Climate Change Scepticism
Climate change scepticism
A study investigating the relationships between climate change scepticism, conservatism and Christianity
Aron Vermaas
SNR: 2034130 | ANR: 206848
December 11, 2020
Master Thesis Sociology
Tilburg University
Supervisor: Prof. dr. P. Achterberg
Second Reader: Femke Roosma PhD
Abstract
Because of the devastating predicted implications of climate change and the complexity of the phenomenon, it is arguably the most challenging phenomenon in the current times. While there is almost complete scientific consensus about the causes of climate, there is much less consensus in the general public. Studies explained that conservative white males tend to be the most sceptical because they have strong system justification tendencies. Other studies showed that conservatism can be a result of Christianity, whilst Christianity itself also leads to scepticism about climate change. Christians tend to have a belief in Eschatology, a desire to dominate over nature and have a reduced trust in science. These two fields of research were not linked before, hence this study linked the two fields, by investigating the relationship between scepticism, Christianity and conservatism. Also, differences between religious cultures and denominations were studied. Analysis of data from the European Social Survey
(ESS) showed that the relation between scepticism, Christianity and conservatism is less prominent as expected. Christianity in a broad European context does not lead to more scepticism and the same goes for conservatism. Although the relation between Christianity and scepticism does vary over countries. There are no significant differences between religious cultures. Potential avenues for future research and the societal relevance are discussed at the end of this Master thesis.
2 Table of contents
Chapter 1: Introduction ...... 4
Chapter 2: Theoretical framework ...... 10
2.1 The conservative white male effect ...... 10
2.2 The relationship between Christianity and climate change...... 14
2.2.1 Research throughout the years ...... 14
2.2.2 Epistemological conflict ...... 16
2.2.3 End times theology...... 18
2.2.4 Fundamentalism ...... 18
2.2.5 Counterarguments ...... 19
2.2.6 The difference between Catholicism and Protestantism ...... 20
2.3 The Christianity-environment relationship on country level ...... 22
2.3.1 Highly Christian countries ...... 23
2.3.2 Protestant culture ...... 24
2.4 Conceptual model ...... 25
Chapter 3: Methodology and operationalization ...... 26
3.1 Data ...... 26
3.1.2 Country-level information ...... 26
3.2 Measurement and operationalization ...... 28
3.2.1 Dependent variable - climate change scepticism ...... 28
3.2.2 Independent variables ...... 32
3.3 Methods for data analysis ...... 36
Chapter 4: Results ...... 37
4.1 Regression models...... 39
4.2 Multilevel analysis ...... 44
Chapter 5: Discussion and conclusion ...... 50
6. Sources ...... 57
3 Chapter 1: Introduction
Climate change refers to a range of global phenomena, like the increased worldwide temperature and related environmental problems, such as rising sea levels due to mass ice loss, a shift in flower and plant blooming and we are experiencing more extreme weather events. Climate change is mainly created by burning fossil fuels, which add heat-trapping gasses into the earth’s atmosphere. Therefore, it can be stated that climate change is caused by human activity, also called anthropogenic climate change (Reidmiller et al, 2017; Leiserowitz,
2007). Climate change threatens the earth’s capacity to sustain life and will have significant consequences for the global society (Xie et al., 2019).
Doran and Zimmerman (2008) researched whether there is a scientific consensus on climate change and on the fact that climate change is caused by human activity. They found that 97% of climatologists who are actively publishing on climate change agree that climate change is happening and that it is caused by human activity. Additionally, Oreskes (2004) reviewed 928 papers about climate change and found, that none of the papers questioned that climate change is caused by anthropogenic or human-induced factors. Therefore, the debate on the authenticity of climate change and the role played by human activity is non-existent among those who understand the nuances and scientific basis of long-term climate processes.
Despite the scientific consensus regarding climate change and its causes, there is no consensus in the general public. For example, 67% of US citizens believe that climate change is happening of which 53% believes that this is caused by human activity (Marlon et al,
2019). In Europe, people tend to believe in climate change more. On average 90% of
Europeans believe climate change is happening and that it is caused by human activity.
However, there is variation between European countries. For example, Russia (82.2%) and
4 Lithuania (88.7%) report somewhat lower beliefs compared to, for example, Spain (95.8%) and Sweden (96.8%) (Poortinga et al, 2018).
Research from McCright & Dunlap (2011) shows that conservative white males are the most sceptical about climate change and report the lowest concern. Conservative white males tend to have hierarchical and individualistic values which leads them to become more sceptical about climate change (McCright & Dunlap, 2011; Krange et al., 2019). Furthermore, it seems reasonable to assume that religion plays a significant role in forming values that create such a conservative worldview. According to several researchers (Hirsch et al., 2013; Veldman et al,
2013; Guth et al., 1995), religious individuals tend to have more conservative values. Religion tends to shape cultural and ethical values and has, therefore, the ability to construct moral codes that embrace environmental attitudes (Veldman et al., 2013). Throughout history, religions successfully established and enforced norms and behaviour, such as bans on drinking or smoking and dress codes (Stark & Iannaccone, 1997). Religions affect societies at every level, from the individual to the national level (Veldman et al., 2013; Hagevi, 2014). In line with the previous arguments, Morrisson et al., (2015) established a ‘conservative
Christianity effect’, in which the authors show that Christian conservatives are more sceptical about climate change. Therefore, there are reasons to assume that religion plays a significant role in the conservative white male effect, possibly creating a ‘Christian conservative white male effect’. This research will link two theoretical fields that have not been linked before, creating a new paradigm to look at climate scepticism.
Besides playing a role in the conservative white male effect, religion may also have a direct effect on climate scepticism (Wilkinson, 2012; Arbuckle & Koninsky, 2015). As Hulme
(2017) puts it; “There is a growing sense that religion, religious thought, institutions and
5 practices might indeed have a part to play in shaping human responses to climate change”
(Hulme, 2017 p.45). To illustrate this, journalist Bill Moyers (2006) in his PBS documentary, presents a Christian bookseller, who sold bumper stickers and t-shirts printed with “Global
Warming is Nothing Next to Eternal Burning.” A Baptist church produced this bumper sticker: “Forget ‘Save the Earth’; What About Your Soul? The Earth is Going to Burn; What
About You?” (Zaleha & Szasz, 2015 p. 25). Scherer (2004) points out that; “Christian traditionalists feel that concern for the future is irrelevant because the planet has no future”.
The famous US pastor MacArthur (2020), known for his climate change denial states that;
God intended us to use this planet, to fill this planet for the benefit of man. Never was it intended to be a permanent planet. It is a disposable planet. Christians ought to know that
(Braterman, 2020). It would be rational to assume that their attitudes towards climate change are important (Hulme, 2017), given the significant economic and political power (Veldman et al., 2012; Grim & Tucker, 2014), as well as the fact that 31.2% of the world population identifies as a Christian (Hackett & McClendon, 2017) and that Christianity still has a large influence on the world.
The role of religion in climate scepticism is arguably a somewhat understudied topic and results are inconclusive and sometimes contradicting (Arbuckle, & Konisky, 2015). The arguments why Christians tend to be more sceptical are three folded. The first argument states that religious individuals have less trust in science and have less scientific knowledge compared to non-religious individuals (McPhetres and Zuckerman, 2018). As since climate change knowledge can be seen as scientific knowledge one could assume that religious individuals have less knowledge about climate change. According to Evans and Evans (2008), science and religion are in a constant conflict over who has the power to make truth claims, which leads religious individuals to become sceptical about climate change.
6 The second arguments state that Christians have a ‘dominion over nature ethic’ meaning that there is a link between a Judeo-Christian paradigm and a desire for dominion over nature
(White, 1967). The third argument states that in some Christian denominations a belief in
‘End Times’ theology is present, meaning that some Christians believe that Jesus eventually will come to earth and that the Earth will then be destroyed. According to Pew Research centre (2009), 79% of US Christians believe in the second coming of Jesus, of which 20% believes it will happen in their lifetime (Heimlich, 2009). Believing that the world can be gone at any given moment decreases incentives to pay for long term benefits. In this view the earth will not survive no matter what, so why bother to save it (Barker & Bearce, 2013).
However, according to some researchers, the effect of religion is very small if not non- existing (Hayes and Marangudakis, 2001; Tietenberg and Tjernström, 2008; Boyd, 1999).
This line of research tested the influence of religiosity on scepticism and concluded that the effect of religion is minor. Taylor et al., (2016) even argue for a ‘greening of religion hypothesis’ in which it is stated that Christianity is becoming increasingly ‘green’ because of a stewardship ethic. As shown, research findings are mixed and the relation between
Christianity and climate scepticism remains unclear. This thesis contributes to this ongoing discussion by examining data of 23 European countries and their scepticism attitudes.
Previous research is mainly conducted in the US and not in Europe. Most of the time research is conducted in specific countries or regions and not in a broad European context (Crona et al,
2013). This thesis jumps into this gap by analysing European data to find out whether or not
Christian religious affiliation has comparable effects in Europe as it has in the US.
The current research also aims to study country differences. Explanations, why people tend to be more sceptical, may be found in individual characteristics but also in-country differences.
7 Because people are influenced by the (religious) culture they are living in. The context in which they live has an impact on their lives, beliefs and practices (Halman & Draulans, 2006).
