GOINS-DISSERTATION-2014.Pdf

CONFRONTING ITSELF: THE AIDS CRISIS AND THE LGBT COMMUNITY IN HOUSTON

______

A Dissertation

Presented to

The Faculty of the Department

of History

University of Houston

______

In Partial Fulfillment

Of the Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

______

John D. Goins

May, 2014

John D. Goins

May, 2014

CONFRONTING ITSELF: THE AIDS CRISIS AND THE LGBT MOVEMENT IN HOUSTON

______

An Abstract of a Dissertation

Presented to

The Faculty of the Department

of History

University of Houston

______

In Partial Fulfillment

Of the Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

______

John D. Goins

May, 2014

iii

ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines the development of Houston’s lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) community from the earliest political organizing in the 1950s through the AIDS crisis of the 1980s. Relying on archival materials, newspapers, and oral histories it tells their story and reveals that despite a detrimental social and political environment it managed to create and initiate a response to AIDS that not only served its own members but also contributed to national efforts in fighting the disease.

By the 1950s, perhaps the earliest gay activists in Houston began to push the limits of their secret existence. They first sought the right to socialize safely in a local bar without police harassment. Their organizational efforts were hindered from within by the elements of diversity and barriers supported by class, race, and gender.

Many were also reluctant to be publically identified as homosexual based on the hostile socio-political climate of the day. Only after the radical gay liberation movement expanded in the early 1970s did organizations become more visible in

Houston. These factors were compounded in the mid-1980s by a strong conservative backlash that threatened their hard-fought gains. Even to this day,

Houston has no law protecting the rights of its citizens against discrimination based on their sexual orientation.

In an examination of the AIDS years in Houston, however, a vital lasting legacy becomes apparent. The city’s AIDS movement, comprised of organizations and groups created by the LGBT community, remained the framework and foundation

for confronting the disease long after the threat had moved beyond its own members.

Houston’s level of LGBT social organization and movement activism reveal that less studied communities in cities outside the nation’s older and larger coastal metropolises provide rich contributions to our understanding of these movements nationally.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction 1

Chapter One 25 “From the GLF to the GPC: The Shift in Gay and Lesbian Activism in 1970s Houston”

Chapter Two 68 “AIDS in Houston, 1981-1984: The Initial Response”

Chapter Three 112 “Politics, AIDS, and the New Right Backlash of 1985”

Chapter Four 149 “1985-1986: Discovery, Definition, and Next Steps”

Chapter Five 177 “1987-1990: Toward a Manageable Chronic Disease”

Conclusion______215

Appendix 223

Bibliography 229

“Confronting Itself: The AIDS Crisis and LGBT Community in Houston”

Introduction

According to a survey published in 1979 by the Advocate, a long established gay and lesbian publication, respondents revealed that in their city:

95 percent were registered to vote 49.3 percent belonged to a local gay organization 30 percent belonged to a national gay organization 73.9 percent had made a financial donation to a political campaign in the last 2 years 86.9 percent had contributed to a gay cause 80 percent knew someone who had experienced repression, discrimination, or police harassment 20 percent had directly experienced the above1

On September 9, 1975, gay men and lesbians in the same city had officially incorporated their own political caucus. Its first rally, on October 21, attracted 500 supporters and seven political candidates. In the early years the group established itself in the community by mailing out surveys and soliciting candidates to seek the caucus endorsement. Its success became apparent in the first year when out of the twenty-eight candidates the caucus had endorsed, nineteen had won.2

Three years later, some 3,000 of the same city’s gays and their supporters protested the appearance of Anita Bryant where she would sing country and patriotic songs at the state bar association annual dinner. Bryant had waged a nation-wide anti-gay campaign beginning with the successful prevention of job

1 Barbara McIntosh, “On Homosexuals…Book to Incorporate Opinions, Beliefs of Houston Gay Community,” The Houston Post, 12 February 1979.

2 Rick Barrs, “Gays Gain Political Clout in Houston,” The Houston Post, 25 June 1978, A1.

discrimination protection for homosexuals in Dade County, Florida.3 The gay activists marched peacefully by candlelight through downtown and ended with a rally in front of the city’s public library.

By 1985, the Anita Bryant march held less meaning for many of the activists.

Being sick or knowing others who were made that protest seem less important than the problem of AIDS. Instead, the political caucus became embroiled in an anti-gay backlash from the right concerning a recent anti-discrimination bill the city council had passed. The bill would have protected the rights of lesbians and gay men from potential hiring discrimination with respect to city jobs. The opponents of the law wasted no time placing the AIDS health crisis into the political conflict and claimed that the gay cancer was one more reason to fight against the advancement of gay rights. Then, in 1987, this city, based on numbers of cases, became the fourth highest impacted metropolitan area nationwide.4 Between July 1988 and July 1993, the city experienced 8,530 new AIDS cases.5

While this narrative could have pertained to any sizable U.S. city, the current tendency of LGBT historiography to focus on the major cities of the east and west coasts would cause most readers to assume that these events occurred in New York

3 Craig Rimmerman, From Identity to Politics: The Lesbian and Gay Movements in the United States (Philadelphia, Penn.: Temple University Press, 2002), 127-129.

4 “More money needed for AIDS victims, doctors tell state panel,” The Houston Post, 10 February 1988 17.

5 Table 2. AIDS cases reported July 1988 through June 1998, by Metropolitan Area of Residence, HIVAIDS Surveillance Supplemental Report, Volume 5, Number 2, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Public Health Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for HIV, STD, and TB Prevention, http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/pdf/statistics_1998_HIV_Surveillance_Report_vol_5_no2.pdf, (accessed February 19, 2014).

or San Francisco, anywhere besides Houston, Texas. These examples attest to the fact that Houston was home to the same level of social organization and movement activism that has been studied in the nation’s older and larger coastal cities.

Houston’s LGBT community, despite a detrimental social and political environment, managed to create and initiate a response that not only served its own but contributed nationally as well. It established a foundation and framework that still exists today.

Pre-AIDS, Houston’s LGBT community, although able to claim a strong politically active component, remained divided on many issues and the greatest majority of its members were still hidden by a cloak of secrecy. Even within the

Houston Gay Political Caucus (GPC), arguably the most developed of any organization within the community, factions were visible along the lines of gender, race, class, differing degrees of being out, and religion, conflicts not unlike those present in other cities at the time.6 Instead of these political realities, a cursory glance would present a bar oriented community seemingly content with celebrating the newly acquired freedoms won by its Stonewall inspired activist elements.

Focusing only on bars misses the importance of AIDS in defining Houston’s gay community.

By 1985, the AIDS crisis directly affected 100 percent of Houston’s LGBT community. The epidemic altered life as it had been and changed the very meaning

6 Van Gosse, Rethinking the New Left: An Interpretive History (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005), 184; John D’Emilio, Sexual Politics, Sexual Communities: The Making of a Homosexual Minority in the United States, 1940-1970 (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 92-94; Marc Stein, City of Sisterly and Brotherly Loves: Lesbian and Gay Philadelphia, 1945-1972 (Philadelphia, Penn.: Temple University Press, 2004), 385-386.

of what it meant to be a member of the LGBT community. While scholars have studied LGBT history and the aspects of its social and political development, no one has explored for in-depth meaning of the AIDS crisis on the LGBT community. In this dissertation, I attempt to remedy this problem in the literature. I also endeavor to complicate what we already know by placing my study in a region previously ignored in LGBT studies. Compared to the North, East, and West, far fewer studies have been published on the South. I argue that while New York and San Francisco have typically been utilized to tell the story of LGBT activism and the response to

AIDS in the United States, a community study of the city of Houston, located in another region, the South, may lead to a better understanding of how the majority of

LGBT communities developed through the 1980s, and responded to the AIDS crisis as it affected their own.

Furthermore, this project embellishes a discussion of the status of Houston as a Southern city. Its primarily liberal inner city voting constituency, its highly diversified demographics, and its stature as an international petrochemical epicenter seem to demonstrate a capacity to embrace change, and make this label challengeable. By the end of the 1970s, the strength, size, and influence of the city’s

LGBT political organization and its successful grassroots AIDS response fortify this line of reasoning. Gay and lesbian supported candidates were swept into the highest elected offices. Conversely, by 1985, the southern traits of adherence to continuity and resistance to change became apparent. A display of antigay right–wing hysteria, including a formal appearance of the Ku Klux Klan, prevailed in resisting the standing of a law protecting city employment from discrimination according to

sexual orientation. The resulting political intransigence left in the wake of this backlash had immense influence in causing city and county officials to stall and avoid responding as thousands became sick and died in the early years of the AIDS crisis. Even today, antidiscrimination policy regarding sexual orientation only exists by executive order of the mayor in Houston. There is still no law on the books banning discrimination based on sexuality. From such a perspective, this is not just a community study for LGBT history under the realm of broader U.S. history, but an opportunity to revisit the southern aspects of this city as well. Here, the theme of conflict between continuity and change plays out in another familiar example of a minority group fighting for equality against a recalcitrant conservative faction determined to maintain its accustomed status quo.

In her book, Fighting for Our Lives, sociologist Susan Chambre wrote that three qualities of the epidemic shaped the development of AIDS communities:

“uncertainty, stigma, and the disaster-like impact.”7 She focused on the LGBT community in New York, explaining that it was not a typical city since it had the largest case numbers and was the place where many organizational models and policies were created. It was also hit earliest and hardest by the crisis. The assertions made by historians who based their studies on New York and San

Francisco may or may not adequately represent the rest of the nation’s LGBT

7 Susan Chambre, Fighting for Our Lives: New York’s AIDS Community and the Politics of Disease (New Brunswick, and London: Rutgers University Press, 2006), 7. For placing the AIDS response into perspective with past epidemics including plague, syphilis, smallpox, cholera, and influenza, see Guenter Risse, “Epidemics and History: Ecological Perspectives and Social Responses,” in AIDS: The Burdens of History (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and New York: University of California Press, 1988), 33- 66; John M. Barry, The Great Influenza: The Story of the Deadliest Pandemic in History (New York: Penguin Books, 2005).

subcultures. While the experience of the epidemic in New York represents one perspective of the AIDS crisis in the United States, a look at younger and smaller communities in other regions could yield another.8 Houston was not hit earliest, nor was it hit hardest. While the gay and lesbian community there contributed with some firsts, it also adopted, through collaboration, some of the innovations of the larger more affected cities. By observing the AIDS crisis through a Houston perspective, one gains better insight into the affect of the AIDS epidemic on the nation’s LGBT communities that were smaller, younger, and at different stages of manifesting a degree of political organization.9

At this point historians have contributed large numbers of vital books on the history of gay liberation and the gay rights movement, but the picture remains far from complete.10 Work has also been done on the history of homosexuality.11

Community studies on LGBT subculture and political social movement organizations

8 San Francisco and New York are home to the oldest, largest, and at this point most politically organized LGBT communities in the nation. Because of this fact, it is not assumable that smaller, more recently formed cities evolved in the same manner. See George Chauncey’s Gay New York: Gender, Urban Culture, and the Making of a Gay Male World (New York: Basic Books, 1994), and Nan Alamilla Boyd, Wide Open Town: A History of Queer San Francisco to 1965 (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 2003).

9 Chambre, Fighting, 4.

10 D’Emilio, Sexual Politics; Linda Hirshman, Victory: The Triumphant Gay Revolution (New York: Harper Collins, 2012); Eric Marcus, Making History: The Struggle for Gay and Lesbian Equal Rights 1945-1990 (New York: Harper Collins, 1992).

11 Dennis Altman, Global Sex (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 2001); Dennis Altman, Homosexual Oppression and Liberation (New York and London: New York University Press, 1971); Thomas A. Foster, ed., Long Before Stonewall: Histories of Same-Sex Sexuality in America (New York and London: New York University Press, 2007); Margot Canaday, The Straight State: Sexuality and Citizenship in Twentieth Century America (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2009); John Howard, Men Like That: A Southern Queer History (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1999); David K. Johnson, The Lavender Scare: The Cold War Persecution of Gays and Lesbians in the Federal Government (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 2004).

are proving invaluable in revealing how the identity of these marginalized citizens has been shaped by their symbiotic relationship with the dominant society around them.12

LGBT community studies have not yet begun to utilize the AIDS period as a tool of analysis for better understanding the overall progression of the movement.

Yet, a recent political history of the LGBT movement argued that compared to the civil rights and feminist movements, “only the gay-driven AIDS movement captured the resources of the government for its needs. The AIDS movement was an inspiration for every progressive social movement of the next quarter century, including – after the worst of the epidemic was over for the gay community – the revival of the gay movement itself.”13 From there, the movement was able to successfully take on the issue of gay men and lesbians serving in the military, and is currently making strides toward equal rights in the arena of marriage.

In her book, Forging Gay Identities, Elizabeth Armstrong wrote that the AIDS crisis “challenged everything of the gay identity movement: the lives and bodies of gay men, beliefs about the healthfulness of gay sex, hard-won pride in gay identity, and the movement’s political and cultural organizations.”14 She argued that the

12 Brett Beemyn, ed., Creating A Place for Ourselves: Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Community Histories (New York and London: Routledge, 1997); Chauncey, Gay New York; Elizabeth Kennedy and Madeline Davis, Boots of Leather, Slippers of Gold: The History of a Lesbian Community (New York and London: Routledge, 1993); Martin Meeker, Contacts Desires: Gay and Lesbian Communications and Community, 1940s-1970s (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 2006); Esther Newton, Cherry Grove, Fire Island: Sixty Years on America’s First Gay and Lesbian Town (Boston: Beacon Press, 1993); Stein, City of Sisterly; Todd C. White, Pre-Gay L.A.: A Social History of the Movement for Homosexual Rights (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2009).

13 Hirshman, Victory, 172..

14 Elizabeth Armstrong, Forging Gay identities: Organizing Sexuality in San Francisco, 1950-1994 (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 154.

AIDS field vied with the gay identity movement for its resources. She saw the responses to AIDS as producing a competitive organizational field, and countered the idea that the effort further crystalized that gay identity movement by forcing it to grow up. She stated that the San Francisco gay rights movement had already achieved a sense of maturity before the onslaught of AIDS. She added that the national gay movement was equally well established as demonstrated by the 1979

March on Washington, D.C. Co-director Lucua Valeska of the National Gay Task

Force remarked that it symbolized the “birth of a national gay movement”.15 Since the gay liberation movement was already strongly recognized by the onset of AIDS, the organization of the AIDS movement became a competing field that deflected resources and personnel from the gay identity movement. Additionally, “the pursuit and receipt of large-scale funding reshaped the structure and loyalties of these organizations.16

Linda Hirshman, wrote in her book, Victory: The Triumphant Gay Revolution,

“Before the epidemic struck, the gay movement had settled in to a predictable pattern.” However, she argued, that because of AIDS “they created the most successful social movement of the contentious American twentieth century. They came out.” “What had started when a gay Stonewall patron threw a brick at a policeman 1969 ended with gay activists spending billions looking for a cure for a

15 Occurring on October 14, 1979, this was the first of the marches in Washington, D.C. for LGBT equal rights and it attracted around 100,000 people. There were subsequent marches in 1987 and again in 1993. Rimmerman, From Identity; 112.

16 Armstrong, Forging, 170-171.

fatal, heavily homosexual disease.”17 No other movement in modern American history has ever gotten the government to provide them with resources to accomplish their aims. Not the feminist movement, not the racial civil rights movement.18

While Armstrong contended that the AIDS crisis produced a competing organization and Hirshman asserted that it caused the LGBT movement to grow up and achieve a level of success otherwise impossible, I argue that it changed the focus of its members and also the way they themselves and outsiders perceived the movement. A different side of the LGBT subculture became visible. Instead of the

Hedonistic excesses of alcohol, drugs, and sex that outside observers saw as the only binding element in the same sex attracted community, it created institutions, staffed by tirelessly committed volunteers, who united to fight for the lives of their own.

Overt celebrations such as the annual Gay Pride parades became interspersed with serious elements designed to commemorate the great loss those who had died and remind others that sexual freedom was not void of responsibility.

Indeed, the AIDS crisis played a pivotal role in the LGBT movement’s history.

Only as the literature on the group’s past expands to include communities beyond the larger coastal cities and the timeline moves forward to include the years of the

AIDS emergency, can a more complete picture emerge. Then, historians may begin to reveal the contributions LGBT society has had on U.S. history over all.

17 Hirshman, Triumphant, 172.

18 Ibid.

To address Houston’s absence from the impressive historiography on other

LGBT communities in the United States, this project will prove that despite assumptions that the only vital and highly organized LGBT communities only developed in the more highly progressive cities of New York or Sam Francisco, a vibrant subculture existed by the middle 1950s in Houston, Texas. Once their political activism became well organized in the mid-1970s, gay men and lesbians had allies among elected officials in the highest ranks of civic government. The

LGBT support of these officials was quite public, and overwhelming majorities continuously reelected them. Even in the 1980s the attempt of a small but boisterous right-wing faction failed to reverse this trend of LGBT acceptance. Then, as the emergency phase of the AIDS crisis descended on the city in the 1980s, their true constitution and strength became apparent as they met the crisis formidably despite the brazen initial lack of public resources.

Questions on chronological scope will be addressed. For years historians considered that anything significant in the lesbian and gay liberation movement began with the Stonewall riots in the summer of 1969. Aspects of LGBT social organization in Houston will amplify the more recent research that has illuminated the existence of substantial communities in cities such as New York, San Francisco,

Portland, and Los Angeles many years before. The homophile groups, known for their accomodationist style political organization, formed in the major coastal cities by the late 1950s and early 1960s. In Houston, a homophile group, the Prometheon

Society formed in 1968 and became the city’s first organization created to seek political change for the city’s non-heteronormative community.19

It will argue for a later chronology as well. The beginning of the 1980s and the onslaught of the AIDS crisis will be a signifier of great change and a new era in the story of LGBT liberation, much as the Stonewall Riots of 1969 have come to represent the beginning of the gay liberation as a mass movement. Therefore, this project will extend into the early 1990s, somewhat beyond what most community studies have done currently. The same innate sense of skilled organizational ability and commitment seen in the success of the GPC provided Houston’s gay and lesbian community with the ability to respond rapidly and successfully to address the AIDS crisis as it became apparent in the city. Even hindered by the tardiness and lack of federal, state, and municipal funding, the local community met the challenge with generous private support and formed service organizations to address the rapidly growing demand for help. The Montrose Clinic, the Montrose Counseling Center,

AIDS Foundation Houston, and the Bering Foundation name but a few of the associations they created out of the need for those affected to receive basic medical, psychological, and financial help to deal with what they were experiencing.

19 For discussion on these groups in the 1950s and 1960s as well as their influence on the movement, see D’Emilio, Sexual Politics; Stuart Timmons, The Trouble with Harry Hay: Founder of the Modern Gay Movement (Boston, Mass.: Alyson, 1990); Harry Hay, Radically Gay: Gay Liberation in the Words of its Founder (Boston: Beacon Press, 1996). These books provide background on Harry Hay, the founder of the Mattachine Society in 1950, one of the oldest homophile organizations in the United States. Marcia M. Gallo, Different Daughters: A History of the Daughters of Bilitis and the Rights of the Lesbian Rights Movement (New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers, 2006). This book is a new inclusive survey of DOB and its successes in the liberation movement. The DOB formed in San Francisco in 1955 as the first lesbian political organization and to provide an alternative to lesbian bars. The anti-gay climate of the 1950s is discussed in Johnson, The Lavender Scare, 59.

This project has utilized remains of the vast print culture that became apparent in the 1970s. Left today is a plethora of magazines, newspapers, pamphlets, periodicals, and other print media. The dissemination of community papers had begun in earnest by then (although a few small publications such as the

Albatross had been in print in the late 1960’s). The print material was usually free and therefore relied on advertising to survive commercially. One such paper was the Nuntius that was published between 1970 and 1977. It was a bar guide presenting some news and editorial content. It became the standard for others that followed. This dissertation has relied on the Nuntius as it began publication earlier than most making it a vital reflection of the climate of the early 1970s. It contained a plentiful amount of editorial material and published correspondence between readers and editors. This Week in Texas, another periodical, though not for the

Houston market alone, began circulation in 1976. With some interruption, it is still in publication today.20

One of the primary contributors to the gay press in Houston and other southern cities was Henry McClurgh who is still active in Houston today.21

McClurgh’s first paper was Contact, which he published beginning in 1974 for only eleven issues. From 1974-1980 he launched and operated the Montrose Star. Then in 1981, he started the Montrose Voice and published it for the next seven years. The

20 Bruce Remington, “Twelve Fighting Years: Homosexuals in Houston, 1969-1981” (MA thesis, University of Houston, May 1983), 8-9; Charles Gillis, “Houston Gay Pride Program,” 1980. The Charles V. Botts Library and Resurrection Archives, Resurrection Metropolitan Community Church, Houston, Texas (Botts), 64-65 (hereafter Pride History).

21 McClurgh interview.

Montrose Voice remains a crucial link to gaining insight into the turbulent political atmosphere of 1980s Houston including the community under the siege of AIDS.

Other Houston papers, in addition to McClurgh’s, included Upfront, later

Upfront America, and the Pointblank Times.22 Although these papers mostly came and went in the 1970s, it is from them that one can discover much about the organizing and sentiments of Houston gays during that period. Information in printed sources is reinforced through oral histories. The author conducted some and others are available in the archives at the University of Houston from previous graduate research on the Houston LGBT community.

The fiscal and social conservatism of the Reagan administration had its influences in Houston as well. In April of 1982, President Ronald Reagan opened the

White House in order to present awards to outstanding volunteers, and to “call attention to what can be done through voluntary action.” First Lady Nancy Reagan was there to hand out the first “outstanding volunteer achievement” awards to eighteen different people and organizations. “Throughout our history, Americans have always extended their hands to neighbors in assistance,” the president said, in pressing for the expansion of volunteerism as a means of flagging federal spending.

He added: “The energy expended by our citizens in problem-solving is absolutely imperative to maintain and improve the quality of life for all Americans.”23

22 Ibid.

23 “Reagan honors 18 for volunteerism,” The New York Times, 15 Apr. 1982; Altman wrote that observers from Tocqueville on have commented on the American capacity for volunteer organization over government reliance. See Dennis Altman, Aids in the Mind of America (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1986), 181.

Absent from the list of eighteen that were awarded at the White House that day were any of the volunteer groups that were forming out of the nation’s gay community to confront AIDS. While we are not exactly aware of why the administration chose not to include these groups these groups in this ceremony, it none-the-less serves as an indication of the political implications of AIDS and its link to homosexuality. This link, in tandem with the rising tide of conservative tenets of the Reagan administration, prevented those in power from seeing beyond their negative stances on gay rights in order to recognize AIDS as the public health crisis that it was. In this instance it is ironical that the method, volunteerism, that Reagan praised was the exact one that the growing AIDS community survived on throughout the 1980s as most national, state, and local agencies responded so inadequately given the magnitude of the crisis. It would be the latter part of the decade before lawmakers would realize that not just the volunteer supported AIDS movement, but the entire U.S. healthcare system was threatened by the exponentially increasing numbers of AIDS cases.

When AIDS was first recognized in the United States in the late 1970s, timing could not have been worse. In 1980, Ronald Reagan’s landslide victory owed credit to a rejection of President Jimmy Carter, the incumbent. Perhaps greater was

Reagan’s economic promise of tax cuts, the backbone of his economic policy known as Reaganomics or supply side economics. This theory purported that tax cuts would lead to economic growth. This would consequently increase government revenues and then enable a reduction of budget deficits. This was highly popular language as in 1980 the unemployment rate had reached 7.8 percent and inflation

stood at close to eighteen percent. Additionally, the gross domestic product was falling steeply.24

Of greater concern for matters of this dissertation was Reagan’s message of ideological conservatism. As Donald Critchlow wrote in his book, The Conservative

Ascendancy, Reagan delivered a clear message that “the cultural revolution begun in the 1960s must be opposed through legislation of prayer in school, ratification of a human life amendment, and restoration of the place of the traditional family in

American life.”25 This matched his resolve for winning the vote of the evangelical

Christian constituency and followed that he would support their antigay agenda. As part of his policy, he stressed volunteerism, charity, and personal giving at the local level. He saw this as a method, based on true Americanism and individualism, sheltered from big federal government influence and directives, ideally suited to reduce the national debt.26

As a result, from 1980 to 1986, Congress reduced federal funds going toward social welfare programs to $58.9 billion, a 42 percent decrease. For the years 1980 to 1985 they legislated a 25 percent decline in the money going to human service

24 Donald Critchlow, The Conservative Ascendancy: How the GOP Right Made Political History (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007), 178.

25Critchlow, Conservative Ascendancy, 172.

26 Andrew Busch, Reagan’s Victory: The Presidential Election of 1980 and the Rise of the Right (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005); Jeffrey D. Howison, The 1980 Presidential Election: Ronald Reagan and the Shaping of the American Conservative Movement (London and New York: Routledge, 2014). For a study on the South’s shift to Republican conservatism see Matthew Lassiter, The Silent Majority: Suburban Politics in the Sunbelt South (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2007).

nonprofit organizations.27 In 1982 and 1983, the Department of Health and Human

Services did not ask Congress for funding necessary to expand ADIS research.

Instead, it took ninety-five percent of its AIDS research funds from already allocated resources for other health research projects. In 1987, the federal government was only willing to spend $85 million on AIDS when Congress had asked for $234 million, and federal medical experts had concluded in 1986 that by 1990 $1 billion would be needed annually for research funds.28

As was the case with the federal government, Texas faced tight fiscal issues as well. The economy, based almost entirely on petroleum, was in a serious recession. Due to political destabilization in the Middle East, the price of oil fell to as low as $10 per barrel, a price beyond the imaginations of twenty-first century minds having experienced oil prices of $120.00 per barrel. This collapse in oil prices cut the state’s revenue by twenty percent. This had particularly severe consequences for Houston as its economy was so highly based in energy, particularly petroleum.

At that point eighty-seven percent of the economy there was based on energy and over the 1980s, this lack of economic diversity rendered 220,000 people jobless.29

In the gay community, the timing was no better. The newly liberated masses of lesbians and gay men around the country did not want anything to cast a shadow on the celebration of their recently achieved sexual freedom. Yet, fact that the

27 Philip M. Kayal, Bearing Witness: Gay Men’s Health Crisis and the Politics of AIDS (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1993), 84.

28 Kayal, Bearing, 86.

29 Kurt Badenhausen, “While the rest of the U.S. economy plods, Houston gets hot,” Forbes.com, http://www.forbes.com/2012/0716/best-palces-12-oil-gas-ecnomy-energy-companies-houston- gets-hot.html (assessed March 20, 2014).

disease was first discovered among the gay community and quickly thereafter resolved by scientists to be caused by an infectious agent that was transmitted through sexual contact, threatened the entire concept of gay liberation. The association of same-sex sexuality and sickness that had taken so long to shed was coming to surface again only in a much more lethal form.30 The conservative right, more than subtly nuanced by the religious zealotry of its Southern, Bible Belt, evangelical fundamentalist counterparts, viewed the onslaught of such an inexplicable plague-like disease as being the exact ammunition needed to rage against the homosexual lifestyle.31 Even within the gay community itself, people were divided over how to react to the crisis. There was fear that the association of the disease with gay men would result in a forced return to the not too distant past of societal repression. There was also concern for the civil rights of their community members who became afflicted with the new, yet to be defined disease.

Much the same as in New York and San Francisco, as increasing numbers of their own became sick, the Houston gay community began organizing to raise money for education and research. The resulting grassroots response was begun by gay men and lesbians and will be referred to herein as the AIDS movement. Like the disease itself, however, its boundaries quickly stretched to include other populations beyond what could be strictly defined as LGBT. What is important for the purpose of this study is that Houston’s LGBT community laid the foundation and

30 D’Emilio explicates the medical model including its origins and influence in Sexual Politics, 15-16.

31 Critchlow, The Conservative, 3, 216-219; Rimmerman, From Identity, 121; Michael Bronski, The Pleasure Principle: Sex, Backlash, and the Struggle for Gay Freedom (New York: Stonewall Inn Editions, 1998), 5, 74-75.

created the response that would remain the framework as the response spread beyond its own community. In this process, it set examples that many other cities and communities would follow as they experienced the onslaught of the disease.

The innovation of the Houston community contributed nationally as well, alongside its counterparts in New York and San Francisco.

Since historians have yet to develop community studies with AIDS as a central focus, the secondary resources will be interspersed with the substantial contributions that scholars from the fields of medicine, sociology, and even journalism have provided.32 Contemporary literature on AIDS continues to be dominated by the work of sociologists. Historians are only now beginning to contribute and raise pertinent questions, the examination of which may permit us to more fully understand the response to the crisis. Thus far, the work has fallen into two categories: AIDS service organizations and AIDS activism. Studies on the former reveal a group of organizations formed by gay men and lesbians and staffed primarily by volunteers. These groups promoted education and provided social services in the gap that existed before government agencies began to contribute.

The latter category has been dominated by arguments that place blame for the lack of urgency and inaction toward AIDS on the government, the gay community, the

32 John-Manuel Andriote, Victory Deferred: How AIDS Changed Gay Life in America (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1999); Douglas Crimp, AIDS Demo Graphics (Seattle: Bay Press, 1990); Barbara Epstein, Political Protest and Cultural Revolution: Nonviolent Direct Action in the 1970’s and 1980’s (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and Oxford: University of California Press, 1991); Kayal, Bearing Witness; Nancy Krieger and Margo Glen, ed., AIDS: The Politics of Survival (Amityville, New York: Baywood Publishing Company, Inc., 1994); Michael Morgan and Susan Leggett, ed., Mainstream(s) and Margins: Cultural Politics in the 90s (Westport, Connecticut and London: Greenwood Press, 1996); David Roman, Acts of Intervention (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1998); Randy Schilts, And the Band Played On (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1987).

African American and Hispanic communities, or American society in general. In order to minimize the limitations of such a stark delineation, Jennifer Brier, in her political history of the AIDS crisis, utilized the term AIDS workers in reference to anyone who came forward to help and involve themselves with AIDS work. The term is perfectly suitable for this study as well.33

The story in Houston is one where, as in the tradition already established by the highly successful work of their GPC, the LGBT community possessed the knowledge, capability, and more importantly, the inclination and confidence, to organize and harness the resources of financial generosity and volunteerism from within their own community. First, they sought to disseminate educational information, then they began to raise money for research, and then in the absence of any social welfare system to deal with the problems created by such a medical disaster, they established an extensive social service program. All was based on the benevolence of their own community as the authorities had refused to even recognize the need.

It was 1990 before the federal government finally realized this and made their first significant response and funding outlay with the passage of the Ryan

White Comprehensive AIDS Resource Act (CARE Act), the National Affordable

Housing Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act. 34 The CARE Act was designed to provide emergency funding to localities that were disproportionately affected by

33 Jennifer Brier, Infectious Ideas: U.S. Political Responses to the AIDS Crisis (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 4.

34 “Congress passes AIDS bill,” The Houston Chronicle, 27 September 1990; “AIDS bill ok’d; city to get funds,” The Houston Chronicle, 27 October 1990, A, 4.

HIV and to make funds available to states for the “development, organization, coordination, and operation of more effective and cost efficient systems for the delivery of essential services.”35 The second bill, the National Affordable Housing

Act, authorized funds to house people with AIDS or PWAs. This would reduce the costs of hospital and institutional care. The Americans with Disabilities Act prevented discrimination toward PWAs to protect their jobs, and housing. Then, it was through the institutions and organizations initiated by the LGBT community that the resources were to be allocated and utilized.

The dissertation is arranged chronologically and into five chapters. Chapter one, “From the GLF to the GPC: The Shift in Gay and Lesbian Activism in Houston,” will explore the postwar era and demonstrate that lesbians and gay men in Houston were organized both socially and politically during this time. By 1955 the Dianas, a group consisting mostly of gay men had organized strictly for social reasons and had begun a tradition of annual parties to celebrate the Academy Awards. The first group to form out of the prospect of affecting social change was the Prometheon

Society. They came and went in the last half of the 1960s but not without making some headway in reducing police harassment and repression.

Following Stonewall, students at the University of Houston formed a chapter of the Gay Liberation Front in 1971 and structured it after GLF New York. Its radical enthusiasm was replaced by the more pragmatic idealism of the national gay rights movement of the 1970s resulting in the formation of the GPC by 1975. The chapter will reveal that by the end of this era, a community had emerged in Houston that

35 Chambre, Fighting, 105.

was well enough organized to achieve recognition as a formidable force, not only among local politicians, but in the national media as well.

Chapter two, “AIDS in Houston, 1981-1984: The Initial Response,” recounts how the disease first manifested itself in the Houston area. It demonstrates that the lesbian and gay community, at first in cooperation with a small contingency of doctors at M.D. Anderson Cancer Center, reacted immediately to take action when no local, county, state, of federal entity would. The organizational base they had created in the 1970s provided a foundation from which they easily developed a viable response to the disease as it swept into Houston. They had allies in the medical community, but innovation, power, and money, all came from within.

Chapter Three, “Politics, AIDS, and the New Right Backlash of 1985,” presents the political history of the AIDS crisis in Houston beginning with the fierce external attack in 1984 and 1985 that threatened to nullify the gains that Houston’s

LGBT population had grown to take for granted. For one, gays and lesbians had achieved the freedom to congregate in public without fear of police harassment and arrest. At the same time, the community enjoyed support from and access to elected officials at the top of the city’s government. Many of these officials were in office due to the support of the movement’s GPC. In the mid-eighties, this all became endangered as the well-organized political activism from the right utilized AIDS as a medium to create fear and promote discrimination.

The right-wing backlash, not unlike the reaction in Dade County, Florida, over a similar antidiscrimination law, seems to have passed quickly and without achieving its desired intentions. From a broader prospective, the very minimal

effect of the 1985 political battle seems to have been negligible in the time-line of

LGBT activism and more of an opportunity seized by those wishing to unseat and end Kathy Whitmire’s stint as mayor (1982-1991). There is no denying that this process, however, did interfere with the city’s resources for confronting the AIDS crisis.

Chapter Four, “1985-1986: Discovery, Definition, and Next Steps,” covers the mid-decade. The discovery of the virus that causes AIDS, along with the ability to test for transmission, began to give definition and direction to the crisis. Local organizations, still relying mostly on their own innovation, leadership, and support, continued to form into the broader-based AIDS service organizations that they remain today. At the time, these organizations continued to hold the leadership role even as the local governments began to take definitive steps to direct or provide a response to the exponentially compounding numbers that were being stricken with

AIDS.

Chapter Five, “Toward a Manageable Chronic Disease, 1987-1990,” reveals the AIDS movement’s adaptability to address the rapidly changing characteristics of the complex disease they were facing. It had spread far beyond the bounds of their own, had continued to wreak havoc on more and more areas of people’s lives. They met challenges innovatively and successfully. Elected officials were divided over whether AIDS was a health or human rights issue, or one of gay rights. This divisiveness created an impasse that resulted in a slow and inadequate reaction to the crisis. They formed committees and applied for grants. The money was conditional, however, and required that local community groups, already

established, be included in the grants. Instead of conforming to these requirements, the competing committees and organizations in Houston and Harris County continued to present a front in Washington, D.C. that lacked unity and ignored the work of the established community AIDS movement there. Consequently, in the meantime, the Houston AIDS movement remained at the helm of the leadership and productive response in Houston remained.

The dissertation raises many questions concerning the response in Houston.

What reasons can be offered to explain why Houston’s governmental action was so slow and inadequate, especially when compared to cities with much lower case loads? How directly related is this to Houston’s location in the conservative South?

How much can actually be attributed to the city’s mid-1980s political climate? Why was the AIDS community’s nationally recognized work so poorly embraced by the local governmental agencies when they finally began planning their proposals? Did the AIDS movement in Houston that was so well initiated and sustained by the city’s

LGBT community for the early to mid-years of the epidemic affect the necessary outreach to individuals and communities beyond those who comfortably identified as gay? How does this reflect on the expansion of the response in Houston to spread outward of the white, male, middle-class, gay community? Did the LGBT community’s programs demonstrate a methodology that maintained the ideals of the gay liberation movement? Were the initial responses aimed at treating the illness individual by individual or did the community recognize the important relationships between the disease, race, class, and inner city crime-related

problems? Did the movement’s actions demonstrate an assault on the decade’s burgeoning strength of conservatism?

Whether these questions can be answered adequately in the first and only project on Houston’s LGBT community and its reaction to the crisis does not affect the importance of these chapters. Similar questions need to be asked of other cities besides the coastal meccas of New York and San Francisco. I argue that Houston’s

LGBT community created and led a response that contributed nationally. It established a foundation and framework that still exists today. This longevity may best be explained by the Houston AIDS movement’s recognition that the disease had quickly spread beyond the borders of its own, followed by their willingness to make the adjustments necessary to sustain their relevance in the dramatically changed landscapes that AIDS created as it expanded. This study may also reveal some of the

South’s characteristics besides those of conservative intransigence. For in the end, the region’s capacity for benevolence and volunteerism prevailed, at least temporarily.

Chapter One

“From the GLF to the GPC: The Shift in Gay and Lesbian Activism in

1970s Houston”

On the evening of January 2, 1971, the University of Houston’s Gay Liberation

Front (GLF) staged a demonstration in front of a bar called the Red Room. The GLF, a social movement organization, was protesting the Red Room’s policies. This downtown Houston establishment was one of the city’s leading gay bars raising the question of why a gay rights group would lead such a protest. The GLF objected to the bar’s racial segregation policies. GLF participants handed out legal sized flyers printed with the following:

BOYCOTT THE RED ROOM - The Gay Liberation Front of Houston regrets that the gay brothers and sisters of Houston are not together. The management of a local Gay Bar, the Red Room unfortunately refuses service to blacks. The discriminatory actions of the Red Room management are clearly racist moves that are a continuation of the repressive and racist attitudes of white Houstonians. These racist attitudes oppress all gays as long as the Red Room and others discriminate against blacks. Disposal of oppressive attitudes is a necessity and demand. We are all prisoners of the Amerikan death culture.36

The bar’s management notified the Houston police, complaining of the protest that was underway in front of their establishment. This action introduced more irony into the situation because law enforcement officers routinely harassed homosexuals as they sought places to meet and socialize.

36 “GLF Pickets Gay Bar,” Nuntius, January 1971, 1.

