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A Companion to Rationalism A Companion to Rationalism i ACTA01 1 14/9/05, 12:03 PM Blackwell Companions to Philosophy This outstanding student reference series offers a comprehensive and authoritative survey of philosophy as a whole. Written by today’s leading philosophers, each volume provides lucid and engaging coverage of the key figures, terms, topics, and problems of the field. Taken together, the volumes provide the ideal basis for course use, representing an unparalleled work of reference for students and specialists alike. Already published in the series: A Companion to Business Ethics Edited by Robert E. Frederick The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy, Second Edition A Companion to the Philosophy of Science Edited by Nicholas Bunnin and Eric Edited by W. H. Newton-Smith Tsui-James A Companion to Environmental Philosophy A Companion to Ethics Edited by Dale Jamieson Edited by Peter Singer A Companion to Analytic Philosophy A Companion to Aesthetics Edited by A. P. Martinich and David Sosa Edited by David Cooper A Companion to Genethics A Companion to Epistemology Edited by Justine Burley and John Harris Edited by Jonathan Dancy and Ernest Sosa A Companion to Philosophical Logic A Companion to Contemporary Political Edited by Dale Jacquette Philosophy A Companion to Early Modern Philosophy Edited by Robert E. Goodin and Philip Pettit Edited by Steven Nadler A Companion to Philosophy of Mind A Companion to Philosophy in the Edited by Samuel Guttenplan Middle Ages A Companion to Metaphysics Edited by Jorge J. E. Gracia and Timothy B. Edited by Jaegwon Kim and Ernest Sosa Noone A Companion to Philosophy of Law and A Companion to African-American Legal Theory Philosophy Edited by Dennis Patterson Edited by Tommy L. Lott and John P. Pittman A Companion to Philosophy of Religion A Companion to Applied Ethics Edited by Philip L. Quinn and Charles Taliaferro Edited by R. G. Frey and Christopher Heath Wellman A Companion to the Philosophy of Language Edited by Bob Hale and Crispin Wright A Companion to the Philosophy of Education Edited by Randall Curren A Companion to World Philosophies Edited by Eliot Deutsch and Ron Bontekoe A Companion to African Philosophy Edited by Kwasi Wiredu A Companion to Continental Philosophy Edited by Simon Critchley and A Companion to Heidegger William Schroeder Edited by Hubert L. Dreyfus and Mark A. Wrathall A Companion to Feminist Philosophy Edited by Alison M. Jaggar and Iris Marion A Companion to Rationalism Young Edited by Alan Nelson A Companion to Cognitive Science A Companion to Ancient Philosophy Edited by William Bechtel and George Graham Edited by Mary Louise Gill and Pierre Pellegrin A Companion to Bioethics A Companion to Pragmatism Edited by Helga Kuhse and Peter Singer Edited by John R. Shook and Joseph Margolis A Companion to the Philosophers A Companion to Nietzsche Edited by Robert L. Arrington Edited by Keith Ansell Pearson ii ACTA01 2 14/9/05, 12:03 PM A Companion to Rationalism Edited by Alan Nelson iii ACTA01 3 14/9/05, 12:03 PM © 2005 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd except for editorial material and organization © 2005 by Alan Nelson blackwell publishing 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148-5020, USA 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK 550 Swanston Street, Carlton, Victoria 3053, Australia The right of Alan Nelson to be identified as the Author of the Editorial Material in this Work has been asserted in accordance with the UK Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, except as permitted by the UK Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act 1988, without the prior permission of the publisher. First published 2005 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd 1 2005 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A companion to rationalism / edited by Alan Nelson. p. cm. – (Blackwell companions to philosophy) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN-13: 978-1-4051-0909-3 (alk. paper) ISBN-10: 1-4051-0909-2 (alk. paper) 1. Rationalism. I. Nelson, Alan Jean. II. Series. B833.C66 2006 149′.7–dc22 2005010996 A catalogue record for this title is available from the British Library. Set in 10/12.5pt Photina by Graphicraft Limited, Hong Kong Printed and bound in the United Kingdom by TJ International, Padstow, Cornwall The publisher’s policy is to use permanent paper from mills that operate a sustainable forestry policy, and which has been manufactured from pulp processed using acid-free and elementary chlorine-free practices. Furthermore, the publisher ensures that the text paper and cover board used have met acceptable environmental accreditation standards. For further information on Blackwell Publishing, visit our website: www.blackwellpublishing.com iv ACTA01 4 14/9/05, 12:03 PM To Linda and Ian with love v ACTA01 5 14/9/05, 12:03 PM Contents List of Contributors ix Acknowledgments xi List of Abbreviations xii Introduction xiv Part I The Core of Rationalism 1 1 The Rationalist Impulse 3 Alan Nelson 2 The Rationalist Conception of Substance 12 Thomas M. Lennon 3 Rationalist Theories