2010: 97). This was quite a novel idea at the time, given that risk analysis had typically been regarded as an issue for experts, rather than the general public (Health and Safety Executive, 1992: 1). In response, the HSE released a report on “The Tolerability of Risks From Nuclear Power Stations” in 1992, which recognised that “many people are bothered about nuclear power and other industrial risks and have become more so during the years since Sir Frank Layfield wrote his report” (Health and Safety Executive, 1992: 1). This document also then formed the basis for the HSE’s publication in 2001 of the overall framework by which the HSE makes decisions on risk more broadly (Health and Safety Executive, 2001: v).

The discourse of risk also became increasingly evident in the rhetoric of the anti-nuclear movement. One of the key leaders of the anti-nuclear power movement, Ralph Nader, based his opposition to the use of nuclear energy on the risks involved. Nader criticised the US Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on the grounds that its “zeal for promoting nuclear power has so overshadowed its responsibility to assure the public safety that it has put at risk not only this generation but a hundred generations to come” (The Washington Post, 1974: A2). In 1976, three high-level engineers employed by the nuclear power division at General Electric publicly resigned from their positions and joined the anti-nuclear movement. One of the engineers presented a resignation letter to General Electric, which justified his decision on the grounds that “nuclear power has become a technological monster and it is not clear who, if anyone, is in control. I am no longer convinced of the technical safety of nuclear power, and I fear the high risk of political and human factors that will ultimately lead to the misuse of its by- products” (The Wall Street Journal, 1976: 11). Another of the engineers wrote in their resignation letter

141 that nuclear reactors “now present a serious danger to the future of all life on this planet” (The Wall Street Journal, 1976: 11). In West Germany, the Federation of Environmental Groups published a report in 1979 investigating the safety of nuclear power stations. The report concluded that nuclear power poses intolerable risks to society. The report detailed every confidential accident reports collected by the West German government between 1965 and 1977, and found that the average number of accidents taking place at nuclear power facilities in West Germany averaged one accident every three days over the past two years. The report describes the public as having been “hoodwinked” by the government over nuclear safety and the risks associated with nuclear power (Buschschluter, 1979: 6).

By the late 1990s, the perception of nuclear power as a source of risk had become firmly entrenched in the nuclear debate. This perception stands in stark contrast to the far more optimistic perception of nuclear power which was widely purported in the 1950s and 1960s. The emergence of a risk society, as well as the increasing visibility of the risks associated with nuclear power in particular, resulted in a contextual shift whereby the behaviour of agents (members of the public and policymakers alike) were increasingly shaped by the belief that nuclear power posed uncontrollable and arguably unacceptable risks to society and the environment. This perception contributed to growing public scepticism around the benefits of nuclear power, and made it increasingly difficult for pro-nuclear government officials and the nuclear industry to gain public acceptance for new nuclear developments. The growth of public opposition to nuclear development from the mid-1970s onwards was influenced by this increasing scepticism towards the safety of nuclear power and the ability of government and industry officials to protect citizens from the dangers of nuclear energy. The risks of nuclear energy had now become a permanent feature in debates over whether nuclear power should be used.

RISK & THE NUCLEAR RENAISSANCE

When the rhetoric of a nuclear renaissance began to gain momentum in the 2000s, advocates of nuclear power argued that many of the long-standing concerns around the safety or dangers posed by nuclear power were resolved. As described in Chapter 5, advocates of the nuclear renaissance assumed that the long-standing public concerns over the risks of nuclear power had been largely overcome as a result of the nuclear industry’s impressive safety record that had been sustained since the Chernobyl disaster in 1986. In addition, nuclear industry representatives announced the development of new nuclear reactor designs and technologies that would be safer than ever before (Power, 2004: 7). Such claims were targeted at assuaging any remaining concerns over the use of nuclear power. The nuclear industry actively worked towards reassuring the public that nuclear power posed minimal, if any, risk to society or the environment.

In their efforts to convince the public that there was no rational reason to fear or oppose a nuclear renaissance, pro-nuclear government and industry representatives advocated the high levels of safety

142 and low levels of risk associated with nuclear power. For example, the World Nuclear Association declares on their website that “the risk of accidents in nuclear power plants is low and declining. The consequences of an accident or terrorist attack are minimal compared with other commonly accepted risks” (WNA 2014l). The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission produced a “Fact Sheet on Nuclear Reactor Risk”, which states that “the risk of a nuclear power plant accident with a significant amount of radioactivity released offsite to the public is very small” (US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2014). In their guide to nuclear regulation, the UK Office for Nuclear Regulation stated that “the design, operation and maintenance of nuclear installations makes the risk of accidents involving the release of radiation extremely low” (Office for Nuclear Regulation, 2014: 23). The UK’s security regulator, the Office for Civil Nuclear Security, stated that “new nuclear build would be unlikely to increase risks to the UK” (HM Government, 2006: 120).

However, despite these efforts by nuclear advocates to frame nuclear power as a low source of risk, the ideational context surrounding nuclear energy and the way that agents’ perceive nuclear risks remained largely unchanged. From 2000 onwards, the risks inherent to the use of nuclear energy continued to feature strongly in debates over whether civil nuclear energy programmes should be established, expanded or abolished. For example, agents who opposed the use of nuclear power continued to justify their opposition by arguing that nuclear power posed unacceptable societal and environmental dangers. Greenpeace stated that the organisation opposes nuclear energy because its use results in “an increased risk from terrorism, radioactive accident and nuclear proliferation” (Greenpeace, 2006). A report commissioned by Greenpeace on the practice of granting lifetime extensions to ageing nuclear power plants described nuclear power as “entering a new era of risk” in terms of nuclear safety, largely as a result of nuclear reactors receiving extended license permits, far beyond their original design lifetimes (Greenpeace, 2014a: 124). These concerns became apparent when, in December 2015, the Belgian government announce that license extensions would be granted to two of its 40-year-old nuclear reactors. Communities surrounding the reactors expressed concerns about this decision and about the safety of the reactors, given that cracks had been discovered in several of Belgium’s nuclear reactor casings (Neslen, 2016). Similarly, in 2014, the Fessenheim nuclear reactors (the oldest nuclear reactors in France) were found to be leaking in several places and had to be shut down. It was not until 2016, however, that the severity of the accident became revealed to the public (Goebel, 2016).

Jim Riccio, Greenpeace’s nuclear policy analyst, highlighted the risks of nuclear power by stating that “every single reactor has the potential to be a Fukushima or Chernobyl…I fail to see why we continue to put our public at risk for the benefit of these corporations” (Hackman, 2015). Friends of the Earth opposes nuclear energy on the grounds that nuclear plants “carry high technical and regulatory risks” (Friends of the Earth, 2013b: 4), and as such, the use of nuclear power “is a risk not worth taking” (Friends of the Earth, 2013b: 8). Friends of the Earth actively campaigned against the Diablo Canyon nuclear reactors in the US on the grounds that “the tremendous and unnecessary risk these reactors pose

143 to public health and the environment necessitates that they be shut down” (Friends of the Earth, 2015). The organisation of Nuclear Free Local Authorities in the UK opposed nuclear power because it is “risky”, and described the use of probabilistic risk assessments as being based on “flawed logic” (Nuclear Free Local Authorities, 2012: 4). The Union of Concerned Scientists, while not describing themselves as either pro or anti-nuclear, do warn that nuclear power creates “added risks to human health, the environment, and global security” (Union of Concerned Scientists, 2015).

When the rhetoric of a nuclear renaissance emerged in the early 2000s, the centrality of risk to considerations of nuclear energy development was evident in reports produced by industry agencies into the risks associated with nuclear power. In 2001, the International Atomic Energy Agency produced a report on risk management and its ability to improve the performance of nuclear power plants (IAEA 2001). The OECD Nuclear Energy Agency produced a report in 2010 which compared the accident risks at nuclear power plants with the risks posed by other energy sources (OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, 2010a).

Public opinion polling from 2000 onwards demonstrates that, in spite of the claims made by nuclear advocates about the high levels of safety and low levels of risk associated with nuclear power, there continued to be a widespread belief that nuclear power is a significant source of risk. The 2010 Eurobarometer study titled Europeans and Nuclear Safety investigated public opinion towards nuclear energy and its associated risks amongst the twenty-seven member states of the European Union. The study found that 51 percent of respondents answered that “the risks of nuclear power as an energy source outweigh its advantages” (Eurobarometer, 2010: 40). In comparison, only 35 percent of respondents answered that “the advantages of nuclear power as an energy source outweigh the risks it poses” (Eurobarometer, 2010: 40). Almost half of the respondents (47 percent) believed that the risks associated with nuclear energy are underestimated, compared with 38 percent of respondents who believed that the risks are exaggerated (Eurobarometer, 2010: 45).

Clearly, a disconnection continued to exist between the way in which advocates and opponents of nuclear energy perceived the risks of nuclear power during the renaissance period. What was consistent amongst both these groups, however, was that the idea of risk continued to underpin the arguments being made. This indicates that the ideational context which informed agents’ perceptions of nuclear power during the renaissance period was fundamentally different from the ideational context which informed agents’ perceptions of nuclear power during the 1950s and 1960s. As described earlier in this chapter, the early development and expansion of civil nuclear energy programmes in the 1950s and 1960s was characterised by a distinct absence of consideration or discussion of nuclear risks. However, from the 1970s onwards, and sustained from 2000 onwards when the expectation of a nuclear renaissance gained momentum, the idea of risk has become a dominant influence in the way that agents understand and form opinions on nuclear energy. This is evident in the discourses used by agents

144 advocating for nuclear energy development, as well as the discourses used by agents opposing nuclear power. Moreover, the growing dominance of the idea of risk in nuclear energy debates supports Beck’s argument that Western societies have, from the late 1960s onwards, evolved into risk societies, whereby considerations of risk have become a central feature in public and political decision-making processes.

Beck’s theory of the risk society also offers insights into the reason why this disconnection continues to exist between different agents’ understandings of the level of risk associated with nuclear power. While Beck argues that all agents in a risk society have adopted a greater preoccupation with risk considerations, Beck also argues that the way in which scientific and technical experts and the general public perceive risks is different. Beck argues that, within a risk society, there emerges a disconnection between how ‘risk technicians’ (scientists and technical experts) and the general public perceive and understand risk. As Beck states,

“what becomes clear in risk discussions are the fissures and gaps between scientific and social rationality in dealing with the hazardous potential of civilization. The two sides talk past each other. Social movements raise questions that are not answered by the risk technicians at all, and the technicians answer questions which miss the point of what was really asked and what feeds public anxiety” (Beck, 1992: 30).

The heightened awareness of risk is exacerbated by the ‘politics of knowledge’ – the inability to overcome the divide between those with the knowledge about risk, and those who the risks are being inflicted upon them. The general public feels threatened by the “projected dangers of the future” (Beck, 1992: 34), whereas scientific experts and authorities justify their endeavours by emphasising the infrequency of risk events so far. Technological industries that continue to flourish in a risk society are those that can best convince the public that they are capable of managing and preventing the risks associated with their activities (Beck, 1992: 32).

This feature of the risk society – the disconnection between the way in which risk technicians and members of the public perceive risk – offers one potential explanation for the reason why members of the public can continue to perceive nuclear power as risky, despite claims made by the nuclear industry stating otherwise. Within a risk society, there is a tendency for scientists, technicians or engineers to speak a different language of risk and have a different understanding of risk than that which is shared by members of the general public, or those that do not have the same scientific or technical training. Nuclear advocates and industry representatives tend to be ‘risk technicians’ in that they tend to support their arguments that nuclear energy is a low-risk technology by presenting scientific and technical data about the safety of nuclear power and the low probability of any serious nuclear incident occurring. For example, by highlighting new reactor designs and engineering advancements as a reason why nuclear power is safe and low-risk. Even former US President George W. Bush supported civil nuclear energy development on the grounds that “Nuclear power is safe. It is safe because of advances in science and

145 engineering and plant design” (Gerstenzang, 2006). However, this emphasis on a scientific or technological understanding of risk is not always shared by individuals who do not have the same technical education. For example, the OECD’s Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) recognises the limitations of the risk and safety assessments that are conducted by the nuclear industry in convincing the general public that nuclear power generation is a low-risk activity. The NEA states that while the results of these risk assessments are “generally accepted by experts in the field, they have been found to be incomprehensible to the public due to the mathematical expressions of risk used and to the extremely long time horizon involved”, and as a result “the reliance on the technical approach to risk has been generally unsuccessful” (OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, 2002: 48).