The incident at the Red Room provides evidence that Houston’s gay liberation movement was in the same fledgling state as other large U.S. cities at this time. The Stonewall riots had occurred just two years earlier in New York. On the evening of June 28, 1969, the patrons of the Stonewall Inn, a gay bar, refused to yield compliantly to another police raid. Their action led to the riots that have become synonymous with the beginning of the gay liberation movement.37

In the years immediately following the Stonewall Riots, there was a frenzy of gay liberation activity throughout the nation. On the eve of the riots there were 50 gay and lesbian social change organizations in existence. Four years later in 1973, there were at least 800. 38 Most cities with large gay and lesbian subcultures contained activists demanding radical revolutionary change to the heteronormative social structure that yielded no less than harsh discrimination toward homosexuals.

As the 1970s progressed, these radical elements gave way to savvier political organizing that has come to be termed the gay rights movement. Utilizing the language of the civil rights movement and the women’s movement, as well as the identity politics methodology of those same groups, these newer organizations had much greater success at gaining more influential places in the decision-making arenas of local and national government. The incident at the Red Room in Houston,

37 David Carter, Stonewall: The Riots that Sparked the Gay Revolution (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2004). See also Marc Stein, City of Sisterly and Brotherly Loves: Lesbian and Gay Philadelphia, 1945-1972 (Philadelphia, Penn.: Temple University Press, 2004), 289-90. Stein presents discussion on what effect the riots may have actually had on lesbian and gay liberation.

38 John D’Emilio, The World Turned: Essays in Gay History, Politics, and Culture (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2002), 83.

however, exposes the contradictions and deep-seated differences that existed in the subculture at the beginning of the decade. The GLF’s attempts at political activism lacked the needed direction and consensus on clearly defined goals.

The GLF, an on campus organization at the University of Houston, called itself

“a political group.” Liberation “from oppression and suppression, both that which comes from within ourselves and that which come from oppressive forces” was its primary goal. “We are gay. Getting our heads together. Loving one another. We will be free.” 39 Such idealistic goals could not adequately represent the Houston community, at least overall. Gays in Houston comprised, as they do today, a large and diverse community with members at various stages of confronting their sexualities. While some were college students and might identify with a movement such as the GLF, others held business or professional jobs that would not permit it.

Still further would be the vast majority of the subculture who lacked any interest in creating an entire identity based on their sexual object choice.

By the middle 1970s, however, another group known as the Gay Political

Caucus (GPC) emerged, which could stand for far greater numbers of gay

Houstonians. It employed a combination of moderate and radical tactics. They provided alternatives for those wanting to be involved discreetly as well as work for those desiring to be front and center in the public eye. It became the successful

39 Ibid., 4.

framework and established the organizing tradition that would make Houston’s

AIDS response remarkable.40

As seen in the contrast between the GLF and the GPC, Houston provides an ideal case study for examining the progression of gay and lesbian rights during this period. This chapter will focus on the rise in and necessary evolution of the political power of the gay and lesbian community from the radical GLF in 1971 to the more politically savvy GPC later in the decade. Not unlike other gay social movement organizations in cities around the nation at that point, Houston lesbians and gays had discovered the value of power wielded from the inside, and of using the system rather than waging war against it. By the end of the 1970s, the GPC had established the foundation and developed a tried and true ability to reach greater and greater numbers of the same sex attracted community in Houston.41

Traditional dating of the decades, though, does not work for this topic.42

When looked at from the prospective of gay rights activism, the 1970s begins with the year 1969 because of Stonewall and ends with the year 1982 because of the expanding AIDS epidemic. The years between 1969 and 1982 show important

40 There are parallels to the grassroots organizing tradition of the Civil Rights Movement. See Adam Fairclough, Better Day Coming: Blacks and Equality, 1890- 2000 (New York: Penguin Books, 2001); Charles M. Payne, I’ve Got the Light of Freedom: The Organizing Tradition and the Mississippi Freedom Struggle (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1995).

41 “Stereotypes…,” Houston Post, 25 Jun., 1978; “GPC,” 4 May 1980; Rick Barrs and Margaret Downing, “Well-Organized Gay Caucus Gaining Political Clout in the City,” Houston Chronicle, 22 November 1981.

42 Bruce Schulman, The Seventies: The Great Shift in American Culture, Society, and Politics (Boston, Mass.: Da Capo Press, 2002), xvi. Schulman referred to the long seventies as the fifteen years from 1969 to 1984.

characteristics. The radical, revolutionary organizations that called for gay liberation dissolved, and in their wake came driven, sharply focused groups that utilized the established political system to work toward their goals.

As the scholarship on gay communities continues to develop and illuminate the more distant past, with a closer examination of Houston in the 1970s one observes a critical time period.43 According to one historian, by the end of the

1970s there had been a transition from 1960’s “shouts of gay power” to that of lobbying for rights.44 Impossible to imagine at the time, in Houston or anywhere else for that matter, this shift would provide the ideal foundational experience for the extreme challenges that would be brought in the AIDS crisis.

Pre-Stonewall Houston

The radical gay rights activism of the early 1970s did not exist in a vacuum but instead was linked to midcentury development within this gay community.

By 1965 the communities that had formed and grown around the country through the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s had achieved the skill to negotiate directly with the police, civic leaders, and lawmakers and function together as an articulate social and

43 These are examples of studies on community organization before and up to the 1970s. Martin Meeker, Contacts Desired: Gay and Lesbian Communications and Community, 1940s-1970s (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 2006); George Chauncey, Gay New York: Gender, Urban Culture, and the Making of the Gay Male World, 1890-1940 (New York: Basic Books, 1994); John D’Emilio, Sexual Politics, Sexual Communities: The Making of a Homosexual Minority in the United States, 1940-1970 (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1983); Allan Berube, Coming Out Under Fire: The History of Gay Men and Women in World War Two (New York: Free Press, 1990).

44 James T. Sears, Rebels, Rubyfruit, and Rhinestones: Queering Space in the Stonewall South (New Brunswich, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 2001), 304.

political electorate.45 Elizabeth Kennedy and Madeline Davis in Boots of Leather,

Slippers of Gold, a book on the Buffalo, New York community, adopted the term

“prepolitical.” They cited the British social historian, Eric Hobsbawm, who had used prepolitical to demonstrate a difference between political activities that ‘“are part of distinctly political institutions’ and ‘social acts of resistance that haven’t yet crystallized into political institutions.’” 46 This term allows the reader to make a distinction between the political movement organizations and the larger adjacent communities that were viably active, even if little more than bar-centered associations.

Similar circumstances existed in Houston. James Sears wrote that in the late

1960s, “aside from the mostly straight-owned gay bars and the hundred or so ‘A-list’ gay men who hosted the Diana Awards, a parody of the Oscars, there were mostly closeted individuals, some of whom displayed the southern fondness of eccentricity.”47 The first known organized group in Houston was strictly a social organization. Since it officially began in 1954 and has met continuously since then, members consider it to be the longest surviving gay organization in the country. It was never directly involved in political activism. This group, called the Dianas, originated when a florist, David Moncrief threw an evening cocktail party for a few

45 Elizabeth Kennedy and Madeline Davis, Boots of Leather and Slippers of Gold: The History of a Lesbian Community (New York and London: Routledge, 1993), 6.

46 Ibid., 11; Eric Hobsbawm, Social Bandits and Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movement in the 19th and 20th Centuries (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1959).

47 Sears, Rebels, Rubyfruit, 53.

gay friends to watch the Academy Awards on television in 1953. The first official meeting was the next year.48 In 1977 it became a 501(C)(3) charitable organization and has continued its tradition not only of hosting social functions but of being a major contributor to LGBT causes in the area.49

Houston resident, Kay Van Cleeve, remembered being present at their third official event, now known as Diana Three. Her recollections offer insight not only into the Diana organization itself, but also into what life was like in mid-century for some of Houston’s same sex attracted population. She revealed a society strongly divided by class, race, and gender. Additionally, strongly committed to keeping their lives secretive, they had few if any aspirations to become involved politically against sexuality based discrimination.50

She described becoming involved with this group as coming out and into a secret world where a group of wealthy and influential gay men who had jobs in banking, energy firms, or owned their own businesses. Significant was that few of these men or their female associates held concerns for political activism toward gay and lesbian rights.51 A male-centered world, they were only concerned with

48 Brandon Wolf, “The Dianas Part I,” Outsmart Magazine, March 2010, http://outsmartmagazine.com/2010/03/the-dianas-part-one/, (accessed June 12, 2013).

49 Brandon Wolf, “The Dianas Part II,” Outsmart Magazine, April 2010, http://outsmartmagazine.com/2010/04/the-dianas-part-two/; (assessed June 12, 2014).

50 Van Cleeve interview, July 6, 2010.

51 For more on lesbian and gay groups existing out of the purpose of formal political organization, see Esther Newton, Cherry Grove Fire Island: Sixty Years in America’s First Gay and Lesbian Town (Boston: Beacon Press, 1993); Chauncey, Gay New York.

enjoying their private social lives while maintaining their existence as a tightly held secret. Already known as the “A Group” within the larger gay world of Houston, they were choosey about their friends and anyone “flamboyant who might draw attention” was not accepted.52 The men mixed with attractive, well-dressed, most often lesbian women, who could accompany them to business affairs. The men and women dated in foursomes so as to appear as heterosexual couples. The ruse was important as they often appeared in the society pages of the newspapers.53

Van Cleeve revealed that there were no overtly identifiable homosexuals or people of color in this social milieu. This statement signified that they were serious about conforming to the rigid gender and racial norms of the times, a system that would have been even more extreme in the South. She commented that gay black men were only around if they were brought by white men as dates. She claimed that black lesbians were never seen and that feminist lesbians stayed out of sight as well.

According to Kay, gay males had limited contact with the lesbian community.54

Kay insisted class divisions were prevalent as well and the same in the gay world and in the South overall. They held high considerations for money, looks, clothes, and where one lived. They had little association with working-class women, and saw them only occasionally when they went out dancing.

52 Van Cleeve interview.

53 Van Cleeve interview.

54 Van Cleeve interview.

Kay shared that by the time of the first gay pride parade in 1979 she suddenly realized “the importance of the bull dykes, the drag queens, and the go-go boys.”55 A Gay Pride Week was held in conjunction with a Gay Pride Conference held by the GLF on the UH campus in 1971. She admits now that it was those who were “on the edge that brought about the positive changes in the lives of gay people, not the people of her group who were all dressed up, drinking martinis, and hidden in someone’s house.” She remembers them thinking then that “that was someone else’s stuff to do.”56 Now she feels that their attitude had been arrogant and unnecessary.

A few gay men and lesbians in Houston did have concerns for making their lives free from the repression, particularly of local law enforcement. They began to experiment with small-scale political activism. Houston’s “ragtag band of committed individuals” formed their first formal political group in 1968. Three soon to be activists, Ray Hill, David Patterson, and Rita Wanstrom created an organization to serve as a support group for gays in the city. The group was known as the Prometheon Society.57

55 Van Cleeve interview. Bull dyke is a term for lesbians exhibiting masculine, aggressive appearance. Drag queen refers to a man demonstrating exaggerated feminine action and dress. Go-go boy refers to male dancers entertaining at discotheques and parades.

56 Van Cleeve interview.

57 It is important to realize that a study of homosexual social organization is incomplete when the more highly organized homophile groups become the sole focus. Consideration must be given to the loosely configured bar communities that existed in and around many more cities and towns in the U.S. See Kennedy and Davis, Boots of Leather.

Wanstrom had some activist experience before the three met. Vice police had raided her Roaring Sixties bar and several lesbians were arrested for “cross dressing.” In actuality they were wearing fly-front pants. (Hill was eventually able to get the mayor to agree to end this type of harassment.) After her bar was raided 2 months in a row, she and others of those arrested joined to raise $2500 to place attorney Percy Foreman on retainer in the event of the next raid.58 They called themselves the Tumblebugs and would stand in court to fight this type of persecution.

At Wanstrom’s invitation, the three met at the Roaring Sixties and named themselves the Prometheon Society after Prometheus, the Greek god known for bringing fire and light to mortals. Wanstrom chose Ray Hill because of his appearance on a local television show, “The Last Word” that featured a discussion on homosexuality. Hill had arranged to be interviewed on the show in conjunction with a Channel 13 program entitled “Houston-Galveston: Sodom and Gomorrah.”59

Hill had learned of the anti-homosexual film documentary when he noticed a film crew photographing people coming and going from the Upstairs, a private club he ran after-hours. Wanstrom was impressed as he debated a Baptist minister, a psychiatrist, and an officer from the city juvenile department. Wanstrom selected

David Patterson knowing that he had arrived in Houston familiar with the

58 Foreman, the Houston defense attorney, was most known for his defense of James Earl Ray in the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. James Barron, “Percy Foreman, Texas Lawyer, 86; Defended the Assassination of Dr. King,” New York Times, 26 August 1988.

59 Sears, Rebels, Rubyfruit, 54.

homophile groups of other cities around the country and had noted Houston’s readiness for organized activism.60

Each of the three assumed a role in the new organization. Patterson created the Prometheon’s bylaws using the constitution of his college fraternity as a model.

Wanstrom and Hill made the Tumblebugs day in court their first project. Wanstrom prepared the judicial aspects for the upcoming trial. For his contribution, Hill was able to get an audience with the mayor’s assistant. Mayor Louie Welch (1964-1973) and his close political associates regularly met at the Red Room bar but only, as they said, “before queer hours.”61 As word about the lesbian raid spread, Hill received a secret summons to meet with the mayor’s assistant Larry McKaskle at City Hall.

McKasle agreed to look into the lesbian bar raids.

When Wanstrom and the Tumblebugs appeared for court, their case was dismissed as the arresting vice-officers failed to appear. The sergeant on the case was transferred to the Narcotics Division and the bar was never bothered again. The small, haphazard organization had discovered the art of negotiating with police and lawmakers.62

The Prometheons were not the first Texas political organization of lesbians and gay men. A small group in Dallas had formed the Circle of Friends in 1965. Both organizations were members of the North American Conference of Homophile

Organizations (NACHO). NACHO was a first attempt, although short-lived, for gays

60 Sears, Rebels, Rubyfruit, 55.

61 Sears, Rebels, Rubyfruit, 55.

62 Sears, Rebels, Rubyfruit, 55.

and lesbians to create a nation-wide association.63 The loose federation of groups encouraged common projects such as a national legal fund that financed court cases on bar closings, the exclusion of homosexual immigrants, and rights of gay military personnel. Most importantly, they provided a platform upon which militants could demand equality, polish protest techniques, and push for the rejection of the medical model.64

The Post-Stonewall Climate in Houston

It is difficult to consider the nature of the gay social movement organizations in Houston in the early 1970s without noting their disparate goals and lack of concrete plans for outcomes. Some utilized rhetoric focused around concepts such as “freedom” or “better self-image.” Most failed to relate to more than small factions of the larger community. Integrity Houston (IH) formed in 1970, and the GLF formed in 1971 and introduced earlier in the chapter are two of the social movement organizations that are presented here as examples. Neither organization was able to meet the needs of a majority of the homosexual community in Houston.

But, introducing these two greatly differing groups will reveal the varying nature of

63 D’Emilio, World Turned, 197.

64 John-Manuel Andriote, Victory Deferred: How AIDS Changed Gay Life in America (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 28. Before 1973, the American Psychiatric Association classified homosexuality as an official mental illness. Ethicist Ronald Bower relates the change to a combination of science and politics. He offered that “secular society” would no longer be able to justify discriminatory practices.

the activist community there and add explanation to the GPC’s success. All of the organizations, however, including those of the 1950s and 1960s, were crucial in the evolutionary process of the organizing tradition that would eventually culminate in the success of the city’s AIDS movement.

This pattern was evident in other cities around the United States. On July 31,

1969, following the one-month anniversary of the Stonewall Riots, the Gay

Liberation Front emerged in New York and other major cities with a militant posture to replace the older homophile brand of gay organizing.65 It stressed being out in public concerning one’s sexual orientation. The new generation expected action as opposed to talk when it came to addressing change. The appeal of resisting the sexual lifestyles that had been imposed on them by society caused chapters to emerge in Los Angeles, San Francisco, and other cities and small towns around the nation. As John D’Emilio explained: “Gay liberation used the demonstrations of the New Left as recruiting grounds and appropriated the tactics of confrontational politics for its own ends.”66 The name was derived from South

Vietnam’s National Liberation Front that had formed to overthrow the South

Vietnamese government in order to reunify North and South Vietnam. The new gay radicals chose this name to convey the drastic politics of the group. The organization intended affiliation with other conventionally minority populations

65 Van Gosse, Rethinking, 177.

66 D’Emilio, Sexual Politics, 233; for a recounting of many militant demonstrations from these years see, Donn Teal, The Gay Militants (New York: Stein and Day, 1971).

such as straight women, U.S. non-whites, and colonized people in other countries around the world.67

This new spirit did not confine itself to New York. The wave of energy spread throughout the country. Somehow, this small event instigated the realization in many homosexuals that the revolution of change occurring in adjacent areas of society actually applied to them as well. All across the United States groups formed to demand and attempt to force society to acknowledge them and their entitlement to the same equal rights as every other group. By 1971, a chapter of the GLF had formed in Houston. Their demonstration in front of the Red Room on that January night in 1971 had been their scheme to participate and contribute in the movement aspiring to overthrow the oppressive structure of society.

As the 1970s began in Houston, however, the Prometheons of the 1960s were falling apart. But regardless of their brevity the group had successfully been able to negotiate with police and consequently created a somewhat safer atmosphere in the bars. Prior to their efforts and remaining true afterwards, gay

Houstonians regularly feared arrest when visiting favorite bars. The raid on

Wanstom’s bar was only one example. Later, in 1979 and in 1980, police raided the popular gay bar Mary’s during Gay Pride Festivities. On one such occasion, police carried sixty-one to jail on various charges.68

67 Van Gosse, Rethinking, 177; Vicki L. Eaklor, Queer America: A GLBT History of the 20th Century (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2008), 124.

68 Barbara Canetti, “1,000 Protest,” Houston Post, 3 Jun 1980.

Even so, it had become significantly safer to socialize in bars and this presented a two-edged sword for liberation activism in the new decade. Now that gays and lesbians could more safely meet in bars, many became less compelled to risk “coming out” further. This majority considered their jobs and the rest of their lives more important than attempting the gamble that was being imposed by the radical groups. Marching in the street was not a priority. With this as a consideration, what sort of organization would be able to represent them in

Houston? Discussions of this and similar issues ignited in the prolific gay press that was growing in Houston.69

An editorial in Houston’s Nuntius noted some questions that were oft-heard during this period: “Oh, I think they’re going too far; they’re just antagonizing everybody” or “Why don’t they stop rocking the boat-all they do is attract a lot of attention to us, I think its better if the straights don’t know so much about us.”

Nuntius editor Jim Lloyd, saw these conversations as evidence of change and reminded his readers that social change had never occurred without a “lot of people being antagonized.”70

On the broader political stage, they needed to address more serious problems to foment lasting change. Foremost, how could they work toward eliminating the discriminatory legal constraints placed on their sexuality? In 1973 the Texas legislature had updated the state penal code to exclude heterosexual oral

69 Local newspapers and bar guides included the Upfront, Pointblank Times, Nuntius, Contact, This Week in Texas, the Montrose Star, and the Montrose Voice.

70 Nuntius, January 1971.

and anal sexual activity from the definition of sodomy while those relations between members of the same sex remained a criminal offense. The resulting Section 21.06 made homosexual conduct a Class C misdemeanor and therefore punishable by a fine of up to two hundred dollars. In Lawrence v. Texas, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in 2003 that state laws criminalizing private sexual activity between consenting adults on the basis of morality were unconstitutional since there is a lack of sufficient justification for state interest in such a matter. Before 2003, though, relationships between same sex partners were illegal. This allowed for police harassment of homosexuals and discrimination in hiring practices as well.71 How could they go about solving the job discrimination problem? Could these reforms be accomplished with most of the community hidden behind the lines?

When the Gay Liberation Front formed at the University of Houston it was not well received by everyone in the community it received the same negative press shown from the Nuntius. Editorial content in Houston’s Nuntius offered glimpses of the GLF’s reception within the local gay community. The column called “The Gay

Guard” spoke very negatively of the GLF by referring to its “goon-squad tactics and their cowardly, anonymous threats to destroy the property and businesses of their fellow gays who do not agree with them.”72

It had the same radical attitudes of the GLF in New York and other cities across the nation in the early days immediately following Stonewall. The group met

71 Dale Carpenter, Flagrant Conduct: The Story of Lawrence v. Texas (New York and London: W.W. Norton, 2012), 25.

72 Nuntius, January 1971, 3.

on Tuesdays at the University of Houston student union building. The organization’s Statement of Purpose and Demands exposed its 1960s radical bent.

An examination of the document revealed anarchistic rhetoric but few specific proposals for confronting the community’s most urgent needs. It did not offer solutions for police harassment, job discrimination, or the penal code that outlawed the existence of homosexual relationship. It provided no realistic structured method for carrying out the reforms that they were seeking. The group “adopted an agenda that included dismantling the judicial system in favor of a ‘people’s court,’ abolishing the nuclear family, and repudiating organized religion for its genocide on gays.”73 GLF members also demanded that they had the “right to free physiological change and modification of sex upon demand.” It demanded a modification in language “so that no gender take priority,” that “technology be used to liberate all people of the world from drudgery,” and that “military oppression both at home and abroad end immediately.”74

According to a statement in the Daily Cougar, the University of Houston student newspaper, in February of 1971, the organization consisted of thirty to forty people “trying to awaken others in this area to self liberation.”75 The GLF employed phrases such as “loving one another” and “we will be free.” The rhetoric was devoid of tangible purpose and goals. The 1960s revolutionary jargon was off-putting to

73 Sears, Rebels, Rubyfruit, 64.

74 GLF Statement of Purposes and Demands in Nuntius, January 1971.

75 “UH recognizes Gay Liberation; ‘times – they are a’ changing,” Daily Cougar, 28 January 1971.

people in the gay male community. In another article called “A View of the GLF” a reader responded by proposing the question as to why the Front had chosen to liberate all people, even those that seemingly had no concern for gays. He continued, “The Front has taken upon itself the task of liberating all people: Blacks,

Housewives, Political Dissenters, Mexican-Americans, Indians, etc. I do not believe that it is fair for this group of people to call themselves GAY when that is but a small part of their activities.”76 This was a common question being asked at the time.

Activist groups of the post-Stonewall type often supported too many battles and consequently lacked a solid focus on that of gay liberation. The GLF sought to involve themselves in civil rights and anti-war issues as well.77 Indeed, this same lack of direction and consequent confusion had plagued the New Left as well.

In September 1971 the Houston GLF proposed “positive programs” that included a range of everything from gay charity groups to “actively confronting political powers.” Some members envisioned gay liberation as an established system where they could live as a “society within a society, with its own rules and terms.” Others defined their greatest concern to be the legal constraints imposed on their sexual freedom. A majority reportedly favored activism and a “political actions committee was formed to ‘ZAP’ political candidates.” This tactic entailed frequently confronting candidates with questions concerning gays. The spokesperson for the group also noted that plans were being made for the November anti-war march

76 Ibid.

77 “UH recognizes Gay Liberation; ‘times – they are a’ changing,” Daily Cougar, 28 January 1971.

being held in Houston. 78 According to this broad agenda, gay liberation was but a fraction of the GLF’s goals. Even though participation in all of these various events could provide exposure for the group, being members of an antiwar march would not likely cause society to view gays and lesbians more favorably.

In early June of 1971, the GLF hosted a Gay Pride Conference on campus in conjunction with Gay Pride Week.79 Participants dubbed the conference “a process of political and social action around its member’s needs.” The GLF asserted their intentions to “build more meaningful lives without shame or guilt.” But while the

GLF sought to contribute to the community in a positive manner, they created controversy as well. Frank Kameny, activist and candidate for U.S. Congress, spoke at the rally. Kameny was known for rejecting the accomodationist tactics of the homophile groups for more militant approaches. Tina Mandel, a gay feminist, also addressed the attendees claiming that, “Women’s lib will liberate the men and gay lib will liberate the heterosexuals.” The vague goals and intentions seen here once again aid in understanding the group’s short-lived existence. Publicity surrounding the conference brought attention of state representatives. Local members of the

Texas House questioned whether the on-campus activities had made inappropriate use of state funds. Using these funds for political activities was considered to be a violation of Section 4 of the House Appropriations Bill. Using this as justification,

78 Nuntius, September 1971, 2.

79 Daily Cougar, 24 June 1971.

Houston Republican Representative A.S. Bowers began a personal investigation that was aimed at GLF, Women’s Liberation, and an anti-war group.80

As the decade progressed, the radical, militant nature of the movement began to change around the nation. The community’s less than favorable response to the

GLF’s priorities and actions reveal that they would require another style of activism to solidify a substantial movement in Houston.

In 1970 the Houston community gave birth to another significant organization. Calling itself Integrity, it developed from a small group that had been meeting at the Holy Rosary Church on Travis each Sunday. It did not seek the radical restructuring of society planned by the GLF. Their pragmatic and realistic goals can be credited for their long-term survival. They established a gay speaker’s bureau and facilitated early screening programs for sexually transmitted diseases

(STDs) with the City Health Department. The directed the program specifically for the homosexual community.81

Integrity began when a group of gays approached a Catholic priest about having meetings at his church. Some gay Catholics in other cities were already functioning within Catholicism and forming religious chapters called Dignity. As it continued to expand beyond religious aims it became independent of the Catholic

Church. The organization in Houston renamed itself Integrity Houston (IH).82

80 Nuntius, December 1971, in Remington, 24.

81 Remington, 25.

82 Charles Gillis, “ Houston Gay Pride Program” (hereafter, Pride History), The Charles V. Botts Library and Resurrection Archives, Resurrection Metropolitan Community Church, Houston, Texas (hereafter Botts), 64-65.

Beyond the speaker’s bureau and the STD screenings mentioned above, they were the first to go before the Houston City Council to ask support for gay causes.83

They led the first efforts in the realm of interviewing political candidates. IH also helped form the Texas Gay Task Force (TGTF) in 1974.84

IH made their first true political strides by conducting a secret interview with mayoral candidate Fred Hofheinz (1974-1978) on October 28, 1973. The members had invited three of the mayoral candidates to attend private interviews in advance of the December 4 elections. Hofheinz accepted, came to the closed-door session alone, and conversed openly with them for an hour. The members asked for four main points of reform: equal consideration in hiring for civil service jobs, an end to police harassment, a liaison with the police department, and instruction in the police academy on sensitivity to minority issues.85 IH members left the meeting with new optimism and circulated flyers to twenty-five gay bars soliciting votes for the politician.

Hofheinz achieved a narrow victory of only 3000 votes. Gays claimed credit for the election. Hofheinz appointed a new police chief, C. M. Lynn. This turned out to be a positive factor in the ongoing battle with the Houston Police Department and

83 Remington, 25.

84 Jim Simmons, “Gays Told Things Are Better,” Houston Post, 6 Sept 1981, B-16; “Update: The Newsletter of the Houston GPC,” Vertical File, “Homosexuals 1978- 1982,” HMC. Various gay movement groups in cities around the state formed the TGTF to unify their goals and activities. It held its eighth annual Conference in Houston in June of 1981. It offered seminars on the history of gay liberation in Texas, homosexuality and the Bible, and political organizing.

85 “Integrity/Houston States Position,” Nuntius, January-February 1974.

their harassment of the homosexual community. Lynn promised not to raid the bars frequented by gays as long as nothing illegal going on.” 86 He reminded them that suspicion of illegal drug use or sexual conduct in an establishment such as a bar would instigate police involvement.

In general, the gay community saw the group as a throwback to or continuation of the homophile movement philosophies of the 1950s. I/H did have commonalities with the homophile movements of the 1950s and 1960s that were introduced above. They preached the old Mattachine message, “What I do reflects on you. What you do reflects on me. What we do reflects on the entire gay community.” The group called on the bar crowd to practice “enlightened self interest” and continually reminded them of the frequent visits made by plainclothes vice officers.87 This pressure for respectability toward mainstream society had been an alienating flaw for many in the homophile groups of the earlier decades. These types of attitudes exerted a pressure that deterred potential members during the climate of the 1970s as well. It was not the ideal organizational outlet for many in

Houston in the 1970s either.88

IH founder Bill Buie attended the first statewide conference to launch reform efforts that was held in Ft. Worth in June of 1974. Upon returning to Houston, he wrote activist Frank Kameny about proposing a Houston municipal civil rights bill.

Houston would not act on this type of legislation for years. Regardless, the

86 Sears, Rebels, Rubyfruit, 173.

87 Sears, Rebels, Rubyfruit, 170.

88 Stein, City of Sisterly, 291.

momentum was present for a new type of organizing.89 As with GLF, though, but for different reasons, I/H did not have a broad enough appeal. The group’s basic nature did not provide representation for the majority of the community.90

Moderation Comes to the Decade

In December of 1969, a group of members of the New York GLF broke off to form the more moderate Gay Activist Alliance. These gays placed their focus on homosexual rights and political organizing for that cause rather “than the panoply of leftist issues championed by GLF’s band of gay hippies.”91 It sought refuge from the lack of direction and the radicalism of the GLF’s 1960’s approach, avowing a single focus – that of gay issues.92 The same had transpired in Philadelphia by 1971.93

Gays in Houston followed this pattern and the GLF at the university disbanded in

1973.94

By 1973, the national liberation movement began to moderate its tactics and rhetoric adding an emphasis on politics. The National Gay Task Force, the first group organizing for political goals on a national scale, formed in New York in 1973.

The NGTF is now the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force (NGLTF) and is based in

Washington, D.C. Its founding codirector Bruce Voeller said it sought “to reeducate

89 Ibid., 174.

90 Pride History, 65.

91 Andriote, Victory Deferred, 9.

92 Van Gosse, Rethinking, 178.

93 Stein, City of Sisterly, 357.

94 Pride History, 66.

society, including its homosexual members, to esteem gay men and women at their full human worth and to accord them places in society which will allow them to attain and contribute according to their full human and social potential.”95

Sociologist Elizabeth Armstrong attributes this change in attitude to the reduction in conflict between the radical and moderate factions of gay liberation that was made possible by the rapid decline of the New Left on the early 1970s. The

New Left’s demise, at that point, made a more radical agenda seem less viable. She argued that in the early 1970s, “gay activists integrated identity politics, interest group politics, and a growing commercial sexual subculture into a gay identity movement.”96 Same sex seeking people from around the nation flocked to the already established meccas and further populated the smaller, yet quickly developing gay neighborhoods such as the Montrose in Houston. Gay oriented businesses and services opened in response.97 As John D’Emilio wrote in Sexual

Politics, Sexual Communities, by the mid-1970s activists “created newspapers, magazines, health clinics, churches, multipurpose service centers, and specialized

95 Andriot, Victory Deferred, 12.

96 Elizabeth Armstrong, Forging Gay Identities: Organizing Sexuality in San Francisco, 1950-1994 (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 2002), xi, 1-5.

97 David Bell and Gill Valentine, eds., Mapping Desire: Geographies of Sexualities (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), 8; Manuel Castells, “Cultural Identity, Sexual Liberation, and Urban Structure: The Gay Community in San Francisco,” in The City and the Grassroots: A Cross-Cultural Theory of Urban Social Movements (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1983), 157; Deborah Bell, interview with John Goins, 7-29-2010; Alexandra Chasin, Selling Out: The Gay and Lesbian Movement Goes to Market (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), XV.

businesses – in short, a range of institutions that implies the existence of a separate, cohesive gay community.”98

In Houston, the first such organization was the Gay Political Coalition. It was initiated by the Montrose Gaze community center. The Gaze Center opened on inspiration of the Dallas Gay Pride Parade from June of that year and provided a meeting place for various gay and lesbian groups. For their first action they appeared before the city council in May of 1973 and asked that the last week in June be declared Gay Pride week. They requested that action be taken to end police harassment and to curb job discrimination within city hiring. The coalition went on to propose a citizens police review board and asked that they be recognized by the city Human Relations Council. Houston Mayor Louie Welch (1964-1973) walked out claiming urgency about a meeting with a Japanese delegation. The activists were shouted down by the infamous city councilman Frank Mann who said, “You’re abnormal. You need to see a psychiatrist instead of the city council.”99 Unfettered by such resistance, the group created an organized plan to distribute newsletters to their mailing list urging them to write letters to the representative when a pertinent bill came before the Texas legislature.100

In 1975, Gay Activist Alliance (GAA) formed on the University of Houston campus and received full campus recognition, something that the GLF had never

98 D’Emilio, Sexual Politics, 2.

99 Pride History, 66; Nuntius, May 1973.

100 Nuntius, May 1973.

enjoyed.101 In the constitution of the GAA one may learn of their goals and easily notice a turn from the radically bent notions of the GLF. GAA founders in Houston, as in other cities, “felt that none of the existing organizations were dealing adequately with the political side of Gay Liberation.”102 They claimed intent to address the needs of the entire gay population; not just at the University of Houston but also in the city’s community overall. They boasted a three-branch approach.

One was to address the social aspects of gay life by providing alternatives to bars such as discussions, dances, films, and speaker presentations. Next, in the political realm, they planned to oppose any group, institution, or faction in society that added to the oppression of the gay community. They intended to carry this out by any nonviolent means necessary.

Interestingly, however, they did not plan to endorse political candidates.

Their reasoning had been to avoid offending any faction in Houston’s diverse gay community. Thirdly, they would address the area of education. They intended to provide speakers, an information bureau, and to hold conventions to disseminate information to the Houston area about their struggle. They sought to work actively on the State Gay Rights Bill then before the state legislature in Austin. They claimed affiliation with the National Gay Task Force (NGTF) and on the state level, the Texas

Gay Conference III to be held on the Houston campus in June of that year.103

101 Daily Cougar, 14 April 1977.

102 GAA statement of purpose; Stein, City of Sisterly, 361.

103 “Statement of Purpose” and “Announcement,” Box 14, vertical file, GAA, CVB.

The GAA regularly published the Lambda Letter, their print link for informing the community of their activities. One such project, unprecedented in

Houston at that point, was a survey for local businesses. They were seeking to discover employers’ “attitudes toward gay employees, both present and perspective.” They were hoping to supplement data provided by a survey conducted by the National Gay Task Force (NGTF).104 In the editorial section of the first Lambda Letter, the publication committee implored participation by members and the community in order to make the group relevant for meeting all individuals’ needs.

In 1978, GAA changed its name to Gay Resource Services (GRS).105 The

Houston Pride program praised them for their service beyond the college community and participation in citywide events. In a “welcome” letter, the organization explained that they were seeking non-profit status. Since Houston had so many groups working with such varied interests and goals, their “sole interest was getting out the necessary information about our lifestyles to interested gays and non-gays.”106 GRS’s commitment to broad civil rights work, alongside their commitment to not exclude various other groups is seen clearly in a letter to the editor in the Daily Cougar. They addressed the information to any “Race, gender, color, creed, sexual, or affectional preference.”107 From a historical perspective,

104 “Lambda Letter,” 18 May 1976, 4, CVB.

105 Pride History, 66.

106 “Dear Friends Letter,” Vertical File UH, CVB.

107 Daily Cougar, 9 April 1979.

these groups demonstrated the evolution in group purposes and aims that formed a search for what might work effectively to unite the Houston community. The Gay

Political Caucus (GPC) formed in 1975 to accomplish this goal.

The GPC and Success

In the 1970s, the GPC, which formed mid-decade, proved to be a major and definitive achievement in the evolution of the gay and lesbian community in

Houston. Its formation and success marked a crucial shift in the solidarity of the gay and lesbian movement. It would focus narrowly on working through the political system to elect officials sympathetic and supportive of their goals. The energy and success is attributable not only to the decades-long liberation movement nationwide but to a few local long-time activists as well. For these Houstonians, their experience, knowledge, and foresight to understand the advantages of organized political activism predetermined their success. The GPC, unlike the groups before them, developed an appeal and culture whereby a much greater majority of the homosexual community became involved.

Their experience allowed them to realize that organizing to engage a far broader swath of the lesbian and gay community toward political activism would require tactics different from the radical attempts that had come before. The community had size and strength but could not be adequately represented by street demonstrations. Their business and professional careers maintained priority over social activism, especially in the conservative climate of Texas. Openness about one’s sexuality could get one fired in most professions. There was no legal

protection from discrimination based on sexual orientation. Harsh disapproval from friends and family members was also likely. Some attributed this necessary discretion to apathy. An I/H leader had made such a statement in 1973, alluding to the fact that as activists they represented what was arguably an invisible constituency.108

The Houston Chronicle interviewed some Houston homosexuals for an article in July 1979 and provided some real life examples of how they coped with the prejudice. It sought to juxtapose “average” gay citizens with those involved as activists. Brian Rogers, a bartender who considered himself to be “escapist vs. a pursuer of causes,” related that he had attended the Town Meeting I in 1978 and circulated “gay Bucks” as his contribution to the cause of liberation. Town Meeting I resulted because the many diverse Houston gay and lesbian organizations decided to formulate priorities and goals for local activism . The event was June 25, 1878 at

Astro Arena and attended by 3500 people.109 The participants adjourned but only after the intense labor that created a broad agenda of resolutions. These included considerations for handicapped homosexuals, the inclusion of women in gay organizations, job discrimination, internal discrimination issues, a civilian police review board, legal reform such as on 21:06, discrimination in the military, implementation of single member districts, public awareness, and religious unity.110

108 Sears, Rebels, Rubyfruit, 172.

109 Pride History, 68. “Gay Bucks” was a campaign to instigate awareness of the amount of money being circulated in the economy by gays. Bills were marked with colored ink before being used for purchases.

110Rick Barrs, “‘Sissy’ Urges Gays to Demand Rights,” Houston Post, 25 June 1978, A1.

Another woman spoke for herself and her partner and used a pseudonym out of fear further openness would threaten their jobs. They met at the rally to protest the Houston appearance of antigay conservative Anita Bryant in 1977. Typically, they considered the veil of secrecy necessary to avoid discrimination at work. While their landlord allowed them to live in a one-bedroom apartment together, they felt slighted at having no partner benefits from their employers.111 The GPC’s success depended on its being able to appeal to people of the varying circumstances seen above.

The GPC officially began with a press conference given on June 30, 1975. Ray

Hill, “Pokey” Anderson, Bob Falls, and Jerry Miller announced the formation of a new political organization to represent the gay and lesbian community in Houston. The

Houston Post, the Houston Chronicle, as well as local radio and television stations covered the event.112 Other than the press announcement, Hill had no official affiliation with the caucus at that point. He provided valuable knowledge and advice for the caucus, however, as he was a long-time Houston activist and one of the very few willing to go public with his sexuality. Pokey Anderson began her experience as an activist in 1973 after attending the first National Women’s Political Caucus

Convention at Houston’s Rice Hotel. This had been the first national convention of women in over 100 years. The caucus’s leaders would testify in Congress in support of issues that were prioritized at the convention. In addition to the feminist side of

111 David Lee, “Houston’s Growing Male and Female Gay Community,” Houston Chronicle, 1 July 1979.

112 Pride History, 66-67.

her work, she became involved at the Montrose Gaze Community Center, which she learned about in the sexual orientation workshop on the top floor of the Rice Hotel during the caucus convention.113 In the GPC, she represented the Houston lesbian community. Reverend Bob Falls was the leader of the newly founded Houston congregation of the Metropolitan Community Church of the Resurrection (MCCR).