According to Crona et al., (2013), there is too little research that studies country differences, whilst this has the potential to be important. This thesis takes the religious cultures of 23
European countries into account, to find out whether or not it matters what religious culture one lives in.
Researching climate change scepticism attitudes is important, as it can help our understanding of variations within the different climate change beliefs and policymakers can thus act accordingly. Because of the devastating predicted implications of climate change and the complexity of the phenomenon, it is arguably the most challenging phenomenon in our time and getting support for climate change mitigation policies is necessary to mitigate climate change and its consequences (Xie et al., 2019).
In sum, in this thesis, I will explore the relationship between conservatism, Christianity and climate change scepticism and I will present theoretical mechanisms on why these mechanisms might, or might not cause more sceptical attitudes towards climate change. The research question is;
RQ: What is the relationship between religion, conservatism and climate change scepticism?
To answer this research question, I formulated eight hypotheses. Five on the individual level and three on country level. Consequently, the first five hypotheses can be answered by performing linear regression analyses. For the last three hypotheses, I performed multilevel
8 analyses. SPSS 26 software is used to perform the analyses on data from the European Social
Survey (ESS), published in 2018.
The investigation will consist of several elements divided over five chapters.
Chapter 2 will entail the theoretical framework. Existing research about climate scepticism in relation to conservatism and Christianity will be discussed and mechanisms will be further explained. Based on this literature, a set of hypotheses will be formulated.
Chapter 3 discusses the methodology and operationalization. This chapter entails how different concepts are measured, how the different hypotheses are statistically tested and the analytical strategy is employed. The chapter also contains information about the ESS data that is used to test the hypotheses.
Chapter 4 will discuss the findings regarding the statistical analyses. Several regression and multilevel models will be shown and interpreted in such a way it helps the reader to understand the results.
Chapter 5 is the last chapter and consists of the conclusion and discussion of the most important results. It will conclude this Master’s Thesis through summarizing the results of the study, briefly discussing its limitations and by noting possible avenues for future research.
9 Chapter 2: Theoretical framework
2.1 The conservative white male effect
Research in risk perception points out that risks tend to be judged lower by men than by women (Stern et al., 1993). Kahan et al., (2007), as other researchers as well (Finucane et al,
2000; Flynn et al., 1994), expanded this theory by adding race into the effect, establishing a
‘white male effect’. This showed that white males consequently have lower risk perceptions on a variety of items, such as dangers regarding; nuclear waste, street drugs, pesticides in food, motor accidents and climate change (Flynn et al., 1994). Furthermore, research from
McCright & Dunlap (2011) adds conservatism into this ‘white male effect’. They show that conservative white males (CWM) are the most sceptical about climate change and report the lowest concern compared to other subgroups. CWMs are more accepting of a range of environmental and technological risks than any other adults. Therefore, my first hypothesis is that conservatives, whites and males all have a positive effect on scepticism about climate change (Hypothesis 1). Several theories explain why such an effect exists. In the next section,
I will present the theories about the CWM effect. Although, admittedly, we cannot test all of these theoretical mechanisms empirically, because the data used does not have all the necessary variables. However, the theories all point into the same direction and have one thing in common, conservatives, whites and males are more sceptical about climate change than their counterparts.
Research from Jost et al., (2003), shows that conservatives have much stronger system justification tendencies; the tendency to support the current status quo and resist attempts to change it. CWMs are the ones who are profiting most from the current economic and political systems. They disproportionately occupy positions of power within the economic system, benefiting from considerable amounts of status and esteem (Massey, 2007). Thus, it seems
10 that CWMs show resistance to new information about climate change, which serves as protection to their status and self-esteem (Kahan, 2008). Because of the challenges climate change has for the capitalist system, it would make sense that CWMs have strong system justification tendencies to keep the capitalistic system in order (McCright & Dunlap, 2013).
The conservative white male effect is a well-established research finding, which has been found in multiple countries such as the US, Sweden, Brazil and Norway (Krange et al., 2019;
Jylhä et al., 2019; McCright & Dunlap, 2011). Such an effect likely exists in other countries as well, even though this has not been researched before. Therefore, this thesis will address this gap and research if the CWM effect exists in a broad European context.
Another explanation, which most of the studies regarding the conservative white male effect use, is the cultural theory of Douglas and Wildavsky (1983) (see; Kahan, 2008; McCright &
Dunlap 2011; McCright et al., 2016). According to the theory, individuals selectively dismiss or support claims of societal danger based on whether or not it supports their cultural norms.
Debates that on the surface feature highly technical and instrumental claims of risk, are in essence a product of an ongoing debate about the ‘ideal’ society. The competing groups/ worldviews at stake in this theory are; individualists, egalitarian, communitarian and hierarchist. Within this typology, there is a group dimension and an individual dimension.
The group dimension represents the degree to which the individual is absorbed by group membership. Those with low group orientation and high individual orientation are more likely to “fend for themselves and therefore be competitive”. Those with a high group orientation tend to believe that individuals are dependent on each other and interact frequently in a wide range of activities, which promotes values of solidarity. The general conclusion in research is that hierarchical individualists are the most sceptical about climate change and see climate change as a low risk in their lives (Kahan et al., 2012). In an American context, this is mostly
11 linked to conservative and liberal views, in which conservative views tend to be more individual hierarchist and liberal views tend to be more egalitarian and communitarian. In the
European context, this is mostly linked to the left-right divide in politics, of which the left is less sceptical about climate change compared to the right of the political spectrum (McCright et al., 2016).
The mechanism in cultural theory is that group membership can affect how group members perceive information. Individuals tend to embrace the beliefs of salient in-groups and resist contradicting information that originates from the out-group, who are perceived as less knowledgeable or less trustworthy than in-group members. This process of following certain beliefs because of group membership is called identity protective cognition (Douglas &
Wildavsky, 1983). What the theory for the conservative white male effect is lacking, is that the theory mainly focuses on one’s risk perception whilst climate scepticism possibly contains more dimensions than just risk perception (Shao, 2017). Also, the theory does not explain why certain people become conservative. Religion likely plays a significant role in forming values which create such a conservative worldview. According to Hirsch et al., (2013), those who are religious tend to have more conservative values. Religion tends to shape cultural and ethical values and can construct moral codes that embrace environmental attitudes (Veldman et al., 2014). Throughout history, religions already successfully established and enforced norms and behaviour. Research already found that religion influences all sorts of behaviours, such as deviant behaviour (Welch et al., 2006), the acceptability of white-collar crimes
(Corcoran et al., 2012) and moral decision making (Welch et al., 2006). Extensive sociological research has already revealed that in the course of history, religions have significantly impacted on cultures (Jochemsen 2018). Religion establishes social norms,
12 guides individual behaviour, and serves as a basis for societal structures, morals, and laws
(Cohen, 2009).
Additionally, Roser-Renouf et al., (2016) found that Americans who perceive climate change as false are significantly more religious and tend to have more egoistic and individualistic values. This indicates that within the group of climate sceptics there are many religious and individualistic persons. Furthermore, Guth et al., (1995) pointed out that religiosity has a strong positive influence on conservatism (see also: Veldman et al, 2014; Hirsch et al., 2013), which in turn influences environmental attitudes. This is especially true for Protestants because their specific belief creates an individualistic and rational view of humankind
(Cantoni, 2015). Therefore, religious factors influence environmental attitudes directly and indirectly. Moreover, Arbuckle (2017) showed that there is an interaction effect on religion and political ideology. He shows that the effect of political ideology on environmental concern partly depends on the type of religion one identifies with. To illustrate this, Protestant liberals are 11% less likely to see climate change as an urgent problem compared to unaffiliated liberals (Arbuckle, 2017). Furthermore, Morrisson et al., (2015) already established a ‘conservative Christianity effect’, in which it is shown that Christian conservatives are being more sceptical about climate change compared to their non-religious counterparts. So, it seems that the effect of conservatism is different for Christians than for non-religious individuals and that there are reasons to assume that religion plays a significant role in the conservative white male effect, possibly creating a ‘Christian conservative white male effect’. Therefore, I expect that conservatism strengthen the effect for Christianity
(Hypothesis 2).
13 2.2 The relationship between Christianity and climate change
Next to strengthening the effect of conservatism, there are reasons to expect that religion has a direct effect on scepticism. There are several arguments about why Christians care less about the environment. This field of research – regarding the relationship between Christianity and the environment – started back in 1967. In that year historian, Lynn White published his highly influential work; the historical roots of our ecological crisis (over 7000 citations at
Google scholar). The main argument in White’s work was that there is a link between a
Judeo-Christian paradigm and a desire for dominion over nature and that this dominion attitude caused the destruction of the environment in the modern world (White, 1967). The roots of this dominion paradigm can be found in several quotes from the Bible, for example in
Genesis 1:26; “Let us make mankind in our image, in our likeness, so that they may rule over the fish in the sea and the birds in the sky, over the livestock and all the wild animals, and over all the creatures that move along the ground” (New American Standard Bible, NASB).
This view places humankind at the centre of the world and nature as a resource for humans to exploit. Humans are seen as distinct from and superior to all other creatures (Village, 2015).
Since White’s thesis in 1967, there has been discussion about whether or not his thesis was right and research has found no consensus on the topic yet (Arbuckle & Konisky, 2015).
