Interrogating Theories of Imperialism: A Case Study on Kagnew Station

by Selam Negassi Kidane

B.A. in African and African-American Studies, May 2010, Washington University in St. Louis

May 17, 2015

A Thesis submitted to

The Faculty of The Columbian College of Arts and Sciences of The George Washington University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

Thesis directed by

Dane Kennedy Professor of History and International Affairs

Dedication

This work is dedicated to the following individuals who inspired, encouraged, and supported me throughout this whole process:

To my parents, Negassi Kidane and Rezan Asfaha, for their tireless support, encouragement, and love.

To my sister, Senit, for inspiring me with her passion and commitment to social justice and equality.

To my grandfather, Kidane Andehaimenot, whose hard work and life lessons of the gift of education built a strong foundation for our family. This thesis is dedicated to his memory and the legacy he established.

ii Acknowledgments

This thesis would not have been possible without the gracious help of several individuals.

I would like to thank Professor Dane Kennedy for working with me on this project. His suggestions, insight, and above all, steadfast encouragement helped me to develop my initial ideas and interests into the work it has become. His help has been invaluable, and I am immensely grateful for it. I would also like to thank Professor Nemata Blyden for her help with this project. Her feedback and encouragement have helped me further enhance and improve this work along the way. Special thanks go to the numerous ‘Kagnew-ites’ who opened up their homes to me and shared their memories and recollections of

Kagnew Station. Without their voices, this work would not exist. Thank you.

iii Table of Contents

Dedication…………………………………………………………………………………ii

Acknowledgement………………………………………………………………………..iii

Introduction…………………………………………………………..……………………1

Road to Kagnew Station………………………………………………………………....15

Economic and Social Impacts……………………………………………………………24 Economic Impacts………………………………………………………………..24 Social Impacts……………………………………………………………………42

Understanding Eritrean and American Relations………………………………………..52

Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………….70

Bibliography……………………..………………………………………………………72

Appendices….……………………………………………………………………………75

iv Introduction

When Kidane Andehaimenot decided to finally leave his village, Halibo, and make a permanent move to ’s capital city, , in 1956, he first turned to his cousin and childhood friend, Haptesillase Gheremedin.1 As captain of the Native Guard of the Army base, Kagnew Station, Haptesillase was charged with the responsibility of hiring local to work alongside the US military police as security guards, inspecting personnel entering and exiting the base as well as patrolling and protecting its perimeter.2 Appealing to Haptesillase to help him obtain a job at

Kagnew Station, Kidane was determined to finally make a permanent move to the city and the opportunities it would provide him and his family.

A former askari in the Italian colonial army and restless youth who frequently sought opportunities to leave the village and travel throughout Eritrea, Kidane had reluctantly returned to Halibo following his discharge from the Italian colonial army to take up the hereditary position of chiqa, an arbitrator of disputes among members of the village. Despite his guaranteed access to arable land and possession of a distinguished, albeit not lucrative3, position within his village, Kidane was not satisfied with the prospect of a subsistence-based living, devoid of the opportunity to partake in the western

1 The experiences recounted here and throughout this work were obtained through oral interviews conducted by the author. Appendix A records the list of interviews. Kidane Andehaimenot’s story was obtained from interviews 15 and 16. 2 Eritrean naming practices entail an individual’s last name to be their father’s first name rather than a shared, continuous family name. Consequently, in Eritrean society, individuals are referred to primarily by their first name. This work will adhere to that practice, providing Eritreans’ full name initially and referencing by their first afterwards. Kagnew Gazelle (29 April 1955 – “Native Guards Complement M.P.’s”) – Article describes Haptesilassie’s role as captain of the Native Guard as well as the role of the unit as a whole. 3 As chiqa, Kidane would charge villagers two birr to hear and deliberate on disputes. However, given that most villagers could not afford to pay the necessary fee, Kidane either waved the fee or did not grant a decision depending on circumstances. As a result, Kidane enjoyed the prestige that being chiqa afforded him but was forced to rely on farming as a means of subsistence.

1 lifestyle and education which he had been exposed to as an askari. Thus, when

Haptesillase guaranteed him a job at Kagnew as a member of the Native Guard if he were to move to Asmara, Kidane packed up his wife and three children and left Halibo for

Asmara and a new future.

As Eritrea transitioned through different political administrations following the end of Italian colonial rule, each bringing economic instability through neglect and dismantling of key resources and infrastructure, Kagnew Station came to represent and provide opportunities for economic security and prosperity during times of escalating hardship. While every Eritrean working at Kagnew Station did not necessarily share

Kidane’s experience with prior colonial administrations or social and economic background, each shared a desire to secure employment during difficult times as well as pursue opportunities for social mobility. Together, these Eritrean employees of Kagnew

Station and their compatriots whose livelihoods depended on the station experienced the social and economic benefits provided by work there.

A major communications facility for the United States Army, Kagnew Station’s4 official purpose, as expressed by military personnel, was to relay military and diplomatic communications to and from the United States and its worldwide network of military and diplomatic posts:

The mission of this United States Army installation, an integral part of the worldwide communications network developed by the United States, is to serve as part of a program to provide rapid radio relay and secure communications for

4 The Kagnew Station complex consisted of eight tracts located throughout Asmara and the surrounding region. Each tract, lettered A through H, housed specific offices and buildings. A list of each tract, its buildings/overall purpose is located in Appendix B. Although Kagnew Station was the official title of Tract E, the residential and recreational quarters, the entire complex as a whole was also referred to as Kagnew Station. For the purpose of clarity, when used in this paper Kagnew Station will refer to the entire complex and “tract E” will be used to refer to the residential area specifically.

2 defense of the United States and the free world. Additional functions include monitoring transmission security procedures and research into natural electronic phenomena. 5

While accusations that its true purpose was a “listening or monitoring post for the Middle

East and ” were denied by US officials, rumors regarding the actual operations occurring within the station complex, not confirmed until decades following its closure in 1977, circulated among journalists, suspicious locals, and resentful

Ethiopians viewed Kagnew Station and American presence in as complicit with

Haile Selassie’s “autocratic regime.”6 Despite these rumors and suspicions, Kagnew

Station enjoyed a successful 24-year long operation in Eritrea, serving as a temporary home to thousands of US soldiers and dependent spouses and children as well as providing employment to thousands of Eritreans.

For Kidane, Haptesillase, and their Eritrean coworkers, however, Kagnew Station represented more than a suspicious hint of wrongful American interference with matters of self-determination. Rather, Kagnew Station, and more importantly employment at

Kagnew Station, represented opportunity. A chance for economic security and social mobility not easily attained in Ethiopia-administered Eritrea, where most, if not all, of the relatively few economic development and modernization projects sponsored by the government were directed towards Ethiopia’s capital city, , and the surrounding region.7 Coupled with a post-war economic recession, Eritreans were left

5 Quoted in “Ethiopians are Suspicious of Big U.S Army Base” - The New York Times, 28 August 1970 6 “U.S. Base in Ethiopia has benefits, but may be phased out” Palo Alto Times 4 April 1970. And “Ethiopians are Suspicious of Big U.S Army Base” - The New York Times 28 August 1970 Additional rumors also circulated among locals, specifically in the Gura region (Tracts F, G, and H), that precious minerals were being mined within Kagnew Station enclosed areas. These rumors will be further discussed later. 7 Interviews 1, 2, and 15.

3 with few viable economic options.

Kagnew Station brought jobs, and plenty of them. With close to 5,000 American soldiers and dependents in Eritrea at a time, $69.5 million invested in the creation of a

“full-fledged American community snugly ensconced in the Eritrean highlands,”8 and

“more than $5.3 million poured into the local economy in the form of rental payments, salaries…and other expenses…not include[ing] payments to domestic help”9, Kagnew

Station came to be one of the largest source of jobs in the Eritrean economy during its duration, employing well over 2,000 Eritreans.10 During an era in which colonies across

Africa and Asia challenged their European colonial regimes and strived to remove the yoke of Western imperialism, many Eritreans welcomed, and enjoyed, the economic and social opportunities that Americans brought with Kagnew Station.

This perspective, however, is lost in scholarly analyses of modern imperialism, and American imperialism in particular. In The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic, Chalmers Johnson charts what he regards as America’s transformation from republic to empire, primarily through the installation of military bases across the globe. Other scholars have concurred with this view, highlighting the manner in which the network of United States military bases worldwide has come to

8 Rasmusson, John. A History of American Forces and Kagnew Station in Eritrea. (Army Public Affairs Office, 1973) 62. 9 “U.S base has benefits, but may be phased out” – The Palo Alto Times, April 4, 1970. Though this figure was used in regards to the 1969 fiscal year, it provides a reliable indication of the amount of money Kagnew Station put into the Eritrean economy annually. 10 While official figures estimate that around 1,700 Eritreans were employed at Kagnew Station, these figures do not include Eritrean workers hired privately by Americans as house maids, security guards, and various domestic help as well as those employed by business derived heavily from American patronage such as restaurants, guesthouses on popular travel routes, villa rentals within Asmara, and so forth. Including those indirectly and directly working for Kagnew Station, the total number of Eritrean employees far exceeds 2,000. This will be further elaborated upon later.

4 resemble a network of colonies.11 Implicit in these analyses, however, is often a moral verdict regarding the presence of these bases. Citing instances of cruelty or intimidation towards local populations and governmental as well as local protests against military bases, works in this body of literature often emphasize the negative aspects of American bases across the globe and the deep resentment held against them by local populations.

Interviews with former employees of Kagnew Station as well as Eritreans residing in

Asmara at the time however, reveal a more complex perspective, one in which the local

Eritrean community appreciated the economic opportunities from the presence of

Kagnew Station while also acknowledging the political maneuvers that it resulted from.

A social analysis of Kagnew Station highlights the need for a more nuanced understanding of not only the impacts of American imperialism abroad, but also the inner workings of imperial structures and the complexities of experiences in imperial systems.

When reflecting on their father’s employment at Kagnew Station, Kidane’s children acknowledged the opportunities they had and the economic stability they enjoyed due to their father’s work:

We were okay. We never went hungry, never had to worry about money, and had the chance to go to school. This was very different from the life that our cousins in the village had, even some families in Asmara were not as comfortable as we were. We were not rich, but we were comfortable, and that is because of Kagnew.12

Rather than a glorification of Kagnew Station and the opportunities provided by the

American base, what Kidane’s sons expressed is an acknowledgement and appreciation for the security and comfort their family enjoyed due to Kagnew Station. Former Eritrean

11 See Catherine Lutz’ The Bases of Empire: The Global Struggle Against U.S. Military Posts and Joseph Gerson and Bruce Birchard’s The Sun Never Sets…: Confronting the Network of Foreign U.S. Military Bases. 12 Interview 7

5 employees of Kagnew Station echo this sentiment, revealing that the economic impact made by Kagnew Station was quite significant and experienced by a wide range of

Eritreans. Scholarship on the history of this region while Kagnew Station was in operation (1941 – 1977), however, fails to take note of these experiences or capture this perspective. Rather, a conflicting perspective, in which Eritrean victimization is emphasized or Eritrean involvement in Kagnew Station is either ignored or overlooked, dominates the scholarly discourse regarding Kagnew Station. The principal objective of this work is to call attention to these neglected aspects of the history of Kagnew Station and complicate the dominant narrative of the lived imperial experience by highlighting the economic, social, and cultural impacts of Kagnew Station within Eritrea. In doing so, this study also hopes to demonstrate the critical value in the use of oral histories to create a more nuanced understanding of Eritrean history.

Utilizing oral interviews, written primary sources in the form of memoirs and newspapers, as well as relevant secondary literature, this work aims to examine the lived imperial experience from the perspective of those who directly experienced it, advocating for an alternative method of analyzing imperial systems. In doing so, this analysis will also underline the shortcomings within current scholarship in its approach to capturing the lived imperial experience. This study, therefore, aims to call attention to the manner in which, contrary to popular scholarship, Eritreans were able to transform the political setbacks brought about by Kagnew Station and foreign intervention into a period of social and economic growth.

Given the tumultuous political history of the region, the question of Eritrean statehood has dominated the scholarly discourse on Eritrean history. As a result, scholarly

6 discussion regarding Kagnew Station occurs as it relates to Eritrea’s political history.

While significant contributions have been made as to the political implications of

Kagnew Station within the context of the diplomatic relationship between the United

States and Ethiopia as well as its role in determining Eritrea’s political future following the end of World War II, virtually none have fully addressed its social and economic impacts within Eritrea. Though the political and diplomatic context regarding Kagnew

Station and its arrival in Eritrea is necessary for a holistic understanding of its implications, the lack of analysis on Kagnew Station’s social and economic impact for

Eritreans has resulted in the historiography’s skewed representation of Kagnew Station, the implications of its presence and operation within Eritrea, as well as Eritreans’ reception of the base and Americans. Certain prevalent themes in Eritrean and Ethiopian historiography, rather than a faulty or deficient analysis, have contributed to the skewed perception of Kagnew Station’s role within Eritrean history.13

Okbazghi Yohannes’ Eritrea, a Pawn in World Politics, draws attentions to the

“external dimensions of the Eritrean problem” and the manner in which it “harnessed the future of the former Italian colony to the vicissitudes of power politics.”14 Beginning with the onset of Italian in the late 19th century up until the defeat of Ethiopian forces in Eritrea nearly one hundred years later, Yohannes demonstrates the manner in which each foreign power conducted its administration of Eritrea for its own benefit at

Eritrea’s expense. From Italian aspirations of imperial glory to British administrative

13 Though distinct states today, the boundaries between their history and historiographies are not as clearly separated. Though Kagnew Station was physically located within Eritrea, its social, economic, and political ramifications were experienced throughout the region of Eritrea and Ethiopia. Thus, this work, though focusing primarily on Kagnew Station social and economic Impacts within Eritrea, will draw from scholarship within both historiographies. 14 Yohannes, Okbazghi. Eritrea, a Pawn in World Politics (Gainesville: University of Press, 1991), ix.

7 calculations to Ethiopian imperial ambitions, Yohannes highlights the continual theme of

Eritrean exploitation for the sake of other powers’ interests. Within this context,

Yohannes discusses the critical role Kagnew Station played in Ethiopia’s efforts to obtain

Eritrea during negotiations within the . Appealing to American interests in the region, Ethiopia was able to secure American support for its demands in exchange for consent to the continued use of the communications facility in Eritrea. In this account,

Yohannes highlights Eritrean victimization for the sake of Ethiopian and American gains.