of Sense Perception and Mind–Body Relation 31 Gary Hatfield 4 Rationalism and Education 61 David Cunning Part II The Historical Background 83 5 Plato’s Rationalistic Method 85 Hugh H. Benson 6 Rationalism in Jewish Philosophy 100 Steven Nadler 7 Early Modern Critiques of Rationalist Psychology 119 Antonia LoLordo 8 Rationalism and Method 137 Matthew J. Kisner 9 Cartesian Imaginations: The Method and Passions of Imagining 156 Dennis L. Sepper vii ACTA01 7 8/9/05, 2:06 PM contents Part III The Heyday of Rationalism 177 10 Descartes’ Rationalist Epistemology 179 Lex Newman 11 Rationalism and Representation 206 Kurt Smith 12 The Role of the Imagination in Rationalist Philosophies of Mathematics 224 Lawrence Nolan 13 Idealism and Cartesian Motion 250 Alice Sowaal 14 Leibniz on Shape and the Cartesian Conception of Body 262 Timothy Crockett 15 Leibniz on Modality, Cognition, and Expression 282 Alan Nelson 16 Rationalist Moral Philosophy 302 Andrew Youpa 17 Spinoza, Leibniz, and the Rationalist Reconceptions of Imagination 322 Dennis L. Sepper 18 Kant and the Two Dogmas of Rationalism 343 Henry E. Allison Part IV Rationalist Themes in Contemporary Philosophy 361 19 Rationalism in the Phenomenological Tradition 363 David Woodruff Smith 20 Rationalist Elements of Twentieth-Century Analytic Philosophy 379 Paul Livingston 21 Proust and the Rationalist Conception of the Self 399 Alan Nelson 22 Rationalism in Science 408 David Stump 23 Rational Decision Making: Descriptive, Prescriptive, or Explanatory? 425 Jonathan Michael Kaplan 24 What is a Feminist to do with Rational Choice? 450 Mariam Thalos 25 Rationalism in the Philosophy of Donald Davidson 468 Richard N. Manning Index 488 viii ACTA01 8 8/9/05, 2:06 PM Contributors Henry E. Allison is Research Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Davis. Hugh H. Benson is Professor and Chair of Philosophy at the University of Oklahoma. Timothy Crockett is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Marquette University. David Cunning is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Iowa. Gary Hatfield is the Adam Seybert Professor in Moral and Intellectual Philosophy at the University of Pennsylvania. Jonathan Michael Kaplan is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Oregon State University. Matthew J. Kisner is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of South Carolina. Thomas M. Lennon is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Western Ontario. Paul Livingston is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Villanova University. Antonia LoLordo is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Virginia. Richard N. Manning is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Carleton University. Steven Nadler is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. Alan Nelson is Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Irvine. Lex Newman is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Utah. Lawrence Nolan is Associate Professor and Chair of Philosophy at California State University, Long Beach. Dennis L. Sepper is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Dallas. David Woodruff Smith is Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Irvine. Kurt Smith is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Bloomsburg University of Pennsylvania. ix ACTA01 9 14/9/05, 12:04 PM contributors Alice Sowaal is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at San Francisco State University. David Stump is Associate Professor and Chair of Philosophy at the University of San Francisco. Mariam Thalos is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Utah. Andrew Youpa is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Southern Illinois University, Carbondale. x ACTA01 10 14/9/05, 12:04 PM Acknowledgments I thank the authors and the editors at Blackwell Publishing for making this volume possible. The final stage of my own editorial contributions was supported by a leave from the University of California, Irvine; and by the hospitality of the Philosophy Department at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, and the Center for Human Science, Chapel Hill. xi ACTA01 11 14/9/05, 12:04 PM Abbreviations Works cited frequently throughout the volume are abbreviated as follows: A Leibniz, Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe (Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschafter, ed.). Darmstadt: Akademie-Verlag, 1923–. Cited by series, volume, and page. AG Leibniz, Philosophical Essays (Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber, trans. and eds.). Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1989. AL Bacon, The Advancement of Learning. In Brian Vickers (ed.), Francis Bacon: A Critical Edition of the Major Works. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996. Cited by page. Ar Aristotle, De Anima (J. A. Smith, trans.). In J. Barnes (ed.), Complete Works of Aristotle, 2 vols. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984. Cited by the standard page and line numbers for Aristotle’s works (Bekker numbers). AT Descartes, Oeuvres de Descartes, 11 vols.
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