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Right-Wing Extremism in Czech Republic

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Right-Wing Extremism in Czech Republic INTERNATIONAL POLICY ANALYSIS Right-Wing Extremism in the Czech Republic MIROSLAV MAREŠ September 2012 n The Workers’ Party of Social Justice (DSSS) is the strongest right-wing extremist party in the Czech Republic with about two percent of votes in the last parliamen- tary election. It profiles itself as the »defender of ordinary people« against »the cor- rupt political elite«, especially the parties in power, and tries to make use of govern- ment corruption scandals to discredit the democratic political spectrum as a whole. n The main strategy to raise support for the extreme right is to highlight criminal cases comprising members of the Roma population: »Anti-gypsyism«, where a number of local citizens who are not among the party’s main support take part in various protest events focused on Roma criminality, is becoming the main area of contact of DSSS with mainstream forces. n Despite its poor showing in elections, the extreme right in Czech Republic attained a certain degree of influence due to media coverage of its activities. Mainstream political parties respond to it and often borrow its anti-gypsy rhetoric, while neither the state nor the non-governmental sector has proven to be very effective in solving the so-called Roma issue. MIROSLAV MAREŠ | RIGHT-WING EXTREMISM IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC Contents 1. Introduction: Dynamics of Right-Wing Extremist Movements and Their Electoral Successes in the Czech Republic ..........................2 2. Agents of Right-Wing Extremism. .3 2.1 The Current State of Right-Wing Extremist Movements and Organisations �����������������������3 2.2 DSSS �����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������4 2.2.1 Focus, Objectives and Main Message .................................4 2.2.2 Images of Enemies ...............................................4 2.2.3 Strategy .......................................................5 2.2.4 Organisational Structure, Hierarchy, Key Personalities, and Leadership ........5 2.2.5 International Ties ................................................6 2.2.6 Social Background ...............................................7 2.2.7 Areas of Contact With the Rest of Society .............................7 3. The Influence of Right-Wing Extremism ....................................9 4. Counterstrategy. .9 5. Conclusion . .10 References . .11 1 MIROSLAV MAREŠ | RIGHT-WING EXTREMISM IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC 1. Introduction: Dynamics of Right-Wing made inroads into the party system under the leadership Extremist Movements and Their Electoral of Miroslav Sládek. The core of the party began to form Successes in the Czech Republic in December 1989 and was registered in February 1990. Its views are a good example of the above-mentioned The present-day spectrum of right-wing extremism in ideological mix, encompassing various Czech nationalist the Czech Republic began to form after the fall of com- and new far-right trends, whereby neo-Nazism did not munism in 1989; however, it also builds on older tradi- have a significant role to play and existed primarily in tions in this part of the political spectrum in the Czech the youth organisation Republikánská Mládež (Republi- lands and perhaps even on nationalistic and right-wing can Youth), which was disbanded by the Ministry of the traditions which, in the historical context, have come to Interior in 2002 (Mareš 2003: 215 – 218). be perceived as extremist (Czech nationalism in the nine- teenth century, agrarian republicanism in the first half The SPR-RSČ was sharply critical of the new post-com- of the twentieth century etc.). The right-wing extremist munist elite (Sládek’s proclamation that it was necessary spectrum in the Czech Republic can, when viewed from »to throw the government into the Vltava« became well the outside, be divided into the groups shown in Table 1. known), engaged in racist invective against the Roma population, opposed the Czech Republic’s member- We should bear in mind that these divisions have been un- ship of NATO and accession to the EU and opposed the dertaken for analytical purposes, whereas in reality the lines demands of the Sudeten Germans (cancellation of the between the various categories are often blurred. Further- Benes decrees, recognition of their right to a homeland more, neo-Nazism is an external designation, as neo-Nazis and the return or property or compensation); anti-Ger- often call themselves nationalists or national socialists. The man rhetoric became strong only after 1991, when co- designation national socialist in the Czech context is also operation with the German Republicans came to an end ambiguous, as traditional Czech national socialism, which