Though not the first to discuss Kagnew Station and American involvement in the narrative of Eritrean history, Yohannes’ analysis of themes of exploitation in Eritrea’s history is representative of the manner in which scholars have often focused their analysis on Eritrea’s political history, especially during the war for liberation, as well as highlighting instances of neglect and harm to Eritreans. This has oftentimes resulted in the neglect of a social history that examines how some Eritreans lived and survived, and in some cases prospered, during those times. However, emphasizing Eritrean abuse and neglect, though common throughout Eritrean scholarship, is not the only cause of a skewed historiography.

In The Politics of Empire: Ethiopia, Great Britain, and the United States 1941-

1974, Harold G. Marcus expands Yohannes’ discussion of negotiations between the

United States and Ethiopia regarding Kagnew Station. Placing them in the context of

Ethiopia’s evolving relationship with world powers during and after World War II,

Marcus details ’s leveraging of Kagnew Station and politics to establish a relationship that benefitted his empire. Analyzing Ethiopia’s evolving relationships with Great Britain and the United States, Marcus points to Kagnew

8 Station’s role as the foundation for the United States’ initial support of Ethiopia.15

Kagnew Station, as Marcus indicates, provided Ethiopia with leverage in Cold War politics to obtain high levels of goods and services from the United States.16 This leverage, however, did not prove absolute or continue indefinitely. Haile Selassie’s government was overthrown by a 1974 military coup, strengthened by popular support.

The United States abstained from military intervention due to declining interests in the region. In discussing the build-up to the 1974 coup, Marcus highlights Ethiopia’s uneven implementation of American aid within Ethiopian society as a primary factor contributing to growing unrest and resentment of Ethiopia’s oligarchy.17 Though Marcus’s analysis incorporates aspects of the indirect economic impacts of Kagnew Station, his discussion is limited to Ethiopia’s management of American aid, therefore keeping the political history of the region at the forefront.

Both Marcus and Yohannes discuss Kagnew Station as it relates to the wider political history of the region, as well as global Cold War politics. While both of their respective works have much to offer in understanding the history of this region, the

15 Referencing a series of correspondence between the British, American, and Ethiopian governments, Marcus demonstrates the manner in which American need to secure its radio facilities in the Eritrean highlands inevitably led to American support of Ethiopia and its demands for sovereignty over Eritrea. Initially acquired while Eritrea was under British occupation, Washington preferred for Eritrea’ northern regions, where Kagnew and other American facilities were located, to remain under British control, however, when British officials made it clear that it had no longer had any intention of holding onto Eritrea, Washington concluded that an Ethiopian controlled Eritrea would be the next best solution for their security interests. See pages 82 – 84. 16 Chapter 4, “American Security and Ethiopia, 1950 – 1960” details the goods and services, mainly in the form of military training and provisions, provided by the United States in return for unrestricted use of Kagnew Station as well as how the Ethiopian government continuously requested for increased amounts of aid throughout the 1950s, 60s, and 70s. See Ethiopia at Bay: A Personal Account of the Haile Selassie Years by John Spencer for a closer examination of how Haile Selassie leveraged Kagnew Station in diplomatic negotiations with the United States. 17 Chapter 7, “Prognosis, 1961 and Thereafter,” discusses both declining interests in Kagnew Station beginning in the early 1970s as well as rise in dissent amongst Ethiopian political groups, culminating in the Washington’s decision to decrease its military presence in the region.

9 exclusion of a social history of Kagnew Station results in a skewed understanding of its impact in Eritrea. Richard Sherman’s Eritrea: The Unfinished Revolution briefly acknowledges the economic impact Kagnew Station had in Asmara, noting how it was

“the biggest new source of jobs…[and] provided thousands of jobs for Eritreans and poured additional money into the local economy.”18 Rather than continuing this line of analysis, however, Sherman shifts his focus to the political implications of Kagnew’s presence in Eritrea, echoing and expanding upon arguments made by both Yohannes and

Marcus.

This preoccupation with the political history surrounding Kagnew Station and the absence of substantial analysis of its social and economic impact are indicative of a trend in Eritrean historiography. Attention is directed to Eritrea’s political history, especially during the years following the end of Italian colonialism, as opposed to its social history. With some of the earliest works in Eritrean historiography geared towards providing UN decision-makers with a historical background to the territory, works on

Eritrean history have commonly focused on Eritreans’ developing political and national consciousness in efforts to provide, or deny, legitimacy to Eritrean demands for statehood.19 This trend increased following the start of Eritrea’s war for independence from Ethiopia. Scholars sympathetic to Eritrean claims for statehood shaped their analyses to counter denials of a separate and distinct Eritrean identity as well as call attention to acts of Ethiopian aggression and abuse towards the Eritrean people.20 As a

18 Sherman, Richard, Eritrea: The Unfinished Revolution (New York: Praeger, 1980) 28. 19 See Trevaskis, G.K.N, Eritrea: A Colony in Transition. Oxford: , 1960; Longrigg, Stephen, A Short . : Greenwood Press, 1974 20 See Lionel Cliffe, Basil Davidson, and Bereket Habte Selassie, Behind the War in Eritrea, Haggai Erlich, The Struggle over Eritrea 1962 - 1978: War and Revolution in the , and Dan Connell Against all Odds: A Chronicle of the Eritrean Revolution. During the UN’s

10 result, Eritrean historiography has neglected the manner in which Eritreans wrestled with their experiences and sought out ways to assert control in their lives. Additionally, in the interest of documenting Eritrea’s plight and bringing international attention to the

Eritrean question, scholars have often emphasized Eritrean victimization and neglect at the hands of Ethiopia and the international community, rather than detailing the manner in which Eritreans managed, and at times thrived, despite their circumstances. A cursory survey of titles of prominent works on Eritrean history underlines this trend: Even the

Stones Are Burning by Roy Pateman, The Eritrean Struggle for Independence by Ruth

Iyob, and Eritrea: A Pawn in World Politics, and I Didn’t Do It For You: How the World

Abused a Small Nation by Michela Wrong to name a few. While trying to expose a history that had been silenced by the ‘victors,’ scholars inadvertently overlooked a perspective that complicates, but enriches, the narratives which they have revealed.

The journalist Michela Wrong’s I Didn’t Do It For You: How the World Used and

Abused a Small African Nation comes closest to a social history of Kagnew Station.

Wrong’s book provides an overview of modern Eritrean history, beginning with Italian colonial ambitions on the coast in an attempt to highlight the manner in which

Eritrea has ‘fallen victim’ to the greed and ambitions of empires, states, and rulers.

Though not a purely scholarly account, Wrong gives a great deal more attention to

Kagnew than other authors and briefly delves into its social history. Two chapters focus on Kagnew Station and US-Ethiopian relations at the time, with one of them concentrated on American soldiers stationed at Kagnew. This chapter, however, captures only one process of deciding how to decide Eritrea’s political future, Emperor Haile Selassie presented the claim that Eritrea should be ‘returned’ to Ethiopia due its historical ties with their neighbor to the south. Therefore, those sensitive to Eritrean demands for independence often structured their analysis to counter Haile Selassie’s claim that Eritreans and Ethiopians were historically, and presently, one people.

11 aspect of the varied experiences of American servicemen and a very scandalous one at that.21 Interviews with former servicemen, as well as memoirs and other written accounts, show that Americans pursued a variety of lifestyles in Eritrea, not acknowledged in

Wrong’s work. Additionally, Wrong’s work does not adequately capture the Eritrean experience regarding Kagnew and the economic opportunities afforded to those who worked there, instead summarizing its presence in Eritrea as an example of Eritrean victimization by American and Ethiopian imperial ambitions. Thus, while Wrong’s account provides the first glimpse into the social and economic impacts of Kagnew

Station, it continues the perception of the exploitation and victimization of Eritrea and

Eritreans by global powers.

Kidane’s experiences working at Kagnew, however, provide a narrative that calls into question and complicates aspects of Wrong’s analysis. Analysis of imperial systems, while emphasizing the oppressive hierarchy of power structures emplaced upon native populations, overlook the complicated nature of imperial systems and the manner in which individuals understood and contested their place in imperial systems. To demonstrate how this carried out in Eritrea, this work examines the social and economic effects employment at Kagnew Station had on Eritreans living in Asmara specifically as well as the various nature of relations between Americans and Eritreans. In doing so, this work attempts to reconcile scholarly accounts of imperialism and Eritrean history with the lived realities presented by former employees and servicemen of Kagnew Station.

A Note on Sources, , and Regional Focus

21 Highlighted in Interviews 1, 2, and 6. Also see “My Response to Chapter 10” review by Wrong’s primary informant.

12 This work will rely primarily on source material obtained from oral interviews conducted by the author. When possible, relevant secondary material as well as written primary accounts have been used to supplement information obtained from interviews, however, the scarcity of relevant source material on the subject of Kagnew Station or even Eritrean social history from the 1950s to the 1970s has not allowed for this to be thoroughly done throughout this work. Though many of the Eritreans interviewed are literate, the practice of keeping personal written records, memoirs, or journals is not common within this society, thus making oral interviews a necessary method for obtaining information regarding everyday life and lived experiences during past decades.

In researching for this paper, three specific groups of subjects were interviewed for source material: American veterans who had served at Kagnew Station, former

Eritrean employees of Kagnew Station, and Eritreans who had resided in Asmara while

Kagnew Station was in operation and had significant interactions with employees and/or servicemen of the base.22 American veterans were contacted with the use of a valuable directory on a Kagnew Station website. Eritrean interviewees, however, were contacted through community networks previously established by the author.

The Kagnew Station complex consisted of eights tracts located throughout

Eritrea, mostly in Asmara and in the surrounding regions. In addition to its eight tracts,

Kagnew Station also had two Rest and Recreation (R&R) centers located in the nearby towns of Keren and , which both employed local Eritreans in support staff roles.

For the purposes of this work however, Kagnew Station’s economic and social impact will be analyzed only in the region of Asmara since all of the interviewees worked

22 The Eritreans interviewed who are not former employees of Kagnew Station were mainly children or close family members of former employees who could speak to the impact employment on the base had on their family as a whole.

13 mainly in Asmara’s Kagnew facilities. On a similar note, this work will solely focus on the Eritrean segment of Asmara’s population. Although Asmara had a diverse population with , Italo-Eritreans, Eritreans, Ethiopians, as well as various other European,

African and Middle Eastern nationals and members of all these populations worked within the Kagnew Station complex, the analysis here will concentrate on Eritrean involvement with the base primarily because they constituted the largest percentage of

Asmara’s population as well as of the indigenous work force at Kagnew Station.

Additionally, this work will focus on the formal years of Kagnew Station’s operation, 1953 – 1977, though operation at the communication center began years earlier. The signing of a formal agreement between the United States and Ethiopia in

1953 regarding the base was followed by a significant expansion of operations, resulting in more jobs and contact with the local population. Nearly all of the interviewees worked or served at Kagnew Station after 1953, thus making the analysis within this work most prevalent to that period.

14 Road to Kagnew Station, 1953

Eritrea, like many other African countries of the modern era, was created by

European colonialism. Officially declared a colony by the in 1890,

Eritrea was formed by the unification of various territories acquired by the Italians since their initial presence on Africa’s northeastern coast twenty years prior. These territories, obtained from Egyptian, Ethiopian, and local control, consisted of people from multiple ethnicities, religions, and languages that extended into neighboring territories. As Gerald

Trevaskis described, the creation of Eritrea resembled “an act of surgery: by severing its different peoples from those with whom their past had been linked and by grafting the amputated remnants to each other under the title of Eritrean.”23

The processes that led to Eritrea’s creation, however, were not unique, but rather are considered part of what scholars refer to as ‘The .’ During the second half of the 19th century, European powers laid claims to portions of the African continent, often those in which they had previously established spheres of influence

23 Trevaskis, Gerald K.N, Eritrea: A Colony in Transition, 1941-1952 (London: Oxford University Press 1960), 10 – 11. Eritrea’s physical landscape can be divided into three general regions: the central highlands, the western and northern lowlands, and the eastern coastal plains. Eritrea’s ethnic and religious landscapes roughly align with its physical landscape. The central highlands are inhabited by the Kebessa who share a common religion (Orthodox ), economic occupation, and various cultural traits such as food and dress with the Tigray and Amhara of Ethiopia. These groups also share a political history, historically associated with succeeding Ethiopian states. The main difference among these groups is language, with the Tigrinya and Tigray speaking Tigrinya and the Amhara speaking Amharic. The Tigray and Kebessa are divided by the Mereb River, which also acts as the border between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Though they inhabit a relatively small section of Eritrea, the Kebessa are demographically dominant, comprising roughly fifty percent of the population. The Tigre and Bilen occupy the north-western lowlands, bordering , as well as the western edge of the highlands, in the region of Keren. Historically, these groups were nomadic and did not fall under the realm of the Ethiopian state. Additionally, while significant numbers identify as Lutheran Protestant or Roman Catholic, the majority are Muslim. Resistance to union with Ethiopia was particularly salient among these groups due to reluctance of being ruled by the Christian empire of Ethiopia. The Tigre and Bilen compromise roughly thirty percent of the population.

15 through trade or exploration, carving out territories amongst themselves without regard to existing borders. What makes the creation of Eritrea unique from other colonies in sub-

Saharan Africa, however, lies in Italy’s negotiations to acquire territory in the highlands of the Horn of Africa.

On May 2, 1889, Italy and Ethiopia signed the Treaty of Wichale, in which Italy acquired the highland provinces of Akkele Guzai, Hamasien, and Seraye from Ethiopia in exchange for a sum of money, weapons, and recognition of Ethiopia’s new emperor as

Menelik II.24 Conflicting translations regarding a specific clause detailing the manner in which Ethiopia should pursue relations with foreign powers led to armed conflict between the two countries from 1895 to 1896.25 With conflicting perspectives on the nature of Ethiopia and Italy’s diplomatic and political relationship and Italian encroachment into Ethiopian regions bordering Eritrea, Ethiopia began to gather troops to push back approaching Italian forces, effectively initiating the First Italo-Abyssinian

War.26 Italy’s defeat at the Battle of on March 1, 1896 ended the war. Italy

24 When Italian presence first began to take root on the northeast coast of Africa, Emperor Yohannes IV of Tigray (a northern region in Ethiopia) held the crown of the . The position of emperor in the Ethiopian Empire was not hereditary, but rather understood to be claimed by the most powerful regional ruler, or king, at the time of the death of the prior emperor. With Yohannes’ death in March of 1889, a political vacuum was left in the Ethiopian empire, which Menelik II sought to fill as a result of his collaboration with Italy in the Treaty of Wichale. Being from a more southern region of Ethiopia, Italy favorably viewed Menelik’s ascension as a means of shifting the locus of Ethiopian imperial power further south and away from their future colony of Eritrea. Implicit in the signing of the Treaty of Wichale was Italian support of Menelik’s claim on the imperial throne. 25 Article XVII of the Treaty of Wichale regarded Italy’s role in Ethiopia’s relations with foreign governments. In the Amharic version, the treaty stated the Ethiopia could, if she so wished, consult with Italy in their dealings with another foreign power. Whereas the Italian version stated that Ethiopia must consult Italy in any relations with a foreign power, effectively making Ethiopia Italy’s protectorate. 26 See Giuseppe Maria Finaldi’s Italian National Identify in the Scramble for Africa: Italy’s African Wars in the Era of Nation-building, 1870 – 1900 and Tekeste Negash’s Italian Colonialism in Eritrea for a more thorough examination of the buildup to the First Italo- Abyssinian War.