The church had evolved from a small group of Christian gays that began meeting together in the summer of 1973 and then affiliated with the MCCR, which is today the oldest and largest community of churches primarily for LGBT persons. Jerry

Miller represented IH.114

The team became more formidable with the addition of Gary Van Ooteghem.

He was not acquainted with the others when they gave the press conference. He had been in Washington, D.C., meeting with Leonard Matlovich. Matlovich served three tours of duty in Vietnam where he earned a Purple Heart and a Bronze Star before he announced his homosexuality to his superiors. He was then in the process of resisting discharge from the military under an exclusion allowing outstanding homosexuals to continue service. Matlovich inspired Ooteghem, who held a lucrative job as assistant to the Harris County Treasurer Hartsell Gray. Returning to

Houston, Ooteghem informed his boss of his intention to appear before the county commission at their August 1, 1975 meeting and propose they adopt a regulation protecting the civil rights of homosexuals. His boss insisted he sign a letter acknowledging awareness that he was not to participate in political activities during

113 Sears, Rebels, Rubyfruit, 167-169.

114 Pride History, 66.

business hours. He refused to sign and was consequently dismissed from his job.

He filed against the city for job discrimination and eventually won his suit.

Ooteghem’s actions brought a large amount of publicity and quickly caught the attention of the founders of the GPC. At their invitation he became the caucus’s first president in February of 1976.115

The group appealed to new members through a philosophy that people should join to meet people, work on committees, and assist in the preservation of their rights. A GPC pamphlet from 1978 stressed that being “out of the closet” was not a priority. Members could work wherever and however they felt comfortable.

There were plenty of people “out front” already. They needed more people, and in any capacity, to help sustain an effective gay organization.116 The GPC was not seeking militant activists. The caucus represented the over-all community. The members of the GPC were interested in working within the system to bring about change in the ways the rest of society treated lesbians and gay men. The structure included a nine-member board of trustees elected from the membership.

Additionally, there were five elected offices, five appointed coordinators, and various committees for fundraising, public relations, and political action. There were also jobs for those not politically oriented. The caucus wanted for the lesbian and gay community to work together. The pamphlet stated that greater

115 Pride History, 67.

116 “No-On-Six Weekend Oct. 14-15-78, Press Packet,” Box, F-T, Vertical File, “Houston Gay Political Caucus,” Botts.. “Prop 6, also known as the Briggs Initiative,” referred to the California proposition to prevent lesbians and gays from teaching in California schools. See Rimmerman, From Identity, 129- 131.

involvement in lesbian programs could raise the consciousness of men on issues concerning the lesbian and feminist movement.117

In selecting candidates for endorsement, the caucus set sights on the repeal of 21.06 of the Texas penal code that made homosexual conduct a criminal offense.

The code was frequently used as a justification to deny employment and public accommodations to lesbians and gays. Police officers used the law as validation to continue harassment of gays and lesbians.118

The GPC officially incorporated on September 9, 1975. It held its first rally at

Cheryhurst Park in the Montrose neighborhood, on October 21 and 500 people and seven political candidates attended.119 During the first couple of years the group labored to establish itself in the community by mailing out surveys and soliciting candidates to endorse. In the beginning they had to “chase” candidates, as one spokesperson recalled in 1980. By that time, though, most office seekers were returning their surveys.120 The interview committees presented fifty questions to the candidates (sixty for mayoral candidates) in the course of a ninety-minute meeting. It grilled them on their ideas relating to the repeal of 21.06, gay and

117 Ibid.

118 Rick Barrs, “Stereotypes Remain but City Gays Gain Political Clout,” Houston Post, 25 June 1978.

119 Pride History, 67.

120 Barbara Canetti, “Gay Political Caucus,” Houston Post, 4 May 1980.

lesbian rights, women’s issues, city services, minority concerns, community development, and policies Houston Police Department.121

By 1977, its second full year, the GPC was well established in the Houston community and local candidates pursued their endorsement. It sought to break with the more radical efforts of the past that had failed to garner long lasting results in establishing a strong politically active LGBT community. The GPC offered voter education, registration, and candidate screening. Its moderate ideals can be seen in a policy statement: “Our approach is that we are reasonable people making legitimate complaints. We dress and speak like the people whose help we are seeking. Confrontation is avoided.”122

The year 1977 delivered measurable accomplishments for the GPC. They endorsed candidate Kathy Whitmire (who eventually served as mayor 1982-1991) and she won the City Controller race. The GPC accepted much of the credit. This victory proved that their bloc voting strategy could succeed at putting a candidate in a major office. As reported in the Houston Post, “City Gays Gain Political Clout,” the

GPC had achieved the ability to influence and win a citywide election. 123

The GPC did involve itself in more overt political activism at times. It supported the rally to protest the appearance of Anita Bryant to sing country and patriotic songs at the Texas Bar Association annual dinner. Some 3,000 gays and

121 “Screening – How It Works,” Update, Oct 1981, Box F-T, Vertical File, “Houston Gay Political Caucus,” Botts.

122 “1977 GPC Policy Statement” in Remington, 38.

123 Rick Barrs, “Stereotypes Remain but City Gays Gain Political Clout,” Houston Post, 25 June 1978.

their supporters marched peacefully by candlelight through part of downtown

Houston and ended with a rally in front of the Houston Public Library. Among others, David Goodstein, publisher of the Advocate, addressed the crowd. Bryant had waged a nation-wide anti-gay campaign beginning with the successful referendum that repealed job discrimination protection for homosexuals in Dade

County, Florida. Due to a coast-to-coast counter attack by gay rights advocates, unity and commitment among homosexual groups increased sharply.124

As for political involvement, Kay Van Cleeve recalls the Anita Bryant march in

1977 as being the first instance where she and other what she termed,

“underground people,” came out and marched in public. She remembered the strong feelings of empowerment as they walked toward City Hall that night.125 This march proved to be the defining moment in Houston’s LGBT organizational history.

Estimates of the numbers of attendees vary widely. Organizers expected around

500 but some claim that as many as 10,000 showed up. Telegrams of support from heterosexual celebrities were read to the crowd. These included Jane Fonda, Alan

Alda, Rob Reiner, and Ed Asner.126

Houston resident Robert Snellgrove said the march defined the 1970s in many ways. While he did not consider himself to be politically involved, he went to

124 Pride History, 68; Eric Marcos, Making Gay History: The Half-Century Fight for Lesbian and Gay Equal Rights (New York: Perennial, 2002), 188; John Howard, Men Like That: A Southern Queer History (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 235-236.

125 Van Cleeve interview.

126 Carpenter, Flagrant Conduct, 25.

the march and attested to its importance. It was “putting one’s self out there in a big way.”127 He said that many saw as it revolutionary. In hindsight he recalled it as one of the greatest moments in the LGBT community. “It was the peak in my mind of activism here,” he declared. He also spoke of the apparent inclusiveness and energy when unexpectedly, nuns and priests mingled in the crowd. Snellgrove argued that numbers were grossly underestimated. No one had any idea of the size of the gay community in Houston at the time and he said “the newspapers would not report it accurately.” The Bryant march provided an example of how organization in

Houston differed from that of New York and San Francisco. Houston had not had a

Stonewall or even anything similar. It was not customary for the community there to march in the streets and publicly display their existence and solidarity. This march was not only self-defining for them, it attested to a stage of LGBT activism more typical of cities in the nation besides those larger and more established as gay destinations.

Community organizers utilized the energy of the Bryant march and created

Town Meeting I, another event of major significance toward the solidarity of the movement in Houston. Where the Bryant march had been emotional, the Town

Meeting was organizational. LaDonna Leake and Ray Hill planned a symposium in order to bring together all of the diversity of the Houston gay and lesbian community to “debate major issues and choose priorities for the local gay movement.”128

127 Snellgrove interview.

128 Pride History, 68.

Some 3500-4000 attended and two time gubernatorial candidate Frances

“Sissy” Farenthold (Texas Representative, 1968-1972) addressed them claiming,

“No one is free unless we all are free.”129 The participants adjourned but only after their intense labor had created a broad agenda of resolutions. These included considerations for handicapped homosexuals, the inclusion of women in gay organizations, job discrimination, internal discrimination issues, a civilian police review board, legal reform such as on 21.06, discrimination in the military, implementation of single member districts, public awareness, and religious unity.130

Many community organizations may trace their roots to the crucial event.

Out of the needs and strategies discussed at the meeting, the Montrose Counseling

Center (MCC), the Montrose Clinic, the Montrose Patrol, the Gay and Lesbian

Switchboard, the Montrose Sports Association, and the Montrose Activity Center began soon after. The GPC itself experienced a surge in new membership.131

The conference was organized down to the last detail as delineated in the

“Workbook for Town Meeting I.”132 In the introduction, co-chairs admonished attendees that they must “work hard to turn the rhetoric of Town Meeting I into

129 David Lee, “Gay Political Strategy Charted as 3500 Gather in Astro Arena,” Houston Chronicle, 26 June 1978, Sec. 2, 1; Pride History, 68.

130 Rick Barrs, “‘Sissy’ Urges Gays to Demand Rights,” Houston Post, 25 June 1978, A1.

131 Carpenter, Flagrant Conduct, 26.

132 “Workbook for Town Meeting I,” June 25, 1978, in possession of author.

political and social reality in the coming year. Together, we can make Houston take a lead in securing gay rights and freedoms nationwide.”133

In 1978, the growth in the GPC continued. It elected Stephen Shiflett as president, bringing his local business background to Houston gay politics. The caucus endorsed the well-attended Town Meeting I staged at the Astro Arena on

June 25, 1978. GPC president Shiflett thanked Mayor Jim McConn (1978-1982) for declaring June 19-25 Human Rights Week. This was as close to a city government sanctioned Gay Pride Week that the movement activists could achieve in 1978

Houston. Mayor McConn responded, “I think it [the homosexual community] is becoming a viable political force.”134 The Chronicle presented some of activist Ray

Hill’s comments on Town Meeting I and the Houston community. Hill attributed the success to the fact that the movement in Houston was not radical in scope. He stressed that the methodology of “recruiting people, getting them enthusiastic and getting them working” led to far more positive consequences than militant, radical actions that moved too aggressively.135

The strategy that worked for the election of Kathy Whitmire (Houston Mayor,

1982-1992) to office of city controller in 1977 proved successful again in 1979 when the caucus managed to unseat anti-gay councilman Frank Mann (Houston City

Council 1967-1979). Mann had worked against gay causes and spoken out against

133 Workbook for TMI.

134 David Lee, “Gay Political Strategy Charted as 3500 Gather in Astro Arena,” Houston Chronicle, 26 June 1978, Sec. 2,1; Pride History, 68.

135 Ibid.

such since he had taken office in 1960. Eleanor Tinsley (Houston City Council 1979-

1995) won his seat. She firmly declared her support for antidiscrimination for homosexuals in city government and within the police force as well.136 Having these two women in high elected office demonstrated a progressive move beyond the status quo of the male-centered political network in Houston. The GPC had made this transition possible.137

The GPC’s success hinged on its ability to recruit support of far greater numbers of same sex attracted people in Houston who were concerned about equality for same sex attracted people. It offered a solution to those who were not completely ready to risk everything including their relationships with their families and their jobs for the sakes of their liberation. This appealed to a greater number of the gay community than ever before. Activist Ray Hill told the Chronicle “It’s alright to be in the closet as long as the closet is a polling booth.”138 One could become involved through voting for the right candidates. Another might be able to give financially. Others seeking more participation could work on the various committees. These varied levels of contribution become obvious in the relationships seen in membership and mailing lists numbers. In 1978, the mailing list had around 5,000 names. By 1980, the mailing list was at 8,022 people. At the same time, the paying members totaled 603. In 1981 the paid memberships totaled

136 Houston Chronicle, 3 November 1979.

137 Houston Chronicle, 3 November 1979.

138 Gordon Hunter, “Time is Now,” Houston Chronicle, 2 July 1979, Sec. 2, 8.

2,100 while the mailing list equaled 12,000.139 In 1982, the membership was at

1,000 while the mailing list was at 15,000.140 These numbers reveal high mailing list subscription by those wishing to stay informed of the voting endorsements and how the candidates might prioritize gay concerns. The contrasting low numbers for paying members may be interpreted to reveal that far fewer were willing to support gay causes to the point of going public with their sexuality. The gay vote was widely distributed. Only one in six people on the GPC mailing list lived in Montrose.

In his recollections of those early days, Snellgrove considered the GPC to be

“a gelling force in the community.”141 He recalled that the meetings were packed with as many as 100-150 people. They were not always nice as passions and politics ran high. Factions formed. He remembered actual physical fights as well.

Members did not all agree easily on prioritization of goals. One major area of conflict was how much weight should be given to issues besides those directly relevant to the LGBT community. Many thought that candidate selection should be considerate of other minorities’ needs. Regardless, success for the GPC in selecting candidates, supporting their campaigns, and seeing them elected, became more and more apparent. Snellgrove attributed it to the fact that it had “a clear mission, clear

139 “Stereotypes…,” Houston Post, 25 Jun., 1978; “GPC,” 4 May 1980; Rick Barrs and Margaret Downing, “Well-Organized Gay Caucus Gaining Political Clout in the City,” Houston Chronicle, 22 November 1981.

140 Clipping “n.a.” Houston Post, 12 April 1982, VF “Homosexuals 1978-1982,” HMC.

141 Snellgrove interview.

goals, and were clearly organized.” It became recognized as a political organization to be dealt with in Houston.142

Newspapers and politicians weighed in with their opinions on the actual strength of the caucus in influencing local politics. The Post claimed on June 25,

1978, “Stereotypes remain but city gays gain political clout.” Some of the comments demonstrate how anti-homosexual sentiment remained prevalent in the city.

Houston’s straight political community saw gays to be “little more than limp-wristed perverts, blasphemies to God that the rest of the world would be better off without.”143 Politicians also doubted the LGBT community’s power and ability to influence large numbers of votes. But, according to a sample by the Post of local straight politicians, those attitudes changed. According to the article, “white effeminate men and butch lesbians” might dominate their thinking but in the inner city, especially Montrose, those in politics pay attention around election time.144

The same article wrote that State Representative Ron Waters agreed that without gay support a victory would be difficult if not impossible in the state assembly’s 79th district (Montrose). State Representative Mickey Leland sought and received GPC backing to gain Barbara Jordan’s seat. He thanked the caucus for what had been his two to one lead in the Montrose district.145

142 Snellgrove interview.

143 Rick Barrs, “Gays Gain Political Clout in Houston,” Houston Post, 25 June 1978, A1.

144 Ibid.

145 Ibid.

Still, some candidates tried to use the GPC’s gay orientation and the attitudes of anti-homosexual sentiment against their opponents. City Council candidate Steve

Jones attempted to gain votes by smearing Kathy Whitmire for her large gay backing. Jones was betting that pervasive knowledge of her outsized gay support in a city with so many opposed to homosexuals would divert some of her votes. The tactic backfired. Whitmire won in spite of the attempt. She confessed, however, that the GPC nod could be a “2-edged sword.” In this election, though, she received more votes than she had lost. Additionally, she received 80 percent of the Montrose vote.146 Critics would not admit that the caucus wielded that much control. After the elections in 1981, none of the winners of the runoff, or their representatives, would admit that the GPC had put their campaigns “over the top.”147 In that runoff, however, four of the GPC candidates won: three in a landslide. Eight out of nine of their candidates won in the general election of that year. These numbers included

Kathy Whitmire’s victory to become Houston’s first woman mayor. Despite the contrarians, the GPC had become a respected political force.148

After the successful 1981 election, the GPC began to receive praise nationwide. The Caucus boasted that their published vetting list of candidates had regard beyond the LGBT community. It claimed to have influenced 50,000 voters in

146 Ibid.

147 Rick Barrs, “Well-Organized Gay…,” Houston Post, 22 November 1981.

148 “Well Organized…” Houston Post, 22 November 1981.

this election, only half of which were homosexual.149 In a Houston Post article, San

Francisco activists praised the GPC’s success saying the Whitmire mayoral campaign should have lasting effects on the lives of homosexuals in Houston. They suggested it would become easier for many gays to remain in Houston rather than immigrate to the coastal gay meccas such as New York or San Francisco.150 Before Whitmire’s victory and as the caucus began preparations, the election was being watched carefully by gay rights leaders around the nation. Lucia Valesca, the executive director of the National Gay Task Force in New York, said, “the extent and sophistication of political organization in Houston’s large and growing homosexual community have reached a point where the city ‘is right at the top of the list’ along with San Francisco and Washington.”151

Conclusion

By the beginning of the 1970s, Houston’s gay community was as large and vibrant as that in many other U. S. cities. The majority of its members, however, were far from forthcoming concerning their sexual preferences. Various groups and organizations formed to push their agendas of openness and change. Each was eager to drive gay liberation to the next level. The GLF and Integrity, two such groups, sought to serve their community but for different reasons. Most gays were disinclined to participate. By the middle 1970s the GPC had emerged with a less

149 William K. Stephens, “Houston Accepts New Political Force,” New York Times, 2 November 1981, A16.

150 Ibid.

151 Stephens, “Houston Accepts,”; Larry Bush, “Majority vs. Gays,” New York Times, 19 November 1981, A31.

radical, more moderate philosophy that appealed to greater numbers of Houston’s homosexual citizens. Instead of offering only open, public demonstrations, the GPC allowed its members the option of pursuing political organization from the inside.

The ultimate goal was to screen candidates and vote to elect those with a consideration for gay interests and causes.

Through the 1970s the lesbian and gay community progressed from a time when the radical GLF protested racial segregation in front of a gay bar to a time when gays had achieved the solidarity to influence citywide elections. It overcame the days of meeting with politicians in secret to an era when candidates publicly sought the GPC’s endorsement. Gays and lesbians evolved from the years when many members of the community complained that activists were a hindrance to a time when those same people joined thousands in subscribing to the mailing list of the GPC. The age of radical activists working for small groups on college campuses had shifted to an era when activism required full time employees within incorporated gay social movement organizations.

The gay and lesbian community of Houston developed into one that was noted nationally for its successful political clout. This shift in activism in Houston demonstrated that the 1970s were a crucial and important phase in the progression of the gay liberation movement. The Houston community provides evidence that utilizing the political system in order to affect policy change was a part of LGBT organizing in the 1970s.

As the 1980s arrived, the AIDS epidemic descended on Houston and its LGBT community. The impact would reveal much about the same sex attracted subculture

that had not been visible before. The organizing tradition of the LGTB community, then well established by the efforts of the GPC, immediately assumed the preeminent vital role to lead the response to the crisis in Houston.

Chapter Two

“AIDS in Houston, 1981-1984: The Initial Response”

During the week of Thanksgiving in 1981, four doctors sat around an office table in the M. D. Anderson Cancer Center (MDA) which is part of the Texas Medical

Center, where they reviewed reports of a growing problem in New York and

California called “gay cancer.”152 One mentioned that he knew of a patient in

Houston who had died of Kaposi’s sarcoma (KS). The patient was from San

Francisco. One month later, the first case of KS in an otherwise healthy young male was diagnosed in Houston.153

Close to a month later, on December 18, 1981, the Montrose Voice, one of

Houston’s gay newspapers, reported that one person had recently died of KS. Two other suspected KS cases had instead turned out to be immunological suppression diseases. Medical alert bulletins had been issued to Harris County physicians “about the disease as a precaution following the first and only recent Houston case.”154

Over a month after the Montrose Voice article, on January 24, 1982, the mysterious illness hit the Houston mainstream press. It appeared in a Houston Post

152 The Texas Medical Center is the largest concentration of medical professionals and experts anywhere in the world. It also remains the largest employer in Houston and the eight largest business district in the United States. http://www.texasmedicalcenter.org/interesting-facts/, (accessed April 21, 2014).

153 Michael B. Wilson, “Its History and Programs, November 1981 –June 1985,” Folder, “AFH History, 11-81 to 6-85” (hereafter Wilson, AFH History), Box 7, John P. McGovern Historical Collections and Research Center, Institutional Collection #72 (hereafter JPMHC),

154 William Marberry, “Two suspected ‘gay cancer’ patients found here false,” Montrose Voice, 18 December 1981.

article, “Unusual Cancer Outbreak Found in Houston Area.”155 It noted the patients had severely suppressed immune systems and the possibility that the combination of sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) due to relations with multiple sex partners and the use of drugs such as marijuana and cocaine could make it worse.156

Two of the MDA physicians, Dr. Guy Newell and Dr. Peter Mansell, became the Houston area spokespersons. The cases had come under the care of the cancer hospital as they were accompanied by the presence of the rare cancer known as KS not usually found in such young men (aged twenties and thirties) nor in this part of the world.157 Over the next two months, these MDA physicians conducted a series of poorly attended meetings to start some form of education for local physicians and the at-risk community, which they defined to be entirely of men who have sex with men (MSM).158 This team also began coordinating a statewide program for education on the growing problem. Houston, at that point, had the only cases

155 Mary Jane Schier, “Unusual Cancer Outbreak Found in Houston Area,” Houston Post, 24 January 1982.

156 The Center for Disease Control had first presented the illness to the national medical community on the second page of its June 5, 1981 Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (MMWR). The data was based on Los Angeles cases of Pneumocystis Pneumonia (PCP), a rare and especially deadly form seen in extreme cases of immune suppression. CDC Weekly Morbidity and Mortality Report, June 5, 1981, Vol. 30, No. 21, http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/june_5.html, (accessed October 10, 2013); “AIDS: the Early Years and CDC’s Response,” http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/su6004a11.htm?s_cid=su6004a11_w, (accessed November 16, 2013). On July 3rd, the New York Times reported, “forty-one American homosexuals were dying from a rare cancer [Kaposi’s sarcoma (KS)] and infectious complications stemming from an unexplainable depression of the immune system,” Philip M. Kayal, Bearing Witness: Gay Men’s Health Crisis and the Politics of AIDS (Boulder, San Francisco, and New York: Westview Press, 1993), 1.

157 This was a rare form of cancer rarely found in the United States and when present, it was primarily in elderly males and immunosuppressant transplant recipients. Malignant tumors form in the skin, mucus membranes, lymph nodes, and other vital organs.

158 Wilson, AFH History.

reported in Texas. Nationally, New York and California had the highest numbers.

Regardless of location, almost 50 percent of the patients had died. This team at the cancer center kept Houston interconnected nationally to what was occurring in other major cities.

According to later surveys in the United States, fifty-five young men had been diagnosed with some infection linked to the virus by the end of 1980.159 In the state of Texas there had been fifty-four cases of Kaposi’s Sarcoma (KS) reported since

1975. This was according to MDA that was closely monitoring Houston for any new cases. The doctors at MDA quickly realized the necessity of initiating a dialogue with the gay community, as all of their cases at that point were gay men. Houston’s near thirty-year-old LGBT organizing tradition, at that point soundly established in the GPC, would transform existent organizations and form new ones to confront the mysterious epidemic that was attacking their own. By the middle of 1982, the basic entities of the Houston AIDS movement were not only conceived, they were fully operational.

This chapter will chronicle how Houston’s LGBT community, relying on the organizing tradition that culminated in the Gay Political Caucus (GPC) by the end of the 1970s, met the challenge aggressively and built an AIDS movement. In these first years, 1982-1984, it fought uncertainty, stigma, and the disaster-like impact of the epidemic by disseminating educational information, raising money for research,

159 Randy Shilts, And The Band Played On: Politics, People, and the AIDS Epidemic 20th Anniversary Edition (New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 2011), Kindle edition, 1387.

getting the city to collect statistics on the case numbers in Houston, and establishing services to help those suffering from the disease.

Organizations such as the Gay Men’s Health Crisis (GMHC) in New York and the San Francisco AIDS Foundation (SFAF) were officially in existence within a few months of one another by early 1982, but the KS AIDS Foundation (KSAF) in

Houston and AID Atlanta were functional then as well. In fact, Miami’s Health Crisis

Network and AIDS Services of Austin (ASA) both have roots to 1983 and AIDS

Services of Dallas (ASD) began in 1985.160 They each, from the beginning, sought to provide aid to sufferers, relay relevant information, and serve as the organized voice regarding questions of public policy.161

Historians Robert Padgug and Gerald Oppenheimer attribute the success of these organizations to a number of factors including the American tradition of self- help and volunteerism; their sympathizers and natural allies in the non-gay world; and their own significant resources consisting of political and social institutions, funds, talent, and labor. 162 More specifically, historic circumstances created what

160 “About AID Atlanta,” AIDS Atlanta, http://www.aidatlanta.org/page.aspx?pid=288, (accessed January 17, 2014); “About Us,” AIDS Services Austin, http://www.asaustin.org/about-us/, (accessed January 17, 2014); “Our History and Our Heritage,” AIDS Services of Dallas, http://www.aidsdallas.org/about/history/, (accessed January 17, 2014); “History,” Care Source, http://www.careresource.org/about/history/, (accessed January 17, 2014).

161 Epstein, Impure, 53. The first of these began when New York playwright Larry Kramer invited hundreds to his apartment on August 11, 1981 for a meeting to raise money for research. A group of about eighty influential gay men came. Then on January 6, 1982, six men met at his apartment and formed what became the first core volunteer organization for addressing the illness. It became known as GMAC. Susan M. Chambre, Fighting For Our Lives: New York’s Community and the Politics of Disease (Piscataway, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 2006), 13, 15.

162 Robert A. Padgug and Gerald M. Oppenheimer, “Riding the Tiger: AIDS and the Gay Community,” in Elizabeth Fee and Daniel M. Fox, Eds., AIDS: The Making of a Chronic Disease (Berkeley, Los Angeles, Oxford: University of California Press, 1992), 257; volunteerism is the subject of Kayal’s Bearing Witness. On voluntary organizations in U.S. history, see: Christine Stansell’s, City of Women:

might be termed a window of opportunity through which these gay and lesbian community organizations could claim a major role in the epidemic as it unfolded.

These included “the combination of the relative strength of gay identity and institutions inherited from the 1970s and the widespread avoidance of the crisis by other elements of society.”163

These characteristics apply to Houston. As shown in the last chapter, the political success of the GPC demonstrated the strength and organizing experience of

Houston gays and lesbians. Unifying and community building in Houston was as evident as any other of the nation’s largest metropolitan areas. Gays and lesbians there had made the near downtown already Bohemian neighborhood of Montrose their own. They established multiple institutions endemic to the gay lifestyle that had become more and more visible since the 1970s. Not only were there bars, retail establishments, and newspapers; they had marching bands, choruses, motorcycle clubs, softball teams, church organizations, and, most importantly, medical clinics.164

The window of opportunity suggested by Padgug and Oppenheimer was present in Houston as well. For the first few years, the city health department did not consider the growing crisis to be out of the ordinary and would not record data, begin an epidemiological study, or educate the public. In this refusal by city officials to assume a leadership role, the LGBT community did voluntarily. Widespread

Sex and Class in New York, 1789-1860 (New York: Knopf, 2012); Lizabeth Cohen, Making a New Deal: Industrial Workers in Chicago, 1919-1939 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013) as examples.

163 Padgug and Oppenheimer, “Riding the Tiger, 257; Altman, AIDS in the Mind, 83.

164 Armstrong, Forging, 166; Altman, AIDS in the Mind, 83.

avoidance of the crisis was also a factor in Houston. Since the disease was linked directly with homosexuals, its presence created a stigma that only worsened as the cases multiplied. AIDS not only carried the negative response that disease solicits, it also gave further rise to homophobia. Philip Kayal wrote in Bearing Witness,

“because of stigma, AIDS is ignored or disavowed as a significant illness despite its biological virulence.” He explained that because of society’s view of homosexuality as a sin, the fact that social science had long treated homosexuality as a disease, and the fact that the disease was transmitted sexually, all add up to homophobia of the disease and the hatred and fear expressed toward those who were infected.165

On January 13, 1981, when the disease had yet to be recognized in Houston,

Citizens for Human Equality (CHE) held its first board meeting and received its incorporation papers shortly thereafter. The group, according to a press release,

“formed out of a desire to involve all Houstonians in an examination of and action on issues that affect our quality of life in Houston.”166 CHE, including long-time activist

Ray Hill, derived from the spirit of Town Meeting I. By December 1981, they found their niche as an information source for the new illness. They hosted a community forum that month with Drs. Richard and Robert O’Brien of the Montrose Clinic, which served primarily gay men, and Drs. Peter W.A. Mansell and Guy Newell of

MDA, to inform the gay community, as there had yet been much national publicity about the illness.167

165 Kayal, Bearing Witness, 6.

166 “CHE gets incorporation papers,” Montrose Voice, 23 January 1981.

167 “STD,” supplement to Montrose Voice, 9 Apr 1982, Box WB-22, folder, ”80s Voices,” Botts.

The doctors and the gay community formed a symbiotic relationship from the very beginning, as the MDA physicians’ educational projects did not run smoothly. While they could conduct research and treat the incoming cancer patients, since MDA was a public institution, these doctors could not utilize its funding to spread information about sexuality or homosexuality.168 The people in the nascent AIDS movement in Houston knew exactly what to do. They would gather and disseminate the information as it became available, like similar groups in the nation’s largest cities. The organizing tradition of the LGBT community, recently most apparent in the successes of the GPC, was made up of a network accustomed to distributing information and raising the necessary funds as well.169

1982

By early 1982, at least four men had died in Houston and nearly seventy had been screened for the rare KS. Four had the unusual cancer and at least some of the other symptoms of what some doctors had begun calling “Gay Compromise

Syndrome.” Mansell and the group at MDA insisted that it was extremely urgent that professionals and laypersons should recognize the symptoms early. The doctors were meeting with physicians throughout the state and nationally, while also

168 Wilson, History.

169 See the literature on community organizing: Charles Payne, I’ve Got the Light of Freedom: The Organizing Tradition and the Mississippi Freedom Struggle (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1995); Adam Fairclough, Better Day Coming (New York: Penguin Books, 2001); Robert Self, American Babylon: Race and the Struggle for Postwar Oakland (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2003); Barbara Ransbey, Ella Baker and the Black Freedom Movement: A Radical Democratic Vision (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003); Marc Stein, City of Sisterly sand Brotherly Love: Lesbian and Gay Philadelphia, 1945-1972 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000).

seeking cooperation with the gay community, so that diagnoses would be made as soon as possible.170

These doctors stressed the need for getting information into the public’s hands in order to combat the uncertainty. With so little known, misinformation and panic were prevalent. In late 1981, these same doctors from MDA began developing epidemiological research; screening and treatment centers; and educational programs for the public, at-risk groups, and healthcare workers. Their program included an extensive “Risk Factor Questionnaire and Individual Risk Assessment.”

By September 20, 1982 they had performed the assessment on over 400 patients in the Houston area. The project was known as the “Kaposi’s Sarcoma and

Opportunistic Infection Screening and Community Education Project.”171 They presented it as an example in other major U.S. cities.172

Even though Houston had ten verifiable cases through the first week in May, the doctors feared there were more that had not been reported. The CDC reported

335 cases nationally and they were getting a new case every day or two. They raised the reported numbers for heterosexuals to fifty with thirteen of those being women.

Fifty percent of the cases at that point were from New York with California

170 Mary Jane Schier, “Rare Cancer Among Homosexuals Still Baffles Doctors,” Houston Post, 16 May, 1982; memorandum from Michael Wilson to “National AIDS Contacts,” 9-20-1982, San Francisco AIDS Foundation Records, Carton 2, “Board of Directors,” folder, “Moss/Gorman Epidemiological Study, 1982,”, University of California at San Francisco Archives, San Francisco, California, (hereafter, SFAF Records, UCSF).

171 Letter to Baker from Wilson and Mansell, “Risk Factor Questionnaire and Individual Risk Assessment,”9-20-1982,” Carton 2, “Board of Directors,” folder “Moss/Gorman Epidemiological Study, SFAF Records UCSF.

172 Wilson, AFH History.

reporting 21 percent. In Houston, so far, all of the known cases had been male, gay, and aged twenty to thirty.173

These were the known cases. They knew there were more. People could die without seeking medical attention. Others might be under the care of doctors who did not recognize the symptoms as part of a pattern. They would have seen nothing to report. Then, as the disease gained more publicity and as a result, its links to homosexuality, the resulting stigma would create more circumstances for which cases would go unreported. Doctors feared for their practices and families feared for their reputations if they became associated with the deadly disease.

This situation directly affected the response in Houston. Because of the low number of reported cases at that point, the Houston Department of Health and

Human Services (HDHHS) was not collecting any data on the disease. This lack of accurate case data became a major hindrance to Houston’s response. With Houston only able to verify ten cases they could not prove the same need as New York or San

Francisco who had case numbers six to seven times that.174

Fortunately, the Houston AIDS movement was linked to the larger national community from the beginning. During the first week of May 1982, the fourth annual Lesbian/Gay Health Conference brought 200 medical providers together at the University of Houston. This would further tie Houston to what was happening nationally in terms of dealing with this disease. Unfortunately, it did not convince

173 Mary Jane Schier, “Rare Cancer Among Homosexuals Still Baffles Doctors,” The Houston Post, 16 May 1982.

174 Mary Jane Schier, “Rare Cancer Among Homosexuals Still Baffles Doctors,” The Houston Post, 16 May 1982.

the city of the seriousness of the spreading illness. Although focused on a broad range of health issues, the recurring topic the first day was the new outbreak of KS that was primarily affecting gay males. They focused on KS, as the full syndrome had not been established. Nationally, there had been at least 300 cases since 1979 and about 100 of those patients had died. Helen Schietinger, coordinator for the

Kaposi’s sarcoma clinic at the University of California, and Dr. Roger Enlow of

Wilson Laboratories Cellular Mechanisms of Disease in New York spoke of the panic among homosexual men because of the deadly effects of the disease if left untreated.175

By the middle of 1982, of the Houston AIDS movement referred to its three primary institutions, the Montrose Counseling Center (MCC), the KS Committee

(KSC), and the Montrose Clinic as the “String of Pearls.”176 They functioned together and at the same time, discovered their own niches within the myriad of needs that were becoming apparent daily. Because the disease was striking the young, often only in their twenties and thirties, they required help beyond the medical realm.

These young men would suddenly need home nursing, legal advice, counseling for emotional and family issues, even financial advice for complications with insurance and Social Security disability issues. In 1985, the fourth major institution, Bering

Community Services Foundation, would join the Houston AIDS community.177

175 Rob Meckel, “Health needs of gays topic of meeting,” The Houston Post, 5 June 1982.

176 Freda Wagman, Snippets from the Trenches: A Mother’s AIDS Memoir (Houston, Texas, Freda Wagman, 2007), 13.

177 Sandy Stacy, interviewed by John Goins, Houston, Texas, 12 July 2011; Richard Vara, “Pastor leading church in outreach ministry,” Houston Post, 18 November 1989.

The Montrose Clinic opened in October of 1981 on lower Westheimer and then moved to 803 Hawthorne St. Although open before actual recognition of the crisis, it was a natural partner as it was already established as a trusted institution in the gay community for information, diagnosis, and treatment of sexually transmitted diseases (STDs).178 A twelve-member board of trustees (non-paid) and a full-time paid executive director managed the clinic. Volunteers primarily staffed the clinic though there were some paid full and part-time positions as well as contracted labor for special projects. It soon became an AIDS resource center that offered both medical services and education.179

The Montrose Counseling Center (MCC) opened in June of 1982. Houston clinical social worker Bill Scott had founded the center to meet the counseling needs of the gay community there.180 Before AIDS, clients sought help with the issues of coming out, depression, anxiety, suicide prevention, as well as alcohol and drug abuse problems. It was located at 900 Lovett and was started with a grant from the

Texas Commission on Alcoholism. It was the first non-profit to open in Montrose.

MCC was to be staffed with eleven therapists who were required to have an MA and two years of experience in the field. Applicants seeking help with alcoholism felt

178 It was established as a private 509(a)(1)&170(b)(1)(A)(vi), non-profit and tax exempt – 501(c)(3) organization. “About Our Clinic,” Institutional Collection No. 72, Box 6, AIDS – “Houston Montrose Clinic, Center for AIDS, RITA!,” Folder, “Montrose Clinic Early 1980s,” JPMHC.

179 “About Our Clinic,” Institutional Collection No. 72, Box 6, AIDS – “Houston Montrose Clinic, Center for AIDS, RITA!,” Folder, “Montrose Clinic Early 1980s” JPMHC. On the history of community clinics see: Gregory Weiss, Grassroots Medicine: The Story of America’s Free Health Clinics (Landam, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006); Anne Enke, Finding the Movement: Sexuality, Contested Space, and Feminist Activism (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2007).

180 Craig Rowland, “Texans attend June International Health Conference,” TWIT, 12 July 1984, 27, UHSC.

more comfortable among the mostly gay and lesbian clientele at the center.181 The counselors at the MCC would confront the emotional impact of the disease – not only for the sufferers themselves but their significant others and family as well.

Particularly in the early years, the fear and anxiety resulting from the threat of the disease posed great emotional issues for those who might have been in an at-risk group. A diagnosis made these issues even worse as work, family, and significant others had to be informed.182

Michael McAdory started the KSC, known today as AIDS Foundation Houston.

His story exemplifies the root of AIDS work in Houston. In February of 1982, he had been the manager of Mary’s, a popular Montrose bar. Becoming ill and not obtaining a satisfactory diagnosis from his regular physician, he went to MDA. There, Dr.

Mansell, who immediately recognized the symptoms, diagnosed McAdory with KS.

Talking with his friends, McAdory realized his contribution would be to push for research and education, and somehow motivate the gay community to become involved. Known as Lord Mac by his friends and acquaintances, he set up an informational group to raise money for the dissemination of any new knowledge on what was then a little known, but rapidly spreading disease. This was the beginning of the KSC. The original group of physicians from MDA joined with McAdory and other concerned individuals to form the organization. It would become the central

181 “HGAC does not take a stand on counseling center,” The Houston Post, 6 April 1983.

