Birth of the Bell Monopoly It Was a Vigorous, but Messy, Competition
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The US Experiment with Government Ownership of the Telephone
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law 4-1-2013 The Wires Go to War: The U.S. Experiment with Government Ownership of the Telephone System During World War I Michael A. Janson Federal Communications Commission Christopher S. Yoo University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, Communications Law Commons, Economic History Commons, Legal History Commons, Other Business Commons, Policy History, Theory, and Methods Commons, Science and Technology Law Commons, and the United States History Commons Repository Citation Janson, Michael A. and Yoo, Christopher S., "The Wires Go to War: The U.S. Experiment with Government Ownership of the Telephone System During World War I" (2013). Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law. 467. https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/467 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Articles The Wires Go to War: The U.S. Experiment with Government Ownership of the Telephone System During World War I Michael A. Janson* & Christopher S. Yoo** One of the most distinctive characteristics of the U.S. telephone system is that it has always been privately owned, in stark contrast to the pattern of government ownership followed by virtually every other nation. What is not widely known is how close the United States came to falling in line with the rest of the world. -
Dismantling Digital Deregulation: Toward a National Broadband Strategy
DISMANTLING DIGITAL DEREGULATION: TOWARD A NATIONAL BROADBAND STRATEGY By S. Derek Turner DISMANTLING DIGITAL DEREGULATION: TOWARD A NATIONAL BROADBAND STRATEGY TABLE OF CONTENTS THE REVOLUTION WILL NOT BE STREAMED 5 Abandoning the Commitment to Competition 7 The FCC’s Premature Deregulation 9 Making Up for Lost Time: A National Broadband Plan 10 DEFINING AMERICA’S BROADBAND PROBLEM 14 The American Decline 15 The U.S. Duopoly Fails to Deliver 19 The Digital Divide Persists as Broadband Becomes an Essential Service 23 Why Some States Are Falling Behind in Broadband Adoption 25 America’s Broadband Failures Are the Result of Policy Failures 27 AMERICA’S BROADBAND PROBLEM: COMPETITION 28 The Computer Inquiries and Competition Policy 30 From Computer II to the 1996 Telecom Act 32 Implementing and Undermining the 1996 Telecom Act 33 The Rest of the World Takes a Different Path 37 Cable TV and the Beginning of the End of Broadband Competition 39 The FCC Kills the Commitment to Competition 42 Platform Competition: Always Right Around the Corner 47 The FCC’s Blindness to Abuses of Market Power 52 FCC Endorses Monopoly Power in the Middle-Mile and Special Access Markets 55 The FCC’s Premature Deregulation of the High-Capacity Broadband Market 59 AMERICA’S BROADBAND PROBLEM: OPENNESS 62 Nondiscrimination and Content Control 63 The FCC Abandons Openness 65 The Early Network Neutrality Debate 68 The Evolution of the Network Neutrality Debate 71 The Case Against Comcast 73 Net Neutrality and the Need for a Fifth Principle 75 Dealing with Managed Services -
The Great Telecom Meltdown for a Listing of Recent Titles in the Artech House Telecommunications Library, Turn to the Back of This Book
The Great Telecom Meltdown For a listing of recent titles in the Artech House Telecommunications Library, turn to the back of this book. The Great Telecom Meltdown Fred R. Goldstein a r techhouse. com Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record for this book is available from the U.S. Library of Congress. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Goldstein, Fred R. The great telecom meltdown.—(Artech House telecommunications Library) 1. Telecommunication—History 2. Telecommunciation—Technological innovations— History 3. Telecommunication—Finance—History I. Title 384’.09 ISBN 1-58053-939-4 Cover design by Leslie Genser © 2005 ARTECH HOUSE, INC. 685 Canton Street Norwood, MA 02062 All rights reserved. Printed and bound in the United States of America. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. All terms mentioned in this book that are known to be trademarks or service marks have been appropriately capitalized. Artech House cannot attest to the accuracy of this information. Use of a term in this book should not be regarded as affecting the validity of any trademark or service mark. International Standard Book Number: 1-58053-939-4 10987654321 Contents ix Hybrid Fiber-Coax (HFC) Gave Cable Providers an Advantage on “Triple Play” 122 RBOCs Took the Threat Seriously 123 Hybrid Fiber-Coax Is Developed 123 Cable Modems -
A Comment on Competition and Controversy in Local Telecommunications Howard A