16 retreated to the borders originally agreed upon in the Treaty of Wichale and Ethiopia’s sovereignty was secured.

Italy’s interactions with a sovereign African state to create its colony, Eritrea, had enormous ramifications during the years immediately following the end of the Italian colonial period. Following Italy’s defeat in World War II, the newly created United

Nations was tasked with the responsibility of determining the political future of Italy’s former colonies. Ethiopia, under Haile Selassie, campaigned for the ‘rightful return’ of

Eritrea, which historically, he asserted, had always constituted a part of Ethiopia.

Additionally, Ethiopia highlighted its economic need for access to the sea and a viable port, a need, it reminded the international community, that had previously been fulfilled by the Eritrean coast. In its endeavor to ensure acquisition of Eritrea, Ethiopia did not just have to contend with imperial ambitions of western powers but also calls for independence from Eritrea’s burgeoning intelligentsia and political elite.

Eritrean aspirations for independence were initially articulated in 1946 when the

British lifted the Italian ban on native political activity.27 With political parties legalized,

Eritrea’s political and intellectual elite began to collectively organize to voice their opinions regarding Eritrea’s future. These elites emphasized the need for independence, citing their colonial experience as reason for Eritrea’s divergent national identity. During its fifty years under Italian rule, they argued, Eritrea experienced significant economic, social, political, and cultural changes as opposed to its neighbor to the south, and therefore Eritrea deserved the right to become a sovereign nation. Additionally, Eritrean

27 British rule in Eritrea during World War II consisted of the maintenance of most Italian colonial policies and practices Certain policies, such as the ban on native political activities, were not lifted until the end of World War II when British administration were able to dedicate more personnel and resources to the administration of Eritrea.

17 elites pointed to Ethiopia’s maintenance of its border with Eritrea during the first Italo-

Abyssinian War in 1895 as proof of the distinction between Eritrea and Ethiopia.

Scholarship analyzing the colonial period in Eritrea, particularly in regards to the development of a national consciousness among Eritreans, has emerged to assess this claim.28 While scholars disagree on the extent to which a shared national identity among

Eritreans emerged during the colonial period, they do agree that, at the very least, the colonial period in Eritrea initiated the process of nation-building that continued and intensified during the subsequent period of British administration and war for independence against Ethiopia.29

Despite Eritrean calls for independence, the United Nations decided to federate

Eritrea to Ethiopia in 1952. The Ethiopian government, however, gradually eroded this federation in a series of orders that effectively stripped the local Eritrean government of power culminating in the dissolution of the Eritrean National Assembly that was charged with the task of governing Eritrea 30 Exhausting diplomatic avenues to achieve independence, Eritreans turned to armed conflict. On September 1, 1961, a group of

Eritrean rebels led by attacked an Ethiopian police post on Mt. Adal in Eritrea’s western lowlands, initiating Eritrea’s war for independence.31

28 See Tekeste Negash’s Italian Colonialism in Eritrea, Ruth Iyob’s The Eritrean Struggle for Independence, Alemseged Abbay’s Identity Jilted or Re-imagining Identity, and Redie Bereketeab’s Eritrea: The Making of a Nation, 1890-1991. 29 Scholars who emphasize the Italian colonial period’s role in creating a national consciousness among Eritreans cite the westernization Eritreans experienced under colonial rule as opposed to Ethiopians, arguing that by the end of the colonial period shared attributes such as language, religions, and customs were eclipsed by the changes undergone during the previous decades. Other scholars, however, disagree not necessarily with the events that took place but their scope, emphasizing that these changes were really only experienced by those in urban areas, and only a to small degree. 30 See Wrong’s I Didn’t Do It For You. 31 Rather than acting independently, these rebels were members of the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF). Established in 1960 in , the ELF was initially a political movement for the public

18 The initial phases of Eritrea’s armed struggle for independence, however, did not feature a coalition of Eritrea’s various ethnic, religious, and social groups. Rather, armed forces were comprised mainly of from Eritrea’s lowland regions, so much so that the Eritrean war for independence was publicized as a Muslim insurrection.32

Escalating grievances against Ethiopian rule due to increased economic neglect, government discrimination, harassment, and violence directed towards Eritreans coupled with rising national consciousness led to increasing numbers of Eritreans joining the armed struggle from the various ethnic and religious sectors of Eritrean society. Eritrean independence was finally achieved in 1993 following their defeat of Ethiopian forces in

Eritrea.

Initial American presence in Eritrea can be traced back to March 11, 1941, with

President Franklin D Roosevelt’s signing of the Lend-Lease Act. Prior to the ‘Day of

Infamy’, which effectively brought the United States into World War II, politicians in

Washington debated with regards to how to respond to German aggression and the outbreak of war on the European continent. Isolationists, desiring to keep the United

States neutral and out of ‘Europe’s War,’ were pitted against those, like President

Roosevelt, who were sympathetic to the Allied’s plight and viewed American assistance as necessary. Despite strong divisions on the issue initially, Congress passed the Lend-

Lease Act in March of 1941 as more Americans saw the financial and military support of

Great Britain and her allies as a means of ensuring a favorable victory without directly entering the war.

articulation of Eritrean aspirations for independence. Hamid established the militant wing of the ELF in 1961, and organized armed resistance against Ethiopia soon followed. 32 While the majority of soldiers involved in the early years of the war were from Eritrea’s regions, there was highland, Christian participation in the initial years of the war.

19 As part of this effort, American civilians and military advisors arrived in

British-administered Eritrea in late 1941 to aid in naval and air-force support missions.

British forces had defeated the Italians in April of that year as part of their military campaign against Germany in . With Eritrea in their possession, Britain set out repairing and incorporating the destroyed Italian air base in Gura and port in

Massawa, into their war effort. American support, under the Lend-Lease Act, proved crucial in ensuring the success of these operations.33 Though these operations were short- lived with Project 19 personnel leaving in late 1943, they provided the opportunity for the

US to establish a firm military presence in the region. Additionally, with Project 19 and the Massawa port restoration, Eritreans first experienced what employment with

Americans had to offer and allowed some to establish connections with Americans, which they capitalized on during the initial stages of Kagnew Station’s establishment. 34

In January of 1943, the United States began planning for the implementation of a War Department radio station in Asmara, Eritrea with the creation of the 4th

Detachment of the Second Signal Service Battalion for the purpose of establishing and operating the Asmara radio station on the site of the old Italian naval station, Radio

Marina.35 In May of 1943, members of the 4th Detachment arrived in Asmara to commence plans for the station, now deemed Asmara Barracks, and within a month, had renovated and expanded existing facilities as well as taken traffic samples to send to

33 See Under the Red Sea Sun by Commander Edward Ellsberg and Project 19: A Mission Most Secret by John W. Swancara for more detailed information on these two missions. 34 Project 19 and Under the Red Sea Sun mentions the employment of Eritreans for various labor needs (i.e cleaning, construction, porting, etc.). Interview 9 discusses how several Eritreans from the neighboring regions of Gura began working with Americans during Project 19 and later continued employment with Americans at Kagnew Station. 35 The Second Signal Service Battalion was later renamed the Army Security Agency following the end of World War 2 on September 15, 1945.

20 Washington. The War Department deemed the samples to be of high quality and set forth expanding operations within Eritrea, and by “June, 1, 1943, one warrant officer and 44 enlisted men began intensive training at Vint Hill Farms to man the new station.”36

Following the end of World War II, Eritrea’s future became uncertain. Under the provisions of Convention, Britain did not conquer Eritrea with their defeat of

Italian forces in 1941 but were technically only caretakers of the Italian colony during the war, establishing the British Military Administration (BMA) in Eritrea to take the place of the previous Italian colonial regime. With the end of the war, the creation of the

United Nations, and Italy’s signing of the Treaty of Peace in 1947 in which they relinquished all claims to their former colonies. Eritrea’s fate would soon become the topic of international conversations with the various world powers each having their own preferential solution to the ‘Eritrean Question.’

As Eritrea’s ‘caretaker’, Britain “was obligated…to restore order in Eritrea, to maintain its economic and social life, to minimize disruptions of indigenous values, to respect the organization and administrations of the territory, and to assist the inhabitants in the utilization of their services.”37 As an imperial power, however, Britain carried out its responsibilities in a manner that would best serve her short and long-term interests.38

Upon acquiring Eritrea, Britain adopted policies that would ensure the administration of

Eritrea would be of least possible cost, especially as the war continued. As a result, though the Italian colonial regime in name no longer existed, the BMA constituted little more than ‘a change of guard’, with the retention of Italian colonial policies as well as

36 Rasmuson, John R. A History of Kagnew Station and American Forces in Eritrea (New York: Public Affairs Office, 1973), 39 – 40. 37 Yohannes, 51. 38 Ibid.

21 lower-level officials and members of the civil administration. 39 This would have significant impact on the economic livelihood of Eritreans during and after the war as well as shape the manner in which Kagnew Station impacted Eritrea economically, which will be further elaborated upon.

Britain’s long-term interests in Eritrea were informed by her colony to the north,

Sudan. Following the end of World War II, the BMA altered various policies related to education and political organization and activity, encouraging Eritrean participation particularly among the northwest regions bordering Sudan. Several scholars have contended that these policies were pursued to strengthen Islamic sentiments among the northwestern regions, including the capital city of Asmara and port of Massawa, in the hopes of the United Nations partitioning Eritrea between Ethiopia and Sudan.40

Ethiopia, however, made clear that they wanted, and deserved, to not just receive, but be returned, the entire colony of Eritrea. Basing their claims to the former Italian colony on historical ties with Eritrea, Ethiopia initiated a large-scale campaign to ensure a favorable decision by the United Nations.41 Simultaneously, Ethiopia also capitalized on its role as one of two independent states in Africa in the polarized post-war global world order. Marketing its potential to have a stabilizing and influential role in the region,

Ethiopia sought out the advantages that partnerships with the United States or the Soviet

Union could provide for Ethiopia. With the maintenance of access to Asmara Barracks of prime importance for national security, the United States and Ethiopia entered into an

39 Yohannes Eritrea: A Pawn in World Politics. See also Trevaskis memoirs. 40 See Yohannes, Eritrea: A Pawn in World Politics, Wrong I Didn’t Do It For You, and Haggai Erlich The Struggle Over Eritrea 1962 – 1978: A Crisis for Détente 41 The Coptic Church proved critical in these efforts. Eritrean priests were urged to advocate for union with Ethiopia from their pulpits, encouraging their congregation to openly support Ethiopia in front of UN commission representatives. See G Trevaskis’ Eritrea: A Colony in Transition and John Spencer’s Ethiopia at Bay.

22 unofficial agreement whereby the United States would support Ethiopian claims for the return of Eritrea and provide military and economic aid to the state in return for unrestricted use of the communications complex within Eritrea.42 On September 15,

1952, Ethiopia was granted its wish with the passing of UN resolution establishing the federation of Eritrea with Ethiopia. The signing of the Base Rights Agreement between

Ethiopia and the United States on May 22, 1953 gave Asmara Barracks its official name,

Kagnew Station, and granted the United States complete control and autonomy over the communications complex for twenty-five years.43

42 See John Spencer Ethiopia at Bay: A Personal Account of the Haile Selassie Years and Harold Marcus The Politics of Empire: Ethiopia, Great Britain and the United States 43 Although the official contract between Ethiopia and the United States was signed in 1953, the United States Army maintained a continuous military presence and radio operations in Asmara due to the support of the BMA. The Base Rights Agreement mainly officiated the continuation of their operations within the next regime, ensured American military and economic aid to Ethiopia, as well as facilitated the expansion of military operations within Eritrea.

23 Economic and Social Impacts

Economic Impacts

When Habte Haile arrived in Asmara in 1967 after leaving his village, Gura, he immediately began to search for a job.44 Desiring a better future than what he could expect in his village, Habte came to Asmara with high hopes for an opportunity for a better life. This aspiration, however, proved difficult given the dire economic conditions in Asmara at the time. Transformed during the Italian colonial period with the creation of a wage-earning labor force and rapid industrialization, damaged during the era of British occupation, and neglected during Haile Selassie’s regime, Asmara’s economy following the end of World War II suffered, making it difficult for Eritreans lacking technical skills or education to make ends meet.45

Emerging out of the Italian colonial period, Asmara had an industrialized economy with a labor force well oriented to work as laborers and in industrial settings.46

Due to its proximity to Ethiopia, Eritrea was used as a base of operations for Italy’s invasion of Ethiopia in 1935. As a result, Asmara was significantly industrialized and built up to accommodate the massive influx of people, goods, and supplies, providing numerous opportunities for Eritreans, particularly those without formal education or

44 Habte Haile story’s was obtained from Interview 2. 45 The relatively small number of Eritreans with formal, advanced education and/or technical training (i.e. mechanics, electricians, etc.) meant that those with these skills were able to secure employment because they were in high demand. Eritreans with these skills constituted Asmara’s middle class. For those without such skills the main options available to them in Asmara were to work as laborers which could promise them no more than subsistence level living. 46 See Yohannes, A Pawn in World Politics, and Redie Bereketeab’s Eritrea: The Making of a Nation, 1890-1991. Both authors discuss the industrialization of Eritrea’s economy during the period of European rule and its creation of a wage-earning labor force.

24 technical training, to find employment.47 The economic boom experienced by Eritrean laborers would continue through the war period. However, the arrival of victorious

British troops in 1941 along with an Allied victory four years later would initiate a process that marked the beginning of the end for Eritrea’s flourishing economy.