182 “HGAC does not take a stand on counseling center,” The Houston Post, 6 April 1983.

clearinghouse and “go to” institution for information on the disease as no public institution assumed this responsibility during the early years of the crisis.183

The Montrose Voice, the primary gay newspaper at that time, published the first detailed information about the illness on April 9, 1982. The supplement, “STD,” listed all previously known STDs with their symptoms and cures but included a new category to classify the yet undefined disease that would soon be termed AIDS. The insert vaguely defined it as a group of illnesses with immune suppression being the common denominator. It also stressed that leading a healthy lifestyle, one that would be good for the immune system, would be the best method of avoidance. The supplement included information about an upcoming pamphlet that would address the vital relationship between lifestyle and health.184 At that point, the majority of

MSM in Houston most would ignore this type of information, as they did not consider themselves to be at high risk for the infection. This group included males who were sexually active with multiple partners or those who regularly abused drugs and alcohol.

The Houston AIDS movement made its first major contribution to the fight against AIDS by publishing the pamphlet, “Toward a Healthier Lifestyle,” on April

17, 1982. It was the first in the country on the new disease, and would include the idea, not then a proven fact, that the disease was sexually transmitted.185 As a joint force, CHE and KSC raised $5000. Sue Lovell, KS AIDS Committee officer and

183 Wilson, AFH History. 184 “STD, A Special Supplement to Montrose Voice,” 9 April 1982, Box, WB-22, Folder, 80s Voices, Botts, (hereafter, STD supplement).

185 Altman, AIDS in the Mind, 161.

Houston City Council member (2006-2012), provided the printing to publish a pamphlet. In 1982, discussion of AIDS prevention was politically volatile. As sociologist Susan Chambre wrote in her book Fighting for our Lives, “the issues that needed to be confronted tapped into the very heart of gay identity, unleashed powerful emotions and revealed the diversity of the gay community.”186 Linking transmission to gay sexual behavior illuminated a divide in the national gay male community over the existence of a gay disease and how this might affect the progress of gay liberation. Rhetoric since the nineteenth century had linked homosexuality with disease.187 Members of the gay community feared that the association of AIDS with gay men would have negative repercussions for the ongoing movement for gay equal rights. Members of the fledgling AIDS movement in

Houston placed any hope of saving lives as the top priority. The members of KSC and

CHE knew the facts in the pamphlet had come from well-respected doctors and researchers and spreading this information was the responsible thing to do.188

The author of the pamphlet noted when researching Kaposi’s sarcoma and the related immunological suppression diseases that, even though the exact medical causes were still undiscovered, there seemed to be a relationship between lifestyle and the incident of these diseases. He worked with Dr. Mansell and Dr. Newell, three consulting psychologists, several medical researchers, and four public health

186 Chambre, Fighting, 43-44. 187 Altman, AIDS in the Mind, 40-41.

188 Sue Lovell, interview with John Goins, Houston, Texas, June 28, 2011; for discussion on how AIDS could pose an opportunity to return to gay liberation rather than interrupt it, see Jennifer Brier, Infectious Ideas: U.S. Political Responses to the AIDS Crisis (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 14-15.

educators. After sixteen weeks and five revisions, the document was released at a fundraiser held by CHE on April 17.189

The Houston Department of Health and Human Services (HDHHS) was not cooperating with the efforts of the MDA doctors and private physicians who had large populations of patients with the illness, or the gay community and its organizations. Since there was no official data on the extent of the crisis in Houston, according to the HDHHS, the numbers did not seem significant enough to warrant further steps. The HDHHS did not consider the circumstances that unusual; particularly not enough to justify an immunological study. As past GPC and KSC officer and current city councilwoman Sue Lovell said, the health department response was that “breast cancer was more serious without realizing that comparing two such diseases was committing a serious error.”190 This attitude of health department officials, that AIDS was only one of many equally serious problems, would continue for several more years.

When Houston city officials denied the severity of the spreading illness their behavior mirrored general assumptions Americans held about the nation’s healthcare system. They comfortably assumed that infectious diseases had been eradicated. Beyond that they believed that if one should appear, it would be cured with a simple visit to a doctor. Accordingly, many felt assured that the case with this new malady would be the same. The medical community would successfully manage this quickly, and everything would return to normal. The words spoken by

189 “STD” supplement.

190 Lovell interview.

a physician at a medical conference in 1983 exemplified this notion. He said in is address: “At a time not too long ago, I was totally confident that the great infectious diseases of humankind were coming under control and would soon – maybe within our own lifetime – vanish as threats to human health…. I take it back.”191

This faith in the power of the medical community and healthcare system was also exemplary of the size, power, and regard held for the medical center in

Houston. Patients came from worldwide destinations for treatment. Its status remains the same today. It was easy to assume, as this disease became more and more visible, that it would only be a short time before the system would successfully overcome it. It would be 1984 before scientists would come to a consensus on the cause of the disease, but even then, ideas held by policy makers and members of the affected communities would still hold back the response and many, many lives would be lost.192

As the Houston AIDS community continued to form, a second organizational meeting for KSC was held on Monday, June 28, 1982, at the law office of Debra

Danburg, (Texas State Representative 1981-2003) at 4803 Montrose, in order to write the by-laws for the Kaposi’s Sarcoma Committee of Houston. It had become a

Texas corporation and began taking the steps to becoming a non-profit, tax-exempt, community service organization.193 Acting chairman of the Board of Trustees,

191 Chambre, Fighting, 2. For a discussion of AIDS as a break with the twentieth century medical trends, see: Elizabeth Fee and Daniel Fox, AIDS: The Making of a Chronic Disease (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1992), 1-5. Also see: Lois Magner, A History of Infectious Diseases and the Microbial World (Santa Barbara, Cal.: Praeger, 2009).

192 Chambre, Fighting, 3.

193 Wilson, AFH History.

Michael McAdory, called the meeting. Others present included: Danburg, Craig

Rowland, Dr. Didier Piot, Dr. David Short, Michael Wilson, Steve Shiflett, and Rick

Ewing. These people represented MDA, private physicians with large numbers of gay men in their practices, and the KCS. When finalized, their “purpose and goals were divided into three categories: Education, support of medical research, and providing social services and potentially patient care to persons diagnosed with

AIDS or ARC.”194 They quickly began the job of fundraising and held a cooperative fund-raiser with Club Scene Magazine at the Swim Club on July 19 for fifty dollars a plate.195

In its first year, 1982, the KSC gave $10,000 to medical research projects. In consensus with their national counterparts, the strategy was to raise money for research since so little was known about this new disease. This was agreeable to the members of local LGBT communities who were making the donations. However, since this initial contribution to AIDS, KSC made no further direct contributions to the area of research. This shift in strategy came out at the annual National Lesbian and Gay Leadership Conference held in Dallas of that year.196

At the 1982 conference, the disease, then a year old, would receive its name,

Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS). On September 24, the CDC began using the term and released the first case definition of AIDS: “a disease at least

194 Wilson, AFH History. ARC or AIDS Related Complex denoted symptoms of AIDS but not to the stage of a full AIDS diagnosis.

195 Minutes, by-laws meeting, 6-8-1982, JPMHC, Box 6, folder, “KS/AIDS Foundation of Houston.”

196 AFH , AFH History.

moderately predictive of a defect in cell-mediated immunity, occurring in a person with no known case for diminished resistance to that disease.”197

Conferees not only discussed prevention but also changed the direction of the LGBT community’s fund raising efforts.198 As explained by Michael Wilson, who kept records for the doctors at MDA and served as president of KSC, officials at the conference told the gay community that it was not practical for them to take on the job of raising the multi-millions of dollars that would be needed to fund the research on AIDS. They argued that raising that amount of funding was the role of the government: federal, state, and local. Officials instead encouraged the AIDS organizations to establish lobbying projects that would obtain federal, state, and local dollars for research. This, KSC began to do but first they had to educate their resource base of gay men as to why they were switching priorities from research to other areas.199

Taking the advice of the officials at the conference, KSC and thirty-eight similar organizations around the nation, united to form the Federation of AIDS-

Related Organizations (FARO). It established an office in Washington, D.C. and hired a lobbyist. In its first year the lobbyist was able to raise the federal allocations for

AIDS research from $12 million to $96 million. The $12 million had been from the first bill passed by the U.S Congress that included funding specifically targeted for

197 “A Timeline of AIDS,” AIDS.gov of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, http://aids.gov/hiv-aids-basics/hiv-aids-101/aids-timeline/index.html,( accessed, January 12, 2014), (hereafter AIDS.gov/ timeline).

198 Chambre, Fighting, 46; Shilts, Band, 179.

199 Wilson, AFH History.

AIDS research and treatment through the agencies of the Department of Health and

Human Services.200 KSC had contributed $5,500 to FARO that year and considered the money well spent. 201

In its first year, the KSC grew into the largest and most visible AIDS service organization (ASO) in Houston. In its first fiscal year ending May 31, 1983, it raised

$29,816.25 from private donations and fund-raisers. Wilson wrote:

During the history of the foundation it continued to find itself the target of complex attitudes directed at the problem of AIDS itself --- attitudes which became more widespread and often times more intense and confused. The community we were trying to educate and help continued to meet our existence with denial of the problem, aggression, paranoia, anger, and frustration. When the problem was distant people tried not to think about it; as it grew closer they demanded reasons for inaction and more and more accountability from the foundation. However, without a doubt, it had begun to prove its worth to the observing community it sought to serve.202

These statements provide an idea of the fear and frustration that these men were undergoing under the stress of this mysterious disease and its threat. It also reveals that in their desperate need for answers, the foundation was the entity they depended upon.

From the very beginning, the foundation’s first priority had been an educational program to respond to the fear in the at-risk population, among healthcare workers, as well as in the general public. This involved creating a training

200 AIDS.gov/timeline.

201 Wilson, AFH History; Chambre, Fighting, 117.

202 Wilson, AFH History

program to prepare its staff and the growing numbers of volunteers who were responsible for disseminating the information.203

The story of Freda Wagman, a mother whose son was diagnosed with KS in

1982, provides an example of how the Houston AIDS movement system functioned.

When, in June, she learned about her son’s diagnosis, Freda Wagman went to a therapist who advised her to go see him immediately because he was dying.204 The next day she went to a counselor at MCC as recommended by Gary’s doctor in San

Francisco. She remembered choosing him to be her therapist if for no other reason than his name was Gary, the same name as her son’s, and he was gay. He was on staff at MCC and helped set up KSC. She became involved by going to the home of a

KSC volunteer to create forms for KSC to use for volunteers and client intake. She used a typewriter and GMHC forms as a model. This was her initial experience as an

AIDS worker in Houston. In the days that followed, she did whatever was needed: including stuffing condoms into bags to pass out at the bars. Wagman is still active today in the Bering Spiritual Support Group that was started in 1985.205

1983

As 1983 began, Houston’s AIDS community continued to develop and demonstrate its leadership role in the response to the crisis and also participated with its national counterparts. On May 2, 1983, “Candle Light Vigil for Public

Health.” was held on the steps of the City Hall. The event was held simultaneously in

203 Ibid.

204 Wagman interview.

205 Wagman interview.

major cities nationwide to draw attention to AIDS and urge donations for research on the still mysterious disease. Hundreds of candles lit up the reflecting pool of

Houston’s downtown plaza. The event was originally to be sponsored by KSC but their board of directors was concerned that the political implications created by its association with homosexuality could jeopardize its application for tax-free status.

CHE took over the responsibility and coordinated the event in conjunction with the

Montrose Clinic, which was the major sponsor. The contributions to KSC for advertising were endorsed over to CHE by the then treasurer Dr. Didier Piot. After expenses, the $546 net proceeds were donated to the Montrose Clinic.206 City officials had yet to acknowledge the disease and this scramble by the fledgling organizations of Houston’s AIDS community to pull together the resources and be in step with the national movement, demonstrated their strong determination and commitment.

By this time, the Montrose Clinic was doing what it could to help with the crisis. The director, Frank Berrier, explained “we feel so inadequate because there is really so little we can do for the AIDS victims.” He went on, “What we try to do is calm the hysteria that usually accompanies the fear of AIDS, the panic. AIDS is an emotional problem as well as physical.”207 Its role would evolve particularly with the advent of antibody testing that began two years later.

206 “CHE donates vigil proceeds to Montrose Clinic,” Montrose Voice, 20 May 1983, Institutional Collection # 72, Box 6, JPMHC.

207 “Montrose Clinic,” Montrose Voice, 13 May 1983, Institutional Collection # 72, Box 6, JPMHC.

The Montrose Clinic was not just a gay clinic. It served any individual who thought they might have a sexually transmitted disease (STD). It had recently launched a new women’s program that offered routine health care options for them at very low cost. The clinic was already a member of the Texas Hospital Association and in the process of obtaining an accreditation from the Joint Commission on

Accreditation of Hospitals to enable medical students to work there for college credit.

To acknowledge the tremendous work of the mostly volunteer staffed and privately funded clinic, Councilman Dale Gorszynski toured the facility on May 13,

1983. The councilman pledged his continued support for gaining research funding and said, “I keep waiting for you to request something, I can’t believe you people are doing such a tremendous work with so little. This is a laudable operation.”208

Berrier and the fundraising chairman, Frank Strictler assured the councilman that funds were always needed but that the community was very conscientious regarding the clinic. He did say they would be grateful for additional funds in order to send volunteers to get further certification from the state health department. The dialogue between the councilman and the clinic leadership revealed a cognizance as early as May of 1983 that the mission of the clinic would have an expanded role well beyond the gay male community. It attests to the financial commitment of the LGBT community for keeping the organizations functioning. It also indicates that

208 “Montrose Clinic,” Montrose Voice, 13 May 1983, Institutional Collection # 72, Box 6, JPMHC.

regardless of the linked between the disease and homosexuality, the AIDS movement had allies on the Houston City Council.209

Less than a month later, the founder of KSC, Michael McAdory, was hospitalized at MDA in June of 1983. At that point the cancer center maintained around fifteen beds for AIDS patients who had some form of cancer in their diagnosis. They would eventually treat around 300 patients annually. His visitors had to wear surgical gowns complete with gloves, masks, and shoe covers. Despite the worsening of his illness, the former mortgage banker recently turned Montrose bar manager, remained committed to his goal of disseminating educational materials and motivating the gay community to become involved.210

As president emeritus of KSC, he continued to talk to patients, doctors, and their families from his isolation room at MDA. “Our group has focused on many of the psychological aspects of having AIDS,” he told reporters, citing the many, many unknowns, resultant rumors, and panicky misconceptions. He continued, “Tell your readers to slow down and enjoy life a little more because there’s no guarantee how long any of us will have. It’s such as waste to see so many people rushing frantically to get nowhere quick.”211 To date, the KSC had raised more than $30,000 for education and printed brochures since Lord Mac had called its first meeting in 1982.

The high variance in case numbers reported by the various institutions proved the likelihood of unreported illnesses. For instance, in June of 1983, the

209 Ibid..

210 Mary Jane Schier, “Slow down and enjoy life,” The Houston Post, 12 June 1983.

211 Mary Jane Schier, “Slow down and enjoy life,” The Houston Post, 12 June 1983.

HDHHS reported twenty-two AIDS cases and of those twelve had died. MDA, however, reported having twenty-five cases, some with only the cancer, KS, and others with alternative infections. The 20 percent death rate rose to 60 percent when other symptoms were present. Since there were no requirements to report cases and the city was not collecting data, some estimates were as high as 200 cases in the Houston area. In May the previous year, four had died and seventy had been screened.212

Soon after, officials at the state level reported that 80 percent of the known cases and 87 percent of deaths in Texas had all been in Houston. Dr. Charles E.

Alexander, chief of the Bureau of Communicable Diseases for the State Department of Health Statistics, had collected data since 1981. Houston then reported twenty- six cases and fourteen deaths but they were saying as well that many more were out there as reporting had only been required since April of 1983. Additionally, the

Texas State Health Department mandated reporting the illness as a communicable disease. Unfortunately, this alone would not improve the reporting consistency and provide better data.213 Patients would still pressure doctors to secret their diagnosis out of fear for their jobs and insurance. Doctors would withhold data out of concern that they would lose patients who would not want to treated by a practice that dealt with AIDS patients. The unreported cases prevented Houston from demonstrating the need for funding when other cities with higher numbers were beginning to see some help from the CDC.

212 “80% of state’s AIDS cases in Houston, officials report,” The Houston Post, 17 June 1983.

213 “80% of state’s AIDS cases in Houston, officials report,” The Houston Post, 17 June 1983.

The physicians from MDA formed the AIDS Working Group (AWG) in June

1983. It was a fifteen-member unit charged to set standardized clinical criteria for private physicians to use in detecting AIDS and/or KS problems. Dr. Guy R. Newell, who had eighteen months before alerting physicians throughout Texas to the threat of the new unnamed disease, was chair. It also launched production of television shows on the University of Texas television network. Dr. Mansell, deputy director of

Cancer Prevention at MDA, provided much of the data for the telecasts. But, Newell said, “Intensive professional and public education still remains to be done before most doctors are likely to report suspected AIDS cases.” 214

Instead of taking this advice, the HDHHS continued their same pattern of denial. They refused to admit that there was a problem, would not partner with the

AIDS service organizations (ASOs) to apply for federal grants, and as a result,

Houston remained behind the other major cities that were by now receiving federal dollars to help with the crisis. Neither were Houston’s public agencies providing educational information on the rapidly expanding crisis. The positive response in

Houston was still surviving on the strength and the leadership of the gay community.215

The lack of solid of case numbers and the difficulty of assessing how badly

Houston had been hit with the epidemic remained one of KSC’s main battles in the first years. KSC worked with local doctors to gather data from their files and find out

214 Mary Jane Schier, “Group aims to fight rumors about AIDS by educating public,” The Houston Post, 12 June 1983.

215 Lovell interview.

what kind of cases they were treating. Rather than wait while the city refused to compile data and establish the need for federal help in Houston, members looked for incidences of PCP, KS, thrush, and other symptoms. These were the most common opportunistic infections that plagued those with depressed immune systems due to

AIDS. They found hundreds of previously unidentified cases. They combined this with information on death certificates and compiled a report that would prove significant enough numbers for the health department to begin monitoring this outbreak. They had known the scope but had not been able to prove it statistically to the health department who could begin the official compilation of data that would demonstrate Houston’s need for any type of funding that might consequently be available. They took these results to the mayor.216

Finally, in mid-June 1983, Mayor Whitmire (1982-1991) set aside $88,000 for the health department to begin compiling data. Whitmire responded, “It is a problem that needs to be addressed before the situation grows out of hand.” 217 If they could finally prove the need in Houston with solid numbers, maybe the city could begin receiving the federal dollars that were beginning to flow to cities that demonstrated the greatest risk.

The KSC sent two representatives to the fifth annual Lesbian and Gay Health

Conference held in Denver that June. The year before in Dallas, local AIDS groups had learned that instead of raising money for research, they should employ lobbyists who could influence legislators to allocate more funding for the disease.

216 Lovell interview; Wagman, 15.

217 “80% of state’s AIDS cases in Houston officials report,” The Houston Post, 17 June 1983.

The Denver conference is distinguished as the first time a group of self-identified people living with AIDS had met to discuss how to respond to the disease. As a result, the attendees made an important impact on the formation of a national AIDS community.218 Attendees presented the Denver Principles, on the last day of the conference and designated it to serve as the ideology for the national movement.

They read: “We condemn attempts to label us as ‘victims,’ which implies defeat, and we are only occasionally ‘patients,’ which implies passivity, helplessness, and the dependence on the care of others. We are ‘people with AIDS’” (PWAs).219 This was a formal condemnation of the term, “AIDS victim.” Epstein wrote that the AIDS movement became the first social movement in the United States to accomplish the large-scale conversion of disease ‘victims’ into activist experts.220

Other principles were directed to the general population, and demanded support in not firing people from jobs, evicting them from homes, refusing to touch them, and separating them from their loved ones. There was an emphasis on individual and communal empowerment encouraging PWAs to form groups and elect representatives.221

Attorney Robert Schwab, a strong community activist and also an AIDS patient, held a seminar that week to address the overall condition of AIDS in

218 Chambre, Fighting, 35.

219 Chambre, Fighting, 35; Michael Callen, Surviving AIDS, (New York: HarperCollins, 1990), 177.

220 Stephen Epstein, Impure Science: AIDS, Activism, and the Politics of Knowledge (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1996), 8; Epstein referenced: Max Navarre, “Fighting the Victim Label,” in Douglas Crimp, ed., AIDS: Cultural Analysis, Cultural Activism (Cambridge, Mass.: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1988), 143-146.

221 Chambre, 35.

Houston and have leaders work on how to reduce transmission and the ubiquitous prejudice and irrational fear. Schwab reiterated the cold facts explaining that 40 percent of those infected die within the first year and 100 percent die within five.

He explained to his audience that it was not only the disease but also the difficulties resulting from the stigma accompanying the disease and the resulting fear among the healthy.222 The prejudice and fear kept sufferers from obtaining proper medical care. It resulted in some choosing to die in secret and alone rather to be seen in public.

Robert Schwab died on December 15th at his home. He had originated the

Texas Human Rights Foundation to advocate for the legal rights of LGBT people. He served as president until shortly before his death. The foundation played a major role in the steps that resulted in Lawrence v. Texas reaching the U.S. Supreme Court in 2003. The Court struck down the state’s sodomy laws.223

Houston’s ASOs also worked to combat the harmful stigma that accompanied the epidemic. Volunteers for KS AIDS Foundation’s (KSAF, formerly KSC) AIDS hotline fielded calls from workers fearful of being infected by co-workers. Worried that a coworker might be gay, they would ask, “What should I do with my files?” that a worker had touched. The hotline also reported incidents of landlords refusing to rent to gays. The AWG also worked to combat the uncertainty from misinformation.

As mentioned earlier, the group was comprised of city and county health officials,

222 Clifford Pugh, “Houston Area Seminar to Address AIDS Condition,” The Houston Post, 20 September 1983.

223 “Gay rights activist dies of AIDS,” Houston Post, 16 Dec 1983. For a full treatment of the case, see Dale Carpenter, Flagrant Conduct: The Story of Lawrence v. Texas (New York and London: W.W. Norton, 2012).

medical personnel, and gay leaders. Nick Curry, Chief of Communicable Diseases at the Harris County Health Department (HCHD) alluded to their job of trying to reduce the irrational fear.224

The greatest contribution in this area remained KSAF’s “Towards a Healthier

Lifestyle,” the first brochure in Houston on safe sex that was specific to AIDS from

April 1982. 225 Three years of research since its original release had proven connections between lifestyle factors and AIDS. Wilson, of the foundation said,

“We’re laying out the information and let’s try and prevent it.” The brochure had urged readers to “Limit the number of sexual partners, avoid activities in which high levels of semen and blood are exchanged, avoid sexual contact with persons who have multiple sexual partners and limit use of recreational drugs such as alcohol and marijuana.”226

Over 90,000 of these were distributed from 1982-1984. By the end of this period, the gay community was responding to the educational campaigns.

Counselors noted what they termed a maturing of the gay community. According to conclusions drawn from their patient population, they considered the gay community to be moving into adolescence. They predicted that it would have happened anyway but that AIDS had hurried it along. From their work as

224 Clifford Pugh, “Living with AIDS,” The Houston Post, 20 September 1983.

225 Altman, AIDS in the Mind, 161.

226 “Houston area Seminar,” The Houston Post, 20 September 1983.

counselors in the community, they concluded that at least some gay men were modifying their sexual behavior.227

Even at that point, AIDS had clearly caused some shift in the character of the then ten-year-old gay rights movement. For many in the gay male community, so predominantly based on sexual institutions and activities, the shift was notable.

Sexuality as the center of gay male identity was replaced, at least partially, with that of the political, cultural and health aspects of the AIDS struggle itself.228 A Houston article cited locals who said that while the change was quite dramatic in New York and San Francisco, it was less so in Houston. While near empty in some major cities, the bathhouses remained very busy in Houston. One bathhouse owner in Houston stated that business was off but from the slowing economy, not AIDS. He said, “gays should worry about their alcohol abuse and livers more than AIDS.”229

Statements such as these suggest that in late 1983, significant numbers of people, even many within the LGBT community itself, had not realized the seriousness of the disease. At the same time, large numbers of MSM in Houston remained outside of the more knowledgeable realm of the AIDS movement itself.

Seeking to address the gay male community and hopefully reach more MSM at the same time, KSAF’s Michael Wilson focused on the area of safe sex and the idea of impeding transmission. He acknowledged that those resistant to actually practicing

227 Ibid.

228 Padgug, “Tiger,” 257.

229 “Houston Area Seminar,” The Houston Post, 20 September 1983.

safe sex would need instruction and encouragement.230 It would be necessary to eroticize safe sex. But, as Micheal Androte wrote, “the question ultimately became, plainly and simply, whether sex was worth dying for.” The community took the role of helping men change their sexual behavior. This meant “reinterpreting sexuality and redefining what it means to be gay in affirmative, life-saving terms.”231

Promoters of safe sex had to emphasize that they were to refrain from certain forms of sex, not from gay sexuality itself. 232 In other words, gay men would not be abandoning their hard won freedoms of the gay liberation movement.

“AIDS Play Safe Week,” introduced by KSAF in September of 1983, was a program different from other cities as it enrolled gay businesses as participants.

Historian Dennis Altman wrote, “The Houston campaign has worked because it is so remarkably American. Where else could the idea of safe sex be turned into a commodity and used as a means of strengthening a communal organization?”233

So as not to offend anyone’s sensibilities and reach as broad an audience as possible, KSAF worked with public relations experts to devise a brochure utilizing teddy bears to visually demonstrate sex as it could be performed in a safer manner.

The campaign also employed the checkered flag, common in the car-racing world, to denote places that encouraged safe sex policies, such as bars, bathhouses, and other types of businesses. KSAF’s safe sex campaign received national recognition and in

230 Wagman interview.

231 Androite, Victory, Kindle edition, loc. 298.

232 Padgug, “Tiger,” 261.

233 Altman, AIDS in the Minds, 92.

100

collaboration with New York, representatives made presentations at the Gay and

Lesbian Health Conferences that occurred each year in tandem with the National

AIDS Conferences. At these forums, Houston trained other cities on utilizing the safe sex strategies in their communities. The program promoted the idea that safe sex was “cool and responsible.” The campaign designed hankies and small brochures to fit into the back pocket of Levi’s 501 jeans, a brand popular with gay men.234 The concept was to have attractive, appealing men, out in the bars with this information visible in their back pockets.235 Gay men had used bandanas, well before AIDS, depending on their color and where they were worn, to express their sexual proclivities. The hankies also fit with the gay macho style that was visible nationally by the mid 1970s.236

The official introductory week of AIDS Play Safe Week in Houston began on a

Sunday night with a prayer vigil at St. Stephen’s Episcopal Church. Other events included a “Can We Talk” at Rich’s Disco, “Straight Talk From the Doctors at M.D.

Anderson,” followed by more humorous information presented by a Joan Rivers impersonator.237 The organizers were committed to a high visibility framework for this project. They took advantage of the fact that the gay male community remained very bar-centered at that point, and dispersed the material accordingly. With the

234 Lovell interview.

235 Wagman interview.

236 Alice Echols, Hot Stuff: Disco and the Remaking of American Culture (New York and London: W.W. Norton, 2010), 28.

237 “Houston Area Seminar,” The Houston Post, 20 Sept 1983.

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health institution’s lack of response in this area, they felt strategically determined to educate their own.

Similarly, the KSAF became concerned with protecting the blood supply.

Members determined to do this in a manner that would simultaneously respect the privacy rights of those who might be members of high-risk groups.238 They worked together with the Gulf Coast Blood Bank to create a solution whereby they placed a question regarding membership in high-risk groups on the confidential application.

It corresponded to a bar code tab that would be placed on the drawn blood of such a donor and the blood would be discarded without divulging the status of the individual donor. This protected the anonymity of the donors and the blood supply at the same time.239

1984

As 1984 began, a survey of fourteen cities by the National Mayors’ AIDS Task

Force revealed that Houston had the sixth highest level of AIDS cases.240 The ravages of the disease were visible on the streets. Freda Wagman remembered

“seeing men walking down the street in two’s whether friends, partners, brothers, whatever, one would be so skinny and weak and they would have a donut pillow as their hips would be so boney they had to sit on the padding.” The fear was palpable as well. She went to a bar many nights with the partner of a client who had died. In conversation with other bar clientele, he would share that his lover had died of

238 Altman, AIDS in the Mind, 78-79; Chambre, Fighting, 115.

239 Lovell interview.

240 “Houston has 6th highest level of AIDS,” The Houston Post, 27 January 1984.

102

AIDS. Sometimes, overhearing this, men standing nearby would “run as if they couldn’t get far enough away fast enough.”241 This type of fear-based behavior would continue until September when the CDC released information that the AIDS virus was not spread through casual contact such as food, water, air, or environmental surfaces.242

It had been slightly more than two years since the first known death from KS had occurred in Houston. At last, HDHHS director Dr. James Haughton announced the initiation of some programs toward addressing the crisis. He claimed that

$64,000 of his budget would be utilized to produce a computerized list of AIDS cases. Established through the health unit’s bureau of epidemiology the list would be confidential while offering the first official depository of data on the disease in

Houston. The program included a phone line to answer questions about other agencies or programs, medical services, counseling, and basic scientific information.

Haughton spoke of plans for educational brochures and seminars. Haughton said that he sought to put the problem into a proper perspective and to fight the confusion and the many unfounded fears caused by the disease.243 Proper perspective for him meant that he considered it to be only one of many health problems in Houston only of relative importance to the many others. Even with these steps by the health director, KSAF still remained the leader of the response and in control of the dissemination of AIDS information in Houston.

241 Wagman interview.

242 MMWR, 9 Sept 1984 in AIDS.gov/timeline.

243 “Registry of AIDS victims: City’s first official list to be anonymous,” The Houston Post, 28 January 1984.

103

At the beginning of March, McAdory of KSAF and several councilmembers met privately with city health chief Haughton to find out what had happened to the

$88,000 Mayor Kathy Whitmire had allocated the previous June for research, education, and tabulation of the disease. The meeting turned “nasty” as Haughton told the group that the CDC did not think any more money was needed for AIDS in

Houston. CDC statistics reported only 33 cases in the city.244 Wilson was able to refute these numbers by reporting that at MDA where he worked, “the numbers far exceed those of the CDC. Right now, at M.D. Anderson, we have fifty-five patients with KS and about eighty-five with an immunological suppression deficiency.”245

By McAdory’s calculations, the money had dissipated as follows: the $88,000 was reduced to $64,000 through budget cuts, $24,000 marked for education was deleted, and of the remaining $40,000, $26,000 was to be used for a computer to track the disease. That left $14,000 to hire a staff and that had not been done. New

York had a $3 million budget while Chicago and San Francisco had $3 million and $2 million dollars respectively. Houston’s mere $88,000, while the city was then fourth in numbers of cases nationally, was paultry.246

McAdory knew that the CDC numbers were the result of unreported and inconsistent data on cases in Houston, and had direct proof of the effect it was having on funding for the city. Working to bring attention to the lack of accurate statistics that would attract much needed funding, McAdory surveyed thirty-five

244 “Nasty meeting with city health department,” TWIT, 23 March 1984, 15-16, UHSC.

245 “Mayor forms new task force,” TWIT, 30 March 1984, 15, UHSC.

246 “Nasty meeting with city health department,” TWIT, 23 March 1984, 15-16, UHSC.

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doctors and four hospitals. He discovered 374 cases and seventy-five deaths. The city had reported seventy cases and sixteen deaths. Doctors were not reporting cases and there was evidence as well that some were lying about the cause of death on death certificates. This was occurring most frequently in private healthcare situations.247 Some instances were attributable to local patient requests that their names not be reported as they feared being fired from their jobs or losing their health insurance.248

In response to McAdory’s findings, Haughton admitted that he regarded this as frustrating that the city did not have access to this information. He regarded this as another symptom of a lack of AIDS education in the public sphere. He praised the foundation’s brochure, “Towards a Healthier Lifestyle,” and wanted to print more at city expense. The foundation asked the city for $40,000 to continue and expand its educational efforts. They also asked for a patient’s advocate and an AIDS task force.

In this same conversation, McAdory revealed another serious problem; insurance companies were refusing to cover AIDS symptoms.249 If insurance companies ignored these types of claims, the county hospital district and therefore the taxpayers would be left holding the bills.

As 1984 unfolded, observers began to see that the numbers of AIDS sufferers were expanding at an exponential rate. The rising numbers of illnesses revealed whole new, previously unpredicted needs. While the distribution of pamphlets and

247 Emily Grotta, “Some aids cases going unreported victim says,” The Houston Post, 22 Mar 1984.

248 “Mayor forms new task force,” TWIT, 30 March 1984, 17, UHSC.

249 Emily Grotta, “Some aids cases going unreported victim says,” The Houston Post, 22 Mar 1984.

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the operation of the telephone hotline had helped with education, KSAF members, sitting around a table working one night, realized there were other crucial areas they were not addressing. As members recall this evening, there was a knock at the door as if on cue. It was a man who had been diagnosed and consequently lost his job, his housing, and had no money, even for food. Providing this young man with some money they realized immediately that it was time for KSAF to enter the realm of social services.250

As officials were discovering in other major cities, AIDS had exposed a gaping hole in the nation’s social service net. Welfare services had been organized for children, the elderly, and poor families, not for young men in their thirties who were dying of an acute undefined disease that was sexually transmitted.251 Where there were programs to aid victims at various levels in a response to a natural disaster such as a tornado, hurricane, or flood, there were no such provisions for victims of a public health disaster. 252 Even though more hospitals had begun to provide specific care for AIDS sufferers, once they left the hospital, there were no services to address the lack of ability these people had for taking care of themselves at home.

People began approaching the foundation with a multitude of other needs caused by the afflictions of this disease. The pleas for help, as shown by the man

250 Wilson, AFH History; Lovell interview.

251 Chambre, Fighting, 24.

252 Michele Landis Dauber, The Sympathetic State: Disaster Relief and the Origins of the American Welfare State (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 2012); James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1999); Edwin Amenta, Bold Relief: Institutional Politics and the Origins of Modern American Social Policy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998); Theda Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in the United States (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1992).

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above, revealed that people were hungry, unable to pay bills, and sometimes even homeless. Employers were firing employees upon learning they were sick. This left them without the means to support themselves in their increasingly debilitated condition. Even those with substantial savings and investments were driven to indigence because when they lost their jobs, they lost their health insurance, and had to pay for the expensive hospital stays out of pocket. In addition, as caregivers needed to go to work, there was no one to care for the increasingly difficult needs of advanced cases. Patients were sometimes just dropped off at hospitals. 253

Responding to these new challenges, the foundation developed the Attendant

Care Program, later known as the Buddy System as GMHC of New York called theirs.254 This involved patient advocates who assessed the needs of individuals and the buddies who actually carried out the assistance.255 Therapist and social worker

Robert Snellgrove was an early participant in this program. He first heard of AIDS in

1981 from a coworker. Soon after he heard about it at his gym. Men called it the

“gay cancer.” Even though the press was not covering it at that point, the malady was already a word of mouth topic, at least among gay men. Soon after though, it

“exploded,” as he put it. He attended a training to be a KSAF volunteer. He described the training as grueling and the weekend-long classes lasted until one or two in the morning.256

253 Wilson, AFH History.

254 Chambre, Fighting, 20-21.

255 Wilson, AFH History.

256 Snellgrove interview.

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He became a member of their buddy program. The KSAF was transitioning from using six-member teams to a one-on-one buddy system in order to meet the higher and higher volume of men requesting their help. Soon after he became a hotline volunteer. He recalled that organizers were striving to make the system more data based and to include more formal training for the volunteers. They were holding monthly forums for the hotline workers to keep them abreast of the latest information and the growing lists of reference materials that could meet the caller’s queries.257

Then, on April 23, 1984, everything changed. Margaret Heckler, United

States Secretary of Health and Human Services, announced that the human cancer virus, HTLV-III was the causation of AIDS.258 As sociologist Stephen Epstein wrote in

Impure Science, the discovery of HIV, as the virus is better known, simply restructured the world, altering what millions did and said. Knowing the cause, how it was transmitted, and soon after, being able to test for its presence, even changed its coverage in the media. The gay community was thereafter divided between those who were positive and those who were not. One’s HIV status became an identifying marker that was used in personal ads along with gender, skin color, and age. It also altered the way that people had sex.259 Knowing for certain that it was sexually transmitted made gay men view safe sex as a viable alternative. Even something as politically controversial as providing intravenous drug users with clean needles

257 Ibid.

258 Epstein, Impure Science, 72.

259 Epstein, Impure Science, 93.

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became an idea that some leaders would endorse. This was hardly good news for current sufferers though. If you had been given eight months to a year to live, it was not very reassuring to find out that it would likely be two to three years at the earliest, before a vaccine would be available.260

Despite the news, in October, Mansell of the AWG told reporters “We’re not that much further along than six months or a year ago in treating or understanding

AIDS. He and another doctor, Stuart Timm, who treated several AIDS patients, noted that in earlier years, the men had come in worried about contracting the disease when at this point they were coming in with further developed symptoms of

AIDS. The doctors both agreed that the cases were getting much worse.261

There is evidence that over the summer of 1984, Mayor Kathy Whitmire was becoming more involved. In June, she formed the Mayor’s Task Force on AIDS. This came out of the meeting between Haughton, McAdory, and some city councilmembers. The KSAF had met with the mayor for over an hour on March 20.

Sue Lovell, vice president of KSAF, explained, “The group [task force] is going to work as sort of a pivot, a coordinator, for all the agencies involved such as City

Health Department, Harris County, the state, the Texas Department of Human

Resources, the MC, the MCC, and KSAF. It was comprised of subcommittees including: Documentation/Discrimination, Buchanan; Education, Dr. Mansell; Social

260 “AIDS cure still years away,” TWT, 27 April 1984, 11, UHSC.

261 Rosiland Jackler, “More facilities needed for AIDS victims,” The Houston Post, 9 Oct 1984.

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Services, Hall; Reporting Systems, Wilson. Members Reeves and Mansell had been on the AWG and Wilson had been affiliated with KSAF.262

On August 21, 1984, Wilson, then president of KSAF, received a letter from

Whitmire about the foundation’s efforts to create a hospice for AIDS patients. She wrote that she saw the need to be very real, and wished him “every success with the endeavor.” She added, “Our community benefits from your many efforts.”263

The minutes from the September 13 task force meeting revealed that 160 cases had been reported and that Dr. Gordon Reeves stated that the reporting of cases had improved drastically. The staff had recorded all confirmed cases by computer and the 120 suspect cases were in a pending file. Michael Wilson explained that This Week in Texas, a magazine published weekly for the LGBT audience, had reported case numbers using the KSAF numbers but that the HDHHS figures should now be used as official. The KSAF’s determination and persistence had finally resulted in an official, reliable system of data compilation on the epidemic.264

Beginning in the fall, the Mayor’s Task Force on AIDS established a program where the HDHHS joined KSAF in sponsoring a series of seminars. This came after an announcement that AIDS cases in Houston and Dallas had increased 500

262 “Mayor forms new task force,” TWT, 30 March 1984, 17, UHSC.