2.2.1 Research throughout the years
Some of the first researchers who tried to empirically test White’s thesis are Hand and van
Liere (1984). They confirmed White’s thesis and complicated it further. The researchers included eight different Christian denominations and found that there were significant differences between the denominations, whereas some express and promote a dominion over nature orientation and some do not. Nevertheless, they conclude that in general, the Christian paradigm does have a negative relationship with attitudes towards the environment.
14 According to their regression models, this effect is the strongest for Protestants, Catholics,
Mormons and Lutherans (Hand & van Liere, 1984).
In line with the results of Hand and van Liere (1984), Eckberg & Blocker (1989) found that members of Christian denominations, in general, were less in favour of policies supporting environmental protection. Items such as; “we should maintain our efforts to control pollution, even if this slows down the economy”, contributed to significant, negative effects for religiosity. The Judeo-Christian paradigm consequently shows negative relations with all items regarding attitudes towards the environment (Eckberg & Blocker, 1989).
A few years later, Guth et al., (1995) showed that religious tradition and religious commitment both have a negative and significant influence on the way one views the environment. There are significant differences between denominations, with Catholics holding more pro-environment attitudes compared to Protestants. Several research findings show that Protestants seem the least environment friendly compared to other denominations, a research finding that has been found by others as well (see: Evans & Feng, 2013; Arbuckle &
Konisky, 2015; Hagevi, 2014; Jochemsen, 2018). Why this is the case will be discussed further in chapter 2.2.6.
More recent research from Arbuckle and Konisky (2015) shows similar results about the relation between Christianity and the environment. The authors tested several religions on whether they showed more or less concern about climate change. Their research points out that members of Judeo-Christian traditions are less concerned about environmental protection compared to non-religious individuals. Again, with Protestants as the most sceptical group.
Smith et al., (2017) found similar results; Christians, in general, are less in favour of a number
15 of pro-environmental actions compared to their non-religious counterparts (Smith et al.,
2017).
Lastly, a study from Roser-Renouf et al., (2016) categorized six different types of attitudes regarding climate change in the US; the alarmed (12%), the concerned (29%), the cautious
(26%), the disengaged (7%), the doubtful (15%) and the dismissive (11%). The alarmed represent the individuals that are very certain climate change is happening. The opposite group being the ‘dismissive’, represent those who are certain climate change is not happening.
The authors point out that 68% of the dismissive is highly religious versus 36% of the alarmed. Indicating that the dismissive group has almost twice the amount of highly religious individuals in their group, it would support the assumption that religiosity has a negative effect on environmental attitudes. Yet, arguably their most important research finding is that the more one is turning to dismissiveness, the more one believes that it is humankind’s right to use the Earth and its resources for our own benefit. In other words, the alarmed almost completely agree that it is humankind’s responsibility to take care of the earth, where the dismissive feel much less responsibility (Roser-Renouf et al., 2016). These findings support the assumption that religious individuals feel less responsibility towards the Earth and adhere to a dominion attitude.
2.2.2 Epistemological conflict
The second argument why religious individuals tend to be more sceptical is that the most accepted view on the relationship between religion and science is the ‘epistemological conflict’ or ‘warfare narrative’ view. The ‘warfare’ or ‘epistemological conflict’ concerns the authority to establish truth claims about the world. For example, a conflict about claims where humans come from, how planets move or, more recent conflicts about, reproductive cloning
16 and stem cell research (Evans & Evans, 2008; Evans, 2010). Today, there is also a conflict between scientists and religious individuals about whether the climate is changing and if this is caused by human activity (Morrisson et al., 2015). This sense of being moral competitors with science over these issues may also affect the willingness to let scientists influence any public policy (Evans & Feng, 2014). Doubting climate change may then have emerged from an identity-defining belief in which climate change is linked to evolution and other scientific theories which can be seen as a threatening and competing theory of the origins of life
(Killburn, 2014). Ecklund et al., (2017) also showed that religious conservatives who are sceptical about evolution theory, also have a higher possibility of being sceptical about climate change. Douglas (2018) says the following: “Theologically fundamentalist Christians have for years explained to themselves that what seem to be secular, mainstream wisdom and conclusions are really the results of conspiracies, biases, and misplaced human pride in academic, scientific, and journalist communities. This cognitive training to reject expert knowledge and to seek alternative, more amenable explanations, has helped disarm the capacity for critical thinking and analysis” (Douglas, 2018 p.8).
Concerning this, McPhetres and Zuckerman (2018) pointed out that religious individuals have less trust in science and have less scientific knowledge compared to non-religious persons.
Because climate change knowledge can be seen as scientific knowledge it can be assumed that religious persons are more sceptical about climate change. A related view is that because
God created and controls nature, it is arrogant to believe that human beings can significantly damage it (Taylor et al., 2016).
Related to the previous arguments, Douglas (2018) has shown that a relationship exists between believing in fake news and religion. The two are connected in three ways. (1)
17 Religion is repeatedly the subject of fake news. (2) Religious believers are repeatedly the targeted public for fake news; and (3) religion - especially, Protestant fundamentalism - is an important historical origin of fake news due to the rejection of expert elites (Douglas, 2018).
2.2.3 End times theology
The third argument is that a belief in ‘End Times’ theology is present in some Christian denominations (Haluza-DeLay, 2014). Such theology includes the belief in the second coming of Jesus and the end times in which the earth gets destroyed and all ‘true Christians’ would soon be raptured from earth (Webster, 2013). Consequently, there is a decrease in environmental concern (Guth et al., 2015) and a lower willingness to take action for the environment (Barker & Bearce, 2013). Believing that the world can be gone at any given moment decreases incentives to pay for long term benefits. Because according to this view the earth will not survive no matter what, there is no incentive to save it. Not surprisingly, is that
Barker and Bearce (2013) point out that those who believe in the second coming of Jesus are less willing to pay for policies to mitigate climate change.
2.2.4 Fundamentalism
Several authors point out that the extent of one’s religious beliefs influences the way one views the environment. Highly religious individuals, who have a literal interpretation of the
Bible and attend churches more often seem to be more sceptical (Douglas, 2018; Eckberg &
Blocker, 1989;). This seems to be a logical follow-up considering the previous arguments
(Dominion over nature, End-Times thinking, epistemological conflict). Those who are more often exposed to religion and are more extreme in their religious behaviour and related thinking can be expected to have more sceptical attitudes. Therefore, I expect that fundamentalism strengthens the relation between religious affiliation and scepticism
(Hypothesis 3).
18 2.2.5 Counterarguments
Although there seems to be quite some evidence that suggests that a relationship between religion and one’s attitude towards the environment exists, there is also a significant number of researchers who believe that the relationship is minor to non-existing; “As a group,
Christians and non‐Christians do not significantly differ in terms of their concern for the environment” (Hayes and Marangudakis, 2001 p. 170). Kanagy & Willits (1993); Boyd,
(1999) and Wolkomir et al., (1997) came to a similar conclusion. Their argumentation mostly points to the religious doctrines that emphasize respect for nature out of a stewardship ethic; that humans are the stewards of God’s creation. Taylor et al., (2016) wrote an extended review about this ‘stewardship ethic’ also called the ‘greening of religion hypothesis’, and found that the stewardship ethic is less widespread than the dominion ethic, even though there is a growing number of people adheres to this stewardship ethic. According to Arbuckle
(2017), there is very little evidence that stewardship beliefs hold prominence. Moreover, even for those who have such a stewardship ethic, for most environmental concern remains a low priority (Taylor et al., 2016). Additionally, most of the researchers who believed that the relation was non-existing did not include denominational differences whilst it is assumed that there are significant differences (Eckberg & Blocker, 1989).
In the aggregate, there are three main arguments why Christians tend to be more sceptical; A dominion attitude, the ‘epistemological conflict’ or ‘conflict narrative’ and a belief in End-
Times theology. These theoretical mechanisms all have one thing in common; Christians are more sceptical about climate change compared to non-believers (Hypothesis 4).
The field of research regarding the relation environment-Christianity is for the most part
American. Christianity in America is more prominent than in most European countries, with
19 some exceptions, like Poland or Portugal. Still, large parts of Western Europe are far more secularized compared to the US. European research is scarce and although some authors such as Hagevi (2014), Chuvieco et al., (2016) and Schultz et al., (2000) already showed that a similar, negative relation between Christianity and the environment is also present in Europe, there is no consensus yet (Arbuckle & Konisky, 2015). This research further explores the relationships in Europe and provides a new paradigm. Namely, Christianity as a part of the conservative white male effect and as a direct effect.
2.2.6 The difference between Catholicism and Protestantism
Several authors (Arbuckle, 2017; Hagevi, 2014; Village, 2015; Guth et al., 1995; Sherkat &
Ellison, 2007; Jochemsen, 2018) point out that between the several Christian denominations,
Protestantism is the most sceptical about climate change. Smith & Hempel (2018) and Smith et al., (2018) explain why Protestantism is the most sceptical of all denominations.