This disconnection between different agents’ understandings of risk was evident when the expectation of a nuclear renaissance emerged. A key argument presented by advocates of the nuclear renaissance was that many of the risks that had long been associated with nuclear development would no longer pose a problem. This argument was based on a ‘scientific’ understanding of risk associated with nuclear power. As described in Chapter 5, in the early 2000s, nuclear industry representatives announced the development of new nuclear reactor designs that would be safer than ever before. The nuclear industry also highlighted its improved safety and operating performance record as evidence that a nuclear renaissance would not suffer from the same safety problems of the past. The assumption underpinning these arguments is that if the public is made more aware of the scientific facts of nuclear power, they are less likely to perceive nuclear energy as ‘risky’, and are more likely to support nuclear new build. However, as Beck suggests, the provision of scientific information is not sufficient evidence to convince all agents that nuclear power is safe and low-risk. These scientific arguments presented by risk technicians – nuclear industry representatives and advocates of nuclear energy – have failed to prevent nuclear energy from continuing to be perceived by many agents as a risky technology, even during the period of the expected nuclear renaissance. Despite the many claims put forward during the renaissance period by government and industry representatives as to the safety of nuclear power, public scepticism and fear over the risks associated with nuclear energy continues.

Psychological research into cognitive processes, such as the way in which people interpret and perceive the frequency and likelihood of risk, provides further insights into the disconnection between risk technicians’ and other agents’ understanding of the risks of nuclear power. In particular, this body of research offers explanations for why individuals associate particular activities or phenomena as having a high or a low risk. Much of the psychological research on judgement and decision-making stems from the assumption that individual rationality is limited or ‘bounded’. This is because individuals have limited access to information, and limited cognitive abilities for information processing. Consequently, individuals tend to rely on various heuristics which reduce the complexity associated with calculating the nature and probability of risks (Kahneman et al., 1982). While these heuristics are useful for individual decision-making, they can also lead to biased and erroneous judgements (Tversky and

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Kahneman, 1974: 1124). The availability heuristic, for example, refers to the tendency for individuals to overestimate the occurrence of events that are readily available and accessible in their minds (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973). As individuals have bounded rationality, they do not have access to complete information, nor do they pay equal attention to all the possible risks. Rather, they tend to overestimate the probability of risks which they are either frequently exposed to, or, the risks which are especially dramatic, vivid and therefore memorable. Cognitive awareness of particular risk events is often amplified by the media, which tend to award disproportionate coverage to dramatic but infrequent events, such as natural disasters or terrorist attacks. For example, studies by Lichtenstein et al. (1978) and Mazur (2006) found that individuals tended to have heightened estimations of frequency for risks which received more extensive media coverage. This cognitive emphasis upon rare but dramatic incidents (such as a disaster at a nuclear power plant) can distort perceptions and judgements about risk. Consequently, people will tend to overestimate risks that are potentially catastrophic but are extremely unlikely to occur.

Psychometric research has also identified a range of other factors which appear to influence individual beliefs and attitudes about risk. In particular, public perceptions of risk are likely to be heightened when exposure to the risk is involuntary rather than voluntary; when the impact of the risk is irreversible; when the harm is concentrated into a single catastrophic event, rather than dispersed across multiple smaller events; when known victims are involved or affected; when the risks are unfamiliar or cannot be controlled by those potentially affected; when there is disagreement over the risk and its potential impacts; when the social distribution of the risk is not equitable; and when the risks impact future generations (OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, 2002: 49; Tanaka, 2004: 1151; Schmidt, 2004). When events take place that correlate with any number of these factors, it is likely that the public perception of the risks will be overestimated (Kubota, 2012: 445). Nuclear power fits many of these criteria. The risks associated with a nuclear incident are typically irreversible. For example, the radiation released by a nuclear accident can irreversibly damage human and environmental health. High-profile nuclear disasters such as Three Mile Island, Chernobyl and Fukushima have demonstrated that the harm associated with nuclear power can be concentrated into a single catastrophic event, and that the risks associated with nuclear power can continue to affect future generations. The risks associated with nuclear power – primarily radiation – are unfamiliar to the general public and cannot be controlled by the individuals that are potentially affected. The constant debate between nuclear opponents and nuclear advocates as to the actual level of danger associated with the use of nuclear power demonstrates to the public that there is disagreement over nuclear risks and its potential impact. Consequently, psychometric research suggests that it is likely that agents will overestimate the risks associated with nuclear power. This offers one potential explanation for why members of the public have continued to view nuclear power as ‘risky’ during the renaissance period, despite claims by government and nuclear industry representatives stating otherwise.

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CONCLUSION

In accordance with an Agents in Context Historical Institutionalist perspective, this research recognises that changes in nuclear energy development are influenced by the ideational and contextual setting in which these changes take place. This chapter has argued that the disconnection between the expectation and reality of the nuclear renaissance in Western Europe and North America can be explained, in part, by a shift in the ideational context of risk. From the late 1960s onwards, there has been a broad contextual shift whereby agents have become increasing aware of and averse to the idea of ‘risk’. This broad contextual shift has significant implications for the development of civil nuclear energy. The initial period of nuclear energy development (the 1950s and 1960s) was characterised by low levels of public and political awareness and apprehension towards risk, which facilitated a more favourable political environment for nuclear energy development. However, from the late 1960s onwards, the emergence of the risk society and increased awareness and opposition to risk has created a more difficult ideational context for the development and expansion of civil nuclear power. The increased public and political awareness and aversion to risk has made it more difficult for governments to convince the general public that nuclear power plants can be operated safely, and to secure new locations for the construction of nuclear power plants.

When the rhetoric of a nuclear renaissance emerged in the early 2000s, the idea of risk continued to feature prominently in the discourse used by both opponents and advocates of nuclear energy development. Advocates of the renaissance argued that public opposition to nuclear power had diminished as agents had become convinced that the operation of nuclear power plants was safe and relatively low risk. However, public opinion polling conducted during the renaissance period contradicts these claims by suggesting that large segments of the public continue to perceive nuclear power as inherently risky. The disconnection between different agents’ understandings of risk is problematic for nuclear energy development. Pro-nuclear policies are likely to be opposed if nuclear power is perceived as presenting significant societal risks. Consequently, the failure of nuclear advocates to convince the public that nuclear power is relatively risk-free suggests that the nuclear renaissance was never likely to succeed. A nuclear renaissance is unlikely to take place in an ideational context where agents are preoccupied with the idea of risk, and where agents continue to perceive nuclear power as being inherently risky.

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10. NEOLIBERALISM

This chapter argues that the disconnection between the expectation and reality of the nuclear renaissance can be explained by the rise of neoliberalism. The rise of neoliberalism is widely regarded as one of the most significant ideological and institutional shifts in the post-war era. In accordance with an Agents in Context Historical Institutionalist approach, this thesis recognises that institutions (the rules and norms that shape human behaviour), ideas and agents have a mutually-shaping relationship. Ideas and institutions shape the behaviour of agents, and are also themselves shaped by the very actions that agents take. The core assumption of neoliberalism – that the market is the most efficient allocator of scarce resources – has heavily influenced government decision-making processes across almost all areas of policy. This chapter argues that the rise of neoliberalism has created an ideational and institutional context in which it is more difficult for nuclear power to succeed. In particular, the rise of neoliberal ideas has meant that state actors have become less willing to directly intervene to support and fund the development of nuclear power. Instead, there is a growing belief amongst policymakers that nuclear energy development should be left to the free market as much as possible. This is problematic given that nuclear industry has historically been dependent on extensive state support in order to construct new nuclear reactors. Even though the nuclear renaissance was meant to be driven by technological advancements and simpler, cheaper reactor designs, the construction of new nuclear power plants is still an immensely expensive and financially risky undertaking that could not be undertaken without the provision of state funds.

This argument is developed through a detailed examination of the British nuclear energy industry, and, to a lesser extent, the history of nuclear energy development in the US. The UK and the US are the ‘heartlands’ of neoliberalism – the countries where neoliberal ideas have been most influential (Peck and Tickell, 2002). Therefore, the argument that the rise of neoliberalism has contributed to the failure of the nuclear renaissance is most likely to apply to these two countries. In doing so, this chapter differs from the rest of this thesis in that it adopts a narrower, country-based (rather than regional) focus. It does not make any claims about the influence of the rise of neoliberalism on the changing trajectory of nuclear development in any other country within Western Europe or North America beyond the UK or the US.

The privatisation of the British nuclear industry is examined in detail in this chapter in order to demonstrate the ongoing inability of nuclear power to compete in a competitive market system, and the problems caused by the state’s growing reluctance to directly and overtly intervene in nuclear energy development. When the rhetoric of a nuclear renaissance gained momentum in the 2000s, the British

149 government agreed in-principle to support a revival of nuclear energy, but remained committed to the neoliberal philosophy that this should be a market-driven process. The state would provide no direct funding for a nuclear renaissance – it would be entirely up to the private sector to finance nuclear new build. While the British government has recently reneged on this promise, an examination of government expenditure on nuclear research and development reveals that the state is unwilling to provide anywhere near the level of direct financial support for nuclear new build that was necessary to facilitate the early establishment and expansion of civil nuclear power in the 1950s and 1960s. Therefore, the nuclear renaissance appears to have failed partly because of the state’s commitment to neoliberalism, and the concomitant absence of direct state support for nuclear new build. The US government has similarly demonstrated a commitment to give in-principle support for a nuclear renaissance, but has refused to provide anywhere near the same extent of direct subsidisation that nuclear development has historically depended upon. Therefore, it is the very absence of state support that has contributed to the failure of the nuclear renaissance. Had the US and the UK governments been willing to provide the same levels of financial support that was required to establish and expand the civil nuclear industry in the 1950s and 1960s, a nuclear renaissance would have been more likely to occur in these countries.

THE RISE OF NEOLIBERALISM

In the 1950s and 1960s, a broad consensus emerged throughout much of Western Europe and North America that states should exercise a highly interventionist role in planning and governance. This consensus emerged largely as a result of the Second World War, during which governments had been compelled to adopt a highly interventionist role, controlling or directing large segments of society and the economy. When the war ended, state intervention was once again seen as necessary to keep the nation united and rebuild economies and societies decimated by war. The role of the state was reconceptualised in the post-war era to encapsulate a specific set of values and assumptions, which included:

“a commitment to social and economic reform; an overriding respect for the constitutional state and representative government; and a desire to encourage individuals’ pursuit of their interests while maintaining policies in the national or public interest. Underpinning these concerns was a conception of the state as the most suitable means for the promotion of ‘the good’ of both the individual and the collective” (Held, 1987: 221).

These assumptions were adopted by politicians at both ends of the political spectrum throughout the 1950s and 1960s, legitimising the idea of “big government”. The belief that government intervention was necessary for ensuring the well-being of society was also widely accepted by the general public (Thomas, 1992: 33). States became increasingly active in the areas of taxation, regulation, welfare

150 provision, public infrastructure, labour markets and public expenditure (Laffan et al., 2000: 23). Politicians became committed to the idea of full employment for all citizens, and numerous industries and services that were privately-owned became nationalised. From 1950 to 1980, public employment, taxation and government spending increased throughout all Western European countries .(Kavanagh and Morris, 1994: 8). The importance of an activist state was reinforced by the dominant economic management strategy of the post-war period – Keynesian economics. The core idea put forth by the economist John Maynard Keynes was that governments should actively manage the economy, primarily by using government spending to influence the level of demand, in order to achieve the ultimate goal of full employment (Heywood, 2003: 63).

However, in the early 1970s, many of the world’s leading economies experienced a period of stagflation. Government attempts at central planning were criticised as being ineffective and problematic. This was based, in part, on Hayek’s (1994) critique of government planning as being counter-productive because it stifles competition and hinders the efforts of entrepreneurs. The idea that governments should be the primary actor in developing and implementing policy began to become contested. Extensive government expenditure on social welfare policies was adding to already significant levels of public debt. Growing levels of unemployment indicated that government promises of achieving full employment were no longer realistic. It appeared that the logic of Keynesian economics – that it was possible to sustain both low levels of unemployment and low levels of inflation – was no longer useful. Concerns about market failure began to be overshadowed by a growing awareness of the potential for government failure.

The apparent failure of state interventionism and the assumptions of Keynesian economics paved the way for the rise of neoliberal thinking. While neoliberal ideas had been developed since the 1940s, they gained new momentum in the 1970s. Critics argued that market mechanisms, rather than state intervention, was the solution to reinvigorating economic growth. The core idea upon which neoliberalism is based is that the market is the most efficient allocator of scarce resources, and that the market is therefore “morally and practically superior to government and any form of political control” (Heywood, 2003: 55). Neoliberals argue that there will be a market-based solution to almost all economic and societal problems (Howard and King, 2008: 1). Therefore, the role of the state should be restricted to creating the conditions and institutional frameworks necessary for markets to flourish (Harvey, 2005: 2). If a market does not currently exist for a resource, it is the role of the state to create that market, but then to step back and exercise only minimal intervention once the market has been created and begun operating (Harvey, 2005: 2). While advocates of neoliberalism recognise that markets are imperfect and that market failure will still occur, they argue that the failures that will inevitably result from state intervention are far worse (Howard and King, 2008: 1). Neoliberals view governments as fundamentally flawed because policymakers and bureaucrats are unable to effectively process the quantity and complexity of information that they are presented with (Heywood, 2003: 55).