263 Letter from Whitmire to Wilson, Box 7, Institutional Collection No. 72, folder, “AIDS Proposal for Action,” JPMHC.

264 Mayor’s Task Force on AIDS, September 13, 1984 meeting, Institutional Collection No. 72, folder, “Mayor’s Task Force on AIDS,” JPMHC.

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percent.265 Some were public forums on AIDS and others were for the medical and allied health providers.266 It is ironic that a city’s health infrastructure would be so determined to remain hands-off in a health crisis that they would allow a grassroots organization, at that point run by gay men and lesbians, to be completely in charge of all dissemination of information and educational aspects of the crisis. Yet, for years to come, KSAF had just that power.

In addition to forming the Mayor’s Task Force on AIDS, Whitmire had contacted the federal government to express concern over the Health and Human

Services regulation requiring Supplemental Security Income (SSI) presumptive disability determinations and the resulting long gap between a disability declaration and the date that a patient finally received funds. These patients would often require emergency housing in order to have a place to live during this period. A response from the Executive Office of the President in Washington expressed that applications for SSI disability from AIDS sufferers were being processed as rapidly as possible. The letter also stated that interim assistance payments were available from state agencies in order to speed up the process of relief.267

Wilson reported that the requests to the KSAF for patient services were coming at the rate of five per week. He also stated that they were running out of money and that at the current rate the costs could exceed $180,000 for the next

265 “AIDS skyrockets in Dallas and Houston! Cases up 500%,” TWIT, 24 August 1984, 11, UHSC; “Mayor proclaims AIDS awareness week,” TWIT, 28 Sept 1984, 15, UHSC.

266 Mayor’s Task Force on AIDS, September 13, 1984 meeting, Institutional Collection No. 72, folder, “Mayor’s Task Force on AIDS,” JPMHC.

267 Letter Stockman to Whitmire, 18 October 1984, Institutional Collection No. 72, folder, “Mayor’s Task Force on AIDS,” JPMHC.

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year. Fundraising was crucial since the city’s ASOs existed solely on money from their community with little or no public assistance. Robert Snellgrove described the situation by saying that in New York and San Francisco, the city governments were funding the ASOs, but in Houston, with the fourth highest numbers of cases, it was a

“pass the hat” paradigm. Bartenders were donating tips. It was all supported through great sacrifice at the grassroots level. Because of this willingness to do all the work with no support, he termed the Houston AIDS effort “heroic.” 268

As 1984 drew to a close, some momentum seemed visible on the part of the mayor and her AIDS task force, but the String of Pearls and the LGBT community continued to remain the backbone of AIDS services in Houston. In the first few years Houston’s AIDS movement had firmly established three major organizations.

They had identified and began confronting the areas of immediate need: disseminating educational information, raising money for research, getting the city to collect statistics on the case numbers in Houston, and establishing services to help the sufferers. They linked their organization with their counterparts in other major cities. They had emerged as leaders with the publication of “Toward a

Healthier Lifestyle” and the design of their Safe Sex Program. The community, its supporters, and its allies, however, continued to dig deeper into their pockets to keep the ever more strained network afloat.

It was at this time that the stability in the political climate for lesbians and gays in Houston began to erode. An extreme backlash against the progress of the LGBT community began when Mayor Whitmire and a majority of council members passed

268 Snellgrove interview.

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an ordinance to protect city employees against discrimination based on sexual orientation. Opponents to such an ordinance forced a referendum to repeal the ordinance, and the citizens of Houston voted against it four to one. As I assert, and is the subject of the next chapter, the timing for introducing such a law had not been politically or financially expedient for Houston’s LGBT community.269

For the next election cycle, following the referendum’s defeat, elected officials were afraid to be associated with any issues that were pro-gay. They feared for their positions in the next election. This was exacerbated and perpetuated by the formation of the Straight Slaters, a group of politicians who launched campaigns to run against each councilmember who had voted for the anti-discrimination legislation.270

So, it was in this volatile political year, when the referendum issue would, for a period of time, reduce the clout of the GPC to nil, that that same community was finding itself daily, to be more and more under assault from AIDS.

269 “Gay rights referendum likely, group says,” The Houston Post, 7 July 1984; Bill Coulter, “No referendum on city’s gay amendment,” The Houston Post, 27 June 1984; John Gravois, “Citywide referendum possible: Gay rights ordinances ok’d,” The Houston Post, 20 June 1984.

270 Stephanie McGrath, “Anti-gay organization names ‘Straight Slate,’” The Houston Chronicle, 9 July 1985.

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Chapter Three

“Politics, AIDS, and the New Right Backlash of 1985”

Between July 1982 and June 1983, there were one hundred new cases of

AIDS in Houston.271 Between July 1983 and June 1984, there were over 500 new cases. Dallas had a similar increase proportionately: fourteen cases in the first period and seventy-five in the next twelve-month period. As KS AIDS Foundation

(KSAF) president Michael Wilson explained to the press, “Our caseload has increased five times in the last year.” As this represented a two-year lag behind the same dramatic surge that had occurred in New York and California, the 500 percent increase in cases represented should have gotten the attention of city officials.272

While a growing number of Houston citizens became infected and died from the mysterious illness known as AIDS, the city’s political attention span remained focused on an expensive and exhaustive anti-gay backlash. Instead of recognizing the direness of this situation, the city’s power bases, represented here by the city government and the gay community, squandered vast resources on a futile political dispute at a time when cooperation and collaboration could have begun to address the AIDS threat years earlier.

The climax came on January 19, 1985, when 250,000 plus voters, a record for any single-issue election in Houston, defeated two proposed ordinances by a 4-1 majority. These ordinances would have officially ended job discrimination by sexual

271 “AIDS skyrockets in Dallas and Houston! Cases up 500%,” TWIT, 24 August 1984, 11.

272 Ibid.

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orientation for city employees. What was to be a decision on an amendment to municipal hiring policies became a forum for a powerful conservative faction of city officials and businessmen to launch a campaign against gay liberation and the

Whitmire administration and its supporters in Houston. Encouraged by the success of the referendum, they took aim at the regular elections the following November.

There they sought to unseat any elected officials who had supported the antidiscrimination ordinance.273

From one perspective, the backlash’s impact on city politics was naught.

After administrators tallied the votes from the regular elections held in November of that year, the challenged officials had retained their seats. Houston voters chose the proven governing experience of the incumbents over the antigay challengers. The backlash did have a measurable impact on the political influence of the gay community, however, at least temporarily. After all, voters defeated this most definitive step forward for gay liberation. And, for the 1985 election cycle, no candidates sought the endorsement of the city’s GPC, a political entity that had become highly desirable to anyone wanting to win an election there. Tom Kennedy of the Houston Post had written in 1984 that the caucus was a “force to be reckoned with.”274 By the 1987 election cycle, however, politicians returned for the caucus’s

273 “Gay rights referendum likely, group says,” The Houston Post, 7 July 1984; Bill Coulter, “No referendum on city’s gay amendment,” The Houston Post, 27 June 1984; John Gravois, “Citywide referendum possible: Gay rights ordinances ok’d,” The Houston Post, 20 June 1984; Stephanie McGrath, “Anti-gay organization names ‘Straight Slate,’” The Houston Chronicle, 9 July 1985.

274 Tom Kennedy, “Gay Political Caucus is a force to be reckoned with,” The Houston Post, 12 January 1984.

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nod. Popular opinion on the importance of equal rights for gays returned to its pre- referendum level as well.275

From another perspective, that of the city’s response to the AIDS crisis, the residual effect was more negative. Evidence of strong cooperation and collaboration between community and government organizations was a requirement of both private and public agencies in order to attract federal grant funding for dealing with the disease and its myriad repercussions. While other major cities had received generous amounts of funding to address the exploding case numbers and the unanticipated needs that came with them, Houston had not. Instead of building a strong coalition that would be able to attract the much needed funds, the city government, the mayor’s administration, the health department, and the volunteer

AIDS community organizations remained in a gridlock of non-communication and denial over the seriousness of the disease, as well as rife with disputes on how to protect the civil rights of those infected.

In this chapter I argue that the greatest effect of the backlash was the distraction and resultant lack of attention that was provided to face the impending epidemic. In this context, however, I also wish to complicate the blame process that so quickly places fault on the right wing, anti-gay element of Houston. This chronicle of events in 1984 and 1985 Houston raises the question of “why then” concerning the timing for presenting an antidiscrimination bill for sexuality in the first place. A look at the lack of success of such legislation in other U.S. cities at the

275 “Gay rights support rebounds from 1985,” The Houston Post, 24 March 1986; Robert Reinhold, “AIDS issue seen as minor factor in Houston Vote: politicians say economy was more important,” The New York Times, 7 November 1985.

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time should have discouraged any such attempts in Houston. The advancing AIDS epidemic proved more powerful than the medical community and government at all levels.

Through the events of the 1985 referendum in Houston one can glean not only an idea of the political climate of 1980s Houston, Texas, and the South, but also an assessment of the power and influence of conservatism in the South regionally. It provides an assessment of just how far gay liberation had come in broader urban

Southern society, by the middle of that decade. The fact that, at this point, Houston had a woman mayor, a black police chief, and a large politically organized gay community should not be misconstrued as evidence that the city was a stronghold of liberal politics. At the very least, the events of 1985 demonstrate, when it came to a person’s sexual object choice, it remained very conservative. The political battle over the referendum, regardless of the fact that an extreme right-wing faction instigated it, exposed a strong line beyond which society was unwilling to grant legal legitimatization to the liberation of sexual behavior between same sex attracted individuals, or more broadly, to allow a reorientation regarding the freedom of human sexuality.276

Other cities in the South and other regions were having this same conversation and the outcomes were not positive. Why did Houston proponents of the ordinance not use these experiences to better prepare for the 1985 debacle? In

1985, anti-discrimination laws that included sexual orientation as a component

276 See Margot Canaday, The Straight State: Sexuality and Citizenship in Twentieth Century America (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2009).

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were far from universally acceptable, making this a clear point of resistance in the on-going battle for gay liberation. While many cities such as Detroit, Michigan;

Columbus, Ohio; and Austin, Texas had approved such ordinances by 1979, New

York had voted one down every year since 1975.277 In fact, it was not until

September of 2013, that San Antonio became the fourth Texas city to create such an ordinance to protect all of its residents against discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity. Ft. Worth had been the first to pass such an ordinance in 2000 with Dallas following in 2002 and Austin next in 2004. In 2010,

Houston’s lesbian Mayor Annise Parker sanctioned such protection by mayoral executive order and then expanded the protections to include gender identity. In

2013, Houston and El Paso offered such protection but still only for city employees.

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Boulder, Colorado’s city council had passed such an ordinance in 1974. By referendum the citizens of Boulder repealed the law and recalled one of the two supporters that were eligible for recall and denied the mayor reelection.279 In 1977,

Anita Bryant utilized her popularity as a pop singer to start a religiously driven movement, “Save Our Children.” She utilized the referendum process where she lived, in Dade County, Florida to undo the antidiscrimination law there. She then

277 “Court Ruling Spurs Homosexuals' Anti-discrimination Effort,” The New York Times, 2 September 1984.

278 Alexa Ura, “Map: Comparing nondiscrimination ordinances in Texas,” The Texas Tribune, 18 September 2013, texastribune.org.

279 Linda Hirshman, Victory: The Triumphant Gay Revolution (New York: HarperCollins, 2012), 245.

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instigated similar movements, mostly successful, in other cities where gays had won these rights: St. Paul, Minnesota; Eugene, Oregon; and Wichita, Kansas.280

Then, there was the Texas gay community itself. It had its conservative factions as well. The Log Cabin Republicans, a gay Republican group, were strong and the first president of the GPC had been president of that organization in

Houston.281 According to their published record, they “have a proud history of fighting to build a stronger, more inclusive Republican Party.” With roots to the

1970s, they claim to work from the inside of the Republican Party to “overcome the forces of exclusion and intolerance.” They linked President Reagan to their founding.282 Previous to the 1984 presidential election, President Reagan held the majority for gay and lesbian voters in pre-election polls in Dallas. A similar poll in

Houston pegged Walter Mondale to be victorious but actual results in Texas gave

Republican Reagan a 67 to 33 percent lead.283 It was at this time that Greg Russell, chairman of the Republican committee of the Houston GPC wrote an article urging that it was time for gay Republicans to organize.284 It is beyond the scope of this paper to explore how and why a political party so admittedly against equality for

280 Hirshman, Victory, 246.

281 Philip Lott and Mary Rogers, “Backlash, The Matrix of Domination, and Log Cabin Republicans” in The Sociological Quarterly, Vol. 38, No. 3, 497-512; Don Gorton, “The Gay Republican Conundrum” in The Lesbian and Gay Review Worldwide, Vol. 14, No. 1, (Jan/Feb 2007): 14-15.

282 Log Cabin Republicans: Our History, www.logcabin.org (accessed March 20, 2014).

283 “Election returns,” TWIT, 9 November 1984, 19, UHSC.

284 Greg Russell, “It’s time for gay republicans to organize,” TWIT, 13 July 1984, 21.

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lesbians and gay men would attract them as supporters. It does none-the-less speak for the diversity within the LGBT movement.

Houston councilmembers and the LGBT political community should have considered all of these elements of the rising power of the right. Jennifer Brier reminded readers in her book, Infectious Ideas, that historical accounts of the 1980s often attribute the New Right’s rise to power being at least in part due to its reaction to gay rights and AIDS.285 She quoted historian Sara Diamond who wrote: “The onset of the Reagan era brought unity to the Right’s disparate elements. New Right think tanks and electoral projects promoted a three-fold set of priorities: anticommunist militarism, supply-side economics, and ‘traditional family values.’”286 As this chapter will reveal, the ‘traditional family values’ ideal, the passage of the ordinance, and the dramatic worsening of the AIDS epidemic provided the ideal platform for them to perpetrate the critical backlash.

City Council Member Sue Lovell posed another explanation for the outsized reaction to the legislation. As an active member of the GPC in 1985, she recalled the ordinance was not even about the gay community. Many different groups were involved. The ordinance was a “vehicle, a Trojan horse. There were members on the council, who supported the gay community, but were opposed to Whitmire and looking for an opportunity to weaken her position for the next election.287

285 Brier, Infectious, 80.

286 Sara Diamond, Roads to Dominion: Right-Wing Movements and Political Power in the United States (New York: Guilford, 1995) in Brier, Infectious, 80.

287 Lovell interview.

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Regardless of the exact causation of the backlash and its timing at the onset of the AIDS crisis, a key issue remained the divisiveness among political leaders over the broader political trends of the time. Conservatism was on the rise and with it political leaders were fighting formidably for continuity of the past over the many social changes begun in the previous decade. As this chapter on Houston in 1985 will show, legalized equality in the realm of sexuality would require quite a battle.

The Referendum of 1985 and the Rise of the Anti-Gay Movement

In June of 1979, at the close of Gay Pride Week, over 5,000 men and women met for a rally in Sprotts Park, near the Heights neighborhood in Houston. Steve

Shiflett, president of the GPC, announced that by their estimate, contrary to reality,

“at least 20 percent” of the Houston population was gay. He concluded, “we can put anyone in office we want because of the strength of our voting bloc.”288 Even though the rally was to commemorate the 1969 Stonewall Riots in New York, community leaders took the occasion to remind participants that their voting power offered the best route for achieving their goals.

288Barbara Canetti, “Gay leaders urge supporters to use voting to gain power,” The Houston Post, 2 July 1979.

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The Montrose Voice, 20 Nov. 1981.

Bloc voting had proved to be the winning strategy for Houston gays since the founding of the GPC in 1975. By 1980, the caucus had elected the city’s first woman comptroller, defeated a 10-year veteran city council member to be replaced by the city’s first woman council member, and by 1982, elected Houston’s first woman mayor who would hold office for the next ten years.

The closing ceremonies and rally began with a softball game between the

Montrose Sports Association and the Houston Police Department. City Comptroller

Kathy Whitmire addressed the group with empowering words: “You people have so much energy and a tremendous base to work from and work together to get the rights and freedoms you want. With your enthusiasm, we can work together for a change.”289 Lacking any premonition of what would unfold politically in the next

289 Ibid.

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decade, these words seemed to express her loyalty to the LGBT movement and its causes.

Despite the GPC’s gleaming success on the election front, all was not perfect, as Bruce Voeller, founder of the National Gay Task Force, revealed in a 1979 article.

He reported that Houston and Los Angeles led all other cities in complaints about police harassment.290 Then in 1981, the police withdrew from their annual softball game with the city’s gay community team. The spokesman for the Houston Police

Officers Association team cited harassment from the anti-homosexual factions as their reason and told reporters that they had become tired of “being pressured by anti-gay groups not to play.”291

But that same year, the mood remained upbeat for the eighth annual Texas

Gay Conference held in Houston. Attendees were told that despite the rise of the conservative evangelical group, the Moral Majority, and regardless of a rise in certain groups that oppose equal rights for homosexuals, the general public’s attitude was changing and becoming less homophobic.292 These statewide gay conferences had begun in the mid-1970s, when participants used only first names on their badges and the only businesses that advertised in the conference brochures were gay bars.293

290 Naomi Carnes, “Harassment of gays charged here,” The Houston Post, 2 February 1979.

291 Tony Freemantle, “Police softball team cancels game with gays,” The Houston Post, 6 June 1981.

292 The Moral Majority was a far-right evangelical religious organization led by Jerry Falwell. They stressed a pro-family doctrine and sought to overhaul the country’s laws with regarding abortion, pornography, prayer in schools, and gay rights.

293 Jim Simmon, “Gays told things are better,” The Houston Post, 4 June 1981.

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More reason for optimism came in August of 1982. U.S. District Judge Jerry

Buchmeyer of Dallas struck down the state’s Section 21.06 of the legal code known as the state’s homosexual conduct law.294 Without this law, opponents of gay rights, or the gay lifestyle as they called it, could no longer claim it was illegal.

In the eyes of the gay community, 1984 began on a positive note as well when Kathy Whitmire, now elected to her second term as mayor, and three city council members made a tour of the city’s gay bars as a statement of gratitude for the support of the gay vote.295 Traveling in a double-decker bus and accompanied by some thirty people, the elected officials said that they were acknowledging support of their constituency in the same way they visited churches and civic clubs.

Both city newspapers reported that protest was minimal in response to the visits.296

Even when vice division raids of eleven gay bars and bookstores during the early weeks of 1984 resulted in forty-six arrests, Houston Police Chief Lee Brown assured the community that he would investigate any potential civil rights violations that might have occurred in conjunction with the raids and arrests.

Brown spoke with fifty members of the gay community in a closed meeting where he also denied the development of an extensive list of suspected homosexuals and

294 “‘Homosexual conduct law’ stricken,” The Houston Post, 8 August 1982.

295 “15 protest visit to gay bars by mayor, council members,” The Houston Chronicle, 19 January. 1984.

296 Jim Simmon and Mark Carreau, “Mayor’s night out gets little reaction,” The Houston Post, 11 January 1984.

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those related to homosexual activities over the last eleven years as activist Ray Hill had claimed.297

The significant trouble began in June of 1984, when Houston City Council member Anthony Hall proposed making into law their longstanding hiring practice of not discriminating against homosexuals. Councilman John Goodner immediately expressed opposition to the issue stating that the new ordinance could prevent the city from keeping gays out of positions in the recreation area where they might serve as role models for children. “What they do in their own communities is their business, I suppose, I just don’t want homosexuals working in city jobs where they could be role models for our children,” he said.298

Councilman Anthony Hall, retorted, “we cannot categorize a class of people by their private activity in such a way as to imply they exhibit a bad role model for people.” He also made the point that people probably work beside gay people all the time and do not know as they act and appear just like anybody else.299

As the proposals became more contentious, ordinance proponents and the gay community planned to keep the rhetoric of the debate focused on the issue of job discrimination and away from anything to do with gay rights or lifestyle. The existing ordinance prohibited city employment discrimination based on “race, color, religion, age, disability, sex, or national origin,” and Hall’s intent was to add sexual orientation to that list. According to Norm Guttman, president of the GPC, the

297 William Pack, “Homosexual air gripes to Brown,” The Houston Post, 24 January 1984.

298 John Gravois, “Gay hiring vote delayed by Council,” The Houston Post, 6 June 1984.

299 Ibid.

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proposal was a “no-change kind of amendment. It validates the rights of gays - that’s all.” He and others made the point that it was only a city ordinance and would have no effect on the private sector.300 But the press did not help proponents in their strategy to maintain a tight focus on job discrimination. In article after article they employed such descriptors as “Gay Rights Referendum,” or “City’s Gay

Amendment” when referring to the legislation.301

At the council meeting in June when the council approved the measures, dozens of protesters sang “America the Beautiful” and “Onward Christian Soldiers.”

Four hundred people, mostly opposed, gathered to shout and express their views.

The “odd coalition” of church groups, Ku Klux Klan members, and mothers with children, held signs such as one that read, “Did the City of Sodom pass a similar ordinance?”302

In July the council cut off debate, and voted against having a referendum. A

Post editorial explained that this was a normal, harmless, money-saving endeavor with the strategy of avoiding the high costs of a single-issue referendum. In this case, however, it proved to be the exact kind of move to inflame the “sizable anti-gay element, with their strong feelings on the matter, tracing back to a variety of sources

- religious fundamentalism, personal emotions, and sheer redneck machismo.”

“Banning discrimination on behalf of gays incenses these types of groups,” wrote

300 Ibid.

301 “Gay rights referendum likely, group says,” The Houston Post, 7 July 1984; Bill Coulter, “No referendum on city’s gay amendment,” The Houston Post, 27 June 1984.

302 John Gravois, “Citywide referendum possible: Gay rights ordinances ok’d,” The Houston Post, 20 June 1984.

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editorialist Donald R. Morris, and he was right; the battle lines had been drawn.303

Significant though, is the fact that Whitmire and many of the council members had been overwhelmingly elected despite the support they received from the gay community. This justifies an assumption that the vast majority of the electorate had been, up to this point, little concerned with the gay influence.

A political action group known as the Committee for Public Awareness (CPA) was out to heighten this concern and oppose gay influence in the city. It formed to override the council’s decision and bring the issues to a citywide vote. It counted on a blitz of grocery stores, discount chains, drug stores, and churches to gather the necessary volume of signatures.304 On July 20th, the committee delivered 63,800 signatures to City Hall. Goodner once again made his rhetorical position on the issue obvious by stating that he “expected supporters of the gay rights amendment to try to turn the issue into a black-white, Democratic-Republican fight, rather than a fight over ‘what kind of city we will give our children and grandchildren.’”305

Another opponent, Councilman Larry McKaskie, made reference to the $1 million that could be saved if the mayor and some of the council members would change their minds and rescind the measure. He was referring to the $350,000 in city costs plus the money being spent by the campaigns on both sides of the issue.306

303 Donald R. Morris, “Gay rights issue has council in a no-win situation,” The Houston Post, 2 July 1984.

304 John Gravois, “Group plans final blitz to force gay rights vote,” The Houston Post, 7 July 1984.

305 Emily Grotta, “Anti-gay petitions delivered to city,” The Houston Post, 7 July 1984.

306 Ibid.

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The primary campaign in favor of the ordnances was the Citizens for a United

Houston (CUH). Bill Oliver, a Beaumont minister and veteran of civil rights efforts, chaired the organization and aimed to focus the campaign almost entirely on educating the public about what the ordinances did and did not mandate.

Additionally, he worked to convince reporters that the bill was not about approval or disapproval of the gay lifestyle. Texas Democratic Senator Craig Washington

(1983-1989) was the treasurer.307

Gay activists labored hard behind the scenes, choosing to maintain a low profile. They chose to remain in line with Oliver’s strategy of keeping the focus on equal rights in city jobs rather than the legal sanction of homosexuality. This pragmatic policy also stressed that while the city and the Chamber of Commerce had been spending several million dollars to improve the city’s image, a defeat on the referendum could send a message that the city was not against legalized discriminatory policies. Adversely, the opponents said that if the laws become implemented, the city image would become one like “Sodom and Gomorrah.”308

By early December, the CUH launched their campaign in favor of the laws with a press conference in downtown Houston. They supplied a list of fifty national professional and religious organizations that came out in favor of adding sexual orientation to existing anti-discrimination policies. The coalition was a loose-knit affiliation of some Houston organizations that were for the law and included, among

307 Rad Sallee, “New support reported for Houston’s gay-rights law,” The Houston Chronicle, 12 December 1984; “United Houston Campaign Kickoff,” TWIT, 21 December 1984, p. 15.

308 Ibid.

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others, the League of Women’s Voters, the New Coventry Presbytery of the

Presbyterian Church, the Metro Community Church, the Houston Women’s Political

Caucus, and the Greater Montrose Business Guild. Their strategy remained to educate the public on exactly what the ordinances did and did not mandate.309

The opposition, which now included conservative churches that took firm antigay stances, the Republican Party, and the Ku Klux Klan among others, saw the issue to be a battle over legalized acceptance of a gay lifestyle. Leading the opposition group, the CPA, Councilman John Goodman announced his new strategy for “becoming blunt” and revealing what he considered to be the true issue at stake: preventing Houston from going the way of San Francisco where, “gays are effectively in control of a heck of a lot of the destiny of San Francisco.”310 He wanted to educate the public about what he perceived to be the homosexual lifestyle, believing that once this was accomplished, they would vote against any gay agenda.

He considered that the real issue to be decided in January was whether or not

Houston would become a haven for homosexuals.

Houston Chronicle commentator Nene Foxhall included some background on

Houston politics in her column on December 23.311 She wrote that historically, the

309 Emily Grotta, “Referendum campaign begins,” The Houston Post, 12 December 1984; Richard Vara, “Clerics urge flocks to back gay ordinance,” The Houston Post, 5 January 1985; “League of Women Voters supports gay rights,” Houston Digest, 10 December 1984.

310 John Gravois, “Councilman pushes hard to defeat gay rights vote,” The Houston Post, 2 December 1984.

311 Nene Foxhall, “Neither side budged an inch before colliding on gay issue,” The Houston Chronicle, 23, December 1984. See also Don E. Carlton, Red Scare!: Right-Wing Hysteria, Fifties Fanaticism, and their Legacy in Texas (Austin: Texas Monthly Press, 1985) and George Norris Green, The Establishment in Texas Politics: The Primitive Years, 1938-1957 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1979).

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business establishment and the municipal government had maintained a symbiotic relationship and basically operated as one entity. She told of the days when

Houston’s powerful business leaders had made political decisions about the city’s future from suite 8-F at the Lamar Hotel.312 This was no longer the case as became most obvious when in 1979 the citizens voted to expand the city council to include representatives of minority districts. This decentralization of power continued when in 1981 a progressive, young female was elected as mayor. She and council members such as Eleanor Tinsley, George Greanias, and Anthony Hall brought a new approach to city government; one that included business-like management and responsiveness to constituents.313

The City Council’s proposed ordinances in 1984 awakened some of these unresolved issues. The Chamber of Commerce Executive Committee, the critical voice of the business community, decided to pressure the Council and Mayor with a threat to either rescind the issues or they would vote unanimously against the antidiscrimination ordinances in the upcoming referendum. Chamber members were expected to keep their opposition low-key and remain detached from the more vocal opposition that had crowded the council chambers for the June 19 vote singing hymns, and shouting anti-gay remarks along with the Ku Klux Klan.314

Whitmire, obviously upset by the committee’s decision to oppose the antidiscrimination effort, said that while she had the “highest regard” for the chamber

312 Carleton, Red Scare, 70.

313 Nene Foxhall, “Neither side budged an inch before colliding on gay issue,” The Houston Chronicle, 23 December 1984.

314 “Councilmen to push for gay-rights vote,” The Houston Chronicle, 4 July 1984.

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executive committee members, by voting to oppose the measures the chamber was supporting anti-gay rights campaigns that were “filled with hate and venom.” She expressed her regret that the committee had made its decision without “listening to anyone on the other side of the issue” and that the decision could “work to the detriment” of the city’s “extensive economic development efforts.”315 She denounced them for involving themselves “in a divisive election which is about bigotry and intolerance and particularly for them to decide to involve themselves on the side of bigotry and intolerance.”316

Ordinance opponent Councilman John Goodner said that the “chamber’s action would ‘uncork the bottle’ for heavyweight support for anti-gay rights campaigners.”317 As both sides knew, the chamber’s decision to take sides would open some deep pockets for financial support for the opposition. Among the

Houston business leaders who made contributions were developer Walter Mischer, and builder Leo Linbeck, Jr., who were co-guarantors on a $100,000 loan to the

Committee for Repeal (CFR), a political action committee working against the propositions. The CFR reported $139,670 in donations received by January 9.318

The opposition used the fear of AIDS as one of its most powerful arguments.

Through the politicization of the disease the CPA carefully perpetrated a fear

315 John Gravois, “Mayor slams chamber on gay vote,” The Houston Post, 20 December. 1984.

316 “Political Meddling by chamber of commerce puts them on side of ‘bigotry and intolerance’ says mayor, Montrose Voice, 21 December 1984; John Gravois, “C of C opposes gay rights vote,” The Houston Post, 19 December 1984.

317 Ibid.

318 Emily Grotta and John Gravois, “Business leaders back anti-gay vote,” The Houston Post, 12 January 1985.

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campaign that distracted the city’s focus from taking the actions needed to face the threat as a health emergency. The opposition also focused on homosexuality rather than equal rights for city employment. One of the pamphlets they distributed before the election urged citizens to “Vote Against both Homosexual Propositions.” They failed to mention that the ordinances dealt with employment anti-discrimination, not homosexuality. Then they placed AIDS into the issue. The brochure made claims such as, “Incurable and Other Diseases are Transmitted by Homosexuals to the

General Public.” They warned that transmission was possible through food handling, mosquitos, beauty parlor services, and the use of public restrooms.319

The opposing side presented the false and erroneous material in a manner that easily propagated fear amongst a public that was highly ignorant about AIDS.

The misinformation also directly opposed the AIDS movement’s educational campaigns that sought to stifle the unknowns and misconceptions that were so rampant. The effort was clearly an attempt to produce fear for political gain and worked counterproductively against the educational materials that were being disseminated by AIDS movement organizations such as KSAF to properly educate the public on how to stop the spread of the disease.320

319 The Houston Post, 20 November 1984.

320 “Vote Against Both Homosexual Propositions,” Vertical File “Homosexuals 1984,” HMRC. For examples of early scholarship on the AIDS epidemic and the response of the grassroots community see Randy Schilts, And The Band Played On: Politics, People, and the AIDS Epidemic (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1987); John-Manuel Androite, Victory Deferred: How AIDS Changed Gay Life in America (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1999); Philip M. Kayal, Bearing Witness: Gay Men’s Health Crisis and the Politics of AIDS (Boulder, San Francisco, and New York: Westview Press, 1993). The direction of the new scholarship can be seen in Brett Stockdill, Activism Against AIDS: At the Intersections of Sexuality, Race, Gender, and Class (Boulder, Col.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003). Local work may be found in Jonathan C. Heath, “Strength in Numbers: Houston’s Gay Community and the AIDS Crisis, 1977-1989,” (M.A. thesis, University of Houston, May 2006); and Elizabeth Jean

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The Houston Post, 20 November 1984.

As both sides added television and radio advertising campaigns during the last days before the election, former U.S. Representative Barbara Jordon gave her endorsement of the ordinances as did Texas State Representative Debra Danburg.

Danburg sought to encourage voters to ignore the negative rhetoric by writing,

“Austin, Texas added this same provision in 1975, nearly ten years ago.

Earthquakes have not occurred, nor has their city government become non- functional.”321

Tudor, “Speaking in Voices, Learning to Talk: The Spoken and Written Culture of the AIDS Foundation of Houston,” (Ph.D. dissertation, Rice University, November 1994).

321Letter from Debra Danburg, Box 3, Folder 3, “Official City Business,” “Gay Rights Referendum,” (KJWPUHSC).

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Former GPC president Steve Shiflett, at that time living in San Francisco, organized a rally that raised $1000 for the Houston battle. Relying on his experience in Houston politics Schiflett said “We understand this to be a raw power play between the good-old-boy network (in Houston) and the more progressive movement at City Hall.”322 He said that the battle in Houston was representative of a new trend from the political right that was threatening gay rights nationally. This was particularly evident in the work of the Moral Majority. This new conservatism, through claims that AIDS was a judgment from God, encouraged the stigmatization of PWAs. The Moral Majority and other Christian Right groups worked to block funding for AIDS education, counseling, and other services for those stricken with the disease.323

Councilmember Eleanor Tinsley stood her ground that “the real issue is discrimination in city employment and the prohibition of such discrimination.” She responded to the rhetoric of the opposition. For instance, they called a citywide

“Leadership” meeting at the Westin Galleria Hotel on January 8 to raise money and to “inflame passions” through a showing of the CBS network television program

“Gay Power, Gay Politics” that made negative allegations against San Francisco’s gay community. She reminded the public that CBS had apologized for many portions of the documentary and agreed that they had been inflammatory as charged. Her statement argued that, “The documentary is about as accurate in depicting what this

322 Mike Snyder, “San Francisco funds raised to support gay measures,” The Houston Chronicle, 7 January 1985; Invitation to Kathy Whitmire, Kathryn J. Whitmire Papers, Box 3, folder 3, “Official City Business, “Gay Rights Referendum,” University of Houston Special Collections (Whitmire Papers, UH).

323 Rimmerman, From Identity, 87.

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issue is all about as the 1915 movie the Birth of a Nation was in depicting the race issue at the time of WWI.”324

Tinsley presented two other relevant events from Houston’s not to distant past. In the 1960s, the city had, following a program by Quentin Meese in the black community, simply put out the word that restaurants should no longer deny services to blacks. One or two black couples were assigned to specific restaurants for service and when they appeared they were served, thereby avoiding the “trauma and bad publicity that stubborn resistance” had brought to other U.S. cities at the time. The same had occurred when the Houston Sports Association brought major league baseball to Houston. Blacks were allowed to buy tickets and sit wherever they wished. She argued that this spirit should continue.325

On Election Day morning, Ulla Godosar, a Houston resident, took her aunt,

Martha Lusek, a visitor from Germany, downtown to walk around and admire the skyscrapers on what they had expected to be a quiet Saturday morning. Apparently unaware of the demonstration going on in front of City Hall, one can only imagine their surprise as they rounded the corner to discover the Ku Klux Klan, outnumbered by both the police and the press, shouting obscenities, some which were aimed at homosexuals, Mayor Kathy Whitmire, and some of the council members. The aunt shared with a reporter that she could not help but reflect on the hate and fear that had led to the horrors of World War II Germany.326

324 “Questions and Answers for the Anti-Discrimination Referendum,” Eleanor Tinsley Papers, MSS 2- 2 Box 89, Folder 14.

325 Ibid.

326 “Demonstration a surprise for visitor,” The Houston Chronicle, 19 January 1985.

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The Houston Post, 19 January 1985

When Election Day passed and the votes were counted, the measures lost by a four to one margin. The voter turnout had been at 30 percent, which was a record high in Houston for a single-issue election. The spending reports for the issues were remarkable as well. While the four opposing groups reported expenditures of

$513,429, the main supporting organization, Citizens for a United Houston, spent less than one half of that at $217,186.327

The outcome of the election forced the supporters of the ordinances to examine how and why their defeat came by such a large majority. Some realized that the overconfidence of the gay community based on the past success of their bloc voting strategy had been a factor. Since for nearly a decade GPC-endorsed

327 Burke Watson, “Referendum foes outspent backers by 2-1,” The Houston Chronicle, 2 February 1985.

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candidates had been swept into office by comfortable majorities, how could this have been so different? But as past GPC president Lee Harrington said, “We were, I think, resting on our victory laurels for the past six years.”328 After all, following sweeping victories in 1979, 1981, and 1983, most politicians considered anti-gay rhetoric to have lost its effectiveness in city elections.

Neither the gay activists nor the supporting council members foresaw the extent of damage that could result when opponents to such ordinances cast their rhetoric with hate-filled emotion based on religious conviction and fear. Even the minority communities did not help as the black leadership had divided over the issue of homosexuality being against the word of God. Only days before the election, seventy members of an organization called Pastors for Houston, which included black ministers of various denominations who had been active in the civil rights movement, held a press conference on the steps on Second Baptist Church. They attested that a victory in the referendum would promote the gay lifestyle.329 The irony of these black ministers allying themselves with the Ku Klux Klan was not missed by a cartoon in Houston Post the day before the election.

328 Nene Foxhall, “Referendum supporters miscalculated,” The Houston Chronicle, 20 January 1985.

329 “Pastors, doctors, lawyers join anti-gay rights forces,” The Houston Digest, 14 January 1985.

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The Houston Post, 18 January 1985

The Whitmire administration had been blind-sided by the unprecedented 30 percent turnout as well. Going into the election they relied on a voting strategy work-up that had failed to foresee the strength of the opposition. The introduction to the guidelines stated: “This is an election about which 90 percent of the voters do not care or do not want to be involved. Of the 10 percent that will vote, about one- third is already strongly pro-council, another one third is anti-council, and the remaining one-third is indifferent to the issue and uncomfortable at being asked whether to support or oppose gays.”330 The Whitmire administration erroneously

330 “General Strategy,” Whitmire Papers, Box 3, Folder 3, “Official City Business, “Gay Rights Referendum,” University of Houston Special Collections (UHSC).

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made these assumptions and failed to detect the need for deploying greater resources in order to succeed in the referendum. Relying on this material, they had failed to consider the poor success rate of similar ordinances in other U.S cities.

One explanation for the high energy of the backlash was that Whitmire had political enemies intent on unseating her. However, many of the ordinance opponents had attended a fundraiser in January that raised $400,000 for the mayor’s upcoming election bid.331 Additionally, she had not been the one who introduced the measure. Council member Anthony Hall had first presented the idea of adding sexual orientation to the list of areas legally protected from discrimination back in December of 1983. It had gained no attention, for or against at that time.