Their explanation is that a belief in, ‘End Times Theology’ or ‘Eschatology’ is highly concentrated among Protestants. Smith et al., (2018) write the following: “Eschatology is a branch of theology concerned with ‘ultimate things’ such as death, judgment, and the final events in the history of the world or of humankind. These beliefs concern future outcomes and are thought to shape interpretations of contemporary events by influencing the courses of action – social, political, and/or moral – individuals believe they should undertake. In many
Christian traditions, eschatology includes the belief that Jesus Christ will return to earth and reign over a new kingdom – a view held prominently among evangelical Protestant” (Smith et al., 2018 p. 298). Worldly events such as natural disasters, wars and other causes of crisis are viewed as precursors of the return of Jesus Christ and as God’s plan. This paradigm can create passivity to care about the future of the Earth (Curry, 2008).
20 Additionally, according to Vogel (2001), Protestantism is a morally rigorous religion, that places a high value on consistency. Therefore, Protestant behaviour is in line with their beliefs. Protestantism lays an emphasis on the believers’ direct relationship and responsibility toward God, which creates an individualistic and rational view of humankind (Cantoni, 2015).
In this relation, McCright and Dunlap (2011) and Roser-Renouf et al., (2016) already showed that more individualistic individuals are more sceptical towards climate change. Thus, it seems likely that Protestants have more individualistic values which leads them to be more sceptical. Moreover, Protestants have a strong preference for economic growth. Their view is that work and money-making is a vocation, an end in itself. Max Weber (2002) argued that it was this attitude that initiated the development of modern capitalism and that Protestants thus have a strong preference for economic growth, even when this means the Earth gets exploited.
This attitude of having a strong preference for economic growth is still present in the
Protestant view today (Arbuckle, 2017). Humanity moved from a friendly relationship with nature to human physical comfort, exploiting nature for its own benefit. There is wide agreement that this Protestant view brought a succession of environmental damages
(Northcott, 1999). It seems that Protestantism has indirectly contributed to environmental degradation (Jochemsen, 2018).
All of these theoretical assumptions have one thing in common; the Protestant tradition is the most sceptical about climate change compared to all other denominations and non-believers
(Hypothesis 5). A combination of a belief in eschatology, a preference for economic growth, high levels of individualistic, conservative values and a high-value consistency make
Protestants the most sceptical in their attitude towards climate change.
21 2.3 The Christianity-environment relationship on country level
So far, I did not make a distinction between different countries. I treated the Christian denominations as the overarching group and made the assumption that because they have the same belief, they hold similar scepticism attitudes. In this chapter, I will take into account that individuals are living in countries, in unique circumstances which have an effect on the individual. Since we are a product of our setting and the particular values we are exposed to, it is within this experience that we must understand religious belief. This is also the case for the Christianity scepticism relation, which is diverse and varies over countries (Hope & Jones,
2014; Crona et al, 2013; Hagevi, 2014). Crona et al., (2013) emphasised the importance of cross-national studies. The authors argue that most studies of climate change attitudes are
‘place-based’ and, therefore, situated in particular and unique situations. Because of this, results are hard to generalize over a larger population. While acknowledging the importance of individual country studies, the authors argue for more comparative cross-national studies.
Several authors (Poortinga et al., 2019; Franzen & Vogl, 2013; Van der Linden, 2015;
Capstick et al., 2015) answered this claim and researched climate change attitudes on country level. Although they did not include religion in their analyses. Despite this shortcoming, it is still relevant to take this type of research into account as it shows that commonly used variables are not predicting the same amount of variance in different countries. For example, political orientations were shown significantly in a majority of the countries, yet not in all of them (Capstick et al., 2015), whilst political orientation is seen as one of the most important predictors of scepticism (van der Linden, 2015; McCright & Dunlap, 2013). The same goes for other variables as well. According to Shi et al. (2016) widely used variables, such as gender, age and education are not predicting the same amount of scepticism in different countries. In other words, the effects of age, education and gender are different in different
22 countries. This leads us to the question such variation exists between countries. A part of the explanation could lay in a country’s religious culture (Hagevi, 2014). Religious culture already showed to be of influence on all sorts of individual attitudes and behaviours (see for example: Stark & Iannaccone, 1997; Muhar & Böck, 2018). Because, People do not live in isolation, but are surrounded by a context that has an impact on their lives, and also on their religious beliefs and practices (Halman & Draulans, 2006, p. 264). In other words, country- level characteristics have an influence on the individual. Therefore, I expect that the relationship between Christianity and scepticism varies over countries (Hypothesis 6).
2.3.1 Highly Christian countries
Societies with a highly religious Christian population are likely to be more exposed and thus more influenced by the aspects why Christians tend to be more sceptical (dominion over nature attitude, epistemological conflict and End-Times Thinking), than societies with a highly secular population. Secularization refers to a broader process of modernization embracing several dynamics such as the rise of modernity, the growth of capitalism, and the expansion of the sciences (Halman & Draulans, 2006). These processes caused religion to lose its former dominant and coordinating influence. Religion steadily lost the encompassing and essential function it once had in traditional society. Therefore, I expect there is more scepticism in highly Christian countries compared to more secularized countries (Hypothesis
7a). Following this train of thought, it would be rational to believe that the relationship between Christianity and scepticism is stronger in Christian countries (Hypothesis 7b).
Because whenever a Christian individual lives in a highly religious culture, this particular
Christian is more often exposed to certain beliefs and practices that potentially lead to scepticism, compared to Christians who live in more secularized cultures.
23 2.3.2 Protestant culture
Today’s global industrialization started its development in Europe, in the second half of the eighteenth century. It has regularly been argued that the Judeo-Christian understanding of the human-nature relationship was a significant foundation for industrialization (Muhar & Böck,
2018). Especially the Protestant interpretation provided a fertile ground for industrialization to grow. The German Sociologist Max Weber (1905) wrote about this in his highly influential work; ‘The protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism”. Weber argued that Protestant culture has a combination of rational character and a strong focus on the virtues of work, which led to the justification of industrialization and the exploitation of natural resources
(Weber, 2002). According to Petrescu-Mag et al., (2020), the religious heritage or culture of a country has, even when largely secularized, a remaining and continuing impact on our culture.
Hagevi (2014) researched 22 European countries to investigate if the religious culture made a difference in a country’s environmental concern. The author points out that it does; especially that countries with a predominantly Protestant culture show significantly less environmental concern compared to other Christian denominations, which is in line with research on the individual level. However, it seems that Hagevi’s measurement for environmental concern is questionable. His measurement was assessed by what respondents believe is more important, being the economy versus the environment. This is not necessarily expressing the level of environmental concern as it could be that one favours the economy for the environment but is also concerned about the environment. The one does not necessarily rule out the other.
Furthermore, since we know that capitalism and industrialization was a result of a Protestant work ethic; a rational and individualistic view of humankind (Cantoni, 2015), it seems sensible to believe that a Protestant culture could lead to higher levels of scepticism.
Therefore, I expect that countries with a Protestant culture are more sceptical about climate
24 change compared to other religious cultures (Hypothesis 8a). Following this train of thought, I expect that Protestants in Protestant cultures are more sceptical (Hypothesis 8b). Because these particular Protestants are more exposed to and influenced by the dominant Protestant culture than individuals in other cultures.
2.4 Conceptual model
In order to visualise all eight hypotheses, a conceptual model was created in the figure below
(Figure 1).
Figure 1 Conceptual model
25 Chapter 3: Methodology and operationalization
3.1 Data
To test the hypotheses listed in the previous chapter, I will use the European Social Survey
(ESS) round 8, which is conducted in twenty-three different European countries. The data is assembled in 2016 - 2017 and is published in 2018. Individuals between the ages of 15 and
100 are in the sample, with an average age of 49. The total number of respondents is N =
44.387. None of the variables had issues with a high number of missing values. I performed several correlations between key items to see whether or not there were any significant changes in the outcomes due to missing values, this was not the case. Therefore, I see no need to compensate in some sort of way for these missing values. Because of this, I performed a listwise deletion before analysis. After this listwise deletion N = 39,125 respondents were left.
Data from all 23 European countries were used to investigate the hypotheses. The ESS makes use of strict random probability methods, which is necessary to make inferences from the samples regarding the target population. The survey is designed as a cross-sectional survey to gather data on attitudes, beliefs, and behaviour in European populations. The ESS is gathered by face-to-face interviews of samples (random probability sampling). SPSS 26 software is used to perform statistical analyses.
3.1.2 Country-level information
Table 1 shows which countries are included, how many respondents there are per country and what their religious culture is. A country’s religious culture will be based on the model from
Hagevi (2014). He made a distinction between Catholic, Protestant, mixed-, Orthodox, and
Jewish cultures. The only country with an Orthodox culture is Russia and the only country with Jewish culture is Israel. Figure 1 shows the percentage of Christians per country.