Hastings Law Journal Volume 50 | Issue 6 Article 7 1-1999 A Comment on Competition and Controversy in Local Telecommunications Howard A. Shelanski Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Howard A. Shelanski, A Comment on Competition and Controversy in Local Telecommunications, 50 Hastings L.J. 1617 (1999). Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol50/iss6/7 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. A Comment on Competition and Controversy in Local Telecommunications by HOWARD A. SHELANSKI* The principal goal of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 is to open the market for local telephone service to competition. So far, however, the statute has attracted headlines more for generating legal controversy than for creating economic competition. The disputes that have commanded such attention and colored public discussion of the Act involve, at their core, the Federal Communications Commission's interpretation of provisions requiring incumbent local carriers to make parts of their proprietary networks available for use by new entrants. While some observers blame litigation and non- compliance with these "network unbundling" provisions for delaying implementation of a generally sound piece of legislation,' others contend either that the FCC's implementation of the unbundling requirements is impermissible and onerous or that regulators have not gone far enough to help new competitors.2 Given the resources devoted to disputes over the Act, it would be easy to suppose, as a variety of commentators have,3 that the success of the 1996 Act depends on how courts and regulators resolve * Acting Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley (on leave 1999-2000) and Chief Economist, Federal Communications Commission. -
Universal Service Monitoring Report
Universal Service Monitoring Report CC Docket No. 96-45 WC Docket No. 02-6 WC Docket No. 02-60 WC Docket No. 06-122 WC Docket No. 10-90 WC Docket No. 11-42 WC Docket No. 13-184 WC Docket No. 14-58 2019 (Data Received Through September 2019) Prepared by Federal and State Staff for the Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service This report is available for reference in the FCC's Reference Information Center, Courtyard Level, 445 12th Street, SW, Washington, DC. Copies may be purchased by contacting Best Copy and Printing, Inc., 445 12th Street, SW, Room CY-B402, Washington, DC 20554, telephone (800) 378-3160, or via their website at www.bcpiweb.com. The report can also be downloaded from the FCC’s Federal-State Joint Board Monitoring Reports website at http://www.fcc.gov/encyclopedia/federal-state-joint-board-monitoring-reports. 1 Table of Contents Introduction and Summary ............................................................................................................................................ 5 2019 Monitoring Report Supplementary Material ......................................................................................................... 7 Section 1 – Revenues and Contributions ....................................................................................................................... 8 Section 2 – Lifeline (Low–Income) ............................................................................................................................. 24 Section 3 – High–Cost Program ................................................................................................................................. -
Overview of the Universal Service Fund and Selected Federal Broadband Programs
Overview of the Universal Service Fund and Selected Federal Broadband Programs Updated June 25, 2021 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov R46780 SUMMARY R46780 Overview of the Universal Service Fund and June 25, 2021 Selected Federal Broadband Programs Patricia Moloney Figliola, Efforts to deploy voice telephone service throughout the United States began almost 100 years Coordinator ago. Starting in the 1990s, these efforts shifted toward the deployment of broadband internet Specialist in Internet and service to homes, schools, and businesses and the provision of infrastructure to support Telecommunications applications such as telehealth and distance learning. These efforts have been supported through Policy various permanent and pilot programs since that time. Further, as a result of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, Congress has passed or proposed legislation to create and fund new programs to accelerate broadband deployment: Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act (P.L. 116-136), Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (CAA 2021) (P.L. 116-260), American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (ARPA) (P.L. 117-2), and Leading Infrastructure for Tomorrow’s America Act (LIFT America Act) (H.R. 1848, introduced March 11, 2021). The LIFT America Act is included because of its intent to provide additional funding to numerous programs established or funded through CARES, CAA 2021, and ARPA. Other legislation has also been introduced in the 117th Congress related to broadband. Major broadband support programs are conducted by the following agencies: Federal Communications Commission (FCC), National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), Department of Agriculture (USDA), Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), Department of the Treasury, and Institute of Museum and Library Services. -
