The Outside Actors That Have Shaped the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

Escalating to Nowhere: The Israeli-Palestinian War – The Outside Actors 3/4/2005 Page i

CSIS______Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street N.W. Washington, DC 20006 (202) 775-3270 [email protected]

Escalating to Nowhere: The Israeli-Palestinian War

Rough Working Draft: Circulated for Comment and Correction

The Outside Actors that Have Shaped the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

Anthony H. Cordesman Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy Center for Strategic and International Studies

With the Assistance of Jason A. Wittemen and Richard G. Young

February 23, 2005

Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved. No further reproduction is permitted without the author’s express written permission. Quotation or reference is permitted with proper attribution. Escalating to Nowhere: The Israeli-Palestinian War – The Outside Actors 3/4/2005 Page ii

Introduction

The reader should be aware that this is an initial rough draft. The text is being circulated for comment and will be extensively revised over time. It reflects the working views of the author and does not reflect final conclusions or the views of the CSIS.

TABLE OF CONTENTS IX. THE OUTSIDE ACTORS THAT HAVE SHAPED THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT...... 1

OUTSIDE ACTORS: THE HIZBOLLAH...... 1 Hizbollah Support of Palestinian Violence ...... 2 The Risk of a “Northern Front”...... 4 Linkages to Syria, Lebanon and Iran ...... 8 The Hizbollah’s Future Role...... 10 OUTSIDE ACTORS: IRAN ...... 11 Iran before the War...... 11 Iranian Support of Palestinian Militancy...... 12 Iran in the International “War on Terror” ...... 13 OUTSIDE ACTORS: SYRIA ...... 14 Syria during the Peace Process ...... 15 Syria during the Israeli-Palestinian War ...... 16 Syria in the International “War on Terror”...... 17 OUTSIDE ACTORS: JORDAN ...... 18 The Shaping of the Jordanian-Palestinian Relationship...... 19 Jordan and the Peace Process ...... 21 The Jordanian Campaign against Militancy...... 23 Jordan and the Israeli-Palestinian War...... 24 OUTSIDE ACTORS: IRAQ ...... 26

IX. The Outside Actors that Have Shaped the Israeli- Palestinian Conflict While Israel and the various Palestinian factions are the key actors in the conflict, other actors have played important roles and will continue to do so in the future. These actors include the Lebanese Hizbollah, Iran, Syria, Jordan and Iraq. Outside Actors: The Hizbollah When the Hizbollah was established in 1982, its primary goal was to force Israel to withdraw from southern Lebanon. When it achieved this goal in May 2000, its focus began to broaden, although it still challenged Israel over disputed territories like the Shebaa Farms region in the foothills of Mount Hermon. Since September 2000, following Ariel Sharon’s visit to the Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem and the subsequent Palestinian uprising, Hizbollah has become much more outspoken in its support for the Palestinian cause. It has repeatedly said that it seeks the withdrawal of Israel from all territory it considers occupied and as rightfully belonging to Arabs.

Hizbollah continues to garner strong support from the Lebanese, Syrian and Iranian governments. It engages in both political and military activity, and its structure is hierarchical, disciplined and secretive. Its central decision-making body is the seven-member Majlis Shura al- Qarar (“Decision-making Consultative Council”), which is presided over by Sheik Seyyed Hassan Nasrallah. Though he is clearly recognized as Hizbollah’s leader, Nasrallah shares power with the other members of the council. Their decisions are generally reached by consensus or a vote. There are also a number of other bodies and committees below the Consultative Council, including the Politburo, which provides advice to the Council, and the General Convention, which implements Council orders and plans day-to-day operations in Lebanon.1

Other elements also influence Hizbollah decision-making. High-ranking resistance fighters are influential, due in part to their privileged status in the General Convention and the fact that their former commanders are often elected to the Consultative Council. In addition, the security and intelligence agencies play an important role in the group, particularly Amn al-Hizb (the “Party’s Security”), which is believed to protect Hizbollah leaders, preserve discipline and monitor all levels of the Hizbollah hierarchy, including the Consultative Council. Moreover,

Iran and Syria, due to their financial and political support, also significantly impact Hizbollah decisions.2

Hizbollah operates a twenty-four-hour global television and radio station, Al Manar, which is reportedly owned by members of Hizbollah’s political branch and receives instructions from Hizbollah’s propaganda wing.3 Al Manar continually solicits donations for Hizbollah during programming breaks. The money is used not only for Hizbollah’s humanitarian operations, but also for terrorist activities and propaganda. Donations can be made to four different banks in Lebanon, which illustrates the Lebanese government’s refusal to freeze Hizbollah’s assets.4

Almost inevitably, Hizbollah reacted strongly to the outbreak of the Israeli-Palestinian War in September 2000. An official statement from the group referred to Sharon’s visit as “a deliberate desecration of Muslim holy places in Jerusalem, a criminal act and an insolent provocation of the feelings and dignities of the Arab and Muslim people.” The group further described Sharon’s visit as a crime and “…a declaration of war on Muslim sacred places in Jerusalem…”5

In October 2000, Al Manar broadcast speeches by Sheik Nasrallah that were clearly designed to incite Palestinian hostility. One such speech included a call to stab Israelis to death: “If you don’t have bullets, who among you doesn’t have knives? Hide the knife, and when he comes close to the enemy let him stab him. Let the stab be fatal.”6 In another instance, Sheik Nasrallah appeared on the independent satellite television station al-Jazeera, in Qatar, and addressed the Palestinians as “holy war comrades-in-arms” and proposed a strategy of gradually escalating the uprising from stones to daggers to firearms and other means of military combat.7 He also reportedly encouraged Palestinians to fight Israelis using suicide operations.

Hizbollah Support of Palestinian Violence

Hizbollah has since offered continued political support and guidance to Palestinian fighters. Typically, this support has manifested in the form of rhetoric in the international mass media. In October 2000, Nasrallah stated that Hizbollah was concerned with all Israeli prisoners, “whether Lebanese, Palestinian or Arab.”8 He also exhorted Arab leaders to protect the Palestinian struggle “by providing support and assistance to Palestinians fighting Israeli troops.”9 Then in January 2001, he pledged to Palestinian families that he would work to secure the

release of their loved ones from Israeli jails.10 Later that year in August, he told his fighters to prepare to join the Intifada (although they have yet to participate actively in the uprising).11 Finally, in April 2002, Nasrallah made public overtures to the Israeli government to bargain for the lives of Palestinian fighters threatened by IDF forces. However, a framework for an Israeli- Hizbollah prisoner release agreement was not reached until late 2003 and no exchanges took place until early 2004.12

Hizbollah is also suspected of providing significant material assistance to Palestinian fighters. There have been a number of reports since October 2000 that the Hizbollah has smuggled arms to Fatah and the Palestinian security services, as well as to Hamas and the Islamic Jihad.13 In February 2002, following the Israeli seizure of a shipment of arms on board the freighter Karine-A in the Red Sea, Arafat accused Hizbollah of attempting to ship the arms to the Palestinian Authority illegally. Within a matter of days, he retracted his comments and instead blamed the Israeli government, which he accused of framing the Palestinians and Hizbollah.14 Just over a year later, on May 22, 2003, the Israeli navy captured a fishing vessel off the coast of Haifa carrying weapons and evidence of plans for terrorist attacks. Israeli authorities suspected the items were being smuggled by Hizbollah, but there was no conclusive evidence that they were bound for Palestinian territory.15

