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NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY Erwin Plein Nemmers Prize in Economics NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY Erwin Plein Nemmers Prize in Economics Date: December 11, 2018 To: Chicago Participants in the 2019 Nemmers Prize Conference From: Ian Savage, Conference Coordinator Information on the Nemmers Prize Conference Thank you for attending the 2019 Nemmers Prize conference associated with the awarding of the Nemmers Prize to David Kreps. We look forward to welcoming you to Evanston. This note is designed to provide some further information on the event. About a month before the conference, I will send another mailing with further logistical information to assist you with your visit. Travel Arrangements Closer to the conference we will send you information on parking information for those coming by car. Summary Schedule of Events Unless noted, all events are at the James L. Allen Center, 2169 Campus Drive Wednesday, May 8, 2019 4:30-6pm Nemmers Lecture – David Kreps (Stanford University) – McCormick Auditorium 6:00-7:00 Reception 7:00 Dinner Thursday, May 9, 2018 8:30am Continental breakfast available and registration desk open 9:00-5:30 Conference - McCormick Auditorium 7:00pm Evening social event and dinner Friday, May 10, 2019 8:30am Continental breakfast available and registration desk open 9:15-4:00 Conference - McCormick Auditorium 4:00pm Adjournment 1 Detailed Conference Schedule The draft schedule for the conference is below. For each speaker, a general description of the subject of their talk is given. Full titles and links to paper(s) will be circulated in the Spring. Minor changes in the start and end times may occur, and we reserve the right to swap the order of presentations. Thursday, May 9, 2019 9:00 Welcome 9:15 Drew Fudenberg (Massachusetts Institute of Technology): Learning 10:15 Break 10:45 Aislinn Bohren (Carnegie Mellon University): Learning Biases 11:45 Annie Liang (University of Pennsylvania): Machine Learning 12:45 Lunch 2:00 Tilman Borgers (University of Michigan): Robustness in Mechanism Design 3:00 Benjamin Brooks (University of Chicago): Robustness in Mechanism Design 4:00 Break 4:30 Andrzej Skrzypacz (Stanford University): Finance 5:30 Adjourn for the day 7:00 Reception and dinner off campus Friday, May 10, 2019 9:15 Aldo Rustichini (University of Minnesota): Black Box Decision Making 10:15 Break 10:45 Faruk Gul (Princeton University): Random Choice 11:45 Gilat Levy (London School of Economics and Political Science): Correlation Neglect 12:45 Lunch 2:00 Gerd Gigerenzer (Max Planck Institute for Human Development): Heuristic Decision Making from a Psychological Perspective 3:00 Muhamet Yildiz (Massachusetts Institute of Technology): Topic TBA 4:00 Adjourn In addition to the speakers, we will be welcoming the following participants from other institutions who have already accepted an invitation to attend: Dilip Abreu - New York University Renee Bowen - University of California, San Diego In-Koo Cho - University of Illinois Yossi Feinberg - Stanford University Alexander Frankel - University of Chicago 2 Lars Hanson - University of Chicago Emir Kamenica - University of Chicago Marco LiCalzi - Università Ca' Foscari Venezia Elliot Lipnowski - University of Chicago Andrew McClellan - University of Chicago Roger Myerson - University of Chicago Efe Ok - New York University Michael Ostrovsky - Stanford University David Pearce - New York University Daniel Rappoport - University of Chicago Doron Ravid - University of Chicago Philip Reny - University of Chicago Thomas Sargent - New York University Ennio Stacchetti - New York University Joel Watson - University of California, San Diego Robert Wilson - Stanford University Others in attendance will be faculty from Northwestern University, and doctoral students from Northwestern, the University of Chicago, and nearby schools. Information for Speakers Paper sessions are 60 minutes long. By March 22, 2019, we need to finalize the title of each talk and the associated paper(s) so that we can publicize the conference and people can register to attend. At that point the final time schedule for the conference will be set. The conference room has a host laptop. You can either e-mail Ian Savage your presentation prior to the conference, bring it with you on a flash drive, or download it from the internet. The Erwin Plein Nemmers Prize in Economics In 1994, bequests to Northwestern University from the late Erwin Esser Nemmers, a former member of the Northwestern University faculty, and his brother, the late Frederic E. Nemmers, led to the establishment of four endowed professorships in the Kellogg School of Management, and biennial prizes in economics, mathematics, music composition and more recently medical science and earth sciences. The Nemmers family ran a church music publishing house in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. The prize in economics is named in honor of the Nemmers’ father. The Nemmers’ hoped that their prizes would carry with them the prestige attached to the Nobel prizes. They are designed to recognize “work of lasting significance” and in particular, recognize “major contributions to new knowledge or the development of significant new modes of analysis.” The winners, in chronological order, are: Peter 3 Diamond, Thomas Sargent, Robert Aumann, Daniel McFadden, Edward Prescott, Ariel Rubinstein, Lars Peter Hansen, Paul Milgrom, Elhanan Helpman, Daron Acemoglu, Jean Tirole, Richard Blundell and David Kreps. Seven of the awardees were subsequently awarded The Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel. For More Information If you have any questions, please contact me at (847) 491-8241 or [email protected]. You might also want to check out the lecture and conference web site at https://www.economics.northwestern.edu/events/nemmers/ Note that you will not need to register on-line as I will take care of this for you (registration will open in late March 2019). 4 .
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