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2009 PIER Conference on Political Economy Participant List Ufuk Akcigit James Alt Department of Economics Institute for Quantitative Social Science University of Pennsylvania Harvard University 3718 Locust Walk Cambridge, MA 02138 Philadelphia, PA 19104 Tel : 617-495-2184 Tel: 215-898-7711 Fax : 617-496-5149 Fax: 215-573-2057 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] Enriqueta Aragones Scott Ashworth Campus Universitat Autònoma de Department of Politics Barcelona, 08193 Bellaterra, Barcelona, Princeton University Spain Princeton, NJ 08544 Tel: 34-(9)3-580 66 12 Tel: 609-258-2153 Fax: 34-(9)3-580 14 52 Fax: 609-258-5349 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] Marina Azzimonti David P. Baron Department of Economics Graduate School of Business University of Pennsylvania Stanford University 3718 Locust Walk 518 Memorial Way Philadelphia, PA 19104 Stanford, CA 94305-5015 Tel: 215-898-7676 Tel: 650-723-3757 Fax: 215-573-2057 Fax: 650-725-6152 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] Marco Battaglini Giorgio Bellettini Department of Economics Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche Princeton University Università di Bologna Princeton, NJ 08544. P.zza Scaravilli 2 Tel: 609- 258-4002 40126 Bologna ITALY Fax: 609- 258-6419 Tel: 39-051-2098136 Email: [email protected] Fax: 39-051-2098040 Email: [email protected] Carmen Bevia Matilde Bombardini Campus Universitat Autònoma de Department of Economics Barcelona, 08193 Bellaterra, The University of British Columbia Barcelona, Spain Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z1 Canada Tel: 34-(9)3-581 21 90 Tel: 604-822-3866 Fax: 34-(9)3-581 24 61 Fax: N/A Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] 2009 PIER Conference on Political Economy Participant List Renee Bowen Steve Callander Stanford Graduate School of Business Graduate School of Business 518 Memorial Way Stanford University Stanford, CA 94305-5015 Stanford CA 94305 Tel: 650-721-1299 Tel: 650-736-2867 Fax: N/A Fax: 650-725-0468 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] Arianna Degan Arnaud Dellis Université du Québec à Montréal Department of Economics Département des sciences économiques Universite Laval Case postale 8888, Succursale Centre- ville 1025 Av. Sciences-Humaines, Local 2174 Montréal (Québec), H3C 3P8 Quebec (QC) G1V 0A6, Canada Tel: 514-987-3000, Ext. 2079 Tel: 418 656-7749 Fax: 514-987-849 Fax: 418 656-2707 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] Aureo de Paula Daniel Diermeier Department of Economics Kellogg School of Management, University of Pennsylvania Northwestern University 3718 Locust Walk 2001 Sheridan Road Philadelphia, PA 19104 Evanston IL, 60208-2009 Tel: 215-898-1506 Tel :847-491-5177 Fax: 215-573-2057 Fax: 847-467-1220 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] Allan Drazen John Duggan Department of Economics W. Allen Wallis Institute of Political University of Maryland Economics College Park, MD 20742 University of Rochester Tel: 301-405-3477 Rochester, NY 14627 Fax: 301-405-3542 Tel: 585-273-4999 Email: [email protected] Fax: 585- 271-3900 Email: [email protected] Jon X. Eguia Dennis Epple Department of Politics Graduate School of Industrial New York University Administration 19 W 4th St, 2nd Floor Carnegie Mellon University New York City, NY 10012 Pittsburgh, PA 15213 Tele: 212- 992- 8073 Tel : 412- 268-1536 Fax: 212-995-4184 Fax: 412-268-8896 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] 2009 PIER Conference on Political Economy Participant List David Epstein Hülya K. K. Eraslan Department of Political Science Johns Hopkins University Columbia University Department of Economics New York, NY 10027 440 Mergenthaler Hall Tel: 212-854-7566 3400 N. Charles Street Fax: 212-222-0598 Baltimore, MD 21218 Email: [email protected] Tel: 410-516-6118 Fax: N/A Email: [email protected] Hanming Fang Cecilia Fieler Department of Economics Department of Economics University of Pennsylvania University of Pennsylvania 3718 Locust Walk 3718 Locust Walk Philadelphia, PA 19104 Philadelphia, PA 19104 Tel: 215- 898-7767 Tel: 215-898-1511 Fax: 215-573-2057 Fax: 215-573-2057 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] Gene Grossman Yosh Halberstam Department of Economics Department of Economics Princeton University Northwestern University Princeton, NJ 08544-1013 Evanston, Illinois 60208 Tel: 609-258-4823 Tel: 773- 964-1439 Fax: 609-258-1374 Fax: N/A Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] Bard Harstad Matias Iaryczower Kellogg School of Management (MEDS) Division of the Humanities and Social 2001 Sheridan Road Sciences Jacobs Center, 5th Floor California Institute of Technology Evanston, IL 60208-2009 Pasadena, CA 91125 Tel: 848-491-5166 