When British troops defeated the Italians in April 1941, they immediately began altering Italian war projects for Allied use in their war effort. Additionally, a light industrial economy developed in Asmara to meet demands for finished goods in Middle

East markets previously met by European imports.48 The absorption of Eritrean laborers previously employed by the Italian war industry into Allied war efforts and emerging industrial firms continued the economic boom of the pre-war years. This boom, however, was short-lived. The end of World War II freed up European industry to return to the production of finished goods for Middle Eastern markets. Additionally, the years following World War II were marked by the widespread dismantling of key infrastructure for export to other British colonies.49 At the end of British occupation, Eritrea’s economy was severely weakened and damaged. Ethiopian rule brought only further damage to

Eritrea’s economy, with the continued dismantling and transfer of factories and other key infrastructure, now to Ethiopia instead. For Eritreans in Asmara who lacked a trade, the number of economic opportunities steadily decreased in the postwar decades.

“A lot of people were looking for a job,” Habte recalled regarding his first months

47 Many Eritreans were also able to obtain technical training during this time while employed in Italian industries, which served them well in the subsequent period under Ethiopian occupation when these skills were highly sought after – Interviews 1, 2, 15, and 16. 48 This industrial economy produced goods such as soap, leather goods, paint, wine, paper, etc. See Yohannes, A Pawn in World Politics, Bereketeab, Eritrea: The Making of a Nation, and Sherman, Eritrea: The Unfinished Revolution. 49 See ’s Eritrea on the Eve. Pankhurst details the dismantling of various Italian infrastructure in Eritrea during the final years of the British Administration for export to various British colonies throughout Africa and Asia.

25 in Asmara, “but there were not many jobs in Asmara at the time. And everybody was trying to get a job at Kagnew because they had open positions at the Oasis Club.” The

Oasis Club, designated for enlisted men and providing dining as well as entertainment services, employed Eritreans in a wide array of positions, including busboys, waiters, cooks, and assistant manager. Initially turned down because of his young age, Habte returned to a second round of interviews.50 Relenting on the age requirement, the assistant manager hired Habte as a busboy. Beginning as a busboy making 92 birr51 a month, Habte soon advanced to the position of waiter with a monthly wage of 120 birr.

With local police officers making between 40 to 50 birr, teachers making around 120 birr, and general laborers earning roughly between 20 to 30 birr a month, Habte, a young teenager, had a monthly salary three times that of average Eritrean day laborers and comparable to educated, working professionals with coveted positions, 52 not to mention access to American goods and amenities not available to the vast majority of Eritreans.53

By virtue of his employment at Kagnew Station, Habte had, in more colloquial terms, hit the jackpot.

Habte’s good fortune in securing a job at Kagnew Station distinguished him from his compatriots who experienced the direct consequences of prior British and Ethiopian policies. Though Eritreans were still able to earn a living as wage-laborers, this living bordered on subsistence due to its low compensation rates. Eritreans whose livelihood

50 Employment at Kagnew Station required applicants to be at least 18 years of age. 51 Birr is a unit of Ethiopian currency 52 Echoed in Interviews 1, 9, and 10 obtaining a position as a police officer or teacher was not easily secured and highly coveted by the local population for the economic stability they provided. Salary information obtained from Interviews 1 and 2. Salaries for Eritrean employees at Kagnew Station were dictated by a salary schedule 53 As an employee at the Oasis Club, Habte enjoyed daily access to large quantities of food, clothing, as well as various facilities located in Tract E.

26 depended on Kagnew Station, particularly those without technical or professional training, however, were able to obtain wages comparable to Asmara’s elite middle and upper class, and were thus able to enjoy a way of life and socioeconomic status otherwise unattainable for them. Furthermore, the job security of Kagnew Station was such that

Eritrean employees could expect to keep their positions for as long as they wished.54

Kagnew Station’s presence in Eritrea, thus, helped to mitigate the economic reality for those who were able to access and harness its economic benefits through various avenues: direct employment, private employment, and conventional or creative entrepreneurship.

Direct Employment

At its height, Kagnew Station directly employed roughly 2,000 Eritreans in positions ranging from houseboy to detective in the Army’s Criminal Investigation

Division (CID). Though Kagnew was known to be one of the main employers in Asmara at the time, what distinguished employment at Kagnew from other places of work was the compensation Eritreans earned. Employees on the lower end of Kagnew Station’s pay grade, such as Habte’s first position as a busboy, had monthly incomes on par with, or often more than, Eritrean working professionals. On account of their income, Kagnew

Station employees, the majority of whom were without formal education or training, had the means to support a living akin to members of Eritrea’s upper-middle class and enjoyed a privileged status within Eritrea as a result.

54 Interviews 1, 2, 14, and 15. Eritrean employees at the base usually kept their positions for decades, often working up until the closing of the base. Instances of employees’ positions being terminated usually resulted from violation of their contract, often in the form of smuggling goods of the base or not fulfilling basic duties.

27 As a firefighter at Kagnew Station, Hadgu Tekle embodied the advantages to be gained from work at Kagnew Station.55 When Hadgu was out of work in Asmara, his friends, members of Kagnew Station’s firefighter squad, informed him of a position opening up at the base within a few weeks. For the following weeks, Hadgu’s friends provided him with the necessary training to take the qualifying exam.56 Fulfilling the basic requirements to become a firefighter, Hadgu was hired and began work, earning

300 birr a month. When word reached his family back in his village that he had secured a position at Kagnew Station, Hadgu, a bachelor living in Asmara with a monthly wage surpassing those of teachers and almost at the level of Asmara’s college-educated professionals, was soon joined by his nephews and nieces and became the main provider for his family. Hadgu’s income placed him firmly in Asmara’s middle class, allowing him, and his family, to enjoy a comfortable life in Asmara.57

A note should be made here about the means by which Eritreans secured direct employment at Kagnew Station. A formal process, with a written application that

Eritreans filled out either at the station or the Department of Labor, existed for Eritreans to apply for jobs at the base. For many of the employees, an advocate, in the form of a current employee or American servicemen, was instrumental in helping them in the process due to the high demand among Eritreans for these jobs. Additionally, education, training, or prior experience demonstrating an individual’s skill set for a particular job,

55 Hadgu’s story was obtained from Interview 1. 56 As part of the application process, Hadgu had to pass an exam regarding protocol for handling specific types of fires. The exam was administered orally. 57 College-educated professionals in Eritrean during the 1950s and 1960s could expect to earn around 500 birr a month, a significant amount higher than what any other professional could expect to earn, unless they worked at Kagnew Station.

28 though not always necessary, also helped in ensuring their hiring.58 In general, however, community networks, as in the case of Kidane, Kidane’s brother Haile who was also a member of the Native Guard, and Hadgu, were pivotal in helping Eritreans learn of a particular opening as well as fulfilling necessary requirements to obtain employment.

When time came for him to get married, Hadgu’s job at Kagnew Station gave him a superior status compared to other bachelors asking families for their daughters’ hand in marriage. “When they heard I worked with the Americans at Kagnew Station,” Hadgu recalled describing his engagement, “they were overjoyed and we got engaged right away.”59 When Hadgu and his family arrived to his fiancé’s home to escort her to the church for their wedding, he had two cars in his procession, surprising the entire village.

“Bringing a car to the village at that time,” explained an Eritrean-American who grew up in Asmara then, “is today’s equivalent of arriving in a private plane to your wedding. It was a very big deal.”60 Bringing not one but two cars, Hadgu’s wealth was recognized by his wife’s community, affirming their association of employment at Kagnew with prosperity and opportunity.

A common folksong sung by local women testifies to the status Hadgu and his coworkers enjoyed within Asmara and especially surrounding villages as a result of their employment at Kagnew Station: “Put makeup on and make yourself beautiful, this man works at Kagnew Station.”61 The implicit message within the song was to attract a man

58 Education and training in this sense did not necessarily translate into a specific degree required but more so demonstration of ability, which could be obtained through preparation from peers as in the case of Hadgu. Oftentimes this was determined via oral exams, so literacy was not always a requirement. Some positions, such as store clerks, did require a written exam and were only filled by those who had the opportunity to attend grade school. 59 Interview 1. 60 Interview 15. 61 Interview 1. Translated from Tigrinya.

29 working at Kagnew Station because of the comfortable life they could afford to provide their families. As employees of Kagnew Station, Hadgu and his coworkers were understood to be financially stable and among Asmara’s elusive middle and upper classes.62 As such, employment at Kagnew Station was highly coveted among the local population, with people traveling to Asmara from all over Eritrea, and even some from

Ethiopia, for a chance to acquire a job. In one case, an Eritrean even pursued legal means to do so.

Haptesillase, as captain of the Native Guard, was in charge of hiring Eritreans for positions within the Native Guard. Since the majority of Eritreans working in the Native

Guard were from Haptesillase’s home district of Akkele-Guzai, unsuccessful applicants to the Native Guard who were from other districts filed suit against Haptesillase, accusing him of nepotism in his hiring process.63 Kagnew Station’s command office, upon hearing

Haptesillase’s defense that the importance of securing Kagnew Station’s border required him to only hire those whom he knew well, trusted, and if necessary could track down through established family and community networks, upheld his selection process.

Though unsuccessful, the mere act of bringing suit to Kagnew Station’s highest office demonstrates that employment at the base was highly sought after by the local population, with applicants pursuing any means to obtain it. Additionally, positions within the Native Guard offered wages, on average around 150 birr, towards the lower

62 The range of wages earned by Kagnew Station employees meant that they enjoyed different socioeconomic statuses within Asmara, with some earning 92 birr and others earning up to or more than 500 birr. Additionally, the financial restraints brought about by raising or supporting a large family affected where an individual fell in Asmara’s socioeconomic classes. Regardless, the least paid Kagnew employee was able, at the very minimum, to enjoy a middle class lifestyle. 63 Information regarding this suit was obtained from Interviews 1, 14, 15, and 16.

30 end of those offered at Kagnew Station, further indicating that employment at Kagnew

Station, in any form, was highly coveted.

Work at Kagnew Station was pursued not just by Asmara’s unemployed, but also employed Eritreans seeking higher compensation. With low-level Kagnew employees earning wages far exceeding those of other employees in Asmara, Kagnew Station began to attract Eritreans employed in other sectors of Asmara’s economy. Eritreans’ preference for employment at Kagnew, however, became a problem particularly for the local

Ethiopian administration whose employees were leaving their government jobs for positions at the base.64 Offering wages well below those provided at Kagnew, the local

Ethiopian administration was in no position to compete with Kagnew Station for workers.

As a result, the Ethiopian government attempted to impose restrictions on salaries offered at Kagnew Station to maintain their government employees.65

Habte and his coworkers became aware of these restrictions during a strike devised by employees with high-school diplomas desiring higher compensation than their coworkers without diplomas. When Habte and his coworkers at the Oasis Club went on strike one evening at 5 p.m. to demand this raise, however, they were denied by management on the grounds that the Ethiopian government had already attempted to establish lower wage limits for each position that Eritreans held at Kagnew Station, wages that were similar to those of Eritreans not working at Kagnew Station were making and regardless of education level:66

Our manager showed us two pieces of paper when we met to discuss our demands. Both had a list of positions and their salaries, one matched what we were making and the others was much lower. He told us the lower one was what

64 Interviews 1 and 2 65 Interviews 1, 2, and 13. 66 Information regarding the Oasis Club strike was obtained from Interview 2 and 15.

31 the Ethiopian government wanted us to make. I remember he told us that we were getting paid at the American rate because they wanted us to be able to live comfortable, stable lives like they had in America.67

Though the Oasis Club management agreed to transfer those with diplomas to other, higher-paying positions within Kagnew Station, management was unwilling to alter their wage scale as a compromise to Ethiopian demands as well as in keeping with their own established pay-grade. The Oasis Club strike, particularly its failure to alter the wage scale due to the intrusion by the Ethiopian government, attests to the significance of

Kagnew Station’s economic impact within Asmara.

The Ethiopian government’s efforts to impose wage limits provide an indication to the significance of Kagnew Station’s economic impacts in Eritrea. With Kagnew

Station, Eritreans could obtain high-paying jobs and place themselves and future generations firmly on the path of social mobility. Acquiring employment directly at

Kagnew Station, though one of the more secure and reliable avenues, was not the only means of accessing the economic benefits that came with Kagnew Station. For the

Eritreans who were unable to obtain a position on the base, different courses were pursued to ensure that they also could partake in the economic boom of Kagnew Station.

Private Employment

When direct employment at Kagnew Station was not a feasible option for

Eritreans, they were left to seek alternative ways of accessing the economic benefits that

Kagnew Station brought to Asmara. One common method was obtaining private employment from Americans affiliated with Kagnew Station. For Eritreans who were too young or lacked the advantageous community networks, education, or good fortune to gain direct employment, private employment often provided the means for them to

67 Interview 2.

32 harness comparable economic benefits from Kagnew Station. Additionally, private employment also provided means for Eritrean women, especially those without basic education, to also partake in the economic boom of the base.

Such was the case for Ghebrehiwet Tewoldemedhin who began his nearly twenty- year period of working for Kagnew Station as a private employee of an American family.68 A teenager in search of work in Asmara, Ghebrehiwet had fewer options open to him because of his young age. However, his aunt, a house girl for an American family associated with Kagnew Station, was able to secure him a position as a houseboy at the household. Ghebrehiwet now found himself employed and with promising prospects for a successful future.

Over the course of the following nine months, Ghebrehiwet took care to work hard and present himself as a good employee. His hard work paid off: when the tour of his employer ended, Ghebrehiwet was recommended for a job at the Oasis Club and began work as a busboy. Similar to Habte, Ghebrehiwet quickly moved up within the

Oasis Club ranks. Beginning as a busboy, Ghebrehiwet was soon promoted to the position of waiter. After a few years as a waiter, Ghebrehiwet obtained a driver’s license and became a bus driver for the base, earning more in both salary and tips. Ghebrehiwet continued working at Kagnew Station until the closing of the base in 1977, nearly twenty years of employment that began because of the connections he was able to establish as houseboy.

Though the majority of Americans serving at Kagnew Station lived on base in the barracks or family housing, a number of them chose to live in the city, usually due to an

68 Ghebrehiwet’s accounts were obtained in Interview 14.

33 interest in experiencing the culture and city. 69 Renting villas or apartments, these

Americans privately employed Eritreans as house girls, houseboys, security guards, and other various support roles for a household.70 Though these positions did not always pay as well as direct employment at Kagnew Station, private employment was advantageous enough for Eritreans because of its higher pay comparable to similar positions with non-

American employers, flexibility, establishment of networks, and future opportunities for employment at Kagnew Station.

