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Civil Society and the Collapse of the Weimar Author(s): Sheri Berman Source: World , Vol. 49, No. 3 (Apr., 1997), pp. 401-429 Published by: Cambridge University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25054008 . Accessed: 07/04/2013 14:12

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BySHERIBERMAN*

everywhere one looks, from social science mono to to the of PRACTICALLYgraphs political speeches People magazine, concept "civil society" is in vogue. A flourishing civil society is considered to have helped bring down the Evil Empire and is held to be a prerequisite for success a the of post-Soviet democratic experiments; civil society in de is to in cline said threaten America. Tocqueville is the the orist of the decade, having noted a century and a half ago that are "Americans of all ages, all stations in life, and all types of disposition to forever forming associations." Further, he linked such behavior the robustness of the nations representative institutions. "Nothing," he claimed, "more deserves attention than the intellectual and moral asso ciations in America_In democratic countries the knowledge of how to on combine is the mother of all other forms of knowledge; its progress depends that of all the others."1 as Today neo-Tocquevilleans such Robert Putnam argue that civil to society is crucial "making democracy work,"2 while authors like Francis Fukuyama and Benjamin Barber (who differ on everything else) agree that it plays a key role in driving political, social, and even economic outcomes.3 This new conventional wisdom, however, is not true as flawed. It is simply always that, Putnam (for example) puts was not it, "Tocqueville right: Democratic is strengthened,

* The author would like to thank Peter Berkowitz, Nancy Bermeo, David P. Conradt, Manfred Halpern, Marcus Kreuzer, Andy Markovits, Anna Seleny, Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, Carolyn Warner, and Gideon Rose, for comments and criticisms. 1 especially helpful Alexis de inAmerica (New York: and Row, 1988), 513, 517. 2 Tocqueville, Democracy Harper inModern Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions Italy (Princeton: Princeton Univer see sity Press, 1993); also idem, "Bowling Alone: America's Declining ," fournal of no. Democracy 6 (January 1995); idem, "The Prosperous Community," American Prospect, 13 (Spring no. 1993); and idem, "The Strange Disappearance of Civic America," American Prospect, 24 (Winter 1996). 3 Fukuyama, Trust: Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (New York Free Press, 1995); and vs. Barber, Jihad McWorld How the Planet Is Both Falling Apart and Coming Together?and What This NY Means for Democracy (New York: Times Books, 1995).

WorldPolitics 49 (April 1997), 401-29

This content downloaded from 155.247.167.222 on Sun, 7 Apr 2013 14:12:38 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 402 WORLD POLITICS weakened, when it faces a vigorous civil society."4This essay will show how a robust civil society actually helped scuttle the twentieth century s most critical democratic experiment, Weimar Germany. Associational life flourished inGermany throughout the nineteenth and in the twentieth Yet in contrast to what early century. neo-Tocque of villean theories would predict, high levels associationism, absent strong and responsive national government and political parties, served to unite It was fragment rather than German society. weak political a was institutionalization rather than weak civil society that Germany's main problem during theWilhelmine andWeimar eras. As Samuel almost three decades societies with active Huntington noted ago, highly and mobilized publics and low levels of political institutionalization into even often degenerate instability, disorder, and violence;5 German a classic of this in ac political development provides example dynamic tion. During the interwar period in particular, Germans threw them selves into their clubs, voluntary associations, and professional organi zations out of frustration with the failures of the national government and political parties, thereby helping to undermine theWeimar Repub lic and facilitate Hitler s rise to power. In addition, Weimar s rich asso ciational life provided a critical training ground for eventual Nazi cadres and a base from which the National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP)could launch itsMachtergreifung (siezure of power). Had never German civil society been weaker, the Nazis would have been so cause or able to capture many citizens for their eviscerate their op so ponents swiftly. A striking implication of this analysis is that a flourishing civil soci not ety does necessarily bode well for the prospects of liberal democ to racy. For civil society have the beneficial effects neo-Tocquevilleans context to posit, the political has be right: absent strong and responsive an active serve to political institutions, increasingly civil society may a undermine, rather than strengthen, political regime. Political institu a tionalization, in other words, may be less chic topic these days than civil society, but it is logically prior and historically more important. As a "a Huntington put it, well-ordered civic polity requires recognizable . . . and stable pattern of institutional authority political institutions [must be] sufficiently strong to provide the basis of a legitimate politi cal order andworking political community."Without such political in trust to stitutions, societies will lack and the ability define and realize

4 Putnam (fn. 2, Work), 182. 5 Making Democracy Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).

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their common interests.6 Political scientists need to remember that Tocqueville himself considered Americans' political associations to be as as to more important their nonpolitical ones, and they need examine two closely how the interact in different situations.7

Neo-Tocquevillean Theories

The logic of neo-Tocquevillean theories bears closer examination. it turns are not to Contemporary scholars, out, the first "rediscover" the great Frenchman, nor even the first to link group bowling and political development.8 After World War II several social scientists also claimed to have in a to found associational life key understanding democracy's success or failure. During the 1950s and 1960s social scientists such asWilliam Korn hauser and Hannah Arendt turn the of helped concept "mass society" into a powerful theory for explaining the disintegration of democracy and the rise of totalitarianism in Europe.9 This school believed that was Europe's slide into barbarism greased by, among other factors, the across collapse of intermediate associations much of the Continent dur the interwar the to Mass ing years; epigraph Kornhausers Politics of So was s men are to or to ciety Tocqueville warning that "if remain civilized art must become so, the of associating together grow and improve in same the ratio in which the equality of conditions is increased."10 6 Ibid., 82-83,5-25. 7 W. Michael Foley and Bob Edwards, "The Paradox of Civil Society," Journal ofDemocracy 1 (July 1996); Larry Diamond, "Rethinking Civil Society: Toward Democratic Consolidation," Journal of Democracy 5 (July 1994); Theda Skocpol, "The Tocqueville Problem: Civic Engagement in American Democracy" (Presidential address for the annual meeting of the Social Science History Association, New no. Orleans, October 12, 1996); and idem, "Unravelling from Above," American Prospect, 25 1996). (March-April8 A distinction toMax Weber; see fn. 23 below. 9 apparendy belonging William Kornhauser, The Politics ofMass Society (Glencoe, 111.:Free Press, 1959); and Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973). See also Sig mund Permanent Neumann, Revolution (New York: Harper, 1942); Karl Mannheim, Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction (New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980); Erich Fromm, Escape from Freedom (New York: Rinehart, 1941); Edward Shils, "The Theory of Mass Society," in Philip Olson, as a ed., America Mass Society (New York: Free Press, 1963); and E. V. Walter, "'Mass Society': The an out Late Stages of Idea," Social Research 31 (Winter 1964). It should be pointed that the concept of mass a one most society has variety of different interpretations. Apart from the discussed here, the well term known usage of the is associated with Jos? Ortega y Gasset, The Revolt of theMasses (New York: a W. W. Norton, 1994), and other theories of cultural decay. For recent discussion of this latter usage, see Neil Mclnnes, "Ortega and the Myth of the Mass," National Interest (Summer 1996). For general mass see overviews of the society literature, Patrick Brantlinger, Bread and Circuses: Theories ofMass as Culture Social Decay (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983); and Salvador Giner, Mass Soci ety (New York: Academic Press, 1976). 10 On the intellectual history of mass society theories, seeWalters (fn. 9), 405; and Sandor Haleb Mass a sky, Society and Political Conflict: Toward Reconstruction of Theory (New York: Cambridge Uni versity Press, 1976).

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on to a on mass Drawing Durkheim, and lesser degree Marx, the soci cit ety theorists argued that industrialization and modernity estranged izens one from another, leaving them rootless and searching for ways of from their traditional masses were avail belonging. Ripped moorings, extremist able for mobilization by movements?unless, that is, individ uals could develop communal bonds through organizational affiliations and involvement. Without "amultiplicity of independent and often conflicting forms of association," Kornhauser wrote, "people lack the resources to restrain their own behavior as well as that of others. Social

atomization engenders strong feelings of alienation and anxiety, and to in extreme behavior to from therefore the disposition engage escape these tensions."11 to was an to Civil society, according these theorists, antidote the po mass litical viruses that afflicted society. Participation in organizations not only helped bring citizens together, bridging cleavages and foster it their ing skills necessary for democratic governance, but also satisfied to to some to a need belong larger grouping. According this view, key reason for the of theWeimar was its status as a clas collapse Republic mass to to sic society, which made it susceptible the blandishments of s were talitarian demagoguery. Hitler supporters drawn primarily from alienated individuals who lacked a wide range of associational mem saw NSDAP a into a berships and in the way of integrating themselves the larger community; had German civil society been stronger, republic not might have fallen.12 not a The empirical evidence did support such causal sequence. For this and other reasons (such as the advent of newer and trendier theo ries), by the late 1960s social scientists had moved on and the concept mass out of society had fallen of vogue. Beginning in the 1970s, how a wave across ever, third of democratization swept the globe,13 and to as as scholars sought identify its causes, well those factors that deter success more were to mined democratic generally. Several drawn the that had attracted Arendt and sameTocquevillean insights Kornhauser, a Work was others few decades earlier. Putnam's Making Democracy par

11 a on Kornhauser (fn. 9), 32; see also Arendt (fn. 9), 315-23. For general review of the literature see Review this point, Joseph R. Gusfield, "Mass Society and Extremist Politics," American Sociological 17 (1982). 12 see On mass society theories and theWeimar Republic, the excellent essay by Bernt Hagtvet, in "The Theory of Mass Society and the Collapse of theWeimar Republic: A Re-examination,w Stein Roots Larsen, Bernt Hagtvet, and Jan Petter Myklebust, eds., Who Were the Fascists? Social ofEuropean Fascism Norway: Universitetsforlaget, 1980). 13 (Bergen, Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).

