Engaging in the Crisis Directly, Moscow Opted for Acting Under the Guise of Tskhinvali

TSNELISI-CHORCHANA CRISIS: FACTS, DETAILS AND CHRONOLOGY

TORNIKE ZURABASHVILI 130

EXPERT OPINION ÓÀØÀÒÈÅÄËÏÓ ÓÔÒÀÔÄÂÉÉÓÀ ÃÀ ÓÀÄÒÈÀÛÏÒÉÓÏ ÖÒÈÉÄÒÈÏÁÀÈÀ ÊÅËÄÅÉÓ ×ÏÍÃÉ GEORGIAN FOUNDATION FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

EXPERT OPINION

TORNIKE ZURABASHVILI

TSNELISI-CHORCHANA CRISIS: FACTS, DETAILS AND CHRONOLOGY

130

2019 The publication is made possible with the support of the US Embassy in Georgia. The views expressed in the publication are the sole responsibility of the author and do not in any way represent the views of the Embassy.

Technical Editor: Artem Melik-Nubarov

All rights reserved and belong to Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form, including electronic and mechanical, without the prior written permission of the publisher. The opinions and conclusions expressed are those of the author/s and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies.

ISSN 1512-4835 ISBN 978-9941-8-2010-6 The decision of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia to set up an observation post between the village of Chorchana in the Khashuri municipality and the village of Tsnelisi in the Russian-held Tskhinvali Region/ South Ossetia in August 2019 caused weeks of crisis at the occupation line. The situation did not escalate into an open confrontation but the high concentration of armed security actors significantly deteriorated the security environment on the ground. The situation grew particularly tense on August 29 when Tskhinvali representatives issued an ultimatum to Georgian authorities and warned them with “legal action” if they failed to remove the observation post. Tbilisi refused to accept the terms. In response, Tskhinvali authorities established new positions deeper into the Tbilisi-controlled territory in a forested area between the villages of Chorchana and Kobi. They also decided to temporarily close the crossing points in the Georgian-majority Akhalgori and Perevi areas in an apparent effort to pressure Tbilisi to withdraw the observation post. The Tsnelisi-Chorchana events were important on many accounts. First and foremost, the decision to set up a police post was significantly detached from Tbilisi’s professed policy of “pragmatism” towards Russia. No less important was the role of the Russian Federation – instead of engaging in the crisis directly, Moscow opted for acting under the guise of Tskhinvali. This was also the first time the European Union’s Monitoring Mission confirmed an instance of borderization on the Tbilisi-controlled territory.

Background

The village of Chorchana1 is situated in the Tsagvli commune north-east of the Khashuri municipality, just two kilometers away from the Gomi- Sachkhere-Chiatura road. The village of Tsnelisi2 lies east of Chorchana, in the Znauri district, on the territory of the Russian-held Tskhinvali Region/ South Ossetia (See Map N1). To the south, Tsnelisi borders one more village of the Khashuri municipality – Kobi, and two villages of the Kareli municipality to the east – Koda and Chvrinisi. Tsnelisi3 is connected to the rest of the Znauri4 district through a narrow road running along the Lopanistskali (Lapnistskali) river. In late 1930s, on this very road exactly where the Georgian police set up an observation post, Soviet authorities opened a talc5 processing plant known as Saqtalki or Gruztalc. Saqtalki was an enterprise of republican subordination, processed minerals extracted

3 in the Chorchana mountains and was the main employer for residents of nearby villages. To house factory workers, the Soviets also built housing facilities in the vicinity of the talc processing plant which, according to the 1959 census, was home to 94 persons,6 primarily ethnic Georgians. The factory has not been operational since 1990.

Map N1: Tsnelisi-Chorchana area with indications of geographic features

Generated by Google MyMaps

The Lopanistskali Gorge, particularly the sources of Lopanistskali’s right tributaries (the northern and north-eastern areas of Chorchana), is rich with mineral resources. Apart from talc, the area is known for reserves of nephritis, nickel, talc-schist, serpentinite and marble. Tskhinvali representatives voiced their interest in the territory shortly after the Russian-Georgian war. In December 2008, Tskhinvali leader, Eduard Kokoity, spoke7 of wanting to restore the defunct factory. The same was articulated in August 2013 by Kokoity’s successor, Leonid Tibilov,8 but what hindered their intentions from coming true was that the industrial resources were located in the Tbilisi-controlled territory, in the Chorchana Mountains and were inaccessible for extraction.