GPC president Sue Lovell had quietly circulated a document to councilmembers over the next six months pledging their support to such a bill. Hall had seen it as protecting heterosexuals as well as gays against discrimination.332

When considering explanations for the high turnout against the ordinances, the support for conservatism confirmed in the November Republican victories undeniably energized the anti-gay forces. As one Houston Chronicle columnist observed, “Reagan’s coattails reached down in Texas as far as any state in the United

States.”333 Reagan received 63 percent of the vote in Texas. U.S. Senate candidate

Phil Gramm won 59 to 41 percent. Gramm had attacked the Democratic candidate

331 Lovell interview.

332 Barbara Canetti, “Closet Politics: What the Gay Rights Referendum Meant,” Houston City Magazine, March 1985.

333 Nene Foxhall, “Pondering polls, GOP, Dems and gay bias,” The Houston Chronicle, 11 November 1984.

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Lloyd Doggett for his support of gays. The Texas Republican Party had denounced the gay lifestyle at their conventions. This enthusiasm was not likely to wane, as the referendum would be two days before Reagan’s inauguration.334

When considering the lack of support for the ordinances, the gay voter turnout lacked its usual enthusiastic participation. What to many was embarrassing and unforgiveable was the poor turnout of the gay population for supporting the disputed policies. The surprise and disapproval of some community members was visible in editorial comments in the days and months following the referendum election. One such expressed his disgust and embarrassment for the poor turn out to vote saying he felt especially so “when Whitmire was willing to stand up for them.” He explained that ten of his straight friends had voted and were curious that so few gays had.335 Another published letter asked, “Did I hear 350,000 voters strong? Where were they all? It appears most are more interested in the price of a cocktail than their rights.”336

Community members suggested that the campaign strategy was at fault. The idea to keep the focus on an ordinance to prevent job discrimination and away from gay rights would be less likely to inflame antigay opposition. This was a bad choice.

Activist Ray Hill said that the focus should have been on getting the community to vote. There should have been more “hand to hand contact.”337 A stronger effort

334 Ibid.

335 Ken King, “Wake Up!,” TWT Readers Respond to Referendum Vote, TWIT, 7 February 1985.

336 Tony Whirlow, Morris Greene, Lant Langley, “’Disgusting,’ TWIT Readers Respond to Referendum Vote,” TWIT, 7 February 1985.

337 Snellgrove interview.

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should have been made for getting the lesbian and gay community to realize the urgency of the situation.

When the Rice University/Houston Post survey was conducted during the height of the referendum frenzy, it revealed that Houston area residents had reversed themselves in the previous year on the highly publicized social question concerning homosexual rights. By 59 to 27 percent, adults in Harris County said that they opposed “the efforts to guarantee equal civil rights for homosexual men and women.” One year earlier, the results showed the approval of the respondents at 50 to 41 percent. The conductor of the poll explained that the very meaning of a survey question could change when an external issue becomes highly visible, explaining why that on all other survey questions about personal morality,

Houstonians remained consistent in supporting the freedom for individuals to choose their own lifestyles.338

The November 1985 Municipal Elections

Before the fallout from the referendum could lose any momentum, ordinance opponents seized the opportunity of the heightened sense of negativity toward the city’s gay constituency to shape their campaign for the upcoming

November elections. As early as June, when the time came for the annual Gay Pride

Parade, anti-gay activist Stephen Hotze and his Campaign for Houston (CFH) followers packed the council chambers to tell Mayor Whitmire that she and other elected officials should not appear in the parade as usual and that they would

338 “Reversal of view on gay rights,” The Houston Post, 25 March 1985.

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acquire 10,000 signatures for an anti-parade petition. He also asserted that police should crackdown on what he said “was lewd and indecent behavior during the parades.”339 Whitmire responded quietly to Hotze that the Mardi Gras style parades were not offensive and had been kept under control by the police. She also emphasized that city officials could participate in anything that they thought appropriate. This was evidence that the anti-gay constituency would not stop with their victory in defeating the referendum. They had bigger ambitions. CFH’s was developing their anti-gay platform for the up-coming November elections.340

Dr. Steven Hotze, anti-abortion and anti-gay activist, and his Campaign for

Houston, became the major force and leadership of the anti-gay constituency in

Houston as they organized a group of candidates for city council known as the

‘Straight Slate.’ The candidates of the Slate were out to defeat and replace anyone on the council who had supported the referendum. They attracted publicity through such tactics as threatening to file a lawsuit in State District Court after the city council voted against allowing them to be listed as a slate on the November ballot.

They had proposed this in order to enable voters to select their entire slate with one response on the ballot.341

339 “City officials urged not to adorn annual Gay Pride Parade floats,” The Houston Digest, 10 June 1985, HMRC, folder 1985.

340 Hotze contended that the parade was “immoral” and should not be supported by the council; “Gay rights foes appeal to council: support of parade, rally discouraged,” The Houston Post, 6 June 1985.

341 Stephanie McGrath, “Anti-gay organization names ‘Straight Slate,’” The Houston Chronicle, 9 July 1985.

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The Houston Post, 16 August 1985

Hotze led the antigay political faction in Houston for the upcoming elections.

He had previous experience in Austin before coming to Houston. There he led the

Austin Citizens for Decency in January 1982 to hold a referendum on a bill to allow landlords to discriminate based on sexual orientation. It was a question of public morality for him. When asked, “should homosexuals be denied official support so

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that they will find it more difficult to expand their influence over the young people of the capital of Texas?”342 He and his supporters unanimously agreed that they should be. The referendum failed and he left Austin for Houston soon after.

The Hotze name became familiar in Houston because of his vocal attacks against both homosexual and abortion groups. The Hotze family firm, Compressor

Engineering Corp. (CECO), donated $30,000 to Citizens for an Honorable Houston, which gave a portion to CFH for the January referendum.343 By the end of the campaign the Moral Majority called him dedicated determined and intense. As one

Houston reporter wrote, “his mile-a-minute speaking style is peppered with football allusions and military metaphors, although he never served in the military.”344 The gay community referred to him as ambitious, ruthless, and psychotic. National

Democratic Committeewoman Billie Carr said that she “blithely brushes him away as ‘just another gnat.’”345

The campaign for the Straight Slate adopted the music of the television western show “Bonanza,” that Hotze labeled “the No. 1 family show in America,” as their theme song. They introduced proposals aimed at restricting the lifestyles of those who carried the AIDS virus. They wanted to force the closing of gay bathhouses and other “sexually oriented businesses where” they contended, “AIDS

342 William Stevens, “Austin voting on whether a landlord can refuse to rent to homosexuals, The New York Times, 16 January 1982; “Austin voters reject amendment allowing housing discrimination,” The New York Times, 18 January 1982, A – 17.

343 Post Austin Bureau, “Houston company donates $30,000 to committee opposed to gay rights,” The Houston Post, 1 January 1985.

344 Straight Slate chief mobilizes forces in Holy War on gays,” The Houston Post, 20 October 1985.

345 Leslie Linthicum, “A voice of the conservative right,” The Houston Post, 11 December 1985.

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is spread.”346 They also sought to require food service workers to obtain health cards to prove that they had tested negative for the AIDS virus.347

As city politics became more and more focused on the November election, another element of fall-out from the January 19 loss surfaced. The GPC recommendation, that before the referendum was undisputed as one of the city’s most influential groups for delivering votes and supplying volunteers, had lost its high credentials. Mayor Whitmire and three other council members, those labeled

‘pro-homosexual,’ met formally and agreed not to seek the caucus’s endorsement.

Council member Anthony Hall said: “Any endorsement by them would have made it the front issue and detract from other issues.”348 In fact, for the Caucus there was nobody to endorse. As the group’s president Sue Lovell explained, “according to our bylaws, a candidate has to ask for support and go through screening. I don’t think the endorsement would hurt anyone. Politicians always make decisions that are politically expedient. This was one of those instances.”349

As the race heated up, former mayor Louie Welch, who had been president of the Houston Chamber of Commerce at the time of referendum, made his announcement to run for the city’s top office. He quickly forced morality to the forefront of the mayoral race as he sought to unseat Kathy Whitmire. He began to

346 “‘Straight Slate’ candidates propose AIDS restrictions,” The Houston Chronicle, 13 September 1985.

347 Jim Simmon, “Welch propels AIDS as key campaign issue,” The Houston Post, 23 October 1985; “Straight Slate New AIDS Test: Anti-AIDS ordinance would ban many jobs,” This Week in Texas, 20 September 1985.

348 Tom Kennedy, “GPC’s strength not even a myth,” The Houston Post, 31 October 1985.

349 Ibid; Jim Simmon, “ Leaders scoff at hints group is back in closet: Candidates keeping gay caucus at arm’s length,” The Houston Post, 29 September 1985.

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attack her support of the controversial referendum from January as his main weapon. He was adamant concerning his desires to prevent Houston from continuing what he saw as a gradual decent into moral depravity.350

By early October, Welch had placed AIDS in the front of his campaign issues.

He attacked Mayor Whitmire for not taking “common sense” steps to stop the spread of the disease.351 Welch and the Strait Slaters insisted that food handlers, day care workers, school teachers, and blood bank technicians should have health cards. They would be tested for HIV, tuberculosis, and leprosy every six months.352

While Whitmire defended herself, claiming that following the advice of health professionals, she was sponsoring educational campaigns as the best strategy; he advocated the same tactics as Hotze and the CFH.353

Late in the campaign, Welch ran television advertisements that tied the spread of AIDS to Whitmire’s support from the homosexual community. He cancelled these only after a few days, however, and his media advisor claimed that

“the case has been made and he wants to close out the campaign with something other than that.”354

350 Jim Simmon, “Welch propels AIDS as key campaign issue: Wants health cards for food, health workers, closing of ‘male houses of prostitution,’” The Houston Post, 25 October 1985.

351 Jim Simmon, “Welch propels AIDS as key campaign issue: Wants health cards for food, health workers, closing of ‘male houses of prostitution,’” The Houston Post, 25 October 1985.

352 Nene Foxhall and Mark Carreau, “Greanias’ City Council Challengers,” The Houston Chronicle, 22 October 1983, 1-3.

353 Jim Simmon, “Welch propels AIDS as key campaign issue: Wants health cards for food, health workers, closing of ‘male houses of prostitution,’” The Houston Post, 25 October 1985.

354 Jim Simmon and Jane Ely, “Welch drops TV commercials on AIDS,” The Houston Post, 2 November 1985.

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As the November elections neared, Welch had a major setback when having completed an interview on a local news program and assuming his microphone was dead, he stated that his solution to the AIDS problem would be to “shoot the queers!” The comment went out over the airwaves and quickly received national publicity. In Houston, Welch received death threats and was forced to don a bulletproof vest as he made his final campaign rounds. Reporters wrote that Welch did not respond well when asked about the vest. To one he remarked, “Don’t put an

‘X’ on my chest.”355 T-shirts immediately went on sale emblazoned with the words

“Louie Don’t Shoot!”356

Candidates running with the Straight Slate attacked the incumbents head-on.

Candidate Dorothy Stephens, pastor of Universal Sky Church, Worldwide

Association, she claims she established four years prior, claimed that councilmember Eleanor Tinsley “traded away her morals by identifying herself as a defender of the civil rights of homosexuals.”357 Stephens supported the Slate’s four- point program: health screening for certain jobs, quarantine of persons who have contracted the disease, intense medical research to find a cure, and upgrading sanitation. Straight Slater Jeff Wallace argued that the problems of Houston’s economy were inseparable from moral issues. He contended that a city that supported homosexuality would be unsuitable for families with children and would

355 Mark Carreau and Nene Foxhall, “Welch hopes bid isn’t shot down by ‘queers’ quip,” The Houston Chronicle, 26 October 1985.

356 “Welch’s gaff goes out over TV,” The Houston Post, 25 October 1985; Mike Snyder, “Welch’s search for campaign issue led to AIDS gaffe,” The Houston Chronicle, 25 October 1985.

357 Rad Salee, “Tinsley’s opponents base attacks on her support of gay referendum, The Houston Chronicle, 14 October 1985.

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therefore discourage businesses from relocating there. While he conceded that he knew of no business that had rejected locating in Houston because of the city’s moral climate, he felt that “any company considers the families they are moving and asks if Houston is a proper place to raise a family.” Candidate Margaret Hotze,

Stephen Hotze’s mother, said the Straight Slate is “really running on trying to preserve the image of Houston and trying to return it to a community oriented to traditional family values.”358

Whitmire, on the other hand, sought to keep the referendum behind her, acknowledging: “The voters had spoken.” A Houston Chronicle survey about the upcoming 1985 election included an open-ended question on what respondents disliked about Whitmire. Less than 15 percent answered negatively concerning her ties to the gay community. Additionally, the poll concluded that she retained the support of 25 percent of the people that voted against the two anti-discrimination measures in January.359

After months of campaigning by the CFH and its Straight Slate of candidates who had “threatened opponents with spiritual damnation and political oblivion,” the election was over. Even though the opponents had increased the numbers of conservative white voters, Kathy Whitmire and the eight City Council members were returned to office.360 Local analysts concluded that when it came to actually casting their votes, citizens considered the condition of the economy and the

358 Ibid.

359 Bill Mintz, “Poll: Gay issue alone will not be enough to beat Whitmire,” The Houston Chronicle, 7 September 1985.

360 Bob Tutt, “1985, a year of political complexity,” The Houston Chronicle, 1 January 1986.

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experience and qualifications of the incumbents to be the top factors in their decisions. A poll of 500 voters revealed that only 15 percent claimed to have voted for “moral” choices.361 As a result, the anti-gay faction’s influence in city politics proved to be short-lived. The distraction and the lethal anti-gay atmosphere that they stirred up in Houston, however, continued to have negative repercussions.

Conclusion

As the political volatility of 1985 became a thing of the past, perhaps the

AIDS crisis could finally receive a more attention. But the city had wasted resources of both time and money defending civil rights issues against a strong anti-gay backlash from the right. Other major U.S. cities such as New York, San Francisco, and Chicago were far ahead of Houston in their concerted responses. But, assigning the blame is complicated. Proponents of the antidiscrimination bill could have postponed the ordinance. Had they considered the success other U.S cities had in passing such legislation, perhaps they would have predicted such an outcome.

Then, priorities could have been on the enormous health crisis that was growing in their city.

It is the conclusion of this chapter that the distraction caused by the anti-gay movement sufficiently prevented the city government and the gay community from focusing on what was actually the largest and most crucial issue at hand: that of the AIDS crisis. If the local government and the community organizations had been able to spend their energy and financial resources focusing on the disease

361 Robert Reinhold, “AIDS issue seen as minor factor in Houston Vote: politicians say economy was more important,” The New York Times, 7 November 1985.

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earlier on, Houston could have been even with or ahead of the other major U.S. cities in their response.

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Chapter Four

“1985-1986: Discovery, Definition, and Next Steps”

In the highly charged political environment of the mid 1980s, antigay

Houston mayoral candidate Louie Welch had remarked that his cure for the AIDS epidemic would be to “Shoot the Queers!”362 As 1985 unfolded, similar comments from high profile conservatives made national news. In March, the New York Times conservative commentator William F. Buckley, Jr. wrote in an editorial column

“everyone detected with AIDS should be tattooed in the upper forearm to protect common-needle users, and on the buttocks, to prevent the victimization of other homosexuals.”363 Patrick Buchanan, conservative commentator and advisor to

Ronald Reagan, said, “the poor homosexuals…have declared war upon nature, and now nature is exacting an awful retribution.”364

Despite this repressive environment, the AIDS movement continued to grow and expand, but several events in this period influenced its focus and goals. For one, the FDA approved a test to detect the presence of the virus. This allowed for great strides in the epidemiological study of the disease. The result was the ability to make some predictions about how AIDS infection and the resulting health crisis

362 “Welch’s gaff goes out over TV,” The Houston Post, 25 October 1985; Mike Snyder, “Welch’s search for campaign issue led to AIDS gaffe,” The Houston Chronicle, 25 October 1985.

363 Epstein, Impure Science: AIDS, Activism, and the Politics of Knowledge (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1996), 187; “Crucial steps in combatting the AIDS epidemic,” The New York Times, 18 March 1986.

364 John-Manuel Androite, Victory Deferred: How AIDS Changed Gay Life in America (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 67; Donald Critchlow, Conservative Ascendancy: How the GOP Right Made Political History (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007), 217.

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would move through the rest of society. This brought about a shift in the AIDS movement’s strategies. The crisis type response of the earlier days evolved into one of more calculation and strategic planning. Where the KS AIDS Foundation (KSAF) had been entrenched strongly in education, it continued to expand into new areas of social service.

Secondly, the disease, initially associated exclusively with homosexuals, had proven to be unconcerned with sex or sexuality when choosing its victims.

Epidemiology of the disease revealed that although unknown early on, it was working its way through social groups other than homosexual men. With AIDS moving into other populations, the AIDS movement took steps to alter its image and methods in order to reach and serve other communities. KSAF, specifically, would have to decide whether to remain a gay organization or broaden its parameters to become an AIDS organization. Also in this new environment, Bering Community

Services Foundation, a fourth major entity in the AIDS movement, came on line to fill gaps in service with a support group, day care, and a dental clinic.365

Lastly, the city became host to the first and only AIDS hospital in the United

States. Known as the Institute of Immunological Disorders, this privately owned facility not only diagnosed and treated AIDS patients; it conducted research and medication trials as well. In only a year, however, the hospital closed, leaving PWAs in the region without the specialized help specific to their needs. Consequently,

365 Jeff Bray, “Adult Day Care Center First in Nation,” Montrose Voice, 6 May 1988; Richard Vara, “Pastor leading church in outreach ministry,” The Houston Post, 18 November 1989.

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Houston’s AIDS movement remained the leader and primary care provider that responded to the city’s AIDS crisis.

The chapter will first attempt to convey the atmosphere of the mid 1980s in

Houston’s LGBT community as it became more and more under the siege of AIDS. It will then introduce three changes that distinguished the 1985-1986 period and demonstrate how the AIDS movement infrastructure evolved as a result. Despite the changing nature of AIDS through this period, Houston’s AIDS movement remained in the leadership role.

AIDS did not isolate itself just to those suffering with the virus. The entire

LGBT community was reminded in some way daily that the crisis was not going away, but instead was getting worse. In early 1985, the LGBT community lost its battle in the referendum over anti-discrimination laws. This affected the political power of the LGBT community as seen most clearly in Houston’s political candidates lack of interest for the endorsement. The success of the political backlash in linking

AIDS with the LGBT community cast a shadow of stigma over everyone, not just those directly affected by the disease. Following the elections that November, the

Gay Political Caucus (GPC) elected their new president, Annise Parker, and began a new year in hopes of overcoming the city’s violent anti-gay climate, distancing themselves from AIDS issues, and rebuilding their clout. But, both out-going president Lovell and the newly elected Parker agreed that the AIDS issue could not

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be ignored. It was already a front and center political issue as some anti-gay groups were using it as a fear tactic to discriminate against gays.366

Additionally, the epidemic was worsening. The devastation left by the disease could be seen in growing numbers of people with AIDS. The extreme weight loss and the presence of KS lesions made the growing numbers of the sick recognizable in public. In the LGBT community, it was as if large numbers of men who had once held jobs and other viable roles in Houston, had simply disappeared. Within the

LGBT community regular hospital visits, caring for housebound loved ones, the loss of life, attending memorial services, and burying the dead became a part of daily life.

By July, Houston had 1,314 confirmed cases within the Houston standard metropolitan statistical area that included Harris, Montgomery, Fort Bend, Brazoria,

Liberty, and Waller Counties. Of those patients, 179 had died.367 Those with AIDS found themselves in a city without many services and few alternatives among those that did exist. Local public agencies placed little priority on AIDS treatment, research, and social services. Even though most hospitals inside the Interstate-610 loop, the inner core of the city, were willing to treat AIDS cases, the care was inconsistent at best. Outside the loop, where the percentage of gay men in the population was much lower, hospitals would likely not admit a patient with AIDS symptoms. Even if admitted, the frightened staff might refuse to provide adequate care. Many AIDS patients, once discharged from a hospital, continued to require

366 Jane Elliott, “Gay caucus hoping to rebuild its clout under new leader,” The Houston Post, 18 January 1986.

367 “Montrose clinic is set to begin HTLV-III Testing,” Montrose Voice, 7 June 1985, Box 6, JPMHCRC.

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care that they could not provide for themselves at home alone. But, citing the potential of fear among their current patients, nursing homes would not admit

PWAs. Insurance companies had initially avoided paying for treatment but that was less prevalent by September of 1985. According to health officials such as Gordon

Reeve, Chief of the Bureau of Epidemiology at the Houston Department of Health and Human Services (HDHHS), as the numbers continued to grow; these issues would have to change.368

Participants in the oral histories for this dissertation conveyed that the character of the atmosphere in Houston at this stage of the epidemic was far from carefree or what could be termed normal. Larry Leutwyler of Bering Spiritual

Support Group (BSSG) spoke of “a foreboding sense of urgency and fear.”369 Since the eventuality of death for gay men remained in the high 50 percent range, a diagnosis seemed the same as a death sentence. It was common for someone to appear healthy one week and then be dead the next. Leutwyler remembered going on a date with a man one night and then hearing the next week that he had died.

Someone with visible KS lesions might go home and remain there, isolated, until he died rather than face being seen in public. It was not uncommon for one to attend his partner’s funeral and, while he was there, the family of the deceased would go in and clean out their home – even of things that they had acquired together. At the

368 “The Houston picture/statistics do not mirror nation’s,” The Houston Post, 15 September 1985.

369 Leutwyler interview.

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same time, partners might not be able to see their love ones and might be excluded from the medical decisions as well.370

Since early on there was no virus or conclusion about how it was spread, fear and near panic became prevalent within the gay community itself. In the bars, still the center of gay life in the 1980s, the influence of AIDS was everywhere. If someone coughed in a bar or club, people scattered out of fear that he might have been sick. On Friday afternoons, when the weekly publication This Week in Texas came out, readers turned first to the obituaries at the back. Timers beeped to remind patients to take their AZT, the first FDA approved drug for AIDS patients, then men passed capsules around to anyone who had forgotten his own.371 Outside the bars, AIDS impacted the lives of those who were not sick. People were attending multiple memorial services each week. Robert Snellgrove noted that as director of the care center, there had been 140 deaths in his first year. He lost his two best friends in only two days. Their services were only hours apart. 372

These examples and their impact became worse in an environment where access to services was poor or unavailable and ambulances would not always go to pick up AIDS patients. There was no hospice and at first no convalescent homes that would take PWAs.373 HDHHS figures predicted the number of cases to rise at the rate of 30 percent every six months. According to M.D. Anderson Cancer Center’s

370 Ibid.

371 Leutwyler interview.

372 Snellgrove interview.

373 Luetwyler interview.

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(MDA) Dr. Peter Mansell, the current system would not be able to deal with the rising number of cases. From 1981 until then, there had been 775 cases of AIDS confirmed in the Houston area. Gordon Reeve, chief of the HDHHS Bureau of

Epidemiology expected more than 500 cases to be confirmed in 1986 and more than

850 in 1987. Reeve explained the large numbers indicated the long incubation period of the virus. Most people, who had their cases confirmed in 1985 and 1986, had probably been exposed between 1982 and 1984. The current number of reported cases did not reflect the current rate of transmission in the population. 374

This affirmed the long-term importance of the testing programs that came about in

1985. Epidemiologists could monitor the time passing between a positive test and a diagnosis of AIDS.

All of these cases were handled by the mostly volunteer staffed AIDS movement organizations in Houston. On March 14, 1985, the Montrose Clinic saw its 10,000th patient, affirming its establishment as an institution in Montrose.375 The clinic was filling a unique need, particularly for the gay community, and existed entirely on patient fees and community donations that made up the difference as clinic costs far surpassed the minimal fees they charged for their services. For example, the clinic charged twenty dollars for an STD screening, treatment, and

374 “Growing AIDS cases here straining services,” The Houston Post, 17 September 1986, 1, 20.

375 Edward Martinez, “Montrose Clinic Sees 10,000th Patient,” Montrose Voice, 22 March 1985, Institutional Collection No.72, Box 6, JPMHCRC.

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follow-up. A Texas State Senate report in 1982 concluded that in the private sector the cost for such a service would be $200.376

The clinic offered its Program for AIDS Counseling and Evaluation (PACE).

This simple test of the immune system was for those concerned about the possibility of AIDS infection. The four-part examination, which consisted of a questionnaire on the patient’s medical and social history, a complete blood count, a skin patch test, and a physical exam cost $40. The test determined if a person’s immune system was working properly and if not, the clinic advised them to seek further treatment.377

The clinic operated with one full-time employee, the director Tom Audette, and three part-timers. All others volunteered free of charge, including the physicians who contributed their services. When more extensive treatment was needed, the clinic referred patients to carefully selected area doctors.378

In the next few months, the role of the Montrose Clinic expanded considerably. Previously, in 1984, Dr. Richard Grimes, formerly a professor of public health administration at the University of Texas Health and Science Center

(UTHSC), had begun to work at the clinic where he observed a constant flow of patients who were far sicker than those with what he termed a typical case of syphilis. To him this trend meant that AIDS had hit Houston. He tested for antigens through skin pricks. If a patient presented no immune response, he knew they were

376 Edward Martinez, “Montrose Clinic Sees 10,000th Patient,” Montrose Voice, 22 March 1985, Institutional Collection No.72, Box 6, JPMHCRC.

377 Ibid.

378 Edward Martinez, “Montrose Clinic Sees 10,000th Patient,” Montrose Voice, 22 March 1985, Institutional Collection No. 72, Box 6, JPMHCRC.

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immune-suppressed and likely to have the effects of the AIDS virus.379 Even though there were still no treatment options, at least these patients could be urged to immediately seek further medical advice.

After the discovery of the HTLV-III virus had been announced in 1984, Dr.

James Haughton of the HDHHS approached Dr. Grimes about the clinic becoming the place to begin antibody testing in Houston. Beginning the week of June 10, 1985, the clinic began performing the tests by appointment. 380 The state provided $60,000 for personnel to conduct the antibody tests. It required that any clinic administering the testing must also provide both pre- and post-test counseling.

This provided the knowledge that a positive test did not mean that the person had

AIDS; only that they had been exposed to the virus. It also informed patients of chances for false positives.381

Perceiving the privacy issues that the test could affect, Haughton said he hoped the test would lead people toward positive action instead of only giving them something to worry about. With no cure, knowing one had the virus presented the uncertainty of how long they had to live. He was unsure about the turnout, as some gay leaders were discouraging people from taking the test. A positive test could make it difficult for them to get health and life insurance and compromise their job status. Haughton admitted that homophobic employers at Houston area restaurants

379 Dr. Richard Grimes, interviewed by Jonathan Heath, Houston, Texas, 7 April. 2005, in Jonathan C. Heath, “Strength in Numbers: Houston’s Gay Community and the AIDS Crisis, 1977-1989,” (MA thesis, University of Houston, May, 2006), 59.

380 “Montrose clinic is set to begin HTLV-III Testing,” Montrose Voice, 7 June, 1985, Institutional Collection No. 72, Box 6, JPMHCRC.

381 Grimes interview.

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had fired some gay employees.382 But, the long-range benefits held great importance. If positive tests should prove to be confirmed cases later, scientists could define the predictability of the test.

Initially, the gay community felt more vulnerable to the privacy threat and swiftly launched their backlash against the test. Local gay organizations placed direct pressure on the clinic to endorse a public statement asking members of the community to refrain from being screened for the HTLV-III antibody.383 The

National Gay Task Force and People with AIDS-San Francisco issued warnings that test results could end up in the wrong hands, jeopardizing a person’s employment as well as his of her insurance coverage. The KSAF hotline immediately received calls from concerned individuals.384

The KSAF responded to the privacy threats of the test by posting 40,000 flyers across Texas signed by Montrose Counseling Center (MCC), Gay Switchboard of Houston, Houston Gay Political Caucus (GPC), Citizens for Human Equality (CHE),

The National Gay Task Force, National Lesbian/Gay Health Foundation, and the

Mayor’s Task Force on AIDS. At the bottom of the flyer, the groups urged people not to take the antibody test and listed a number of reasons why. These organizations agreed with health officials, however, that high-risk groups for AIDS should not

382 “Montrose clinic is set to begin HTLV-III Testing,” Montrose Voice, 7 June 1985, Institutional Collection No. 72, Box 6. JPMHCRC.

383 Ibid.

384 Grimes interview.

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donate blood. The closing admonishment read: “Educate yourself, protect yourself, safeguard the blood supply, protect the community’s health, and play safe.”385

The clinic began testing, but utilized a system where the testing and the results remained completely anonymous. The overwhelming numbers of people who came for testing attests to the popularity of the program.386 At that point in

1985, 12,000 Americans had been diagnosed with AIDS and the number of cases was doubling every ten months.387 “The clinic was instantly overwhelmed. Some weeks, 1000 tests were performed.”388 The surge was linked to Rock Hudson’s announcement of his diagnosis from July 25 of that year. Because of his popularity as a film star, his diagnosis and death that October had definite impact on the awareness of the public, their concern about the epidemic, and even on policy development concerning AIDS.389

As established earlier, the clinic was run almost entirely by volunteer workers. Dr. Grimes estimated that the generous workers provided $100,000 worth of free labor per year during the 1980s. Volunteers provided both pre-test and post- test counseling. They were responsible for telling people night after night that they

385 “Statement on HTLV-III/LAV Antibody Test,” National Gay Task Force and PWA-San Francisco, January 4, 1985, Box 6, JPMHCRC.

386 For more on the testing debate and the issues surrounding anonymous testing see: Stephen J. Enrig, North Carolina and the Problem of AIDS: Advocacy, Politics, and Race in the South (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press), 2011.

387 Gerald Clarke, Elaine Dutka, and Barbara Kraft, “AIDS: A Spreading Scourge,” Time, 5 August 1985, 50.

388 Grimes in Heath, 63.

389 Susan M. Chambre, Fighting For Our Lives: New York’s Community and the Politics of Disease (New Brunswick and London.: Rutgers University Press, 2006), 58.

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tested positive for the AIDS virus. Dr. Grimes remembered thinking, “God, that’s got to be awful to sit down and tell people they’re positive. That’s got to be really hard to do.”390

In perfecting the program, the clinic developed another invaluable offering to address the inevitable silence that came after giving a client their test results.

Ralph Lasher, the clinic’s Executive Director, began the “Next Step Program.” The post-test conference was an opportunity to inform the newly diagnosed patients what they should focus on next such as, “choosing a doctor, learning about treatments, and how to maintain good health while preparing, soberly, for the possibility of death by preparing a will, or living will.”391

The testing program increased the demand for the programs at KSAF. One such instance was the AIDS hotline, a primary part of their work since early 1984.

The telephone line, operated by volunteers, was up from nine a.m. to nine p.m.

Monday through Friday. The workers took a two-day training course to prepare them to answer questions about the disease. The most common questions included:

What are the symptoms of AIDS? How is it contracted? Nate Sebastian, the foundation’s executive director, told a Houston City Council committee that the nature of the questions, even at that point, demonstrated that there was still a lot of ignorance about AIDS. Stigmatization of gays with AIDS exacerbated the silence on the health crisis and hindered educational efforts. Workers could sense that the

390 Grimes in Heath, 65.

391 Ralph Lasher, interviewed by Jonathan Heath, Houston, Texas, 20 April 2005, in Heath, 68.

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number of calls was also linked to what was happening in the media. For instance, when Rock Hudson died, numbers soared from 400 per month to around a 1000.392

Robert Snellgrove related two hotline conversations that summed up the inseparable relationship between the disease and homosexuality in the minds of most. First was a call from a woman in the suburbs whose son was returning from

California with full-blown AIDS. The woman called the hotline, as she had absolutely no one else to turn to. Her greatest emotion was fear over what her husband was going to do to their son when he arrived despite the fact that he was deathly ill. For Snellgrove, the unforgettable part was that the woman’s only support, the only person she could talk with, was he, an anonymous person over the telephone. This incident markedly demonstrates not only the stigma surrounding

AIDS but the results of inadequate education about the disease.

His second story also happened on his work shift at the hotline. Even though the location of the call center was kept secret for the protection of the volunteers, one night he received a call at his desk, which happened to be in front of a plate- glass window. The caller said, “We are coming to kill you,” and repeatedly exclaimed, “God says that you deserve to die and all fags should die.” The caller was so adamant that Robert left his shift early. These two instances, one of a woman’s lonely, isolated suffering, the other of fear and stigma so deeply rooted that it manifested itself in violence, demonstrated that the disease and homosexuality

392 “Hot line dispels callers’ misconceptions on puzzling problems of AIDS,” The Houston Post, 24 February 1986.

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remained inextricably linked at that point. It suggested as well that more educational programs were needed to stifle the fear.393

Many volunteers also participated in the AFH buddy program. The buddy program replaced the care team program that assigned six volunteers to each patient. Because the numbers increased so rapidly, the one-on-one approach became the only sustainable alternative. Each volunteer was assigned a “buddy” for whom they supplied counseling and support. When the buddy died, they took a mandatory leave of absence in order to recover. Once back, they took on another.394

All of these programs became more in demand as the testing program made increasing numbers of people aware of their status in relation to the disease. To their credit, by August 1985, KSAF’s outreach could claim some success among gay men in Houston. Officials and leaders of the KSAF reported that the rate of increase in AIDS cases appeared to have leveled off. As Michael Wilson, president of KSAF, explained, the percentage of cases in male homosexuals had dropped below 90 percent in Houston for the first time. Unfortunately, following the pattern apparent in the earlier and harder hit cities, this signaled that other populations were becoming at risk for the disease.395

Although other factors could have contributed to the flattening of the rate of increase among gay men, officials knew that education was a major one. The

393 Snellgrove interview.

394 Chambre, Fighting, 20; Kayal also wrote of the toll AIDS work took on its volunteers. See Philip M. Kayal, Bearing Witness: Gay Men’s Health Crisis and the Politics of AIDS (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1993).

395 “Rate of increase for AIDS is leveling off here,” The Houston Post, 3 August 1985.

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brochure, “Toward a Healthier Lifestyle” and the safe sex campaign, while initially aimed at the gay community, had achieved quantifiable success since numbers were down among white gay males. But, the fact now apparent to AIDS movement organizers was that little education was going to other at-risk groups and their numbers were increasing rapidly. According to the CDC, male-to-male (MSM) sex was the most common mode of exposure resulting in 46 percent of the cases from

1981 to 2000. Injection drug use and heterosexual contact followed at 25 and 11 percent respectively. All three areas increased rapidly through 1996. After then, transmission among heterosexuals did not decline as in the MSM and intravenous drug user populations. The CDC emphasized as well that minority MSM may not identify as gay or bisexual because of attached stigma, and as a result may be difficult to reach with HIV prevention campaigns. Equally problematic was that the proportion of AIDS cases resulting from heterosexual contact and among heterosexual women was much greater than in the early years of the epidemic.396

These demographics proposed new challenges since originally, gay men and lesbians had created the response to reach the gay male community. Because of the stigma linking AIDS to homosexuality, the existing institutions faced the challenge of being able to reach the new demographics while continuing to serve their own.

Nationwide, 6 percent of AIDS victims were women. In Houston, only six of the 328 or 1.8 percent of the confirmed AIDS cases had been women. The national statistics for homosexuals and bisexuals were 73 percent while the Houston number

396 “HIV and AIDS --- United States, 1981-2000,” CDC MMWR, 1 June 2001, http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5021a2.htm, (assessed February 10, 2014).

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was 89.1 percent. While 80 percent of the victims were intravenous drug users in

Newark, New Jersey and 30 percent were in New York City, in Houston that category only amounted to 2.4 percent. Only in one statistic did Houston’s numbers match those of the national statistics: 51 percent had died in Houston while 56.7 percent had died overall.397 Taking these statistics as advanced warning, the AIDS movement knew what to expect in terms of how the disease would spread into its own population.

In 1986, with the epidemic spreading outward, the foundation realized the need to expand their outreach to include MSM in minority communities, heterosexuals, youth, and women: those at risk beyond the self-identifying gay male.

They appointed Curtis Dickenson, a married father of four children, as new executive director with this goal in mind.398 Already many volunteers and even a few board members were from outside of the gay community. The foundation was very successful at attacking AIDS where the problem seemed in the beginning – in the gay community. When they sought help outside and it was not delivered, they invented it themselves.

Dickenson saw the foundation’s reputation as a gay organization to be problematic at that point in that the disease had spread far beyond that demographic. He represented a new image for the foundation at a time when the disease had become one of the major health problems of the day. As a result, the

397 “The Houston picture/statistics do not mirror nation’s,” The Houston Post, 15 September 1985.

398 “Father of 4 represents new image for AIDS Foundation of Houston,” The Houston Post, 19 May 1986.

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foundation’s outreach and educational programs needed to expand accordingly in order to reach everyone at potential risk.399 He said, “We want to be perceived as a community and not a gay organization.” But he knew that it would not happen over night. The stigma of disease and gay sexuality prevented MSM in minority and heterosexual populations from approaching organizations with gay association for help.

The appointment of Curtis demonstrated the foundation’s effort at diversifying their outreach as early as 1986. This lack of diversity in the early outreach of the nation’s AIDS movements is often criticized. Some of the newer

AIDS movement literature explores how the strong link between male homosexuality and the disease prevented members of other communities from seeking educational materials and prevention strategies that they did not regard as applicable to them. AFH had already realized the shortfall.400

As a need became apparent in Houston, the LGBT community responded with an organization to meet it. As that entity grew, it evolved to remain a major player in the continued war against AIDS. The next example was Bering Community

Services Foundation beginning in late 1985. It grew into a major member of the

Houston AIDS movement, and interestingly, came out of a faith-based organization,

Bering Methodist Church. Even though conservative churches took the position that

399 For more on the inability of gay organizations to reach other at-risk populations, including others involving MSM sexuality, see: Chambre, Fighting; Inrig, North Carolina; and Brier, Infectious.

400 Inrig, North Carolina, 43. In his book addressing North Carolina and the South, Professor Inrig explains why white gay organizations were not the most effective avenues for responding to AIDS in minority communities. This was a point made by the CDC as mentioned above. See “HIV and AIDS --- United States, 1981-2000,” CDC MMWR, 1 June 2001, http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5021a2.htm, (assessed February 10, 2014).

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homosexuality was “sinful and unnatural,” many congregations chose to focus on

“loving and caring,” seeking the LGBT community as a target on their ministry. In fact, at the end of the 1980s, the two largest ASOs in New York were Gay Men’s

Health Crisis (GMHC) and the faith-based organization, God’s Love We Deliver.401

Bering also came along at the time AIDS was spreading beyond the gay male subculture. Organizers there took steps form the beginning to reach minority communities and make them feel welcome to the resources they offered.

