Addressing Corruption in the Nigerian Military Establishment

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Addressing Corruption in the Nigerian Military Establishment International Journal of Innovative Legal & Political Studies 7(3):52-63, July-Sept., 2019 © SEAHI PUBLICATIONS, 2019 www.seahipaj.org ISSN: 2467-8503 Addressing Corruption in the Nigerian Military Establishment 1Eme, Okechukwu Innocent & 2Chris Umeokafor 1Department of Public Administration & Local Government University of Nigeria, Nsukka, Nigeria 2Department of Public Administration & Local Government Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Awka, Nigeria ABSTRACT Nigeria is currently bedeviled by the problem of Boko Haram insurgency and other ethno-religious conflicts which are ravaging the geopolitical zones of the country. The Nigerian armed forces have been playing significant roles in crisis management especially, the fight against insurgency in the country. This paper investigates the operations of the Nigerian armed forces in the fight against Boko Haram insurgents and these identities, their success and challenges. The modernization theory was adopted as the theoretical framework of analysis. Documentary method was adopted as the method of data collection and content analysis was employed as the method of data analysis. The paper found that the Nigerian armed forces have made significant achievement in the fight against Boko Haram and these groups as shown in the number of territories it has recovered from the insurgents. However, the paper is of the view that a lot still needs to be done as the insurgents have fought back on several occasions. The Paper also found that the Nigerian armed forces do not have adequate weapons to prosecute the war against insurgents. There are also reports of a third force within and outside the armed forces that sabotage the efforts of the armed forces. This third force are politically and financially exposed persons who are involved in corruption. The paper recommends adequate funding and monitoring of these funds of the armed forces to enable them purchase modern military equipments to fight the insurgents. The armed forces themselves should be motivated through training and adequate financial and material incentives. Finally, the federal government should fish out sponsors of Boko Haram and other groups in the country and punish them as provided by the law of the country. Keywords; Armed force, Boko Haram, Insurgency, Ethno-religious identities & Politically & financially exposed persons. INTRODUCTION The funding of the military, especially the ongoing decade of counter insurgency operation, is generating heated controversy especially over who handles the money allocated to the Ministry as both the Ministry of defence (MOD) and the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA) have repeatedly denied handling the money. While the former has washed its hands off the expenditure of the military, the ONSA, too, has done the same but some officials of the former have faulted the ONSA‟s claim. In view of the above, critical sections of the populace have been asking questions about the funding of the ongoing counter insurgency operation which involves the military and all the security agencies such as the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) and the Department of the State Security Services (DSS).The controversy came to the open when the Leadership Weekend in 2014, in a story published in one of its edition quoted a ministry source alleging that the ministry of 52 Eme & Umeokafor..,.…. Int. J. Innovative Legal & Political Studies 7(3):52-63, 2019 defence was not involved in the funding of the operation. The story further disclosed that the Presidency dealt directly with Service chiefs. Another MOD official, who corroborated the story, explained that the funding of the counter insurgency operation is being handled by the office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA). According to him, the MOD‟s involvement in the funding of the military is on paper, not real. It is on paper that the military receives its fund through the MOD that may have to do with the overheads but when you are talking of the real funding of the ongoing counter insurgency operation, the vote is allocated to the Office on the National Security Adviser. This is why the ministry is not aware of the purchase of any ammunition or any other thing that is needed for the operation. Some soldiers, SSS and policemen and officers according to the source left the country for the counter insurgency training in Germany. The MOD was not aware of it. Whatever they need is channeled to the NSA and all we are told is that some officers are traveling to some place. In the area of purchasing, the Leadership Weekend(2014) had posed the puzzle who is in charge of the due process, verification, qualities, standardization, etc? By implication, ministries of interior, defence, and the police affairs are not directly involved in their capital expenditure, and the question is, who accounts for their purchases. What we are saying is that, each of these ministries not only the