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Furthermore, as humans are rationally-minded, self-interested beings, bureaucrats will use their positions in government to better their own self-interest, rather than acting in the interests of the general public (Heywood, 2003: 55). Therefore, any kind of state societal or economic planning is likely to be defective in some way. On the other hand, neoliberals believe that markets avoid these limitations as they are self-regulating, efficient, democratic, and will typically deliver fairness and economic justice (Heywood, 2003: 56). Advocates of neoliberalism argued that the high levels of debt, inflation and unemployment that spread in the 1970s were ultimately caused by failed government intervention. Neoliberals pointed to excessive government regulation, high levels of public spending, and unnecessary tariffs and constraints on international trade as the key reasons for the economic downturn of the 1970s (Steger and Roy, 2010: 10). Consequently, the state was viewed as both the “chief factor behind the downturn, and the primary obstacle to recovery” (Tonkiss, 2001: 253).

Neoliberalism advocates three key public policies, all of which became increasingly prevalent in Western Europe and North America – the “heartlands” of neoliberalism (Peck and Tickell, 2002) – from the 1970s onwards: privatisation of state-owned enterprises, deregulation of the economy, and liberalisation of trade and industry (Steger and Roy, 2010: 14). However, it was within the UK and the US that the ideas of neoliberalism had their greatest impact (Heywood, 2003: 55). In the UK, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher actively worked to reduce the power and control held by the state. This was primarily achieved by instituting a widespread program of privatisation of state-owned industries, including the privatisation of telecommunications, transportation, mining and electricity companies. Similar developments took place in the US. In 1978, President Jimmy Carter delivered a State of the Union address that highlighted the limitations of state intervention in trying to solve economic and societal problems, declaring that “there is a limit to the role and the function of government. Government cannot solve our problems” (Carter, 1978). The election of President Ronald Reagan in 1981 ushered in a similar suite of neoliberal policies. In his Inaugural Address, Reagan stated that “government is not the solution to our problem; government is the problem” (Reagan, 1981). Reagan argued that the problems plaguing the US were “proportionate to the intervention and intrusion in our lives that result from unnecessary and excessive growth of government,” and as a result, he would “curb the size and influence of the Federal establishment” (Reagan, 1981). Reagan’s faith in neoliberal principles was evident with his introduction of sizable and widespread tax cuts, for example by reducing the top rate of taxation from 70 percent in 1981, to 28 percent in 1986 (Jones, 2012: 265).

Neoliberal ideas have spread beyond the US and the UK, but not necessarily with the same degree of influence. Neoliberalism has become central to the policies adopted by global institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Trade Organisation. Various forms of neoliberalism, often under the guise of ‘economic rationalism’, were implemented in Canada, Australia and New Zealand from the 1980s onwards. Many of the post-communist states of Eastern Europe and Latin America underwent major market-orientated restructuring of their economies in the

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1990s (Heywood, 2003: 56). Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, neoliberalism was championed by the IMF and the World Bank to become the dominant developmental agenda throughout Africa (Konings, 2011). Neoliberal policies were installed throughout Europe under the guidance of the European Monetary Union, which compelled Eurozone members to adopt policies of free trade, flexible labour markets, monetary restraint and budget austerity (Hermann, 2007).

An extensive body of academic literature has argued that the growth of neoliberalism and market ideologies has fundamentally transformed the way in which governments think about social and economic problems (see, for example, Crouch, 2011; Jones, 2012; Peck, 2010; Brown, 2015). Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, neoliberal thinking became “common sense” across capitalist societies (Evans and Sewell Jr., 2013: 47), and was widely believed to be “the new hegemonic ideology” (Gamble, 2001: 127). Even after the global financial crisis of 2007-08, neoliberal thinking has continued to remain the dominant political orthodoxy across most of the world’s advanced economies (Crouch, 2011). However, debate still continues as to exactly what extent the principles and rhetoric of neoliberalism has actually been implemented in practice. For example, Cahill (2014: 14) examines changes in the size of the state and the nature of state regulation of the economy over four decades in order to differentiate between the “utopian visions of neoliberal theorists and the realities of neoliberalism in practice”. Cahill argues that there is a clear difference between the normative agenda advocated by neoliberal fundamentalists and “actual existing neoliberalism”. While there has been a broad shift towards the implementation of neoliberal theories in practices, there are clear disparities in the degree to which neoliberal ideas have been realised across countries and time. Moreover, the widespread programme of deregulation, privatisation and marketization has resulted in a fundamental transformation in the role of the state, but not necessarily a retreat of state power. A similar conclusion is made by Peck and Tickell (2002: 383) who argue that while the “metalogic” of neoliberalism has become increasingly pervasive, neoliberalism itself should be conceptualised as a complex and often contradictory “process” rather than an idealistic “end-state”. The difficulty in ‘measuring’ the difference between the rhetoric and reality of neoliberalism is also attributed to the malleability of the concept, with various different neoliberal ‘schools’ advocating various interpretations of the neoliberal doctrine. One the one hand, this malleability makes it difficult to assess the extent to which neoliberal ideas have influenced policy change. However, it is also this very malleability which has been argued to have made neoliberalism so resilient over decades of political and social change. For example, Schmidt and Thatcher (2013) argue that the gap between the rhetoric and reality of neoliberalism does not indicate the weakness of neoliberal ideas, but rather, is evidence of the way in which the malleability of neoliberalism has aided its resilience.

The difference between the rhetoric and reality of neoliberalism speaks to another debate that has taken place about the role of the state and the way in which governments undertake the process of governing. Several scholars have argued that governments in recent decades have reconceptualised what their role

153 in society should be and what practices and processes should be utilised in order to best achieve their goals. This transformation has been described as a shift from ‘government’ to ‘governance’ (Jordan et al., 2005; Kennett, 2008: 4; Newman, 2005; Rhodes, 1996). The concept of ‘government’ typically refers to the formal institutions of the state and their ability to make and impose decisions upon members of society through laws, taxes and regulations (Stoker, 1998: 17). Governance, on the other hand, signifies the emergence of a new technique in the process and system of governing (Rhodes, 1996: 652- 3). More specifically, it refers to the ways in which governing styles are moving away from the formal powers of the state, towards new partnerships, interactions and interdependencies between the state and a plethora of non-state actors (Héritier, 2002: 185; Rhodes, 1996; Rhodes, 1997; Rhodes, 2007; Stoker, 1998). These arrangements often take place through markets or networks, rather than simply through hierarchical models of governance (Bevir, 2009: 3). The rise of neoliberal ideas has contributed to this shift, with governments becoming less willing to directly intervene in the economy. As the power of the state has gradually been eroded, the two distinct spheres of ‘public’ and ‘private’ are becoming increasingly blurred (Stoker, 1998: 17), and the ability of the state to directly influence society has been reduced. The involvement of a wider range of actors also means that government decision-making processes have become more decentralised and democratic. An institutional context has emerged whereby government decision-making is now subject to the input of a much wider range of agents, whom policymakers must now collaborate with in order to achieve their policy goals.

However, despite the widespread recognition that a shift from government to governance has occurred, the implications of this transition for the power and influence of the state remains contested. The involvement of a larger range of actors in the process of governing has led several scholars to claim that there has been a “retreat” (Strange, 1996) , “eclipse” (Evans, 1997: 63), “shrinking” (Sbragia, 2000: 243), or “hollowing out” (Rhodes, 2007: 1248) of state power. Bell and Hindmoor (2009), however, reject the notion that the involvement of a wider range of actors in the governing process has caused governments to lose their capacity to govern. They challenge the argument that the power of the state has been eroded over time, as well as reviewing and challenging the work of others who argue that arguments about governance instead of government are overdone. While recognising that governments are now more likely to forge relationships with a larger range of non-state actors, they argue that governments continue to remain the central players in establishing, operating and monitoring governance arrangements. Bell and Hindmoor (2009) present an alternate, ‘state-centric relational’ view of governance, whereby states have actually enhanced their capacity to govern by strengthening their own institutional and legal capacities, and by developing closer relations with non-state actors. Governments seek to develop partnership relationships because non-state actors possess valuable resources (such as expertise, legitimacy and contacts) which the government can then utilise to further their own policy goals. In order to acquire these resources, governments must be prepared to make

154 policy concessions. Thus, the importance of both the state and state-society relations in governance is emphasised.

The growth of neoliberalism represents one of the most significant ideational and institutional shifts in the post-war era. While debates continue over the definition of neoliberalism, the difference between neoliberal principles and practice, or the impact that neoliberalism has had on transforming the role of state, there has nevertheless been a fundamental shift in the ideational and institutional context in which government actors undertake the process of governing. In spite of ongoing debate about the degree of influence that neoliberalism has had, there is clear evidence of a shift in thinking which places more emphasis on markets, and more scepticism about the role, efficiency and effectiveness of government action.

NEOLIBERALISM & NUCLEAR POWER

The widespread adoption of neoliberal principles by governments throughout Western Europe and North America has contributed to a shift in the way that governments address social, economic and political problems. It is therefore reasonable to expect that the growth of neoliberalism would have also produced a shift in the way in which state actors perceive and manage their energy sectors, including the policy area of civil nuclear power. Nuclear power has historically been dependent upon large amounts of state intervention and financial support in order to succeed. It is reasonable to assume that, as neoliberal principles and the market doctrine have become increasingly influential, governments would become less willing to directly intervene in, support and fund civil nuclear energy development. Instead, policymakers would be more likely to expose nuclear energy to the power of market forces. In a purely neoliberal world, nuclear power plants would only be constructed if private industry thought it would be profitable to do so. However, as described in greater detail in Chapter 4, the high costs and financial risks associated with nuclear power means that it still struggles as a purely profit-making venture.

This section explores the extent to which the rise of neoliberalism has influenced the way in which nuclear power is governed, and argues that the dominance of neoliberal thinking appears to have contributed to the disconnection between the expectation and reality of the nuclear renaissance in the UK and the US. It does so by first describing the way in which the early expansion of civil nuclear energy industries was facilitated by a particular ideational and institutional context characterised by high levels of faith in state-based planning and intervention. It then outlines the way in which the rising influence of neoliberal ideas gradually produced a new ideational and institutional context, characterised by a shift towards market mechanisms and a more minimalist role for the state. It argues that this shift has proved problematic for nuclear energy development, as governments have become less willing to provide direct financial support for nuclear new build. It examines the privatisation of

155 the British nuclear industry to demonstrate the ongoing difficulties faced by nuclear power to compete in a market-based system. It argues that the inability of nuclear power to successfully compete in a political environment where governments are unwilling to provide direct financial support has contributed to the failure of the nuclear renaissance.

The early development of civil nuclear energy was facilitated, in part, by the particular ideational and institutional context within which policy decisions about nuclear energy were made. As described above, government decision-making in the post-war era was characterised by high levels of faith in the effectiveness of state-based planning and intervention. This belief was reflected in Keynesian economics, the mainstream economic orthodoxy of the time, which argued that a highly interventionist state was necessary in order to stimulate economic growth. Keynesian economics was one expression of the dominant orthodoxy of the post-war period, whereby a highly activist state was widely believed to be beneficial for the well-being of both society and the economy. The belief in a highly activist role for government helped to facilitate the early development of civil nuclear power programmes. State support for nuclear development in the post-war period included the provision of large subsidies to encourage private industry investment, funds being set aside for research and development expenditures, and protections being implemented to ensure that private companies would only face limited liabilities in the event of a nuclear accident. In some instances, governments facilitated the establishment of nuclear reactor sites by providing direct payoffs to communities in the affected region. Governments also worked to limit public participation which may hinder the development of the nuclear industry by prohibiting judicial review of the licensing procedures. Given the high capital costs and financial risks involved in the construction of nuclear power facilities, civil nuclear energy programmes could not have been established without this support.

The extensive level of state intervention that was undertaken to support the early development of nuclear energy is evident in the cases of the UK and the US. Quantifying levels of state intervention is a problematic task. Many state functions cannot be quantified in a robust or simple manner. For the state functions that are quantifiable – such as the degree of government spending on certain policy areas – comparative historical datasets that stretch from the end of World War II through the present day are often difficult to find, or simply do not exist. The absence of inaccessibility of these kinds of comparative datasets may be indicative of a broader story around the culture of secrecy and lack of transparency that has surrounded government operations, particularly in the post-war decades. Nevertheless, from the document analysis conducted as part of this thesis, a broad overview has been constructed of the high levels of state interventionism in the UK and the US in the 1950s and 1960s.