When Larry Luetwyler came to Houston in 1983 as an out gay man, he learned of Bering United Methodist from the advertising they directed toward the

LGBT community. Luetwyler had always wanted to be a minister but because he was gay felt he could not. To remain in touch with his faith, he attended there regularly. The congregation was made up of mostly older heterosexuals but included a few young gay males. A back row of older women assumed the roll of making visitors, even those who were lesbian or gay, to feel welcome and comfortable. They also discouraged people from leaving early. This cross- generational response further demonstrated the commitment of this church’s congregants to serving the LGBT community. Reverend Pogue, the lead pastor, had convinced the congregation to welcome the LGBT community as they were located in the heart of Montrose and he considered it a responsibility to serve the local population. Because of this policy, however, a number of the congregants left for other churches. 402

401 Chambre, Fighting, 60, 63.

402 Luetwyler interview.

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Having noted the lack of support groups in Houston, Leutwyler approached

Reverend Pogue about starting one. Then in 1986, He, Jay Nelson, Troy Treash, and

Annette Jones, the associate pastor, began the Bering Spiritual Support Group

(BSSG). The name denoted its spiritual component but was innocuous enough to work in the stigmatized environment that surrounded AIDS.

Troy Treash came to Bering in the early 1980s when invited by a man he was dating. Treash felt called into the ministry, but as with Luetwyler, had not been able to reconcile it with his homosexuality. Through his work with the support group he found resolution. He stated in his interview that in hindsight he could see the sequence: finding Bering, the AIDS crisis came, the support group formed, and his calling returned.

Before the support group, he and several other gay and lesbian members had convened a Bible study class at the church. They socialized together, usually attending steak night at the Brazos River Bottom, a local gay bar. The first person

Treash knew to become ill was a member of this group was. He recalled praying at the man’s bedside when he died.403 This experience further confirmed his commitment to the group’s mission.

BSSG quickly grew from around seventy to well over one hundred.

Attendees had to be HIV positive or affected by HIV in some way. This meant that some people were there as they had children, family, or partners who were HIV positive, had AIDS, or had died from the disease. Initially it was predominantly gay,

403 Treash interview.

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white, and male, but from the early days the membership included some heterosexuals. It was inclusive of all faiths and beliefs, including Jews, Muslims, and even Atheists. The group was publicized through the church bulletin and the social networks of other gay organizations. Bering Church members served on every HIV oriented board in the city and this helped invite attendees as well.404

They addressed the effects of the stigma and fear of AIDS. When a member returned from Thanksgiving holiday and shared in group that his family had made him eat from disposable paper plates with plastic wear because he was infected with AIDS, the group incorporated a potluck style dinner each Wednesday before the meeting. This reinforced the idea that AIDS did not spread through casual contact and the suppers are a tradition that remains today. The support group helped create a safe haven where attendees could escape the constant stares and discrimination that the stigma of AIDS forced upon its sufferers. The general public clearly knew the symptoms of AIDS at that point. Any weight loss and especially any visible purple skin lesions from KS became confirming signs. The stares and whispers were discomfiting to PWAs even as they waited in a doctor’s office.

BSSG met needs as they materialized. The members volunteered as caregivers at hospitals to augment the care of the often-frightened nursing staff.

They even sent groups to other churches to combat ignorance and fear by explaining the known facts concerning transmission.405 They made panels available for presentations on AIDS. Each panel was comprised of a gay man, a PWA, a mother,

404 Ibid.

405 Leutwyler interview.

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and a straight person. Some businesses and churches called to book a panel presentation but requested only the mom and the straight person.406 Response to this program was positive and The Methodist Hospital and other churches provided them with large grants. Wealthy citizens in Houston supported it the program with donations as well.

From early on the program made efforts to serve other communities beyond the original majority of gay white males. Bering had shuttles to bring people in from other neighborhoods, and because of the stigma toward same sex sexuality and

AIDS in their own communities, coming to another part of town to seek help had its advantages. This met with some resistance as well. According to Treash, some same-gender loving people of color were reluctant to face preconceptions of white communities. But, being a church and not a gay organization bridged some of these challenges. Many members, of course, had families and this made it a welcoming place for heterosexuals.407

By the mid 1980s, the spread of AIDS into communities beyond that of gay men was an established fact in New York and San Francisco. Houstonians knew that this would be the circumstance in their city soon. The gay and lesbian community formed AIDS movement in Houston took steps to diversify so that they could appeal to and serve the non-gay at risk population of the city. KSAF assumed a policy of becoming an AIDS organization instead of a gay organization. The newly

406 Treash interview.

407 Treash interview.

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formed Bering Community Services Foundation made provisions as well. The church provided transportation from neighborhoods outside of Montrose.408

During this time period, the CDC suggested that while the drastic increase in the numbers of cases was not drawing enough attention to the epidemic, perhaps the element of cost would. As the expense of patient care reached into the hundreds of thousands of dollars, maybe local elected government officials and their constituents would finally awaken to the seriousness of the spreading crisis.409 At that point, the average cost of treating each patient was $100,000 annually. In

Houston, it would be difficult to discern for certain whether the slowly developing concerns were over the numbers of sick people and the rising fatalities, or due to an increasing fear for the financial health of the city’s healthcare and hospital systems.

Regardless of motive, these concerns resulted in welcoming a private hospital corporation to open the nation’s first AIDS hospital there in 1986. Its success and longevity, however, was another story.

On January 28th, the University of Texas and American Medical

International (AMI), a for-profit hospital chain based in California, announced plans to open an AIDS hospital in Houston. According to Dr. John Ribble, dean of the

University of Texas Medical School in Houston and Dr. Charles LeMaistre, president of MDA, they were considering the Citizens General Hospital at 7407 North Freeway near the Houston Intercontinental Airport as the location so that AIDS patients not only from around the state but from near-by states as well might have easy access.

408 Ibid.

409 “Growing AIDS cases here straining services,” The Houston Post, 17 September 1986, 1, 20.

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Suggesting that investors projected potential profit in treating AIDS patients,

Richard D’Antoni, group vice president for AMI in Houston, said that this was in a sense a pilot hospital, and if successful, other such facilities would be possible. AMI gave an initial $1 million as seed money to establish a research program that would include support for studies of drugs important to AIDS treatment and care. Ribble was considering the support of MDA, given its commitment to continued research and patient treatment at their facility where AIDS patients had been treated since

1982.410

Of major concern was the treatment of indigent patients. AIDS was depriving successful, well established men of their financial solvency as they were losing their jobs, then their health insurance, and soon after drained of money through the exorbitant costs of hospital stays and constant medical interventions.

AMI agreed that patients would not be turned away. This included those who had exhausted their insurance and Medicaid funds. AMI set aside funds for this but did not reveal the amount.

Another concern about an all AIDS patient hospital was that AIDS patients would be able to continue to seek treatment at whatever public or private hospital they chose. Dr. James Haughton of the HDHHS expressed concerns on this point.

Was such a hospital a step toward segregating AIDS patients into one facility in one part of town? He argued that segregation of AIDS patients was a bad idea since it would give the impression that such patients should be segregated. He said, “I don’t

410 Ruth SoRelle, “UT looking at plans to establish AIDS hospital in Houston,” The Houston Post, 28 January 1986.

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see a need for it.”411 Proponents stressed that the hospital was not to become the only place that served those patients. Ribble said that the plan was for the hospital to offer health care for AIDS patients that would be far better than what was available at the scattered community hospitals.

Within six months, the affiliation agreement between the University of Texas

System and AMI had cleared and the hospital was slated to open later in the year.

Lynne Walters, a spokeswoman for the institute said that major work was going on to complete the conversion of Citizens General into an AIDS hospital and a research institute for the study of diseases of the immune system.412

About this time, MDA became one of fourteen facilities nation-wide to receive a grant that was part of a $10 million federal commitment to AIDS-related research. MDA received a $5.8 million five-year grant, part of which would be to treat and evaluate AIDS patients and the other part would go toward anti-viral drug research.413

Dr. Irwn Krakoff, head of the Division of Medicine at MDA, said that the facility treated about 300 patients per year and that number was not expected to decrease. The details of the affiliation with AMI’s Institute for Infectious Diseases were not final but he expected that most of the work under this grant would be done at MDA. He said that treatment for AIDS currently “is not satisfactory, and its almost

411 Ruth SoRelle, “UT looking at plans to establish AIDS hospital in Houston,” The Houston Post, 28 January 1986.

412 Ruth SoRelle, “UT, group clear way in renovation of site for first AIDS hospital,” The Houston Post, 6 January 1986.

413 Ruth SoRelle “M.D. Anderson receives grant of $5.8 billion for AIDS unit,” The Houston Post, 30 June 1986.

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mandatory these patients be involved in clinical research.”414 He noted that receiving of the grant demonstrated recognition to MDA for its leadership in the research and treatment of AIDS.

The details of the relationship between MDA and the AIDS hospital, and MDA and its responsibility under the details of this new grant, were not clear at that point. In less than a year, Houston’s PWAs would bear the brunt of this ambiguity, as the AIDS hospital would close. Consequently and even worse, Houston would lose its major research services for AIDS as well as its host ship of clinical trials for the disease.415 Under the situation of having a disease with no known cure, access to research and clinical trials is the one hope of surviving until the range of treatment options improves.

Even while the AIDS hospital was operating, KSAF remained the leader in coordinating and providing services in Houston and the financial commitment of the

LGBT community continued to be its primary source of funding. As KSAF began to address other social service needs by assisting patients with paying rent or buying groceries, and providing emergency lodging at the McAdory House, the financial burden increased substantially. Wilson estimated that keeping these programs viable during the next year would cost $300,000 and so far, help from local philanthropic organizations remained non-existent. A recent request for a grant from the United Way was turned down without explanation.416

414 Ibid.

415 Ibid.

416 “Rate of increase for AIDS is leveling off here,” The Houston Post, 3 August 1985.

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The board of KSAF decided to attempt fundraising in Houston outside the

LGBT community. Curtis Dickson, executive director of the foundation said that,

“this really did mark the first attempt of a prominent group of Houstonians to conduct a benefit for the AIDS Foundation. We were very hopeful that this would be a success, and we are still hopeful that it will come off.”417 Results of this effort provide a barometer of the broader community’s attitude on AIDS and gay rights.

The highly controversial referendum of 1985 and the consequent backlash against homosexual rights had discouraged many from supporting anything gay and AIDS, in most minds, was still considered to be a gay disease.

The first attempt did not appear promising. On November 6th in 1986, the

$100 a person jazz concert fund-raiser that was hoping to raise $100,000 for AFH, had sold only fifty-four tickets. Event organizers said that they would be lucky to make $20,000. Prominent Houstonians gave enough to cover event costs but the cash flow stopped there. Observers of the Houston social scene presented differing opinions on what may have happened. Some said that AIDS was still too closely linked with the homosexual community and that additionally, the tight financial times had prevented much generation of interest.418

Others thought it had been poor planning, exemplified by lack of enough publicity, and a late start. Houston socialite, Carolyn Farb, who was active in numerous fund-raising events, said that in her opinion the Houston community was

417 “Houston’s elite fund-raiser for AIDS foundation fizzles,” The Houston Post, 6 November 1986.

418 “Houston’s elite fund-raiser for AIDS foundation fizzles,” The Houston Post, 6 November 1986.

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ready to participate in the AIDS cause. She explained that there had to be follow-up once a project was publicized, though, as people receive so many invitations.

Another socialite who refused to give her name said that, “AIDS does have a great barrier in the fact that there is the homosexual element. You have to be honest about that. With the money going to the AIDS Foundation, all people think about are the Gay Rights Movement and people marching for the gay parade.” She said that the best way to raise money would be to focus on the research and medical aspects.

“Avoiding any connection to the community is essential, because that brings in the social and moral aspects of the disease.”419 Her statement demonstrates the far reaching and long sustained consequences of the anti-gay backlash from 1985. As these groups such as the Straight Slaters politicized AIDS along with their other anti- gay rhetoric, they hindered the city’s AIDS response for years to come. The turnout for this fundraiser and the comment by the socialite confirm this point.

It also provides a grassroots reflection of the hands-off attitude of the

Reagan administration. AIDS appeared to be very low on his agenda for the same reason. It was not healthy politically to be associated with the disease because of its link to homosexuality. He had consistently requested modest funds for the disease only to see Congress raise the amount on its own.420

As 1986 came to a close, Houston’s LGBT community remained the controlling entity for the crisis response in Houston. Events directly associated with the AIDS crisis caused further changes in the focus and goals of the AIDS

419 Ibid.

420 Epstein, 187; Brier, Infectious, 78-87.

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movement in Houston. The approval by the FDA, of testing for the AIDS virus greatly expanded the role of the Montrose Clinic, which became the first site in the region for the program. The epidemiology of the disease revealed that other populations were as vulnerable as that of gay men. As a result, KSAF began policy changes that would make it better suited to reach and serve non-gay and minority communities. For a short time, Houston was host to the nation’s one and only AIDS hospital that not only diagnosed and treated AIDS, it also performed drug trials making the latest medications available to those who needed them. The closure of the institution continued to insure that KSAF and the Houston AIDS movement would remain the leader in the response to AIDS in the Houston area.

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Chapter Five

“Toward a Manageable Chronic Disease

1987-1990”

By the end of the 1990s, five years later, Houston had effectively established itself nationally as an antigay, anti-AIDS city, because of its poor response to the epidemic. The city sponsored public education projects. The county opened an AIDS clinic to accommodate PWAs. But, as this chapter will reveal, this happened following great political grandstanding and stalling on the part of government agencies at every level: local, state, and federal. Between the leadership of a health chief who refused to consider AIDS a health concern in Houston, and the political leadership’s lack of willingness to work together with the community based CBOs in applying for grants, it achieved a national reputation for being a “bad place for

AIDS.”421

Yet the association of AIDS with homosexuality remained a barrier that elected officials could not pass. In December of 1987, Senator Craig Washington told the Texas Legislative Task Force (TLTFA) on the Economic Spread of AIDS that

“if AIDS were spread any other way besides sexually, the problems of support would not exist.”422 Elected officials were divided over whether AIDS was a health and human rights issue, or one of gay rights. This divisiveness created an impasse that resulted in a slow and inadequate reaction to the crisis. By the end of the decade, the

421 “Houston seen as ignoring AIDS, ex-gay leader says,” The Houston Post, 25 October 1987, 1, 35.

422 R. G. Ratcliffe, “Doctor calls AIDS human rights issue,” The Houston Chronicle, 12 December 1987, 1, 20.

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AIDS movement in Houston still remained the primary source of response toward the epidemic. This chapter will show that the political battle over whether AIDS was a public health issue or one of gay rights hindered policy makers in their abilities to effect an adequate response to the crisis. This impasse stalled decision making at the state level. Repercussions of this same conflict were evident when Mayor Kathy

Whitmire created the Houston Harris County Task Force on AIDS (HHCTFA).

Similar troubles plagued the leadership of the Houston Department of Health and

Human Services (HDHHS). As a result, at the end of the 1980s, Houston’s local pubic response remained minimal and the community based volunteer AIDS movement continued to lead the effort to survive the mounting problem of AIDS in Houston.

In the second half of the 1980s, the numbers of cases in Houston continued to rise. No matter how hard the primarily volunteer community worked, more and more became sick and died. By 1988, the LGBT community was, more than ever, in a state of despair, suspicion, and desperation. Even as some lived longer, they couldn’t anticipate how much longer, because death seemed to remain the eventuality. Many of the original activists and leaders of the movement became sick or died from the disease. Even for those not infected, AIDS was overwhelming and left them with serious burnout. The emotional impact of friends and associates dying so relentlessly and in such great numbers was most difficult.423 The

423 Stephen Epstein, Impure Science: AIDS, Activism, and the Politics of Knowledge (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and Oxford: University of California Press, 1996),116; D. J. Wilson, “Death, disillusionment, thin ranks in AIDS battle,” Houston Post, HAM-TMC Library, McGovern Collection and Historical Research Center (hereafter MCHRC), box 1 “AIDS Practice Manual.”

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unyielding stress of operating with scarce resources and so little public help or support compounded this.

Consequently, in the last half of the 1980s, it was virtually impossible to find much about life in the LGBT community that was not involved, at least indirectly, with the AIDS crisis. Even by 1988 when the increasing rate of new cases had leveled off some, the numbers were still staggering and people were losing lovers, friends, and family members on a daily basis.

The epidemic had spread in Houston in the manner that officials had expected. They predicted it to hit Houston first, next Dallas, and then move to the smaller communities. In 1988, the large increasing numbers of cases were in San

Antonio and Austin. Statewide the total cases stood at 5,579 with 3,240 fatalities. In

1986, there were 1,104 new cases. In 1987, there were 1,031 new cases. In 1988, there were 1,271 new cases and 318 died.424

Officials agreed that education remained the only vaccine at the end of 1988.

Safe sex, now a five-year old practice, and changes the gay community made lifestyle-wise, were paying off. The rate was not climbing at the predicted rate of doubling every six months. Houston Harris County had fewer new cases in 1988 than in 1987. The numbers there had gone from 767 cases and 379 deaths in 1987 to one-third less, at 489 cases with only 126 deaths in 1988. In Dallas the flattening rate of increase was similar.425

424 “AIDS slowing down somewhat across Texas,” TWIT, 30 December 1988, 19.

425 Ibid.

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Following the November 1985 elections, the Gay Political Caucus (GPC) had committed itself to addressing the AIDS crisis, as it had become a political issue.

Even in 1988 this philosophy remained as the new elected president David Fowler ran with AIDS at the centerpiece of his agenda. He addressed the caucus saying, “we are a political caucus and AIDS has become political issue. We are morally obligated to this.”426

In August of 1987, Annise Parker arranged what she had planned to be low- key meeting with the lame-duck city health director, Dr. James Haughton, to recap what had happened in the last four years in regard to the AIDS crisis. Instead, the meeting was packed and hostile toward the absent Whitmire for her lack of engagement with AIDS and the health department’s prevailing position that AIDS was just one of many health problems confronting Houston and was undoubtedly receiving its due share of public resources. Whitmire had received over 800 postcards on her birthday commemorating the deaths of persons with AIDS. When on July 30th she had announced her plans for re-election, she was picketed and as she spoke to a packed ballroom activists raised a banner that read, “We Demand

Action On Aids.” The GPC did not endorse her in 1987.427

That same year, the GPC went beyond the role of vetting and endorsing political candidates to that of attacking discrimination. It launched a program called

Media Watch. Members called attention to any radio, television, and newspaper

426 “HGLPC elects new officers,” TWIT, 29 January 1988, 15.

427 John Gravois and Steve Friedman, “Gay caucus refusing to endorse Whitmire,” The Houston Post, 8 October 1987.

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articles containing slurs and stories toward lesbians and gays. By April, it established Operation Documentation, wherein panels of professionals would hear testimony on accounts of discrimination against gay men, lesbians, minorities, and women. The professionals could then access if any legal action was advisable.428

Then, at the caucus’s twelfth retreat in March of 1987, members produced a five-year plan of twenty-five goals divided into four categories: political action, financial, educational, and internal management. Major areas included community outreach and education, increasing membership involvement, strengthening the gay bloc vote, and retaining liaison with and beginning to monitor elected officials. They also planned to establish archives that would include an oral history component.429

Also in 1987, the GPC, then the Houston Gay and Lesbian Political Caucus

(HGLPC), surveyed its membership and Paul Simmons, vice president of the HGLPC, reported that the average caucus member was “white, a Democrat, male, middle- aged, middle-class, and attended college.” The survey also revealed that seventy- four percent of the respondents were between the ages of twenty-five and forty and only six percent were under eighteen. Additionally, sixty-seven percent said their families knew that they were gay.430 The political arm of the LGBT community in

Houston was still in the hands of the white, gay, male. Counting the existence of a

428 “HGPC approves annual budget,” TWIT, 27 Feb, 15; “HGPC operation documentation in high gear,” TWIT, 24 April 1987, 20.

429 “HGLPC holds Galveston retreat,” TWIT, 4 March 1987, 25.

430 “HGLPC surveys its membership,” TWIT, 25 September 1987, 23.

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Republican caucus within the HGLPC, this survey revealed one more characteristic by which it mirrored the broader southern based society that surrounded it.

Each June, the annual gay pride celebrations continued as well. In 1987, they voted whether to have the parade at night instead of its traditional afternoon venue.

The idea did not win enough supporters to pass.431 That year’s parade was scaled down, however, as a show of support for the many that had died due to AIDS.432

Parade organizers did not allow motorized floats and publicized it as a parade of the people. Then, in1989, Houston Pride held its first awards banquet following the

June celebration. It provided a formal occasion to recognize and present awards to those organizations that had contributed the most to the community.433 Naturally, the big winners had been AIDS service organizations, providing more proof that during this period AIDS was inseparable from life for the members of the LGBT community. The three biggest winners were the Colt 45s and the TroubleFund, both organizations to help PWAs who lacked resources, and the Names Project, founder of the AIDS Memorial Quilt. Mayor Kathy Whitmire had made a surprise appearance to congratulate the over one hundred volunteers that the Houston Pride organization celebrated that evening.434

State Involvement

431 Houston Pride meeting Sunday,” TWIT, 37 20 February 1987, 20.

432 “Houston pride parade at 4pm Sunday, June 28,” TWIT, 5 June 1987, 17.

433 “Houston Pride awards banquet,” TWIT, 30 June 1989, 25.

434 “Mayor salutes Pride week,” TWIT, 28 July 1989, 17.

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In 1987, the state created the Texas Legislative Task Force on the Economic

Spread of AIDS (TLTFA) to travel about the state and prepare a report for the next legislature on the economic impact of AIDS. The first meeting came amidst the announcement of some staggering new facts. The state Health Commissioner

Robert Bernstein informed them that the number of diagnosed cases of AIDS in

Texas would increase from the present 3,412 cases to more than 25,000 by the end of 1993.435 Health authorities announced an 11.7 percent increase in AIDS cases worldwide from November to December. With costs reaching upwards of $100,000 per year per case, the task force was to explore possible funding and health care solutions to present to the legislature at the next meeting in 1989. The task force admitted that due to the association of AIDS with homosexuality, many taxpayers would not be willing to support it financially.436

The task force considered the cost savings of treating patients at home rather than in the high-cost hospital environment. It looked at making AZT a Medicaid- eligible drug. The drug, although expensive, could affect savings by slowing the progression of the disease and thus keeping people out of hospitals. At that time,

AZT treatment cost $8,000 to $10,000 a year. The panel weighted the idea of a high- risk insurance pool. Those unable to obtain private coverage but could afford the premiums, could join and avoid impoverishment and ending up in the taxpayer supported system. Such a plan would also cover diabetes, cystic fibrosis, cancer, and

435 R. G. Ratcliffe, “Doctor calls AIDS human rights issue,” The Houston Chronicle, 12 December 1987, 1, 20.

436 Ibid.

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other chronic diseases. AIDS would be the disease to finally force the state to set up such as system.437

Even though the state had distributed some funds toward AIDS, when compared to spending of other states, the figures were near the bottom. For a state with the fourth highest number of diagnosed cases, Texas remained fourth from the bottom in terms of spending. Only four states, Ohio, Georgia, Pennsylvania, and

Iowa, spent less on AIDS than Texas. In 1987-1988, Texas spent $581 per diagnosed case on education and health-related expenses associated with the disease.

Between 1983 and August 2, 1987, 699 cases were diagnosed in Texas.438 As more individuals contracted the disease, treatment costs would drive them into poverty and then into the taxpayer supported hospital system.

In October of 1987, following the FDA recommendation for AZT to be the first drug generally available to doctors for the treatment of AIDS,439 the federal government issued Texas a grant of $1.8 million to help about 300 AIDS patients receive AZT.440 It required patients to have an AIDS or ARC diagnosis, be under the care of a physician, and have a family income below the poverty line. All application materials would remain confidential.

In late 1987, state health officials awarded the state’s first tax dollars to be directed toward AIDS. Dr. Robert Bernstein, the state health commissioner, said

437 “Texas near bottom in AIDS spending,” The Houston Chronicle, 4 December 1987, 1, 24.

438 “Texas near bottom in AIDS spending,” The Houston Chronicle, 4 December 1987, 1, 24.

439 “Anti-AIDS drug leaps hurdle en route to speedy approval,” The Houston Chronicle, 17 January 1987, 1, 1.

440 “Grant found to fund AZT for AIDS-hit Texans,” The Houston Chronicle, 14 October 1987, 1, 5.

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that they had received seventy-seven applications for over $7.5 million for the $1.5 million in available funds for community-based organizations across the state. The

AIDS Foundation of Houston trailed narrowly behind the AIDS Services of Austin for the largest grant. AFH said the grant would represent 20 percent of their group’s budget. It would use it to increase case management volunteers, to pay part of the operating costs of a residence facility for AIDS patients, and to expand counseling services. The Institute of Religion in Houston, Community Care in Galveston, and

Omega House in Houston also received funds.441

The Texas Health Department awarded federal education grants to two groups in Houston in early 1988. The AFH received close to $80,000 and the

Association for the Advancement of Mexican Americans (AAMA) got nearly $60,000 of the $575,000 that was given to the state by the CDC. There was one grant for the education of individuals who practiced high-risk behavior and the other was for educating minorities about the risks of contracting AIDS. 442

By 1989 in Texas, there were 6,000 confirmed cases. Health officials were more and more frustrated by public apathy and the lack of money and legislation for battling the disease. In Austin, the state capital, the legislature was finally succumbing to pressure, including that from its own SLTFA, and began to put together some sort of comprehensive AIDS bill. But, as with local debates over whether to take action on AIDS, this one teemed with controversy over whether the

441 R. G. Ratcliffe, “Insurance firms get OK to share data on AIDS-virus tests,” The Houston Chronicle, 17 December 1987, 1, 17.

442 T. Gregory Gillan, “2 Houston groups get grants for AIDS Education Programs,” The Houston Chronicle, 9 February 1988.

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issue was one of public health or of gay liberation. A statement made by Texas State

Sen. Carl Parker in a Senate Finance Committee meeting offered a premonition of the nature of the upcoming debates on such legislation. According to him, spending taxpayer money on AIDS education was like throwing dollars “down a rat hole” and that the money should be spent on ailments such as diabetes that could be controlled with treatment.443

Even though the TLTFA made a statement that passing legislation should be easier due to changing attitudes about AIDS, this was far from the case.444 The

Senate proposed a bill making it illegal to intentionally expose anyone to the virus.

AIDS activists saw this as issuing broad discretion to force individuals to submit to testing. Then, within a month, the House Budget Committee writers decided that

Texas should only receive one half of the $45 million to be spent on AIDS prevention.

In March, Texas House Speaker Gibson D. “Gib” Lewis (Ft. Worth) had recommended spending $45.8 million over the next two years on AIDS.

Representative Deborah Danburg expressed her excitement over the new state AIDS budget: “I’m Thrilled – if this recommendation is carried through I think we can finally say that the state of Texas has entered the twentieth century on this.” 445

Antigay activist Stephen Hotze, leader of the campaign against city council members who had supported the 1984 antidiscrimination ordinances, resurfaced to

443 “Changing attitudes on AIDS,” The Houston Post, 16 February 1989.

444 Ibid.

445 “Texas AIDS budget beefed up big,” TWIT, 31 March 1989, 23.

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tell the Texas House Public Health Committee that “the so-called AIDS evidence had been overblown,” and the only ones benefitting from AIDS funding were drug users.446 They did approve an additional $15 million for AIDS for the next two years, but critics were quick to point out that the sum was quite short of what would be needed. Plus, this was $15 million below what had been approved by the House.

Members expressed concern that money might be used to promote homosexuality.

Such as statement suggests that legislators believed that placing funds in the hands of AIDS movement organizations to use in the fight against AIDS would be the same as fostering homosexuality. This is more evidence that many lawmakers in Texas still viewed the AIDS crisis as a gay liberation issue and not a public health disaster.

They did unanimously pass an anti-discrimination bill to protect AIDS patients and their caregivers. The bill to allow hospital patients to be tested for AIDS without their knowledge was amended to require that this be for diagnosis and treatment only.447

As the major AIDS bill passed the Senate, the battle continued as it entered the House where lawmakers proposed entirely different tactics. Still basically the same issue of public health versus gay rights, the House bogged down over whether the bill would contain references to the “unlawfulness” of homosexuality. The state’s public health officials pleaded in vain to have them consider the public health aspects rather than criminal justice. Finally leaving the House, it contained

446 “AIDS evidence overblown,” The Houston Post, 18 April 1989.

447 “Proposed AIDS funding slashed by $15 million,” The Houston Chronicle, 9 May 1989; “Budget committee approves additional 15M,” The Houston Post, 9 May 1989.

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provisions to set up treatment programs, regulate testing sites, and criminalize the intentional spread of the virus. In the same session, legislators voted to keep the

Texas Commission on Human Rights funded if they would be barred from hearing complaints of discrimination in cases regarding AIDS.448

Pressure on all sides of the capital increased as it continued to seem that gay rights was just as emphasized as the public health aspects. The Senate and the

House both passed the bill with only minutes left in the 71st legislature. The bill was the state’s first unified attack against AIDS. Lobbyist Glen Maxey said about the final bill, “there are a lot of things that the gay community can’t live with, but there a lot of things that’ll keep people alive.” He saw that as the trade-off that had to be made to get the bill passed. Reverend Chris Steele, who headed the AIDS Task Force for legislators said: “It’s a compromise, acceptable in the best spirit of compromise.”

Despite opposition from anti-AIDS activists, she continued to support a bill for further research into the epidemic.449

At a time when estimates predicted 4,000 new AIDS cases in the next four years if treatment, diagnosis, and definition remained unchanged, the AIDS hospital became a financial failure and would soon close. By 1992, Houston was expected to have 8,910 cases of AIDS with an upper estimate of 10,135 and a lower of 7,692.

448 “Proposed AIDS funding slashed by $15 million,” The Houston Chronicle, 9 May 1989; “Budget committee approves additional 15M,” Houston Post, 9 May 1989.

449 “Behind-the-scenes scramble makes AIDS, measure,” The Houston Chronicle, 31 May 1989.

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The area had 2,044 cases at the end of March including eighty-two new cases from

February.450

The AIDS hospital, officially the, Institute of Immunological Disorders (IID) announced in March that it would only be accepting new patients who had health insurance or other financial resources available to pay for their care.451 By July, protesters picketed in front of the hospital. They were demonstrating the many layoffs and cutbacks the administrators of the private hospital had made.452

Officials explained that the priorities of the hospital were to provide the highest quality care for its current patients and to continue research programs directed toward eventual elimination of the disease. The needs of patients without health insurance reached a point that threatened to compromise those priorities. The hospital accepted all patients from its affiliate, MDA. Some of these were indigent.

Their care began to exceed $3 million and was expected to be greater than $5 million by August when the hospital’s fiscal year ended. Houston Health Chief

Haughton had seen this as a weakness for the hospital in its proposal stages. He predicted that once the private capitalist project did not produce expected profits, it

450 “Health officials predict 8,000 new AIDS cases here in next 4 years,” The Houston Post, 12 April 1988, 1-16; “Metropolitan Assessment for Houston and Harris County,” box, 1005, folder, “AIDS 1989,” Harris County Hospital District, Harris County Archives, Houston, Texas (hereafter, HCHDHCA).

451 Ruth SoRelle, “AIDS hospital not admitting indigents,” The Houston Chronicle, 13 March 1987, 1, 1.

452 “PWA protest at hospital,” TWIT, 3 July 1987, 25.

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would close leaving a gap in services worse than it had been before. Sadly, he was right.453

As Haughton had noted in his initial reluctance about the IID proposal, the closing of the AIDS hospital would create serious problems beyond the loss of the hospital itself. It would cause a gap in federally funded research and testing in

Houston.454 The AIDS hospital had operated under a contract with the federal government that was to pay the University of Texas M.D. Anderson Hospital $5.8 million over a five-year period to test experimental AIDS medications. The program had created a federally funded AIDS Treatment Evaluation Unit. Once the hospital closed, AIDS patients in Houston would be unable to receive the newest medications being tested for the infection. Those in the program already would continue only until the end of their particular experimental trial. Those with cancer in their diagnosis would be able to continue their care at MDA. The closing of the hospital put even more pressure on the local AIDS movement to provide services and continue its leadership role in the response.455

On April 24, 1987, with the collapse of the AIDS hospital on the horizon, the

AFH continued to take a leading role in the response. Its members, Joe W. Tomlinson and Donald Skipwith, along with Jean Settlemyre of the IID, submitted a proposal to

County Judge Joe Lindsay for the establishment of a Harris County Task Force on

453 Ruth SoRelle, “Baylor considers filling gap in AIDS program,” The Houston Chronicle, 30 October 1987.

454 Ruth SoRelle, “Baylor considers filling gap in AIDS program,” The Houston Chronicle, 30 October 1987.

455 Ruth SoRelle, “Baylor considers filling gap in AIDS program,” The Houston Chronicle, 30 October 1987.

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AIDS. 456 The mission statement stated that with Houston now the fourth most impacted city in the country and tens of thousands of Harris County residents who would then or soon after be impacted by the disease, the two organizations asked the judge to take leadership and appoint a task force for the following purposes: to determine the overall needs of the county to address this issue, to define the economic impact for the present and the future, and to mobilize and expand existing resources – medical, political, and otherwise, both inside and outside of Harris

County. The proposal stated the issues and goals, named the first board members, and included the then current statistics for the disease in Harris County.

The Houston Harris County Task Force on AIDS

Mayor Kathy Whitmire and County Judge Lindsay took the suggestion made by AFH and the IID and created a countywide panel on AIDS. Called the Houston

Harris County Task Force on AIDS (HHCTFA), it replaced the Mayor’s Task Force on

AIDS that she had convened on the spring of 1984. She formed the Mayor’s Task

Force to coordinate the various organizations and their responses to the crisis.457

The new panel would address AIDS education, availability of social services, and coordination of research at the local level. Members of the panel included: Joan

Raymond, superintendent of the Houston Independent School District; Dr. William

Butler, president of Baylor College of Medicine; Dr. Roger Bulger, president of the

University of Texas Health Science Center at Houston; Brown McDonald, executive director of the AIDS Foundation of Houston; Councilman George Greanias and

456 “Proposal to establish Harris County Task Force on AIDS,” box 0987, folder “AIDS,” HCHDHCA.

457 “Mayor Whitmire names her new AIDS panel,” TWIT, 25 September 1987, 15.

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County Commissioner El Franco Lee; and representatives of public health agencies, community groups, hospitals, and medical schools.458

Whitmire expressed that most importantly they needed to work to meet the needs of AIDS sufferers and their families.459 Lindsay responded, “The need for

AIDS treatment is just one issue.” “We must make the rest of the community understand the problem we are facing.”460 Yet the plans contained no funding.

Elected officials still feared that any funding with a taxpayer base would be politically damaging because of the lingering link between AIDS and homosexuality.

Whitmire and Lindsay sparked an instant controversy for failing to appoint an AIDS patient to the panel. Critics complained that Whitmire did not appoint any gays, and name them as such, to the panel. Supporters agreed with Lindsay that there were gay members serving in other capacities on the panel, but to appoint any would politicize this committee that was supposed to be nonpolitical. In an attempt to placate the LGBT community, they named Brien McDonald, executive director of the AIDS Foundation Houston, to an at-large position, rather than as a representative of the foundation.461

The first major project on their agenda was the creation of a service and treatment center for AIDS patients. Lindsay endorsed the proposal but noted that

458 D.J. Wilson, “Gay opponents rap way mayor handles AIDS” “Meet with Whitmire aids in ‘Charged Up’ session,” The Houston Post, 27 August 1987.

459 “AIDS panelists call for building to treat victims,” The Houston Chronicle, 16 October 1987, 1,29.

460 “AIDS panelists call for building to treat victims,” The Houston Chronicle, 16 October 1987, 1, 29; letter from Durbin the Lindsay, box 0987, folder “AIDS,” HCHDHCA.

461 Ruth SoRelle, “Lindsay seeks new AIDS hospital plan,” The Houston Chronicle, 16 September 1987, 1, 23; John Barnich,“The untold story on Houston’s AIDS panel,” TWIT, 14 October 1987, 27.

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there were no funding sources available and renovating and operating such a building would be quite costly. However, the closing of the AIDS hospital would rapidly increase the burden on the publicly supported Harris County Hospital

District rapidly.462 Citing that AIDS prevention efforts and research could lessen the demand for this specific type of care as well as the number of people who were infected by the virus, he refused to say that the opening of such a facility was inevitable.463

Richard Durbin, whose committee originated the plan for the center, asked for $200,000 in seed money to hire an executive director and pay for further planning.464 They were currently caring for indigent patients in the hospital district, but if AIDS care could become a community effort in Houston, they could attract matching federal dollars. With caseload increasing and without federal dollars to pay for care, the burden of AIDS patients would fall heavily on local tax funds.

Whitmire and Lindsay did not supply the $200,000 reinforcing the idea that

Houston would rather wait for federal funding than to make any financial commitment to stand up for all of the planning that was being done. 465

In 1988, As Lindsay’s proposal continued to come together through the

HHCPA, a second proposal for an umbrella AIDS service organization came in from a

462 Ruth SoRelle, “Lindsay seeks new AIDS hospital plan,” The Houston Chronicle, 16 September 1987, 1, 23.

463 John Barnich,“The untold story on Houston’s AIDS panel,” TWIT, 14 October 1987, 27.

464 Letter from Durbin to Lindsay, 12-19-1987, box 0987, folder “AIDS,” HCHDHCA.

465 Ruth SoRelle, “Panel on AIDS urges $20 million bond issue for center,” The Houston Chronicle, 15 January 1988.

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group calling itself the AIDS Regional Coalition of Houston (ARCH). This created another, competing organization. The director of epidemiology, the city health department, and the new city health director, who replaced Haughton, Dr. John

Arradondo, supported the ARCH. He said the agency was a good idea as it would be neutral: not just public affiliations, but private ones as well. They were warned once again, this time by the chairwoman of the TLTFA, that Houston would never get federal funds to fight disease as long as agencies continued to compete with one another. This sparked further controversy within the patient care committee of the

HHCPA meeting.466

Lindsay wanted to coordinate all care through his group, the AIDS Care

Foundation. Two separate proposals presented a bad impression in Washington where officials already saw Houston to be “in disarray” over AIDS. Federal officials at both major funding agencies, the CDC and the Health Resource Services Agency, required that volunteer, local, and county agencies work together to obtain needed funds.467

There was also no denying that Houston lacked the type of care that was crucial in meeting the needs of patients of AIDS. In December, an incident occurred that illustrated the point well. A resident returned home from work one day to find a 31-year-old AIDS patient confused and weak outside their Montrose area home.

