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Abandon Ship Interagency Decisionmaking During the Mayaguez Incident

Abandon Ship Interagency Decisionmaking During the Mayaguez Incident

Marines storm SS Mayaguez to recover ship (DOD/Michael Chan)

Abandon Ship Interagency Decisionmaking During the

By Richard B. Hughes

The struggle on was, in a sense, a metaphor of the entire : an action begun for what seemed a good and noble purpose, which quickly degenerated into an ugly, desperate fight, micromanaged from no less than the office of the President of the .

—Ralph Wetterhahn The Last Battle: The Mayaguez Incident and the End of the Vietnam War

n the spring of 1975, ’s ship and its crew. The focus of this effort Commander Richard B. Hughes, USNR, communist govern- became an assault on Koh Tang, a small currently serves as a Reservist supporting the ment seized a U.S. merchant ship, the island in the Gulf of approxi- Naval History and Heritage Command in Navy I Combat Documentation Detachment 206 in SS Mayaguez, leading the United States mately 30 miles from the Cambodian Washington, DC. to mount a joint operation to rescue the mainland.1 Despite the notable evolu-

98 Recall / Abandon Ship: Revisiting the Mayaguez Incident JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 tions in joint and interagency doctrine May 13. The crew was initially moved a plan to seize the island and retake the in the more than 40 years since this there as well, but the following day they U.S. vessel. They also authorized U.S. incident, it remains strikingly relevant were taken by fishing boat to the port of aircraft to sink any Cambodian gunboats because of the nature of the challenges it Kompong Som on the Cambodian main- in and around the island.11 On the after- presented to interagency decisionmakers: land.5 By this time, some 12 hours after noon of May 14, a fourth NSC meeting a short timeline, limited intelligence, the Mayday call, U.S. P-3 Orion surveil- was held and a military plan approved.12 forces not tailored to the mission, an lance aircraft were already keeping the SS Less than 5 hours later (now the unpredictable opponent, and fevered Mayaguez under observation. morning of May 15 in Cambodia), a public interest. At the time, the “Maya- President Ford initially learned of the force consisting of 170 U.S. Marines, guez Incident” was generally viewed as a seizure at his morning briefing on May 12 transported via eight U.S. Air Force heli- success.2 A more sober review, however, (it was already evening in Cambodia), and copters, launched from Utapao to assault shows that the military operation nearly the NSC met at approximately noon that Koh Tang, with the intent of recovering ended in disaster. A close examination same day. Because the United States had the SS Mayaguez and its crew. Based on of interagency decisionmaking reveals a no diplomatic relationship with the Khmer his intelligence briefing at Utapao, the series of pitfalls, including intelligence Rouge government, overtures were made commander of the assault force believed failures, poor interagency communica- to try and contact them via .6 The that 18 to 20 Khmer irregulars and their tion, and incomplete assessment of risk. NSC reconvened at 10:30 a.m. on May families were garrisoned on Koh Tang, These factors led the National Security 13. During this meeting, the President with less than 100 total people on the Council (NSC) to make decisions was informed that the SS Mayaguez island.13 The Defense Intelligence Agency that had little chance of furthering was anchored at Koh Tang and that a (DIA), however, believed that “[p]ossibly President ’s foreign policy military aircraft had observed what were 150 to 200 Khmer Communists were objectives and that placed U.S. forces at thought to be at least some members of on the island, armed with 82mm mor- grave risk. Military and civilian leaders the crew being moved to the island itself.7 tars; 75mm recoilless rifles; 30-caliber, would do well to review the lessons of Following this meeting, the President 7.62-mm, and 12.7-mm machineguns; this crisis, lest they make the same mis- directed the U.S. military to intercept any and B4W41 rocket[-]propelled grenade takes in the future. vessels approaching or leaving Koh Tang. launchers.”14 The first helicopters crossed Various military assets were moved closer the beach shortly after dawn local time The Incident to the area, including the and immediately received heavy fire from It was only 12 days after the fall of USS Coral Sea and the destroyer USS prepared positions. Of the first wave of Saigon, the sobering end to U.S. Harold E. Holt. In addition, U.S. Marines eight helicopters, three were shot down involvement in the Vietnam War. Con- stationed in the and U.S. Air and the other five received heavy battle fidence in U.S. military power was at a Force helicopters from Nakom Phanom, damage. (Two never returned to base and low ebb and the Watergate scandal had Thailand, converged on Utapao, the clos- none participated in subsequent opera- propelled Gerald Ford into the White est Thai base to Koh Tang.8 tions.) While the original plan envisioned House.3 In Cambodia, the Khmer Late that evening (now the morning that all U.S. forces would land within 10 Rouge, a murderous new anti-American of May 14 in Cambodia), a third NSC minutes, only 131 Marines landed during communist government, had come meeting was convened. At the same time, the course of 17 insertion attempts made into power in Phnom Penh less than U.S. aircraft attempted to stop the fish- over 3 hours. Even more troubling, they a month earlier. On May 12, 1975, at ing vessel, which was moving the crew found themselves in isolated and compro- 4:03 p.m. local time, the U.S. Defense to Kompong Som. Although orders mised positions.15 Attaché in , Indonesia, after were to sink such vessels if they did not Minutes after the assault began, consulting with the U.S. Ambassador, turn around, the U.S. pilots had spotted the USS Holt pulled alongside the SS dashed off an intelligence message to “Caucasian faces” on board and held Mayaguez and placed a security force Washington. The message relayed a their fire.9 After warning shots and even on board, but found no one there. At Mayday call from a privately owned tear gas were unable to make the boat almost the same time—and perhaps cargo vessel of U.S. registry that had reverse course, real-time communica- spooked by the flurry of American air initially been received by an affiliated tions allowed President Ford to make activity and the loss of a number of patrol company in Indonesia: “Have been the decision whether to sink the vessel boats—the Cambodian government in fired upon and boarded by Cambodian or allow it to proceed. He elected to let Phnom Penh ordered the crew of the armed forces at 9 degrees 48 min. it move inside the 12-mile boundary of SS Mayaguez released. At approximately N/102 degrees 53 min. E. Ship being Cambodian territorial waters and proceed 10:00 a.m. Cambodian time, the USS towed to unknown Cambodian port.”4 to the mainland.10 Still convinced that at Wilson, another destroyer that had just The Cambodians, after initially taking least some of the crew was on Koh Tang arrived on the scene, intercepted a Thai the vessel to the nearby island of Poulo or still aboard the SS Mayaguez, the NSC fishing vessel with the entire crew of the Wai, then moved it to Koh Tang on discussed military options, coalescing on SS Mayaguez onboard.16

JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Hughes 99 Marine and Air Force pararescueman of 40th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron (in wet suit) run for Air Force helicopter during assault on Koh Tang Island to rescue U.S. merchant ship SS Mayaguez and crew, May 15, 1975 (DOD)

The crew’s recovery, in some sense, after a full headcount was taken following island assault.20 The costs of attack- brought the crisis to an end, but the as- evacuation. How they died will likely ing Koh Tang were significant, with sault on Koh Tang was now unfortunately never be fully known, although author a total of 68 casualties.21 In fact, this a pitched battle. A second wave of 100 Ralph Wetterhahn makes a convincing could have been much worse, since, Marines from Utapao was landed around case that they survived on the island, as described above, the evacuation of noon local time as the force attempted only to be later captured and executed by the Marines nearly ended in complete to consolidate its precarious positions. Khmer forces there.18 disaster. How did this happen? Certainly Shortly thereafter, they were advised to there were errors in tactics and execu- disengage and prepare for extraction. Analysis of Interagency tion, but the errors by strategic leader- What followed was a desperate effort to Decisionmaking ship were much more telling.22 retrieve all the Marines before nightfall. At the time, the Ford administration’s To better consider how this decision- Only through the extraordinary heroism actions during the Mayaguez Incident making evolved, it is useful to consider of the Marines, U.S. Air Force, and U.S. were seen as broadly successful: the the perspectives and contributions of Navy close air support, naval gunfire sup- crew was returned safely, no pro- some of the key players at the NSC level. port (including machine gun fire from the tracted hostage situation ensued, and These include the Department of Defense gig of the USS Wilson), and astonishing it appeared that the U.S. military had (DOD), Central Intelligence Agency flying by the U.S. Air Force H-53 heli- cowed the Cambodian communists.19 (CIA) and Intelligence Community copter crews was this accomplished. The Hindsight paints a different picture, broadly, and Department of State. We final account of the attack on Koh Tang however. Although the low-risk air must also determine whether their contri- was sobering: 15 killed in action, with 3 attacks on Kompong Som and Cam- butions coalesced into a well-integrated missing and 49 wounded. These numbers bodian naval vessels were effective in strategic perspective that balanced risk to do not include an additional 23 Air Force influencing the Cambodians, the U.S. and reward for the national interest. personnel killed in a May 13 helicopter ground assault was ill advised, a risky crash during preparations for the attack.17 insertion of poorly prepared troops on Department of Defense The three Marines missing in action were an island where none of the crew was DOD, including the Joint Chiefs of initially believed to have been on the heli- ever located. The crew’s release was Staff and the commander in chief of copters; their absence was discovered only made in spite of, not because of, the Pacific Command (CINCPAC), had a

