Negotiating in Times of Conflict
Total Page：16
File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb
cover Negotiating in Times of Conflict Gilead Sher and Anat Kurz, Editors Institute for National Security Studies The Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), incorporating the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, was founded in 2006. The purpose of the Institute for National Security Studies is first, to conduct basic research that meets the highest academic standards on matters related to Israel’s national security as well as Middle East regional and international security affairs. Second, the Institute aims to contribute to the public debate and governmental deliberation of issues that are – or should be – at the top of Israel’s national security agenda. INSS seeks to address Israeli decision makers and policymakers, the defense establishment, public opinion makers, the academic community in Israel and abroad, and the general public. INSS publishes research that it deems worthy of public attention, while it maintains a strict policy of non-partisanship. The opinions expressed in this publication are the authors’ alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute, its trustees, boards, research staff, or the organizations and individuals that support its research. Negotiating in Times of Conflict Gilead Sher and Anat Kurz, Editors משא ומתן בעת סכסוך גלעד שר וענת קורץ, עורכים Graphic design: Michal Semo-Kovetz and Yael Bieber Cover design: Tali Niv-Dolinsky Printing: Elinir Institute for National Security Studies (a public benefit company) 40 Haim Levanon Street POB 39950 Ramat Aviv Tel Aviv 6997556 Israel Tel. +972-3-640-0400 Fax. +972-3-744-7590 E-mail: [email protected] http:// www.inss.org.il © 2015 All rights reserved. ISBN: 978-965-7425-79-4 Contents Introduction 7 Always Try Engagement 17 Erik Solheim Obstructing the Spoilers of Peace 29 Miriam Fendius Elman Disarming Militant Groups from Within: Building Support for Peace among Combatants in Northern Ireland 47 Benedetta Berti, Ariel Heifetz Knobel, and Gary Mason When the Diaspora Becomes an Obstacle: The Armenian Diaspora and the Negotiations between Turkey and Armenia, 2009-2010 63 Gallia Lindenstrauss A Conflict within a Conflict: The Fatah-Hamas Strife and the Israeli-Palestinian Political Process 81 Anat Kurz Religious Dialogue as a Contribution to Political Negotiations: A Practitioner’s Report 95 Trond Bakkevig “Level II” Negotiation Strategies: Advance Your Interests by Helping to Solve Their Internal Problems 107 James K. Sebenius Constructive Negotiations in Contentious Contexts 125 Louis Kriesberg Negotiations and Power Sharing Arrangements in Burundi’s Peace Process: Achievements and Challenges 141 Patrick Hajayandi Liberia: How Diplomacy Helped End a 13-Year Civil War 155 Alan J. Kuperman The 1996 “Grapes of Wrath” Ceasefire Agreement and the Israel-Lebanon Monitoring Group: A Model of Successful Negotiations in Conflict Management 173 Marc Finaud Overcoming Socio-Psychological Barriers: The Influence of Beliefs about Losses 193 Ruthie Pliskin, Eran Halperin, and Daniel Bar-Tal Overcoming Relational Barriers to Agreement 205 Byron Bland and Lee Ross The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Is There a Zone of Possible Agreement (“ZOPA”)? 213 Robert H. Mnookin When Negotiations Fail to Bear Fruit: The Case for Constructive Independent Steps 227 Gilead Sher Contributors 243 Introduction Introduction “There is no easy way,” Senator George J. Mitchell While in the summer of 2014 we at the editorial board were busy reviewing the set of articles by the contributors to this volume, Israel and Hamas were engaged in yet another bloody round of hostilities. Provisional ceasefires collapsed one after another. For over seven weeks, Israeli civilians faced the reality of relentless rocket, mortar, and missile fire from the Gaza Strip by Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. In Gaza, one of the poorest and most densely populated areas in the world, massive destruction as well as the number of direct and collateral deaths and casualties accumulated as Israel resorted to an all-out military campaign – Operation Protective Edge – in an effort to bring the fire from the Strip to a halt. When blood is spilled, people are filled with vengeance and anger, along with despair, bereavement, mistrust, and frustration. This moment is a golden opportunity for hate-driven extremists, yet even for the non-radical person, emotions run high and harsh rhetoric tends to eclipse hope and calls for a diplomatic resolution. However, we suggest that there might be ways to resolve, or at least to mitigate, even complex, violent, and protracted conflicts between communities and nations, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict among them. The articles collected here explore this potential for conflict resolution. When