In addition to suspected arms smuggling, there is evidence that Hizbollah actively trains Palestinian fighters. On April 21, 2002, Hizbollah official Mohammed Raab acknowledged that Hizbollah provides Palestinians with military intelligence and suggestions for stockpiling supplies, trench building, and destroying tanks.16 In addition, a December 2003-January 2004 investigation by the Israel Security Agency uncovered a Hizbollah-financed and guided terrorist infrastructure within the state of Israel. On February 8, 2004 two Arab Israeli citizens, brothers Jassan and Sirhan Atmallah, were indicted in Israel’s Northern District Military Court for attempting to establish “a terrorist infrastructure among Israeli Arabs that would be financed by Hizbollah and under its military guidance,” and for “preparing a list of candidates for military training, types of war material that [they] would need, etc.”17 The Shin Bet claimed that Hizbollah provided the individuals with “military training … and … large sums of money to prepare terrorist attacks.”18

On July 20, 2004, Hizbollah leader Sheik Seyyed Hassan Nasrallah publicly acknowledged that Hizbollah provided covert assistance to Palestinian militants for the first time. At the funeral of Ghaleb Awwali, a senior Hizbollah official killed by an allegedly Israeli- planted car bomb in Beirut on July 19, Nasrallah said that Awwali was “among the team that dedicated their lives in the last few years to help their brothers in occupied Palestine.” Adding that “we [(Hizbollah)] do not want to hide this truth. We want to declare it and boast about it.”19 According to a senior Israeli intelligence official, ten Hizbollah “controllers” in Beirut manage forty-four cells of Palestinian militants throughout the West Bank and Gaza.20

Moreover, although Hizbollah has traditionally restricted its support of Palestinian militants to Islamic-based groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad, evidence suggests that it has also provided assistance to secular resistance groups as well. For instance, leaders of the Al- Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades in Nablus claimed in July 2004 that they “speak to their Hizbollah handlers by telephone almost daily.” 21 Specifically, they stated that Hizbollah “was transferring $50,000 every two or three months to [their] operatives in Nablus,” and that “one cell in the nearby Balata refugee camp received $1,000 a month [from Hizbollah] for ammunition and cell phone calling cards, plus $10,000 to $15,000 to help plan specific attacks.” And a Brigades’ leader, who identified himself as Abu Mujahed, suggested that “we are receiving funding from Hizbollah because we have no other option.”22

The Risk of a “Northern Front”

Hizbollah has engaged in a number of low-intensity attacks on Israeli military outposts and civilian settlements since the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000.23 There is an ongoing possibility that Hizbollah could further expand its use of armed violence to create a “Northern Front” that might significantly influence the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

If such a “Northern Front” were to emerge, it might start in the Shebaa Farms region. The conflict over the area dates to the French and British Mandates’ post-World War I division of territory, which placed the Shebaa Farms in Syria. Following World War II, United Nations cartographers accepted this position. The Israeli seizure of the Golan Heights from Syria during the 1967 Six Day War included the seizure of the Shebaa Farms as well. When Israel withdrew from Lebanese territory in May 2000, Israeli forces remained in Shebaa, considering the land part of annexed Syrian territory. However Hizbollah and the Lebanese and Syrian governments

claim that Shebaa belongs to Lebanon, arguing that the Syrian government gave the territory to Lebanon in 1951. Thus, in Hizbollah’s view, Israel has not yet completed its withdrawal from Lebanon. This makes the Shebaa Farms a major point of contention.24

On October 7, 2000, Hizbollah seized three IDF soldiers—Staff Sergeant Binyamin Abraham, Staff Sergeant Adi Avitan, and Staff Sergeant Omar Sawaid—in the Shebaa Farms region, and kidnapped Israeli reservist Elhanen Tennenbaum, suspected by Hizbollah of being a Mossad agent, a few days later. The three soldiers were seized by Hizbollah forces that allegedly were disguised as UN soldiers, using a mock UN vehicle. Sheik Nasrallah clearly stated the reason for the October 2000 kidnappings. “We took Israelis prisoner in order to trade them— there is no other solution,” he said in a public statement on the day the soldiers were kidnapped.25

These kidnappings threatened to expand the Israeli-Arab conflict beyond Israel’s northern borders within weeks of the outbreak of open hostilities in the Palestinian territories. It prompted Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak to issue an ultimatum to the Palestinians on October 7, 2000, and to demand Hizbollah to halt its assaults on Israeli military outposts and civilian settlements. Barak warned, “We shall direct the IDF and the security forces to use all means at their disposal to halt the violence.”26

This ultimatum did not halt Hizbollah activity but within a few months the group did begin to negotiate with the Israeli government for an exchange of prisoners. In December 2000, Israel offered to exchange the bodies of slain south Lebanese guerrillas for information concerning the missing Israelis. Hizbollah insisted on a trade of prisoners for the Israelis, with no other concessions. On April 6, 2001, Israeli Defense Minister Binyamin Ben-Eliezer stated that he would consider the release of the Lebanese guerrilla Mustafa Dirani if it led to the release of the Israeli prisoners.27 A month later, he said he was willing to pay “any price” for information concerning the hostages’ whereabouts.28 In late October 2001, the Israeli government publicly stated that it believed the three soldiers were dead, though negotiations for the release of their bodies continued.29 In July 2003, Hizbollah representatives insisted they still held the Israeli prisoners, and pledged to capture more if Israel did not negotiate a prisoner exchange with them.30

On November 9, 2003 a German-brokered deal was reached for Hizbollah to turn over Elhanen Tennenbaum and the bodies of the three IDF soldiers (who by that time had been confirmed dead) in return for the release of 430 Hizbollah, Lebanese Shi’ite, Jordanian and Palestinian security prisoners and administrative detainees, and the re-internment of the remains of 60 Lebanese decedents and members of Hizbollah from the IDF’s Cemetery of the Fallen Enemy to Lebanon. The exchange took place on January 29, 2004.31 The agreement was widely criticized by many Israeli political leaders and defense analysts who warned that because the exchange was so unbalanced, it would “simply serve to encourage yet more kidnapping of Israeli citizens, particularly military personnel, as a means of putting pressure on the Israel authorities.”32 Nevertheless, as of mid-June 2004 the four seizures of October 2000 are the only reported Hizbollah kidnappings since the start of the war. Yet Nasrallah has stated on at least two occasions that the group would consider doing so again to secure the release of Lebanese and Palestinian prisoners still being held in Israel.33

On April 14, 2001, another incident that killed an IDF soldier in the Shebaa Farms area demonstrated how quickly the Israeli-Palestinian War could escalate and broaden to a regional conflict. Israel responded to the Hizbollah’s attack by firing at least 40 tank and artillery shells into suspected Hizbollah hideouts in the Lebanese hills near Israel’s northern border. The Israeli Air Force (IAF) then dispatched planes that struck targets in southern Lebanon. It was the first time that fighter jets attacked Lebanon since Ariel Sharon assumed office.34

The incident provoked an international reaction. The day after the attack, Kofi Annan’s representative in southern Lebanon, Staffan de Mistura, characterized the incident as “very regretful” and as having occurred “in a way and place that represent a clear violation of Resolution 425 and the Blue Line as far as the UN is concerned passes there.”35 The Bush administration accused Hizbollah of causing a new wave of violence in the region.36 The Lebanese newspaper Al-Mustaqbal was also critical, questioning the timing of the operation.37

Hizbollah has also been the cause of a number of other incidents in the Israel-Lebanon border area and occasional IDF reprisals against Syria and Lebanon:

? October 10, 2000: Infiltration attempt near the Hatzbani river. Two infiltrators are killed, one wounded. ? November 16: Hizbollah militants plant an explosive charge near an IDF convoy. There are no casualties. ? November 26: An explosive charge planted by Hizbollah kills one Israeli soldier and wounds two.