4 Tskhinvali sharpened its messages in 2018, a year after Leonid Tibilov was replaced by Anatoly Bibilov. In June 2018, Tskhinvali representatives voiced their first appeals for changing the region’s “border.” To scrutinize the issue, Tskhinvali authorities convened a “parliamentary commission on border delimitation and demarcation.”9 According to the assembly members, the commission was established upon the request of Tsnelisi10 residents who were “concerned that a part of their village appeared outside of the Republic’s borders in the demarcation process.” The assembly members did not shy away from explicitly expressing interest in the mineral resources.11 They also stressed that unlike the Federal Security Service, which used the topographic maps of the 1980s in the “demarcation” process, the “parliamentary commission” decided to guide its work with maps from the 1920s and 1930s. “The issue necessitates further research; if the border [in Tsnelisi-Chorchana area] was demarcated inaccurately, these facts should be identified and corrected,” said12 the then head of the Tskhinvali “parliament,” Pyotr Gasiev.

Where exactly is the observation post located?

The Georgian police post is located in the vicinity of the Saqtalki plant on the eastern slopes of the hill range separating Chorchana and Tsnelisi, about 250 meters away from the Lopanistskali River. The Ministry of Internal Affairs had to pave a new road north-east of Chorchana to reach the observation post. According to the administrative boundaries of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Georgia, the area of the observation post was located in the Khashuri district, outside of the Autonomous Oblast of South Ossetia. This is also confirmed by the EUMM’s statement of September 16, 201913 which said the new observation post was established “some 240 meters away from the ABL and on Tbilisi-administered territory (TAT) in accordance with the traditionally understood run of the ABL in that area.” The EUMM’s “traditionally understood run of the ABL” implies the administrative boundary of the Autonomous Oblast of South Ossetia in accordance with the topographic (military) maps of the 1980s. The Russian Federal Security Service is using these very maps for borderization but they are not publically available.

5 Since 1922 when the Autonomous Oblast of South Ossetia was formed within the Soviet Socialist Republic of Georgia, the region’s boundaries were adjusted several times. Apparently, changes were applied to the Tsnelisi-Chorchana area as well. Maps from the 1920s retrieved from the National Archives of Georgia show that parts of the area north and north- east of Chorchana fell inside the region’s boundaries. However, the small scales of these maps and the inaccuracies of their narrative descriptions14 make it impossible to draw the region’s exact boundaries (see annexes 1 and 2 or visit the following links www.bit.ly/2pmTvOI and www.bit. ly/34qUqwp). By the 1980s, the administrative boundary running through Tsnelisi- Chorchana had already formed into its current shape. Topographic maps from 1980 and 1989 retrieved in the research process show that the administrative boundary in this area passes on top of a ridge separating the Cheratkhevi and Lopanistskali Gorges, from the Kaprebis-Boseli15 Mountain to the Zamrali Mountain.16 The boundary line descends into the Lopanistskali Gorge from the southern slope of the Zamrali Mountain and passes along the right bank of the river until reaching the southern tip of the village of Tsnelisi. According to this outline, the right bank of the Lopanistskali River between the villages of Gvirgvina and Tsnelisi, including the area of the observation post, falls outside the Autonomous Oblast (see annexes 3 and 4, or visit the following linkswww.bit.ly/3356KBX and www.bit.ly/2JG4jyl).17 Maps created in Georgia since the restoration of its independence repeat the very same trajectory. That eastern bank of the Lopanistskali River was indeed outside of the administrative boundaries of the Autonomous Oblast, was also confirmed on numerous occasions by representatives of the occupation regime, including the former deputy head of the region’s “security service”, Sergey Kolbin. In an interview on February 8, 2014, Kolbin said18 in the village of Tsnelisi “where the border follows the Lopanistskali River, several households ended up on the right bank of the river, on the territory of Georgia.” “If we take the boundary of the Autonomous Oblast of South Ossetia, the part of Tsnelisi on the right bank [of the river] falls on the territory of Georgia… [during the Soviet Union,] people living in these areas obtained house construction permits not in South Ossetia, but in the district administration of Gori. Technically, they are Georgian citizens andare