MOD, should be deeply involved in all their transactions for accountability. Reacting to a story published by TELL Magazine, the then ONSA, in a statement issued and signed by the special adviser to the NSA on media and publicity, Mr. Karounwi, Adekunle, denied ever being involved in the funding of the military as reported. He said, our attention has been drawn to the false and misleading story published in TELL magazine of June 2, 2014, alleging that for some years now, defence funds have been under the management of the national security adviser instead of the ministry of defence where the funds were traditionally administered. We state, clearly and unambiguously, that ONSA is separate from MOD in all budgetary affairs. The ONSA defends its budgets before the National Assembly and MOD does for its own. All budgetary provisions are clearly spelt out and within the public domain, ONSA has no responsibility for military personnel‟s salaries and alliances, capital projects or otherwise. All are within the domain of MOD. So, how can the ONSA be accused of managing defence funds. We request that, for any allegation from any source about ONSA, please recourse be made to the NSA for his own side of the story before publishing. There is need for a holistic and balanced report at all times. But the findings of Transparency International (2017), BudgIT (2018) and Compendium of Arms Trade Corruption(2019) have contradicted the ONSA defence. From their findings, they were able to establish that the military is being poorly funded, some disagree and that the money passed by the National Assembly is being diverted or withhold by the Presidency. They even found out that military purchases some refurbished ammunition as a result of poor funding or mismanaging of the money allocated to it and that most of the contractors given jobs are recommended by the National Assembly members and the officials of the presidency and the ruling party. The objective of this paper is to identify and discuss the major military corruption, the actors and cost implications on the polity. To achieve this objective, following the introduction is conceptualization of corruption. Theoretical framework of analysis and methodology follows. The analysis of cases, conclusion and recommendations follows. Conceptualizing Corruption Transparency International( Dixon & Raymond,2017), reiterated its position on the problem of corruption in military establishments across the globe, maintaining that corruption in military procurement was not peculiar to Nigeria, but a global challenge which undermines confidence in state institutions. A Senior Advisor with the TI, Mr. Ian Andrews, said corruption in military establishments has become dangerous, divisive and wasteful with far reaching consequences on the state. He, however, expressed confidence that the standard raised by Nigerian military institution based on the approaches adopted by the present leadership would restore confidence and reposition the nation‟s military for efficiency and effectiveness (2017). According to him, 53 Eme & Umeokafor..,.…. Int. J. Innovative Legal & Political Studies 7(3):52-63, 2019 What corruption is about today, it is not about exposing issues? It is not about us telling you what you need to do but we are here today to help you to understand the reasons and I learnt from the comments we had with officers. There is a great understanding to the challenge. It undermines the confidence and public trust in the constitution of the state and of the Armed Forces and it is wasteful because too much is spent on a lot of things which do not meet the needs of the Armed Forces(TI,2017,p2). There have been different efforts to define corruption by many organisations, scholars and commentators. Ontologically the word corruption comes from the Latin verb “rumpere” meaning “to break”, which connotes the breaking of normal or societal norms or practices. Corruption is to make putrid, to taint, to rot, it means depravity, to defile, not genuine, much vitiated, dishonest, and venal (Eme,2015). The word “corrupt” when used as an adjective literally means “utterly broken”. It was first used by Aristotle and later Cicero who added the terms bribe and abandonment of good habit. Corruption is a form of dishonest and unethical conduct by a person entrusted with a position of authority, often to acquire personal benefit (Aristotle ,1981) Khan sees corruption as an act which deviates from the rules of conduct governing the action of someone in a position of public authority because of private regarding motives such as wealth, power and status (Khan cited in Amundsen, 1996). Corruption could also be conceived as pervasion of integrity or state of affairs through bribery, favour or depravity (Otite, 2000). In a more holistic conceptualization, the International Monitory Fund (IMF) vignettes corruption as an abuse of office or trust for private benefit: and is a temptation indulged in by not only public officials but also by those in positions of trust and authority in private enterprise or non-profit organizations (IMF, 1998).
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