Tel: 626-395-4061 Fax: 847-467-1220 Fax: 626-405-9841 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] Robert P. Inman Daniela Iorio The Wharton School Department of Economics & Economic University of Pennsylvania History, Universitat Autonoma de Philadelphia PA 19104 Barcelona 08193 Bellaterra Tel: 215/898-8299 Barcelona, Spain Fax: 215/898-6200 Tel : 34 93 581 4685 Email: [email protected] Fax : 34 93 581 2012 Email: [email protected] 2009 PIER Conference on Political Economy Participant List Tasos Kalandrakis Navin Kartik Department of Political Science Department of Economics University of Rochester Columbia University Rochester, NY 14627-0146 New York NY 10027 Tel: 585-273-4902 Tel : 212-854-3680 Fax: 585-271-1616 Fax : 212-854-8059 Email: [email protected] Email [email protected] Jonathan Katz Brian Knight Division of Social Sciences Department of Economics California Institute of Technology Brown University Pasadena, California 91125 Providence, RI 02912 Tel: 626 395-4065 Tel: 401-863-1584 Fax: 626 405-9841 Fax: 401-863-1970 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] Roger Lagunoff Massimiliano Landi Department of Economics Department of Economics & Statistics Georgetown University Singapore Management University Washington DC 20057 USA Singapore 178903 Tel: 202 687-1510 Tel: 65 6828 0872 Fax: 202-687-6102 Fax: 65 6828 0833 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] Michel Le Breton Gilat Levy Université de Toulouse 1 London School of Economics Gremaq and Idei Department of Economics Manufacture des Tabacs, Bat F Houghton Street 21, Allée de Brienne London WC2A 2AE 31000, Toulouse, France England Tel: (33) (0)5 61 12 85 77 Tel: 44 0 207 955 6652 Fax: (33) (0)5 61 12 86 37 Fax: 44 0 207 831 1840 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] Claire S.H. Lim Alessandro Lizzeri Graduate School of Business Department of Economics Stanford University New York University Stanford CA 94305 New York, NY 10003 Tel: 650-721-1289 Tel : 212-998-8907 Fax: 650-725-0468 Fax: 212-995-3932 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] 2009 PIER Conference on Political Economy Participant List John Londregan George J. Mailath Department of Politics Department of Economics Princeton University Univeristy of Pennsylvania Princeton, NJ 08544 3718 Locust Walk Tel: 609.258.4854 Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297 Fax: 609-258-5349 Tel: 215-898-7908 Email: [email protected] Fax: 215-573-2057 Steven Matthews César Martinelli Department of Economics Department of Economics University of Pennsylvania Center for Economic Research 3718 Locust Walk Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Philadelphia, PA 19104 Mexico, Camino a Sta. Teresa 930, Tel: 215-898- 7749 Mexico, D.F. 10700 Fax: 215-573-2057 Tel: +52 (55) 5628 4197 Email: [email protected] Fax: +52 (55) 5628 4058 Email: [email protected] Andrea Mattozzi Maurizio Mazzocco Division of the Humanities and Social Department of Economics Sciences Duke University California Institute of Technology 213H Social Science Building Pasadena, CA 91125 Durham, NC 27708 Tel: 626-395-3473 Tel: 919-660-1849 Fax: 626-793-8580 Fax: 919-684-8974 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] Nolan McCarty Antonio Merlo Woodrow Wilson School of Public Department of Economics and International Affairs Penn Institute for Economic Research Princeton University University of Pennsylvania Princeton, NJ 08544 Philadelphia, PA 19104 Tel: 609-258-4810 Tel: 215-898-7933 Fax: 609-258-5014 Fax: 215-573-2057 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] Pablo Montagnes Massimo Morelli Kellogg School of Management Departments of Political Science and Northwestern University Economics Evanston, IL 60208 Columbia University Tel: 773- 414-4068 New York, NY 10027 Fax: N/A Tel: 212-854-3646 E-mail: Fax: 212-222-0598 [email protected] Email: [email protected] 2009 PIER Conference on Political Economy Participant List Andrea Moro Rebecca Morton Department of Economics Wilf Family Department of Politics Vanderbilt University, New York University Nashville, TN 37240 New York, NY 10003-9580 Tel: 615-343-1516 Tel: 212-998-3706 Fax: N/A Fax: 212-995-4184 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] Roger Myerson Martin J. Osborne Department of Economics Department of Economics University of Chicago University of Toronto 1126 East 59th Street 150 St. George Street Chicago, IL 60637 Toronto, Canada M5S 3G7 Tel: 773-834-9071 Tel: 416-978-5094 Fax: 773-702-8490 Fax: 416-978-6713 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] Nicola Persico Mattias Polborn Department of Economics Department of Economics New York University University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
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