ESI, PUBLIC VERSION Before the FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS
PUBLIC VERSION Before the FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION Washington, D.C. 20554 ESI, Complainant, Proceeding No. 16-407 v. Bureau ID No. EB-16-MD-005 AT&TCorp., Defendant. AT &T'S ANSWER TO ESl'S FORMAL COMPLAINT AT&T Services, Inc., on behalf of its affiliate Defendant AT&T Corp. (collectively, "AT&T"), pursuant to section l.724(b) of the Commission's Rules 1 and the Enforcement Bureau's Notice of Formal Complaint (Dec. 15, 2016), files this Answer to the Fonnal Complaint ("Complaint") filed by Express Scripts, Inc. ("ESI"), on December 13, 2016. As required by section 1. 724(b) of the Commission's Rules, AT&T sets forth below its defenses and responses to the material allegations in the Complaint and states as follows: 1. AT&T admits the allegations in paragraph 1 of the Complaint. 2. AT&T is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to whether ESI is the nation's largest stand-alone full-service phannacy benefit management company or as to how many prescriptions it handles every day through its networks of retail pharmacies and home delivery facilities. AT&T is also without knowledge or infmmation sufficient to form a belief as to how ESI coordinates the distribution of outpatient I 47 C.F.R. § l.724(b). PUBLIC VERSION phannaceuticals. AT&T is also without knowledge or infonnation sufficient to form a belief as to how or whether ESI achieves successful financial and health outcomes or as to the scope of services that ESI provides. The allegations in paragraph 2 are therefore denied. -
PHOENIX CENTER POLICY BULLETIN NO. 17 Page 1 of 18
PHOENIX CENTER POLICY BULLETIN NO. 17 Page 1 of 18 PHOENIX CENTER POLICY BULLETIN NO. 17 George S. Ford, Ph.D. Thomas M. Koutsky, J.D. Lawrence J. Spiwak, J.D. April 2007 WIRELESS NET NEUTRALITY: FROM Carterfone TO CABLE BOXES Abstract: Over the past few months there have been calls to impose “wireless net neutrality” rules on the burgeoning United States wireless industry. These critics assert that certain practices by the wireless industry—such as handset “locking” practices, data bandwidth limitations, and control over features included on handsets—unduly hamper the ability of consumers to access and use advanced data communications services and, therefore, require severe regulatory intervention to protect consumers. To correct this perceived market defect, wireless network neutrality advocates essentially seek to turn highly sophisticated wireless telecommunications networks into commodity-based networks. In support of this proposal, wireless network neutrality advocates point to the Federal Communications Commission’s 1968 Carterfone decision and the more recent Cable Navigation Devices rules as examples in which the Commission has taken what they allege to be a similar regulatory approach for both the landline telephone and video programming distribution market. In this BULLETIN we show that neither the mandates of, nor conditions relevant to, Carterfone and the Cable Navigation Devices decisions appear to support the regulatory intervention sought by the wireless network neutrality advocates. Indeed, the Carterfone and Cable Navigation Devices decisions appear to decidedly call for a rejection of the recent proposals for wireless network neutrality. We also discuss the substantial risks that Carterfone-type regulation would commoditize wireless network services in a way that could substantially harm the prospects for entry and competition in the industry. -
FROM CARTERFONE to the Iphone: CONSUMER CHOICE in the WIRELESS TELECOMMUNICATIONS MARKETPLACE
FROM CARTERFONE TO THE iPHONE: CONSUMER CHOICE IN THE WIRELESS TELECOMMUNICATIONS MARKETPLACE Michael T. Hoekert Obituary Ma Bell Dies at 107. Ma Bell died at the stroke of midnight, Saturday, De- cember 31, 1983. She succumbed to the forces of technological change and the pub- lic's desire for competition. She was 107 years old. Funeral arrangements were made by the U.S. Department of Justice's antitrust department team led by William Baxter. Officiating was Judge Harold H. Greene.' I. INTRODUCTION So began a tribute written by the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 1944 upon the divesture, in late 1983, of the largest company the world had ever seen, the American Telegraph and Telephone Company ("AT&T").2 Tens of thousands of proud men and women could not help but mourn the loss of the $155 billion telephone empire that they had a very real hand in constructing. Through the twentieth century, AT&T brought universal local and long distance telephone service to the United States, a monumental task by any measure. As a government-sanctioned and vertically integrated monopoly with universal service as its mandate, AT&T harnessed immense economies of scale and scope in tackling this challenge.4 By the 1950s, AT&T t J.D. Candidate, May 2009, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law. The author would like to recognize Professor Robert Frieden's passion for the issues dis- cussed here, and thank him for his eagerness to share his knowledge and criticism through- out the development of this Comment. I The Day the Bell System Died, http://www.porticus.org/bell/bellsystemdied.html (last visited Sept. -