26 Table 1 Religious culture per country and number of respondents per country
Catholic Protestant Mixed Jewish Orthodox
Ireland (2489) Norway (1487) Germany (2644) Israel (1956) Russia (1728) Czech Republic (2074) Netherlands (1564) Switzerland (1405) Hungary (1316) Sweden (1422) Austria (1848) Finland (1773) Belgium (1677) UK (1757) Slovenia (1248) Estonia (1862) France (1796) Iceland (783) Spain (1661) Poland (1505) Lithuania (1731) Italy (2289) Portugal (1146) Based on the model of Hagevi (2014) *The number between parentheses refers to the total number of respondents in this particular country
Figure 2 Percentage Christians per country
Percentage Christians for 23 European countries | N = 39,215
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Source: European Social Survey round 8 (2016)
27 3.2 Measurement and operationalization
3.2.1 Dependent variable - climate change scepticism
The task of operationalizing climate change scepticism is a complex one since analysts agree that the field of climate change behaviour research has been noncumulative and non- theoretical in nature (Milfont & Duckitt, 2004). Dunlap & Jones (2002) tried to make sense out of all the measures researchers have taken and found at least 700 different measures for climate change attitudes. Some scholars researched belief systems (see for example, Weber,
2010; Leiserowitz, 2007; McCright & Dunlap, 2011), others researched pro-environmental behaviour (Barr, 2007; Mayer & Smith, 2019; Xie et al., 2019) and some researchers focussed on ‘climate change concern’ (Lo & Chow, 2015; Kvaløy et al., 2012), ‘worry’ (Leiserowitz,
2005) or ‘risk perception’ (Stern & Dietz, 1994; Lujala et al., 2015; Kahan, 2008). Or make use of multiple dependent variables (Shao, 2017). Also, term use seems to be confusing, for example, some scholars used ‘global warming’ or ‘climate change’, while others take measures for environmentalism. This lack of consistency in the literature could explain some of the variation in the results in itself (Schuldt, Konrath & Schwarz, 2011; Whitmarsh, 2009).
In short, previous research shows that climate change scepticism can refer to multiple things and, thus, can be measured in multiple ways.
Because of this, there is no one particular way to measure climate scepticism. Therefore, I performed an unrotated exploratory factor analysis (FA), to find out which dimensions are reflected in the data (Table 1). I included eight items which are all questions that research whether one is sceptical or not. The items are all coded in such a way that a higher score means that one is more sceptical. The items are:
- You may have heard the idea that the world's climate is changing due to increases in
temperature over the past 100 years. What is your personal opinion on this? Do you
28 think the world's climate is changing? Respondents could choose from four possible
answers: definitely changing (1), probably changing (2), probably not changing (3),
definitely not changing (4).
- Do you think that climate change is caused by natural processes, human activity or
both? Answer possibilities are: entirely by human activity (1), mainly by human
activity (2), About equally by natural processes and human activity (3), mainly by
natural processes, (4) entirely by natural processes (5).
- How worried are you about climate change? Five possible answers with the response
options from extremely worried (1), very worried (2), somewhat worried (3), not very
worried (4), and not at all worried (5).
- How much have you thought about climate change before today? Five possible
answers ranging from a great deal (1), a lot (2), some (3), very little (4) and not at all
(5).
- To what extent are you in favour or against the following policies in [country] to
reduce climate change? Increasing taxes on fossil fuels, such as oil, gas and coal. Item
options are, strongly in favour (1), somewhat in favour (2), neither in favour nor
against (3), somewhat against (4) and strongly against (5).
- To what extent are you in favour or against the following policies in [country] to
reduce climate change? Using public money to subsidise renewable energy such as
wind and solar power. Item options are strongly in favour (1), somewhat in favour (2),
neither in favour nor against (3), somewhat against (4) and strongly against (5).
- To what extent are you in favour or against the following policies in [country] to
reduce climate change? A law banning the sale of the least energy-efficient household
appliances. Item options are strongly in favour (1), somewhat in favour (2), neither in
favour nor against (3), somewhat against (4) and strongly against (5).
29
Because the range of the variables is different (1 through 4, 1 through 5 and 1 through 10), it is not possible to recode them without losing valuable information. Therefore, I decided to calculate the standardized scores, or Z scores, for all eight variables. I used these standardized scores for my FA and reliability analysis. This way there will be no errors due to differences in range.
I expected that FA would find multiple dimensions for scepticism in the data, given that previous research almost always separated different dimensions. However, surprisingly, FA and the scree plot criteria shows there is just one component (Table 2). Thus, I decided to create one scale that includes all 8 items. This decision had as a consequence that it would simplify my results, which is preferable. Results should be given in the simplest possible way.
More importantly, treating scepticism as one variable is a different approach compared to previous research, which always used more variables for scepticism or separated them.
Because factor analysis shows one factor, I chose to create one ‘super’ variable containing eight items. This made this research distinct from previous research, creating a new paradigm towards scepticism.
Reliability analysis shows a Cronbach's alpha of .68. This is somewhat too low since the rule of thumb is that Cronbach’s alpha should be higher than .7. Nevertheless, Perry et al., (2004) argued that a Cronbach’s alpha with less than 10 items and a Cronbach’s alpha between .5 and .7 is acceptable, as a scale with less than 10 items tends to underestimate the true reliability (Perry et al., 2004; Sijtsma, 2009). I tried two strategies to maximize Cronbach's alpha. First, I checked if reliability would increase in the case, I deleted the item with the lowest factor loading; are you in favour of an increase in taxes on fossil fuels to reduce
30 climate change? This resulted in the same Cronbach’s Alpha, so I decided to keep the variable in. Secondly, I checked if Cronbach’s alpha would increase in the case in which I separated the scale into two factors, namely the first four items and the last three items. For the first four items Cronbach’s alpha would be .67 and for the last three items .49. Therefore,
I decided to keep the scale as presented in Table 2, since it seemed to be the best possible way to measure scepticism.
Table 2 unrotated factor analysis for climate change scepticism Items factor 1 How worried are you about climate change? (1-5) .73 How much thought about climate change before today? (1-5) .67 Climate change caused by natural processes, human activity, or both (1-5) .55
Do you think the world’s climate is changing? (1-4) .60 Do you think climate change will have a good or bad impact across the world? (1- 10) .54 Are you in favour of an increase in taxes on fossil fuels to reduce climate change? (1-5) .39 Are you in favour of subsidies for renewable energy to reduce climate change? (1- 5) .46 Are you in favour for banning the sale of least energy efficient household appliances to reduce climate change? (1-5) .47 Eigenvalue 2.51 Cronbach’s alpha .68 N 39,215 Source: European Social Survey round 8 (2016) *Note: The number of factors is based on the Scree plot criteria *Note: Making two scales would lower the reliability of the scale significantly
Lastly, I computed the sum scores of the variables and extracted the mean by dividing the sum scores by the total number of items (8). Respondents who answered a minimum of six
31 questions were included in the scale. This way I allowed respondents who missed two questions to be included in the analysis and thus there would be a higher rate of total respondents in the analysis. All of this together resulted in the variable scepticism.
3.2.2 Independent variables
My independent variables are Christianity, Racial minority status, conservatism and religious fundamentalism. Religion is assessed in a two-question process. First the question: “Do you consider yourself as belonging to any particular religion or denomination?” is asked. This question makes a distinction between religious and non-religious individuals. Those who answered yes are seen as religious and those who answered no are considered non-religious.
The second question asked is: Do you consider yourself as belonging to any particular religion or denomination? If yes, which one? Respondents get 8 possible answers. The first four are; Roman Catholic (1), Protestant (2), Eastern Orthodox (3), and other Christian denominations (4), which are all considered Christian denominations. The other options are
Judaism (5), Islam (6), Eastern religions (7) and other non-Christian religions (8). There is one category which is called ‘not applicable’ (66) which represents the non-religious individuals. For my analysis, I put eastern orthodox and other Christian denominations into one category, since they represent a very small amount of the sample. This category will be called ‘other Christians’. The last four options (Islam, Judaism, Eastern religions and other non-Christian religions) are also put into one category, called ‘other religions’. Each of these categories represents a fairly small number of respondents, and because of this, they were put together into one category. Non-believers were also included in the analysis because this way
I was able to compare Christians with other religions and non-believers. Handling the variables this way means that the largest part of the data will be included in the analysis.
32 Religious fundamentalism was assessed by three items.
- Regardless of whether you belong to a particular religion, how religious would you
say you are? Answer possibilities are on a 10-point scale, in which 1 means not at all
religious through 10 which means very religious.
- Apart from special occasions such as weddings and funerals, about how often do you
attend religious services nowadays? Answer possibilities are never (1), less often (2),
only on special holy days (3), at least once a month (4), once a week (5), more than
once a week (6) and every day (7).
- Apart from when you are at religious services, how often, if at all, do you pray?
Answers possibilities are never (1), less often (2), only on special holy days (3), at
least once a month (4), once a week (5), more than once a week (6) and every day (7).
The items were all coded in such a way that a higher score means that one is more fundamentally religious. The items were standardized because they have a different range and by recoding them valuable information would be lost. Next, I performed an unrotated FA
(Table 2), since the expectation is there is only one factor. FA analysis fulfilled this expectation by pointing out that all items loaded on one factor. Reliability analysis showed a
Cronbach’s alpha of .85 which is considered good (Table 3) (Perry et al., 2004). Lastly, the sum scores were computed by adding up the three items and divided this score by three. This resulted in the fundamentalism scale.
33 Table 3 unrotated factor analysis for religious fundamentalism
Items factor 1 How religious are you? (1-10) .89 How often do you attend religious services? (1-7) .88 How often, if at all, do you pray (1-7) .86
Eigenvalue 2.30 Cronbach’s alpha .85
N 39,215 Source: European Social Survey round 8 (2016) Source: European Social Survey round 8 (2016) Measuring conservatism is a complex task since the term can be measured and interpreted in multiple ways. McCright and Dunlap (2011) and Krange et al., (2019) measured conservatism by asking their respondents how conservative they are. It can be argued that this measurement leaves room for error since the term is complex and refers to a multitude of values
(O’Sullivan, 2013). According to O’Sullivan (2013), conservatism consists of; being against radical change and high-value placement upon stability, combined with an unwillingness to break from societal order. To measure conservatism, a selection of the 21-item Portrait values questionnaire (included in the ESS), was used (Schwartz, 2003). The items consisted of short sentences and a respondent has to answer whether it is like him or not, on a 6-point scale.