Jefferson Davis Hospital released him, saying that there was nothing else they could

466 Ruth SoRelle, “Expert urges cooperation on healthcare proposals,” The Houston Chronicle, 4 June 1988, 1-1.

467 Ruth SoRelle, “Expert urges cooperation on healthcare proposals,” The Houston Chronicle, 4 June 1988, 1-1.

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do. They put him in a taxi but he never reached his home. Maybe he did not need to be in a hospital but he still required care – the intermediate type that was still not available in Houston. His condition worsened and he died a few days later at Ben

Taub Hospital, Houston’s Level I Trauma Center located in the Texas Medical Center.

Ben Taub also served the indigent population. This example illuminates one of the more egregious gaps in services available for AIDS patients in Houston.468

At this point, Lindsay and proponents of the AIDS facility formed a new umbrella organization known as the Greater Houston AIDS Alliance (GHAA). Dr.

George Alexander was the president. The alliance encompassed all local AIDS organizations even though many had balked at the start for fear that it would be dominated by Lindsay and Whitmire. Houston ASOs formed a coalition to elect seven members to the board and also make recommendations about possible appointees to the six at-large positions. The GHAA was out to raise enough corporate and philanthropic funds to run the intermediate care facility. Perhaps they were finally following the advice of governmental officials that Houston had been going about the structure of their proposals in the wrong way.469

As these officials convened committees and stalled, the second annual Living with AIDS Symposium met in Houston in October 1987. Rodger McFarlane, former executive director of the Gay Men’s Health Crisis in New York, and project director of the AIDS Professional Education Program at Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer

468 Ruth SoRelle, “Immediate care seen as lacking,” The Houston Chronicle, 31 December 1988, A, 19.

469 Ruth SoRelle, “Intermediate AIDS care seen as lacking,” The Houston Chronicle, 31 December 1988, A-19.

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Center, said that advocates of AIDS patients perceived Houston as a place that ignores the disease. He went on to say that the failure of a Houston gay rights referendum in January of 1985 contributed to the city’s anti-gay, anti-AIDS image.470

Usually most visible in their refusal to work in cooperation with the established

AIDS movement organizations, this was not the first, nor would it be the last such observation.

As the keynote speaker of the symposium, he said that Houston was known as one of the “bad places for AIDS.”471 He said that despite the high incidence of the disease there, government efforts at education and care for patients had been minimal. Only recently had the city health department began a widespread distribution of educational materials. While private and public institutions provided healthcare, once outside of the hospital, few social services were available for the patients.

He praised the AIDS Foundation of Houston for beginning many of the social programs that were available and starting the first educational programs. AIDS service groups across the country faced a lack of resources and in New York officials had ignored the city’s crushing AIDS and education burden for years. While private groups worked to stem the tide, AIDS continued to spread among younger and younger people and among drug abusers.

The worst lesson he learned was that “the better we provide for people with

AIDS and their families, the more money we were able to raise, the more grants we

470 “Houston seen as ignoring AIDS, ex-gay leader says,” The Houston Post, 25 October 1987, 1, 35.

471 Ibid.

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got, no matter how many volunteers we were able to sign up and train, the more clients we got.”472 The city had finally gotten involved in New York, but too late.

Estimates were that sixty percent of New York’s 250,000 drug users and an equal percentage of the city’s gay population was then infected with the virus.

McFarlane stressed that New York’s mistakes should be a learning case for

Houston and urged that they not wait to take action. It was the time to teach preventative measures to women, teenagers, and children before these groups also become overwhelmingly infected. The myth that only gay white men die of the disease was dangerous to the whole world, he explained. Then, gay men made up only 10 percent of the world’s AIDS population. At that time in New York, according to officials, more drug abusers were dying than gay men. “Three years from now, more people will have died from AIDS than ever had from polio or from the war in

Vietnam. “We have not seen one-tenth of the problem yet,” he predicted.473

MacFarlane was not the only national leader of the AIDS to offer admonition to Houston. Visiting the city in 1988, prominent AIDS scientist Mathilde Krim explained that Houston in 1988 could be compared to New York in 1982 and urged the mayor and municipal government to not make the same mistakes. Krim founded AIDS Medical Foundation, now known as AMFAR. She said people had gone to the mayor for help, but they were ignored, and look where New York is today.

When she was asked why AIDS was still considered a gay disease in Houston she

472 “Houston seen as ignoring AIDS, ex-gay leader says,” The Houston Post, 25 October 1987, 35.

473 Ibid.

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replied “That’s because of the mental deficiency of the people in charge in Texas, especially here in Houston.”474

In May, the outpatient AIDS clinic finally opened its doors at 2015 Thomas

Street.475 Seven years since AIDS cases were officially discovered in Houston and two years since the clinic was originally proposed it was finally able to see patients.

This was only a portion of the grand all-encompassing AIDS service facility that had originally been conceived by County Judge Lindsay. Even in the current year, it had faced problem after problem including that of transportation. In January, it was held up for 60 days more for asbestos abatement. In April, the private physicians association and the GHAA were protesting the location of the new AIDS clinic because of its isolation from the Texas Medical Center.

From the viewpoint of AIDS patients, though, Thomas Street was a welcome addition to Houston. They enjoyed a sense of comfort in being treated there since all cases were AIDS related. They were protected from the eyes of those who did not understand. Mary Parker said that her son had been grateful for the place when it opened in the last couple of years of his life. Even once he had been on disability for two years and was able to get on Medicare and get a private doctor, he still had to go there to get his meds since they were not covered under Medicare. 476

Leadership at the HDHHS

474 “Mathilde Krim visits Houston,” TWIT 8 April 1988, 23.

475 Letter from McFather to Lindsay, 4-20-1989, box 1005, folder, AIDS 1989, HCHDHCA; “AIDS clinic dedication ceremonies,” TWIT, 14 July 1989, 9.

476 Parker interview.

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The leadership of the HDHHS had been a source of the lack of services and local government support from the beginning of the crisis. In August 1987, the president of the HGLPC, Annise Parker, put together what was to be a “low-key meeting with the lame duck city health director, Dr. James Haughton, to discuss what had happened with AIDS in the past four years.”477 Statements about the meeting reveal the nature of the community’s feelings toward city’s leadership with regard to the worsening crisis.

Haughton went into the meeting expecting to be the target but instead they attacked Whitmire. Opponents aired a long list of complaints against the mayor.

They noted her lack of supporting presence at the IID or other hospitals that treated

AIDS patients. They complained that she had not come out to make statements similar to those made by the mayors of New York, San Francisco, and San Diego. In her defense, aids cited her service on the task force on AIDS of the U.S. Conference of

Mayors.

Haughton took the opportunity to state that if anyone expected to “get a retraction from me or a change in my position on AIDS, they had come to the wrong meeting.” He reiterated his view that AIDS was only one of Houston’s serious health problems and not the most serious. He reminded everyone that the health department had begun introducing AIDS education materials into all their patient

477 D.J. Wilson, “Gay opponents rap way mayor handles AIDS” “Meet with Whitmire aids in ‘Charged Up’ session,” The Houston Post, 27 August 1987; “AIDS is not Houston’s top killer disease,” TWIT, 4 September 1987, 19.

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contacts.478 He argued that the epidemic was different in New York, Miami, or elsewhere, and not a problem in Houston. “If you look at mortality figures in

Houston,” he continued, “800 have died of AIDS locally in the last seven years. In that same time span, we’ve had over 3,000 colon cancer deaths among men and

1,400 breast cancer deaths among women. So you can see AIDS is not Houston’s number one killer.”479 He also pointed out that ninety-five percent of what they did was education. He called attention to the brochures in water bills, the bus posters and the media blitz for the coming fall on radio and television. He did praise the gay community for their work and that changes in behavior could be seen.

He had already been challenged in his thinking at a congressional hearing held at Texas Southern University that previous May. He bragged on how well

Houston had handled AIDS and cited statistics that showed Houston had risen less than other cities. The audience chuckled. Dr. Peter Mansell, councilwoman Sue

Lovell, and councilman Greanias all refuted the remarks. Haughton based his information on the CDC report that projected the spread of AIDS across the nation to be higher in other cities than in Houston. Mansell explained that a 50 percent increase based on 1000 cases was 1500 cases. He continued, “they might not be as high as the 126 percent increase from earlier, but it is still a lot of people. I can’t derive any comfort from that.” Dr. Robert Awe, a local physician testified that he and others of the local medical community had approached the state about the need

478 Houston Post. D.J. Wilson, “Gay opponents rap way mayor handles AIDS,” The Houston Post, 27 August 1987; “AIDS is not Houston’s top killer disease,” TWIT, 4 September 1987, 19.

479 Houston Post. D.J. Wilson, “Gay opponents rap way mayor handles AIDS,” The Houston Post, 27 August 1987.

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for funding for the indigent. They were told that AIDS was not a state problem- it was a Houston problem.480

Houston attorney John Barnich argued that Haughton actually interfered with the community’s response by downplaying the seriousness of the disease and not cooperating on grant applications that led to the loss of millions of dollars. Not cooperating meant city and county agencies were not working collaboratively with the established CBOs. This pattern caused Houston to miss funding opportunities again and again. In 1986, the Health Resources and Services Administration, a division of the United States Health and Human Services Department awarded money to four most AIDS-impacted cities. They bypassed Houston and awarded

Miami instead that was fifth in numbers of cases. This year in 1987, HRSA funded nine top cities and once again bypassed Houston, rejecting their grant citing lack of municipal involvement and support.481 The continued refusal of the city and county agencies to work cooperatively with existent AIDS CBOs was the main hindrance to a substantial AIDS response in Houston. This was the problem that plagued the last half of the 1980s there in terms of AIDS. As a result, the AIDS movement continued to struggle in financial straits but none-the-less remained the leadership of the campaign against the disease.

In August, Haughton resigned. The concerned community agreed that he could have done more for AIDS in Houston and waited in hopes that the mayor would appoint a new director for whom AIDS was a higher priority. According to

480 “Congressional hearing on AIDS held at TSU,” TWIT, 8 May 1987, 11.

481 John Barnich,“The untold story on Houston’s AIDS panel,” TWIT, 14 October 1987, 27.

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Sue Lovell, who worked with him for over four years, he freely admitted that AIDS was not a priory to him. AIDS community leaders hoped that the new director would aggressively seek federal funds and work harder to educate the community on AIDS.482

Then at the end of 1988, a funding crisis involving the CDC grants for the next year revealed the Haughton’s replacement, Dr. John Arradondo had displeased the city council and the local AIDS movement CBPs as well. At the beginning of the crisis, upon discovering the mysterious illness, MDA had seen the necessity of partnering with the gay community. Seven years later, under new health director,

Dr. John Arradondo, the city of Houston seemed to consider the LGBT community merely an ancillary part of the response.

In 1988, the CDC changed their grant application procedures. In adhering to their policy of fostering cooperation between county, local governments, and grassroots based CBOs, applicants had to apply through the city instead of directly to the CDC. In the process, Arradondo, omitted the Montrose Clinic and the AFH.

The grant application came under close scrutiny, particularly by the city council since it left out two of Houston’s oldest agencies. The city council approved a

$700,000 supplemental proposal to the CDC to cover the excluded organizations.

Additionally, Arradondo informed the council that where the city was applying for $5.4 million, it was likely that they would receive only about $2.5 million. At that point, Houston needed at least $12 million annually in AIDS funding.

Councilmembers John Goodner and Eleanor Tinsley were especially critical that out

482 “Houston Health Director quits,” TWIT, 21 August 1987, 22; Lovell interview.

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of the $5.4 million application, only $1.1 million was allocated for local agencies.

Arradondo defended accusations that he was supplanting existing agencies’ work in order to expand city bureaucracy. He also received pointed questions about the city’s ability to gear up and hire as many as 60 new qualified employees to implement the expanded program in time.483

The city council approved the grant finally but not without issuing

Arradondo serious warnings about their distrust for his application that had $1.1 million for local agencies while $4.3 million was included for a greatly expanded city program. It contained nearly $800,000 of additional funding for AFH and the

Montrose Clinic and at Council’s insistence, and an amendment stating that funding local agencies was the city’s highest priority. Councilman Jim Greenwood sent

Arradondo into the CDC negotiations with a stern warning: “You’ve gotten off on the wrong foot with council, and there’s a very big credibility gap. You’ve got a chance to burn us. But if you burn us, you won’t get a second chance.”484

As a result of the funding limbo, AFH and the Montrose Clinic faced layoffs at the opening of 1989. Even though they had received verbal confirmation that the money would come, the official word had to come from the office of U.S. Rep. Mickey

Leland and they were closed for the end of year holiday.485

483 Kim Cobb, “Arradondo expects only half of requested AIDS funding,” The Houston Chronicle, 6 December 1988, A-3.

484 Kim Cobb, “Reluctant city council approves health chief’s application for AIDS grant.” The Houston Chronicle, 8 December 1988, A-37.

485 Ruth SoRelle, “Two AIDS groups put in limbo.” The Houston Chronicle, 31 Dec 1988, A-217.

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Houston’s AIDS Movement Remains Leader of Response

In the latter years of the 1980s, the LGBT initiated response continued its leadership role as well as one of actually providing services. The Montrose Clinic, in its five-plus years of existence, had seen over 13,000 patients for a total of more than 22,000 patient visits.486 Additionally, since the beginning of the HIV Antibody test in June of 1985, they had pre-test counseled 7,139 and actually tested 6,762.

From their 1981 budget of $55,000 they had grown to their current (1987) budget of $250,000. They continued to ask for nominal fees for their services but the charges paid for very little of the services. Private donations, grants, and funding programs continued to cover the operating expenses. They still worked closely with the HDHHS and had formal agreements for student rotation with U.T. Medical

School, the School of Nursing, and other private schools.

AFH had grown by 1987 as well. Around 600 volunteers then staffed the buddy program of the AFH, going “above and beyond the call of duty to provide the physical, emotional, and spiritual support that is often so lacking.”487 From this system evolved the services such as Project Food and Stone Soup, which supplied donated food for the buddies to transfer to their patients.488

AIDS patients were becoming ill enough to require twenty-four hour care, but not to the point of requiring hospitalization. Besides, hospitals provided the

486 A statement for the clinic on July 13, 1987, box 6, folder, “About Our Clinic,” JPMHC.

487 Leslie, Linthicum, “Montrose and AIDS: Death becoming and everyday visitor to neighborhood at the hub,” The Houston Post, 22 March 1987.

488 “Pantry offers taste of compassion: Stone Soup in Montrose helps out victims of AIDS,” The Houston Post, 11 May 1987.

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very most expensive alternative for care. Next would have been nursing homes, but most were turning away PWAs. The AIDS movement in San Francisco formed its

Shanti Project to fill this need but Houston lacked the cooperation between the city and CBOs to carry out such a service.489 With community generosity the McAdory

House opened in November of 1984 and had received no public assistance or tax dollars.490 It had been set up to accommodate patients with nowhere to stay until their Social Security began to flow. McAdory House was not equipped, however, to provide what we know today as hospice services. This was one more need that would have to be addressed. These are the very reasons, the apparent inability of local, county, and state organizations to work with CBOs that resulted in Houston being unable to meet the eligibility requirements for the large grants that San

Francisco and other major cities received.

When Rev. Donald W. Sinclair came to the inner city Bering Memorial United

Methodist Church, it was poverty-stricken with its membership having fallen from

2500 to only 450. With Houston in a recession, contributions had dwindled to the point that the church could not afford to repair its air conditioning system. Sinclair considered the church’s role to be that of serving the surrounding community. With the church in the center of Montrose, and the neighborhood highly populated with the city’s gay community, there was great need because of AIDS.

489 Philip M. Kayal, Bearing Witness: Gay Men’s Health Crisis and the Politics of AIDS (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1993), 144.

490 Michale Shannon, “KS/AIDS Foundation Opens McAdory House,” Montrose Voice, 2 November 1984.

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With the blessing of the regional Bishop above him, in March of 1988, Bering

Methodist Church opened the Bering Care Center to provide a day care facility for those unable to care for themselves while their caregivers maintained their jobs.491

The Bering United Methodist Church also donated space for a dental clinic where dentists, volunteering one day each week from their own practices, would serve those with AIDS as they were most usually refused service in regular practices.492

Without any state or city support to make the center happen, once again individuals and businesses donated necessary items to make it a success.493 Bering also established a financial assistance program to help patients with rent, medicines, and other costs associated with AIDS. The program had just run out of money having distributed $25,000 to the area’s needy. The program caught the attention of the former U.S. Surgeon General C. Everett Koop and on a visit to Houston he met with six Houston area clergymen with AIDS ministries. 494

Having addressed the intermediate care problem to an extent, the AIDS movement moved toward that of hospice care. Many PWAs required a place where they could receive the care and support needed for the last days of their lives. In

1986, 75-year-old Eleanor Munger, a retired Montessori teacher and AFH volunteer, opened Omega House. Located in a rented Montrose duplex, the house was a non- profit, charitable hospice. It received no government funding and depended on

491 “PWA day care center opens,” TWIT, 8 April 1988, 19.

492 Sandy Stacy, interviewed by John Goins, Houston, Texas, 12 July 2011; “Church to Open Dental Clinic,” The Montrose Voice, 28 August 1987; “PWA dental clinic opens,” TWIT, 4 September 1987, 15.

493 Jeff Bray, “Adult Day Care Center First in Nation, “ Montrose Voice, 6 May 1988.

494 Richard Vara, “Pastor leading church in outreach ministry,” The Houston Post, 18 November 1989.

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donations from individuals, businesses, religious groups, charitable foundations and the medical community for supplies. It existed on workers who were trained volunteers. The monthly expenses were around $10,000 but the hospice care for a

PWA was $90, far less than hospital care would have been.495

The Bering Spiritual Support Group (BSSG) was at this point bigger than ever. Attended by well over a hundred each Wednesday night, its role of helping people help each other was fulfilling a crucial need in Houston. Mary Parker remembered the first time they attended the room was crowded and full of people.

She and her son were quite nervous since this was a church based support group.

The betrayal they felt ran deep as they were from the Sagemont area in east

Houston with an abundance of churches yet none were welcoming to gay men, particularly ones with AIDS. She realized that if the church representatives had approached them with any evangelical dogma, they would not have stayed. The atmosphere was warm and friendly. Her son Kelly saw an acquaintance and they began to feel comfortable.496

Kelly had been diagnosed by her husband’s doctor and was soon hospitalized for PCP. He was fired from his job the first time he was late to work after a hospital stay. In those days it took little excuse for employers, particularly in a service industry that handled food, to fire employees who were gay and suspected of being

AIDS carriers.

495 Rosaland Jackler, “‘I felt really called’ 75-year-old Houston grandmother to open hospice for AIDS victims,” The Houston Post, 26 August 1986; Barbara Karkabi, “Retired teacher envision hospice for dying AIDS patients,” The Houston Chronicle, 29 June 1986; “Omega Houston founders day,” TWIT, 4 September 1987, 17; Stacy interview.

496 Parker interview.

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During another hospital stay, after her husband had passed away from cancer, and Kelly was on life support, she realized they needed help. This was more than they could handle alone. A member of BSSG came by their room and encouraged them to come to the Wednesday night group. As soon as Kelly recovered and left the hospital, they became part of a network that helped with their needs. The caring and supportive atmosphere was “catching,” Parker said. Everyone helped each other. The next time Kelly was in the hospital and she had to work, someone from the group would stay with him so that he was not alone.

Parker knows without a doubt that “going to Bering Spiritual Support Group and being with others who understood what he was going through made the last two years of his life a lot easier.”497 Even though she continues to attend the group as a facilitator and work with the church outreach programs, she knows that “you don’t pay back what they did for my son. They made him proud for who he was.”

She did not take a break after her son died and remains active in the program today.

After she lost her son a woman came to the group who had three sons and all of them had AIDS. She realized that no matter how bad your situation might be, there were always ones that were worse. Today the group is smaller. The medications that are available and the needs have changed. “People come when they need us and then they are out living their lives when they don’t. And that’s a good thing.”498

AIDS Foundation Houston (AFH) took a leading role once again as it sought to create affordable housing for AIDS patients. The proposal that federal community

497 Parker interview.

498 Parker interview.

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development funds be used to purchase a 45-unit apartment complex in Montrose went a step further to reality when at Whitmire’s recommendation, $525,000 in federal funds were set aside to acquire housing for AIDS patients. The proposal would next go to City Council for approval. The apartments were small and would provide independence with minimum maintenance. The units, located at 1423

Hawthorne Street were for indigent patients. The program would run in conjunction with McAdory House, which was AFH’s emergency housing program.

The location was also close to Bering Church and residents of the units could easily access the Bering programs.

The city’s involvement here was further evidence that the administration was finally taking some steps to help with the crisis. The lack of local government contributions to the fight had been criticized for being too little too late. It had mainly focused on testing and education as exemplified by the recent brochures that were distributed through city water bills.499 In July, AFH had completed purchase of an apartment complex to provide affordable housing for PWAs. The AFH had accomplished another major expansion of its service outreach.500 Supplying affordable housing for PWAs is an area that AFH remains active in today.

As the city of Houston began sponsoring more visible public education campaigns in 1987, the issue over gay rights came into play once again. In July, the city planned go public with one to help alleviate fear among those least likely to be exposed to the disease. The gay community had accused the health department and

499 Dianna Hunt, “City pushes funding for AIDS plan,” The Houston Chronicle, 11 June 1988, 1, 25.

500 “Residents file suit,” The Houston Post, 16 June 1989; “AIDS foundation gets housing grant,” The Houston Chronicle, 11 December 1988, C-6.

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Whitmire of avoiding the subject because of its “unattractive link to the gay community.” 501 Once it was known how the disease was transmitted, the trend was to shift educational material away from risk groups and toward risky behavior. This meant focusing on anyone who might be sexually active, including young people.

The advertisements did not include information on safe sex practices such as condom use. Instead, it focused on educating the public on how the disease was actually transmitted. The campaign addressed the common fears such as casual contact, toilet seats, telephones, shaking hands, and swimming in a public pool.502

In 1988, the Houston Metro bus system displayed placards warning the pubic about AIDS. The signs listed telephone numbers to call for information about how to prevent the spread of AIDS.503 Perhaps most visible were the 400 billboards that went up around the city. The Patrick Media Group donated the space to the

Department of Health and Human Services and the American Red Cross. There were four messages: three from the health department and one from the Red Cross.504

After her son Gary had died on April of 1995, Freda Wagman also realized that she needed a support group. Peggy Sales, the director of volunteers at AFH at the time, introduced her to BSSG. She is still attends the Wednesday night meetings. Gary had been a long-term survivor. He lived a relatively normal life for many years, having been hospitalized only twice. The stays were only four months apart. Admitted the second time with PCP, he did not survive.

501 Susan Warren, “City to launch campaign to educate public about AIDS,” The Houston Chronicle, 19 June 1987, 1, 20.

502 Ibid.

503 “Metro bus unveiled placards warning the pubic about AIDS,” The Houston Chronicle, 11 March 1988.

504 Tom Moran, “City spends $7200 on billboards to promote anti-AIDS messages,” The Houston Chronicle, 6 April 1988; “City spends $7200 on billboards to promote anti-AIDS messages,” The Houston Chronicle, 6 April 1988.

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Republican U.S. Representative Jack Fields (1981-1996), one of the state’s most conservative congressmen, was the first in the area, if not in the state, to disseminate public education materials on AIDS. He mailed his northeast Eighth

Congressional District constituents a newsletter containing non-emotional information about the spread and prevention of the disease. Even though government-provided AIDS education was controversial because of the traditional link of the disease to homosexual and bisexual males, Fields said that since AIDS is a threat to the general public and a “danger to virtually every adult engaged in non- monogamous sex,” the issue could not be ignored. The mailing also reiterated that the disease could not be transmitted through casual contact or by insects including mosquitoes.505

These broad educational efforts still did not contain the tools educating people on how to have sex and avoid transmission. Instead of considering that people would have sex anyway and instruct them on condom use and any other methods of safe sex, they steadfastly held to their belief that stressing abstinence would prevent the spread of the disease. This remained in line with the Reagan policy.

The White House policy on AIDS may explain some of the reluctance to move forward aggressively on AIDS policy at the state and local level in Texas and

Houston. On October 22, 1986, Surgeon General Koop released his report on AIDS.

Drawing fire from conservatives, it called for education to address both school-age children and adults at the same time. He wrote, “many people, especially our youth,

505 “Fields’ office to distribute AIDS information,” The Houston Chronicle, 27 June 1987, 1, 21.

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are not receiving information that is vital to their future health and well-being because of our reticence in dealing with the subjects of sex, sexual practices, and homosexuality. This silence must end.”506 Reagan approved wording for his own educational program that undermined Koop’s AIDS prevention efforts. According to him, materials on AIDS produced by the federal government would “encourage sexual behavior – based on fidelity, commitment, and maturity, placing sexuality within the context of marriage.”507

On May 1, 1987, Reagan formed his Presidential Commission on the Human

Immunodeficiency Virus Epidemic, known as the AIDS Commission. Reagan had not taken a prominent role on AIDS thus far and the commission showed leadership but also allowed the administration to “mark the limits of what AIDS prevention should look like.” Reagan’s secretary of education, William Bennett, and his undersecretary of education, Gary Bauer, were his primary spokesmen on AIDS. They both had strong ties to the Religious Right and while claiming to place health above politics, they “ultimately relied on a conservative political approach instead of a public health program,” wrote Jennifer Brier in Infectious Ideas. 508 Reagan eventually placed a PWA on the commission but against the admonishments of Bauer who explained that while homosexuals had been major victims of AIDS, they had also

506 Jennifer Brier, Infectious Ideas: U.S. Political Responses to the AIDS Crisis (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 88-89. Koop also presented the racial disparities of the disease. While African Americans accounted for twenty-five percent of all people with AIDS, they made up only twelve percent of the population.

507 Brier, Infectious, 92; “Education secretary backs morality as main AIDS weapon,” The Houston Chronicle, 7 October 1987, 1-2.

508 Brier, Infectious, 93.

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caused its spread. 509 He told the president “If you feel that we must appoint a homosexual, I would recommend a ‘reformed’ homosexual – this is someone not currently living the gay lifestyle.”510

As the 1980s drew to a close, the median survival time of Houston AIDS patients had risen from 33 to 44 days from diagnosis to death.511 This seems like little progress for eight years of work. Additionally, Houston was still experiencing rising case numbers and resources remained scarce and hard to acquire for the AIDS service organizations. Despite the AIDS clinic at Thomas Street and a step toward more visual educational efforts, the community-based organizations continued to lead and provide the bulk of services for fighting the epidemic and providing services for those affected.

The division among political leaders as to whether AIDS should be considered a public health crisis or a gay liberation issue continually stalled processes that could have enabled Houston to offer its citizens an adequate response to the epidemic. Fortunately, Houston’s community based AIDS movement had the strength, organization and support to lead the response until the federal government passed much needed relief legislation early in the next decade.

509 “Reagan planning to name homosexual to AIDS panel,” The Houston Chronicle, 7 July 1987, 1-3.

510 Brier, Infectious, 94; “Reagan approves commission on AIDS,” The Houston Chronicle, 5 May 1987, Section 2-1. Newer secondary sources reveal that Reagan sought to treat HIV/AIDS as a public health problem and did not exploit the disease to the benefit of the antigay agenda. Sources also reveal the President to have been in conflict with the Religious Right and the conservative wing of his party on these issues. Whatever his personal feelings on homosexuality were, he opposed California’s 1978 Proposition 6. See also Critchlow, Conservative, 216-218; Donald Critchlow, Phyllis Schlafly and Grassroots Conservatism: A Woman’s Crusade (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2005); Didi Herman, The Antigay Agenda: Orthodox Vision and the Christian Right (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1997); Cynthia Burack, Sin, Sex, and Democracy: Antigay Rhetoric and the Christian Right (Albany: State University of New York, 2008).

511 “Median survival time rises,” The Houston Post, 17 December 1989.

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The political undesirability of committing tax payer funds to address AIDS stalled progress at the state level until legislators in Austin finally passed a comprehensive

AIDS bill in 1989. Locally in Houston, the same political intransigence stalled response from the leadership in the city health department and on the Houston and

Harris County Task Force in AIDS until they finally opened an AIDS service clinic in

1989.

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APPENDIX

Pertinent People and Organizations

AIDS Care Foundation – County Judge Lindsay proposed to coordinate all AIDS care through this group.

AIDS Foundation Houston (AFH) - AFH began as Houston’s first ASO in 1982. It still serves the area today. AFH formed as the KS AIDS Committee (KSC), then became KS AIDS Foundation (KSAF), and then became AFH.

AIDS Regional Coalition of Houston (ARCH) – This was a second proposed umbrella AIDS service organization to coordinate all AIDS care in the region.

AIDS Service Organizations (ASOs) Primary organizations in the nation’s largest cities included: Gay Men’s Health Crisis (GMHC) in New York, the San Francisco AIDS Foundation (SFAF), the KS AIDS Foundation (KSAF) in Houston, AID Atlanta, Miami’s Health Crisis Network, AIDS Services of Austin (ASA), and AIDS Services of Dallas (ASD).

AIDS Working Group Doctors Newell and Mansell formed the group in June 1983. It was a fifteen-member unit charged to set standardized clinical criteria for private physicians to use in detecting AIDS and/or KS problems.

American Medical International (AMI) – The for-profit hospital chain, based in California, that opened an AIDS hospital in Houston known as the Institute for Immunological Disorders (IID).

Arradondo, Dr. John – Arradondo was chief of HDHHS from 1987 to 1992. He was controversial because of his lack of interest in the established CBOs in Houston.

Bering Community Services Foundation – Beginning in 1985 within Bering United Methodist Church, the organization remains a vital ASO in the Houston are today.

Circle of Friends – Formed in 1965 in Dallas, Texas, this was the first political organization of lesbian and gay men in Texas.

Citizens for Human Equality – This committee formed in 1981 to examine and take action on issues that affected the quality of life for lesbians and gay men in Houston.

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Committee for Public Awareness (CPA) - A political action group formed to oppose gay influence in Houston and stand against the antidiscrimination ordinances of 1984.

Citizens for a United Houston (CUH) - The primary campaign leader in favor of the antidiscrimination ordinances of 1984.

Committee for Repeal (CFR) - A political action committee working against the antidiscrimination propositions of 1984.

Dianas – Beginning as a social organization for gay men in the 1950s and serving as a valuable financial beneficiary during the AIDS crisis, today the Dianas are a major charitable organization in Houston.

Federation of AIDS-Related Organizations (FARO). KSC and thirty-eight similar organizations around the nation united to form this national affiliation in 1982 to lobby for federal AIDS research funding in Washington, D.C..

Gay Activist Alliance (GAA) – The organization began nationally in 1969 as a moderate political group compared to the earlier GLF. It was the first officially recognized gay and lesbian political organization at the University of Houston. In 1975 it became Gay Resource Services.

Gay Liberation Front (GLF) – Formed in New York immediately following the Stonewall Riots, the group was radical in nature and supported New Left anti-war marches as well as causes for gay liberation. A Houston chapter began on the University of Houston campus in 1971.

Gay Political Coalition - A 1970s gay and lesbian political group initiated by the Montrose Gaze community center.

Greater Houston AIDS Alliance (GHAA) – County Judge Lindsay convened this alliance to encompass all local AIDS organizations in Houston. This included AFH, MCC, the Montrose Clinic, and Bering Foundation.

Haughton, Dr. James – Haughton served as the chief of HDHHS from 1983-1987. He was controversial for denying that AIDS was a significant health problem in Houston and therefore took little or no action against the epidemic for most of his tenure.

Hill, Ray – One of Houston’s earliest activists for gay and lesbian rights. He was a founder of CHE, an organizer for the Anita Bryant march and Town Meeting I. He served as president of the GPC as well.

Hofheinz, Fred – Mayor of Houston, 1974-1978.

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Hotze, Stephen - Anti-gay activist and his Campaign for Houston (CFH) fought the antidiscrimination ordinances and launched the Straight Slate campaign against city council incumbents who had supported the proposals.

Houston Gay Political Caucus (GPC) - Known today as the Houston Lesbian and Gay Political Caucus, it represents the LGBT community there since its formation in in 1975. It came to power by vetting candidates and bloc voting.

Houston Harris County Task Force on AIDS – Mayor Whitmire and County Judge Lindsay created this task force to take action in the AIDS crisis. Their first project was to plan and open an outpatient clinic for AIDS patients.

Houston Pride – Houston Pride is the administrative organization for the lesbian and gay parade and celebration that is held each year in Houston.

Institute of Immunological Disorders (IID) - The AIDS hospital, also charged to to test treatments and experimental AIDS medications. The program involved a federally funded AIDS Treatment Evaluation Unit charged with the same purpose.

Integrity Houston – The group of gay men formed in 1970 as a political organization known for its speaker’s bureau, its STD screenings, and its presentations before the Houston City Council to ask support for gay causes.

Lanier, Bob – Mayor of Houston, 1992-1998, upon taking office, he met with the LGTB community to plan what direction they could take together to respond to the AIDS epidemic in Houston.

Lindsay, County Judge Joe - Lindsay served as county judge during the height of the AIDS crisis in the 1980s.

Log Cabin Republicans – A gay Republican group active from the 1970s. Members claim they work to build a more inclusive Republican party. In Houston there was a Republican caucus within the GPC.

Lovell, Sue – Served on the Houston City Council from 2006-2012. She was an early founder of the AFH and also a past president of the Houston Lesbian and Gay Political Caucus.

Mann, Frank – He served on the Houston City Council, 1967-1979. Mann worked against gay causes in Houston.

Mansell, Dr. Peter - M.D. Anderson doctor who in 1981 became Houston area spokesperson on AIDS.

Mattachine Society – This was the primary 1950s homophile organization in the United States.

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Mayor’s Task Force on AIDS Created by Mayor Kathy Whitmire in 1984 to coordinate all the agencies involved in Houston’s response to AIDS.

McAdory, Michael – Michael, also known as Lord Mac, started the KSC, known today as AIDS Foundation Houston. His story exemplifies the root of AIDS work in Houston.

McAdory House – In 1984, AFH opened the McAdory House, named for Micheal McAdory, as an emergency shelter for those without a place to live between the time of their diagnosis and the effective date of their Social Security benefits.

McConn, Jim - Mayor of Houston, 1978-1982.

M.D. Anderson Cancer Center – MDA is part of the University of Texas Health Science Center located in Houston, Texas. Because of the existence of Kaposi’s sarcoma in the original diagnoses of many early AIDS patients, they were treated at MDA.

Montrose – Montrose is the near downtown neighborhood in Houston that since the 1970s has had a high concentration of LGBT people as well as institutions and businesses that serve them.

Montrose Clinic – Opened in 1981, the clinic provided information, diagnosis, and treatment of sexually transmitted diseases (STDs). In 1985 it became Houston’s first testing site for HIV.

Montrose Counseling Center – The center opened in 1982 to meet counseling needs of the LGBT community in Houston.

Montrose Voice – This was the primary newspaper published specifically for the LGBT community in Houston from 1981 to 1988.

National Gay Task Force, the first group organizing for political goals on a national scale, formed in New York in 1973. The NGTF is now the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force (NGLTF) and is based in Washington, D.C.

Newell, Dr. Guy - M.D. Anderson doctor who in 1981 became Houston area spokesperson on AIDS.

North American Conference of Homophile Organizations (NACHO) – The first attempt at a nationwide federation of lesbian and gay political groups that encouraged common projects such as a national legal fund that financed court cases

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on bar closings, the exclusion of homosexual immigrants, and rights of gay military personnel.

Nuntius - A gay newspaper in Houston published from 1970-1977.

Omega House - A non-profit, charitable hospice opened in 1986 by 75-year-old Eleanor Munger, a retired Montessori teacher and AFH volunteer. It was originally located in a rented Montrose duplex.

Parker, Annise – Mayor of Houston (2010-) and past president of the Houston Lesbian and Gay Political Caucus.

People With AIDS (PWAs) - Term derived from the Fifth Annual Lesbian and Gay Health Conference in Denver in 1983 to replace the term AIDS victim.

Prometheon Society – The first political affiliation for lesbian and gay men in Houston. The group formed in 1968.

Resurrection Metropolitan Community Church (RMCC) - A worldwide church serving the LGBT community with roots in Houston going back to 1972.

Ryan White Comprehensive AIDS Resource Act (CARE Act) – This was the first national comprehensive AIDS legislation containing emergency funding for the nation’s hardest hit cities. Ryan White, the legislation’s namesake, had contracted AISDS through blood transfusion, and died at age eighteen. Additional components were the 1990 National Affordable Housing Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act.

Section 21.06 – Portion of the Texas legal code known as the state’s homosexual conduct law. Without this law, opponents of gay rights could no longer claim such rights were illegal.

Straight Slate – The group of anti-gay candidates for city council in the Houston 1985 election cycle. They sought to defeat incumbent councilmembers who had supported the ordinances addressing discrimination in hiring for city jobs based on sexuality.

Texas Gay Task Force – A statewide affiliation for gay and lesbian political groups formed in 1974.

Texas Human Rights Foundation Originated by Robert Schwab, the foundation advocated for the legal rights of LGBT people. It played a major role in the steps that resulted in Lawrence v. Texas reaching the U.S. Supreme Court in 2003.

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Texas Legislative Task Force on the Economic Spread of AIDS (TLTFA) This task force was charged by the Texas State Legislature in the 1980s to study and report on the potential state economic impact of the AIDS epidemic.

This Week in Texas (TWIT) – A weekly Texas newspaper for a gay audience that began publication in the 1970s.

Thomas Street Clinic – The countywide outpatient AIDS clinic located at 2015 Thomas Street, conceived by County Judge Joe Lindsay and his HHCTFA. It opened in 1989.

Tinsley, Eleanor – She served on the Houston City Council, 1979-1995. She firmly declared her support for antidiscrimination for homosexuals in city government and within the police force as well.

Town Meeting I – This was an organizational meeting in 1978 to bring together all of the diversity of the Houston gay and lesbian community to debate major issues and choose priorities for the local gay movement.

Tumblebugs – A lesbian political rights organization formed in the 1960s to combat police discrimination.

Welch, Louie – Mayor of Houston, 1964-1973. Welch came back to challenge incumbent Whitmire in 1985 on a strong anti-gay platform.

Whitmire, Kathy – Mayor of Houston, 1982-1991. Strongly allied with the LGBT constituency because of their support toward her campaigns. Following the political backlash of 1985, she distanced herself somewhat, and was criticized for not taking a more assertive role in the fight against AIDS.

Wilson, Michael - He served as an early president of the AFH. He also recorded information on MDA and an early history of AFH.

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Bibliography

Primary Sources