Verizon Communications, Inc., Based in New York Were Among the Largest in U.S
Corporate HISTORY HIS TORY OF VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS INC. 2 The History Of Verizon Communications Verizon’s Formation: The Bell Atlantic - GTE Merger The mergers that formed Verizon Verizon Communications, Inc., based in New York were among the largest in U.S. busi- City and incorporated in Delaware, was formed on ness history, culminating in a defini- June 30, 2000, with the merger of Bell Atlantic Corp. tive merger agreement, dated July 27, 1998, between and GTE Corp. Verizon began trading on the New Bell Atlantic, based in New York City, and GTE, which was in the process of moving its headquarters from York Stock Exchange (NYSE) under the VZ symbol on Stamford, Connecticut, to Irving, Texas. Monday, July 3, 2000. It also began trading on the NASDAQ exchange under the same symbol on March GTE and Bell Atlantic had each evolved and grown through years 10, 2010. of mergers, acquisitions and divesti- tures. Each had proven track records in successfully The symbol was selected because it uses the two integrating business operations. letters of the Verizon logo that graphically portray Prior to the merger, GTE was one of the world’s largest speed, while also echoing the genesis of the company telecommunications companies, with 1999 revenues of name: veritas, the Latin word connoting certainty and more than $25 billion. GTE’s National and International Operations served approximately 35 million access reliability, and horizon, signifying forward-looking lines through subsidiaries in the United States, Canada and visionary. and the Dominican -
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-54 Before the Federal
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-54 Before the Federal Communications Commission Washington, D.C. 20554 In the Matter of ) ) Business Data Services in an Internet Protocol ) WC Docket No. 16-143 Environment ) ) Investigation of Certain Price Cap Local Exchange ) WC Docket No. 15-247 Carrier Business Data Services Tariff Pricing Plans ) ) Special Access for Price Cap Local Exchange ) WC Docket No. 05-25 Carriers ) ) AT&T Corporation Petition for Rulemaking to ) RM-10593 Reform Regulation of Incumbent Local Exchange ) Carrier Rates for Interstate Special Access Services ) TARIFF INVESTIGATION ORDER AND FURTHER NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING Comment Date: June 28, 2016 Reply Comment Date: July 26, 2016 Adopted: April 28, 2016 Released: May 2, 2016 By the Commission: Chairman Wheeler and Commissioners Clyburn and Rosenworcel issuing separate statements; Commissioner Pai and O’Rielly dissenting and issuing separate statements. TABLE OF CONTENTS Para. I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................. 1 A. Executive Summary ....................................................................................................................... 11 II. BACKGROUND .................................................................................................................................. 12 A. Business Data Service Connects Business ..................................................................................... 12 B. The Business Data -
State Universal Service Funds 2018: Updating the Numbers
State Universal Service Funds 2018: Updating the Numbers Sherry Lichtenberg, Ph.D. Principal Researcher, Telecommunications National Regulatory Research Institute April 2019 © 2019 National Regulatory Research Institute 1101 Vermont Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20005 www.nrri.org About the Author Sherry Lichtenberg, Ph.D. is the Principal for Telecommunications at the National Regulatory Research Institute. Her telecommunications background includes competitive advocacy on the state and federal levels, operational support-systems design, performance metrics, contract arbitration, program management, and third-party testing. She has been a product manager, business manager, and operations leader for AT&T, MCI, and Verizon Business competitive local services. Dr. Lichtenberg received her Ph.D. from Rutgers University. Acknowledgments Many thanks to the 49 state public utility commission staff members who responded to NRRI’s 2018 study of State Universal Service Funds. Special thanks for their input and review to Sandy Reams, Kansas Corporation Commission; Cullen Robbins, Nebraska Public Service Commission; and Michael Ripperger, New Mexico Public Regulation Commission. Executive Summary Universal Service is a key component of both federal and state communications policy. Its goal is to ensure that regardless of where they live, all citizens have access to robust, reliable communications services, including broadband connectivity, at affordable rates, with “reasonably comparable service” across the country. The four Federal Universal Service