Based on the definition by O’Sullivan (2013), I considered what items had to do with conservatism and put them into a factor analysis and performed a reliability analysis (Table
4). Six items have been found to measure the same construct; these are visualised in Table 4.
The items were all coded in such a way that a higher score means that one is more conservative. The items were all considered to be related to conservatism because they question whether one is in favour of change versus stability and how one should behave in a proper way versus breaking from societal order (O’Sullivan, 2013). Doing a reliability
34 analysis resulted in a Cronbach’s alpha of .73, which is considered acceptable (Perry et al.,
2004; Sijtsma 2009). Lastly, by computing the sum scores and dividing this score by the number of items (6), the conservatism scale was created. Respondents who have answered 5 out of 6 questions were also included in the analysis. Those with more than one missing value were deleted from the analysis and all this together resulted in the variable conservatism.
Table 4: Unrotated factor analysis conservatism
Items factor 1
Important to behave properly (1-6) .71 Important to live in secure and safe surroundings (1-6) .69 Important to get respect from others (1-6) .68 Important to do what is told and follow rules (1-6) .63 Important that the government is strong and ensures safety (1-6) .62 Important to follow traditions and customs (1-6) .60 Eigenvalue 2.56
Cronbach’s alpha .73 N 39,215
Source: European social survey round 8 (2016) | Based on O’Sullivan (2013)
Gender is operationalized by male and female, of which females are the reference category.
Racial minority status is assessed by the question: Do you belong to a minority ethnic group in country? Possible answers are yes and no. When one considers itself as an ethnic minority, this respondent will be considered as non-white. The rest of the respondents are considered white. I recoded the items in such a way that racial minorities are the reference group.
Education is operationalized by the EISCED scale ranging from 1 to 7, in which 1 is considered the lowest education and 7 the highest possible education. Lastly, age is
35 operationalized by the year of birth. The ESS already had a calculated age of the respondents in the dataset. Table 5 presents the descriptive statistics of all included variables.
Table 5 descriptive statistics of all included variables
Variable Min Max Mean SD N
Scepticism -1.53 2.08 .0 .55 39,215
Protestant 0 1 .12 .34 39,215
Catholic 0 1 .35 .48 39,215
Other Christian den* 0 1 .05 .21 39,215
Other religions 0 1 .07 .25 39,215
Non believer 0 1 .41 .49 39,215
Fundamentalism -1.44 2.29 .0 .23 39,215
Conservatism 1 6 4.32 .78 39,215
Male 0 1 .48 .50 39,215
Racial minority 0 1 .94 .24 39,215
Education 1 7 4.04 1.83 39,215
Age 15 99 49 18.27 39,215
* Den is short for denomination | Source: European Social Survey round 8 (2016)
3.3 Methods for data analysis
To test the hypotheses, both multiple linear regression models and multilevel analyses will be performed. The first five hypotheses are on the individual level, for which linear regression is used. The last three hypotheses are on country level and will thus be tested by multilevel modelling. In these models, individuals (level 1) are nested in countries (level 2). For
Multilevel models, in which countries are level 2 it is advised to use a minimum of 50 countries (Meuleman & Billiets, 2009). The current study only contains information for 23 countries, which can be considered as a shortcoming. However, it does not mean Multilevel is
36 not possible at all. According to Hox et al., (2012) it is possible to perform Multilevel analysis, but only very large country differences can be discovered. This limitation will be taken into account and will be addressed as a limitation in the discussion. Statistics that will help to create a clearer image between the different variables such as correlations and mean values are also used. The specifics about the models are introduced in the result section.
Chapter 4: Results
Before starting the analyses, it might be interesting to explore the key variables by correlating them. It also might be interesting to explore country differences. Table 6 shows a correlation matrix for my key variables, being scepticism, fundamentalism and conservatism.
Table 6 Correlation matrix with key variables; scepticism, conservatism and fundamentalism
scepticism conservatism fundamentalism scepticism 1 .025*** .028*** conservatism x 1 .245*** fundamentalism x x 1
*** p< .001 | N = 39,215 | Source: European Social Survey round 8 (2016)
The correlation between scepticism and conservatism is .025. The relationship is significant and positive, indicating that conservatism leads to more scepticism or the other way around, as Pearson’s correlation does not say anything about the direction of the relationship.
Although, based on the theory we assume that conservatism leads to scepticism. Although the strength of the relationship is weak, there is hardly any difference from zero. Nevertheless, the direction of the relationship is in line with my hypotheses. Fundamentalism is another key item in my research since it can indicate the relationship between religion and scepticism.
37 Correlating them results in a positive significant relation of .028, which indicates that there is a positive relation between fundamentalism and scepticism. This despite the – yet again - very weak correlation, which hardly differences from zero. Nevertheless, the direction of the relationship is as expected and would thus support my hypotheses. The third correlation presented is the relation between conservatism and fundamentalism. This correlation is a quite strong and positive correlation (.245), which would support the assumption that those who are religious tend to be more conservative.
Next, the analysis was performed, but the file was split by country, to see what the strengths of the relationships are in different countries and explore these country's differences as preparation for the multilevel analyses. At a first glance, it is remarkable that there are some countries in which the relationships are in the opposite direction from what was expected. For example, Italy and Poland (countries with high levels of Catholicism), have significant negative relations between conservatism and scepticism, which was the opposite of what I expected. It seems even more remarkable that in countries with a protestant (Norway,
Sweden, Finland, The UK, The Netherlands) or mixed culture (Germany and Switzerland), the relationship between scepticism and conservatism seems to be the strongest. Finland,
Sweden, Switzerland and Germany report significant correlations around .125 and Norway,
The Netherlands, The UK around .075. The only country with a protestant culture and a negative correlation is Estonia. Taking into consideration that these correlations should be handled with caution, it does support the assumption that in protestant cultures the relationship between conservatism and scepticism is stronger than in other religious cultures.
38 4.1 Regression models
To answer the first five hypotheses, I created multiple regression models (Table 7 & 8). The first model examines the conservative white male effect, controlling for education and age.
The model is significant at the p<.001 level and has an explained variance of 3,2%. This means that the independent variables explain 3.2% of the variation in the dependent variable scepticism. The effect for age is a small positive effect, indicating that the older one gets, the more sceptical one becomes. For every year increase in age, one is becoming .002 more sceptical on the conservatism scale. For example, an individual that is 60 years old scores on average .020 higher than an individual that is 50 years old. This effect stays the same throughout all the four models. Education is a negative effect, indicating that the higher one's education is, the less sceptical one becomes. For every increase in educational level, one is becoming -.044 less sceptical. The effect of education stays approximately the same throughout all four models. The variable ‘white’ is a significant negative effect, which means that white people are -.042 less sceptical on the scepticism scale compared to those who identified as an ethnic minority. However, when I add the religious denominations and interactions into the model, this effect turns insignificant. This means that when we take religious denomination into account the effect of being white disappears. So, there are no significant differences between whites and non-whites when we take religious denominations into account. Males are significantly more sceptical compared to females. This effect stays approximately the same over the three models. The effect of conservatism is a very small positive and insignificant effect. This means that although the effect is positive, the effect is not significantly different from zero, meaning that the effect is small and cannot be generalized to the population. The effect of fundamentalism is also a small positive insignificant effect. Indicating that the effect is not statistically different from zero and cannot be generalized to the population.
39 In the aggregate, the first model points out that males are more sceptical compared to females.
That the older one gets, the more sceptical one becomes and that the higher one is educated, the less sceptical one becomes. Conservatism and fundamentalism have no statistically significant effects. Finally, white people are less sceptical compared to ethnic minorities.
Since not all the effects for the first hypothesis (conservatism, white, male) are significantly leading to more scepticism, there is no conservative white male effect in a broad European context. Thus, hypothesis 1 cannot be supported.
In model 2, I added the dummy variables for religion type. Non-believers are the reference category in this model. Protestants are significantly less sceptical than non-believers. The effect for Catholics is positive, but not significantly different from zero. Thus, there is no statistically significant difference between non-believers and Catholics in scepticism. Other
Christians are .165 more sceptical than non-believers and other religions are .095 more sceptical than non-believers. In other words, other Christians are the most sceptical, followed by other religions. Non-believers and Catholics are equally sceptical, whilst Protestants are the least sceptical. To support my third hypothesis, all Christian denominations had to be significantly more sceptical compared to non-believers. And to support my fifth hypothesis,
Protestants had to be the most sceptical. These assumptions are not supported by the analysis.
Therefore, both hypotheses 3 and 5 cannot be supported.