? January 31, 2001: Six mortar bombs are fired in the area of the Sion river outpost. There are no casualties. ? January 26: Infiltration attempt near the Shebaa Farms. Two infiltrators are killed; one wounded. ? February 16: Hizbollah militants shoot at an IDF convoy near Shebaa Farms. One soldier is killed, three additional soldiers are wounded. ? April 14: An IDF soldier is killed by an anti-tank missile fired at a position near Shebaa Farms. ? June 29: Hizbollah fighters fire 12 rockets and mortars at an Israeli position in the Shebaa Farms. Two Israeli soldiers are wounded. ? July 1: Hizbollah fires rockets and mortars at Israeli positions in the Shebaa Farms. There are no casualties. ? October 22: Hizbollah operatives attack Israeli military posts in the Shebaa Farms. There are no casualties. ? January 23, 2002: Hizbollah militants shell Israeli positions in the Golan Heights. There are no casualties. ? February 4: Hizbollah anti-aircraft weapons fire on Israeli warplanes conducting a surveillance mission over southern Lebanon. There are no casualties. ? April 8: Hizbollah launches a rocket against an Israeli hilltop military station. No casualties are reported. ? January 21, 2003: Hizbollah fires an estimated 25 rockets and mortar shells at the Israeli outpost of Roueissat al-Alem in the Shebaa Farms region. No casualties are reported. ? July 5: Hizbollah fires 26 anti-aircraft missiles into northern Israel, but causes no reported casualties. ? July 22: Hizbollah fires anti-aircraft shells at Israeli jets flying over southern Lebanon. Two Israelis in the nearby town of Shlomi are wounded. ? August 8: Hizbollah militants fire rockets and mortar shells at three Israeli military positions in the Shebaa Farms. Israel retaliates with airstrikes against suspected Hizbollah positions in the disputed area and Lebanon. ? August 10: Hizbollah anti-aircraft shells kill a 16-year-old Israeli boy and injure four others in the town of Shlomi. It is the first killing of an Israeli civilian since Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon three years earlier. ? October 6: Hizbollah militants fire on an IDF force south of the Fatma Gate; one IDF soldier is killed in the attack. ? January 19, 2004: An IDF soldier is killed when Hizbollah militants fire an anti-tank missile at his patrol that was neutralizing explosive charges near Zari’t. The IDF responds by striking two Hizbollah targets in Lebanon. ? May 7: Hizbollah militants launch anti-tank missiles and mortar shells at IDF soldiers in the Mount Dov area, near the IDF’s Gladiyola outpost. One IDF soldier is killed and two are severely wounded in the attack. ? July 20: Hezbollah snipers shoot and kill two IDF soldiers repairing an antenna on the rooftop of an IDF outpost on the Israel-Lebanon border.

On June 8, 2004, the IDF claimed that 14 infiltration attempts and 105 anti-aircraft attacks, 42 anti-tank missile attacks, 5 Katyusha rocket attacks, 7 shooting attacks, and 10 explosive device attacks had been made against Israeli targets since the Israeli pullout from Southern Lebanon in

May 2000. In total, the IDF reported that eleven IDF soldiers and six Israeli civilians were killed and 53 soldiers and 14 civilians were wounded in these attacks.38

Hizbollah has gained Arab support from such attacks, and has shown that it is careful to calculate the effects of its attacks. As Nayef Krayem, the general manager of Hizbollah’s television station Al Manar, stated, “All our steps are very studied. We encourage the Palestinians to continue the resistance, but we want to ensure that we don’t provoke negative consequences on us or Lebanon.”39 Even the slightest miscalculation can threaten Hizbollah’s public support in some way.

Linkages to Syria, Lebanon and Iran

Long before the Israeli-Palestinian War began, Israeli officials tried to make the Syrian and Lebanese governments claim responsibility for Hizbollah attacks, accusing the former of supplying the group and permitting them to operate from Lebanese territory, while charging the latter with refusing to deploy Lebanese troops along its border with Israel, and thus giving Hizbollah free reign in the southern part of Lebanon. It also threatened numerous times to retaliate against interests of both countries.

On April 16, 2001, Israeli warplanes attacked Syrian radar sites in Lebanon’s central mountain region, Dar al Baidar. The attacks killed one Syrian soldier and wounded four others. These were the first strikes against Syrian military installations in five years. The previous attack was in 1996, when Israeli gunships hit Syrian Army positions near the Beirut airport during a bombing campaign against Lebanon.

The Israeli attack against Syrian positions led to more criticism of Israel by Arab and Islamic leaders, as well as fears of an escalation of the Israeli-Palestinian violence into a possible regional conflict. The Syrians and Hizbollah, while refraining from immediate retaliatory measures, vowed to respond in due course. Hizbollah’s deputy leader, Sheik Naim Kassem, pledged vengeance against Israel at an “appropriate time and manner…contrary to Israeli expectations,” while Syrian foreign minister Farouk al-Sharaa pledged that Israel would “pay a heavy price…at the convenient and appropriate time.”40

Neither Syria, nor Lebanon, retaliated for the Israeli attacks, at least in an overt manner. On July 1, 2001, Israeli jets again attacked a Syrian radar position, this time in Sarin Tahta in

eastern Lebanon, injuring three Syrian soldiers and one Lebanese. The assault was in retaliation for a Hizbollah attack in Shebaa Farms two days earlier.41 On October 22, 2001, Israeli aircraft fired on a Lebanese border position, in response to a Hizbollah attack that same day.42

Hizbollah activity did decrease between October 2001 and July 2003. Indeed, there were only seven major reported altercations between Israel and Hizbollah during that time. It seems likely that Syrian president Bashar al-Assad applied pressure on the Hizbollah to reduce its number of attacks, in particular when such attacks were perceived to increase the likelihood of a military confrontation against Syria and/or Lebanon. Syria may want tension and clashes to maintain the pressure on Israel, but it is doubtful that Syria perceives an escalation from a low- intensity Israeli-Palestinian intra-state conflict to an interstate war against a militarily and economically superior Israel to be in its interest.

Tensions between Hizbollah and Israel flared again in August 2003. On August 2, the Hizbollah leader Ali Hussein Saleh was killed in a car bomb in Beirut. Hizbollah blamed Israel for the assault, saying that, “All information available…proves beyond a doubt complete Israeli responsibility for this heinous crime.”43 Hizbollah retaliated against Israel on August 8, when militants fired rockets, anti-tank missiles, mortar shells and light weapons at Israeli military positions in the Shebaa Farm region. Israeli warplanes and artillery quickly responded with attacks on suspected Hizbollah positions in Shebaa Farms and southern Lebanon.44 Hizbollah shelled Israeli positions again two days later. Israel destroyed the cannon that launched the shells, but took no other action against the group.

The Bush administration responded to the resumption of violence with increased diplomatic pressure on Syria and Lebanon. The U.S. asked that the governments restrain the militants and stop their support of Hizbollah’s terrorist actions. The US State Department in particular encouraged Lebanon to take back control of the south from the militants.45 Syria’s refusal to end its support of Hizbollah, as well as groups like Hamas and the Islamic Jihad, has worsened its already strained relationship with the US.

The efforts of the U.S. and other countries to restart the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and reduce the level of violence in the region have made it increasingly difficult for Hizbollah to use the Palestinian plight as one of their foremost objectives without fear of broad international reprisal.46 It is also likely that Hizbollah views the U.S.’s attempts to convince the Palestinian

Authority and Syria to shut down the operations of Hamas, the Islamic Jihad, and other militant groups as a warning.47

The Hizbollah’s Future Role

The Hizbollah is now more than a Lebanese resistance movement. Following the Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon, the Lebanese government was unprepared to fill the political, military and security void left by Israel. Hizbollah assumed the role of a local government of sorts, offering basic services, such as schools, hospitals and health clinics to the people.48 While benefiting the group’s public image, it serves as another constraint on Hizbollah’s ability to wage all-out war against Israel.