6 registered as their [Georgian] citizens. That they are integrated in South Ossetian society is a different matter,” said Kolbin. The observation post area falls outside of the region’s boundaries also by Tskhinvali-recognized maps. According to a map posted on the website of the region’s so-called president, the boundary line between the villages of Gvirgvina and Tsnelisi follows the Lopanistskali River. The map, according to its information note, was created in 2007 and has been posted on the website since it was launched in 2012 (see annex 5 or visit the following link: www.bit.ly/33atvEI). It is also noteworthy that local sources in Tskhinvali have confirmed the periodic presence of EUMM groups and the Georgian police in the area. On September 15, 2019, for instance, local media wrote that in the last 11 years, Tsnelisi residents have continuously raised the issue of “unknown persons, including armed ones,” entering their village “from the territory of Georgia.”19 Additionally, in 2015, Tskhinvali representatives expressed20 dissatisfaction that EUMM patrols engaged in a conversation with Tsnelisi residents. “We explained to EUMM patrols that it is unacceptable to start such conversations because such communications push the observers and the South Ossetian population to violate the border,” said one of Tskhinvali’s representatives.

Positions: Georgian Government

In 2018, when Tskhinvali’s first territorial claims emerged, Georgian officials responded with traditional messaging. Reconciliation Minister, Ketevan Tsikhelashvili, said the decision to establish a commission was “provocative.”21 “Statements on demarcating a non-existing border have no legal and logical grounds,” the Minister noted. Deputy Foreign Minister Davit Dondua echoed these remarks, accusing Tskhinvali representatives of provocations. “There can be no talks on delimitation, since there is simply no border,” Dondua added.22 Additionally, Foreign Minister Davit Zalkaliani pledged to raise the issue at the Geneva International Discussions. In spite of Tbilisi’s diplomatic efforts, in January 2019, seven months after Tskhinvali convened “the parliamentary commission,” paint markings appeared on trees in the area between Tsnelisi and Chorchana.23 The EUMM assessed these markings as a feature of borderization.24 It became apparent that the occupation force was trying to put its plan into action.

7 Tbilisi met the news with alarm as this would inflict very heavy damage on the authorities both inside and outside of the country; yielding additional territory without opposition and upon Tskhinvali’s request would significantly affect the country’s international image. Loss of additional territory would also translate into humanitarian problems and this would damage Tbilisi’s reputation even further. 25 It was, however, attempts to introduce new rules of the game in the borderization process that alarmed Tbilisi the most. As a rule, Georgian officials have traditionally tried to oppose the borderization process through mobilizing the international community and peddling on humanitarian matters. But this was when representatives of the occupation forces followed the administrative boundary with various degrees of precision and did not exceed the boundary line significantly. But now, Tskhinvali representatives expressed territorial claims on hundreds of hectares of land falling outside of the boundary line, significantly threatening the status quo in the area. No less important was the political connotation of the issue; the observation post was installed shortly after massive anti-government protests in Tbilisi, one of whose main lines was the government’s Russia policies. Georgian officials did not speak about the crisis in detail. The main message in their media appearances was that the observation post was a standard police facility26 and that its main purpose was to “guarantee” and “improve” security environment on the ground.27 They, however, indirectly touched upon the illegitimacy of Tskhinvali’s territorial claims. According to Kakhaber Kemoklidze, Chief of Staff of Georgia’s new National Security Council, 28 “this territory was and has been considered as a territory under the control of Georgia’s central authorities, both before the 2008 war and after it. It is an interesting detail that EUMM observers and mobile units of the Georgian police were periodically patrolling the areas.” The Deputy Foreign Minister echoed the points, saying the territory of the police post “has always been and is currently under the control of the Georgian authorities which is confirmed by international observers, including the EUMM.” The Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued two statements on the matter. In its August 30 statement, the MFA said the “mobilization of military equipment and personnel by the occupation forces” was an attempt to destabilize the situation29 while in its September 6 statement, the agency expressed

8 concern over a newly-installed “border post.”30 The Ministry stressed one of the aims of these processes was to push Tbilisi “into starting so- called demarcation-delimitation procedures.” “This is a futile attempt and unacceptable to the Georgian authorities; an internal administrative boundary does not require any demarcation,” the statement reads.