following the meeting between Franz Schönhuber and originated at the end of the nineteenth century, is usually Miroslav Sládek. The SPR-RSČ also demanded the reuni- understood in the Czech environment as the centre-left of fication of Carpathian Ruthenia, which was annexed by the political spectrum (although there is some overlap with the Soviet Union in 1945 (Mareš 2003: 209). the nationalistic neo-Hussitism) (Mareš 2008). We should also note that successful political entities in the political The SPR-RSČ was unsuccessful in the first free elections party environment generally represent an amalgamation of following the fall of communism in 1990, but did win various ideological trends undertaken by their leaders for seats in parliament in 1992 and 1996. In the early elec- pragmatic reasons and often encompassing ideologically tions in 1998, however, it did not manage to cross the antagonistic far-right movements (Mareš 2003: 221). 5 percent threshold and since then right-wing extremism has not been represented in the Czech Parliament. In In the 1990s, the party Sdružení pro Republiku – Repub- 2000 the SPR-RSČ declared bankruptcy and a large part likánská strana Československa (Association for the Re- of the party (including Sládek) transferred to a new party public – Republican Party of Czechoslovakia – SPR-RSČ) bearing the name of its chairman: Republikáni Miroslava Table 1: Basic ideological division of the right-wing extremist spectrum in the Czech Republic Nationalists Neo-Nazis »New« Far Right Neo-Hussitism Ultra-conserva- Integral Catholic Espousing tradi- White Power Pragmatic mix of Ideologically (builds on the tive movement movement tional Nazi ideo - (modern neo- various ideologi- undefined »fighting« ethos (builds on the (partially tied to logy; subservi- Nazism, espous- cal trends, or ex- focus on white of the Hussite reactionary tra- Clerical Fascism) ence to Nazi-era ing a superior treme version of supremacy; revolutionary dition in Czech Germany; ties position for the »mainstream« identity based movement history) to the tradition Czech nation Czech traditions on xenophobia of Sudeten Ger- man Nazism Manifestations in various Czech fascist trends Source: Mareš 2008 2 MIROSLAV MAREŠ | RIGHT-WING EXTREMISM IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC Sládka (Miroslav Sládek’s Republicans – RMS). In 2008, of Národní / svobodný odpor (National / Free Resistance the original SPR-RSČ was reactivated, but by then it – NO / SO) and Autonomní nacionalisti (Autonomous had become marginal and was suspended in 2011 Nationalists) in 2006. In 2008, the party even founded after failing to submit its legally mandatory annual the paramilitary Ochranné sbory Dělnické strany (Work- financial report. In 2010, the small Republikánská strana ers’ Party Protection Corps), and the youth association Čech, Moravy a Slezska (Republican Party of Bohemia, Dělnická mládež (Workers’ Youth) was established in Moravia and Silesia – RSČMS) broke off from the SPR- support of it. DS was strongly involved in the anti-Roma RSČ, but it is entirely without influence (Bast, Mareš, demonstrations in Litvínov-Janov in 2008, and won 1.07 Smolík, Vejvodová 2010: 240). percent of the vote in the elections to the European Par- liament in 2009, qualifying it to receive public funding In the elections to the Czech National Council (until (Bastl, Mareš, Smolík, Vejvodová 2011: 164). 1992) and the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic (as of 1996), the SPR-RSČ and RMS In 2010, DS was dissolved by court order. Its members scored the following results: and leadership transferred to Dělnické strany sociální spravedlnosti (Workers’ Party of Social Justice – DSSS). 1990* – VDS / SPR-RSC 1.0 % (72,048) This party had been established under a different name 1992 – SPR-RSČ 5.98 % (387,026) and orientation as early as 2004, but the wing supporting DS assumed power and assumed the above name and 1996 – SPR-RSČ 8.01 % (485,072) structures in case DS was prohibited (Mareš 2012). DSSS 1998 – SPR-RSČ 3.90 % (232,965) is also supported by Dělnická mládež (Workers’ Youth). 2002 – RMS 0.97 % (46,325) In the 2010 parliamentary elections, DSSS received 1.14 percent of the vote (Ministry of the Interior 2011: 8). 2006* – Národní síly 0.17 % (9,341) 2010 – SPR-RSČ 0.03 % (1,993) * in 1990 the SPR-RSČ formed a coalition with the Všelidová demokra- 2. Agents of Right-Wing Extremism tická strana (All People’s Democratic Party – VDS) and in 2006 was part of Národní sily (National Powers), and thus legally ran on the ticket of Národní strana (National Party). 2.1 The Current State of Right-Wing Extremist Source: Czech Statistical Office 2012 Movements and Organisations The various parties and movements that split off from The DSSS is the strongest right-wing extremist party in the the SPR-RSČ and the parties that were established
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