Engaging in the Crisis Directly, Moscow Opted for Acting Under the Guise of Tskhinvali

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Engaging in the Crisis Directly, Moscow Opted for Acting Under the Guise of Tskhinvali TSNELISI-CHORCHANA CRISIS: FACTS, DETAILS AND CHRONOLOGY TORNIKE ZURABASHVILI 130 EXPERT OPINION ÓÀØÀÒÈÅÄËÏÓ ÓÔÒÀÔÄÂÉÉÓÀ ÃÀ ÓÀÄÒÈÀÛÏÒÉÓÏ ÖÒÈÉÄÒÈÏÁÀÈÀ ÊÅËÄÅÉÓ ×ÏÍÃÉ GEORGIAN FOUNDATION FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES EXPERT OPINION TORNIKE ZURABASHVILI TSNELISI-CHORCHANA CRISIS: FACTS, DETAILS AND CHRONOLOGY 130 2019 The publication is made possible with the support of the US Embassy in Georgia. The views expressed in the publication are the sole responsibility of the author and do not in any way represent the views of the Embassy. Technical Editor: Artem Melik-Nubarov All rights reserved and belong to Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form, including electronic and mechanical, without the prior written permission of the publisher. The opinions and conclusions expressed are those of the author/s and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies. Copyright © 2019 Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies ISSN 1512-4835 ISBN 978-9941-8-2010-6 The decision of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia to set up an observation post between the village of Chorchana in the Khashuri municipality and the village of Tsnelisi in the Russian-held Tskhinvali Region/ South Ossetia in August 2019 caused weeks of crisis at the occupation line. The situation did not escalate into an open confrontation but the high concentration of armed security actors significantly deteriorated the security environment on the ground. The situation grew particularly tense on August 29 when Tskhinvali representatives issued an ultimatum to Georgian authorities and warned them with “legal action” if they failed to remove the observation post. Tbilisi refused to accept the terms. In response, Tskhinvali authorities established new positions deeper into the Tbilisi-controlled territory in a forested area between the villages of Chorchana and Kobi. They also decided to temporarily close the crossing points in the Georgian-majority Akhalgori and Perevi areas in an apparent effort to pressure Tbilisi to withdraw the observation post. The Tsnelisi-Chorchana events were important on many accounts. First and foremost, the decision to set up a police post was significantly detached from Tbilisi’s professed policy of “pragmatism” towards Russia. No less important was the role of the Russian Federation – instead of engaging in the crisis directly, Moscow opted for acting under the guise of Tskhinvali. This was also the first time the European Union’s Monitoring Mission confirmed an instance of borderization on the Tbilisi-controlled territory. Background The village of Chorchana1 is situated in the Tsagvli commune north-east of the Khashuri municipality, just two kilometers away from the Gomi- Sachkhere-Chiatura road. The village of Tsnelisi2 lies east of Chorchana, in the Znauri district, on the territory of the Russian-held Tskhinvali Region/ South Ossetia (See Map N1). To the south, Tsnelisi borders one more village of the Khashuri municipality – Kobi, and two villages of the Kareli municipality to the east – Koda and Chvrinisi. Tsnelisi3 is connected to the rest of the Znauri4 district through a narrow road running along the Lopanistskali (Lapnistskali) river. In late 1930s, on this very road exactly where the Georgian police set up an observation post, Soviet authorities opened a talc5 processing plant known as Saqtalki or Gruztalc. Saqtalki was an enterprise of republican subordination, processed minerals extracted 3 in the Chorchana mountains and was the main employer for residents of nearby villages. To house factory workers, the Soviets also built housing facilities in the vicinity of the talc processing plant which, according to the 1959 census, was home to 94 persons,6 primarily ethnic Georgians. The factory has not been operational since 1990. Map N1: Tsnelisi-Chorchana area with indications of geographic features Generated by Google MyMaps The Lopanistskali Gorge, particularly the sources of Lopanistskali’s right tributaries (the northern and north-eastern areas of Chorchana), is rich with mineral resources. Apart from talc, the area is known for reserves of nephritis, nickel, talc-schist, serpentinite and marble. Tskhinvali representatives voiced their interest in the territory shortly after the Russian-Georgian war. In December 2008, Tskhinvali leader, Eduard Kokoity, spoke7 of wanting to restore the defunct factory. The same was articulated in August 2013 by Kokoity’s successor, Leonid Tibilov,8 but what hindered their intentions from coming true was that the industrial resources were located in the Tbilisi-controlled territory, in the Chorchana Mountains and were inaccessible for extraction. 