Positions: Tskhinvali, Moscow

Tbilisi’s move to deploy an observation post in the Chorchana-Tsnelisi area triggered heavy criticism among Tskhinvali authorities with their representatives accusing Tbilisi of “invading” their territory.31 According to their statements,32 Georgian police set up the post “illegally,” “on the South Ossetian territory, in close vicinity to the village of Tsnelisi.” They also said33 the presence of Georgian police officers frightened residents of nearby villages. On August 28, Tskhinvali representatives organized an armored vehicle raid34 to Tsnelisi and issued an ultimatum to Georgian authorities, warning them with “legal action,” if they failed to remove the observation post.35 Tbilisi refused to accept the terms. In response, Tskhinvali authorities established new positions 1.3 kilometers deeper into the Tbilisi-controlled territory in a forested area between the villages of Chorchana and Kobi. Tskhinvali representatives explained36 that they set up the new post to uphold the security of local residents and that it did not pose any threat to neighboring villages in the Tbilisi-controlled area. To legitimize their claims, Tskhinvali authorities issued a new map of the area37 which shows the boundary line descending to the Lopanistskali River not from the Zamrali Mountain directly, but passing south-wards along the hill ridge separating Chorchana and Tsnelisi and going downhill to Tsnelisi only from the Kobi forest. According to Tskhinvali authorities, their new “border post” (feature number 17 on map 2) is situated on the “state border of the Republic of South Ossetia” on the western slopes of the Kaprebis-Seri ridge, pursuant to the April 20, 1922 decree38 on the Arrangement of the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast. This represents a blatant attempt to fabricate the document; the Kaprebis-Seri ridge is indeed referred to in the decree but not in the area where the new Tskhinvali map presents it to be. According to the document, the western boundary of the Autonomous Oblast passes

9 the Peranga39 Mountain and the Dzirula headwaters, runs through the Kaprebis-Seri ridge, crosses it in the area of the Cheratkhevi headwaters and continues along the Lopanistskali River. As per this description, Kaprebis- Seri is located not in the Tsnelisi-Chorchana area but in an area close to the headwaters of the Lopanistskali River, north-west of the village of Lopani. That Kaprebis-Seri is located north-west of Lopani is also confirmed by a corresponding inscription in the 1989 topographic map (see annex 4).

Map N2: Tsnelisi-Chorchana area according to a new Tskhinvali map

Source: facebook.com/komitetgosbezopasnosti.southossetia/

In parallel, Tskhinvali authorities accused the EUMM of “border” violations.40 “During the last round of the Geneva International Discussions, I stated that [EUMM] observers were visiting the right bank of Tsnelisi illegally; and this is when they do not have a right to work on the South Ossetian territory and their presence here is illegal,” said Tskhinvali’s chief negotiator with the Georgian government, Murat Dzhioev. Approximately a month later, on October 24, Tskhinvali security service representatives temporarily detained a four-member group of observers patrolling the Tsnelisi-Chorchana area.41