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ticularly important for the revival of interest in the role played by pri in vate, voluntary associations sustaining vibrant democracy.14 Like the mass recent society theorists, neo-Tocquevillean analyses stress to the way individuals relate each other and their society when measure ex explaining why democratic regimes function well. To and the success of uses plain democracy, Putnam, for example, the concepts of civic community and social capital; for both of these the key indica tor is what might be termed associationism, the propensity of individ uals to a form and join wide range of organizations spontaneously. to According Putnam: Civil associations contribute to the effectiveness and stability of democratic . . on government. both because of their "internal" effects individual members and because of their "extemaT effects on the wider associations polity. Internally, instill in their members habits of cooperation, solidarity, and public spiritedness...... a dense network of . .. the Externally secondary associations [enhances interests to articulation and aggregation of and] contributes effective social col laboration.15

sense Associations "broaden the participants' of self, developing the T into the 'We.'" "Networks of civic engagement," meanwhile, "foster norms sturdy of generalized reciprocity and encourage the emergence of social trust," which help resolve dilemmas of collective action and smooth economic and political negotiations.16 For Putnam almost any serve as as type of secondary association will these functions, long it is not organized around vertical bonds of authority and dependency. As he puts it: "The manifest purpose of the association [need not] be po litical."17 in a or a can "Taking part choral society bird-watching club an teach self-discipline and appreciation for the joys of successful col to laboration," he writes, thus contributing the efficiency of regional government in Italy; the decline of league bowling, similarly, signals the decay of democracy in the United States.18 In sum, for Putnam and oth 14 are ear Recent neo-Tocquevillean analyses somewhat different in emphasis, however, from their mass states?on lier society counterparts. In particular, they focus?as Putnam's title what "makes some no democracy work," that is,what makes healthier than others; there is explicit dis a new cussion of the possibility of descent into totalitarianism. For Putnam and his counterparts, in or other words, the dependent variable is the strength effectiveness (it is unclear which) of democratic mass was institutions, while for society theorists the dependent variable the slide into totalitarianism. 15 see Putnam (fn. 2,Making Democracy Work), 89-90. On social capital, also James Coleman, Foun dations Social (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1990). 16 of Theory Putnam (fn. 2,1995), 67. See also idem, "Tuning In, Tuning Out: The Strange Disappearance of Social Capital in America," PS (December 1995); and idem (fn. 2, "The Prosperous Community"). 17 a on Putnam (fn. 2, Making Democracy Work), 90. For separate argument the consequences of see organizations' internal structures, Harry Eckstein, "ATheory of Stable Democracy," in Eckstein, Division and Cohesion in A Norway (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966). 18 Democracy: Study of Putnam (fn. 2,Making Democracy Work), 90; idem (fn. 2,1995), 70.

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ers in new of the generation neo-Tocquevillean analysts, associationism is both an indicator of healthy democracy and a prerequisite for it.

Testing the Theory

thesis has attracted much This neo-Tocquevillean attention, especially in its to scene. application the contemporary American Nevertheless, there has actually been little in-depth analysis by political scientists of on the "internal" and "external" effects associations actually have indi This sets out to vidual members and the wider polity.19 essay therefore test the of as the claims of the theory?specifically, by probing effects sociationism on the political life of one country (Germany) over the course of almost a century (from the mid-1800s to the Nazi takeover in 1933). The investigation is facilitated by thework of historians of Ger many, who, largely unnoticed by political scientists, have fought their own over some battles related issues: those debates provide extensive evidence of the vigor of German civil society, along with documenta tion of its causes and effects. a based on a One might counter, of course, that theory only single case and is inherently problematic that, moreover,20 German political was a of development during this period certainly influenced by range them factors extending beyond civil society, many of highly particular. are reasons an neo Nevertheless, there several why inability of to account for the central features of this case Tocquevillean analysis should be significant and troubling. First, scholars have long viewed its as a crucial theoretical the Weimar Republic and collapse testing in interwar is so ground. The disintegration of democracy Germany to our so central understanding of and critical for we at the least be of the history of modern Europe that should wary any cannot it. the theory of political development that explain Second,

19 some to his but Putnam, for example, cites development and economic studies buttress points, out on s on citi much less empirical research has been carried associationism political effects, whether to some zens or societies. The old mass society literature did, however, spur sociologists investigate of these questions. See, for example, Nicholas Babchuk and John N. Edwards, "Voluntary Associations E. W. "Associ and the Integration Hypothesis," Sociological Inquiry 35 (Spring 1965); David Holden, as to Rural ations Reference Groups: An Approach the Problem," Sociology 30 (1965); Maurice Pinard, "Mass Society and Political Movements: A New Formulation," American Journal ofSociology (July 1968); and also Sidney Verba, "Organizational Membership and Democratic Consensus," Journal of scientists are to these See Politics 27 (August 1965). Some political beginning investigate questions. Dietland Stolle and Thomas Rochon, "Associations and the Creation of Social Capital," in Kenneth Newton et al., eds., "Social Capital inWestern Europe" (Manuscript, 1996); and idem, "Social Capi Scientist tal, Associations and American Exceptionalism," inAmerican Behavioral (forthcoming). 20 Social in Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Inquiry: Scientific Inference Qualitative Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 209-12.

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case as an exam postwar neo-Tocquevilleans highlighted precisely this ple of the impact of associationism (or lack thereof) on political out comes. And third, while the United States has been considered the homeland of associationism ever since Tocqueville, comparable honors could also be bestowed on Germany, making it resemble a most likely case for determining the reliability of the neo-Tocquevillean theory. The extraordinarily vigorous associational life ofWilhelmine and Weimar was commented so so in Germany frequently on, much fact of Vereinsmeierei that contemporaries spoke the (roughly, associational or fetishism mania) that beset German society and joked that whenever or more were to three Germans gathered, they likely draw up by-laws and an found association.21 The German passion for forming organiza tions was so characteristic that it became the butt of several well-known satires, including Kurt Tucholskys classic poem "DasMitglied" (The most Member).22 Max Weber, Germany's perceptive analyst during this note period, took of his countrymen's predilection for voluntarily join in of ing together groups; recognizing the significance this phenome non to for political development, he urged his colleagues study German organizational life in all of itsmanifestations, "startingwith the bowling to or club [!]... and continuing the the religious, artis or tic literary sect." Yet Weber also observed that German association ism, unlike itsAmerican or British counterparts, did not lead directly to to or responsible citizenship, much less liberal democratic values. "The not quantitative spread of organizational life," he argued, "does always go hand in hand with its qualitative significance." He explicitly noted a not that participation in, say, choral society did necessarily promote man to use true civic virtue: "A who is accustomed his larynx in voicing on a con powerful sentiments daily basis without, however, finding any to a nection his actions," he said of singing group members, "that is man ... a citizen in the sense of the who easily becomes good passive word."23

21 James J. Sheehan, German Liberalism in theNineteenth Century (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Hu in im manities Press, 1995), and Thomas Nipperdey, "Verein als soziale Struktur Deutschland sp?ten zur 18. und fr?hen 19. Jahrhundert: Eine Fallstudie Modernisierung," in Nipperdey, Gesellschaft, Kul zur neueren tur, Theorie: Gesammelte Geschichte (G?ttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1976). 22 Aufs?tze Kurt Tucholsky, "Das Mitglied," inMary Gerold-Tucholsky, ed., Zwischen Gestern undMorgen: aus Eine Auswahl seinen und Gedichten (Hamburg: Taschenbuch, 1952), 76. 23 Schriften Max Weber, "Gesch?ftsbericht und Diskussionsreden auf den deutschen soziologischen Tagun zur gen," inWeber, Gesammelte Aufs?tze Soziologie und Sozialpolitik (T?bingen: J.C B. Mohr, 1924), in Social Local and Nazism: 1880-1935 Hill: 442, quoted Rudy Koshar, Life, Politics, Marburg, (Chapel University of North Carolina Press, 1986), 4, emphasis added. See also Margaret Levi, "Social and Politics and 24 Unsocial Capital: A Review Essay of Robert Putnam's Making Democracy Work,n Society (March 1996).