Hizbollah has a large army and sizeable arsenal that, if used in conjunction with coordinated Palestinian attacks, could pose a serious threat to Israel and the resumption of peace. By most accounts, Hizbollah reportedly has between 2,000 and 5,000 “conventional” fighters based in Lebanon that have received special operations training from Iranian, Syrian, and mercenary military instructors.49 They also allegedly field 500 to 1,000 operatives that have received special training and are capable of carrying out various types of terrorist attacks. Such operatives are stationed throughout the world. Furthermore, Israeli and Western military sources believe the group has between 8,000 and 10,000 Katyusha rockets, with an estimated range of 12 miles.50 Israeli intelligence believes Hizbollah possesses wire-guided TOW missiles, artillery and 57mm anti-aircraft guns.51 Some Israeli officials have warned that Iran is providing them with 240mm Fajr-3 missiles, with a 25-mile range, and 333mm Fajr-5 missiles, with a possible 45- mile range.52 There also are reports that Syria is providing rockets to the group. And on October 25, the Lebanese newspaper Al-Mustakbal reported that Sheik Nasrallah had recently vowed that, “in the current situation, the resistance [(code name for Hizbollah)] must be stronger than in the past, and if there is a possibility to acquire stronger weapons, we should aquire them because the national interest requires it.”53

Thus, although Hizbollah has yet to play a significant direct role in the Israeli-Palestinian War, signs indicate that the group is capable of playing a considerably larger role in the conflict in the future. At least publicly, Hizbollah members perceive the Palestinians’ situation as an extension of their own. And while the Hizbollah’s independence is constrained, it still has more flexibility to fight against Israel in ways that states such as Syria, Lebanon and Iran do not have.

Outside Actors: Iran

As the previous discussion has shown, Iran has played a continuing role in undermining the Israeli-Palestinian peace effort and supporting Palestinian violence. Since 1979, the Iranian government has existed as a fundamentalist Shiite Islamic theocracy, though elements have emerged that have attempted to introduce moderate political and economic reforms.

Iran’s foreign policy remains adversarial with the West, particularly the United States and its allies. The Iranian government is fundamentally opposed to the existence of the State of Israel, for both ideological and security reasons, and actively seeks its destruction. Israel’s Jewish identity is viewed as a blight on the Muslim character of the region. At the same time, Israel’s military strength represents a threat to Iranian regional dominance. A successful peace process between Israel and the Palestinians could result in a more secure and empowered Israel, which would further threaten Iran’s goal of regional domination. The International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) has also suggested that a successful peace process would politically isolate Iran even more and decrease its influence in Lebanon.54

Iran before the War

Throughout the peace process, Iran attempted to derail negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. Iran publicly offered its political and financial support to the opposition front that rejected Yasser Arafat and the PLO’s decision to accept Israel as a partner in the Oslo Accords. As noted in previous chapters, such groups included Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC). Iran also publicly continued to support the activities of the Hizbollah, which allowed the Iranian government to exercise some measure of influence over the politically weak Lebanon.

Tehran organized “Conferences for the Support of the Uprising” in December 1990 and October 1991, which were attended by delegates from the opposition factions. Iran established a “Fund for the Martyrs” to provide financial and humanitarian assistance to Palestinians engaged in jihad against Israel. At a meeting in Damascus in February 1996, the Iranian government encouraged the opposition movement to coordinate their efforts against Israel. Between 1996 and 2000, Hamas, PIJ and Hizbollah activists continued to meet with the Iranian leadership, while Iran provided financial support and military training to the organizations’ members.55

Both Iranian “hardliners” and “moderates” reacted strongly to the Palestinian uprising in September 2000. Iranian foreign minister Kamal Kharazi consulted with Hizbollah’s Sheik Nasrallah in early October, and told reporters that “the issue of Jerusalem is not only important for the Palestinians, but for all the Muslims of the world. This indicates how deep the Israeli provocation was in its attack on Al Aqsa Mosque.” The Iranian foreign minister also met with UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in October. Mr. Kharazi is reported to have asked Annan to deliver a warning to Israel concerning an Israeli retaliatory attack against Lebanon or Syria: “Please convey this warning to Israel. The counter reaction will be extremely violent, and no one will be able to stop Lebanon's Islamic resistance movement from retaliating.” 56

Iranian Support of Palestinian Militancy

Since the eruption of the Israeli-Palestinian War, Iran has consistently urged extremist Palestinian elements to step up their fight against Israel. Iran’s rhetoric was strongly anti-Israel during the “International Conference on the Palestinian Intifada” that took place in Tehran on April 24-25, 2001, which was organized by the generally reform-oriented Iranian parliament (Majlis). President Muhammad Khatami, often praised for his moderate and reformist views, called for an international tribunal to try Israeli leaders “like war criminals.”57 Representatives from Hamas, PIJ, and Hizbollah played active roles in the conference and Sheik Nasrallah pledged solidarity with the Palestinian cause. U.S. officials subsequently charged Tehran with attempting to coordinate the rejectionist front more tightly since the outbreak of the Israeli- Palestinian War, and with facilitating the smuggling of arms and funds via land and sea into the Palestinian territories.58

Iranian arms shipments were so frequent in 2000-2001 that the United States convinced Turkey to revoke permission for Iran to fly planes carrying military and other hardware to Syria over Turkish airspace in early May 2001. This closed the primary supply route that Iran had used for over 20 years to distribute weaponry to various anti-Israel groups – including Iranian Revolutionary Guards deployed in Lebanon since 1982 – through Syria.59 However, this only slowed down one form of transfers to Lebanon. Iran found other routes to move materiel into Lebanon and to the Palestinian Authority. It continued to move arms by both land and sea, and gave no indications that it would stop supplying rejectionist organizations with money and funds.

An illustration of this kind of arms shipment occurred in January 2002. On January 3, Israeli forces captured the freighter Karine-A in the Red Sea. Onboard, the Israelis found more than 50 tons of rockets, antitank grenades, and explosives, which they believed were bound for use by the Palestinian Authority. The Israeli government publicly stated that it believed Arafat and the PA had attempted to buy the weapons from Iran, using Hizbollah as an intermediary.60 Israel presented no direct evidence for Iranian involvement but argued, among other things, that most of the weapons were made in Iran and were loaded off the Iranian coast.61 Though the crew seemed to support elements of the Israeli charges, Iran dismissed the accusations, and Arafat first blamed Hizbollah and then Israel for conspiring to frame the PA. The Israeli government found the episode to be especially disturbing because it indicated that Iran was “trying to…create another base, besides its base in Lebanon,” according to Israeli Major General Giora Eiland.62

Despite Iranian denials, the European Union (EU) and the U.S. tended to accept Iranian culpability in the Karine-A affair. In January, Javier Solana spoke before the European Parliament and referred to the Karine-A as “the link between Iran and the PA.” On February 6, U.S. Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet testified before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee that Iran remained “the foremost state sponsor of terrorism.”63 Also in February, Israeli officials claimed they had evidence that Iran had financed militant operations in Gaza and the West Bank and Tanzim operatives, associated with Arafat’s Fatah movement, had traveled to Iran for “instructions and training.”64

Iran in the International “War on Terror”

The U.S. State Department’s publication “Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2003,” stated that Iran was “the most active state sponsor of terrorism in 2003.” In regard to Iran’s anti-Israel operations, it further reported that:

During 2003, Iran maintained a high-profile role in encouraging anti-Israeli activity, both rhetorically and operationally. Supreme Leader Khamenei praised Palestinian resistance operations, and President Khatami reiterated Iran’s support for the “wronged people of Palestine” and their struggles. Matching this rhetoric with action, Iran provided Lebanese Hizballah and Palestinian rejectionist groups -- notably HAMAS, the Palestine Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine–General Command -- with funding, safehaven, training, and weapons. Iran hosted a conference in August 2003 on the Palestinian intifadah, at which an Iranian official suggested that the continued success of the Palestinian resistance depended on suicide operations. 65

In April 2003, the Bush administration introduced its “road map for peace” to Israel and the Palestinians. At the same time, the U.S. began to apply increasing pressure on both Iran and Syria to end their support of militant groups. On July 21, Bush stated that, “Syria and Iran continue to harbor and assist terrorists. This behavior is completely unacceptable, and states that support terror will be held accountable.”66

Perhaps because of the U.S. victory in the Iraq war, Iran announced two days later that it was participating in international anti-terror efforts, and was in fact holding some members of the Al-Qaeda terror network in custody and had expelled others. It is likely that Iran’s sudden cooperation with the U.S.’s demands was designed to reduce the increasing international pressure on the Iranian government. However, there are no indications that Iran’s compliance is sincere or more than a temporary change in policy. Iran’s financing and training of Palestinian militant factions continues to represent one of the most significant obstacles to Israeli-Palestinian peace.