10 A radically different explanation of Tbilisi’s decision was offered42 by the so-called foreign minister of Tskhinvali, Dmitry Medoev. He said the primary goal of the “Georgian provocation” along with “domestic, image- related objectives,” was to sell the resource-rich area to a foreign investor. “This is an immoral principle of doing business which guides international corporations in different parts of the world; they are interested neither in the Ossetian population, nor in the fate of Georgia. Their primary objective is to control resources and profit,” said Medoev. The Kremlin demonstrated a much more reserved position than the Tskhinvali authorities. In its August 30 statement, the Russian Foreign Ministry accused Tbilisi of “provocation” and called for restraint from both “sides”43 while in its September 24 statement, the Ministry focused on the need for “prompt de-escalation” and “consensual decision.” The overall role of the Russian Federation was interesting – instead of engaging in the crisis directly, Moscow opted for acting under the guise of Tskhinvali. As a result, military units under the Russian flag did not directly feature in the crisis. Nevertheless, according to local media, “special security measures” carried out in Tsnelisi, including an armored vehicle raid44 and the deployment of the so-called “border post,”45 were led by the newly-appointed head of the region’s security service, Oleg Shiran.46 Shiran, like his predecessor Mikhail Shabanov, is an long-serving FSB employee and was recently dispatched to the region from Moscow. That local security actors acted in coordination with the FSB was confirmed by Tskhinvali representatives.47 According to Valerian Alikhanti,48 head of the “border service” of Tskhinvali’s security service, the Russian FSB units were informed about their steps in detail. “We are in permanent communication,” said Alikhanti on September 5, in an interview recorded at the new “border post.” He also noted49 that the newly-seized territory would be protected by local forces together with the “border” forces of the Russian Federation.

Conclusion

Events in the Tsnelisi-Chorchana area allow us to draw several conclusions. First and foremost, the crisis demonstrated that the security environment on the ground is fragile and that it could escalate at any moment. Tskhinvali’s decision to choose the 1922 decree as a basis for redrawing

11 the “border” increases the probability of this happening; considering the inconsistencies and ambiguities of the document, in all likelihood, tensions at the occupation line will repeat again. And the responsibility for all of this will rest on the Russian Federation as the only actor which exercises effective control over the area. Whether the Kremlin will open Pandora’s box remains to be seen, but hints at other problematic areas at the “border,” voiced by Anatoly Bibilov and Oleg Shiran, speak to this very point. The crisis also demonstrated that although the current status quo might be unfavorable for Tbilisi, Georgian officials will not tolerate further deterioration of their positions. The threat of moving the borderization process deeper into the Tbilisi-controlled territory has already pushed the authorities to take preemptive measures, a radically different approach from the Georgian Dream’s government’s otherwise passive “occupation” policy. Tskhinvali’s growing territorial appetite might again pose the need for proactive measures which would require both decisive actions and vigilance from the Government of Georgia. The Tsnelisi-Chorchana crisis demonstrated the government’s weakness in the latter component; Tbilisi failed to determine possible reactions of the occupation regime and, as a result, got a new “border post” deeper into its territory.

Tornike Zurabashvili is a 2019-2020 fellow of the Eurasia Democratic Security Network

12 Annex N1: Map of the Autonomous Oblast of South Ossetia, 1920s

Source: National Archives of Georgia www.flickr.com/photos/national_archives_ of_georgia/with/15889638623/

13 Annex N2: Map of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Georgia, 1922

Source: National Archives of Georgia www.flickr.com/photos/national_archives_ of_georgia/with/15889638623/