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This now to the essay proceeds explore internal and external effects on of German associationism, focusing the Protestant middle classes in particular because of the critical role they played in the disintegration of theWeimar Republic and the rise of the Nazis.24 The results show that the were in an postwar neo-Tocquevilleans wrong their assertion that absence of civil society paved the way for the collapse of democracy and to the rise of totalitarianism in Germany. I find, the contrary, that par ticipation in organizations of civil society didlink individuals together and help mobilize them for political participation (just as current neo in the case not Tocquevillean scholars claim), but German this served to strengthen democracy but to weaken it.And finally, I show that the NSDAP rose to not power, by attracting alienated, apolitical Germans, but rather by recruiting highly activist individuals and then exploiting their skills to and associational affiliations expand the party's appeal and as consolidate its position the largest political force in Germany. The essay concludes by probing the broader implications of the German case for theories of political development.

Civil Society in Bismarckian and wllhelmine germany

German associational life grew rapidly during the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Spurred by changes in the legal code, the break down of preindustrial corporate traditions, and growing social wealth an and diversification, increasingly dense network of private voluntary was associations spread throughout the country. This trend pronounced to comment was an enough for many that Germany in the grips of "as on eve asso sociational passion" the of the 1848 revolutions. Voluntary were areas to ciations active in public life, in ranging from education a land preservation ; in particular, they helped growing and self assertive bourgeoisie pursue its social and economic interests. Many historians, therefore, have interpreted German associational life from to as a the mid-eighteenth the mid-nineteenth century "symptom of

24 a on see For review of the literature the middle classes and fascism, Bernt Hagtvet and Reinhard to K?hl, "Contemporary Approaches Fascism: A Survey of Paradigms," and Reinhard K?hl, "Precon ditions for the Rise and Victory of Fascism in Germany," both in Larsen, Hagtvet, and Myklebust (fn. 12). See also Hans Lebovics, Social Conservatism and theMiddle Classes in Germany, 1914-1933 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969); Hans Speier, German White Collar Workers and the Rise in ofHitler (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986); and J?rgen Kocka, Die Angestellten der deutschen reasons text Geschichte, 1850-1980 (G?ttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1981). For detailed in the not to and notes below, observations about bourgeois Protestant associationism do necessarily apply its labor or Catholic counterparts, among others.

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... a to the rise of bourgeois society and factor serving accelerate" its development.25 next The spurt of German associational growth began in the 1870s. One was the constitution new contributing factor adopted by the Ger man Reich in the of universal a 1871: granting suffrage encouraged to in to wide variety of groups form organizations order give themselves a voice in as institu the political sphere. More importantly, just the tional structure was certain of the Reich prompting kinds of organiza tional activity, the prolonged economic downturn that began in the late 1870s highlighted the vulnerability of different groups and increased state two sec demands for aid. During the following decades almost all tors a of German society engaged in frenzy of associational activity, with heavy industry, small business, the Mittelstandy and white-collar own over groups all forming their organizations.26 The fight protec was a reason new tionism certainly key for the emergence of associa as to tions, but the Great Depression, contemporaries referred it, did more than merely highlight the divergent interests of different socio to was at a economic groups. It led many recognize that Germany his a torical turning point, poised between traditional agricultural existence two and industrialized modernity. The tension between these visions a stimulated the formation of wide variety of organizations, many of as which (such patriotic societies, sports and reading clubs, and neigh were to borhood associations) designed foster certain values and lifestyles, rather than directly engage the political process. In practice, the set up in 1871 only widened the were existing cleavages within German society, since political parties

25 see Nipperdey (fn. 21), 182; also David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley, The Peculiarities of German in History: Bourgeois Politics and Society Nineteenth-Century Germany (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 194ff.; David Blackbourn, "The German Bourgeoisie: An Introduction," inDavid Black bourn and Richard J. Evans, eds., The German Bourgeoisie (London: Roudedge, 1993); J?rgen Kocka, "The European Pattern and the German Case," in J?rgen Kocka and Allan Mitchell, eds., Bourgeois Society in Nineteenth Century Europe (Oxford: Berg, 1993); Karl-Erich Born, "Der soziale und wirtschaftliche Strukturwandels Deutschlands am Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts," in Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Moderne deutsche Sozialgeschichte (Cologne: Kiepenheuer und Witsch, 1966); and Vereinswesen und b?rgerliche Gesellscaft in Deutschland, special issue of Historische Zeitschrift, ed. Otto Dann (Mu nich: R. Oldenburg Verlag, 1984). 26 Hans-Ulrich Wehler, "Der Aufstieg des Organisierten Kapitalismus und Interventionsstaates in und An Deutschland," in Heinrich August Winkler, ed., Organisierter Kapitalismus: Voraussetzungen fange (G?ttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1974); Heinrich August Winkler, Mittelstand, von Demokratie und Nationalsozialismus: Die politische Entwicklung Handwerk und Kleinhandel in der Weimarer und Dirk Die Erben Bis Republik (Cologne: Kiepenheuer Witsch, 1972), 47ff.; Stegmann, Parteien und in der des marcks: Verb?nde Sp?tphase Wilhelminischen Deutschlands (Cologne: Kiepenheuer und Witsch, 1970); David Blackbourn, "Between Resignation and Volatility: The German Petite Bourgeoisie in the Nineteenth Century," in Geoffrey Crossick and Heinz-Gerhard Haupt, eds., Shop in and keepers and Artisans Nineteenth Century Europe (London: Methuen, 1984); J?rgen Kocka, Facing Total War: German Society, 1914-1918 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984).

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since na organized around discrete, particularistic social groups and structures were not or to over tional political strong responsive enough come social divisions. Under these conditions, associational activity occurred largely within each sector of society and helped lock in the fragmentation of the Reich. as These developments continued apace the power bloc that had dominated the Reich since 1871 fell apart and German politics entered a new to a phase. Bismarck had been able hold together majority coali on a tion based antisocialism and protectionist logroll serving the interests of "iron and rye." By the early 1890s, however, the Iron Chan cellor had been dismissed and mounting contradictions within the versus versus dominant classes (industry agriculture, protectionists free versus traders, exporters producers for the domestic market) threatened to coalition. The more rip apart the ruling lower and middle classes, were in over, becoming increasingly mobilized: electoral participation creased from 50.7 percent of those eligible in 1871 to 77.2 percent in in more 1887, and participation Reichstag averaged than 75 percent from then until the outbreak of war in 1914.27This posed a to structures to challenge traditional political in general and existing as in political parties such the National Liberals particular.28 Liberals had been the dominant force in Germany in the years after unification, but their political organizations, like those of other estab lished groups, found it difficult to adapt to the changing environment inwhich they had to operate. Until the 1890s most parties (with the exception of the Social Democratic Party of Germany [the SPD] and to a lesser extent the Catholic Zentrum) were informal collections of notables {Honoratioren).These parties had little in the way of formal at were active organization, especially the grassroots level, and really at structures were not to only time; their institutional simply up was now the task of performing well in the hurly-burly that German politics.29 The failure of the National Liberals in particular to adjust to new the conditions left many of their potential constituents, particu areas larly in rural and among sections of the middle class, searching for This other ways of expressing their social and political aspirations.

27 Stanley Suval, Electoral Politics inWilhelmine Germany (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985), esp. chap. 2. 28 on Radical Nation The following section draws heavily Geoff Eley, Reshaping the German Right: See also alism and Political Change after Bismarck (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994). Blackbourn and Eley (fn. 25), 144-55; and Koshar (fn. 23), esp. 46ff. 29 some to to Liberals did make attempts respond the challenges of popular mobilization and the political organization of workers by the SPD, but these proved unsuccessful. See Eley (fn. 28), 2; and Sheehan (fn. 21), pt. 6.