4 Tskhinvali sharpened its messages in 2018, a year after Leonid Tibilov was replaced by Anatoly Bibilov. In June 2018, Tskhinvali representatives voiced their first appeals for changing the region’s “border.” To scrutinize the issue, Tskhinvali authorities convened a “parliamentary commission on border delimitation and demarcation.”9 According to the assembly members, the commission was established upon the request of Tsnelisi10 residents who were “concerned that a part of their village appeared outside of the Republic’s borders in the demarcation process.” The assembly members did not shy away from explicitly expressing interest in the mineral resources.11 They also stressed that unlike the Federal Security Service, which used the topographic maps of the 1980s in the “demarcation” process, the “parliamentary commission” decided to guide its work with maps from the 1920s and 1930s. “The issue necessitates further research; if the border [in Tsnelisi-Chorchana area] was demarcated inaccurately, these facts should be identified and corrected,” said12 the then head of the Tskhinvali “parliament,” Pyotr Gasiev. Where exactly is the observation post located? The Georgian police post is located in the vicinity of the Saqtalki plant on the eastern slopes of the hill range separating Chorchana and Tsnelisi, about 250 meters away from the Lopanistskali River. The Ministry of Internal Affairs had to pave a new road north-east of Chorchana to reach the observation post. According to the administrative boundaries of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Georgia, the area of the observation post was located in the Khashuri district, outside of the Autonomous Oblast of South Ossetia. This is also confirmed by the EUMM’s statement of September 16, 201913 which said the new observation post was established “some 240 meters away from the ABL and on Tbilisi-administered territory (TAT) in accordance with the traditionally understood run of the ABL in that area.” The EUMM’s “traditionally understood run of the ABL” implies the administrative boundary of the Autonomous Oblast of South Ossetia in accordance with the topographic (military) maps of the 1980s. The Russian Federal Security Service is using these very maps for borderization but they are not publically available. 5 Since 1922 when the Autonomous Oblast of South Ossetia was formed within the Soviet Socialist Republic of Georgia, the region’s boundaries were adjusted several times. Apparently, changes were applied to the Tsnelisi-Chorchana area as well. Maps from the 1920s retrieved from the National Archives of Georgia show that parts of the area north and north- east of Chorchana fell inside the region’s boundaries. However, the small scales of these maps and the inaccuracies of their narrative descriptions14 make it impossible to draw the region’s exact boundaries (see annexes 1 and 2 or visit the following links www.bit.ly/2pmTvOI and www.bit. ly/34qUqwp). By the 1980s, the administrative boundary running through Tsnelisi- Chorchana had already formed into its current shape. Topographic maps from 1980 and 1989 retrieved in the research process show that the administrative boundary in this area passes on top of a ridge separating the Cheratkhevi and Lopanistskali Gorges, from the Kaprebis-Boseli15 Mountain to the Zamrali Mountain.16 The boundary line descends into the Lopanistskali Gorge from the southern slope of the Zamrali Mountain and passes along the right bank of the river until reaching the southern tip of the village of Tsnelisi. According to this outline, the right bank of the Lopanistskali River between the villages of Gvirgvina and Tsnelisi, including the area of the observation post, falls outside the Autonomous Oblast (see annexes 3 and 4, or visit the following linkswww.bit.ly/3356KBX and www.bit.ly/2JG4jyl).17 Maps created in Georgia since the restoration of its independence repeat the very same trajectory. That eastern bank of the Lopanistskali River was indeed outside of the administrative boundaries of the Autonomous Oblast, was also confirmed on numerous occasions by representatives of the occupation regime, including the former deputy head of the region’s “security service”, Sergey Kolbin. In an interview on February 8, 2014, Kolbin said18 in the village of Tsnelisi “where the border follows the Lopanistskali River, several households ended up on the right bank of the river, on the territory of Georgia.” “If we take the boundary of the Autonomous Oblast of South Ossetia, the part of Tsnelisi on the right bank [of the river] falls on the territory of Georgia… [during the Soviet Union,] people living in these areas obtained house construction permits not in South Ossetia, but in the district administration of Gori. Technically, they are Georgian
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