Obtaining full-time, direct employment at Kagnew Station was a frequent result of private employment by Americans. With many of these Americans establishing close relationships with their Eritrean employees, these workers often obtained work subsequently either directly at Kagnew Station or with other Americans living off base.71

Those who did not work directly at Kagnew Station were far more likely to obtain

69 Interviews 10, 13, and 22. See also Larry Bucher, Sea Stories. In Interview 13, Jakubik discussed his choice to live in the city as opposed to on base, a decision, he mentions, that was quite common among soldiers eager to escape the confines of the base and increase their cultural exposure. He, along with his wife, and the other two soldiers rented a villa in downtown Asmara. Interview also mentioned the relatively high number of Americans who rented out villas in downtown Asmara, which provided a comfortable livelihood for Eritreans able to purchase property to rent out. Interview 22 also discusses how officials allowed servicemen to live off base because they were often less likely to “get into trouble” as opposed to the others stationed at Kagnew. 70 Interviews 13, 14, and 19. In the event that servicemen opted to live off base, they were often needed to employ at the very minimum a security guard and/or housekeeper (either a houseboy, housegirl, or both). Housegirls were only hired for households containing a spouse and/or children to perform domestic chores within the home that mainly entailed cleaning, laundry work, looking after children, and cooking. With a housegirl present, houseboys (if also present) typically performed errands other than those completed by the housegirl - grocery runs, bringing needed supplies to the home, yard work outside of the home, etc. In the event of soldiers sharing a villa together without spouses or dependents, only a houseboy was hired and carried out chores both inside and outside the home. A similar arrangement occurred on the base, with only houseboys working in the barracks were only servicemen lived and both housegirls and houseboys working in dependent housing, however it was common for only housegirls to be employed as domestic workers for dependent housing on the base. Also, an important note to make, though the terms ‘girl’ and ‘boy’ are used, the individuals employed in these positions were from a wide age range, with some in their mid to late teens and others in their fifties or sixties. 71 See Larry Bucher, Sea Stories. Also, Interview 13 and 14 discuss this common occurrence.

34 employment than their Eritrean compatriots by virtue of their close association with

Americans.

The temporary nature of Americans’ enlistment in Eritrea made private employment lack the security that direct employment at the base held. Despite this,

Eritreans privately employed by Americans could expect to either be assisted by their employer in securing a permanent position on the base or at the very least have references with which to secure private employment with new American arrivals to Asmara, providing them with steady work and a reliable income.

Eritrean men, such as Ghebrehiwet, who obtained employment from Americans living off base, were primarily hired as security guards or houseboys. Though similar positions were available directly on Kagnew Station, these positions were significant because they lacked the age requirement mandated by official employment at Kagnew and also provided a means for Eritreans to earn supplemental income due to its part-time nature.72 With a minimum age requirement of eighteen, employment at Kagnew Station was unattainable for Asmara’s unemployed youth.73 As houseboys, however, these young men were able to gain employment, albeit on a small scale, often putting them on track to obtain a job at Kagnew Station once they were of age. Additionally, the flexibility of private work appealed to many Eritreans, especially those with entrepreneurial interests, allowing them to pursue other interests alongside their houseboy duties. Eritrean men, however, were not the only ones to take advantage of the opportunities private

72 Security guards typically worked their shifts during the evening, which allowed them to pursue other employment during the day. While houseboys at Kagnew Station had to tend for a whole floor of soldiers, houseboys in a private household only had a handful of people to look after. When their duties were completed or their employers were at work, they were often able to also pursue other lines of work. Many of these houseboys often had private businesses or contracts that they managed in addition to being a houseboy. 73 Interview 2.

35 employment provided. Eritrean women, who had fewer options than men in Eritrea’s patriarchal society, were particularly keen to capitalize on the economic and social benefits to be had through Kagnew Station.

Eager to establish an independent lifestyle, Tekaa Asfedai began work at Kagnew

Station in the mid 1950s as a young woman in her early twenties. Securing employment as a domestic worker for a family living in downtown Asmara, Tekaa sought ways to capitalize on the opportunities available to her position. Over the next ten years, Tekaa continued her work as a private domestic worker, obtaining contracts to clean houses and provide laundry services for several families at a time, as well as securing direct employment at Kagnew Station. By hiring local Eritrean women to perform laundry and cleaning services at a fixed rate, Tekaa was able to outsource work she obtained through contracts at a fraction of the rate she was directly paid. Combined with the wages she received directly from Kagnew Station, Tekaa earned an average of 300 to 400 birr a month, a significant income for any Eritrean at the time, let alone a woman without formal education. Following the closing of Kagnew Station, Tekaa received a visa to continue her domestic work for American military households in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia where she continued her domestic work contracts, employing several Eritrean refugees.

While earnings as high as Tekaa’s were not the norm, women could still expect higher rates of compensation from Kagnew than elsewhere in Asmara.

For the vast majority of women lacking education or training whose life circumstances compelled them to obtain employment, domestic work provided one of the few economic options for them in Asmara.74 However, given the economic conditions

74 Interviews 9, 15, and 18. Women usually sought employment typically as a result of dire circumstances – i.e death of a husband, extreme poverty, and/or running away from home or

36 shared by most Eritreans during this era, relatively few Eritrean households, only those in the affluent upper class, were able to hire domestic workers, making this a coveted, albeit extremely low-paying75 position. For those unable to secure respectable employment as a domestic worker or laborer, the alternative they were often left with was working as a barmaid, often understood to include prostitution. With the arrival of American families to Asmara, women seeking positions as domestic workers now had more opportunities to obtain respectable employment. American employers, additionally, had the financial resources to provide these workers with a higher wage than what they could expect from their Eritrean counterparts. Some women, like Tekaa Asfedai, were able to benefit from the economic opportunities Kagnew Station provided for women to become self- sufficient and financially secure.

As with wages provided directly by Kagnew Station, compensation paid by

Americans living off the base was also subject to government oversight. When Stan

Jakubik and his wife decided to provide their house girl, Ghidai, with higher wages so she would be able to pay school fees for her son, his superior officers reprimanded him for paying a rate other than what had already been established.76 Without disclosing how they became aware of Ghidai’s earnings, army officials ordered Jakubik to lower

Ghidai’s wages to the established rate.77 While Jakubik and his wife continued to pay

Ghidai a higher wage despite orders, army regulations for wage payment in private kicked out of home. However, educated women typically worked as schoolteachers, secretaries, etc prior to getting married and/or having children. 75 As a domestic worker in Eritrean households, women typically earned a monthly income around 2 or 3 birr a month, supplemented by room and board provided by the household they worked in. 76 Interview 13. 77 Interviews on this topic reveal that the ‘established rate’ was an understood rate that would be paid to domestic workers, although no official documentation was referred to that listed the exact rates.

37 employment resemble limitations placed on wage increases for official Kagnew Station employees as a result of the Ethiopian government’s insistence. 78

Though two distinct categories of work, Eritreans often still referred to those working directly on the base and those privately employed by American households as

‘Kagnew employees’ because of the similar benefits related to their high pay that they enjoyed. Eritreans who were able to obtain private employment with Americans often used it as a springboard for further economic benefits, either pursuing direct employment at the base as in the case of Ghebrehiwet or entrepreneurial ventures as in the case of

Tekaa. Despite lacking the security that direct employment provided, Eritreans were able to make private employment just as advantageous as direct employment, and more so in some cases. Private and direct employment, however, were not the only means of creating a livelihood off of Kagnew Station.

Conventional and Creative Entrepreneurship

While direct employment at Kagnew Station or private employment with

Americans were the most direct ways to access the economic benefits brought about by the base, Eritreans also devised ways to access these economic opportunities outside of

American employment. The purchasing power that Americans brought with them to

Asmara provided entrepreneurial Eritreans with the opportunity to establish businesses catered to Americans. Additionally, the influx of American goods that arrived with the base also provided Eritreans with the means to create markets targeted towards other

Eritreans.

As a result of a clientele that had the financial means to purchase goods and services that most other Eritreans in Asmara lacked, Eritreans with the financial resources

78 Interview 14

38 to do so opened up various restaurants and bars throughout Asmara, primarily in downtown Asmara and in neighborhoods bordering Kagnew Station. These places of business, and their owners, thrived as a result of American patronage.

In addition to establishing restaurants or bars, Eritreans who had surplus income, often as a result of employment at Kagnew Station, were also able to build villas and apartments to rent to Americans living off base, often at rates that far exceeded what

Eritreans would pay. A typical monthly rent for a villa, for example, would be around 90 birr, three times the average Eritrean laborer’s monthly wage, which for Americans converted into roughly 35 US dollars. 79 Though this was considered cheap rent for

Americans, their Eritrean landlords profited greatly from this arrangement, providing them with additional advantages from Kagnew Station’s presence. These economic opportunities, however, were only available to Eritreans who possessed or could acquire the financial capital necessary to establish a business. For less fortunate Eritreans, other, more creative entrepreneurial ventures were their only option.

‘One man’s trash is another man’s treasure’ goes the common saying. In Eritrea during the duration of Kagnew Station, however, a more appropriate version would be

‘one man’s trash is another’s man’s livelihood.’ Selling discarded items with reusable potential was a major means of making money for a variety of Eritreans.80 While some

Eritreans sold recyclable trash as a means of earning extra income, others chose to make a career doing so. Several Eritreans established contracts with Kagnew Station and individuals to pick up trash on the base or from private homes and transport it to the local

79 The exchange rate between Ethiopian birr and US dollars during this time was roughly 2.5 birr to 1 dollar. 80 Interviews 1, 13, and 15. Eritreans were able to reuse discarded items in a variety of ways – using empty soda cans or similar containers for cooking means or to create portable lamps, repairing small broken machines for resale, etc.

39 junkyard, providing them with the opportunity to glean any reusable materials and make additional income.81

American trash was so valuable that a local gang of young boys, who guarded the junkyard in which trash was often discarded from the base, would not allow outsiders from other neighborhoods to rummage through freshly discarded trash, until they had searched through it and collected their pickings.82 Once new trash was carefully looked through for items that had potential for reuse by the guards, other individuals were only then allowed to do the same. Both children and adults participated in sifting through the junkyards, though often for different motives. While children, especially those whose families could afford to provide them with a stable home, would use the opportunity to look for items to use as toys, adults focused their efforts on searching for items that could be sold. Selling reusable trash was just one means by which Eritreans were able to create a livelihood from Americans. And for those who were unable to secure employment directly on base or with Americans, it was their main way of economically benefitting from the presence of Kagnew Station.

American goods sold to Eritreans were not solely gleaned from junkyards but also obtained directly from Kagnew Station, either in partnership with Americans or through more deceptive means. While Eritreans were often the primary sales agent in such transactions, they obtained those goods through partnerships established with

Americans who would purchase and provide them, either splitting profits or selling it to them. Employees at Kagnew Station could at time bypass Americans to acquire goods to sell, usually by stealing and smuggling goods off of the base. Additionally, transactions

81 Interviews 1, 14, and 15. 82 Interview 1 and 15.

40 between Americans and Eritreans also operated in the reverse, with Americans purchasing goods contraband for them but not Eritreans, such as marijuana. What resulted was a lucrative black market, from which both Eritreans and Americans were able to gain significant profit and goods and services.83

The Post Exchange and Commissary stores were located within Tract E from which American servicemen and their families could purchase American goods at extremely low rates. These goods, and prices, however, were intended only for

Americans servicemen and their dependents. Eritrean employees at Kagnew Station were not allowed to purchase goods from these stores, even those who worked in the stores as clerks or management. Despite this regulation, Eritreans were still able to acquire goods from the base, either as gifts from American friends, in business transactions from

American partners, or in some cases by theft, which they in turn sold on the black market.84 The low prices of these goods provided an opportunity for the reselling of

American goods to Eritrean consumers at higher prices for profit.85 A carton of cigarettes, for example, were sold for one US dollar, but could be sold on the black market for roughly 4 US dollars, which was equivalent to about 7 to 8 birr.86 Though the selling of

American goods, either obtained through garbage gleaning or Kagnew Station itself, was highly lucrative for many individuals, for the majority of those who participated in it, it

83 Recycled American goods were also sold on the black market, but on a much smaller scale than those obtained directly from Kagnew Station stores. 84 Interviews 1 and 2. Eritreans also sold items they received as gifts, especially when they received duplicate items. Christmas, for example, often saw Eritreans receiving the typical, but highly regarded Wrangler jeans from multiple American coworkers or associates 85 Interviews 9, 10, 13, & 17. 86 Interview 15, 16, and 20. Rather than being resold as carton – cigarettes were often in smaller quantities, either as individual pieces of smaller boxes.

41 provided merely a supplemental income. Regardless, Eritreans were able to earn a significant income through these means.

For Eritreans living in Asmara, Kagnew Station provided a means of alleviating the economic strains characterized by Ethiopian rule. Although helpful, accessing the economic gains to be had through the base did not require formal education, adding even more to its appeal for Eritreans, the majority of whom had at most a third grade education.87 With Kagnew Station, Eritreans who had no prospects besides working as a day laborer could now count themselves as members of Asmara’s exclusive, and growing, middle class.

Social Impacts

The palm-tree lined Haile Selassie I Avenue, Asmara’s Fifth Avenue…[was] the in place to see and be seen. Its multi-storied buildings sold the latest products of affluent European societies – the chic fashion clothes, the modern appliances, the fancy rugs, the latest books from Italy and America…and anything else you needed for easy living…Haile Selassie I Avenue roughly divided Asmara into two sections. The area to the south was Europeanized. That to the north of the street was much less so. The Italians, as almost all other Europeans of their times, believed in segregating themselves from the natives. In the 60s, the division was more economic than racial.88

The Asmara Mike Metras encountered during his time at Kagnew Station was the quintessential example of a tale of two cities. During the Italian colonial period, Asmara blossomed into piccolo Roma, replete with fixtures of comfortable European living. This

87 During the Italian colonial period, native education past the third grade was banned. Only those educated in the handful of Swedish mission schools were able to bypass this policy. For most Eritreans growing up under Italian rule, a basic education proved practically impossible. Although lifted with the end of World War II, many Eritreans still lacked the economic security necessary to support the pursuit of an education. 88 Mike Metras, Ethiopia: Travels of a Youth (Somonauk: Michael Metras, 2002), CD-Rom edition. Section entitled “A Walk in Asmara.”