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as helped spur yet another burst of associational growth in Germany, organizations designed to appeal to awide variety of disaffected groups sprang up across the country. a trou By the end of the nineteenth century, therefore, distinct and bling pattern had already begun to appear inGermany?the growth of civic associations of strain. When in during periods national political and structures either or to stitutions proved unwilling unable address their citizens' needs, many Germans turned away from them and found succor and support in the institutions of civil society instead. Because institutions weak national political reinforced social cleavages instead to narrow of helping them, moreover, associational activity generally occurred within rather than across group lines. Under these circum served not to citizens into stances, associational life integrate the polit as to ical system, neo-Tocquevilleans would predict, but rather divide or them further mobilize them outside?and often against?the exist ing political regime. were As the liberal parties stumbled, their natural constituencies left of their natural activists unorganized, and many found themselves adrift and in search of alternative ways of becoming involved in public affairs. As one observer has noted, "Members of the middle strata may have looked with disdain on parties and elections, but they participated a with extraordinary vigor in dense network of other institutions through which they sought political influence, social identity and eco roles in nomic advantage."30 Many of these activists played critical so forming and staffing the nationalist associations that became popu lar inGermany in the decades beforeWorld War I. as are as The nationalist associations, Geoff Eley argues, best viewed were as or "symptoms and agencies of change. They formed distinctive ganizations within a spacewhich the difficulties and obsolescence of an of had older mode dominant-class politics opened up."31 They targeted a to new broad swath of German society and attempted provide chan were not nels for participation in public life. Many of these groups di was not to rectly "political" organizations, however. Their primary goal participate in theWilhelmine political system, and indeed, they often defined themselves in direct repudiation of existing political institutions were and structures, arguing that they Volksvereine (people's associa to tions) devoted cross-class solidarity and national unity. Another dis was contrast to tinctive characteristic of these groups that, in old-style

^Sheehan?fn^l)^. 31Eley(fn.28),xix.

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and the of Honoratioren organizations parties, they placed idea popular center. legitimacy front and The Navy League and Pan-German for broke new in terms mass League, example, ground of participation activism. and Both emphasized membership involvement in discussion and both were more decision making, and willing than the Honora tioren to organizations offer "particularly deserving" individuals the op to rise to portunity leadership positions. In many ways, the nationalist to neo organizations conform the type of civil society institutions scholars hold as Tocquevillean up exemplary: "horizontally" organized, and to narrow stressing equality community, devoted overcoming par ticularistic interests. na Even though increasing numbers of Germans turned away from tional politics during theWilhelmine era, this hardly meant that they were becoming apolitical. Quite the contrary, in fact: the population was increasingly mobilized and politically active. Some observers failed to note the because the change, however, popular energies of the were arenas Protestant middle classes in particular channeled into out side of national structures and political organizations.32 Some took in an arena refuge local government, for example, in which liberals and the more an middle classes generally felt they could play important role. A Liberal National parliamentarian and former mayor of Berlin named Arthur Hobrecht captured this feeling in his observation that common "the citizenship which is derived from endeavors in the organs us more of local government becomes increasingly valuable for the the as a conflict of material interests fragments contemporary society strata whole."33 In general, though, the discontented middle and rural to of the German population turned the organizations of civil society. were into ex Some of these drawn political life and developed ties with most as a isting political parties; however viewed themselves sanctuary to from traditional politics. The "various organizations which members strata to of the Protestant middle belonged, therefore, helped deepen

32 were SPD Workers and Catholics, by contrast, efficiendy organized through and by the and the contrast to SPD were Zentrum, respectively. In the liberal parties, both the and the Zentrum able to create their own affiliated associations in most areas of social life. One consequence of this, however, was as were the further fragmentation of German society, the associations affiliated with these parties so as to create encompassing "subcultures" that hived off their members from other groups. Referring to the SPD in Dieter see particular, Groh has termed such behavior "negative integration"; Groh, Neg und ativeintegration revolution?rer Attentismus (Frankfurt: Verlag Ullstein GmbH, 1973). The litera ture on the socialist and Catholic subcultures inWilhelmine andWeimar Germany is immense; good to are in Weimar places begin the bibliographies Eberhard Kolb, The Republic (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988); and Hans Mommsen, The Rise and Fall ofWeimar Democracy (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996). 33 Sheehan (fn. 21), 237.

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the divisions within their ranks and furthered the debilitating fragmen tation of liberalism's social base."34 eve War were On the of World I, practically all Germans discon tented with national political life. The then chancellor Bethmann Hollweg would laterwrite of this period:

While the storm-clouds ever more on the an al gathered heavily world horizon, on . . . most inexplicable pressure weighed the political life of Germany. [M]alaise and dejection imparted a depressing tone to political party activity, which lacked any progressive impulse. The word Reichsverdrossenheit [dissatis faction with the imperial state] rose up out of the darkness.35

to With the national government unresponsive calls for economic and political change and traditional political parties unable to adjust to the era mass an of politics, civil society offered outlet for the demands and an aspirations of increasingly restive German populace. This growth of not a in associations during these years did signal growth liberal values or democratic political structures; instead, it reflected and furthered the na fragmentation of German political life and the delegitimization of an tional political institutions. State-society relations thus took omi nous turn during the Wilhelmine era, with consequences that would plague theWeimar Republic in later decades.

Civil Society in the Weimar Republic

The democratization of Germany at the end ofWorld War I opened a new up phase in the country's associational life. Hitherto unrepre to own sented and unorganized groups began form their organizations, at and theWeimar years witnessed feverish associational activity prac tically every level. The number of local voluntary associations grew as throughout the 1920s, reaching extremely high levels measured by both historical and comparative standards.36 National associations also

34 vor Ibid., 237-38. See also Thomas Nipperdey, "Interessenverb?nde und Parteien in Deutschland dem Ersten Weltkrieg," inWehler (fn. 25). 35 von zum 1 Theobald Bethmann-Hollweg, Betrachtungen Weltkrieg, vol. (Berlin: R. Hubbing, 1919-21). 36 a William Sheridan Allen, The Nazi Seizure of Power: The Experience of Single German Town, 1922-1945 (New York: 1984); Peter Fritzsche, Rehearsals for Fascism: Populism and Political Mobiliza cross-na tion inWeimar Germany (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); and Koshar (fn. 23). For on see tional comparisions of the impact of civil society activity democracy, Nancy Bermeo, "Getting or Mad Going Mad? Citizens, Scarcity, and the Breakdown of Democracy in Interwar Europe" (Paper at presented the annual meeting of the APSA, San Francisco, 1996); Nancy Bermeo and Phil Nord, eds., "Civil Society before Democracy" (Manuscript, Princeton University, 1996); and Dietrich and Democ Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber Stephens, and John D. Stephens, Capitalist Development racy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), esp. 113-14.

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in grew rapidly, and participation professional organizations reached in as very high levels among the middle classes particular.37 Yet, inWil helmine the rise in associationism not Germany, signaled, the spread of liberal values or the development of healthy democratic political insti but rather the reverse. of tutions, The parties the bourgeois middle had reconstituted themselves after the war commit and proclaimed their ment to true so becoming "people's parties" and reintegrating German ciety. But these parties found it increasingly difficult to hold on to their constituencies in the face of growing economic, political, and social a conflicts during the 1920s. Once again this created vicious circle. The the structures weakness of bourgeois parties and national political drove succor many citizens looking for and support into civil society organi were zations, which organized primarily along group lines rather than across to them. The vigor of associational life, in turn, served further structures. re undermine and delegitimize the republic's political The sultwas a highly organized but vertically fragmented and discontented to society that proved be fertile ground for the Nazi's rise and eventual Machtergreifung. The German revolution raised hope among the middle classes that era the "divisive" and "unrepresentative" parties of the Wilhelmine a of the nation's would be replaced by single Volkspartei capable unifying menace patriotic bourgeoisie and confronting the of social democracy. a course was Popular support for such strong, but institutional jeal ousies and elite divisions prevented its adoption. Instead, Weimar's a early years saw, along with strengthened conservative movement, the two formation of main liberal parties (the German Democratic Party [DDP] and the German People's Party [dvp]) and of several smaller re as as gional parties, well reconsolidation of the Catholic Zentrum. The was nonsocialist portion of Germany's political spectrum thus perma nently divided among a large (and eventually increasing) number of soon to parties, which began squabble among themselves.38 to a movement or The failure of the bourgeois parties form single even to agree on important issues of the day did not dull the desire of some a the German middle classes for form of antisocialist unity and 37 Kocka (fh. 26); idem, "The First World War and the 'Mittelstand': German Artisans andWhite Inter Collar Workers," Journalof Contemporary History 8 (January 1973); Gerald Feldman, "German Interests in est Group Alliances inWar and Inflation, 1914-1923," in Suzanne Berger, ed., Organizing and Politics Uni Western Europe: Pluralism, Corporatism, the Transformation of (New York: Cambridge Lower inWeimar Ger versity Press, 1981); Rudy Koshar, "Cult of Associations? The Middle Classes Holmes and many," in Rudy Koshar, ed., Splintered Classes (New York: Meier, 1990); and Hagtvet (fn. 12). 38 Weimar 1918-1933 Larry Eugene Jones, German Liberalism and theDissolution of the Party System, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988).