The development of the British civil nuclear industry was primarily a state directed and controlled process. The UK Government established the UK Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA) in 1954 as the government’s principal advisor on civil nuclear energy policy. Government-planned nuclear power

156 stations were ordered from and built by the private sector, with technical assistance provided by the UKAEA, but remained owned and operated by the nationalised British Electricity Authority (The Economist, 1955: 645). This was undertaken through a process of competitive tendering via ‘turnkey’ contracting, whereby the entire design and construction of a nuclear power station was carried out by a single contractor (Pocock, 1977: 50). The British government provided extensive financial support for the initial expansion of nuclear power in the form of large-scale subsidisation (Carr, 1997: 393), while also providing state-owned land for nuclear power plants to be constructed on (Hall, 1986: 131).

Moreover, the development of the British nuclear power programme began with a distinct absence of scrutiny from Parliament, Cabinet, the media or the public (Hall, 1986: 9). The sites for the construction of the first nuclear reactors in the UK were chosen by the state largely in secret, with little requirements for public accountability. The public were typically not informed of what was going to be constructed at the sites, and there was minimal opportunity for negotiation with affected stakeholders (Openshaw, 1986: 90). The UKAEA was also exempt from complying with regular planning procedures and legislation (Openshaw, 1986: 90). In 1947, 1949 and 1950, the issue of nuclear energy did not receive any mention in Cabinet discussions, despite considerable advancements in domestic nuclear research and planning occurring during these years (Hall, 1986: 26). Instead, decisions were made by a “charmed circle” consisting of the Prime Minister and a select group of ministers, while the House of Commons was “kept in a state of almost total ignorance” about the country’s nuclear energy programme (Hall, 1986: 26-8). The first time that any public announcement was made about plans for the development of civil nuclear power was in 1955, when the white paper A Programme of Nuclear Power was submitted to Parliament (Openshaw, 1986: 89). However, it was not until the late 1960s that wider public debate on nuclear energy emerged in the UK (Williams, 1980: 31).

Civil nuclear energy development in the US was also a state-led process. Non-state actors, such as the media, the public, and members of academia, were largely excluded from any kind of policy discussions (Rosenbaum, 1999: 81). As a result, public consultation and public debate on nuclear development was almost non-existent during this time (Morone and Woodhouse, 1989: 120). The US government provided direct financial support for nuclear energy development by funding research and development activities, sharing patents with nuclear reactor manufacturers at no cost, funding the development of technology for nuclear waste management, and taking responsibility for establishing nuclear waste disposal sites (Rosenbaum, 1999: 76). By the end of the 1970s, over $12bn in subsidies had been provided by the US government to the nuclear industry (Rosenbaum, 1999: 76). The US government also supported nuclear energy development by implementing the Price-Anderson Nuclear Industries Indemnity Act in 1957, which limited the amount that a nuclear plant operator would have to pay in damages in the event of a nuclear accident to $560m. Any costs exceeding this figure would be paid by the government.

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However, from the 1970s onwards, the ideational and institutional context within which government actors operated began to transform. Neoliberal ideas became increasingly influential in debates over the role of the state in society and the economy. The election of political leaders who supported and implemented the ideas of neoliberal economists has contributed to a shift in the extent to which governments were willing to intervene in the economy. Policymakers increasingly sought out market- based solutions as an alternative to the high levels of state intervention that had characterised the post- war era. Governments sought to privatise, either partially or in full, many of their state-owned enterprises. Energy industries, which had typically involved a high degree of state-ownership in the post-war period, appeared to be an ideal target for market-based reform.

At the same time, civil nuclear energy industries throughout Western Europe and North America had begun to stagnate. The number of nuclear reactor construction starts in these regions had declined rapidly from the late 1970s onwards. The cost and construction time for new nuclear reactors was rising, far exceeding their original cost estimates. Public opposition towards nuclear power was becoming more widespread. The nuclear power industry appeared to be in need of reform. Neoliberalism provided a clear critique for why these problems were taking place. Policymakers, increasingly influenced by the ideas of neoliberalism, blamed the high degree of state ownership and intervention in nuclear energy as a key reason for why these industries were failing to succeed. Advocates of neoliberalism criticised government regulation of the nuclear industry for being excessive, inefficient and ineffective. They argued that the only way to remedy the situation was to abandon state ownership and turn instead to liberalised arrangements that would introduce competition into the nuclear sector.

The governance of the British electricity sector, including its civil nuclear energy industry, provides a clear example of the growing influence of neoliberalism. As previously discussed, the early development of civil nuclear power in the UK was heavily supported by the activist British state. Direct support for the construction of the first nuclear power plants in the UK was provided by the government in the form of extensive subsidisation, the provision of state-owned land for the construction of new nuclear reactors, a closed governance and decision-making process which insulated the nuclear industry from any potential public opposition, exemption from potentially problematic planning procedures or legislation, and so on. The establishment and growth of the civil nuclear industry in these decades was facilitated by the highly interventionist role adopted by the state at the time.

However, an ideational and institutional shift towards the ideas and practices advocated by neoliberalism began to emerge in the UK in the 1970s. In 1976, the British Labour government formally abandoned their use of Keynesian policies (Crouch, 2011: 16). The election of Prime Minister Thatcher in 1979 brought with it a wave of neoliberal and market-based reforms. Since then, successive British governments have continued to invoke the language and ideas of neoliberalism, albeit to slightly differing degrees. The dominance of neoliberal ideology has changed the way in which policymakers

158 think about and manage the energy sector as a whole. In 1982, the British Energy Secretary Nigel Lawson made it clear that the country’s energy sector was going to be significantly reformed in line with neoliberal ideas, stating that “our task is rather to set a framework which will ensure that the market operates in the energy sector” (Helm, 2003: 44).

The privatisation and liberalisation of the UK’s energy sector began in the early 1980s as part of the Conservative government’s push to expose nationalised industries to market forces. In 1983, the Energy Act was introduced which removed the requirement that only twelve regional bodies (or Area Boards) were able to supply electricity. While the impact of the Electricity Act was limited, it was one of the first clear steps towards the gradual privatisation of the electricity industry in the UK. The Electricity Act 1989 outlined the new structure for Britain’s electricity generation and supply industry, which came into force in 199026. The assets of the Central Electricity Generating Board were transferred into multiple different companies, while the state retained responsibility for regulation.

As Britain’s electricity industry has been privatised, so too has its nuclear industry shifted from being a state owned and directed entity, to being exposed to competitive market forces. The British nuclear industry has been restructured in line with the core principles of neoliberalism, although this has not always been a straightforward process. Nuclear power was initially excluded from the government’s process of privatisation as the high operating and decommissioning costs involved meant that it could not successfully compete in a free market system (Taylor, 2007: 36). However, the British government reversed its position only a few years later. Two state-owned organisations, Nuclear Electric and Scottish Nuclear Limited, had managed to achieve dramatic cost and efficiency improvements in the nuclear reactors they oversaw (Taylor, 2007: 52). A review of the commercial viability of the nuclear industry had also been launched in 1994, which subsequently concluded that privatisation of the industry should proceed, and that public funds should no longer be used for the construction and operation of new nuclear power stations (Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, 2007).

The first concrete steps towards reducing state control over nuclear power were made in 1996, when the eight most modern nuclear power plants in the UK were privatised under the holding company British Energy, while the remaining nuclear power plants continued as part of the state-owned British Nuclear Fuels. The privatisation meant that the state would no longer be able to directly influence or determine the commercial decisions of British Energy (Yahaya, 2013: 12). However, the government’s intended distance from the company did not last. British Energy began facing financial difficulties from

26 At around the same time that the Electricity Act was being introduced, the British government was also attempting to build a new nuclear reactor at Hinkley Point (‘Hinkley C’). Nuclear power development in the UK had historically been dependent upon government subsidy, but the Electricity Act and the shift towards privatisation meant that such subsidisation was no longer possible. Hinkley C which was ultimately was abandoned due to its lack of economic viability.

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2002, which resulted in the state reclaiming a financial interest in the company while providing a £650m loan to prevent the company from failing (National Audit Office, 2010: 4; Conway, 2003). Yet even after these financial difficulties and the need for government assistance, policymakers and nuclear industry representatives alike continued to retain a rhetorical commitment to the primacy of market mechanisms, reaffirming their belief that the British nuclear industry could be expanded and reinvigorated without state funds.

NEOLIBERALISM & THE NUCLEAR RENAISSANCE

The rise of neoliberalism and the influence of neoliberal principles over the state’s management of civil nuclear energy was also going to pose a challenge to the success of the nuclear renaissance in the UK. When the rhetoric of a nuclear renaissance began to gain momentum, the British government appeared to remain firmly committed to the principles of neoliberalism. Political leaders remained adamant that a nuclear renaissance could take place in the UK in a competitive market environment. This was made clear in a White Paper on nuclear power which was published in January 2008. The paper confirmed the government’s support for nuclear new build, but asserted that this expansion would be entirely funded by the private sector – that “it will be for energy companies to fund, develop and build new nuclear power stations in the UK, including meeting the full costs of decommissioning and their full share of waste management costs” (Department for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, 2008: 10). Consequently, while the state supported the idea of an expansion of nuclear power, the rhetoric put forward by policymakers in the 2000s made clear that the state would not be directly intervening in or funding such an expansion. The Business Secretary, John Hutton, stated that the British government would not provide any subsidies to encourage the development of nuclear power or to assist with the decommissioning of nuclear reactors (BBC News, 2008). The Minister for Energy, Malcolm Wicks, promised that “no cheques will be written, there will be no sweetheart deals” for the construction of nuclear power plants, and that “there will not be any special fiscal arrangements for nuclear” (Select Committee on Trade and Industry, 2006). The UK Energy Secretary, Ed Miliband, stated that “we are right not to subsidise new nuclear power stations because we have an obligation to get to a low-carbon future at the lowest cost to the billpayer” (Crooks, 2009b: 13). The influence of neoliberal ideas on nuclear power policymakers was evident. There was a clear rhetorical commitment that the state was no longer willing to directly fund nuclear development. Instead, it would be up to the private sector to construct new nuclear plants, and to make the claims of a nuclear renaissance into a reality.

It would be reasonable to expect that the British government’s commitment to neoliberal principles, and its refusal to adopt an active, interventionist role in supporting a nuclear renaissance, would pose significant challenges for the success of the nuclear renaissance. The construction of nuclear power plants in the UK – as well as throughout Western Europe and North America more broadly – had always

160 been heavily dependent on the provision of state funds, as well as the state’s willingness to support nuclear development in regards to legislation and regulation. Consequently, the British government’s decision to no longer provide this level of support would mean that a nuclear renaissance would only succeed if it was able to successfully compete in a free market environment.

At first, nuclear industry representatives made it clear that they supported the state’s decision not to fund new nuclear development. The nuclear industry appeared confident that the economics of nuclear power were so favourable that a nuclear renaissance was possible even in the absence of government financial support. As early as 2005, Vincent de Rivaz, CEO of EDF Energy, argued that nuclear power plants could be built without public funds, stating that “the idea that nuclear requires special subsidies, special state financial aid, is, with respect, an old-fashioned view of the nuclear industry” and that “the market will deliver the diversity which we all need on nuclear as on other energies” (House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee, 2006: 110). In 2006, the CEO of British Energy declared that new nuclear power stations could be constructed in the UK without the provision of public subsidies (Harrison, 2006). The electric utility company E.ON stated in a press release that “there is no requirement for either government subsidies or for a guaranteed long-term cost of carbon to make new nuclear power stations economic” (E.ON UK, 2008).

However, despite this optimistic rhetoric from industry figures, it quickly became clear that nuclear power was struggling to compete in a free market environment. In May 2009, de Rivaz reversed his position on government financing of a nuclear renaissance, stating that the government needed to provide financial support in order to create a “level playing field” so that nuclear could compete with other low-carbon technologies (Crooks, 2009b: 13). The comments were made after the British Government had promised subsidies for offshore wind and ‘clean coal’ power stations, but had continued to remain adamant that subsidies would not be provided to support nuclear power. De Rivaz argued that in order for nuclear development to take place in the UK, there needed to be “a robust carbon price with a realistic floor” (Crooks, 2009a: 2). Despite this demand, however, de Rivaz continued to assert that “we don’t ask for taxpayers’ money. We don’t ask for government subsidy” (Greenpeace International, 2009).