100 Recall / Abandon Ship: Revisiting the Mayaguez Incident JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 critical role to play during Mayaguez a C-130 pilot during the operation, later machine guns, and rocket-propelled decisionmaking. They had to plan for stated, “On Wednesday (early morning, grenades. Although neither of the and prepare to execute operations as May 14th DC time), I knew, or thought I more accurate estimates ever reached well as advise President Ford of his knew, from the intelligence brought back the operational commander, at least options and their military viability and by our A-7 pilot that the Mayaguez crew the IPAC estimate was available to risk as the NSC process evolved. In the was not on Koh Tang. But this was not the NSC.30 Colby often characterized first area, DOD acquitted itself well. so clear back in Washington.”27 Despite 100 troops as the upper end of enemy Assets were moved into the area quickly this new and important information, the strength. During the NSC meeting on and a true joint effort was made to focus remained on Koh Tang. May 13, he noted, “Our estimate was coordinate U.S. Navy, Air Force, and Regarding the timing of operations, that there were 2,000 in Kompong Marine Corps forces to respond to the Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger Som. There is not a large force on the crisis. On May 13, 1975, the day follow- initially reflected the cautions articulated island [Koh Tang].” When President ing the seizure of the ship, DOD pro- in the paper, informing the President that Ford responded, “Do you think we can vided an options paper to the President, “we need the morning of the 16th for a figure with 100?” Colby replied, “Yes. showing three scenarios for recovery of coordinated assault.” When Secretary of The KC [Khmer Communists] have just the SS Mayaguez and its crew.23 This State proposed an assault arrived in power. They probably have paper provided reasonable advice about on the morning of May 15, Schlesinger not had time to man the island more the timing of any attack on Koh Tang noted, “the problem with that is that fully.” The director’s written update, and/or the Mayaguez, appearing to the Coral Sea will not be there.” But as provided to the President (and briefed favor waiting until at least the morning Colby and others urged quicker action, verbally) to the NSC on May 14, did of May 16 for any assault. It noted that Schlesinger changed course, stating, “We not provide any substantial update on with such a delay, “[h]elicopter-borne will be prepared to go on the morning the Cambodian forces on Koh Tang assault operations could be conducted of the 15th.”28 By the time of the NSC itself, focusing instead on the Cam- from the deck of the [USS] Coral Sea,” meeting on May 14, the acting head of bodian order of battle at Kompong by then expected to be within miles of the , David Som.31 This was in spite of a request Koh Tang, thus significantly lowering C. Jones, was committed to an assault at the Director of Central Intelligence the risk of conducting operations from that evening (the following morning, morning meeting on May 14 for a Thailand, 190 nautical miles distant. It Cambodian time).29 This advancement in full update of the Cambodian order also advised that the operation “be given the timeline created significant new risks of battle, which certainly should have additional time for the working of the for the operation, robbing the Marines of alerted Colby to the more accurate DIA diplomatic process.”24 an extra day to plan, forcing the helicop- estimate.32 In aggregate, the CIA direc- Unfortunately, because the DOD ters to operate from Utapao (a 1.5-hour tor’s briefs to the NSC left the impres- paper was provided to the NSC before flight from Koh Tang) rather than the sion that the Marines would encounter the sighting of crewmembers headed for USS Coral Sea, and restricting the tactical only token resistance. General Jones the Cambodian mainland, it assumed the air support available in the initial phases also seemed unconcerned when briefing crew was either aboard the Mayaguez of the operation. the proposed action on the afternoon of or on Koh Tang. There is no evidence May 14, either unaware or unconcerned that the paper was ever updated in light The Intelligence Community that his assault force would be taking of this new information. Likewise, the These risks were amplified because on heavy weapons–capable forces that discussions at the NSC on the evening CIA Director Colby and others did would leave it outgunned.33 The Joint of May 13 (after “Caucasians” had been not articulate the full extent of the Chiefs of Staff certainly mirrored the spotted being transferred to Kompong threat during the NSC meetings. U.S. confidence of on-scene commanders, Som) took no notice of the crew’s loca- intelligence produced three estimates who still had access only to the earlier tion, focusing instead on how soon an of military strength in the course of estimates of 20 soldiers with no heavy assault on Koh Tang could be launched.25 the crisis. An initial Intelligence Pacific weapons.34 Even the earliest analyses By the time of the NSC meeting on (IPAC) estimate severely underesti- of the operation concluded that intel- May 14, CIA Director William Colby mated Khmer Rouge strength on Koh ligence failures occurred at all levels.35 provided the best update available on Tang at only 10 to 20 soldiers. A May the crew’s whereabouts, advising the 13 IPAC assessment was closer, estimat- The State Department President that “the Cambodians have ap- ing 100 soldiers, with 75mm recoilless The State Department also had a role parently transported at least some of the rifles, machine guns, and rocket launch- to play during NSC meetings and was American Crew from Koh Tang Island ers. A May 12 DIA estimate was almost ably (or at least powerfully) represented to the mainland, putting them ashore at perfect, estimating that there was a by Secretary Kissinger.36 Yet Kissinger Kompong Som port at about 11:00 last total of 150 to 200 soldiers armed with seemed to focus more on military rather night, Washington time.”26 David Mets, 82mm mortars, 75mm recoilless rifles, than diplomatic options,37 leaving this

JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Hughes 101 Marine prepares to fire on and destroy important equipment on disabled HH-53 to prevent its capture by Cambodians (U.S. Air Force/Ronald T. Rand) key aspect of national power unex- State also had indications that the particularly well during this crisis. Indeed, plored. The only efforts by the State Cambodians were wavering and that Secretary Kissinger was the biggest advo- Department to use diplomacy consisted more time might be useful. A cable sent cate for the use of force, so much so that of providing a message to the Khmer by the U.S. Embassy in on May Christopher J. Lamb believes that he was Rouge via the People’s Republic of 14 (addressed to the State Department aware of the U.S. Embassy Tehran’s cable China, both in Washington and in and CINCPAC Hawaii, among others) and made a conscious decision not to Beijing.38 Although diplomatic commu- titled “Chinese Embassy Tehran believes share it with his NSC colleagues.44 nications with the new (and decidedly Mayaguez to be freed soon” provided anti-American) government in Phnom evidence that the Chinese were pressur- Strategic Perspective Penh were extraordinarily difficult, ing the Khmer Rouge to release the vessel If strategy is balancing ends, ways, there were potential avenues, including and crew.42 Just before the American means, and risk, then the Mayaguez broadcasts in Khmer helicopters lifted off to assault Koh Tang, Incident is a stark example of how these and Cambodian representatives in Paris the U.S. Foreign Broadcast Information can become unbalanced. By failing to and Moscow. State, however, did not Service monitored a domestic radio properly account for risk, senior leaders pursue either of these avenues.39 During broadcast by the Cambodian minister of jeopardized a serious strategic setback. the initial NSC meeting, virtually all of information indicating they would release The desired (and achieved) result of Secretary Kissinger’s comments related the SS Mayaguez and order the ship to having the vessel and crew returned was to which, not whether, military actions depart Cambodian waters.43 Neither of certainly critical to the United States, needed to be taken.40 At the next day’s these nascent indications that there might reeling from geopolitical setbacks in meeting, Kissinger was absent, and be room for a repatriation of hostages Vietnam and a general public percep- Under Secretary of State for Political without military action was ever discussed tion that U.S. military power was at Affairs Joseph Sisco represented the State at the NSC. The role of State in the NSC low ebb. But the President should have Department. Sisco did not utter a word was to serve as the subject matter expert known that the military plan presented during the 45-minute meeting, and no on and advocate for diplomacy, yet the to him had huge risks for the American diplomatic options were discussed.41 record shows they did neither of these forces and presented little to no chance

