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Operational Code Analysis of Iran's Supreme Lead- Ership

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Operational Code Analysis of Iran's Supreme Lead- Ership OPERATIONAL CODE ANALYSIS OF IRAN’S SUPREME LEAD- ERSHIP—AYATOLLAHS KHOMEINI AND KHAMENEI The Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences of İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University by Elizabeth Richter In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of MASTER OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS The Department of International Relations İhsan Doğramaci Bilkent University Ankara August 2016 i ABSTRACT AN OPERATIONAL CODE ANALYSIS OF IRAN’S SUPREME LEADERSHIP— AYATOLLAHS KHOMEINI AND KHAMENEI Richter, Elizabeth MA, Department of International Relations Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Özgür Özdamar August 2016 The psychological approach employed in Leadership Studies asserts that understand- ing a leader’s characteristics is of paramount importance in understanding the role of that leader in foreign policy decisions. As the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, and Khomeini before him, has ultimate veto power over Iran’s foreign policy, and as such, an analysis of his political beliefs is warranted. Utilizing Operational Code Analysis, this research aims to identify patterns in the political belief systems of Khomeini and Khamenei. Three main hypotheses have been posited in this thesis: (1) The political beliefs of Supreme Leaders Khomeini and Khamenei will reveal signif- icant differences from the average world leader (i.e. norming group). (2) Supreme Leader Khamenei’s foreign policy decisions will be more cooperative than his pre- decessor (Khomeini). (3) The Supreme Leaders’ political belief systems have evolved throughout their tenure as Iran’s leaders due to the experience gained in of- fice. The results reveal that the supreme leaders of Iran demonstrate several signifi- cant differences in their political belief system in contrast with the average leader, that Khamenei is indeed more cooperative than Khomeini, and that both leaders’ political belief systems have changed over time. Furthermore, the findings show that Supreme Leader Khamenei is particularly invested in the nuclear program and highly wary of the ‘other’ in the political universe when it comes to this issue. Keywords: Ayatollah Khamenei; Ayatollah Khomeini; Foreign Policy Analysis; Operational Code Analysis (opcode); Nuclear Negotiations iii ÖZET İRAN DİNİ LİDERLİĞI’NİN DIŞ POLITIKASI: AYETULLAH HUMEYNİ VE HAMENEYİ’NIN OPERASYONEL KODU Richter, Elizabeth Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Özgür Özdamar Ağustos 2016 Liderlik çalışmalarında kullanılan psikolojik yaklaşım; liderin karakter özelliklerini anlamanın, dış politika kararlarını anlamakta azami önemli olduğunu öne sürmektedir. Hamaneyi ve ondan önceki Humeyni, Dili Lider olarak, Iran dış politikasında üst düzey veto yetkisine sahiptir, buna bağlı olarak, politik görüşlerinin analiz edilmesi gereklidir. Bu araştırma; Operasyonel Kod Analizinden istifade ederek Humeyni ve Hamaneyi’nin, politik düşünce sistemlerindeki yapıyı belirlemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu tezde üç temel hipotez ortaya konmuştur: (1) Dini Liderler Humeyni ve Hamaneyi’nin politik inanç sistemi, ortalama bir dünya liderinden belirgin şekilde farklıdır. (2) Dini Lider Hamaneyi’nin politik kararları selefinden (Humeyni) daha işbirliğine yatkın olacaktır. (3) Dini Liderlerin politik düşünce sistemleri, Iran Liderleri olarak görevde kalmaları süresince ofiste edindikleri tecrübe sebebiyle gelişim göstermiştir. Sonuçlar; Iran Dini Liderlerinin politik düşünce sisteminin ortalama bir lidere kıyasla belirgin şekilde farklı olduğunu, Hamaneyi’nin kesinlikle Humeyni’den daha işbirlikçi olduğunu ve her iki liderin de politik düşünce sistemi zaman içinde değiştiğini ortaya koymuştur. Buna ek olarak; bulgular Dini Lider Hamaneyi’nin nükleer programa özel olarak önem verdiği ve bu konu ile ilgili görüşmelerde politika alemindeki diğer liderlerden oldukça şüphe duyduğunu göstermektedir. Anahtar Kelimeler: Ayetullah Humeyni; Ayetullah Hamaneyi; Dış Politika Analizi; Operasyonel Kod Analizi; Nükleer Müzakereler iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS First, I wish to express my sincere thanks to my thesis supervisor, Dr. Özgür Özdamar, for initially sparking my interest in this methodology in his Foreign Policy Analysis course, and his useful comments, suggestions and guidance throughout my endeavor. I would also like to thank Sercan Canbolat who wrote his MA thesis on the operational code of Islamist leaders while at Bilkent University. I have been in- spired by the structure of his thesis and have found many useful sources within his study. Additionally, he willingly answered my many questions about Profiler Plus, for which I am very grateful! I am indebted to Michael Young and the individuals at Social Sciences Automation, Inc. for developing and constantly improving Profiler Plus, making this research