14 Annex N3: Topographic map of Tskhinvali and nearby areas, 1980

Source: www.mapk38.narod.ru/map2/k3814.html

15 Annex N4: Topographic map of Tskhinvali and nearby areas, 1989

Source: www.mapk38.narod.ru/map1/ik38064.html

16 Annex N5: Map of Tskhinvali Region/South Ossetia, 2007

Source: www.presidentruo.org/karta-respubliki-yuzhnaya-osetiya/

17 References

1. According to the National Statistics Office of Georgia, the number of inhabitants in the village of Chorchana in 2014 was 62. 2. According to Tskhinvali authorities, the village of Tsnelisi was home to 26 persons in 2015. 3. According to Tskhinvali’s administrative division, the village of Tsnelisi belongs to the Balta commune which comprises seven villages: Balta, Lopani, Gvirgvina, Metekhi, Kaleti, Bziskhevi and Patkineti. In 1989, ethnic Georgians formed the majority in three of these villages (Lopani, Kaleti and Bziskhevi) while ethnic Ossetians constituted the majority in the five remaining villages. As of today, there are only two dozen ethnic Georgian families living in these areas with almost all of them concentrated in the village of Lopani. 4. In 1989, Znauri was home to 10,189 persons. A total of 3,619 persons or 35.5% of the total population was ethnic Georgian. According to Tskhinvali authorities, Znauri was inhabited by 4,531 persons in 2015 of whom only 431 were ethnic Georgian. 5. Chorchana talc was used for the chemical and ceramic industries. 6. Population of the villages of the Znauri district in 1959. Ethno-Kavkaz.narod.ru, ethno- kavkaz.narod.ru/znaur.html 7. Государственное Послание Президента Республики Южная Осетия Эдуарда Кокойты «О стратегии развития Республики Южная Осетия до 2012 года». Information Agency Res, December 26, 2008, www.cominf.org/node/1166478918 8. Леонид Тибилов: «Надежды, связанные с признанием независимости, оправдались». Web-site of the so-called president of Tskhinvali, August 23, 2013, www.presidentruo.org/leonid-tibilov-nadezhdy-svyazannye-s-priznaniem- nezavisimosti-opravdalis/ 9. В Южной Осетии создали парламентскую комиссию по вопросам делимитации госграницы. Information Agency Res, June 20, 2018, www.cominf.org/ node/1166517090 10. According to local media, a total of eight households appeared on the “Georgian” side of Tsnelisi. 11. За ‘Волшебство’ Ответят: Парламент Намерен Расследовать Скандальную Демаркацию Границ. Information Agency Res, June 19, 2018, www.cominf.org/ node/1166517082 12. Состоялось Заседание Восьмого Заседания Восьмой Сессии Парламента Республики Южная Осетия, web-site of the so-called parliament of Tskhinvali, June 20, 2018, www.parliamentrso.org/node/1917 13. Situation at the Administrative Boundary Line with South Ossetia. EU Monitoring Mission, September 16, 2019, www.eumm.eu/en/press_and_public_information/ press_releases/36637/

18 14. Maps from the 1920s retrieved from the National Archives do not provide a detailed account of all geographic features of the area. Unlike topographic maps, earlier maps of the region are quite general and are of a low geographic value. 15. Mountain on the Likhi range, on the headwaters of the Cheratkhevi River. For the exact location, visit the following link - www.bit.ly/2q7OFoi. 16. Mountain on the eastern branch of the Likhi range, overlooking the villages of Lopani and Gvirgvina. For the exact location, visit the following link - www.bit.ly/2N5wA3v. 17. It is not clear to the author whether the Russian occupation forces are using these maps in the borderization process. 18. Сергей Колбин: Определение линии границы - процесс двустороннего признания и взаимных соглашений. Information Agency Res, February 2, 2014, www.cominf. org/node/1166500987 19. Грузия хочет запугать жителей Южной Осетии, подорвать веру в Россию и отвлечь от объединения Отечества. Information Agency Res, September 15, 2019, www.cominf.org/node/1166525346 20. Диалог патрулей наблюдателей миссии Евросоюза с жителями Южной Осетии близ границы невозможен, - Хох Гаглойты. Information Agency Res, September 23, 2015, www.cominf.org/node/1166506251 21. “The statement of the occupational regime about the demarcation of the non-existent border has no legal and logical grounds,” State Minister for Reconciliation and Civic Equality, June 21, 2018, www.smr.gov.ge/NewsDetails.aspx?ID=1295 22. “Tskhinvali Makes Territorial Claims.” Information Agency Civil Georgia, June 25, 2018 www.civil.ge/ka/archives/244991 23. Civic Movement Strength in Unity, February 10, 2019, www.youtube.com/ watch?v=yxhZi_ZD-C0 24. Situation at the Administrative Boundary Line with South Ossetia. EU Monitoring Mission, September 16, 2019, www.eumm.eu/en/press_and_public_information/ press_releases/36637/ 25. The Chorchana Mountains are one of the major income sources for locals; local residents collect bladdernuts, chestnuts and wild flowers seasonally and sell them in nearby towns. 26. “Technical meeting in Ergneti is over.” Radio Liberty, September 6, 2019, www. facebook.com/radiotavisupleba/videos/494228394687362/ 27. “Technical meeting in Ergneti is over.” Radio Liberty, September 13, 2019, www. facebook.com/radiotavisupleba/videos/498962387316466/ 28. “Technical meeting in Ergneti is over.” Radio Liberty, August 29, 2019, www.facebook. com/radiotavisupleba/videos/413286142650973/ 29. Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia on the developments at the occupation line, close to the village Chorchana situated in the territory controlled by the government of Georgia. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, August 30, 2019, www.mfa.gov.ge/News/saqartvelos-sagareo-saqmeta-saministros-ganck-(52). aspx?CatID=5&lang=en-US