102 Recall / Abandon Ship: Revisiting the Mayaguez Incident JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 of recovering the entire crew. The plan, ganization Act of 1986 and the con- forces alongside regular naval forces has as drawn up, called for assaulting Koh sequent successful joint operations of come a long way. In light of these suc- Tang in spite of the fact that no one the past several decades. Yet the issues cesses, it is hard to imagine an operation knew the location of the hostages with that plagued national leadership during as chaotic as the Mayaguez Incident in any certainty. Indeed, the evidence that the Mayaguez Incident do not seem the current joint environment.53 did exist suggested that the crew was not so antiquated when viewed alongside Yet perhaps the most enduring lessons on Koh Tang, a fact perhaps explained those that have confronted more recent of Mayaguez are those related to the abil- by the strong focus of the decisionmak- U.S. administrations: intelligence not ity of the NSC to rapidly and effectively ers on recovering the ship itself.45 They reaching the correct decisionmakers, the synthesize the collective knowledge of may also have been focused on avoiding failure of policymakers to discuss criti- the various stakeholder agencies into a a repeat of the 1968 Pueblo Incident, cal information at the NSC, policy and truly national perspective. Especially dur- a significant black eye for American operational risks that seem foolish in ing crises that occur in the “gray area” prestige.46 In any event, not carefully hindsight, and an imbalanced focus on between war and peace, the NSC must accounting for the crew’s whereabouts one instrument of national power. formulate and realistically evaluate ap- introduced serious risks to U.S. foreign Could the same mistakes be made proaches that utilize all the instruments policy. If the crew had not been released, again? Certainly the current emphasis on of national power to resolve a crisis. I the costly assault on Koh Tang would joint doctrine and joint education is of argue that it is in this area that the biggest certainly have been perceived by many as some help. The plans presented by DOD failures of Mayaguez occurred. Issues foolish and ineffective, recovering only during the Mayaguez Incident were the that were known inside each agency an empty ship and leaving the Khmer result of an embryonic joint planning (for example, the actual location of the Rouge still in possession of the crew. The process that unraveled under the stress of hostages or that a hastily assembled force crew likely would have made for useful short-fused planning efforts. My own ex- of Marines would be attacking a well- hostages for the Cambodians, even had periences as a planner at the International defended island) were never substantially the empty ship been recaptured.47 Security Force Headquarters and Interim discussed at the highest levels. The plan Perhaps more importantly, senior Joint Command in Afghanistan would to end the crisis was focused exclusively decisionmakers poorly understood the lead me to believe that we could do on the military instrument of national military risks of the assault.48 The helicop- better, especially at the tactical level. power, despite indications that diplomacy ter assault by lightly armed Marines with Likewise, important changes within the might have a role to play. Risks to mis- no combat experience into well-defended Intelligence Community have occurred sion and negative policy implications of landing zones against a battle-hardened in the past 35 years. Intelligence support mission failure were never articulated and and determined foe with heavy weaponry to operations has certainly improved, evaluated by the NSC. went in many ways better than it should and lessons learned from the terrorist Is the current interagency deci- have. It could just as easily have ended attacks on September 11, 2001, among sionmaking environment substantially with the Marines being completely over- others, has led to community-wide changed from that of 40 years ago? run.49 Although the evacuation efforts efforts to break down interagency stove- Without the congressional pressure that avoided this grim turn of events, the pipes.52 Likewise, the 1987 standup and led to Goldwater-Nichols, USSOCOM Marines left behind on Koh Tang (assum- subsequent evolution of U.S. Special and other military reforms, the NSC ing they did survive and were captured Operations Command (USSOCOM), role in the interagency decisionmaking by the Cambodians, as noted above) still which had its origins in the disastrous process has remained advisory rather could have been exploited as hostages mission to res- than directive, creating an environment and propaganda tools.50 In short, the cue American hostages held in in in which individual agencies may be military assault on Koh Tang incurred April 1980, has significantly enhanced more worried about protecting their risk that was not justified to achieve the the military’s ability to rapidly and ef- equities than working toward a common ends desired. This is especially true since fectively plan such operations. In recent objective. In this environment, synthesis a more nuanced approach might have years, USSOCOM and the Joint Special of information and the instruments of yielded the same result; especially telling Operations Command have shown an national power must occur on an ad hoc is that a more multifaceted approach was ability to quickly assimilate intelligence basis. Equally troubling, such disconnects not even considered.51 and manage risk to execute short-fused at the strategic level also create obstacles operations, such as the much publicized to collaboration in the field. Recent Conclusions Operation Neptune Spear, which resulted operations in Iraq and Afghanistan bear One can be forgiven for viewing the in the death of Osama bin Laden in May witness to the ongoing challenges in get- Mayaguez Incident as a relic of a 2011. The actions against the Somali ting the State Department and military bygone era; after all, it occurred nearly pirates who hijacked the MV Maersk staffs to work together effectively to 40 years ago, before the Goldwater- Alabama in 2009 also demonstrate that integrate the instruments of national Nichols Department of Defense Reor- the employment of special operations power, leading some to say that “the time

JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Hughes 103 the most seasoned joint planner or com- mander needs to check his assumptions and ensure that new data do not conflict with the underpinnings of their opera- tional design. Since the SS Mayaguez crisis, the need for carefully integrated interagency operations that balance all el- ements of national power and judiciously assess risk on an ongoing basis has only increased. However, many national lead- ers believe we are no better at meeting such demands today than we were 40 years ago. As former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard Myers argues, we “have to realize that the United States’ interagency and national security apparatus, as currently organized, can’t deal effectively with the threats of the twenty-first century.”55 Perhaps, then, what the Mayaguez Incident teaches us— and we have been slow to learn—is that better national security decisionmaking will not occur simply by electing more talented leaders. It requires serious orga- nizational reforms similar to those that have served to improve joint planning and special operations. JFQ

Notes

1 Koh is Khmer for island, so the article avoids the redundant construction Koh Tang Island. 2 The American public and press gener- ally approved of the operation, and President Ford’s rating in the Gallup Poll increased from Marines reboard USS Harold E. Holt (DE-1974) from SS Mayaguez after merchant ship’s recovery, Koh 39 to 51 percent. See The Kennedy School of Tang Island, Cambodia, May 14, 1975 (DOD/Michael Chan) Government, The Mayaguez Incident (Boston: President and Fellows of Harvard College, has come to look to a new, more effective to focus on singular solutions (military or 1983), 22. operational model.”54 While the NSC has otherwise) that do not take into account 3 President Gerald Ford’s pardon of former certainly contributed to unity of perspec- all aspects of complex policy challenges. President in September 1974, tive at the strategic level, it continues to In the interim, joint leaders would be along with a poor economy and foreign policy setbacks, had made him an unpopular fall well short of unity of effort among well advised to ensure that interagency President. Ford’s approval rating was only agencies, which is essential to effective stakeholders are present, critical, and 39 percent in , and did strategy and decisionmaking. Instead, we vocal in planning efforts, and that advice not generally view him as the solution to the rely on “lead-follow” relationships be- provided to national leadership reflects Nation’s woes. See Robert J. Mahoney, The tween agencies, often leading to strategic a whole-of-government perspective. Mayaguez Incident: Testing America’s Resolve in the Post-Vietnam Era (Lubbock: Texas Tech solutions dominated by one instru- During Mayaguez, agencies were cer- University Press, 2011), 3–5. ment of power. Until we have a reliable tainly present at NSC discussions, but 4 The Kennedy School of Government, 1. framework that integrates the resources they fell short in the critical and vocal 5 Government Accountability Office each element of government brings to categories; diplomatic cables were not (GAO), The Seizure of the Mayaguez: A Case bear, we will continue to have strategic evaluated, the whereabouts of hostages Study in Crisis Managment (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1976), 63–64. blind spots. These can lead national and enemies’ dispositions were not fully 6 These efforts at least appeared unsuccess- decisionmakers, like those in the Ford ad- discussed, and perilous military plans ful as the Chinese returned diplomatic notes, ministration during the Mayaguez crisis, were left unquestioned. Likewise, even but some scholars speculate that some of these