Despite U.S. pressure, Iran has continued to provide financial, political and ideological support to Hizbollah. A July 2003 report by the International Crisis Group (ICG) indicated that the group’s leadership first verifies important decisions with Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, whom Hizbollah considers “their ultimate source of authority.”67 Khamenei reportedly has not overturned any Consultative Council decisions, and instead exercises more significant influence through the Hizbollah’s security and intelligence agencies, which Israel alleges are trained by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard.68 Outside Actors: Syria

The Syrian government has had a hostile relationship with the State of Israel for over 50 years, and the two countries remain in a state of war. Syria joined with fellow Arab states in unsuccessful wars against Israel in 1948 and 1967. In the 1967 Six Day War, Israel captured the Golan Heights from Syria, and retained control of the territory after the war ended. Israel’s refusal to withdraw from the Golan contributed to Syrian animosity toward Israel in subsequent years.

In 1970, the nationalist regime of General Hafez al-Assad assumed power in Syria, due in large part to Assad’s anti-Israel rhetoric and agenda. Under Assad, Syrian troops fought against

Israel in 1973 and again in 1982, when Israel invaded Lebanon. Syrian forces remained in Lebanon after Israel withdrew in 1985, and Syria became the militarily and politically dominant power in the country.

Syria during the Peace Process

Syria became involved in the peace process with Israel in 1991, along with Lebanon, Jordan and the Palestinians. However, Syria continued to support anti-Israel militant factions while demanding the full return of the Golan Heights. This led to stop-and-go negotiations with Israel, which have occurred ever since. Syria has allowed a variety of hard-line and extremist groups to operate from within Syria. These groups can be divided into four major categories:

? The Hizbollah; ? Palestinian Islamic organizations, including Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ); ? Radical left-wing Palestinian organizations, including the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine- General Command (Jibril), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (Habash), the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Palestine Liberation Front, the Fatah Revolutionary Council/Abu Nidal, Fatah/Abu Musa and an extremist faction of the Popular Struggle Front; ? Other Middle Eastern and international terrorist groups, including the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), the Japanese Red Army and others.

A 1999 report on Syria’s role in terrorism by Dr. Reuven Ehrlich (Avi-Ran) noted that,69

“Syria currently serves as a center for eight Palestinian terror organizations which reject the peace process and the peace accords and oppose Arafat. Five of these Palestinian terror organizations are among the most radically leftwing: the ‘Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command (PFLP- GC)’/Ahmed Jibril, the ‘Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP)’/Na’if Hawatmeh, the ‘Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)’/George Habash, ‘Fatah’/Abu Mussa, and the radical segment of the ‘National Struggle Front’/Khaled Abd al-Majid faction. Three of the eight organizations belong to the pro-Iranian Islamic stream: ‘Islamic Jihad in Palestine’/Shkaki faction, ‘Hamas’ and ‘Hizbollah in Palestine’/Ahmed Mah’anah faction. Damascus and its vicinity provide a haven for most of the leadership and the political and military infrastructure of these eight terror organizations, as well as for other Palestinian terrorist groups. Furthermore, these organizations have established - with Syrian approval of course - representations and operational infrastructures in the Syrian controlled area of Lebanon. “…Damascus is the primary center of left-wing Palestinian organizations opposed to the Palestinian Authority and the Oslo Accords. Syria serves as an important area of activity for Hamas outside of Judea, Samaria and Gaza, and senior Hamas officials carry out operational, political and propaganda activities from Damascus. The infrastructure of the ‘Palestine Islamic Jihad’ outside of Judea, Samaria and Gaza is primarily located in the vicinity of Damascus, from where its operations and activities in the ‘territories’ are directed. “The leaders of most of these terrorist organizations reside in Syria, from where they oversee and direct the military, political and propaganda activities of their organizations against Israel and other Arab states. Among the senior leaders and activists of the terror groups residing in Damascus are: Dr. Ramadan Shalah, Secretary-General of Islamic Jihad and his deputy Ziad Nehaleh; Imad al-Alami, chairman of Hamas’ ‘Interior Committee’, who is a dominant figure in activating the organizations’ military apparatus for carrying out attacks; Ahmed Jibril, George Habash and Nayef Hawatmeh, leaders of the three main left-

wing Palestinian terrorist organizations. Also active in Syria are middle- and low-ranking military activists of all the above mentioned groups. “The Syrians permit these groups to maintain their military and political infrastructure in areas under their control in Lebanon. The most widespread infrastructure belongs to Hizbollah, which is also the leading group that concentrates attacks in southern Lebanon. The Syrians also permit some limited activity by the left-wing Palestinian terrorist groups. With Syrian approval, the Beka’a Valley continues to serve as an organizational and training center for Middle East and international terrorist groups.” The peace process essentially was stalled through the time of Hafez Assad’s death on June 10, 2000. His son Bashar was selected to be president only a short time after his father’s death. In general, Bashar has pursued his father’s policies, and has supported anti-Israeli factions, although he did make a new peace initiative to Israel in December 2003. The proposal, however, was contingent upon Syria’s longstanding demand for a full Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights to the pre-1967 war boundaries—a demand which Bashar knew Sharon’s government would reject. Israel and most of the international community viewed Bashar’s gesture as a political tool intended more to bolster Syria’s diplomatic position vis-à-vis the US, rather than as a sincere effort to achieve a lasting Israeli-Syrian peace.70

Syria during the Israeli-Palestinian War

After the Israeli-Palestinian War began in September 2000, Syria provided financial and military assistance to Palestinian militant factions, such as Hamas, Hizbollah, the PIJ, the PFLP, and the Palestine Liberation Front, as well as the Kurdistan Workers’ Party.71 These organizations had headquarters, training camps, installations, and logistic, political and propaganda offices in Syria, generally in or around Damascus. From their bases in Syria, they were able to smuggle weapons into the West Bank and Gaza, conduct training and drills, and distribute propaganda for encouraging terrorist acts against Israel.72 Syria argued on numerous occasions that only the political, informational and humanitarian wings of these organizations were allowed to operate in Syria.

Israel has accused the Syrian government of protecting criminals and terrorists in the Beka’a Valley, where they allegedly cultivate hashish, cocaine and heroin, and produce counterfeit currency in order to finance militant operations.73 The evidence for such activity is limited, but it is clear that, as previously mentioned, the Syrian government under Bashar Assad has permitted the Hizbollah to execute terrorist attacks from Lebanon on the Shebaa Farms region in Israel, and has allowed the Hizbollah to maintain control of bases in southern Lebanese infrastructure.

The U.S. State Department’s report on “Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2003” describes Syria’s activity as follows:

The Syrian Government in 2003 continued to provide political and material support to Palestinian rejectionist groups. HAMAS, the PIJ, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine operate from Syria, although they have lowered their public profiles since May, when Damascus announced that the groups had voluntarily closed their offices. Many of these groups claimed responsibility for anti-Israeli terrorist acts in 2003; the Syrian Government insists that their Damascus offices undertake only political and informational activities. Syria also continued to permit Iran to use Damascus as a transshipment point for resupplying Hizballah in Lebanon. Syrian officials have publicly condemned international terrorism but continue to make a distinction between terrorism and what they consider to be the legitimate armed resistance of Palestinians in the Occupied Territories and of Lebanese Hizballah. The Syrian Government has not been implicated directly in an act of terrorism since 1986.74 Syria in the International “War on Terror”

Syria’s support of militant factions has sharply affected its relationship with the United States. The Bush administration has perceived Syria as a significant factor behind Palestinian violence and was concerned with Syria’s opposition to the U.S.-led coalition’s campaign against the Saddam Hussein regime during and after the 2003 Iraq War.