42 section of Asmara, or Campo Cintato, however, was barred from Eritreans as a result of colonial policies that segregated Asmara along racial lines. 89 Following the end of the

Italian colonial period and its racial policies, the Campo Cintato, or Kombishtato as the local population referred it to, became accessible to Eritreans, but only those who possessed the means to do so. This access, as Metras noted, now had an economic restriction that barred Eritreans who lacked the wealth to engage in this aspect of life in

Asmara, a wealth that was not easily acquired without education or specialized training.

Life in Asmara for the middle and upper class, therefore, was distinctly different than it was for working class Eritreans.

For Asmara’s working class, however, Kagnew Station provided a means to elevate their socioeconomic status for themselves and future generations. Their elevated socioeconomic status allowed Kagnew employees and their families to engage in the exclusive social and cultural life that Asmara had to offer. With the social mobility and cultural exposure that Eritreans associated with Kagnew Station, the base came to represent more than just a source of employment for many of its employees. Rather, it became a symbol of future opportunities that only it could provide for a large percentage of Asmara’s population.

Social Mobility

Reflecting on the significance of Kagnew Station’s operation in Asmara, Habte emphasized the economic stability the base provided for its Eritrean employees, their families, and many residents of Asmara as a whole. With this stability, working-class

89 Campo Cintato means ‘enclosed area’ and refers to the section of Asmara that closed off and fortified for Italian settlers. The fortifications were built during the rebellions and armed conflicts that arose as a result of Italian expropriation of land and expansion into Ethiopia. See Francesca Locatelli’s “Beyond the Campo Cintato: Prostitutes, Migrants and ‘Criminals’ in Colonial Asmara (Eritrea), 1890 – 1941 in African Cities: Competing Claims on Urban Spaces

43 Eritreans had the opportunity to firmly establish themselves and their families within

Asmara’s middle class, primarily through the purchase of property and acquisition of education. Through these means, property ownership and educational opportunities,

Kagnew employees ensured that the economic benefits they obtained from the base would transfer over into an opportunity for social mobility for themselves and future generations.

When Kidane and his family moved to Asmara in 1956, they paid 10 birr a month for a single room apartment, similar to what others families of their size lived in. For most working-class families in Asmara, rent consumed the bulk of their monthly earnings, leaving little for food and other basic necessities. With his income of 150 birr a month, however, Kidane was able to save a significant portion of his income each month for the goal of purchasing a home. After Kidane had saved up enough money, he was able to purchase land for a home for his family. With his two older sons, he built his family’s home, a house that still stands to this day and now serves as the home for his youngest son and family. Owning a home in Asmara, much like anywhere else in the world, was significant for a family’s socioeconomic status and economic stability, securing their status within Asmara’s middle class.

Home ownership in Asmara was quite significant for a family’s socioeconomic status, and remains so today. As a recent migrant from Asmara explained, “To own a home in Asmara now is a big thing. If you own a home, it means you are stable, you are okay…not everyone could say that, it was very hard for most to buy a home, then and especially now.”90 To obtain a home was not an easy task for Asmara’s residents during

Kagnew’s tenure. The average cost of building a basic home in Asmara at that time could

90 Interview 14

44 run a family at least 5,000 birr.91Although lending institutions were present, they were scarce and most families lacked the necessary capital needed to qualify for a loan that could assist them in building or purchasing a home. Kagnew employees, however, had the surplus income and means to purchase property and build homes for their family. As

Habte explained it, “at the very minimum, if they didn’t build a house for Americans to rent, they built a house for the family. This was because of the base…all of Tiravolo and

Edaga Hamusat were built by Kagnew employees, because they had the extra income to save and build up a house.”92 The purchasing of property allowed Eritrean employees to transform the economic benefits they received from the base into avenues for establishing and securing their positions within Asmara’s upper classes.

While home ownership secured a family’s place within the middle class, education was a means of further advancing that status. Though Italian colonial policies limiting education to the third grade had long been lifted, their legacy endured, resulting in an adult population that had, at best, a partial elementary education and as a result, were confined to working class positions.93 Thus, most Eritrean families in Asmara lacked the means to finance an education beyond elementary and middle school, let alone to university. For those employed at Kagnew Station, however, education, especially an advanced education, was not an unrealistic dream.

Charlie White, a veteran who served at Kagnew Station during its early years from January of 1953 to August of the following year, remembered the effect Kagnew

91 Interview 15 92 Interview 2. Tiravolo and Edaga Hamusat are residential neighborhoods in Asmara. 93 See “The Ideology of Colonialism: Educational Policy and Praxis” in Tekeste Negash, Italian Colonialism in Eritrea.

45 Station had on one particular Eritrean employee.94 Jud, the Eritrean manager of the Oasis

Club, explained White, “had a big business set up downtown where he employed local people to do laundry, cleaning, and so on… basically services catered to Americans. He had made enough money that, before I left, he was able to go to India for college. He did very well for himself!”95 At a time when Kagnew Stations’ operations functioned on a relatively small scale, Jud was able to not only prosper economically from the base, but also transform it into an opportunity for further social mobility by striving for a college degree, a feat unrealistic for most Eritreans due to their economic limitations.96

Beginning with the era of British administration to the present, public has been free, but the limited number of seats resulted in many students not having the opportunity to further their studies beyond middle school.97 With only two public high schools in Asmara, Eritrean students were required to take the General

Examination at the end of eight grade, from which the top scorers would move on to high school. For those who did not score within the top percentiles, private school remained the only option for them to further education, the fees for which could run up to 10 to 15 birr per month. With the average monthly salary of Eritrean day laborers at 30 birr, the majority of Eritrean families could not afford to finance a private school education for their children. For these students, their best prospects were apprenticeship at a local trade

94 Interview 12. 95 Ibid. Jud was most likely this individual’s nickname. Given the difficulty many Americans had with pronouncing some Eritrean names, it was quite common for short nicknames to be used instead. 96 The Base Rights Agreement, signed in September of 1953 allowed for the expansion of Kagnew Station, resulting in an increase of soldiers, facilities, and jobs for local Eritreans. Although the American military population reached as high as 5,000, this was during its height in the mid to late 60s. In the early 1950s, however, personnel did not surpass 1,000. See chapters 4 and 5 of Rasmusson, A History of Kagnew Station and American Forces in Eritrea. 97 Information regarding education during the 1950s and 1960s in Eritrea was acquired from Interviews 15, 16, 18, and 19.

46 store to obtain valuable technical training. This too, however, was not easily attained since most individuals with technical knowledge often aimed to keep such skills and knowledge within their families or select circles rather than sharing it with others.98

Without these valuable social connections, Eritreans had little hope of gaining the necessary technical skills and knowledge they would need for such careers. Kagnew

Station employees, however, had the surplus income to finance a private education if necessary, and as a result, the majority of their children graduated, at the very least, with high school diplomas. With high school diplomas, Eritrean children of Kagnew employees now had multiple options open to them that their peers not connected to the base did not have. They had the choice of attending college, technical school, or finding skilled employment that would allow them to, at the very least, continue to partake in the middle class lifestyle established by their families.

With the stability and opportunity provided by home ownership and education,

Kagnew Station employees and their children had prospects for social mobility that were not common or widespread for other Eritreans in Asmara at the time. Among Asmara’s

Eritrean population, they were best equipped with the necessary tools to cross the divide between the dual cities that Metras noted during his time at the base. While climbing the social ladder was an almost automatic effect of employment or association with Kagnew

Station, Eritreans were also able to acquire the means to navigate the various cultures that existed in Asmara, cultivating a cultural exposure and awareness that allowed them to engage in the various cultural communities that existed within Asmara.

98 Interview 15 recalls instances of deliberate maneuvers utilized so that assistants and workers could not gain detailed knowledge. For example, those who had Commercial Driver’s License (CDL) and drove deliveries back and forth between Asmara and Massawa would not let their delivery assistances ride alongside them but rather had to sit in the bed or top of the truck. As a result, they were not able to observe the driver and how they drove the vehicle.

47 Cultural Exposure

Why should I go to the States? You’ve brought America here.

Oasis Club waiter, October, 196799

Growing up in Asmara during Kagnew Station’s operation, Haddis Yohannes had countless experiences and encounters with the base and the Americans it brought to

Eritrea.100 Significant among those various experiences, however, was the first time he distinctly remembers hearing the English language. Driving home with his older brother one afternoon, Haddis heard English for the first time. A detective for Kagnew Station’s

Criminal Investigative Division (CID), Haddis’ brother, Tzehaye Yohannes, had a radio in his Jeep to receive and make calls to the command office. Waiting in the car for his brother to return, a message for his brother began to come in. “All of a sudden the radio is talking, and I start to freak out! I was disturbed; I didn’t know what was going on,”101

Haddis described his initial reaction. When Tzehaye returned, Haddis told him about the radio incident. Tzehaye assured his brother everything was okay, picked up the radio, and started to speak. “At that point,” Haddis recalled, “I had this passion to speak the language that they were talking in but I didn’t understand…it was an urge to understand that began then and continued.”102

By virtue of his brother’s work at Kagnew Station, Haddis would get his wish and more. As rewards for good performance at school, Haddis routinely received American goods from his brother, such as clothing and toys. When he got older and entered high

99 Quoted in chapter 4 of Rasmusson, A History of Kagnew Station and American Forces in Eritrea 100 Haddis’ experiences were obtained from Interview 3. 101 Interview 3 102 Ibid.

48 school, Haddis began to take English language lessons at Kagnew Station as well as karate classes. Spending more and more time on the base, Haddis and his friends became increasingly fascinated by the aspects of American culture they were exposed to.

Listening to the 24-hour Kagnew Station radio broadcast at a popular teahouse for

Asmara’s youth, Haddis was further influenced by the revolutionary lyrics and music of

Jimi Hendrix, Sly & The Family Stone, Led Zeppelin, and other American artists of the time. When many of his peers, those not as influenced by American culture as Haddis, joined the armed struggle for independence en masse, Haddis, influenced by the ideology behind nonviolence and the peace movement, chose not to take up arms. Instead, Haddis and his friends donned bell-bottom jeans and Afro picks with the iconic fist as a symbol of the Black Power Movement, acting in solidarity with freedom struggles across the globe. Even Eritrean youth, who were not as aware as Haddis of the symbolism behind such hairstyles and accessories, dressed similarly, making American dress more of an indication of socioeconomic class than political beliefs. While Haddis’ experiences were not necessarily shared by the majority of Asmara’s youth, they do convey the extent to which Kagnew Station impacted and at time shaped the social and cultural life of

Asmara, especially Asmara’s youth. While Haddis’ eagerness to fully embrace aspects of

American culture that he was exposed to represents a relative minority of reactions among Eritrean youth, it was not necessarily unusual. Listening to American music, wearing American clothes, and adopting others visual symbols of American culture were fairly popular among Eritreans, especially those whose families had the financial means to do so.

49 Eritrean employees of Kagnew Station, and members of their immediate families such as Haddis, were especially privy to aspects of American way of life, dress, and culture. One particularly salient example of this is dress. While the characteristic

European shirt and tie were common outfits among Eritrea’s upper class and educated professionals, they were not standard practice among those who did not hold such positions.103 Eritrean employees of Kagnew Station, however, not only had the monetary resources necessary to purchase such clothing, but also the cultural exposure and awareness to partake in European clothing. Donning their shirts, ties, and blazers,

Kagnew employees were easily recognizable within Asmara and symbolic of the extent to which the base had not only exposed a segment of the Eritrean population to American cultural practices, but also provided them with the means to participate and partake in it.

Conclusion

Intertwined with Kagnew Station’s economic impact, the base’s principal social impact was in the expansion of Asmara’s middle class. Whereas only technical training or education, both difficult to attain, could channel one into Asmara’s middle class,

Kagnew Station employees earned incomes that placed them firmly in the middle class.

By facilitating the emergence of a middle class with the purchasing power and leisure time to engage in social and cultural activities, Kagnew Station enabled more Eritreans to not only pursue opportunities for social mobility but also partake in the social and cultural life of Asmara. The overall economic and social impact of Kagnew Station coupled with the colonial policies of prior administrations as well as Ethiopian rule,

103 Interview 16.

50 furthermore, shaped how many Eritreans perceived the base and Americans as an imperial presence as well as the manner in which they interacted with them.

51 Understanding Eritrean and American Relations

In September of 1963, Hugh Downey, a soldier stationed at Kagnew, found himself bored after a day at the outdoor market in Keren.104 Deciding to drive down the roads leading out of town, Downey came alongside a priest and stopped to offer him a ride. Overcoming their respective language barriers, the priest, Abba Zereselassiye, accepted Downey’s offer and indicated to Downey the general direction of his village.

Arriving to the priest’s village of Shinnara, Abba Zereselassiye immediately set out to find a translator to express his gratitude to Downey as well as request a special favor.

Showing him the village’s dilapidated school, Abba Zereselassiye asked Downey to help the village rebuild the schoolhouse. Agreeing to help, Downey returned to Asmara and

Kagnew Station with a mission.

Requesting supplies from Kagnew officials, Downey was granted use of equipment to help build the schoolhouse and recruited volunteers to assist in their efforts.105 With the necessary provisions at hand, Downey set forth coordinating the project to rebuild Shinnara’s school. Over the course of the subsequent months,

Shinnara’s school was rebuilt and a friendship developed between Downey and the people of the village. Following the assassination of President John F. Kennedy in

November of 1963, Abba Zereselassiye and several elders of the village traveled to

Asmara to express their condolences to Downey as well as inform him of their decision to name the new school, ‘J.F. Kennedy School, Shinnara,’ in honor of the late president.

The completion of J.F Kennedy School, however, did not represent the culmination of

Downey’s relationship with Shinnara and the surrounding region. Rather, it was the

104 Downey’s story can be found in A Place of Hope, Interview 4, and Lalmba’s official website. 105 Interview 4. Past veterans assume that Kagnew's officials were eager to help Downey in his efforts as a means to bolster relations between Eritreans and Americans.

52 starting point of Lalmba, an organization Downey created to meet the needs of the poor in Eritrea. Following the completion of J.F Kennedy School in Shinnara, other schools in neighboring villages were also rebuilt as a result of Lalmba’s efforts. Following his discharge from the US army, Downey returned to Keren in January of 1966 with his wife

Marty to continue the work started under Lalmba. Hugh and Marty’s story, unique and remarkable in its own way, allude to the complexity and diversity in relations between

Eritreans and Americans throughout the duration of Kagnew Station.