Under increasing pressure from the private sector, the British government began to show signs of reneging on their commitment to a private-financed nuclear renaissance. In a statement to Parliament in 2010, the Energy and Climate Change Secretary, Chris Huhne, reconfirmed that “there will be no public subsidy for new nuclear power” (Department of Energy & Climate Change, 2010). However, Huhne then specified exactly what was meant by this. Huhne admitted that “few economic activities can be absolutely free of subsidy in some respect” (Department of Energy & Climate Change, 2010). Huhne revealed that subsidies for nuclear power could be offered if “similar support is also made available more widely to other types of generation” and that he was “not ruling out action by the

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Government to take on financial risks or liabilities for which it is appropriately compensated or for which there are corresponding benefits”. In 2011, the British government released a White Paper on electricity market reform which acknowledged that “the current market arrangements will not deliver investment at the scale and the pace that we need” (Department of Energy & Climate Change [DECC], 2011: 3). The paper introduced a Carbon Price Floor and Contracts for Difference to encourage investment in low-carbon energy technologies. Huhne denied that these initiatives constituted the subsidisation of nuclear power, stating that “there is no public sector [support] for nuclear…Nuclear is getting no special treatment” (Harvey et al., 2010: 2). The White Paper reforms were welcomed by the nuclear industry. De Rivaz described the initiatives as providing the “framework we were expecting to see” before investment in nuclear power could continue (Blair and Clark, 2011: 4), while the CEO of Horizon Nuclear Power described the bill as “critical” for developers to progress their nuclear energy projects (Hickman, 2012).

However, even after the introduction of these initiatives, the expansion of the British nuclear industry continued to encounter problems. In March 2012, German utilities RWE and E.ON announced that they would withdraw plans for two new nuclear power plants in the UK for financial reasons (Milmo and Harvey, 2012). In October 2012, de Rivaz warned the House of Commons Energy Committee that EDF would be unable to build new nuclear plants in the UK unless there was a “compelling business case” to do so (Pfeifer and Pickard, 2012: 2). In 2013, Centrica abandoned its plans to invest in a partnership with EDF to construct four nuclear reactors in the UK, citing rising construction costs and delays (BBC News, 2013b).

In October 2013, the British Government approved construction of the Hinkley Point C nuclear reactor. The Secretary of State for Energy, Edward Davey, stated that the approval was significant because “for the first time, a nuclear station in this country will not have been built with money from the British taxpayer” (BBC News, 2013g). However, in order for the reactor to be built, the British government had to approve a guaranteed fixed price (“strike price”) for the electricity produced by the reactor. While the wholesale electricity price in the UK in 2013 was approximately £48/MWh, the strike price for Hinkley Point C was almost twice this market rate at £92.50/MWh (in 2012 prices, but then indexed to inflation) for thirty-five years (World Nuclear News, 2014). In December 2013, the European Commission began an investigation into the legality of the UK government’s subsidisation of Hinkley Point C (Macalister, 2013a). The Commission calculated the estimated cost of Hinkley Point C to be £25bn – well above EDF’s estimate of £16bn. The Commission questioned the legality of the subsidies given that the project was likely to be profitable without subsidisation. After the British government agreed to certain amendments, the Commission approved the contract for Hinkley Point C with an overwhelming majority (Barker and Clark, 2014). Meanwhile, government representatives continued to deny that their actions constitute the subsidisation of nuclear power (The Telegraph, 2013b). This continued until October 2015 when the Department of Energy and Climate Change announced that a

162 deal was reached between EDF and China General Nuclear Corporation to build the Hinkley Point reactor. At the end of the official announcement released on the Department’s website, contained within the fine print on ‘Notes to editors’, is a small bullet-point which states that “The Government confirms that it is not continuing the ‘no public subsidy policy’ of the previous administration” (Department of Energy & Climate Change, 2015).

Even with the state’s recent announcement that it is now willing to provide some level of subsidy to nuclear, there is little indication as to what level of subsidy would be provided. This further problematizes the economics of nuclear power by creating financial uncertainty for potential investors in the UK nuclear market. An examination of the British government’s expenditure on nuclear research and development indicates that on a broad level, funding for nuclear during the renaissance period remains far lower than when the rise of neoliberal ideas first took place in the 1970s. Even though the British government has reneged on its commitment to a neoliberal philosophy of no state support, the level of financial support being offered during the renaissance period is nothing like the levels of financial support that were being offered in the 1950s and 1960s.

Gaining access to comparative historical data on government expenditure on civil nuclear energy development is no easy task. One of the most comprehensive comparative historical datasets available on government expenditure on nuclear energy is the International Energy Agency’s (IEA) dataset on energy research, development and demonstration (RD&D) expenditure. However, these records only begin in 1974. Comparative historical data on government spending on energy RD&D in general, or on nuclear RD&D specifically, prior to this date are exceedingly difficult to find. This may be as a result of several possible factors, including a lack of consistent record keeping at the time, or the secrecy surrounding nuclear energy development particularly in the decades following the end of the Second World War when the technology was also being advanced for military purposes. An examination of Cabinet papers discussing nuclear development in the 1950s and 1960s, for example, gives little indication of the amount of money that would be allocated to support nuclear development. Despite these limitations, data provided by the IEA from 1974 onwards still illustrates noticeable changes in the willingness of government to directly support nuclear RD&D, as well as RD&D on energy technologies more broadly.

Figure 9 below charts the British government’s expenditure on research, development and demonstration (RD&D) of energy technologies from 1974 to 2013 (in million USD, 2014 prices and exchange rates). It illustrates the exceedingly high levels of government spending being invested in nuclear RD&D in the mid-1970s. In 1974 (the earliest data point available), $1175m was spent on RD&D for nuclear power alone – almost twenty times as much money as was invested in RD&D for fossil fuels that same year ($54m). Government spending on nuclear RD&D in 1974 was so high that it accounted for 91 percent of the British Government’s total RD&D spending on energy technologies.

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This demonstrates that there was a clear commitment by the British government at this point in time to directly support and fund nuclear energy development.

Figure 9: UK Government RD&D Expenditure by Energy Technology, 1974-2013

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Chart compiled using data from International Energy Agency (2015)

However, government spending on nuclear RD&D declined steadily from 1974 until the mid-1990s. Nuclear RD&D expenditure has remained at low levels ever since, although a slight increase in spending has occurred from roughly 2006 onwards. Nevertheless, nuclear RD&D expenditure in 2013 was only $85.4m – only a fraction of the spending that was being invested in 1974. The decline in nuclear RD&D spending in the UK over this time period was reflective of a trend that was taking place across much of Western Europe and North America. For example, the US, Italy and Germany all reduced their support for nuclear energy RD&D by more than 90 percent from 1985-1995 (Dooley, 1998: 548).

The decline in government expenditure on nuclear RD&D from the mid-1970s onwards is a clear indication of the state’s withdrawal from directly funding nuclear energy development. This is consistent with the increasingly pervasive spread of neoliberalism over this time period, which has heavily shaped the way that policymakers think about the relationship between the state and the market. In particular, this decline is consistent with the growing belief that the expansion of civil energy industries should be a market-driven, rather than a state-driven, process.

The rise of neoliberalism appears to have contributed to policymakers’ increasing reluctance to directly fund and support nuclear energy development. When representatives of the UK government first spoke

164 in favour of a nuclear renaissance, they remained adamant that no public monies would be provided in order for such a revival of nuclear power to take place. This stance was, at first, supported by nuclear industry representatives, who were confident that nuclear power could compete in a free market environment. However, the failure of the nuclear renaissance in Western Europe and North America to date indicates that nuclear power is less likely to succeed in non-state driven systems. The backflip performed by industry representatives, who are now demanding government subsidies for nuclear new build, further reinforces the conclusion that nuclear power is unable to compete in a market-based system. Consequently, the rise of neoliberalism appears to have contributed to the failure of the nuclear renaissance – at least in the UK – by removing the large degree of state intervention and subsidy that the nuclear industry has historically depended on in order to build new nuclear reactors.

That said, the rise of neoliberalism cannot, in isolation, explain the failure of the nuclear renaissance. Given that the rise of neoliberalism is a broad contextual shift, it would be expected that government expenditure on all sources of energy generation would be reduced from the 1970s onwards – not just nuclear power. However, as Figure 9 illustrates, this is not the case. While British government spending on nuclear RD&D has never again come close to the level of expenditure in 1974, there has been a sudden increase since 2003 on government RD&D energy expenditure driven mainly by investment in renewables and energy efficiency technologies. In 2010, government RD&D expenditure for renewables was $297m – far higher than the levels of renewable RD&D expenditure in the 1970s and 1980s. This indicates that the rise of neoliberalism is only one factor which has contributed to the decline in government spending on nuclear power. It may be that a combination of factors – such as increasing public opposition to nuclear power, growing safety concerns, ongoing financial problems, as well as the growing influence of neoliberal ideas – has contributed to the state’s reluctance to subsidise nuclear energy.

Even so, UK Government expenditure on nuclear RD&D remains low. Figure 10 below illustrates the decline in nuclear RD&D as a proportion of total energy RD&D expenditure from 1974-2013. Whereas nuclear RD&D expenditure constituted 91 percent of total government energy RD&D expenditure in 1974, nuclear RD&D expenditure counted for only 14 percent of total energy RD&D expenditure in 2013. So while the decline of government spending on nuclear RD&D can be explained partly by a broader decline in energy RD&D expenditure more generally, there has also been a clear trend whereby the British government has spent less and less money on nuclear RD&D expenditure in comparison to investment in other energy technologies.

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Figure 10: UK Government RD&D Expenditure on Nuclear Power as a Percentage of Total R&D Expenditure, 1974-2013

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This chapter has focused primarily on examining the influence of neoliberalism on civil nuclear energy development in the UK. However, given that both the UK and the US are the very “heartlands” of neoliberalism, it is reasonable to assume that a similar trend would be occurring in the US. The US government has consistently provided rhetorical support for a nuclear renaissance (see Chapter 2 for examples of the statements made supporting a nuclear renaissance). Unlike the UK government, however, the US government has agreed to provide financial support for the revival of nuclear power. However, nuclear industry representatives have criticised the financial support being offered as being insufficient for nuclear new build to take place. For example, when the US Department of Energy released proposals for the assistance that would be provided to help finance nuclear construction, the head of policy development described the proposals as “unworkable” (Lee, 2007). The vice president of congressional affairs at Exelon warned that the amount of government financial assistance provided “changes the equation on whether to build at all” (Lee, 2007). To date, the financial assistance provided by the US government has not been sufficient to kick-start a nuclear renaissance. The ongoing financial challenges faced by nuclear new build in the US (described in more detail in Chapter 4), an inability to compete in a free market environment, and insufficient government financial support has meant that many of the proposals for nuclear reactors that were meant to be constructed during the renaissance period have since been suspended or abandoned.

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A similar story of the rise of neoliberalism and a concomitant withdrawal of state support for nuclear development is evident in the US (albeit to a lesser extent than the UK). An examination of the US government’s expenditure on RD&D of energy technologies from 1974-2014 reveals a similar trend to that experienced in the UK. As displayed in Figure 11 below, US government spending on energy RD&D declined steadily from 1974 until the late 1990s. Since then, there has been a gradual increase in energy RD&D spending, driven mainly by investment in fossil fuels, renewables, energy efficiency, and other cross-cutting technologies and research. However, expenditure on nuclear RD&D has declined from a peak of $4621m in 1979, to $874m in 2014.

Figure 11: US Government RD&D Expenditure by Energy Technology, 1974-2014

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Chart compiled using data from International Energy Agency (2015)

Moreover, as is the case with the UK, US government spending on nuclear R&D as a proportion of total energy R&D spending has also declined steadily from the mid-1970s until the present day. As displayed in Figure 12, government spending on nuclear RD&D in 1974 accounted for 75 percent of the US government’s total RD&D spending on energy technologies. This demonstrates that there was a clear commitment by the US government at this point in time to directly support and fund nuclear energy development. However, since then, government spending on nuclear RD&D has declined to the extent that in 2014, nuclear RD&D accounted for only 14 percent of total energy RD&D funding. This demonstrates that a similar trend has taken place in both of the heartlands of neoliberalism, the US and the UK. Government spending on nuclear RD&D in both countries has declined from 1974 until the present day, indicating a steady withdrawal of state financial support for nuclear energy development over this time period.