During Hafez Assad’s presidency, the Syrian government used Hizbollah as a proxy to maintain low-intensity pressure on Israel. However, Hafez tended to keep the group “at arm’s length.”75 According to Dennis Ross, former American special envoy to the Middle East, “Hafez Assad was no slouch when it came to threatening Israel. But he controlled the flow of Iranian arms to Hezbollah, and he never provided Syrian weapons directly. He certainly did not mind Hezbollah keeping the pressure on Israel, but he was not about to let Hezbollah drag him into a war with Israel either.” Ross added, “But Bashar Assad seems to lack his father’s sense of limits.”76

Syria did vote with the U.S. on UN Security Council Resolution 1441 on November 8, 2002, and helped the U.S.’s efforts in the Security Council to require the disarmament of Iraq unanimous. However, in April 2003, Syria reportedly allowed between 300 and 3,000 Arab fighters, including members of Hizbollah, to travel from southern Lebanon to Iraq, presumably to assist the Iraqi resistance against the coalition.77 This reflected Bashar Assad’s willingness to form a closer relationship with Hizbollah, and distinguished a clear change in Syrian policy.

Syria reportedly offered safe haven to members of Saddam Hussein’s regime during or immediately after the Iraq war, though the Assad government denied the accusation. On April

14, 2003, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell threatened economic and political penalties against Syria if it continued to assist the Hussein regime against the coalition.78 The Bush administration also aired concerns about Syria’s chemical weapons program, and one administration official referred to Syria, along with Libya and Cuba, as a member of the “junior varsity axis of evil.”79 Syria ultimately responded to U.S. pressure by closing its border with Iraq and expelling Iraqi officials, including several that were on the U.S.’s most wanted list.

The U.S. became especially concerned with Syria’s support of Palestinian extremism following the introduction of the U.S.’s “road map for peace” on April 30, 2003. On May 3, Colin Powell met with Bashar Assad in Damascus, in part to discuss Syria’s role in the international war on terror. Following the meeting, Powell stated that Assad had agreed to close the offices of several of the militant groups in Syria, including Hamas, the PIJ, and the PFLP- GC.80 However, the Syrian Foreign Ministry and the militant groups would not definitively confirm Assad’s order. Four months later, Western diplomats alleged that there was evidence that the militants’ offices in Syria were still operational. While Hamas and PFLP-GC spokesmen claimed that their offices were closed, other sources reported that these groups were still transferring funds from their headquarters in Syria to cells outside the country and were continuing to teach bomb-making classes.81

According to the International Crisis Group, in September 2003 “Syrian pressure allegedly halted an attempt by the Lebanese Central Bank to investigate Hamas funds in Lebanese banks.”82 Furthermore, on January 29, 2004, in a statement regarding that day’s suicide bombing in Jerusalem, US Secretary of State Powell suggested that Syria had supplied the perpetrators with weapons. He said, “Syria cannot be serious about wanting a better relationship with Israel, the United States or anyone else, as long as it serves as any kind of transshipment point for weapons that are going to terrorists of the kind who killed innocent people this morning in Jerusalem.”83 Thus, Syria’s political, military and financial assistance to anti-Israel extremist factions such as Hamas, the PIJ, and the Hizbollah continues to threaten Israeli security, as well as international efforts to achieve peace in the region.

Outside Actors: Jordan

The history of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is inextricably linked to that of the Palestinian people. Jordan has been a partner with Israel in the peace process, but it has also been

a strong supporter of Palestinian rights, and its actions have been shaped by the fact that there is a very sizeable number of Palestinians living in Jordan. It is likely that Jordanian policies and actions will influence the course of Israeli-Palestinian relations and the character of any future peace agreement between the two sides.

The Shaping of the Jordanian-Palestinian Relationship

The present peace between Jordan and Israel took a long time to shape. In the aftermath of World War I, the League of Nations placed the Mandate for Palestine and Trans-Jordan, composed of present-day Jordan, Israel, Jerusalem, Gaza and the West Bank, under British administrative control. The British subsequently divided the Mandate into the semi-autonomous Hashemite Kingdom of Trans-Jordan (present-day Jordan), and Palestine (present-day Israel, Jerusalem, Gaza and the West Bank), which remained under direct British authority.

Trans-Jordan became independent in May 1946. When the State of Israel declared its independence two years later, the Trans-Jordanian government dispatched armies to fight in the Arab war against Israel. Israel defeated its opponents, and the subsequent armistice left the West Bank under Trans-Jordan’s administrative control, though the UN left the West Bank’s final status unresolved. In 1950, Trans-Jordan was renamed the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Jordanian parliamentary elections on April 11, 1950, allocated an equal number of seats for representatives from the West Bank as from Jordan-proper (the “East Bank”). On April 24, the Jordanian parliament approved a motion to unite Jordan and the West Bank under one political system, and the West Bank Palestinians were offered Jordanian citizenship.84 Jordan officially considered the West Bank to be under Jordanian administration until 1988.

Jordan lost control of the West Bank to Israel following Israel’s victory in the Six Day War in June 1967. At the same time, Israel gained control of the Golan Heights, the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip and the entirety of Jerusalem. There were 300,000 Palestinian refugees entering Jordan at that time, so that a total of one million Palestinians lived in Jordan by the end of 1967. This, in turn, markedly increased the presence of anti-Israel Palestinian resistance groups—including the PLO and George Habash’s PFLP—in Jordan. Soon thereafter, these groups adopted guerrilla and terrorist tactics in combating Israel.

Jordan’s King Hussein initially pursued a policy of accommodation with, and support for, the Palestinian groups. However, as these groups became more powerful, they sought to gain

greater autonomy and influence over the Jordanian government. They violated Jordanian laws and illegally imported arms from Eastern Europe. Their guerrilla actions against Israel brought Israeli retaliation against Jordan. Israel attacked three Jordanian villages in 1968. By the end of the year, the focus of the Palestinian groups changed, as they turned their attention away from Palestinian independence and toward overthrowing Hussein’s regime. By 1970, Jordan’s stability and security were clearly threatened, and the Jordanian armed forces were locked in bitter conflict with the Palestinian militants.85

In September 1970, tensions between the Jordanian government and the Palestinian factions reached a boiling point. Despite conciliatory agreements between Hussein and Yasser Arafat, who by then was chairman of the PLO, Palestinian guerrillas seized and occupied several strategic positions in Jordan, including an important oil refinery. The PFLP also hijacked three commercial airliners on September 6 as a political gesture. International pressure on Jordan increased and King Hussein felt that the militant groups threatened the future of his government. On September 16, he declared martial law and ordered the disarmament of the militants.86

The resulting conflict, known to the Palestinians as “Black September,” influenced Jordan’s relationship with Yasser Arafat’s PLO (and later the Palestinian Authority), and to some extent Israel and the United States. Civil war broke out in Jordan between Hussein’s government and Arafat’s Palestine Liberation Army (PLA). Syria intervened on the Palestinian side, sending tanks into Jordan, and Israel deployed troops on the Jordanian border. The two sides waged battles throughout the remainder of 1970 and into 1971.87

Fatah publicly demanded the overthrow of the Hussein government and rumors circulated that the PLO planned to form a Jordanian “government-in-exile.” In response, the Jordanian army launched a final offensive against the Palestinian forces and arrested 2,300 of the remaining 2,500 fighters. Most were released in Jordan or exiled, but Jordan became a pariah among the Arab states for its alleged harsh treatment of the Palestinians. The Black September war illustrated that the Jordanian government would not allow Palestinian militancy to threaten its own security, whether that threat came from internal machinations, regional instability, or damage to Jordan’s international reputation.