Activities such as those undertaken by Hugh and Marty often find themselves well publicized in government publications intending to highlight the humanitarian works conducted by Americans during the tenure of Kagnew Station.106 Throughout the period that the base was in operation, hundreds of American soldiers volunteered their time, energy, and resources by teaching at local schools and universities, sponsoring individuals and families with financial support, and building infrastructure to support whole communities as in the case of Downey. Officials routinely point to these activities when emphasizing the good Kagnew Station did for the both United States’ national interests as well as those of the Eritrean people. These stories, however, are either ignored or discounted in examinations and analyses of imperial powers and their relations with native peoples. Rather, the general subjugation of local populations within imperial structures as well as the distinct polarity of relations between imperial powers and local populations is emphasized in scholarly accounts of imperial systems.

In I Didn’t Do It For You, Michela Wrong calls attention to the tensions and resentment that characterized relations between Eritreans and Americans. While Wrong acknowledges the humanitarian efforts of Americans such as Downey, she goes on to

106 See Kagnew Gazelle, the official newspaper of Kagnew Stations.

53 explain how relations such as those shared between the people of Shinnara and Downey were far from the norm:

Kagnew undoubtedly had its charitable side, but only the obtuse could fail to register that the attitude of Eritreans and Italian settlers towards the Kagnew men was not always one of gratitude, let alone indulgent amusement. The moral chasm between 1960s and 1970s America and Eritrea of the day – puritanical, conservative, God-fearing – was too wide to be easily bridged. GIs who went horse riding in the countryside came to anticipate a stoning by village children. In a strait-laced Eritrean family, a daughter who dared date a serviceman was regarded as bringing shame on the household. And there were plenty of young Eritrean males who enjoyed nothing better than loitering in Asmara’s bars in the hope of a scrap with the GIs, arrogant despoilers of their women, supporters of a loathed Ethiopian occupation force.107

With two radically different perspectives on relations between Eritrean and

Americans during the 1960s and 1970s, it is difficult to make sense of how the various accounts coincide with one another. This chapter intends to wrestle with and complicate the frameworks as well as narrative accounts with which scholars such as Wrong provide to understand imperial systems. Rather than a faulty account of imperial systems, these analyses lack the nuance to fully capture the complexity of relationships within imperial systems such as existed in Eritrea throughout the duration of Kagnew Station. These theories often examine relations between groups in imperial systems on a single spectrum, ranging from collaborative to hostile. First-hand accounts of experiences in these situations reveal, however, that relations were much more complex and often seemed to contradict one another. This section will demonstrate that to fully understand the complexity and contradictions that characterized relations between Eritreans and

American during the duration of Kagnew Station, readers must first understand the economic, political, and social factors that shaped the variety of interactions between them rather than analyzing relations independent of their context. In doing so, this section

107 Wrong, Michela, I Didn’t Do It For You, p. 231.

54 conveys the manner in which these factors shaped relations between Eritreans and

Americans in a myriad of ways.

Economic

Remember the Italians who invaded and said, “Eat but don’t speak?” Remember the English who invaded and said, “Speak but don’t eat?” Remember the Amharas who invaded and said, “Don’t speak and don’t eat?”108

Reflecting on his years in Asmara working at Kagnew Station, Ghebrehiwet recalled an occasional ploy utilized by rural Eritreans with farms bordering roads frequently used by American servicemen. “Some farmers would plant their crops very close to the edge of the road, too close; so when the Americans drove their trucks, they crushed the crops. Then, the farmers would go and complain at Kagnew. The Americans then gave them compensation for the lost crops, and it was always a lot of money, most of them would retire afterwards!”109

For Eritreans living outside of Asmara, there were few if any means of accessing the economic resources to be acquired from Kagnew Station. Some who had the means, and benefit of location, opened up rest stop centers where American travelers en route to an R&R center in Keren or Massawa would stop for food and refreshments. For the vast majority of Eritreans not living in Asmara, however, relocating was the only means of doing so, a feat that was too difficult for the vast majority of Eritreans, who were without the means of paying for rent, food, and other basic necessities. Some, as Ghebrehiwet recounted, were able to devise ways to work around their geographic misfortune with the resources they had.

108 Reesom Haile, “Believe it Or Not” – Reesom’s poem juxtaposes the economic and political climates of the three successive colonial administrations in Eritrea in the late 19th and 20th century. 109 Interview 14.

55 While using such means to obtain payouts from Americans was not the norm for all rural Eritreans, it did happen on occasion. More importantly, however, is what these incidents reveal about Eritrean perceptions of Americans. For Eritreans, especially those among Eritrea’s lower socioeconomic classes, the wealth that was frequently and casually displayed by Americans became their primary identifying factor. This wealth, and means of accessing it, framed the manner in which Eritreans viewed and interacted with

Americans. During an era of widespread economic hardships among Eritreans,

Americans represented an opportunity to escape the poverty that plagued so many others.

Relations between Americans and Eritreans, therefore, were largely shaped by this fact as well as, and more importantly, the extent to which Eritreans were able to access the economic resources to be gained from the base.

Leaving the boundaries of Kagnew Station and venturing out into the city of

Asmara was known to bring about a great deal of unwanted attention for American soldiers. Street children were regularly known to follow soldiers throughout town, asking for money and soliciting for various illicit goods and services. Discussing the walks he often took throughout Asmara, one veteran recalled encountering a young boy who worked to procure clients for a local prostitute.

’Hey GI, you want my mom? She’s a virgin,’ he asked me. It was actually quite common to hear that. If they weren’t working as pimps, they were selling drugs, or threatening us to give them money. They would also come and ask, ‘want me to watch your car? I’ll protect it for you,’ which was code for my friends and I will come and loot it unless you give us money.110

The various tactics employed by street children speaks to the desperation of the economic conditions experienced by many Eritreans during the 1950s and 1960s. For those whose families were not able to tap into the economic gains to be had through Kagnew Station,

110 Interview 13.

56 drastic measures were often taken to make ends meet and oftentimes, Americans factored into these means because they were regarded as the main possessors of wealth in

Ethiopian-controlled Eritrea. Whether it entailed selling drugs, using violence or the threat of violence, soliciting sex, or begging for money, Eritreans lacking stable employment, either at Kagnew Station or elsewhere, utilized desperate means to scrounge a means of survival off of the base.

Wrong’s examination of these occurrences, especially ones involving Eritrean prostitutes and bargirls, however, focuses on the exploits of American soldiers rather than the motives compelling the participation of the Eritreans involved. In doing so, Wrong disregards the agency of these women and the narrative that brought them into such an industry. As noted in the previous chapter, Eritrean women had few viable options to pursue economic security. Education was a privilege only those of higher socioeconomic classes could hope to procure. For the many Eritrean women who were unable to obtain an education, marriage provided the only hope for economic security, but it did not become a reality for many. Divorce, death of a spouse, domestic abuse, or a number of other occurrences could instantly make women vulnerable and require them to secure an independent means of economic security. Employment at Kagnew Station provided one method of doing so, as discussed in the previous chapter, but the difficulty of securing these opportunities often necessitated working in illicit employment.111

While Wrong’s account is not erroneous, it does fail to take into account the experiences of Eritreans that compelled them to participate in the more scandalous aspect

111 Eritrean women in vulnerable circumstances also entered into intimate relationships with Americans, often resulting in marriage. Despite discouragement from the command office, marriages between American servicemen and Eritrean women frequently occurred, however, the Eritrean women who entered into such relationships were often those who were not living in their parents’ household, often because they had run away from home.

57 of Kagnew’s history. Whether scandalous or respectable by their society’s standards,

Eritreans were often persuaded to interact with Americans and the base largely because of the economic hardships they were certain to face outside of American employment.

Although the United States was not in Eritrean as a colonizing power, the imperial nature of its presence in Eritrea lends itself to an analysis of the role Kagnew employees played in the imperial structure of Kagnew Station.

In “Non-European foundations of European imperialism: sketch for a theory of collaboration,” Ronald Robinson presents his analysis of the mechanisms of collaboration that facilitated European rule in non-European territories. Examining the various structures of control that existed in circumstances of European presence in Asia and

Africa, Robinson asserts that the more ‘European’ these collaborating sectors were, the less likely direct colonial control was needed for European powers to access the economic or political resources they wanted. In the case of Kagnew Station, the case could be made that Eritrean employees of the base were the collaborating agents utilized for the American base to successfully implement their intelligence-gleaning efforts in

Eritrea. A closer examination of the political forces at play in Eritrea, however, complicates this application and requires a more nuanced reading of who exactly comprised the collaborating forces for the United States’ imperial mission in Eritrea.

Political

Excursions into the regions surrounding Asmara were a frequent hobby for servicemen stationed at Kagnew Station. Renting out vehicles or horses provided by the base, Americans eager to experience Eritrea outside the confines of Kagnew Station traveled beyond the borders of Asmara and explored the rural areas of Eritrea as well as

58 its other cities, such as Keren and Massawa. Such activity, while allowed by the base command, did have limitations; especially as Eritrea’s war for independence escalated and rural areas were deemed unsafe and therefore off-limits due to increased military activity. Despite these restrictions, American servicemen often defied orders from base command designed to regulate American interactions with Eritreans as well as activity outside the base.

During an afternoon of explorations on the road between the towns of Nefasit and

Dekamhare, Joe and Tom, soldiers serving at Kagnew Station, decided to satisfy the curiosity they shared with many of their comrades by venturing off the road into areas labeled as ‘rebel territory’ and therefore off-limits to Americans.112 After an uneventful trip into the restricted area, Joe and Tom decided to return back to the main road, during which they were met with several armed Eritreans, members of the Eritrean Liberation

Front, standing in the middle of the road. With continuous reports of shifta, or bandits, frequently attacking both civilians and military personnel on roads outside of Asmara,

Joe and Tom rightfully expected, at the very least, to be stripped of all their possessions if not killed.113 To their surprise, however, their encounter with members of the ELF did not

112 Michael Metras, Ethiopia: Travels of a Youth (Somonauk: Michael Metras, 2002), CD-Rom edition. Joe and Tom’s experiences are recounted in the “Nefasti to Decamere Road” section on Metras’ CD-rom version of his book Ethiopia: Travels of a Youth, a published memoir of his time and experiences while at Kagnew Station. 113 Shifta attacks were an occasional occurrence on the roads connecting Asmara to other Eritrean towns and cities. Reports of shifta attacks as well as cautionary advice to avoid their road traps (large rocks or animals were used to block the road forcing drivers to stop their vehicles) were often published in Kagnew Station’s newspaper The Gazelle. Due to similar tactics in employing roadblocks as well as shifta’s use of military clothing as disguises, Americans often confused shiftas and their attacks as conducted by members of the ELF. Misconceptions about the manner and nature of Eritrean resistance have led to confusion on Eritrean sentiments towards Americans during this period. Perhaps the main source of directed violence towards Americans were committed by shifta.. While shifta regularly attacked Americans on the roads outside of Asmara, as well as anyone else who happened to travel on these roads, the purpose of these attacks was to procure valuable items, not to make a political

59 result in casualty, though it did end with Eritrean soldiers ‘borrowing’ various much- needed military equipment from the Americans. Rather than physically harming them, the ELF soldiers they met proceeded to inform them of the goals of the Eritrean

Liberation Front. The ELF’s main spokesman in their encounter parted ways with them with a final reminder that provided a different perspective on Eritrean - American relations in Eritrea: “But remember that we are fighting the Ethiopian government, not you Americans.”

This encounter between Joe, Tom, and members of the ELF provides insight into political factors shaping interactions between Eritreans and Americans. The ELF soldier’s final reminder to Joe and Tom, that their fight was against Ethiopia and not the

United States, highlights the important role political sentiments played in how Eritreans related to Americans. Far from an anomaly in Eritrean-American relations during

Kagnew Station’s duration, Joe and Tom’s interactions were not as uncommon as scholarly accounts of military bases have suggested. Members of the ELF often happened upon Americans in Eritrea and had peaceful, albeit formal interactions. 114 Despite accounts that assert tensions between Eritreans and Americans due to the imperial nature of Kagnew Station, Eritrea’s war for independence directly against Ethiopia, especially as the war intensified during the late 60s and early 70s, caused the majority of Eritreans to view Ethiopians, not Americans, as the imperial power to contend with during the years of Kagnew Station. This interpretation of Eritrean perceptions of American, however, contradicts how scholars have interpreted American presence abroad. Focusing on the statement. While ELF did at times hold up Americans on the road, this was not a regular practice and only done at times when they felt their security threatened.

114 See “Blow Jobs, Bugging, and Beer” in Wrong’s I Didn’t Do It For You. Wrong documents veterans’ remarks of interactions with members of the ELF on page 233.

60 imperialistic nature of American presence in foreign countries, scholars have often overlooked or disregarded the political dynamics, and multiple imperial powers, at work in these regions.

Perhaps the most direct accusation of American imperialism can be found in

Chalmers Johnson’s Sorrows of Empire. Analyzing the network of bases around the globe, Johnson contends that America’s string of military bases has taken the form of a new type of empire. Describing the general conditions that characterize these bases,

Johnson highlights the discord between Americans tied to the base and the locals surrounding it:

The conditions there – expropriation of the island’s most valuable land for bases, extraterritorial status for American troops who committed crimes against local civilians, bars and brothels crowding around the main gates of bases, endless accidents, noise, sexual violence, drunk-driving crashes, drug use, and environmental pollution – are replicated anywhere there are American garrisons. 115

Discord and hostility, according to Johnson, are the main sentiments in relations between

Americans and local populations in military outposts. The weight of Johnson’s argument lies in the power imposed upon foreign governments through the presence of American military bases. According to Johnson, these bases present an example of United States’ power. This line of analysis, however, fails to take in consideration the other political powers present in such situations. In the case of Kagnew Station, America’s imperial military presence existed alongside, and was often overshadowed by, Ethiopia’s colonizing presence.