104 Recall / Abandon Ship: Revisiting the Mayaguez Incident JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 communications may have reached the Khmer unreliable tactical communications (especially ment of State, U.S. Embassy Tehran Cable government, possibly via its embassy in Beijing. across Service lines); inadequate pre-mission 14MAY750856GMT: “Chinese Embassy See Richard G. Head, Frisco W. Short, and planning; employment of forces outside of their Tehran Believes Mayaguez to Be Freed Soon,” Robert C. McFarlane, Crisis Resolution: Presi- training and doctrine; chaotic and incomplete Digital National Security Archive, 1975. dential Decision Making in the Mayaguez and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; 43 GAO, 124. Korean Confrontations (Boulder, CO: Westview and poor plans for supporting fires were noted 44 Lamb, 123. See also Christopher J. Lamb Press, 1978), 145; see also Mahoney, 216. in several immediate reviews of the action. See and Alexandra A. Singer, The Mayaguez Crisis 7 Gerald R. Ford, National Security Council GAO, 59–61; CINCPAC Command History, Mini Case Study (Washington, DC: Project on [NSC] Minutes, May 13th, 10:22am, 1975 10–20; and Patrick, 21–22. National Security Reform Case Study, 2009), (Washington, DC: The , 1975), 2. 23 Department of Defense, Possible Scenarios 4–7. 8 GAO, 115–126. for Recovery of Ship and Crew, Options Paper 45 Lamb, 81. For a more detailed analysis of 9 Ford, NSC Minutes, May 13th 10:40pm, 2. (Quantico, VA: Ford Library, 1975), 2. the tension between the objectives of ship and For specifics of the aircraft and pilots’ observa- 24 Ibid., 2. crew, see also Lamb and Singer, 5–7. tions, see also Commander in Chief, U.S. 25 Ford, NSC Minutes, May 13th, 10:40pm, 46 Lamb, 202. See also Lucien S. Vanden- Pacific Command Headquarters (CINCPAC 1–23. brouke, Perilous Options (New York: Oxford HQ), Command History Branch, CINCPAC 26 Ford, NSC Minutes, May 14th, 3:52pm, 3. University Press, 1993), 83–84. Command History, 1975, Appendix VI, Top 27 David A. Mets, “Last Flight from Koh 47 Vandenbrouke makes a strong case that Secret, Declassified May 8, 1980 (San Fran- Tang: The Mayaguez Incident a Generation President Ford and others were clearly aware cisco: CINCPAC HQ, 1976), 17. Hereafter, Later,” Joint Force Quarterly 45 (2nd Quarter that this was a real, perhaps even likely, out- CINCPAC Command History. 2007), 112. come. Vandenbrouke, 83. 10 Ford, NSC Minutes, May 13th 10:40pm, 28 Ford, NSC Minutes, May 13th, 10:40pm, 48 Vandenbrouke notes that “[u]nder the 2–5. The boat in question was a Thai fishing 12–14. best of circumstances, the difficulty of conduct- vessel with Cambodian guards; the terrified 29 Ford, NSC Minutes, May 14th, 3:52pm, ing a successful operation with units that have Thais wanted to turn around, but were forced 7–9. never worked together, drawn from services on at gunpoint by their Cambodian captors. 30 Christopher J. Lamb, Belief Systems that never train together, is great.” He goes See Ralph Wetterhahn, The Last Battle: The and Decision Making in the Mayaguez Crisis on to detail the NSC’s poor understanding of Mayaguez Incident and the End of the Vietnam (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1989), these risks. Ibid., 88–90. War (New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers, 129–130. For additional details on intelligence 49 The Joint Chiefs, After Action Report, Inc., 2001), 104–106. messages at the CINCPAC level, see also Ma- 19. 11 Ford, NSC Minutes, May 13th, 10:40pm, honey, 251–255. 50 These Marines were initially listed as 5–23. 31 Director of Central Intelligence, National MIA, and their status was later changed to 12 Ford, NSC Minutes, May 14th, 3:52pm, Security Council Intelligence Briefing, “Cam- KIA. Ibid., 21. See also GAO, 65. When they 1–27. bodian Forces during Mayaguez Incident,” were initially discovered missing, a search by 13 CINCPAC Command History, 19. U.S. National Archives and Records Adminis- the crew of the USS Wilson was unsuccessful. A 14 GAO, 89–92. tration (NARA), 1975. proposed SEAL Team insertion to search fur- 15 Urey W. Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation 32 Director of Central Intelligence, Memo- ther was considered but voted down. Mahoney, (Washington, DC: Center for Naval Analy- randum, “The Rescue of SS Mayaguez and Its 179–180. sis–Marine Corps Operational Analysis Group, Crew,” NARA, 1975, 12. 51 While decisionmakers during the Maya- April 1977), 10–13. 33 Ford, NSC Minutes, May 14th, 3:52pm, guez Incident were justifiably concerned about 16 GAO, 125 7–9. a long-lasting hostage standoff such as had 17 CINCPAC Command History, 19. 34 In addition to multiple intelligence esti- occurred with the USS Pueblo in 1968, a more 18 Wetterhahn believes, based on interviews mates, a hastily organized command and con- recent example, the 2001 Hainan Incident, in with a Cambodian who commanded the Khmer trol structure contributed to poor situational which a U.S. EP-3 ARIES II crew was held by troops at Koh Tang, that awareness. In at least one instance, an Air Force the People’s Republic of China, demonstrates Joseph N. Hargrove was wounded, captured intelligence officer who had access to higher that a “pause” for diplomacy can be more ef- shortly after the initial battle, and then execut- enemy troop strength numbers was rebuffed fective than a purely military solution, especially ed by gunshot. According to the same source, when he attempted to provide them to those when backed by a credible military response. First Class Gary Hall and Private Danny planning the assault. See Mahoney, 251–255. 52 Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, “The Cultural G. Marshall were captured by a Khmer patrol 35 Patrick, 21. Revolution in Intelligence: Interim Report,” on the island some days after the battle and 36 “It is not surprising to find that Ford, Washington Quarterly 31, no. 2 (2008), 47–61. transported to Kompong Som where, a week pushed into office by the Watergate scandal, 53 Sean D. Naylor, “A Triumph for JSOC,” later, on orders from Phnom Penh, they were relied heavily on Kissinger to formulate foreign Defense News, May 9, 2011, 11. beaten to death with a B40 grenade launcher. policy. . . he was undoubtedly strongly influ- 54 Dennis Blair, Ronald Neumann, Eric See Wetterhahn, 277–289. enced by Kissinger’s opinion.” See Lamb, 63. Olsen, “Fixing Fragile States,” The National 19 Head, Short, and McFarlane, 147–148. 37 Lamb notes, “A diplomatic settlement Interest, September–October 2014. See also B. 20 On the other hand, air attacks, both on rated a very poor second on the list of American Baylor, J. Burington, B. Davis, R. Goehring, Cambodian naval vessels and on Kompong Som priorities, especially for the Secretary of State, “Iraq: A Case Study in Building Civil-Military by the Coral Sea, did appear to influence Cam- who headed off such a development as best he Capacity, 2007–2010,” Prism 1, no. 3 (2011), bodian decisionmakers. See Mahoney, 157. could.” Lamb, 246. See also Mahoney, 25. 137–138; Rudra Chaudhuri and Theo Farrell, 21 Eighteen Marines, Sailors, and Airmen 38 GAO, 66. “Campaign Disconnect: Operational Prog- were killed in the attack on Koh Tang, although 39 Ibid., 67–68. ress and Strategic Obstacles in Afghanistan three Marines were initially listed as MIA, with 40 Ford, NSC Minutes, May 12th, 12:05pm. 2009–2011,” International Affairs 87, no. 2 50 wounded. See After Action Report: Rescue 41 Ford, NSC Minutes, May 13th, 10:22am. (2011), 284–287. of the SS Mayaguez and Its Crew (Washington, 42 Although the cable’s insight came via a 55 Richard B. Myers, Eyes on the Horizon: DC: The Joint Staff, May 19, 1975), 21. Pakistani diplomat, it still should have given Serving on the Front Lines of National Security 22 A poor command and control structure; decisionmakers some degree of pause. Depart- (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2009), 301.

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