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in economic greater role the political, social, and life of the republic. Throughout the 1920s "burghers from all social stations [continued] to demand more a more voice" effective representation and direct political to and refused abandon the ideals of bourgeois unity and community.39 In life on a sense this context, bourgeois social took renewed vigor and more of urgency. "More voluntary associations attracted members and did so in a more active fashion than ever before. Just as retailers, bakers, interest and commercial employees had organized into economic so groups, also did gymnasts, folklorists, singers and churchgoers gather into new a as clubs, rally members, schedule meetings, and plan full sortment of conferences and tournaments."40 or at At first, this activity occurred in conjunction with, least parallel to, traditional party politics, since the newly reconstituted liberal par to ties tried improve their grassroots organization, cultivate broader even status a ties, and achieve the of "people's party." By the middle of to the decade, however, the attempt reshape the relationship between national political life and civil society had failed, with the Great Infla tion of 1922-23 being the turning point. Economic historians may dis agree over which socioeconomic groups suffered the most, but there is little doubt that the middle classes suffered gready, even if the pain was more was psychological than material.41 This followed by the crushing stabilization of 1923-24, which hit white-collar workers and the mid dle classes particularly hard. "By the end of the 1920s the economic po sition of the independent middle class had deteriorated to such an extent was no to that it longer possible distinguish it from the prole tariat on the basis of income as a criterion."42 more so The economic dislocations made all groups jealous of their more narrow cioeconomic interests and strident and in their political demands, while making the middle classes increasingly resentful of were seen as a both workers and big business, who having dispropor over tionate influence the national government and political parties. By measures as fighting for such the eight-hour day and better wages, the

39 at see Fritzsche (fn. 36), chap. 2, quote 21. On the middle classes and the revolution, also Arthur Rosenberg, A the German (London: Methuen, 1936); Winkler and Kocka (fn. 26). 40 History of Republic Fritzsche (fn. 36), 76. 41 treatment The most comprehensive of almost all aspects of the Great Inflation and its aftermath in is Gerald Feldman, The Great Disorder: Politics, Economics and Society the German Inflation, see 1919-1924 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993). On the psychological aspects in particular, von J?rgen Kr?dener, "Die Entstehung des Inflationstraumas: Zur Sozialpsychologie der deutschen et Hyperinflation 1922-23," in Gerald Feldman al., eds. Consequences of Inflation (Berlin: Colloquium, 1989). 42 " Larry Eugene Jones, 'The Dying Middle': Weimar Germany and the Fragmentation of Bour see geois Politics," Central European History 5 (1972), 25; also Kocka (fn. 37).

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SPD was to core con considered be serving the class interests of its stituency above all else; the contrast between real (if limited) SPD suc cess and the political impotence of the middle classes generated further paroxysms of antisocialist fervor.43 un Middle-class groups also became increasingly frustrated with the willingness or inability of liberal and conservative parties such as the DDP, DVT and DNVP (German National People's Party) to recognize act as on their needs and their representatives the national political came to seen as stage. These parties be the tools of big capitalists and financial interests, and the ideal of the people's party faded as the tradi tional parties of the middle and right seemed to be run by and for an unrepresentative elite.44 Local-level organizations and associational af were to or filiations, furthermore, allowed languish break away. Not vote surprisingly, the share of the traditional bourgeois parties dropped precipitously throughout the 1920s. In 1924 the DVP and DDP together to attract were managed only about 15 percent, and splinter parties to alienated and con forming capture their increasingly fragmented stituency. By 1928?the high point of economic stabilization and sup posedly the "golden age" of theWeimar Republic?the splinter parties were outpolling the traditional parties of the middle.45 a As before, middle-class tension and frustration sparked growth in associational activity. During the 1920s middle-class Germans threw themselves into their clubs, community groups, and patriotic organiza tions while increasingly abandoning the seemingly ineffectual liberal parties. By the middle of the decade both the style and the substance of bourgeois social life inGermany had begun to change:

43 as a a The SPD itself did much to preserve its image worker's rather than people's party. See Richard Hunt, German Social Democracy, 1918-1933 (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1964); Donna Harsch, German Social Democracy and the Rise of Fascism (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993); Heinrich August Winkler, "Klassenbewegung oder Vblkspartei?" Geschichte und "K?nnte die SPD der Weimarer eine Gesellschaft, vol. 8, 1972; Hans Kremdahl, Republik vblkspartei werden?" inHorst Heimann and Thomas Meyer, eds., Reformsozialismus und Sozialdemokratie (Berlin: Politics: Social in Interwar Verlag J.H.W. Dietz, 1982); and Sheri Berman, Ideas and Democracy Europe (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, forthcoming). 44 saw a The 1920s even something of resuscitation of the old Bismarckian coalition of iron and rye, was to secure a of subsidies and the most infamous of which like its predecessor able wide range tariffs, was der in der der which the Osthilfe. See Dietmar Petzina, "Elemente Wirtschaftspolitik Sp?tphase 21 Vom Weimarer Republik, Vierteljahrshefte fur Zeitgeschichte (1973); and Gerald Feldman, Weltkrieg zur (G?ttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1984). 45Weltwirtschaftskrise Jones (fnn. 38, 42); idem, "In the Shadow of Stabilization: German Liberalism and the Legiti macy of theWeimar Party System," and Thomas Childers, "Interest and : Anti-System Par ties in the Era of Stabilization," both in Gerald Feldman, ed., Die Nachwirkungen der Inflation auf die deutsche Geschichte (Munich: R. Oldenburg Verlag, 1985). See also Hans Mommsen, "The Decline of in From the B?rgertum in Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century Germany," Mommsen, Weimar toAuschwitz (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991).

This content downloaded from 155.247.167.222 on Sun, 7 Apr 2013 14:12:38 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions COLLAPSE OF THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC 417 an un Spurred by growing political tensions, social organizations helped to lead precedented surge of apoliticism that escaped the control of bourgeois elites.... [M]any spokesman forWeimar apoliticism argued that social organizations would do more than cushion political strife?they would bind together amoral "folk of classes and strata. . . . istic, antisocialist, community" disparate [T]he middle and late 1920s ... thus saw not an acceleration of tensions that had only an originated in the Empire but also unprecedented rupture between the social and the political authority of the local bourgeoisie.46

was no an What occurred in Germany less than inversion of neo-Toc not in quevillean theory; only did participation civil society organiza to to it. tions fail contribute republican virtue, but it in fact subverted "[A]s the middle class became more and more disenchanted with and to into hostile towards the republic, their energies ceased be channeled and of the proto political organizations party political organizations center and right which the old elites had traditionally headed. Instead the radicalized troops of the middle class deserted these organizations and their leaders."47 were seen to tra Private associations correctly offer benefits that the were to as a sense of ditional bourgeois parties failing provide, such DVP DNVP community and unity. While the DDP, and had trouble shak as ing their image Honoratioren parties dominated by business and agri a cultural elites, many private bourgeois associations brought together a sense relatively wide range of individuals and created of purpose that transcended socioeconomic divisions.

For many provincial burghers, associational life facilitated social contacts and was friendships and muffled party differences. Repeatedly, the club lauded for reconciling burghers. As an officer of a bourgeois choir in Hesse's Marburg commented, in "a time of both internal and external antagonisms, it is the Ger man that binds members of the folk..." In a similar the song together fashion, summer festival of Celle's riflery club offered the mayor a happy example of and civil servant."48 unity between "burgher

of can in theWorld War I vet A fine example these trends be found erans as the organization known the Stahlhelm. One of largest and most politically powerful organizations during the 1920s, the Stahlhelm reached a peak membership of between five and six hundred an role in election to the thousand and played important Hindenburg's a presidency. It had relatively diverse membership, attracting support

46 Koshar (fn. 23), 166. See also Gerald Feldman, "German Interest Group Alliances inWar and in Inflation, 1914-1923," in Berger (fn. 37); and Charles Maier, "Strukturen kapitalistischer Stabilit?t den zwanziger Jahren," inWinkler (fn. 26). 47 Dedev J. K. Peukert, The Weimar (New York: Hill andWang, 1989), 230. 48 Republic Fritzsche (fn. 36), 76.