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Figure 12: US Government RD&D Expenditure on Nuclear Power as a Percentage of Total RD&D Expenditure, 1974-2014

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Chart compiled using data from International Energy Agency (2015)

CONCLUSION

Two conclusions can be drawn from an examination of the development of the UK and the US nuclear energy industries. Firstly, the rise of neoliberal ideas has created a new institutional and ideational environment that has heavily shaped the behaviour of policymakers and their approach to civil nuclear energy development. From the 1970s onwards, the British government has in rhetoric and, to a lesser but still significant extent, in practice, gradually removed itself from directly intervening in and supporting nuclear new build in the UK. This has taken place within a broader context of the UK government seeking to liberalise its electricity market. The decline of state interventionism and preference for market mechanisms in the governance of nuclear energy is most evident with the privatisation of the British nuclear industry, and the British government’s promise that it would not directly finance a nuclear renaissance in the UK. While supporting the idea of a nuclear renaissance, the British government declared that it would be entirely up to the private nuclear industry to finance the revival of nuclear power. This is in stark contrast to the policy position of the British government in the 1950s and 1960s, when it adopted a highly interventionist role in supporting the establishment and expansion of a civil nuclear energy industry. Clearly, the British government’s approach to nuclear policymaking has been influenced by a broader contextual shift whereby neoliberalism has achieved ideational dominance.

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Secondly, this broad institutional and ideational shift away from state interventionism and towards neoliberalism has contributed to the disconnection between the expectation and reality of the nuclear renaissance. The construction of new nuclear reactors in the UK and the US has historically been heavily dependent on high levels of state subsidisation and legislative and regulatory support. This has been necessary to overcome the immense political and economic challenges associated with nuclear new build (see Chapter 4 for a detailed analysis of the financial problems hindering nuclear development). The highly activist role that the UK and US governments adopted in the post-war period helped to overcome these political and financial challenges. However, as neoliberal principles have become increasingly influential over time, the state-market relationship has been reconfigured. Governments have gradually taken on much less of an interventionist role, instead outsourcing many of their functions to market and network based arrangements. An ideational and institutional context has developed where governments are less willing to directly fund large-scale projects such as the construction of nuclear power plants. This very absence of state support appears to be a causal factor contributing to the failure of the nuclear renaissance.

When the rhetoric of a nuclear renaissance gained momentum in the 2000s, the UK government gave in-principle support for a nuclear renaissance, but remained committed to the belief that this should be a market-driven process. It soon became clear – from nuclear industry representatives themselves – that a privately financed renaissance would not be possible. Despite promises of technological advancements and new reactor designs, the construction of new nuclear power plants was still an immensely expensive and financially risky undertaking, and could not take place without the provision of state funds. Similarly, while the US government did agree to provide financial support for a nuclear renaissance, the amount of funding provided has been far less than what the nuclear industry perceives as necessary for a renaissance to succeed. The counter-factual argument therefore holds: had the UK and US governments been willing to provide the same levels of subsidisation and support that had helped to establish and expand the civil nuclear industry in the 1950s and 1960s, a nuclear renaissance would have been much more likely to succeed in these countries.

Nevertheless, despite this broad contextual shift, there has recently been some slippage in the UK government’s commitment to neoliberal principles. The UK government’s announcement in October 2015 that it was abandoning its ‘no subsidy’ policy for nuclear development is evidence of this. However, even with this announcement, the support that the British government is willing to provide to nuclear new build is likely to still be far less than it was in the 1950s and 1960s. So while there is some slippage between the UK government’s commitment to neoliberalism in principle and in practice, policymakers are still operating within a dramatically different institutional and ideational context to that which facilitated the early expansion of nuclear energy in the post-war period. Even with the government’s announcement that it may provide some level of subsidisation to the nuclear industry, it

169 is highly unlikely that the British government will be willing to adopt the same degree of state activism which nuclear power has historically relied upon in order to succeed.

While this chapter has focused on the influence of neoliberalism on the UK nuclear industry, and to a lesser extent the US nuclear industry, it is expected that the rise of neoliberalism has also hindered the success of the nuclear renaissance throughout Western Europe and North America more broadly. Western Europe and North America have been described as the “heartlands” of neoliberalism (Peck and Tickell, 2002). It is therefore unsurprising that neoliberal principles have become increasingly influential in the management of nuclear industries throughout many OECD countries (OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, 2004). The UK has played a crucial role in this process by acting as a pioneer of liberalisation with the privatisation of its energy system, including its civil nuclear industry. The privatisation of the British electricity market has since been used as a role model for electricity market liberalisation policies implemented in the European Union (Heddenhausen, 2007: 21). As more countries follow the UK’s example of taking steps to liberalise their nuclear industries, it is likely that the construction of nuclear plants will continue to be impeded by governments becoming increasingly unwilling to provide the extensive level of subsidisation that has historically supported the construction of new nuclear power plants. Unless the economic challenges facing nuclear power are resolved, or governments choose to re-adopt the highly interventionist role of the 1950s and 1960s, a nuclear renaissance is unlikely to occur.

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11. CONCLUSION

This chapter concludes the thesis by returning to the core research questions. A summary is provided for the way in which each research question has been answered in this thesis. The contribution to knowledge that this thesis provides is then revisited. The limitations of the research project are discussed, and recommendations for future research are proposed.

ANSWERING THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The core aim of this thesis was to develop a more comprehensive understanding of why there is a disjuncture between the expectation and reality of the nuclear renaissance in Western Europe and North America. In order to fulfil this aim, this thesis answered two core research questions:

This chapter concludes the thesis by illustrating the way in which this research project has answered both of the research questions.

What factors have influenced the changing trajectory of civil nuclear energy development in the past?

This thesis has identified several factors which have influenced the changing trajectory of civil nuclear energy development over time. These factors have been classified into two groups. Firstly, the changing trajectory of civil nuclear energy development over time can be explained by factors relating specifically to the construction and operation of civil nuclear power facilities (‘nuclear-specific factors’). These are the factors that are frequently cited in academic literature as having an influence on nuclear energy development, and which have also emerged from the expert interviews conducted for this research project.

The nuclear-specific factors identified in this thesis as influencing the changing trajectory of civil nuclear energy development are the economics of nuclear power, the safety of nuclear power, and the storage and disposal of nuclear waste. Each of these factors have influenced the trajectory of nuclear energy development in terms of an ideational shift in the way in which the issue is perceived and

171 prioritised as a policy problem. The economics of nuclear power, the safety of nuclear power, and the radioactive waste produced by nuclear power plants were broadly overlooked, or considered as a ‘non- issue’, by policymakers during the early development and expansion of civil nuclear energy programmes in Western Europe and North America. However, from the mid-1970s onwards, each of these issues have become increasingly problematic for policymakers and industry representatives attempting to undertake nuclear new build.

In addition to these nuclear-specific factors, the changing trajectory of civil nuclear energy development can also be explained by a broader range of factors that do not relate specifically to the construction and operation of civil nuclear power plants. The changing trajectory of civil nuclear energy development has also been influenced by broader structural, ideational, and institutional changes in context (termed ‘contextual factors’). The analytical framework underpinning this thesis, Agents in Context Historical Institutionalism, is based on the core argument that the thoughts and behaviours of individual agents are shaped and constrained by the context in which agents operate. This suggests that the thoughts and behaviour of agents who directly or indirectly influence nuclear energy development (such as policymakers, political leaders, nuclear industry representatives, voters, lobby groups, and activists) will be shaped or constrained by the context in which they are located. As the institutional, ideational, structural and political context changes, this can shape the way in which individual agents perceive and respond to the use of nuclear power. Consequently, the trajectory of civil nuclear energy development has changed over time because of factors specific to the use of nuclear power, as well as because of broader changes in institutions, ideas, structures, politics, economics, society, and culture that have taken place from 1945 until the present day.

Four contextual factors were identified in this thesis as having influenced the changing trajectory of civil nuclear energy development over time. Each of these four contextual shifts had been identified in the political science literature as some of the major and most influential contextual changes in the post- war era. The contextual shifts discussed included the rise of environmentalism, the declining levels of public trust in government, the emergence of a risk society, and the rise of neoliberalism. Each of these contextual shifts gained momentum in the 1970s – roughly the same time period at which a turning point took place in the development of civil nuclear energy in Western Europe and North America. Since then, each of these contextual shifts have helped to shape the way in which agents think about and behave towards the issue of nuclear power. Each of these contextual shifts have influenced the changing trajectory of civil nuclear power by making it more difficult for political leaders and industry representatives to gain public acceptance and support for nuclear new build.

All of the factors discussed in this thesis – both the nuclear-specific and the contextual factors – are interactive and dynamic. In some instances, a broader contextual shift may have contributed to a shift in the way in which agents perceive and respond to issues specific to the use of nuclear power. For

172 example, there is a mutually-interactive relationship between the rise of environmentalism, and the way in which nuclear waste is perceived and prioritised as a policy problem. As described in Chapters 6 and 7, the rise of environmentalism (a contextual shift) has contributed to the growth in public awareness of the dangers of nuclear waste (a nuclear-specific factor). Meanwhile, the potential for environmental damage resulting from nuclear accidents such as Chernobyl has helped to further legitimise the environmental movement by highlighting to the public the environmental damage that is being caused by industrial development. A two-directional relationship is present here between the broader contextual shift, and the issue relating specifically to the use of nuclear power. Other broad contextual shifts such as the growth of a risk society and declining levels of public trust in government have hindered nuclear energy development by contributing to heightened public concerns about the safety of nuclear power and the dangers associated with nuclear waste. The rise of neoliberalism has made the economics of nuclear power more problematic as a result of state’s increasing reluctance to directly fund nuclear energy development. The nuclear-specific factors are also capable of influencing one another. For example, the growth in public and political concern over the safety of nuclear power has influenced the economics of nuclear power through the implementation of more stringent, and therefore more expensive, safety and regulatory requirements. This was evident in the political and regulatory response to the Fukushima nuclear disaster, whereby governments have imposed more rigorous (and costly) safety standards on nuclear power plants.

Can the factors which explain the changing fortunes of nuclear energy in the past explain the disconnection between the rhetoric of a nuclear renaissance and the reality of civil nuclear energy development in Western Europe and North America since 2000?

This thesis has argued that the factors which explain the changing fortunes of nuclear energy in the past can also explain the disjuncture between the rhetoric of a nuclear renaissance and the reality of civil nuclear energy development in Western Europe and North America since 2000. Both the nuclear- specific factors and the contextual shifts that this thesis identified as having influenced the changing trajectory of nuclear development in the past have continued to affect nuclear development from 2000 onwards, the period when a ‘nuclear renaissance’ was meant to take place. The nuclear-specific factors that have posed challenges for the construction and operation of nuclear facilities from the mid-1970s onwards have not been resolved. The economics, safety and waste issues that have challenged nuclear development in the past continue to pose a problem today. Even though the rhetoric of a nuclear renaissance suggested that these problems had been overcome, there is little evidence which supports these claims. Moreover, an ideational shift has taken place whereby each of these nuclear-specific factors are now perceived and prioritised as a far more salient policy problem than they were in the 1950s and 1960s. Consequently, any attempt at engaging in nuclear new build in Western Europe and North America continues to be challenged by the problems of nuclear economics, safety and waste. The

173 failure of the nuclear renaissance in these regions can be explained, in part, by the ongoing public and political challenges posed by the economics, safety and waste issues of nuclear power.

Moreover, the contextual shifts that contributed to the stagnation and decline of nuclear energy in the 1970s have not been undone. The contextual shifts that have taken place throughout Western Europe and North America from the 1970s onwards have meant that any attempt to undertake nuclear new build must now contend with a much more problematic institutional, ideational, structural, and political context than there has been in the past. The rhetoric of a nuclear renaissance suggested that a revival of nuclear power was imminent in Western Europe and North America that would be akin to the levels of growth and expansion that had taken place in these regions in the 1950s and 1960s. However, these claims failed to recognise that there have been significant contextual shifts that have changed the way in which agents think and act towards the issue of nuclear power. These contextual shifts have created new challenges for nuclear development that did not exist in the 1950s and 1960s, making it far more difficult for nuclear new build to take place. Consequently, the same factors (nuclear-specific and contextual) that contributed to the decline of nuclear power from the 1970s can also help to explain the disjuncture between the rhetoric and reality of the nuclear renaissance from 2000 onwards.

This thesis does not attempt to claim that any one of these nuclear-specific or contextual factors can, in isolation, explain the failure of the nuclear renaissance in Western Europe or North America. Nor does this thesis attempt to weight the factors by determining which individual factor is more or less important in explaining the failure of the nuclear renaissance, or whether it is the nuclear-specific factors or the contextual factors that are more or less important in explaining the failure of the nuclear renaissance. Instead, this thesis argues the simple premise that the disjuncture between the rhetoric and reality of the nuclear renaissance in Western Europe and North America cannot be explained by any one factor. Rather, there are a broad range of interactive and dynamic factors that have contributed to the failure of the nuclear renaissance in these regions. There is a clear continuity between the factors that contributed to the decline of civil nuclear power in the 1970s, and the factors that have contributed to the apparent failure of the nuclear renaissance. Certain factors may be more influential in explaining the failure of the nuclear renaissance in some countries than in others. However, determining this kind of degree of influence to a robust and empirical level is beyond the scope of this study. Nevertheless, a brief comment is made below highlighting some preliminary reflections on the comparative value of the explanatory factors. The comparative value of the explanatory factors is clearly an area that lends itself to future research into the failure of the nuclear renaissance or the changing trajectory of civil nuclear energy more broadly.

