Abandon Ship Interagency Decisionmaking During the Mayaguez Incident
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Marines storm SS Mayaguez to recover ship (DOD/Michael Chan) Abandon Ship Interagency Decisionmaking During the Mayaguez Incident By Richard B. Hughes The struggle on Koh Tang was, in a sense, a metaphor of the entire Vietnam War: an action begun for what seemed a good and noble purpose, which quickly degenerated into an ugly, desperate fight, micromanaged from no less than the office of the President of the United States. —RALPH WEttERHAHN The Last Battle: The Mayaguez Incident and the End of the Vietnam War n the spring of 1975, Cambodia’s ship and its crew. The focus of this effort Commander Richard B. Hughes, USNR, communist Khmer Rouge govern- became an assault on Koh Tang, a small currently serves as a Reservist supporting the ment seized a U.S. merchant ship, the island in the Gulf of Thailand approxi- Naval History and Heritage Command in Navy I Combat Documentation Detachment 206 in SS Mayaguez, leading the United States mately 30 miles from the Cambodian Washington, DC. to mount a joint operation to rescue the mainland.1 Despite the notable evolu- 98 Recall / Abandon Ship: Revisiting the Mayaguez Incident JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 tions in joint and interagency doctrine May 13. The crew was initially moved a plan to seize the island and retake the in the more than 40 years since this there as well, but the following day they U.S. vessel. They also authorized U.S. incident, it remains strikingly relevant were taken by fishing boat to the port of aircraft to sink any Cambodian gunboats because of the nature of the challenges it Kompong Som on the Cambodian main- in and around the island.11 On the after- presented to interagency decisionmakers: land.5 By this time, some 12 hours after noon of May 14, a fourth NSC meeting a short timeline, limited intelligence, the Mayday call, U.S. P-3 Orion surveil- was held and a military plan approved.12 forces not tailored to the mission, an lance aircraft were already keeping the SS Less than 5 hours later (now the unpredictable opponent, and fevered Mayaguez under observation. morning of May 15 in Cambodia), a public interest. At the time, the “Maya- President Ford initially learned of the force consisting of 170 U.S. Marines, guez Incident” was generally viewed as a seizure at his morning briefing on May 12 transported via eight U.S. Air Force heli- success.2 A more sober review, however, (it was already evening in Cambodia), and copters, launched from Utapao to assault shows that the military operation nearly the NSC met at approximately noon that Koh Tang, with the intent of recovering ended in disaster. A close examination same day. Because the United States had the SS Mayaguez and its crew. Based on of interagency decisionmaking reveals a no diplomatic relationship with the Khmer his intelligence briefing at Utapao, the series of pitfalls, including intelligence Rouge government, overtures were made commander of the assault force believed failures, poor interagency communica- to try and contact them via China.6 The that 18 to 20 Khmer irregulars and their tion, and incomplete assessment of risk. NSC reconvened at 10:30 A.M. on May families were garrisoned on Koh Tang, These factors led the National Security 13. During this meeting, the President with less than 100 total people on the Council (NSC) to make decisions was informed that the SS Mayaguez island.13 The Defense Intelligence Agency that had little chance of furthering was anchored at Koh Tang and that a (DIA), however, believed that “[p]ossibly President Gerald Ford’s foreign policy military aircraft had observed what were 150 to 200 Khmer Communists were objectives and that placed U.S. forces at thought to be at least some members of on the island, armed with 82mm mor- grave risk. Military and civilian leaders the crew being moved to the island itself.7 tars; 75mm recoilless rifles; 30-caliber, would do well to review the lessons of Following this meeting, the President 7.62-mm, and 12.7-mm machineguns; this crisis, lest they make the same mis- directed the U.S. military to intercept any and B4W41 rocket[-]propelled grenade takes in the future. vessels approaching or leaving Koh Tang. launchers.”14 The first helicopters crossed Various military assets were moved closer the beach shortly after dawn local time The Incident to the area, including the aircraft carrier and immediately received heavy fire from It was only 12 days after the fall of USS Coral Sea and the destroyer USS prepared positions. Of the first wave of Saigon, the sobering end to U.S. Harold E. Holt. In addition, U.S. Marines eight helicopters, three were shot down involvement in the Vietnam War. Con- stationed