This content downloaded from 155.247.167.222 on Sun, 7 Apr 2013 14:12:38 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 418 WORLD POLITICS from different socioeconomic groups, regions, and both the liberal and conservative In the a camps. addition, organization encouraged high level of membership participation, had a relatively democratic internal structure, and maintained contacts with other clubs and associations. In the early years of the republic the Stahlhelm developed ties with par ties of the center-right and right, viewing such links as the best way to ensure success its the of nationalist, antisocialist agenda. By the mid the was tra 19205, however, organization becoming disillusioned with ditional and to a party politics began emphasize nationalist and to populist communitarianism. Many burghers began transfer their pri mary political loyalties to it from center-right and right political par to at ties, helping eradicate these parties' authority the grassroots level. nature a The of the organization is captured well by 1927 manifesto, which declared:

not want to or a new want... Stahlhelm does form become party. But it does for its members to acquire the possibility and the right of decisive participation in all positions of public service and popular representation, from the local com to con munity the national government.... Stahlhelm opposes all efforts and ceptions that seek to divide the German people. It esteems highly the experience of old comradeship at the front and unity and wants to develop out of it a na . . . tional sense of unity. [I]n full recognition of the value and the vital unity among enterprise, entrepreneur, and fellow workers, Stahlhelm will not hinder an honest and decisive settlement of conflicts of interest. It demands, however, maintenance of interest the and preservation the transcending of the German community.49

After 1928 the Stahlhelm began to lose membership and influence, in part because it allied itself more closely with the DNVP, but mostly was to to because it unable adjust the increasing mobilization and rad was icalism that sweeping Germany during the late 1920s and early to wartime 1930s. The organization remained tied the memory of the was not in came generation and very successful attracting those who of age later. It had trouble operating amid the accelerating disintegration of traditional political structures and did not manage to cultivate ties to

49 to were rearma Among the other goals of this neo-Tocquevillean paragon, it is interesting note, ment, the extirpation of degeneration and foreign influence, and the acquisition of Lebensraum. "Berlin Stahlhelm Manifesto," first published in Stahlhelm und Staat (May 8,1927), reprinted inAnton Kaes, Martin Jay, and Edward Dimendberg, eds., The Weimar Republic Sourcebook (Berkeley: University see of California Press, 1994), 339-40. On the development of the Stahlhelm, Fritzsche (fn. 36), chap. 9; Volker Berghahn, Der Stahlhelm: Bund der Frontsoldaten, 1918-1935 (D?sseldorf: Droste, Weimar 1966); and J.M. Diehl, Paramilitary Politics in Germany (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1977).

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either the new or bourgeois splinter parties their constituencies. Ironi cally, therefore, while the Stahlhelm had played a crucial role in infus into ing nationalist populism the German political system and further was not weakening the traditional bourgeois parties, it the Nazis and the Stahlhelm who would be the ultimate beneficiaries of these trends.

As the Great Depression spread throughout Europe, Germany found itself with weak political institutions and a fragmented but highly or not a so ganized civil society; this, the atomized anomie of pure "mass to to ciety," would prove be the ideal setting for the rapid rise power of a skilled totalitarian movement.

The Rise of the nsdap

During the 1920s the Nazi Party (the NSDAP)was stagnant?low on to or amass a funds and unable fill meeting halls significant share of the vote. so to By 1926 the situation had become dire that the party began move a NSDAP toward major shift in strategy. Where previously the had on areas now re focused primarily urban and working-class voters, it oriented its appeal toward the middle classes, nonvoters, and farmers, while proclaiming itself above the group divisions that plagued the as as country. Thus, late the 1928 elections the Nazis polled only 2.6 were percent, whereas four years later they the largest party in the Weimar What enabled the Nazis to make such Republic.50 spectacular inroads into the German electorate? The depression, the weak response to it from mainstream parties, Hitler's charisma and political savvy?all a these clearly played role. A significant part of the answer, however, lies with contemporary German civil society. voters As abandoned traditional bourgeois parties during the 1920s a vac and then grappled with the ravages of the depression, political uum in a vacuum that offered the Nazis a opened up German politics, to an To this golden opportunity assemble unprecedented coalition. NSDAP inWeimar's end, the exploited its increasingly strong position

50 A good summary of the history of the Nazi party during this time is provided by Dietrich 1919-1933 Pa.: Orlow, The History of theNazi Party, (Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, treatments Thomas 1969). Good English-language of the formation of the Nazi constituency include "The Mid Childers, ed., The Formation of theNazi Constituency (London: Croom Helm, 1986); idem, dle Classes and National Socialism," in Blackbourn and Evans (fn. 25); Peter Stachura, ed., The Nazi and The Nazi Voter: The Machtergreifung (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983); Thomas Childers, Per Social Foundations ofFascism in Germany (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1983). most Hitlers W?hler C.H. haps the up-to-date analysis in German is J?rgen W. Falter, (Munich: Verlag Beck,1991).

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rich associational life. The dense networks of civic engagement pro vided the Nazis with cadres of activists who had the skills necessary to spread the party's message and increase recruitment. Those networks as a NSDAP to mas also served fifth column, allowing the infiltrate and ter a sector to significant of bourgeois society before emerging seize structures. one notes: control of Germany's national political As scholar

Path-breaking work in recent years on the rise of National Socialism has stressed the of local and associa importance newspapers, municipal notables, voluntary tions, and points to the buoyancy and vigor of civic traditions. Had bourgeois new community life been overly disoriented and fragmented, the body of evi dence indicates, the Nazis would never have been able to marshal the resources or into the social networks to their plug necessary political success.51

on at During the second half of the 1920s the Nazis concentrated tracting bourgeois "joiners"who had become disillusioned with tradi tional party politics. Like the neo-Tocquevilleans, Hitler recognized that participation in associational life provided individualswith the kinds of leadership skills and social ties that could be very usefid in the political arena.52 Civil society activists formed the backbone of the Nazis' grass roots or propaganda machine. The party also skillfully exploited their contacts to ganizational and social expertise gain insight into the fears to tailor new to and needs of particular groups and appeals them? as using them, in other words, "focus groups." The activists, finally, pro movement contrast vided the with unparalleled local organizations. In to were to the other bourgeois parties, the Nazis able develop flexible accurate two and committed local party chapters that enabled full and way communication between the national party and its frontline troops. cru Recent research into local life in interwar Germany details the cial role played by bourgeois "joiners" in paving the way for the Nazi to rise power. Rudy Koshar's excellent study of Marburg, for example, were an activist shows that party members unusually bunch. "Before September 1930 there existed at least 46 Nazi party members with 73 cross-affiliations. For the period before 30 January 1933 overall, there were at least 84 Nazi students and 116 nonstudent party adherents with to non 375 cross-affiliations occupational associations, sports clubs, fraternities party municipal electoral slates, civic associations, student

51 Fritzsche (fn. 36), 13. 52 to Rudy Koshar, "From Stammtisch Party: Nazi Joiners and the Contradictions of Grass Roots Fascism inWeimar Germany? Journal ofModern History 59 (March 1987), 2; idem (fn. 23), 185ff.; Hans Mommsen, "National Socialism: Continuity and Change," inWalter Lacquer, ed., Fascism: A Readers Guide (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976); and Hagtvet (fn. 12).

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and other local voluntary groups." By January 1933 there was at least one Nazi in one out Party member of every four voluntary groups in was even more the city.53 The Nazi elite well connected.54 a Koshar describes the key role of civil society activists in creating powerful and dynamic Nazi organization inMarburg. By the time of the Nazi breakthrough in the 1930 elections, the NSDAP had represen tatives in a civic associations to move wide range of working spread the out ment's message, get the vote, and discredit political opponents. victories were more be "The 1930-31 electoral lasting than expected, cause NSDAP was over a the gaining control field of social organizations activists not wider than that supporting bourgeois parties."55 The only a NSDAP to an created powerfiil electoral machine but also helped the a no chor itself in local communities in way other bourgeois party could to match. The Nazis used their local organization design propaganda events to and political that would mesh with and appeal Marburg's par the NSDAP seem and re ticular social rhythms, making sympathetic contrast sponsive by with elitist and out-of-touch liberals and conservatives.

was attractive in because of its in conversations [T]he party part positive image in the local marketplace, stores, university classrooms, fraternity houses, meeting soccer s mass could halls, fields, and homes. Hitler seemingly mysterious appeal hardly have been so extensive without the unplanned propaganda of daily social life... . the NSDAP moral over Through infiltration, gained authority organiza tions inwhich it also established a material base. It was becoming the political material that constituencies hub, the focus of legitimacy and power, bourgeois had lacked.56

not associational The Nazis did merely exploit their cadres' preexisting even activists into a wide of bonds; they deliberately infiltrated range in to from bourgeois organizations order eliminate potential opponents Without the to positions of power within them.57 opportunity exploit

53 in Koshar, "Contentious Citadel: Bourgeois Crisis and Nazism inMarburg/Lahn, 1880-1933," Childers (fn. 50), 24,28-29. See also Koshar (fn. 23); Hagtvet (fn. 12); Allen (fn. 36); and idem, "The Nazification of aTown," in John L. Snell, ed., The Nazi Revolution: Hitlers and the German Nation (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1973). 54 a several came In study of right-wing extremists in the U.S., Raymond Wolfinger and colleagues inDavid to a similar conclusion. SeeWolfinger et al., "America's Radical Right: Politics and Ideology," E. ed., and Discontent (New York: Free Press, 1964). Apter,55 Ideology Koshar (fn. 23), 202. 56 Ibid., 204,202. 57 a see Winkler On the party's infiltration of variety of bourgeois associations, Mommsen (fn. 52); Union (fn. 26), 168ff.; Larry Eugene Jones, "Between the Fronts: The German National of Commer to Koshar cial Employees from 1928 1933," Journal of 'Modern History 48 (September 1976); (fn. 37); and Peter D. Stachura, "German Youth, the Youth Movement and National Socialism in theWeimar Allen and Republic," in Stachura, ed., The Nazi Machtergreifung (London: George Unwin, 1983).