19 30. Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs over the recent developments along the occupation line. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, September 6, 2019, www.mfa.gov.ge/News/sagareo-saqmeta-saministros-ganckhadeba-bolo-dros. aspx?CatID=5&lang=ka-GE 31. Южная Осетия требует от Грузии немедленно прекратить провокацию, - МИД. Information Agency Res, August 30, 2019, www.cominf.org/node/1166524946 32. Сообщение пресс-службы Аппарата Полномочного представителя Президента РЮО. Special representative of the so-called president of Tskhinvali, August 29, 2019, www.080808.su/node/1005 33. Сообщение пресс-службы Аппарата Полномочного представителя Президента РЮО. Special representative of the so-called president of Tskhinvali, September 17, 2019 www.080808.su/node/1006 34. Югоосетинские пограничники осуществили рейд на бронетехнике в приграничной полосе. Information Agency Res, August 28, 2019, www.cominf.org/ node/1166524887 35. Южная Осетия будет действовать в рамках закона, - Егор Кочиев, Information Agency Res, August 19, 2019, www.cominf.org/node/1166524933 36. КГБ Южной Осетии принимает меры по локализации угроз безопасности на границе. Information Agency Res, October 28, 2019, www.cominf.org/ node/1166524883 37. Statement of the security service of Tskhinvali. September 5, 2019, www.facebook. com/komitetgosbezopasnosti.southossetia/photos/a.802454996593522/118102191 8736826/?type=3&theater 38. Report of the Georgian Non-Governmental Organizations on Violation of Fundamental Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law, Open Society Georgia Foundation, 2009, www.osgf.ge/files/publications/2010/Etnikuri_cmenda_Georgian_WEB_ version.pdf 39. Mountain on the Likhi range, close to the village of Perevi in the Sachkhere municipality. For the exact location, visit the following link - www.bit.ly/36omwdr. 40. Южная Осетия призвала международных наблюдателей не нарушать границу республики. Information Agency Res, September 17, 2019, www.cominf.org/ node/1166525387 41. Грузинские спецслужбы активно продолжают политику системных провокаций, - КГБ. Information Agency Res, October 24, 2019, www.cominf.org/node/1166526083 42. Глава МИД Южной Осетии назвал цель провокаций Грузии на границе. Information Agency Res, August 31, 2019, www.cominf.org/node/1166524982 43. Комментарий Департамента информации и печати МИД России о ситуации на границе Южной Осетии и Грузии. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, August 30, 2019,www.mid.ru/web/guest/kommentarii_predstavitelya/-/asset_publisher/ MCZ7HQuMdqBY/content/id/3767452

20 44. Югоосетинские пограничники осуществили рейд на бронетехнике в приграничной полосе. Information Agency Res, August 28, 2019, www.cominf.org/ node/1166524887 45. Поручение президента Комитету госбезопасности: изучить и другие возможные угрозы со стороны Грузии. Information Agency Res, September 5, 2019, www. cominf.org/node/1166525138 46. New Tskhinvali KGB Chief Appointed. Information Agency Civil Georgia, August 6, 2019, www.civil.ge/ka/archives/315963 47. Командир пограничников рассказал подробности операции на границе Южной Осетии. Information Agency Sputnik, September 5, 2019, www.youtube.com/ watch?v=gMrVGfLzZaE 48. Выставление югоосетинского поста в районе села Уиста обеспечит жителям их безопасность, - Валерий Алиханты. Information Agency Res, September 5, 2019, www.cominf.org/node/1166525118 49. Ситуация на границе Южной Осетии с Грузией - интервью начальника Погранслужбы КГБ РЮО. Information Agency Sputnik, September 5, 2019, www. youtube.com/watch?v=ROo6EvJwFZU