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REFLECTIONS ON THE COMPARATIVE VALUE OF THE EXPLANATORY FACTORS

The nuclear specific and contextual explanatory factors identified in this thesis are dynamic and interactive. These factors mutually support and influence one another. The intertwined nature of these factors means that it is difficult to identify and weight the importance of any one nuclear-specific or contextual factor against another in shaping civil nuclear energy development. As the research aims and research questions have defined the scope of the study to investigate civil nuclear energy development and the outcome of the nuclear renaissance at a regional level, this study has not had scope to investigate the factors that have been more or less influential in determining the outcome of the nuclear renaissance in individual countries within these regions. Moreover, the framing of the research project has been designed to facilitate a holistic approach to allow for the identification of a wide range of explanatory factors, without prioritising any one factor over the other. In order to make methodologically-robust claims about the comparative value of the explanatory factors identified in this thesis, further research is required.

However, some limited comment can still be made about the apparent importance of particular explanatory factors identified in this thesis. Of the nuclear-specific factors identified, the issue of the economics of nuclear power appears to be a particularly important explanatory variable. While public opinion continues to remain divided over the safety of nuclear power, and the implementation of a long- term storage and disposal solution for high-level nuclear waste continues to elude almost all nuclear countries, neither of these factors appear to have greatly impeded the success of the nuclear renaissance in countries such as the US, the UK and France. Instead, the issue that appears to have been particularly influential in hindering the success of the nuclear renaissance in these countries, as well as throughout Western Europe and North America more broadly, is the economics of nuclear power.

The unfolding story of the nuclear renaissance in the UK is clear evidence of this. In spite of a lack of a high-level waste solution, and a divided public opinion on nuclear power, the UK government continues to persevere with its expectation of a nuclear renaissance. Neither cost, waste or safety considerations have yet stopped the British government from politically supporting the emergence of a British nuclear renaissance. Yet in practice, it appears to be the issue of cost that has ultimately caused the British nuclear renaissance to be unsuccessful. The construction of the Hinkley Point C reactor was meant to be the gateway project to the nuclear renaissance in the UK. However, Hinkley Point C has suffered from years of delays and extensive cost overruns primarily to financing issues (rather than as a result of public opposition over nuclear waste or nuclear safety). Despite all of the other nuclear- specific and explanatory factors that could hinder the development of civil nuclear energy in the UK, it appears that in the case of the Hinkley Point C reactor, it is ultimately the economics of nuclear power

175 that has been its undoing to date. This suggests that the cost of nuclear power may be more influential than the other nuclear-specific factors identified in this thesis. Moreover, the story of Hinkley Point C is not an anomaly – the other ‘renaissance’ reactors in Finland and France, while being further progressed than Hinkley Point, have experienced similar extensive cost and construction overruns. In Finland, the cost overruns experienced at the Olkiluoto Nuclear Power Plant have already caused plans for an additional nuclear reactor (Olkiluoto 4) to be cancelled. This evidence therefore suggests that in explaining the apparent failure of the nuclear renaissance, the cost of nuclear power (as opposed to nuclear safety or nuclear waste) is a particularly important explanatory variable. However, in order to substantiate this claim, further research is needed to empirically evaluate the relative influence of the economics of nuclear power compared to the other explanatory factors. This research would, ideally, be conducted at a country-specific, rather than at a regional, level of investigation.

Of the contextual factors identified in this thesis, changing perceptions of risk and the rise of neoliberalism appear to be particularly influential in shaping the changing trajectory of civil nuclear power. While the rise of environmentalism has created new challenges for civil nuclear energy development, it has also created new opportunities for nuclear power to be embraced on the grounds of its low carbon emissions and its contribution to mitigating climate change. Nuclear advocates have capitalised on the salience of environmental issues by reframing nuclear power as a low-carbon energy solution that is necessary for combating global warming. This strategy appears to have had some success, with a growing ‘reluctant acceptance’ among the public for nuclear power as a result of its low-carbon credentials. Thus, environmentalism has posed both a challenge and an opportunity for nuclear power. Moreover, while changes in public trust in government appears to have contributed to the difficulty in government’s convincing citizens of the need for nuclear power, the timeframe with which levels of public trust in government began to decline does not align exactly with the timeframe identified in this thesis as the point at which the fall of nuclear power began. Therefore, the influence of both environmentalism and public trust in government on hindering the success of the nuclear renaissance may be somewhat limited compared to the other contextual factors identified in this thesis.

However, changing public and political perceptions of risk, as well as the rise of neoliberalism, appear to be more influential in shaping the outcome of the nuclear renaissance in Western Europe and North America. The dominance with which considerations of risk now permeate all aspects of public and political decision-making mean that public and political perceptions of nuclear power have fundamentally changed. Considerations of risk are now intrinsic to the nuclear debate, and the perception of nuclear power as a risky technology has been reinforced by the nuclear disasters at Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and more recently, Fukushima. Government and industry efforts appear to have had little success in convincing large segments of the public that the risks associated with nuclear power can be effectively contained by technical and regulatory solutions. The ongoing disconnect between the way in which nuclear advocates and those opposed to (or even uncertain about) nuclear power view the

176 risks involved has contributed to a stagnation in the nuclear debate, and ultimately, a lack of widespread public support for the nuclear renaissance.

Moreover, the rise of neoliberalism appears to be a particularly influential contextual factor in explaining the changing trajectory of nuclear power and the outcome of the nuclear renaissance, as it means that states are now far less willing to provide the extensive levels of intervention and financial support that have historically been necessary for nuclear new build to succeed. Amongst countries in Western Europe and North America, there remains a political commitment to the principles of neoliberalism and market forces, which has shaped government policy for nuclear power. For example, the UK government’s commitment to neoliberal principles was highlighted by the government’s announcement that the nuclear renaissance could succeed in the UK by being entirely funded by the private sector. While the British government has since wavered on this commitment, it is still highly unlikely that the extensive levels of financial support that have historically been provided to the nuclear industry will be reinstated. The ongoing problem of the economics of nuclear power highlights that high levels of state intervention and financial support are still necessary for nuclear new build to succeed.

Put simply, there is little evidence to suggest that nuclear new build can successfully take place in a truly liberalised and competitive energy market. Given that countries in Western Europe and North America are unlikely to abandon their commitment to neoliberal principles, this suggests that a nuclear renaissance will struggle to succeed in these regions. Meanwhile, the countries which have witnessed the greatest levels of nuclear new build since 2000 (namely China and Russia) are countries characterised by high levels of state intervention and aid in nuclear energy development. This suggests that the failure of the nuclear renaissance in Western Europe and North America can be explained, in part, by the lessening of state intervention and financial aid as a result of the rise of neoliberalism. Given that much of Western Europe and North America remains committed to neoliberal market principles, this suggests that nuclear power is unlikely to again receive the same levels of state aid that it has historically depended upon in order to succeed – and which recent developments indicate is still necessary for nuclear new build to take place. These are, however, limited reflections on the comparative value of the explanatory factors identified in this thesis. In order to make more robust, empirically-grounded claims about the extent to which any one of these nuclear-specific or contextual factors has been more influential than the other, further research which is aimed at a country-specific, rather than a regional level of investigation, is needed.

CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE

This thesis addresses the existing dearth of academic research into the reasons for the disjuncture between the expectation and reality of the nuclear renaissance in Western Europe and North America. It has developed a rigorously detailed, empirical account of changes in nuclear energy policy and

177 development in these regions from 1945 until the present day. In doing so, it documents the disjuncture that exists between the rhetoric and reality of the nuclear renaissance. It challenges popular explanations for the failure of the nuclear renaissance (such as the Fukushima disaster and the economics of nuclear power) as being simplistic and taking a ‘snapshot’ perspective of nuclear development. It contrast, this thesis develops a more holistic understanding for this disjuncture than popular explanations suggest. It broadens the debate on nuclear power by identifying the importance of a wide range of factors – both nuclear specific factors and broader contextual shifts – in explaining the changing trajectory of civil nuclear energy development and the outcome of the nuclear renaissance.

As this thesis has been underpinned by a problem-based research approach, the emphasis of this study has been on developing an empirical, rather than a theoretical, contribution to knowledge. As a result, the literature contribution made by this thesis is limited. Nevertheless, despite this empirical focus, this thesis has still made a theoretical contribution to knowledge by broadening the disciplinary and theoretical approach that has typically been adopted in the field of energy studies, as well as by advancing the literature on Agents in Context Historical Institutionalism. The theoretical contribution to knowledge made by this thesis is described in more detail in the next paragraphs.

This thesis made a theoretical contribution to the field of energy studies, as well as to the specific research area of comparative nuclear history and the outcome of the nuclear renaissance, through its adoption of a social science based research approach. As described in more detail in Chapter 1, the field of energy studies has been dominated by a technical and scientific research approach. This thesis challenges this dominance and extends the literature on energy studies by instead adopting a social science based approach to the research topic. By adopting a different disciplinary approach to the topic of comparative nuclear history, this thesis develops a theoretical understanding of civil nuclear energy development that highlights the importance of a broader range of social, political, institutional and ideational factors in determining how and why nuclear energy development changes over time, but which have received little to no consideration in previous literature on energy studies and nuclear power. It argues that a purely techno-scientific approach to understanding nuclear energy development provides a narrow interpretation of comparative nuclear history, and fails to explain the reasons for regional variation in the outcome of the civil nuclear renaissance.

This thesis makes a further theoretical contribution to knowledge through its use of historical institutionalism as an analytical framework to investigate the topic of civil nuclear power. More specifically, this thesis makes a theoretical contribution to the historical institutionalism literature by lending support for two of the core claims of historical institutionalism (these core claims are discussed in more detail in Chapter 3). Historical institutionalism is premised upon the central idea that “history matters” when analysing processes and outcomes of institutional change. This thesis has demonstrated the importance of this core claim of historical institutionalism by placing “politics in time”. That is, by

178 highlighting the way in which many of the issues which contributed to the initial decline in nuclear new build in the 1970s still remain unresolved today, and as a result, have continued to hinder the prospects of a revival of civil nuclear power. Moreover, historical institutionalism highlights the importance of contextual conditions in creating and shaping institutional arrangements. This thesis lends support for the core assumption of historical institutionalism that “context matters”, and that policy change cannot be understood by examining a single institution or process. Throughout the four contextual explanatory factor chapters (Chapters 7-10), this thesis has illustrated the way in which political, social, economic, cultural, structural, institutional and ideational context has shaped the trajectory of civil nuclear energy development throughout history, and continues to shape contemporary policy developments and the outcome of the nuclear renaissance.

In addition to lending support to the core claims of historical institutionalism, this thesis makes a further theoretical contribution to knowledge by expanding the application of a newly developed, more expansive version of historical institutionalism. As described in more detail in Chapter 3, Agents in Context Historical Institutionalism (AiC-HI) was developed by as a more flexible version of historical institutionalism that integrates a broader range of causal variables, including formal and informal agents, institutions, ideas, context and structure, but which does not privilege any one of these variables over another. To date, AiC-HI has primarily been applied as an analytical framework to better understand the subject area of banking and financial systems (see Bell and Hindmoor, 2014; Bell and Feng, 2014; Bell, 2012). This thesis therefore makes a theoretical contribution to knowledge by extending the application of AiC-HI to a new subject area. Specifically, this thesis represents the first instance of AiC-HI being applied to the field of energy studies, and to the subject area of civil nuclear energy development and the nuclear renaissance in particular. In doing so, it has demonstrated the ability of AiC-HI to facilitate the creation of a more holistic and comprehensive understanding of subject areas beyond which it has previously been limited to.

Moreover, this thesis makes a theoretical contribution to knowledge by lending support for the core argument of AiC-HI: that both agents and context are central to understanding how and why policy development changes over time. Specifically, this thesis demonstrates the way in which a broad range of factors (relating to both individual agency and the broader context) operate in a mutually dynamic and interactive manner to influence the changing trajectory of civil nuclear energy policy and development. The mutually shaping nature of these interactions means that neither structure, nor agency, can be identified as more influential than the other. In doing so, this research highlights the limits of the structure-agency debate. It privileges neither structure nor agency as being more important in influencing policy change, but instead highlights the way in which both of these types of factors mutually shape and reinforce one another.

