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A Reliabilist Strategy for Solving the Problem of Induction by Fergus

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A Reliabilist Strategy for Solving the Problem of Induction by Fergus A Reliabilist Strategy for Solving the Problem of Induction By Fergus Dale Prien ORCID: 0000-0002-0940-9676 Dissertation Submitted in Total Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts by Research in Philosophy In the School of Historical and Philosophical Studies At the University of Melbourne Melbourne November 2019 Student Name: Fergus Prien Student Number: 588353 Acknowledgements There are a number of people and institutions that must be thanked for having made it possible for me to undertake this research project, and now complete it. I thank the Australian Government for supporting my research training at the University of Melbourne through the Research Training Program (RTP). I also thank the University of Melbourne and the School of Historical and Philosophical Studies in general for the opportunity to study at a great institution with learned academics who care about both the intellectual formation and general wellbeing of their students. More specifically, I would like to thank my primary supervisor, Howard Sankey, for the great multitude of hours that he has put in to both reviewing the various iterations of this dissertation (many far different from this one) and patiently helping me to think and write more critically. I have certainly grown in my scholarly ability and passion for philosophy under his supervision. I want to thank Brennan McDavid for her contribution to the supervision of my dissertation during her time at the University of Melbourne, as well as Greg Restall for agreeing to be my secondary supervisor quite late in this project. I also want to thank Brian Ellis, James Franklin, Callan Ledsham, Andrew Mullins, Xavier Symons, Brother Reginald Mary Chua, Fernando Jativa, and my fellow graduate philosophy students at the University of Melbourne who attended both or either of my seminar presentations – the feedback that I received from these people at specific points in my research certainly contributed to how I have formulated the thesis that I defend in this dissertation. Lastly, I would like to thank my wife, Renee Prien, for her constant encouragement, friendship, and incredible sacrifice so that I could put the necessary time into conducting my research and completing this dissertation. To Renee and our two children, Josephina and Leo, I dedicate this dissertation to you. 2 Student Name: Fergus Prien Student Number: 588353 Contents Acknowledgements ...................................................................................................................ii Introductory Remarks .............................................................................................................. 4 Chapter 1. The Problem of Induction ...................................................................................... 7 Chapter 2. Internalism Rejected ..............................................................................................32 Chapter 3. An Externalist Solution to the Normative Problem ...............................................56 Chapter 4. Responding to the Sceptic on Their Terms ...........................................................79 Concluding Remarks ............................................................................................................ 104 Bibliography ......................................................................................................................... 108 3 Student Name: Fergus Prien Student Number: 588353 Introductory Remarks In this dissertation I propose a reliabilist strategy for solving the problem of induction. In essence, the problem of induction shows that it is in principle not logically possible to show that we can possess inductive knowledge if inductive inference involves the principle of regularity. While I submit that the problem of induction is successful at defeating the assumption that inductive inference is a source of knowledge if inductive inferences involves the principle of regularity, my thesis is that it is nevertheless a contingent fact about human cognition that inductive inference is a source of knowledge, and that such a claim is well supported by sound philosophical reasoning. In so doing, I make two central claims: firstly, we can possess inductive knowledge without needing to show how we know that inductive inference is a source of knowledge, and secondly, we can show how we know that inductive inference is a source of knowledge, even though it is by no means necessary that we do so. The structure of the outline of my thesis goes as follows. Before I develop my strategy for solving the problem of induction, I establish the necessary groundwork that underpins the solution that I defend. For instance, in Chapter 1 I examine and analyse the problem of induction and conclude that it is successful in showing why inductive inference does not involve a quasi-logical relation such as the principle of regularity. Instead, I propose that the success of the problem of induction leaves us with no real choice but to conclude that it is a contingent fact about human cognition that inductive inference is a source of knowledge. I also elaborate on why we should take a particularist approach to sceptical problems to show how we know what we know. Then in Chapter 2 I consider the reasons why many epistemologists find an internalist account of justification to be intuitively plausible in the construction of an adequate theory of knowledge, and how internalism is prima facie compatible with a particularist approach to responding to sceptical concerns. I then proceed to argue that the types of factors that are relevant to justification do not possess an internalist character, but are instead 4 Student Name: Fergus Prien Student Number: 588353 externalist in character. I also draw out the implications of an externalist account of justification for how we should understand a particularist approach to responding to the concerns of the sceptic. In the remaining two chapters I develop a two-stage strategy for successfully solving the problem of induction, with each chapter dedicated to one of the two stages of this strategy. In Chapter 3 I argue that if we are to solve the problem of induction we should adopt a ‘simple reliabilist’ theory of justification and knowledge, where beliefs are justified on the basis of whether or not they were produced by a cognitive process that has a history of being contingently reliable. Insofar as contingently reliable cognitive processes are exactly the type of thing that qualifies as a contingent fact about human cognition, and inductive inference is a reliable cognitive process of an epistemic agent, I contend that we already have adequate grounds to conclude that inductive inference is able to confer justification upon its output beliefs, and ultimately qualify as a source of knowledge. Moreover, seeing as a reliable process is an externalist source of justification, the proponent of simple reliabilism has philosophically motivated reasons to reject the demands of the sceptic to show that we know that inductive inference is contingently reliable. Thus, by understanding inductive inference from the perspective of simple reliabilism, I conclude that a philosophically plausible solution to the problem of induction is at our disposal. In Chapter 4, I argue that while it is not necessary to placate the concerns of the inductive sceptic, the proponent of simple reliabilism can still do so by explaining how the contingent reliability of inductive inference means that an inductive justification of inductive inference is possible. In so doing, I provide a supplemental solution to the problem of induction which is both philosophically and psychologically plausible. In developing both of these stages of a reliabilist strategy for solving the problem of induction I also respond to what I consider to be the strongest objections to both reliabilism in general and whether the reliabilist account 5 Student Name: Fergus Prien Student Number: 588353 of how an inductive justification of inductive inference is philosophically adequate. Ultimately, I conclude that the two-stage reliabilist strategy that I defend for solving the problem of induction is sufficiently robust and dynamic to be successful at showing that inductive inference is a source of knowledge, and that – if we so please – we can show how we know it too. 6 Student Name: Fergus Prien Student Number: 588353 Chapter 1. The Problem of Induction Introduction Among the first tasks of developing a successful strategy for solving the problem of induction is to establish what the argument for the problem of induction actually is, why it is prima facie plausible, how we should respond to such prima facie plausibility, and why it is important that the problem is solved. In this opening chapter I will fulfil these tasks. Firstly, I will introduce key epistemological notions such as knowledge, justification, rational belief, induction, and deduction that are assumed in the formulation of the argument for the problem of induction. I then examine Hume’s argument that has become known as the ‘problem of induction’ and conclude that it is successful in showing that we cannot know either inductively or deductively that the principle of regularity that most people assume connects their beliefs about observed matters of fact to our beliefs about unobserved matters of fact. In so doing, I respond to the common objection that the problem of induction is unsuccessful because it incorrectly assumes a deductivist account of knowledge.
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