Jordan and the Peace Process

The Jordanian government became active in promoting regional peace after this crisis with Palestinian resistance groups. However, war continued to engulf the region. In 1973, Egypt and Syria launched an attack on Israel to regain the Golan Heights and the Sinai Peninsula. The 1973 war was followed two years later by the Lebanese civil war.88

The Jordanian government concluded that the widespread political instability and near- constant state of warfare represented a hindrance to regional economic growth and prosperity. The Jordanians further believed that much of the conflict stemmed directly or indirectly from the Israeli occupation of Arab land. As a result, Jordan began to advocate peaceful, diplomatic measures to regain the occupied Arab territory from Israel.89

Jordan’s first peace proposal came in 1972 and called for establishing a federal state called the United Arab Kingdom, which would include the existing Jordanian state and the Israeli-occupied West Bank. According to the plan, each region would have its own parliament and executive under the overall authority of the Jordanian monarchy. Lingering animosity from Black September and competitive Jordanian and Palestinian nationalist ideologies caused the defeat of the proposal. In 1974, discussion of Palestinian absorption into Jordan largely ended when Arab leaders recognized the PLO as the “sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.” 90

Jordan has long played a significant role in attempting to establish a formal peace process between Israel and the Palestinians. On February 11, 1985, King Hussein offered to coordinate peace negotiations with Israel as part of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation.91 The proposal failed, but it indicated that Jordan was willing to participate actively in Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. In 1988, the Jordanian government dissolved what remained of the formal political association between Jordan and the West Bank. On July 28, Jordanian development aid to the West Bank ceased, and on July 30, Hussein disbanded the Jordanian parliament, which still included an equal number of Jordanian and West Bank Palestinian representatives.92 The next day, Jordanian administration of the West Bank officially ended, an act that was one of several important catalysts for the 1990s peace process.

The end of the Cold War and the defeat of Iraq in the Gulf War in 1991, helped stimulate new peace efforts. The Jordanian government publicly supported negotiations with Israel, though

it allowed a number of Palestinian rejectionist groups to operate offices within Jordan. At various times, these groups included the PFLP, PFLP-GC, DFLP, PIJ, and Hamas. Jordan, however, tightly restricted the actions of such groups.

The U.S. and the Soviet Union organized the Madrid Peace Conference in October 1991, which laid the foundation for future accords. Israel and the Palestinians began to negotiate openly and directly for the first time, though initially the PLO was (at least nominally) excluded from the process.93 As a result, the Madrid Conference helped create the atmosphere of cooperation that led to the 1993 Oslo Accords between Israel and the Palestinians. It also led to the 1994 Washington Declaration between Israel and Jordan. The Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty, which was signed on October 26, 1994, ended the state of war between Israel and Jordan, returned 380 square kilometers of Israeli-occupied land to Jordan, and guaranteed Jordan an equal share of water from the Yarmouk and Jordan Rivers. It also clearly defined Jordan’s borders, so that Israel formally acknowledged that the West Bank was not part of Jordan. Jordan became the second Arab state, after Egypt, to make peace with Israel.

The Jordanian government increasingly cracked down on several of the Palestinian militant groups in Jordan as negotiations with Israel progressed. It arrested 30 Palestinians, including 15 members of the Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) on February 25, 1994, and an Islamic extremist for stabbing tourists on February 27. Jordan declared Hamas to be an illegal organization in April 1994, and arrested another 25 Islamists, or Arab “Afghans,” for planning the assassination of Jordanian officials. More than 20 other Palestinian Islamic extremists suspected of planning terrorist acts against Israel were arrested after Jordan signed the treaty with Israel on October 26, 1994, including militants based in Syria and affiliated with Hizbollah.94 The government also restricted the activities of Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood, even though the two groups enjoyed significant support from the Jordanian population.

Jordan also supported the broader peace effort. In July 1998, King Hussein was diagnosed with cancer of the lymph glands and traveled to the U.S. for chemotherapy. He broke off treatment in order to assist U.S. President Bill Clinton in mediating between Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Natanyahu and Yasser Arafat at the October summit that produced the Wye River agreement. Hussein returned for more treatment, but it was unsuccessful, and he died on February 7, 1999. His son, Abdullah, succeeded him. The new king strongly supported Ehud

Barak’s peacemaking efforts, stating that, “We think he will measure up to our expectations.”95 Encouraging the Israeli-Palestinian peace process became one of the central tenets of Abdullah’s foreign policy, and he even attempted to involve outside actors, such as Spain, in the mediation process.96 He also offered to “assist and give confidence” in negotiations between Israel and Syria.97

The Jordanian Campaign against Militancy

King Abdullah’s government has taken an unsympathetic view of Hamas and other militant organizations operating in Jordan. It cooperated closely with Israel and the Palestinian Authority throughout 1999. On August 30, Jordanian officials closed five Hamas and Muslim Brotherhood offices in Amman, including the Hamas newspaper Filastine al-Muslimah, because they were “involved in activities incompatible with their [business] licenses.”98 They also arrested 15 Hamas activists, and issued warrants for others. Government agents arrested three senior Hamas leaders on September 22, as they attempted to return to Jordan from Iran. The ICT suggested that the crackdown might have been inspired by “sheer self-preservation.” Hamas reportedly operated a military training camp and stored weapons and explosives in Jordan, and had begun to keep a security file on the Jordanian government.99

In November 1999, four of the Hamas leaders under arrest were “forc[ibly] exiled” to Qatar, and the Abdullah government announced a total ban on Hamas activities in Jordan.100 The 1999 campaign against Hamas, which continued in 2000, was similar to the actions against Palestinian militants almost 30 years prior – both were motivated by the overarching policy of safeguarding Jordanian security, even from those actors that the Jordanian population was inclined to support ideologically.

Anti-Israeli sentiment increased in Jordan after the Israeli-Palestinian War began in September 2000. On October 7, Jordan chose not to send an ambassador to Israel because of the outbreak of hostility. At the same time, numerous demonstrations broke out across Jordan calling for the expulsion of the Israeli ambassador. On November 19, militants shot an Israeli diplomat in the hand and leg. On December 6, another Israeli diplomat was shot outside a supermarket in Amman.101 However, the Abdullah government continued to cooperate with Israel in the anti- militancy campaign. In May 2001, the Jordanian government announced it had arrested 13

Islamic fundamentalists in January, believed to have been plotting to attack Israeli and Western targets in Jordan.102

Jordan and the Israeli-Palestinian War

Jordan has endured increasing militancy and threats to its internal security as a result of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In June 2001, the Jordanian government limited the number of Palestinians entering the country, a move that angered the Palestinian Authority. The government also banned demonstrations by Islamic militants.103 The Jordanian Security Services acknowledge that support for Islamic extremist organizations has intensified, though a March 2003 study by the Institute for Social Research (ISR) at the University of Michigan indicated that 70% of Jordanians did not believe Islamic leaders should influence Jordanian politics.104

Jordan has, however, remained committed to regional peace. On July 21, 2003, a newly convened Jordanian cabinet formally stated that it would continue to encourage the Israeli- Palestinian peace process. Jordan will likely play an important role in the conflict in the future. The Jordanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) published Jordan’s official position on the conflict and the derailed peace process in August 2003. According to the document,105