While American support was responsible for establishing Ethiopian colonialism in Eritrea, the acts of violence that eventually propelled Eritrean mass armed resistance

115 Johnson, Chalmers, Sorrows of Empire, p.8.

61 were carried out by the Ethiopian state, resulting in Eritreans viewing Ethiopia as the oppressive imperial power that subjugated them The policies and practices of brutality that came to characterize Ethiopian rule, such as public hangings and bombing of villages, were carried out directly and exclusively by Ethiopian officials. This directly contrasted with perceptions of Kagnew Station and Americans, who were often referred to as dekki sony for their carefree and relaxed demeanor.116 Thus, when the struggle began, infrastructures representing the Ethiopian state such as police stations and military outposts, rather than Kagnew Station or other symbols of United States government, were targeted.117 As the war escalated, incidents did occur that resulted in Kagnew Station being caught in the crossfire of attacks by ELF against the Ethiopian state. However, these were few and far between and did not represent an actual policy of the ELF to target the base or the American government.118 While Johnson presents compelling analysis as to the growth of an imperial network of American military bases, his argument virtually omits the other political powers that are often at play alongside the

United States in similar settings. In doing so, Johnson’s theory emphasizes, in some cases exaggerates, the imperial role that the United States holds while diminishing the imperial maneuvers of other regional powers, resulting in an unbalanced representation of regional politics and their influences.

116 Dekki sony translates literally to ‘Children of Monday.’ The phrase was understood to reference Americans’ relaxed and carefree demeanor. As one person explained it, “On Monday you are always fresh, relaxed…the Americans were like that, always relaxed, fresh, and looking for a new adventure.” Interview 1, 15, and 22. 117 The war initiated with members of the ELF attacking an Ethiopian police outpost in west Eritrea. The ELF, and later EPLF, used similar guerrilla tactics throughout the war. 118 At times Kagnew Station or American servicemen were harmed or injured in crossfires between Eritrean liberation forces and the Ethiopian Army.

62 Mark Kowal’s visit to Asmara in 1980 best captures the manner in which

Eritreans viewed Americans as an imperial presence. When Kowal, an American veteran who completed a tour at Kagnew Station in the early 1970s, returned, he encountered a completely different city than the one he left behind. A daily curfew set at 7pm mandated that everyone stay indoors, with the consequence of being shot on sight if caught outside.

Kowal recalls, however, how people throughout the neighborhood he stayed in came to visit him in the evenings:

After the closing of Kagnew Station in the early 70s, all the Americans had left, so I was kind of the only American in town. People came from all over the neighborhood, people I didn’t know, to visit me and ask me if we were coming back. They were hoping the Americans were returning.119

Kowal’s interactions during his 1980 visit provide further evidence of how Eritreans differentiated between Americans and Ethiopians when it came to imperial control in

Eritrea. Dergue-controlled Asmara in the 1980s was distinctly different from the Asmara of Kagnew’s time, with economic hardships and difficulties even more pronounced and widespread than previous decades. Eritrean inquiries as to whether or not the Americans would return, therefore, also further speak to the economic impact of Kagnew Station as a whole.

While distinguishing between the perceptions and imperial roles of the United

States and Ethiopia is critical for understanding Eritrean-American relations, relying on just the political influences lends itself to a simplified interpretation of relations. Further clarifications and analyses are necessary to present a more accurate portrayal of Eritrean-

American relations. Throughout her chapter on Kagnew Station, Wrong highlights how

Eritreans, especially young Eritrean men, resented the American GIS because they were “

119 Interview 20.

63 arrogant despoilers of their women, supporters of a loathed Ethiopian occupation force.” 120 This claim, however, clashes with many Eritreans’ accounts of their interactions with Americans during the early years of the Eritrean war for independence.

Reconciling these different accounts requires a closer examination of the groups and identities within Eritrean society and how it informed the different ways they interacted with and perceived Americans.

Social

When Negash Kahsai joined the Eritrean Liberation Front as a young man in his early twenties during the early 1970s, his family was anything but supportive.121 Negash had been attending school in Addis Abba, Ethiopia when he fled following rumors that him and his other Eritrean friends were soon to be arrested for financially supporting liberation efforts in Eritrea. His father and uncle, both employees at Kagnew Station, dismissed his patriotic and revolutionary ideals, emphasizing the importance of obtaining an education to continue the social advancement they had accomplished through work at the base:

My uncle especially didn’t believe in what we were fighting for. But he was not alone. Most of the elders at that time didn’t support the struggle, especially those who were Kebessa. Gaining independence was not that important for them. They would always tell us how much worse it was under the Italians, so even though things weren’t perfect they were satisfied, especially because they had a good life with working at Kagnew. When things got worse under Haile Selassie and later with Mengistu, that’s when they really began to support the movement.122

Negash’s contention with his family concerning his revolutionary convictions reveals the varied sentiments regarding Eritrea’s political state among the local population.

Beginning in the 1970s, as police brutality and oppression became the norm, Eritreans

120 Worng, I Didn’t Do It For You, p. 231. 121 Interview 21. Name has been changed to protect anonymity. 122 Ibid.

64 living in Asmara came face to face with the colonial occupation of Eritrea by Ethiopian forces. The closure of Kagnew Station in the mid 1970s further contributed to the widespread economic hardships endured by Eritreans. As a result, more and more highlanders, or Kebessa Eritreans, especially the youth, joined the fight against Ethiopian rule. Negash’s experiences, and those of similar Kebessa youth joining the struggle prior to the mid 1970s reveal, however, the nuanced manner in which Eritreans perceived the political reality they lived in. Additionally, Negash’s experiences as a member of the

Muslim-dominated ELF provide further insight into how Eritreans utilized both national and ethnic identities:

When I first joined, I was in a small company with mostly lowlanders. When we would prepare to eat, the other Kebessa guys and I would often prepare and eat our food by ourselves, mainly because we were not used to the way they prepared their food and such. It wasn’t until we got tired of eating the same thing every night that we finally started to join the others during meal times. It’s ironic because we were all there to fight for Eritrean independence but we still had to deal with our own tribalism.123

As we see here, ethnicity and religion, rather than race, held a larger influence on how

Eritreans perceived themselves and interacted with others. This, however, contradicted many preconceived notions that Americans held, where race was a primary factor influencing interactions. They compel us to focus more closely on the other factors.

Rather, ethnicity, religion and even generational affiliation shaped how Eritreans identified and related to other groups.

Given the generational and ethnic differences among Eritreans as it related to their perceptions of Ethiopian rule, Wrong’s account of the resentment and frustration among

Eritreans towards Americans requires reconsideration. While Western lens of analysis often compel readers to examine these interactions along the lines of national identity,

123 Ibid.

65 interactions between Eritreans and American also require an analysis from the perspective of the various identities of Eritreans. In the case of Kagnew Station, the manner in which ethnic, regional, and racial identities influenced relations between

Eritreans and Americans must be regarded alongside influences of nationality.

Clayborne Chavers, an African American soldier stationed at Kagnew, learned how race influenced Eritreans’ perceptions of identity within the early months of his tour:

I had been speaking with a little boy, and when he left, he said, “Thank you nigger.” That was the first time I had ever been called that. I wasn’t angry with him though; he was only a little kid who didn’t know better. I was angry at whoever taught him that. There was a great deal of prejudice and bigotry that happened there. African Americans not only had to deal with prejudice and bigotry from their white American counterparts but also the Eritreans at times as well124

Although the armed forces had officially been integrated beginning in 1948, the US

Army took many years to fully carry out the integration mandated by Executive Order

9981. For Kagnew Station, however, integration did not become a reality until mid

1960s. Rather than a symptom of error by US military personnel, the lack of African

Americans stationed at Kagnew Station during the early years of its operations was understood by many veterans to be a result of Ethiopian orders.125 Rumor was that Haile

Selassie specifically requested for African Americans to not be stationed at the base, a request followed until the early 1960s.126 As one veteran explained, “whenever they picked up a new soldier stationed and realized he was Black, he would receive transfer orders within the next couple of days. The first one to actually complete his tour at

124 Interview 5. 125 Interview 5 and 12. See also Bucher’s Sea Stories. 126 Interview 22.

66 Kagnew didn’t happen until the early 1960s, and that was because he was the only person on base who knew how to properly take care of the antennas!”127

African Americans serving at Kagnew Station soon realized that, for many

Eritreans, the color of their skin did not automatically result in feelings of comradeship with the Eritrean population. Eritreans often used derogatory terms such as adgi or baria128 to reference African Americans, indicating, for many African Americans, that they did not view them as equals. These terms, however, were not exclusively used in referencing African Americans but also utilized to refer to other Eritreans.129

Rather than a homogenous group, Eritreans contested with each other meanings of ethnicity, race, and nationality. Relations with Americans, as a result, were wrapped up in the negotiations of these meanings. The manner in which Eritreans recognized their identities influenced the manner in which they interacted with Americans, or did not in some instances. Additionally, ostracizing certain communities or individuals often factored into closer relations with Americans.

Conclusion

A common event that appears in recollections of Americans’ tenure in Kagnew

Station is Eritrean children pelting soldiers with rocks when they wandered off the main roads. Wrong contributes these acts to Eritrean resentment of American presence in

127 Ibid. 128 Adgi literally translates to a donkey but is implied to mean that the individual has donkely-like mannerisms and intellect. Baria literally translates to slave but is also used to refer to individuals, Eritreans included, who have a darker skin tone or facial features that are not widely considered to be typical Eritrean facial features. See Interviews 5,15, 20, and 22. 129 Interview 7,18, and 19. Members of Eritrea’s Kunama ethnic group were often referred to as baria by other Eritreans due to their darker skin complexion. Interviews also noted the manner in which various ethnic groups had derogatory terms for other groups, revealing the manner in which Eritrean recognized distinct differences amongst themselves according to ethnic and religious lines.

67 Eritrea and its support of Ethiopian occupation. This line of analysis, however, fails to take into account the symbolism rock throwing had among neighborhood children throughout Asmara. As one Eritrean who grew up in Asmara explained it, rock throwing was a common occurrence that anyone could encounter traveling in other neighborhoods or regions that were not their own. Additionally, rock throwers more often than not were young children engaging in play, rather than acting on behalf of their political beliefs and ideologies:

Anyone walking in a neighborhood that they didn’t belong in would get rocks thrown at them. For example, if I walked through Geza Banda, and I grew up in Geza Kenisha, I would get rocks thrown at me by the neighborhood kids there. Of course, I could go back with my neighborhood friends and throw rocks back at them if I wanted to!130

According to this accounts, rock throwing was understood to convey that individuals did not belong in a particular area and needed to leave immediately. As another Eritrean further explains, however, it was also part of innocent childhood fun. “There was a school bus that would take the American kids to school in the morning. Sometimes, my friends and I would throw rocks at them. It was foolish and I know that now, but back then we were kids and just having fun.”131 There is no doubt that incidents involving rocks thrown at Americans could have been fueled by resentment and frustration, however, these actions were more complex and nuanced, and more of a matter of internal dynamics among Eritrean communities, than Wrong implies.

Scholars and journalists, such as Wrong, who have commented on the relations between Eritreans and Americans within imperial systems often view them as static or dependent on one or two variables concerning matters of political relations. This section,

130 Interview 21. 131 Ibid.

68 however, has aimed to demonstrate the manner in which these relations are more complex and nuanced than these scholars allude to. As in the case of Eritrean and

American relations during the tenure of Kagnew Station, a variety of factors are at play that influence relations in various ways. Although more tedious, a full examination of each of these factors is necessary to fully understand how they worked together to affect relations within imperial systems.

69 Conclusion

Kagnew Station officially closed its doors on April 29, 1977, with the departure of the few remaining members of the United States armed forces. What began as a symbol of the strong partnership between the United States and Ethiopia ended as a result of the deteriorating relationship with the new Communist regime in Ethiopia. As the intensity of Eritrea’s war for independence against Ethiopia increased, Ethiopia’s communist regime under strengthened, and America’s need for

Kagnew Station decreased, the base was increasingly downsized due to Ethiopian suspicion and American disinterest. One year short of its expected twenty-five year duration, Kagnew Station nonetheless had momentous influence on the economic, social, and cultural atmosphere of Asmara during its duration.

Through Kagnew Station, Eritreans in Asmara were able to pursue opportunities for economic stability and prosperity, social mobility, and cultural exposure not fostered by either Ethiopian regime. As evidences by the cases presented, Eritreans took advantages of the possibilities that the base provided, exemplifying the agency they had in crafting opportunities for themselves. These experiences, in which Eritreans were able to transform the presence of Kagnew Station in Eritrea into one of economic and social prospects, shaped the manner in which Eritreans not only viewed Americans but also engaged with them.

Current theories of imperialism, however, fail to capture and articulate the experiences that occurred within Eritrea during Kagnew Station. While these theories are valuable and necessary in analyzing imperial structures, they lack the perspectives of imperialism ‘from within,’ from the eyes of those who lived and experienced it first-

70 hand. In order to produce a more holistic understanding of the lived imperial experience, this description of ‘from within’ must include perspectives who were both the imperialized and members of the imperial power. By incorporating accounts from both

Eritrean employees of Kagnew Station and American veterans, this study highlights the shortcomings between these accounts and the theories and analyses presented by scholars of both imperialism and Eritrean history as a means of advocating for a theoretical approach that incorporates both. In doing so, we can begin to formulate a method of analyzing imperialism based on the everyday, common exchanges and interactions that occurred between individuals and groups.

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Palo Alto Times

Websites www.kagnewstation.com - Website created and maintained by Kagnew Station veterans, contains memoirs, newspaper scans, and directory of veterans. www.lalmba.org - Official website of Lalmba, organization created by Hugh Downey containing information of the founding and history of the organization.

74 Appendix A – Interviews

Name Language 1. Hadgu Tekle Tigrinya 2. Habte Haile Tigrinya 3. Haddis English Yohannes 4. Will Amatruda English 5. Clayborne English Chavers 6. Ron Ruffner English 7. Joseph English Fitzgerald 8. Tom Hyatt English 9. Regina English Mansfield 10. Tzehaye English Yohannes 11. Don Witten English 12. Charlie White English 13. Stan Jakubik English 14. Ghebrehiwet Tigrinya 15. Negassi Kidane English 16. Kahsai Kidane English 17. Martha Tigrinya 18. Rezan Asfaha Tigrinya 19. Woldensie English Asfaha 20. Mark Kowal English

21. Anonymous Tigrinya

22. Anonymous English

75 Appendix B – Kagnew Station Tracts

Name Military Branch Function Location Tract A Army Administrative Asmara, Eritrea Buildings Tract B Army STRATCOM receiver Asmara, Eritrea site Tract C Army Operations site Asmara, Eritrea Tract D Army STRATCOM Asmara, Eritrea Transmitter site Tract E – Kagnew All Residential Asmara, Eritrea Station Tract F US Navy Navy Receiver site Gura, Eritrea Tract G US Navy Navy satellite terminal Gura, Eritrea Tract H US Navy Navy Transmitter site Gura, Eritrea

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