un- dertaking manageable. Fatih Erol, I greatly appreciate your suggestions. I would also like to thank Assist. Prof. Dr. Reza Hassanpour for providing immensely useful feedback on the historical, biographical and foreign policy chapters of my thesis. Erika Schiller and Ashley Isaacson, I am very grateful for your friendship, editing and comments. I would especially like to thank Amir Shaygan (M.Sc. Industrial En- gineering), who provided much-needed assistance with the t-test performed in Chap- ter 7; I wouldn’t have been able to do this without you! Thank you also to my family who has encouraged me to continue my studies and supported my decision to com- plete them in Turkey, so far from home. Volkan Demiröz, thank you for the count- less ways you have supported me throughout this process, including translating my abstract! v TABLE OF CONTENTS TITLE PAGE………….………………………………………………………………i ABSTRACT……………….…………………………………………………………ii ÖZET…………………...……………………………………………………………iii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS………………………………………………...…………iv TABLE OF CONTENTS………………………………...………………….….……v LIST OF TABLES…………………………………………………………….......…ix LIST OF FIGURES…………………………………………………...………..…….x CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION………………………………………………….…1 1.1 Significance of the Study………………….…………………………………...3 1.2 Research Questions and Overview..…………..……………………………….5 1.3 Organization of the Chapters…………………………………………………..6 CHAPTER 2: OPERATIONAL CODE LITERATURE REVIEW……………...…10 2.1 Foreign Policy Analysis Overview…………...……………………………....11 2.2 Rational Actor Models……………………………………………………..…13 2.3 Cognitive Studies of Foreign Policy Analysis…………………………….….18 2.4 Leadership Studies in Foreign Policy Analysis………….……………….…..21 2.4.1 Leadership Trait Analysis……………………………………………..23 2.4.2 Operational Code Analysis……...…...…………….………….………24 2.4.2.1 Evolution of Operational Code Analysis……………………….…...26 2.4.2.2 Operational Code’s Analytic Techniques………………..………….31 2.4.2.3 Interpreting Operational Code Results………………..…………….32 2.4.2.4 Recent Contributions to Operational Code Analysis ….……………36 2.5 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………36 vi CHAPTER 3: RISE OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC…………………………...….38 3.1 Modernization / Westernization of Iran………………………………………38 3.1.1 Amir Kabir…………………………………………………………….39 3.1.2 Reza Shah Pahlavi…………………………………………………….40 3.2 Oil: The 1953 Coup & Prime Minister Mossadegh…………….…………….41 3.2.1 The United States Falls from Favor in Iran…………………………...45 3.2.2 Increased Political Participation of the Clergy……….……………….47 3.3 1979 Revolution………………………………………………………………49 3.3.1 Ayatollah Khomeini’s Role…………………………………………...50 3.3.2 A New Islamic Republic………………………………………………51 3.3.3 Complete Severing of U.S.-Iranian Relations………………………...53 3.3.4 The Public is Introduced to Khomeini’s “Guardianship of Jurispru- dence………………..………………………………….…………………....54 3.4 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………57 CHAPTER 4: BIOGRAPHIES OF IRAN’S SUPREME LEADERS………………59 4.1 Ayatollah Khomeini: A Biography…………………………………………...59 4.1.1 Ayatollah Khomeini’s Early Years……………………………………59 4.1.2 Khomeini’s Education………………………………………………...63 4.1.3 Fourteen Years of Exile………………………………………….……65 4.1.4 The Legacy of Ayatollah Khomeini…………………………….…….73 4.2 Ayatollah Khamenei: A Biography…………………………………….…….75 4.2.1 Ayatollah Khamenei’s Early Years and Education………...….……...76 4.2.2 Ayatollah Khamenei’s Political Beginnings and Revolutionary Role..78 4.2.3 Khamenei’s Legacy…………...............................................................84 4.3 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………86 CHAPTER 5: IRAN’S FOREIGN POLICY…………………..................................88 5.1 The Foreign Policy of Iran’s Supreme Leader…………..…………………..….89 vii 5.1.1 Supremacy of the Leader…………………………...………………....90 5.1.2 Pragmatism vs. Ideology…………...………………………………....96 5.2 Iran’s Foreign Policy Agenda………………………………...…………..……102 5.2.1 Iran’s Foreign Policy as Presented by Foreign Minister Zarif………102 5.2.2 Exporting the Revolution and Iran as a Regional Power…...….…….105 5.2.3 Islamic Awakening………………......…….…….………………..…110 5.3 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………..118 CHAPTER 6: METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN………………….120 6.1 Research Questions………………………………………………………….121 6.2 Methodology and Research Design…………………………...……….……122 6.2.1 Research Tools: VICS and Profiler Plus……………..…………..….123 6.2.2 Temporal and Spatial Domains………………………………...…....126 6.2.3 Variables and Hypotheses……………………………………………128 6.2.4 Data Needs…………………………………………………………...130 6.3 Overview of Case Selection: The Ayatollahs’ Nuclear Program…………...134 6.4 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………..136 CHAPTER 7: DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION………………………….137 7.1 Analysis Results: The Leaders’ Political Belief System vs. Norming Group……………………………………………………………………………138 7.2 Learned Operational Code…………………………………...……….……..146 7.3 The Supreme Leaders’ Foreign
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