we first decided to publish this volume, we contacted prominent researchers and practitioners from around the globe with specializations in a variety of different conflict arenas. Interestingly, several dominant themes and recommendations for negotiating in times of conflict recurred in many papers. Perhaps this is not surprising, as in attempts to manage conflicts throughout history and throughout the world, the same mistakes have been made time and again – mistakes that too often result in futile 7 Introduction efforts, widespread fatalities, and horrendous suffering. In light of this, the importance of taking on board the experiences of conflict resolution analysts and practitioners cannot be underestimated. We hope that the lessons presented in this publication provide valuable material for policymakers, mediators, and negotiators who strive to avoid pitfalls in their quest for peace and aim to create a tolerable if not promising future for those embroiled in conflict and war. The articles herein focus on elements and policies equipped to facilitate alleviation of tension and contribute to peacemaking efforts within the context of negotiation strategy. The lessons and policy recommendations for the most part were based on specific cases that were then translated into general terms. Much emphasis falls on inclusiveness as a key negotiating strategy, the potentially supportive role of international actors, and the psychological dimension of conflicts and conflict resolution. Additional lessons concern the challenge of paving the way for negotiations, where rival parties face a deadlock. Many of the articles touch upon several of these aspects, and together reflect with three principal themes: general approaches to negotiations, case studies, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The section dedicated to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict reflects the particular interest at INSS and its Center for Applied Negotiations (CAN) in enriching the discourse on managing and advancing a resolution of this complex issue and on guiding associated peace-oriented policy. In light of this underlying logic, general conclusions that are specifically relevant to Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking efforts are underlined in the context of this introductory, integrative essay. A Focal Negotiating Strategy: Inclusiveness A significant lesson that emerged repeatedly from the analyses and conflict resolution accounts stresses the importance of inclusiveness. Many authors advocate making an effort to include as many influential actors as possible into a peace process, even those who are considered as spoilers of the process or armed non-state insurgent groups, i.e., terrorist organizations – though this would not be unconditional inclusion and must be based on their readiness to discuss terms for an end to violence. The main message from these papers is that whatever the challenges, the more inclusive the peace process, the 8 Introduction more successful it is likely to be. Trying to marginalize spoiler groups and other problematic constituents rarely works, and in many cases only bolsters the group one is seeking to sideline. Talking to and including groups in the process is nearly always recommended: it will not always succeed, but it will succeed often enough to be worthwhile. In his essay, Erik Solheim asserts that history shows that governments in many cases end up talking to those they once branded as terrorists, so they may as well try earlier. Several groups that were once deemed spoilers have been convinced to lay down their arms and adopt a political approach. Solheim explains that talking to terrorists or rebel factions does not mean giving in, but is rather an attempt to avoid violence if there is even a slim chance of reaching agreement by bringing up issues of conflict and perceived wrong and injustice. In other words, speaking with such groups does not mean that their violence is condoned. While negotiations are often seen as comprising two opposing parties, the reality is far more complex. Breakaway factions, diaspora communities, interest groups, and an array of third parties all have an influential role in negotiations that must be fully understood and addressed. Thus, Miriam Fendius Elman urges policymakers to include into the peace process, as early on as possible, constituencies known as spoilers who attempt to undermine the negotiations. Elman explains that while governments work to integrate their spoilers into the peace process, they must not shy away from taking a swift and decisive response if violence should occur. Cracking down on spoiler violence sends a message to the other side that leaders are serious about peace. In their chapter, Benedetta Berti, Ariel Heifetz Knobel, and Gary Mason present a case study on intra-party loyalist negotiations in Northern Ireland.