40 Table 7 Linear regression model estimating scepticism
Model 1 Model 2
B SE Beta B SE Beta
Intercept .069** .022 .026 .022
Age .002*** .000 .074*** .002*** .000 .080***
Education -.044***.001 -.149*** -.046***.001 .155***
White -.042***.011 -.019*** .003 .012 .001
Male .039*** .005 .035*** .039*** .005 .036***
Conservatism .001 .004 .001 -.003 .004 -.004
Fundamentalism .002 .003 .003 -.005 .004 -.008
Protestant -.024* .010 -.014*
Catholic .002 .008 .001
Other Christians .165*** .014 .066***
Other religions .095*** .012 .046***
R2 .032 .038
F 217.930 155.310
Model p .000*** .000*** p<0.001*** p<0.01** p<0.05*| Source: European Social Survey (2018)
In model 3 I added the interaction terms for conservatism and religious denomination (table
8). This model reveals the information that is needed to research the second hypothesis. The interaction effect for conservatism and Protestants turned out to be insignificant, therefore there is no difference in scepticism for conservative non-believers and conservative
Protestants; they both have an effect of .022. The interaction effect for conservatism and
Catholics and other Christians is a significant negative effect. This means that the effect of conservatism is weaker for these two Christian denominations than for non-believers. In other words, the effect for conservatism is equally strong for Protestants and non-believers and weaker for Catholics, other Christians and other religions. Therefore, the effect of
41 conservatism is not stronger for Christians than for non-believers. Thus, the second hypothesis cannot be supported.
Moving on to the fourth model, I changed the reference category for the interaction terms for fundamentalism, because fundamental non-believers do not exist. The reference category for this interaction term is other religions by fundamentalism. In this case, the direct effect of fundamentalism symbolizes the effect for fundamental other religions and is a small negative effect, although it is not significant at the p<0.05 level. Indicating that it does not vary significantly from zero. The interaction effects are all significantly weaker for Christian denominations compared to other religious fundamentalists. Thus, hypothesis four is not supported. Fundamentalism does not seem to play a key role in the relationship between religion and scepticism and is not stronger for Christians than for other religions.
42 Table 8 linear regression model estimating scepticism
Model 3 Model 4
B SE Beta B SE Beta
Intercept -.074** .027 .115** .039
Age .002*** .000 .079*** .002*** .000 .080***
Education -.045*** .001 -.154*** -.046*** .001 -.154***
White .002 .012 .001 .007 .012 .003
Male .039*** .005 .036*** .039*** .005 .036***
Conservatism .022*** .005 .032*** .015** .004 -.005**
Fundamentalism -.003 .004 -.005 .005 .010 .007
Protestant -.004 .051 -.002 -.202*** .058 -.122***
Catholic .223*** .036 .195*** .033 .045 .029
Other Christians .403*** .080 .162*** .216* .085 .041*
Other religions (ref) .311*** .057 .149*** 0 0 0
Conservatism* -.006 .012 -.015 .004 .012 .011 Protestant
Conservatism* -.052*** .008 -.209*** -.047*** .008 -.188*** Catholic
Conservatism* -.056** .018 -.102** -.043* .018 -.079* Other Christians
Conservatism* -.050*** .013 -.112*** -.019* .008 -.042* Other religions
Fundamentalism* -.040** .015 -.020** Protestant
Fundamentalism* .001 .012 .001 Catholic
Fundamentalism* -.070*** .013 -.024*** Other Christians
R2 .039 .040
F 114.858 90.506
Model p .000*** .000*** p<0.001*** p<0.01** p<0.05* | Source: European Social Survey (2018)
* Note because fundamental non-believers do not exist, I cannot use them as a reference category. Therefore, other religions are the reference category in model 4. I did include non-believers in the analysis to avoid errors, but I did not mention them in the table because this value has no meaning.
43 4.2 Multilevel analysis
To test the last three hypotheses, I needed to perform a Multilevel analysis. To get a first impression of the data, I created two regular regression models. First, dummies for secular, in between and religious countries were created. Then a linear regression analysis was performed, which showed that secular countries are the most sceptical. Religious- and in between countries were statistically the same. This result was not in line with my expectations. Next, dummies for four religious’ cultures (Catholics, Protestants, Mixed,
Other) were created and control variables age and education were added to the model. The model shows that other religious cultures are the most sceptical, followed by Protestant countries. Mixed countries are the least sceptical and Catholics are third. This would partly support the assumption that Protestants are more sceptical, at least compared to Catholic countries.
After the first impression of the data, an empty model was created to calculate the intraclass correlation (ICC). This makes it possible to see how much of the variation is explained due to country-level differences. The empty model indicates that 7% of the variation in the dependent variable scepticism, can be attributed to variation between countries. 93% of the variance in scepticism takes place at the individual level. This outcome supports the assumption to perform a Multilevel analysis (Merlo et al., 2005).
Next, the first analysis was performed to see whether the effect of Christianity significantly varies over countries (Table 9). To investigate variation between countries, a random effect of country was added to the model. All relevant control variables (conservatism, fundamentalism, age, education, gender, white) were also added to the model. Both the intercept and the slope are allowed to be random. When the random slopes for all Christian
44 denominations are significant, the effect for Christianity varies over countries. In this case hypothesis 6 will be accepted.
The most important information can be found in the last four rows of Table 9. The intercept varies significantly over countries (.030) and both the effects for Catholics (.004) and other
Christians (.013) vary significantly over countries. The effect for Protestants (.004) does not vary significantly over countries. This means that the effect for Catholics and other Christians varies over countries whilst the effect for Protestants does not. Hence, hypothesis 6 is not supported.
45 Table 9
Scepticism about climate change - Multilevel linear regression analysis. Unstandardized coefficients presented (Standard errors between parentheses).
-2 Log Likelihood 58447.411
Constant -.058 (.038) Protestant .038 (.021) Catholic .037* (.018) Other Christians .035 (.032) Other religions .042* (.017) Non-believers (ref) 0 Conservatism -.014*** (.003) Fundamentalism -.010 (.004) Age .042*** (.003) Education -.102*** (.003) White .025* (.012) Ethnic minorities (ref) 0 Male .022*** (.003) Female 0 Level 1 variance .259*** (.002) Level 2 variance intercept .030** (.007) Level 2 variance slope Protestants .004 (.003) Level 2 variance slope Catholic .004* (.002) Level 2 variance slope Other Christians .013* (.006) p<0.001*** p<0.01** p<0.05* | Source: European Social Survey (2018)
Table 10 contains information to research hypothesis 7a & b. A similar procedure was followed, with the addition of some new variables. A level 2 predictor for Christian culture is added as well as the interaction terms for Christian culture and the Christian denominations.
46 The model shows that the effect of Christian culture is insignificant (-.172). This means that
Christian cultures are not more sceptical about climate change than non-Christian cultures.
Therefore, hypothesis 7a is not supported. The interaction effects for Protestants (.258) and other Christians (.055) by the level of Christianity are insignificant. The interaction for
Catholics in Christian cultures is positive and significant (.171). This means that the effects for both Protestants and other Christians are not stronger in Christian cultures, but is stronger for Catholics in Christian cultures. This effect (for Catholics in Christian cultures) varies significantly over countries (.013). Both the effects for Protestants (.016) and other Christians
(.031) in Christian cultures do not vary over countries. Because the model shows that only the interaction effect for Catholics in Christian cultures is significant and the rest is not, hypothesis 7b is not supported.
47 Table 10 Scepticism about climate change - Multilevel linear regression analysis unstandardized coefficients presented (standard errors between parentheses).
-2 Log Likelihood 58443.680
Constant .031 (.250) Protestant -.079 (.063) Catholic -.057 (.041) Other Christians .014 (.072) Other religions .041* Non-believers (ref) 0 Conservatism -.014*** (.003) Fundamentalism -.010* (.004) Age .042*** (.003) Education -.102*** (.003) White .024** (.003) Male .022*** (.003) Female (ref) 0 Christian culture -.172 (.167) Protestant*Christian culture .258 (.137) Catholic*Christian culture .171* (.081) Other Christian*Christian culture .055 (.144) Level 1 variance .259*** (.002) Level 2 variance intercept .024** (.008) Level 2 variance slope Protestant* Christian culture .016 (.010) Level 2 variance slope Catholic* Christian culture .013* (.006) Level 2 variance slope Other Christians* Christian culture .031 (.017) p<0.001*** p<0.01** p<0.05* | Source: European Social Survey (2018)
Table 11 contains information for the last hypotheses (8a & b). The same procedure was followed again, but this time Protestant culture was added and Christian culture was removed, to specifically test the effect of Protestant culture.
48 The model shows that a Protestant culture is not more sceptical compared to other cultures
(-.040). Therefore, hypothesis 8a is not supported. However, the interaction effect for
Protestantism in Protestant cultures is positive and significant (.036). This means that the effect of Protestants gets stronger in a Protestant culture. This effect does not vary over countries. Hence, hypothesis 8b is supported.
Table 11 Scepticism about climate change - Multilevel linear regression analysis, unstandardized coefficients presented (Standard errors between parentheses).