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Weimar's rich associational network, in short, the Nazis would not have to sectors so been able capture important of the German electorate quickly and efficiently. A brief profile of the Nazi methods can be found in the case of the German peasantry. During the interwar years peasants joined and par in a ticipated wide range of professional, special interest, and regional a over era. associations, trend carried from theWilhelmine Early in the the to vote or republic peasantry tended liberal conservative, but they like other bourgeois groups soon began to desert traditional political most parties. During the second half of the 1920s peasants either with arena or to one drew from the national political gave their support of new not ex the splinter parties; they did disproportionately support the treme right.58 As the depression bore down, however, the crisis in Ger man more acute agriculture became and the political situation in rural areas more on DNVP volatile. Large landowners used their influence the to secure a amount and other political organizations large of help (in cluding the notorious Osthilfe), but the peasantry found itselfwithout a powerful political champion. Until late in the day the Nazis essentially ignored rural Germany, and the vaguely socialist aspects of the Nazi program (such as land re to form and expropriation) tended drive farmers away. But by the end of the 1920s the NSDAP, clever and opportunistic in ways its competi tors were un not, noticed the political potential of the frustration and rest across spreading the countryside. In 1928, therefore, the party refashioned its agricultural program, eliminating many offensive planks on and focusing instead the particular needs and demands of rural in habitants.59 R.Walther Darre was the key figure inNazi agricultural policy, and to by the end of 1930 he decided that the way win the peasantry's sup out areas was to ex port and box potential opponents in rural capture In November 1930 an instruction isting agricultural organizations.

58 vote In the 1928 elections, for example, the NSDAP share of the in the predominendy rural districts of East Prussia, Pomerania, East Hannover, and Hesse-Darmstadt was below its national average. NSDAP in Horst Gies, "The and Agrarian Organizations in the Final Phase of theWeimar Republic," Henry A. Turner, ed., Nazism and the Third Reich (New York: New Viewpoints, 1972), 75 fn. 2. See also Richard J. Evans andW. R. Lee, eds., The German Peasantry (New York: St. Martins Press, 1986); 1914-1924 Hill: Robert G. Moeller, German Peasants and Agrarian Politics, (Chapel University of North Carolina Press, 1986); Shelley Baranowski, The Sanctity of Rural Life: Nobility, Protestantism, and Nazism inWest Prussia (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); andWerner Angress, "The Po litical Role of the Review Politics 21, no. 3 (1959). 59 Peasantry," of see and the Swastika: On Nazi agricultural policy during this period, J. E. Farquharson, The Plough NSDAP a of The and Agriculture in Germany, 1928-1945 (London: Sage, 1976). For discussion why other as SPD see parties such the passed up this opportunity, Berman (fn. 43).

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sheet ordered the NSDAPs agricultural apparatus (agrarpolitischeAppa rat, or aA) to

penetrate into all rural affairs like a finely intertwined root system_[The aA] should embed itself deeply in [all rural organizations] and seek to embrace every so element of agrarian life thoroughly that eventually nothing will be able to occur in the realm of agriculture everywhere in the Reich which we do not ob serve and whose basis we do not understand. Let there be no farm, no estate, no no no no local of the RLB village, cooperative, agricultural industry, organization no rural where [an agricultural organization], equestrian association, etc., etc., we have not?at the our least?placed [representatives].60

in Darre became particularly interested capturing the Reichslandbund (RLB), a major player in German agrarian life that by the end of the 1920s had 5.6 million members. During the 1920s the RLBhad coop a DVP DNVP. erated with number of bourgeois parties including the and RLB the But eventually many members grew disgusted with organiza to consider tion's political vacillation and inept leadership and began NSDAP as a interests. the the potential champion for agricultural During to over latter part of 1930 Darre decided that the best way gain control RLB was one the by "conquering position after another from within."61 on in of the The aA focused first placing supporters lower ranks RLB, on Darre then capturing leadership positions. Like his f?hrer, recog if Nazis nized the value of gradualism and legalism, reasoning that the nibbled "away at [the RLB's] official apparatus, then, along with this stones out on mortar, the big will fall their own."62 successes After the NSDAPs in local elections in 1931, Darre began to harder for Nazi to the RLB He push appointments leadership. recog an RLB an in nized that official endorsement could play important role a one of the 1932 elections. Soon he succeeded in getting Nazi named the four presidents of the RLB, and in 1932 the RLBduly endorsed the on RLB Nazis. Darre continued his attack the from within, eliminating the remaining non-Nazis from all influential positions. This pushed as RLB increasingly into the Nazi fold, brandishing the NSDAPs image while new the champion of Germany's "neglected" groups opening up avenues of an obstacle to Nazism in for manipulation. "Instead proving RLB became the countryside, the and other agricultural organizations into the convenient conveyor belts for Nazi propaganda reaching deep

60 Quoted in Gies (fn. 58), 51. 61 Ibid., 62. See also Zdenek Zofka, "Between Bauernbund and National Socialism: The Political Orientation of the Peasantry in the Final Phase of theWeimar Republic," in Childers (fn. 50). 62 Ibid., 65.

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rural population. In this way the intermediate groups facilitated the rise of Nazism."63 The Nazis had infiltrated and captured awide range of national and local associations by the early 1930s, finally bridging the gap between bourgeois civil society and party politics that had plagued Germany for a was to two half century. From this base Hitler able achieve goals that had eluded creation an long German politicians?the of effective a true political machine and cross-class coalition. With these in Nazi hands and bourgeois competitors eliminated, Hindenburg found it in creasingly difficult to ignoreHitler's demands for a change of course. By the end of 1932 Schleicher had lostHindenburg's confidence;64 two days was to was after Schleicher forced resign, Hitler named chancellor.65

conclusions: germany, associationism, and Political Development

case a The German reveals distinct pattern of associationism that does not to conform the predictions of neo-Tocquevillean theories. German was civil society rich and extensive during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and this nation of joiners should accordingly have a it provided fertile soil for successful democratic experiment. Instead, to not mean was succumbed totalitarianism. This does that civil society it con disconnected from German political development; was, rather, in nected ways that the reigning neo-Tocquevillean theories ignore. The vigor of German civil society actually developed in inverse rela to tion the vigor and responsiveness of national political institutions structures. to and Instead of helping reduce social cleavages, Germany's in weak and poorly designed political institutions exacerbated them; stead of responding to the demands of an increasingly mobilized pop structures ulation, the country's political obstructed meaningful a interests participation in public life. As result, citizens' energies and were were deflected into private associational activities, which generally

63 Hagtvet (fn. 12), 91. 64 RLBs were At least partially because of the efforts, which directed by the Nazis; Hagtvet (fn. 12), 75. 65 a to In tragic irony, Hindenburg's decision may well have allowed the Nazis snatch victory from to run as the jaws of defeat. After the July 1932 elections the NSDAP began into trouble, Hider's in ability to deliver on his promises caused dissent among different groups within the Nazi coalition and the party's previously formidable organization had trouble maintaining necessary levels of enthusiasm more out to and funding. A few months of power and the party might have begun self-destruct. See new to 1933 the study by Henry Ashby Turner, Jr.,Hitlers Thirty Days Power:January (New York: Ad dison-Wesley, 1996); and also Orlow (fn. 50), 233ff.; and Childers, "The Limits of National Socialist Mobilization," in Childers (fn. 50).