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As the problem-centred research approach underpinning this study has meant that the focus of this thesis has been on developing its empirical, rather than theoretical, contribution to knowledge, further research is needed to develop the limited theoretical contribution made in this paper. This thesis has demonstrated the strength of AiC-HI in explaining changes in civil nuclear energy development at a regional level for Western Europe and North America. However, in doing so, it has made an inevitable trade-off between the breadth and depth of the data collected and the explanation developed. Further research is needed to investigate the ability of AiC-HI to explain variations in nuclear energy policy and development at a country-specific level. Such research would help to develop a more nuanced approach to understanding the reasons for changes in nuclear policy, and would also help to better identify the strengths and weaknesses of AiC-HI as an analytical framework. Moreover, while this thesis lends support for the core claim of AiC-HI that agents, context, ideas and structure are all factors that are mutually influential for policy change, using AiC-HI to examine nuclear energy development at a country-specific level would help to develop a greater depth of understanding and identify whether some of these factors are more or less influential in shaping nuclear policy.

LIMITATIONS & FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS

There are several limitations associated with the present research. Firstly, while this thesis focuses upon the rhetoric and reality of the nuclear renaissance in the Western Europe and North America, adopting a regional approach means that many of the more nuanced, country-specific experiences of nuclear energy development have not been explored in detail. Instead, this thesis has discussed the experience of nuclear development in the UK and the US to a greater extent than in other countries. There are several reasons for this emphasis. The political rhetoric of a nuclear renaissance was strongest in these two countries, where political leaders at the highest level of government across multiple administrations and competing political parties made public statements in support of a nuclear renaissance. Furthermore, the existing body of literature discussing nuclear energy development focuses largely on the experiences of the US and the UK – and as such, the greatest amount of information for analysis was available for these two countries, particularly for historical information on nuclear development in the 1950s and 1960s. The dearth of available data is a common problem facing comparative historical research (Green, 2004: 47). Care has been taken to ensure that qualifications are included throughout this study in any instance where the availability of historical data is limited. Future research is needed that focuses more heavily on investigating the experiences of nuclear development and the nuclear renaissance in Western Europe and North America beyond the US and the UK. Adopting a country- specific approach to future research into nuclear energy would help to capture more of the nuanced differences in how and why civil nuclear energy development changes over time, which have not been able to be captured at a regional level of investigation.

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Another limitation of this study was the limited diversity of experts interviewed. The majority of experts interviewed were academics, with only a small number of government and industry representatives interviewed. This was because academic researchers tended to be far more willing to participate in an interview than government or nuclear industry representatives. Many of the interview invitations sent to government organisations and private companies working in the nuclear industry were declined or received no response. The difficulty in finding government or industry representatives who would agree to an interview was somewhat unsurprising given the highly controversial nature of nuclear power. Moreover, several of the interviewees mentioned during their interviews that the controversy surrounding nuclear power, and the highly secretive culture surrounding nuclear development, meant that it would be difficult to gain access to government and industry representatives working in the area of nuclear power. However, even though the majority of the interviews were conducted with academic researchers, many of these academics had previously worked for government departments or nuclear energy companies, and were willing to comment on their experiences when working in those capacities. Future research is needed to incorporate the perspectives of a wider cohort of stakeholders on nuclear energy development and the factors that have influenced the outcome of the nuclear renaissance.

Interview data was not available to support or substantiate the findings of the broader contextual explanatory factor chapters (Chapters 7-10). The purpose of conducting expert interviews for this study was to develop an understanding of the factors that experts currently working or researching in the field of nuclear power identified as being influential for civil nuclear energy development and the outcome of the nuclear renaissance. Interviewees were questioned broadly about what factors they thought were influencing the trajectory of civil nuclear energy development and the nuclear renaissance, as well as contemporary challenges and opportunities for the nuclear industry. Interviewees were not ‘encouraged’ to identify particular factors, nor were they directly asked about whether they thought particular factors (such as nuclear-specific or broader contextual) were influential in civil nuclear energy development. Through this process, it became clear that interviewees were identifying almost exclusively nuclear- specific factors when answering these interview questions. While a small number of interview participants did note the importance of the broader political and social context in determining the trajectory of civil nuclear energy development, they did not discuss the specific contextual factors identified in this thesis. For this reason, interview data is not available to support the findings of the broader contextual explanatory factor chapters (i.e. Chapters 7-10).

Moreover, the lack of discussion of broader contextual factors within the expert interviews is unsurprising given that a core claim of this thesis is that existing explanations for the failure of the nuclear renaissance have been dominated by nuclear-specific factors (such as the cost of nuclear power and concerns about nuclear safety). This same dominance of nuclear-specific explanatory factors was mirrored in the expert interviews conducted for this thesis. Therefore, the lack of interview data discussing the influence of broader contextual factors on civil nuclear energy development lends further

181 support for one of the core justifications of this thesis – to broaden the debate on nuclear power away from the nuclear-specific factors which have dominated thinking on how and why nuclear policy and development changes over time.

Due to time and resource constraints, this research project has only investigated the impact of four post- war contextual shifts on civil nuclear energy development and the outcome of the nuclear renaissance in Western Europe and North America. In accordance with a problem-centred approach to research, these four contextual shifts were chosen as they were expected to be most relevant to the research questions under investigation. However, there are many other contextual shifts that occurred in the post- war period that could have been investigated to determine whether, or to what extent, they have contributed to the disconnection between the expectation and reality of the nuclear renaissance. It is recommended that future research into nuclear power and the failure of the nuclear renaissance is conducted to explore the influence of other contextual shifts not addressed in this thesis. Are there other broad contextual shifts, beyond the four examined in this thesis, that can help to explain the disjuncture between the rhetoric and reality of the nuclear renaissance? For example, the rise of monitory democracy or changes in the military-industrial complex could be explored to investigate whether each of these post-war shifts have contributed to changes in the trajectory of civil nuclear energy development, or the failure of the nuclear renaissance more specifically.

As this research has focused primarily on the changing trajectory of nuclear energy development in Western Europe and North America, further research is needed to investigate whether the research findings are relevant in shaping nuclear development in other regions of the globe. For example, future research questions could include: are the factors which explain the disjuncture between the rhetoric and reality of the nuclear renaissance in Western Europe and North America present in other regions where there is more evidence of a nuclear renaissance taking place? Can the absence of the nuclear-specific or contextual factors help to explain the success of nuclear energy development in other regions or countries? For example, can the absence of a commitment to neoliberal principles help to explain why nuclear new build has been more successful in countries such as China and Russia? Has the rise of environmentalism been less pronounced in these countries, and has this therefore meant less barriers to the construction of new nuclear reactors? Are there differences in public and political perceptions of risk in countries such as China and Russia, as opposed to the US and the UK, and does this have an impact on nuclear energy policy and development?

Moreover, further research is needed to investigate whether certain nuclear-specific or contextual factors identified in this thesis are more or less influential in shaping nuclear energy policy and development in particular regions or countries. For example, are the economics of nuclear power more important in shaping nuclear development than considerations of nuclear safety or nuclear waste? Are changing risk perceptions more influential than declining levels of public trust in government? There is

182 also need for further research to investigate the extent of the interaction between the nuclear-specific and the broader contextual factors identified in this thesis. For example, to what extent has the rise of neoliberalism and environmentalism influenced the economics of nuclear power? This is a question that has been addressed to a brief extent in this thesis, but which further research could explore to a much greater level of detail. In order to determine whether certain nuclear-specific or contextual factors identified in this thesis are more or less influential in shaping civil nuclear energy development, further research should be conducted at a country-specific, rather than at a regional, level of investigation. This would allow for a more nuanced explanation to be developed as to the reasons for how and why nuclear energy development changes over time (as some of these nuances have been overlooked as an inevitable result of the regional focus that this thesis has adopted). Investigating changes in nuclear energy policy and development at a country-specific level would also provide further opportunity to expand the theoretical contribution that Agents in Context Historical Institutionalism can make to the field of energy studies, and help to further establish AiC-HI’s value in explaining policy and institutional change over time.

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

This thesis has investigated why there is a disjuncture between the expectation and reality of the nuclear renaissance in Western Europe and North America. It has challenged existing explanations for the nuclear renaissance – such as the rise of safety concerns after the Fukushima nuclear disaster, or the ongoing financial problems plaguing nuclear power – as being unable to, in isolation, explain why there is little evidence of a nuclear renaissance taking place in these regions. Both the nuclear-specific and the contextual factors which this thesis has identified as explaining the changing fortune of nuclear energy in the past suggest that a nuclear renaissance is unlikely to take place in Western Europe or North America in the near future. The rhetoric of a nuclear renaissance suggested that the nuclear- specific factors which continue to hinder nuclear new build (the economics of nuclear power, nuclear safety and nuclear waste) were going to be resolved, primarily through technological advancements and new reactor designs that would be cheaper, safer and produce less radioactive waste than ever before. However, despite these promises, civil nuclear energy development continues to be hindered by the economics of nuclear power, the safety of nuclear power, and the radioactive waste that nuclear power produces. While there is little evidence to suggest that these problems will be overcome any time soon, the nuclear industry continues to place their faith in small modular reactors as the way forward for nuclear power, by overcoming the historical failures of large conventional reactors and adapt to the gradual decentralisation of energy systems. However, even if small modular reactors are able to overcome some of the nuclear-specific factors that have historically impeded nuclear new build, the success of the nuclear industry will continue to be challenged by the broader contextual shifts that

183 contributed to the decline of nuclear power from the 1970s onwards. Until these ongoing issues are resolved, it is unlikely that a nuclear renaissance will succeed in Western Europe or North America.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1: PROJECT INFORMATION SHEET

Name of project Much Ado About Nothing? The Expectation and Reality of the Global Nuclear Renaissance

Researcher Ms. Shashi van de Graaff PhD Student School of Political Science and International Studies The University of Queensland, Brisbane QLD 4072 Email: [email protected] Phone: +44 77333 54901

Purpose of the study My project examines what has happened to the recent expectations of a global ‘nuclear renaissance’. I am investigating to what extent a global nuclear renaissance has taken place, the reasons behind this outcome, and what this suggests about the future of the global nuclear industry. I am interviewing representatives of government, the nuclear industry, non-government organisations, academics and energy experts that have expertise in the area of nuclear energy development in order to explore this topic.

Participation in the study Taking part is your choice. You can decide not to participate at any time, whether prior to or during the meeting. If you agree to participate, we would have an interview that should take approximately 30 minutes. Feel free to say if a shorter meeting would suit your schedule. It would take place at a time and place that suits you.

Confidentiality Your participation in the study would be anonymous. All identifying information will be separated from any written notes I keep. Notes will be stored securely and computer data will be password protected. You will be given the opportunity to decide whether you agree to have published any information gained from the meeting. If you agree, I will also ask you to tell me how you wish to be described as the source of the information (e.g. if you are happy to be referred to as an ‘Energy Department employee’). Please note the meeting can be ‘off-the-record’, with no information gained being used in the study. I am simply interested in hearing your thoughts and any information you can provide.

Ethical clearance This study adheres to the guidelines of the ethical review process of The University of Queensland. Whilst you are free to discuss your participation in this study with the researcher (contactable at [email protected]), if you would like to speak to an officer of the University not involved in the study, you may arrange to speak to the Chair of Research Committee of the School of Political Science and International Studies by making contact with the Finance and Research Support Officer on + 61 7 3365 1524 or emailing [email protected].

Thank you for any assistance you are able to give

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APPENDIX 2: PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM

Name of project Much Ado About Nothing? The Expectation and Reality of the Nuclear Renaissance

Researcher Ms. Shashi van de Graaff PhD Student, School of Political Science and International Studies The University of Queensland

Your involvement in this research is highly valued. After reading the project information sheet, please review the information below and tick the box if you agree:

 I have read the project information sheet.

 I am willing to participate in this research.

 I understand the nature of the research and my role in it.

 I understand I am free to withdraw from participating in the project at any time.

 I understand that the researcher will keep all my personal information confidential.

Do you agree that information gained from your interview may be published? Yes No, I wish this interview to be ‘off-the-record’

Do you give permission for the interview to be tape recorded? Yes No

Date: ______

Signature: ______

Researcher’s signature: ______

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APPENDIX 3: TABLE OF INTERVIEWEES

Industry Role Academia University Research Fellow Academia Director of a University Energy Research Centre

Academia Executive Dean of a University Engineering Faculty

Academia Director of an Energy Research Consultancy Academia Director of a University Centre for Engineering

Academia Deputy Director of a University Energy Research Institute

Academia Director, University Centre for Energy Law Academia University Lecturer in Sustainable Development Academia University Reader in Energy Politics Academia University Course Director in Nuclear Energy Academia University Research Fellow Academia University Professor of Energy Policy Senior Research Fellow in Energy and Environment at a Policy Academia Think Tank Academia University Professor of Energy Policy

Government and International Relations Advisor for a National Government Nuclear Science Research Organisation

Head of External Affairs for Nuclear New Build at a UK Energy Industry Company

225