in the Philippines and U.S. Air and the other five received heavy battle fidence in U.S. military power was at a Force helicopters from Nakom Phanom, damage. (Two never returned to base and low ebb and the Watergate scandal had Thailand, converged on Utapao, the clos- none participated in subsequent opera- propelled Gerald Ford into the White est Thai base to Koh Tang.8 tions.) While the original plan envisioned House.3 In Cambodia, the Khmer Late that evening (now the morning that all U.S. forces would land within 10 Rouge, a murderous new anti-American of May 14 in Cambodia), a third NSC minutes, only 131 Marines landed during communist government, had come meeting was convened. At the same time, the course of 17 insertion attempts made into power in Phnom Penh less than U.S. aircraft attempted to stop the fish- over 3 hours. Even more troubling, they a month earlier. On May 12, 1975, at ing vessel, which was moving the crew found themselves in isolated and compro- 4:03 P.M. local time, the U.S. Defense to Kompong Som. Although orders mised positions.15 Attaché in Jakarta, Indonesia, after were to sink such vessels if they did not Minutes after the assault began, consulting with the U.S. Ambassador, turn around, the U.S. pilots had spotted the USS Holt pulled alongside the SS dashed off an intelligence message to “Caucasian faces” on board and held Mayaguez and placed a security force Washington. The message relayed a their fire.9 After warning shots and even on board, but found no one there. At Mayday call from a privately owned tear gas were unable to make the boat almost the same time—and perhaps cargo vessel of U.S. registry that had reverse course, real-time communica- spooked by the flurry of American air initially been received by an affiliated tions allowed President Ford to make activity and the loss of a number of patrol company in Indonesia: “Have been the decision whether to sink the vessel boats—the Cambodian government in fired upon and boarded by Cambodian or allow it to proceed. He elected to let Phnom Penh ordered the crew of the armed forces at 9 degrees 48 min. it move inside the 12-mile boundary of SS Mayaguez released. At approximately N/102 degrees 53 min. E. Ship being Cambodian territorial waters and proceed 10:00 A.M. Cambodian time, the USS towed to unknown Cambodian port.”4 to the mainland.10 Still convinced that at Wilson, another destroyer that had just The Cambodians, after initially taking least some of the crew was on Koh Tang arrived on the scene, intercepted a Thai the vessel to the nearby island of Poulo or still aboard the SS Mayaguez, the NSC fishing vessel with the entire crew of the Wai, then moved it to Koh Tang on discussed military options, coalescing on SS Mayaguez onboard.16 JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Hughes 99 Marine and Air Force pararescueman of 40th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron (in wet suit) run for Air Force helicopter during assault on Koh Tang Island to rescue U.S. merchant ship SS Mayaguez and crew, May 15, 1975 (DOD) The crew’s recovery, in some sense, after a full headcount was taken following island assault.20 The costs of attack- brought the crisis to an end, but the as- evacuation. How they died will likely ing Koh Tang were significant, with sault on Koh Tang was now unfortunately never be fully known, although author a total of 68 casualties.21 In fact, this a pitched battle. A second wave of 100 Ralph Wetterhahn makes a convincing could have been much worse, since, Marines from Utapao was landed around case that they survived on the island, as described above, the evacuation of noon local time as the force attempted only to be later captured and executed by the Marines nearly ended in complete to consolidate its precarious positions. Khmer forces there.18 disaster. How did this happen? Certainly Shortly thereafter, they were advised to there were errors in tactics and execu- disengage and prepare for extraction. Analysis of Interagency tion, but the errors by strategic leader- What followed was a desperate effort to Decisionmaking ship were much more telling.22 retrieve all the Marines before nightfall. At the time, the Ford administration’s To better consider how this decision- Only through the extraordinary heroism actions during the Mayaguez Incident making evolved, it is useful to consider of the Marines, U.S. Air Force, and U.S. were seen as broadly successful: the the perspectives and contributions of Navy close air support, naval gunfire sup- crew was returned safely, no pro- some of the key players at the NSC level. port (including machine gun fire from the tracted hostage situation ensued, and These include the Department of Defense gig of the USS Wilson), and astonishing it appeared that the U.S.