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organized within rather than across group boundaries. The vigor of civil activities then continued to draw involve society and ment from and further their away parties politics, sapping strength and significance. Eventually the Nazis seized the opportunities afforded by such a a to a na situation, offering unifying appeal and bold solutions tion in crisis. The NSDAP drew its critical cadres precisely from among civil activists with few ties to mainstream bourgeois society politics, and itwas from the base of bourgeois civil society that the party launched its swift In one cannot rise Machtergreifung. short, understand the of the Nazis without an appreciation of the role played by German civil one cannot contours society, and understand the of that civil society without to reference the country's weak political institutionalization. From Bismarck's tenure onward German political parties exhibited two to on major weaknesses.66 First, they tended focus particular and narrow relatively socioeconomic groups. Workers, large landowners, large industrialists, Catholics?all had political parties catering specif to or ically them. Instead of reconciling the interests of different groups a sense creating of national unity, therefore, parties reflected and deep was to ened the divisions within German society. Only Hitler able overcome a this pattern, finally creating cross-class political coalition a at a a and uniting majority (or least plurality) of Germans under sin in gle political umbrella. Second, Germany's bourgeois parties particu never to era mass lar adjusted fully the of politics. Instead, they retained an to or elite organizational style and failed develop strong grassroots to to ganizations and cultivate strong ties the associational lives of their was sectors constituencies.67 The result that large of the German mid even dle classes withdrew further from national political activity. In to general, therefore, the party system served aggravate the lack of po litical and social cohesion that had plagued Germany since unification. structures was a reason The weakness of such national political key that Germans threw themselves into clubs, organizations, and interest groups during periods of strain like the 1870s and 1920s. Because the 66 Many, indeed, have blamed Bismarck for the nature of the German party system. By allowing to universal suffrage but failing provide responsible government, Bismarck ensured that political par ties would be necessary but also somewhat impotent. Furthermore, by continually manufacturing crises SPD as and identifying certain parties (i.e., the and Zentrum) enemies of the Reich, Bismarck increased the that and their constituencies had in with each other. 67difficulty parties working SPD to core con Both the and the Catholic Zentrum managed avoid such problems with their an sistencies. Each maintained close ties with extremely wide range of ancilliary organizations, and SPD was a mass as a to the in particular very effective party. Largely result of these parties' ability inte grate political and civil society life, their constituencies (i.e., workers and Catholics) proved less likely to vote on were to for the Nazis later than other groups. Because they contributed the segmentation of can at German society during the 1920s, however, these parties still be held least indirectly responsible for the collapse of theWeimar Republic.

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social political system deepened cleavages, however, civil society insti tutions often catered to a members of particular group: socialists, own Catholics, and bourgeois Protestants each joined their choral soci eties and clubs. However bird-watching horizontally organized arid civic minded to these associations may have been, they tended hive their off rest to memberships from the of society and contribute the formation of what one observer has re called "ferociously jealous 'small "68 was cleaved publics.' Germany increasingly into distinct subcultures or communities, each of which had its own, separate associational life. not overcome Civil society activity alone, in short, could the country's or social divisions provide the political cohesion that would have been to weather the crises necessary which beset Germany beginning in 1914. For this, strong and flexible political institutions, particularly po litical parties, would have been necessary. eve a On the of the Great Depression, Germany found itself in pre carious political situation?its civil society was highly developed but and its mainstream were segmented, bourgeois parties disintegrating. citizens in associations were Many active secondary politically frus trated and dissatisfied; when the depression added economic and polit to was a a new ical chaos the mix, the result golden opportunity for out to political force. The Nazis stepped into the breach, reaching the or disaffected bourgeois civil society activists and using the country's to ganizational infrastructure make inroads into various constituencies. The dense network of German associations enabled the NSDAP to cre ate a a cross in remarkably short time dynamic political machine and ever seen?one to class coalition unlike anything Germany had before which it soon succumbed. case us neo The German should make skeptical of many aspects of In Tocquevillean theory. particular, German political development now raises questions about what has by become practically conventional is a wisdom, namely, that there direct and positive relationship between a rich associational life and stable democracy. Under certain circum case: stances, clearly the very opposite is the associationism and the can prospects for democratic stability actually be inversely related. Fur neo thermore, many of the consequences of associationism stressed by Tocquevillean scholars?providing individuals with political and social skills, creating bonds between citizens, facilitating mobilization, de to to creasing barriers collective action?can be turned antidemocratic

68 see Fritzsche (fn. 36), 232. On this point, also M. Rainer Lepsius, "Parteiensystem und Sozial zum struktur: Problem der Demokratisierung der deutschen Gesellschaft," in Gerhard A. Ritter, ed., vor Deutsche Parteien 1918 (Cologne: Droste, 1983).

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as well as to democratic ones. associationism ends Perhaps, therefore, should be considered a politically neutral multiplier?neither inher endy good nor inherendy bad, but rather dependent for its effects on the wider political context.69 in The neo-Tocquevilleans have fact already been criticized for their inability to predict whether civil society activity will have negative or positive consequences for political development. Some, for example, to have taken Putnam task for praising the long-term salutory effect of civil society activity inNorthern Italy while ignoring the fact that this to selfsame activity proved be consistent with Fascism.70 What the seems to we want to know analysis presented here indicate is that if on or even when civil society activity will take oppositional antidemoc we to our concrete ratic tendencies, need ground analyses in examina tions of If a institutions and structures political reality. country's political are capable of channeling and redressing grievances and the existing political regime enjoys public support and legitimacy, then association ismwill probably buttress political stability by placing its resources and beneficial effects in the service of the status quo. This is the pattern Tocqueville described. on structures are If, the contrary, political institutions and weak and/or the existing political regime is perceived to be ineffectual and il an to legitimate, then civil society activity may become alternative pol itics, increasingly absorbing citizens' energies and satisfying their basic associationism will needs. In such situations, probably undermine po litical stability, by deepening cleavages, furthering dissatisfaction, and movements. providing rich soil for oppositional Flourishing civil soci ety activity in these circumstances signals governmental and party fail ure and may bode ill for the regime's future. This latter pattern fits Germany in the late nineteenth and early as we to twentieth centuries, have seen, but it may be applicable many cases as other well, with provocative implications. The weakening of communist in was a regimes Eastern Europe, for example, hastened by rise in civil society activity there in the 1980s; parts of the contempo are a rary Arab world witnessing remarkable growth in Islamist civil 69 Foley and Edwards (fn. 7); Skocpol (fn. 7, "The Tocqueville Problem"); Diamond (fn. 7); Pinard (fn. 19); Hagtvet (fn. 12), esp. 94; Koshar (fnn. 37,23); Winkler (fn. 26), esp. 196; and Fritzsche (fn. 36). 70 across See Sidney Tarrow, "Making Social Science Work Space and Time: A Critical Reflection on Robert Putnam's Making Democracy Work," American Review 90 (June 1996). In terestingly, Tarrow also criticizes Putnam for failing to recognize that much of the civil society activity was or to he finds directly indirectly created by Italian political parties. According Tarrow, in other not an an words, civil society may be independent variable (as Putnam claims) but rather intermediary variable, along the lines suggested by the analysis presented here.

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that on with the society activity feeds the citizenry's frustration region's unrepresentative and unresponsive authoritarian . In such not situations civil society may necessarily promote liberal democracy, as the neo-Tocquevilleans would have it, but rather may simply corrode the of the current an foundations political order while providing orga can nizational base from which it be challenged. From this perspective, the fact a militant for its that Islamist movement, example, provides supporters with religious classes, professional associations, and medical us movement services tells little about what might happen should the ever us more gain power; it tells much about the political failure and gloomy prospects of the nations existing regime. one not so to find of Unfortunately, need look far abroad examples a on this pattern. The New York Times noted in recent report the Dis trict of Columbia, for example, that for many ofWashington's residents come to mean a home rule "has patronage-bloated, ineffective city pay roll offering phantom services." The weakness and failure ofWashing a ton's local government and political system, in turn, has spurred both rise in associational and a of social consciousness activity" fragmentation and communal identity. Volunteerism [is] growing stronger in the face of the dwindling services, mismanagement and budget shortfalls that to one bedevil the city," according neighborhood activist. "Gradually," come to to care says another, "people feel they have take of themselves not and worry about the other guy."71 Another observer proclaims: "Amid widespread disillusionment with government and its ability to most a solve the nation's pervasive problems, loosely formed social movement a return to ... promoting civil society' has emerged drawing a powerful and ideologically diverse group of political leaders."72 When associationism and communitarian activities flourish in such a context, it would seem that there is cause, not for celebration, but rather for concern deep about the failure of the community's political institutions. true connec Finally, if neo-Tocquevilleans have misunderstood the tions between civic and political institutions, the policy advice they to current offer should be called into question. Responding public dis state satisfaction with the of democracy in America, many have argued that the remedy lies in fostering local associational life.This prescrip to tion may prove be both misguided and counterproductive, however. a If population increasingly perceives its government, politicians, and 71 Ward 3 block-watch organizer Kathy Smith and Cleveland Park Citizens Association president Stephen A. Koczak, respectively, quoted in Francis X Clines, "Washington's Troubles Hit Island of Af fluence," New York 77m?, July 26,1996, p. A19. 72 a to "Promoting Return to 'Civil Society,' Diverse Group of Crusaders Looks New Solutions to Social Problems," Washington Post, December 15,1996.

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to be inefficient parties and unresponsive, diverting public energies and interest into the secondary associations may only exacerbate problem, fragment society, and weaken political cohesion further. American would its were di democracy be better served if problems addressed recdy rather than indirecdy. Increased bird watching and league bowl in other are to ing, words, unlikely have positive effects unless the are nation's political institutions also revitalized.73

73 On this point, see also Skocpol (fn. 7,1996,1996).

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