-2 Log Likelihood 58518.459
Constant -.051 (.035) Protestant .006 (.016) Catholic .037*** (.008) Other Christians .004 (.015) Other religions .037* (.017) Non-believers (ref) 0 Conservatism -.013*** (.003) Fundamentalism -.008* (.003) Age .042*** (.003) Education -.103*** (.003) White .021 (.003) Ethnic minorities (ref) 0 Male .022*** (.003) Female (ref) 0 Protestant culture -.040 (.032) Protestant culture*Protestant .036* (.014) Level 1 variance .260*** (.002) Level 2 variance intercept .025** (.006) Level 2 variance slope Protestant .001 (.002) Level 2 variance slope Protestant* Protestant Culture 000 (.001) p<0.001*** p<0.01** p<0.05* | Source: European Social Survey (2018)
49 Chapter 5: Discussion and conclusion
Climate scepticism is an important phenomenon in the current times, as quick action is needed to mitigate the consequences of climate change. The current study focussed on the relationships between conservatism, Christianity and scepticism. The literature regarding these relationships hinted that conservative values would lead to more scepticism (McCright
& Dunlap, 2011; Kahan, 2007; Krange et al., 2019) and that white males are more sceptical
(Flynn et al., 1994), creating a conservative white male effect. Because (McCright et al.,
2016; McCright & Dunlap 2011) did not make clear why people have conservative values there was a missing link in this effect. Several authors (Veldman et al., 2014; Hirsch et al.,
2013; Guth et al., 1995) showed that Christianity and conservatism are strong and positively related, with Christianity leading to more conservatism. Additionally, a large amount of research suggested that Christianity leads to more scepticism (for example: Arbuckle &
Konisky, 2015; Roser-Renouf et al., 2016; Ecklund et al., 2017; Hand & van Liere, 1984).
Hence, I connected these two fields of research, suggesting there is a ‘Christian conservative white male effect’. Assumptions regarding these relationships between Christianity, conservatism and scepticism were for the most part found and researched in American context and literature. Therefore, I wanted to research whether similar mechanisms are at work in a
European context. These assumptions were all made on the individual level, whilst the religious culture one lives in also seemed to matter for scepticism attitudes (Hagevi, 2014).
Consequently, differences between religious cultures and the effect of religious culture on the individual were also researched. In the aggregate, the current research aimed to link two theoretical fields and to test if similar relations between conservatism, Christianity, Christian culture, and scepticism exist in Europe.
50 For the largest part, the results did not meet the expectations. The current research reaches a similar conclusion as mentioned in the theoretical section; the relation between Christianity and scepticism seems to be minor (Hayes and Marandugakis, 2001; Kanagy & Willits, 1993;
Boyd, 1999; Wolkomir et al., 1997). On the whole, we can conclude that conservatism does not lead to more scepticism in a broad European context and that there are some small effects for Christianity. Other demographic variables, such as age and education seem to be more important. Thus, the linkage between theoretical fields is less prominent as expected. The results from the current research suggest there is not a Christian conservative white male effect, but instead a low educated, old, male effect.
Going more into detail, Protestantism was argued to be the most sceptical of all denominations. The results showed the exact opposite, of all Christian denominations
Protestants turned out to be the least sceptical. The interaction terms for fundamentalism and conservatism with the Christian denominations were also in the opposite direction as expected. Indicating that some of the expectations were actually in the opposite direction.
Except the research finding that Protestants in Protestant cultures became more sceptical, most expectations regarding the multilevel analyses were not met. The results showed that differences between religious cultures are small. Scepticism about climate change is thus not much stronger in particular religious cultures. The question remains why the results are so different as expected and sometimes even in the opposite direction.
First, a comment can be made regarding the research finding that Protestants are the least sceptical. Several authors used a different measurement for climate scepticism. Asking respondents what they found more important, the environment versus the economy, or jobs versus the environment (Hagevi, 2014; Arbuckle & Konisky, 2015; Eckberg & Blocker,
51 1989). Both measurements let respondents choose between the environment or the economy, whilst it is known that Protestants have a specific preference for economic growth (Weber,
2002). Hence, letting Protestants choose between the environment versus the economy is a skewed measurement which can lead to Protestants and Protestant cultures being more sceptical. There is the possibility that this line of research found that Protestants were the most sceptical because of this skewed measurement and that the current research found something different because of a different measurement for scepticism that not included the economy.
The research finding that Protestants are more sceptical in Protestant cultures, also indicates that Protestants are less sceptical in other religious cultures. It could be that when Protestants live outside a Protestant culture, the influence of Protestantism on scepticism largely disappears. Inside their Protestant culture, they do have more sceptical attitudes towards climate change because they are living in a context in which they become more sceptical. The question remains what is causing this research finding. One possibility is that in Protestant cultures End-Times thinking is more part of the culture and that Protestants become more sceptical in such a context. Another possibility is that because of the Protestant work ethic,
Protestant countries are relatively affluent countries. Lo and Chow (2015) showed that affluent countries are more sceptical about climate change because they believe they can pay the costs of the consequences of climate change; it can be that such a context makes
Protestants more sceptical. Indeed, this is a speculative argumentation and further research is needed to examine why individual Protestants in Europe tend to be the least sceptical, but become more sceptical in a Protestant context.
52 Another possible reason the most of the expectations were not met, can be that climate scepticism is more prominent in the US than in Europe. In the US approximately 67%
(Marlon et al., 2019) believes in climate change vs approximately 90% in Europe (Poortinga,
2018). Climate change belief is not the same as climate scepticism but can provide an indication. Because there are more sceptical people in the US, it is more likely to find larger effects. Since Europeans are less sceptical, the effects are smaller. This can be part of the explanation of why the effects of this research were smaller than expected. Since the theoretical mechanisms described in this research are for the largest part based on American literature. Future research should take into account that the American situation is different than the European situation.
Furthermore, it seems that conservatism and Christianity are context-dependent in a way that it depends what the effect of these predictor variables are, based on whether someone is
American or European. The results already showed that the effects for Catholics and other
Christians varied over countries within Europe. In the US the effect for scepticism and
Christianity seems to exist (McCright et al., 2016; Arbuckle & Konisky, 2015) but this mechanism does not work in Europe. Being a Christian has apparently a different meaning in the US than in Europe. Future research should research differences in the meaning of
Christianity between Europeans and Americans. What does it mean to be a Christian in
Europe in comparison to the US, concerning the environment?
Since hypotheses that suggested that Christians are more sceptical compared to non-believers were not supported, a different approach is needed to explain the relation between Christianity and the environment. Another possible explanation could be the ‘greening of religion hypothesis’ (Taylor et al, 2016). This stated that religions are increasingly adhering to a
53 stewardship ethic instead of a dominion ethic. It could be that there is a paradigm shift in several religions leading to greener values and that this new paradigm is becoming more prominent compared to the dominion ethic. Future research can bring more clarity to this by asking respondents specific questions about dominion versus stewardship ethics.
Other parts in the world, such as Africa and Asia are fairly underrepresented in the current literature. The same applies to other non-western religions, such as Islam and Buddhism. In the current research, other religions were significantly more sceptical than non-believers.
However, because the aim of this research did not include expectations regarding these findings, there were no conclusions drawn. It can be an interesting avenue for future research to find out what religions are more or less sceptical and why. Climate change is a global problem and does not stop at borders. Therefore, other parts of the world and other religions should also be researched.
Finally, we may note a few limitations to the study. First, the measurement for fundamentalism is questionable. Other research (Village, 2015; Sherkat & Ellison, 2007) had an alternative measurement for fundamentalism. Items such as; I interpret the Biblical account of creation literally and The Genesis account tells us exactly how humans were created (Sherkat & Ellison, 2007 p.33) were used. These items include Biblical literalism, which was not possible to measure in this thesis because these kinds of questions were not included in the ESS data-set. Instead, questions regarding church-going, praying and how religious someone is, were used. Indeed, this is an alternative but not exactly the same as
Biblical literalism. The results regarding fundamentalism must therefore be taken in with caution.
54 Second, my measurement for conservatism is a good, theoretically well-substantiated scale.
However, McCright et al., (2016) argue that conservatism in the American context is comparable to having a right-wing ideology in European context. Looking at it through this paradigm, the current research could have included a left-right scale to see whether or not this makes a difference in scepticism. Future research can simply replace the measurement for conservatism or add the left-right scale to measure this alternative explanation of conservatism.
It was already mentioned that, when doing Multilevel analysis, it is advised to analyse a minimum of 50 countries (Meuleman & Billiet, 2009). Only very large effects can be found when there is a low number of countries included (Hox, et al., 2012). Therefore, there is the possibility that the expectations were right, but that due to the low number of countries, these effects were ‘unseen’. Future studies can include more countries, and do a similar analysis to see whether this gives different results.
The linear regression models and Multilevel analyses were done on all 23 European countries and all the respondents living in these countries. Looking back, it could have been wise to exclude Russia and Israel from the analyses because these countries were the only two countries that have a different religious culture, have different social structures and it can be argued that these two countries are not a part of Europe. The two countries could have been considered as outliers and thus be deleted. There is the possibility that this would change the outcomes of this study.
Practical implications of the current research are that policymakers do not have to take
Christianity into account as a ‘essential’ factor since they do not differ much in their
55 scepticism attitudes compared to non-believers. Other variables such as education, age and gender are more important, so it would be more rational to focus policy on low educated old males, than on Christians.
56 6. Sources
Data
ESS Round 8: European Social Survey Round 8 Data (2016). Data file edition 2.1. NSD -
Norwegian Centre for Research Data, Norway – Data Archive and distributor of ESS data for
ESS ERIC. doi:10.21338/NSD-ESS8-2016.
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