Jordan believes that the focus and attention of the international community must be directed at solving, without any delay or procrastination, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as a prelude to solving, comprehensively, the broader Arab-Israeli conflict. …[I]mplementing the Tenet Plan and the Mitchell Report Recommendations are important steps in the right direction. The Palestinian commitment to carry out institutional reforms and fight terrorism should be reciprocated with an Israeli commitment and action to end the occupation of Palestinian cities and towns, stop incursions and cease all military operations in order to prepare the right and positive environment for re-initiating the peace process on the Israeli-Palestinian track. Jordan believes excessive force applied by Israel against the Palestinian people since the Autumn [sp] of 2001 must come to an immediate end. Additionally an international monitoring mechanism should be allowed on the ground, to ensure that both parties are performing the obligations that they undertook under various previous agreements and guarantee the implementation thereof and uncover possible violations of international humanitarian law in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Jordan believes a time-lined resumed Peace Process with defined terms of reference and a clear end point based on the original terms of reference (United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242, 338 and 425 and the Land for Peace formulae), the Arab Peace Initiative of the Beirut Summit, and United Nations Security Council Resolution 1397 should be launched as soon as possible. In this context, Jordan fully supports the views expressed by His Excellency Mr. George Bush, the President of the United States of America, on 24 June 2002, in which the US President outlined his views for an end game at the Palestinian- Israeli track to include the establishment of a Palestinian State by mid 2005 next to the State of Israel in the West Bank and Gaza. Jordan supports efforts being made through the Quartet to draw up a clear roadmap leading to the implementation of US President George W. Bush’s Vision. Furthermore, Jordan supports the evolution of the roadmap and is hopeful that when announced and endorsed by the Quartet, it will constitute an integral

part of international legitimacy and will assume a status that is binding upon all. Jordan emphasizes that the road map ought to be viewed as a package that is to be accepted as such in its totality or rejected in its totality. No room should be left for any party to pick and choose elements of the road map and reject others. Jordan is content that the road map has been extended beyond the Palestinian-Israeli track and aspires to achieve a comprehensive solution at the Syrian and Lebanese-Israeli tracks too by mid 2005… The Palestinian refugee problem is particularly important to Jordan. It is likely that the need to resolve the refugee issue, in addition to Jordanian security concerns, has served to motivate Jordan’s intense interest in the peace process. According to the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), 1,740,170 Palestinian refugees were registered with the agency in June 2003. This constitutes approximately 31.9% of the current Jordanian population and 42% of the entire registered refugee population. This number of refugees in Jordan is greater than the total number of registered refugees in Lebanon, Syria and the West Bank combined. This has greatly impacted Jordanian infrastructural, social and economic development. Compared to Lebanon, Syria, Gaza and the West Bank, Jordan has the relatively highest level of socio-economic integration of refugees, and correspondingly it has the lowest percentage of “special hardship cases” (SHCs)—refugees to whom the UNRWA directly administers food rations—in the UNRWA area of operation.106

Jordan has acknowledged that it will not allow any new Palestinian refugees to be added to its existing numbers and will not grant nationality to new refugees. Furthermore, it has called for Israel to agree to a Palestinian right of return to their former homes in Israel, legal resolution for displaced persons (DPs) stemming from the 1967 War, Israeli compensation for Palestinian loss of property and domicile, and for emotional and psychological suffering and harm. Finally, the MFA has stated that Jordan intends to seek compensation for “the actual cost incurred for hosting Palestinian refugees since 1948 and DPs since 1967, taking into consideration the cost of services, loss in agricultural land, cost of infrastructure, depleted resources, collectively owned enterprises, and civil institutions.”107

Jordan has, however, continued to make efforts to bring an end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and recreate the peace process. It has also responded positively to the Sharon initiatives to withdraw from Gaza. Jordan -- along with Egypt -- had recalled its ambassador in September 2000 in protest against what the Jordanian government deemed “Israel’s excessively forceful response” after fighting erupted. Following Arafat’s death and the improvement in Israeli-

Palestinian relations, however, Jordan’s Cabinet voted on February 15, 2005 to return its ambassador to Israel.108

Soon after Jordan’s Cabinet made the ruling, Israel accepted the nomination of Ambassador Maarouf al-Bakhit (Jordan’s then envoy to Turkey). Ambassador al-Bakhit arrived at his new post in Israel on February 20—the same day that Egypt named Muhammad Assem Ibrahim to be Egypt’s next Ambassador to Israel. The previous Jordanian ambassador to Israel, Abdul-Illah al-Kurdi, was appointed in August 2000, but never actually arrived in Israel. The return of the Jordanian and Egyptian ambassadors to Israel after a four year absence, marked a renewed sense of diplomacy and improved relations between the countries.

Outside Actors: Iraq

As long as Iraq was under Saddam Hussein, it contributed significantly to Palestinian militant efforts between the outbreak of the Israeli-Palestinian War and early 2003. However, the U.S.-led coalition’s war against Iraq in March 2003 ultimately removed the Hussein government from power and ended formal Iraqi assistance to Palestinian extremist groups.

In January 2003, the Israeli Foreign Ministry released a report detailing the ways in which the Iraqi government had aided Palestinian militants since the Israeli-Palestinian War began. Two groups in particular benefited from Iraqi financial and military assistance: the Palestinian Liberation Front (PLF), led by Mahmoud Zidan Abu El Abbas (known as Abu Abbas), and the Arab Liberation Front (ALF). The Iraqi government allowed the PLF and ALF to operate training camps outside Baghdad, where operatives received instruction in weapons training, preparing ambushes, firing at moving vehicles, constructing explosives and manufacturing and using Molotov cocktails. The militants were generally given orders or suggestions for actions against potential targets following their training.109

Iraq also gave substantial financial compensation to the families of injured and dead Palestinian militants, including those of suicide bombers. The money was presented to the families on behalf of Saddam Hussein in public ceremonies throughout the West Bank and Gaza, which Palestinian Authority representatives sometimes attended. Israeli forces confiscated a number of ALF reports during Operation Defensive Shield that illustrated the extent of Iraqi financial support. The documents indicated that the Iraqi government awarded $10,000 to each

of the 12 Arab families whose relatives were killed in riots in October 2000. In September 2002, Iraq distributed more than $10,000 worth of checks to the families of deceased militants at a PLF ceremony. In January 2003, ALF representatives in Gaza stated that Iraq planned to increase the allocations from $10,000 to $25,000 and that Iraq had granted $5,000 to the families whose homes were destroyed in Rafah and $25,000 to those whose homes were destroyed in Jenin in 2002. The ALF also stated that Iraq had given a total of $30 to 35 million to Palestinians since the beginning of the Israeli-Palestinian War.110

One of the stated causes of the U.S.-led coalition’s invasion of Iraq in 2003 was to gain intelligence regarding the networks of militants operating in Iraqi territory. The Bush Administration also attempted to link the invasion of Iraq with the effort to restart the Israeli- Palestinian peace process. On February 26, 2003 Bush stated, “Success in Iraq could begin a new stage for Middle Eastern peace and set in motion progress towards a truly democratic Palestinian state. The passing of Saddam Hussein’s regime will deprive terrorist networks of a wealthy patron that pays for terrorist training, and offers rewards to families of suicide bombers. And other regimes will be given a clear warning that support for terror will not be tolerated.”111

In April 2003, Saddam Hussein’s regime was ousted from power and coalition forces also captured former PLF leader Abu Abbas, who was the alleged mastermind behind the PLF hijacking of the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro in 1985.

Since that time, however, Islamic and pro-Ba’athist resistance movements have resurged. They have actively challenged coalition forces, and Iraq has remained an environment in which militant groups can operate. The coalition’s failures in defeating Iraqi rebels and militants has bolstered the spirits of the Palestinian extremist factions, and has demonstrated that even the U.S. military can be challenged using guerrilla tactics. Iraq may also slide back into authoritarianism if the U.S. and its allies prove unable to establish a stable democratic and economic infrastructure in the country. If that were the case, Iraqi financial and military support of Palestinian extremism may resume, and militant Palestinian groups could gain significant additional tactical support.

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