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A Case Study on Arms Exports to Saudi Arabia Compliance with The Universiteit van Amsterdam Master in Sociology Social Problems and Social Policy Track Master Thesis Compliance with the European Union Common Position on Arms Exports A Case Study on Arms Exports to Saudi Arabia Robin Hübscher [email protected] Student nr.: 11125616 Supervision: First supervisor: prof. dr. Jan Willem Duyvendak Second supervisor: drs. Paul Aarts Amsterdam, 30th June 2016 Abstract Saudi Arabia became the biggest arms importer in 2015 and EU member states contributed substantially to the Saudi imports. With a Common Position on arms exports, all EU member states are legally bound to `responsible` arms export controls. It is argued that states commit to responsible arms export controls in order to improve the international reputation. With poor accountability mechanisms it is mainly arms trade scandals which push states from commitment towards compliance. With a case study on EU arms exports to Saudi Arabia it is explored whether the Common Position was applied consistently by the EU member states. The case study shows that virtually all arms export licences were granted. Denied licence applications can partly be linked to arms trade scandals and point to concerns on human rights violations which, however, did not prevent exports worth billions from being issued. The results support the assumption that states commit to responsible arms export controls mainly to improve the international reputation which questions the preventive element of arms export controls. ii Contents 1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1 2 Arms Trade and Reputation ............................................................................................................ 3 2.1 Why Do States Sell Arms? ....................................................................................................... 3 2.2 Why Do States Agree to Arms Transfer Controls? .................................................................. 4 3 Arms Control ................................................................................................................................... 7 3.1 Common Position .................................................................................................................. 10 4 Method and Data .......................................................................................................................... 12 5 The Arms Trade Between EU Member States and Saudi Arabia ................................................... 14 6 Implementation of the Common Position..................................................................................... 17 6.1 Issued Licences ...................................................................................................................... 18 6.2 Denied Licences ..................................................................................................................... 21 6.2.1 Criterion 2: Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law .................................. 25 6.3 Which Countries Denied Licences? ....................................................................................... 27 7 Discussion ...................................................................................................................................... 32 8 Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................... 35 9 References ..................................................................................................................................... 37 10 Appendix .................................................................................................................................... 45 iii List of Abbreviations APC Armoured Personnel Carrier ATD Arms Transfer Database ATT Arms Trade Treaty CCW Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects CFE Treaty on Concentional Armed Forces in Europe COARM Working Party on Conventional Arms Exports CoC Code of Conduct CP Common Position HRW Human Rights Watch ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights MED Military Expenditure Database Miksa Ministry of Interior Kingdom of Saudi Arabia ML EU Common Military List NPE Normative Power Europe PoA Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects SALW Small Arms and Light Weapons TIV Trend Indicator Value UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights UNROC United Nations Register of Conventional Arms WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction iv 1 Introduction Saudi Arabia became the biggest arms importer in 2015 with arms imports worth $3.2 billion. The military expenditure of Saudi Arabia is the third highest worldwide and, measured as a share of GDP, Saudi Arabia devotes seven times more financial resources to the military than the worldwide average. Arms exports from EU member countries account for 42% of the total arms imports of Saudi Arabia and have thus contributed substantially to the huge increase of Saudi arms imports since the turn of the millennium. A sharp contrast to the flourishing arms trade between EU countries and Saudi Arabia is the EU parliamentary vote in favour of an arms embargo against Saudi Arabia in February 2016 (EU Parliament: RSP 2515). The call for an arms embargo comes after allegations of serious breaches of international humanitarian law by Saudi Arabia in the Yemeni war which started in early 2015, the same year in which arms exports to Saudi Arabia rose to a new high. Arms exports from the EU are subject to transfer controls, which are an important preventive element of arms controls (Bauer 2010: 311). Arms transfers are the responsibility of the member states but a key common denominator is the legally binding “Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment” (EU Council 2008). Before becoming legally binding, the Common Position (CP) was a Code of Conduct (CoC) which was introduced in 1998. The CP is aimed at strengthening and harmonizing the export policies of member states (Bromley 2008) by setting minimum standards in the form of eight consolidated criteria against which exports need to be assessed. Several studies and NGO reports on the CP cast doubt on the success of harmonizing EU countries arms export policies and point to an inconsistent application. Bromley and Broszka (2008) assess the impact of the CoC ten years after it was introduced. They find little evidence for harmonization of EU member states arms exports but observe an increased restrictiveness regarding arms exports under the human rights and conflict criteria of the CoC. Erickson (2011) looks at EU arms exports in connection with human rights, conflict and democracy in the recipient country and conducts a case study on the China embargo. She concludes that domestic material and normative interests remain important in explaining member states arms exports. The events of the Arab Spring have further generated a lot of attention regarding arms exports from EU member states to countries which were affected (Bromley 2012; Duquet 2014; Hansen/Marsh 2014). Findings on arms exports prior to the Arab Spring point to a lax and inconsistent application of the CoC and CP. This case study on EU arms exports to Saudi Arabia is motivated by the concurrence of the above: The relevance of Saudi Arabia as biggest arms importer, the controversial nature of arms exports to Saudi Arabia exemplified by the EU parliamentary vote in favour of an arms embargo and study results pointing to an insufficient or inconsistent application of the CP. The main research question addressed with the case study is as follows: 1. Is the Common Position applied consistently by the European Union member states regarding the control of arms exports to Saudi Arabia? 1 Looking at the consistency of the application of the CP, notifications on denied licences for arms exports as reported in annual EU Council reports, are an important information source. These reports include information on granted and denied licences broken down by categories of military equipment as laid out by the EU Common Military List (EU Council 2015). Regarding licence denials, there is also noted on which of the consolidated criteria the denial is based upon. The information on denied equipment and cited criteria can give some insight into what could be the reason for the denial which leads to the following two sub-questions: 2a. Licences for which Military List categories were denied? 2b. What are the most reported criteria leading to licence denials? Although there have been improvements in transparency, public information on the arms trade is scarce, especially when it comes to the reasoning behind export decision. Nonetheless should possible explanations of licence decisions not be left out in order to go beyond the descriptive character of the first research questions. An explanation is sought with the third sub-question: 3. What could explain differing applications of the Common Position? This is arguably the most interesting part of the topic but it is also very tricky, not to say impossible, to explain what lies behind the decisions whether or not to grant a licence. This is reflected in the use of the word
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