JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE DECISION SUMMARIES

March-April 2021

Letter of Informal Adjustment to Lipsmeyer (Arkansas Judicial Discipline & Disability Commission March 19, 2021) The Arkansas Judicial Discipline & Disability Commission informally adjusted a former part-time judge who, while a candidate in a run-off election for a new judicial position in 2020, signed a letter to attorneys asking for contributions to help offset campaign expenses.

Letter of Informal Adjustment to Ryan (Arkansas Judicial Discipline & Disability Commission March 19, 2021) (https://www.jddc.arkansas.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/Informal- Adjustment-Jerry-Ryan.pdf) The Arkansas Judicial Discipline & Disability Commission informally adjusted a former judge for signing, in 2018, an order in a guardianship case in which he had been attorney of record for several months in 2013 before the court granted his request to withdraw.

In the Matter Concerning Connolly, Decision and order (California Commission on Judicial Performance April 2, 2021) (https://cjp.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/40/2021/04/Connolly_DO_Pub_Adm_4-2- 2021.pdf) The California Commission on Judicial Performance publicly admonished a judge for (1) displaying improper demeanor toward 2 criminal defense attorneys who appeared by phone during an arraignment and (2) making an inappropriate remark about a jury verdict to a defendant who had been acquitted. (1) In a criminal matter pending before the judge, Martin Lijtmaer represented Jorge Ramirez, and Rachel Steinback represented co-defendant Felipe Ramirez. On March 20, 2020, the day after the governor announced the statewide stay-at-home order due to COVID-19, Lijtmaer called the judge’s clerk to request permission to appear by telephone for the arraignment scheduled that afternoon because he and Steinback were concerned about having been exposed to the virus and the possibility of spreading it at the courthouse. The judge spoke to Lijtmaer over the phone and said his clerk would call back to communicate his decision. Lijtmaer and Steinback attempted to find another attorney who could appear at the arraignment in their stead, but they were unable to do so. At approximately 2:00 p.m., the clerk told Lijtmaer that the judge would allow counsel to appear by telephone. At the arraignment, Lijtmaer and Steinback appeared by telephone; their clients were in custody and appeared in person. After arraignment, Lijtmaer asked that his client, Jorge Ramirez, be released on his own recognizance, citing, among other reasons, health concerns outlined in a recent letter in Lijtmaer’s possession. The following exchange occurred:

THE COURT: How am I going to see that letter, if you’re not in my courtroom? LIJTMAER: Well -- THE COURT: How am I going to see that letter if you are not in my courtroom? I’m not going to, am I? LIJTMAER: As an officer of the court – THE COURT: All right. LIJTMAER: -- I’d ask the court to -- THE COURT: Is there anything further? Is there anything further, sir? Anything further, sir? LIJTMAER: Yes, your honor. I have letters -- Yes. I have letters from both -- THE COURT: Which I cannot see, because you have not come to my courtroom? All right. LIJTMAER: Your honor, respectfully, the reason I didn’t -- THE COURT: Respectfully? You have not come to the courtroom. LIJTMAER: Your honor -- THE COURT: All right. So, with that, I’m going to set -- I am going to set -- I am speaking, sir. I am speaking. We are setting the preliminary hearing at this time for April 13th, for each. Bail is going to be set for Mr. Ramirez, Jorge, for $150,000; and for Felipe at $100,000. If you have those letters, you can bring those in at the time.

Steinback requested that her client be released on his own recognizance. Before Steinback finished explaining that her client was vulnerable to complications from COVID-19, which he was more likely to contract if he remained in custody, the judge asked: “And how do you know this? And how do you know this?” Steinback responded that she had learned about her client’s medical history from his family. The judge replied: “I suggest you bring in that paperwork at the time of the preliminary hearing.” Steinback said that her client has a family to support and a full-time job that has been deemed essential under the stay-at-home orders and that he would lose if he were not released from custody. The judge responded:

Okay. I’m going to stop you there. Because we’re done. All right. I am not releasing either of these people, with these charges. There are multiple charges. If you wished to present this evidence, you should have been here or had someone represent you. . . . Bail for Jorge in the amount of $150,000, and for Felipe at $100,000.

In the judge’s response to the preliminary investigation letter, he acknowledged that he “should not have demonstrated irritation or impatience with defense counsel” and that he “spoke too sharply” to them. He asked the Commission to “take into account the highly unusual circumstances present at that time:” the court had not yet implemented operations to conduct matters remotely; it was not clear how long the governor’s stay-at-home order would be in effect; and there was no clear guidance about how to handle the attorneys’ request to appear telephonically at a criminal proceeding. The Commission acknowledged that the circumstances were unusual and presented challenges, but noted that “the unusual circumstances and challenges affected the defense attorneys as well as the court” and concluded that “the initial lack of clarity about how to

2 handle court proceedings during the public health crisis did not excuse or explain the judge’s mistreatment of the attorneys.” The Commission emphasized that there was “no evidence of provocative conduct by counsel,” whom the judge had given permission to appear by telephone. At his appearance before the Commission, the judge “claimed—for the first time—” that he had spoken with Lijtmaer on the telephone twice and told him to send whatever information he had to present to the court before the hearing, but that he had not received anything. The judge told the Commission that, during the telephone arraignment, he did not mention his earlier instruction to Lijtmaer because of the relationship between the attorneys and their clients who were in his courtroom. The Commission noted that it does not consider new evidence at an appearance, absent certain circumstances that were not present, and found that the judge’s explanation for not questioning Litjmaer during the telephonic hearing was unpersuasive. The Commission stated that the judge seemed sarcastic and impatient and interrupted both Lijtmaer and Steinback while “the attorneys, in contrast, appear polite and respectful.” At his appearance before the Commission, the judge acknowledged that the transcript “looks bad,” but did not admit that he committed misconduct or display contrition, arguing instead that he had not treated the “attorneys any differently because they were not in the courtroom.” (2) On August 20, 2018, a jury convicted Dalisha Jordan and another defendant but acquitted defendant Eugene Germany. After the jurors left the courtroom, the judge said to Germany: “Let me tell you, you’ve been given a gift from God because there’s no question in my mind that you’re guilty of this crime. Now, with that, though -- well, I’ll tell you, chivalry is not dead. If you’d taken the deal, Ms. Jordan would have had that six year deal. She’s going to get a lot more time than that. So, you know, take that into consideration. All right. But you’ve been given a gift. What you do with it is your choice. Fair enough?” Germany responded, “Yeah.” At his appearance before the Commission, the judge asserted that he thinks what he said “was right” and “what [he] should have done” and that it was his “duty” and his “responsibility” as a judge to advise Germany that he had been “given a gift from God” so that “Germany would take advantage of opportunities he has been given.” However, the Commission found, the judge had disparaged “the jury’s determination that the defendant had not been proven guilty. The jury system is an essential pillar of American democracy. The judge’s role in a jury trial is to be neutral. Judge Connolly’s remark was likely to undermine public confidence in the independence of the jury and its important role in the justice system.” Further, it explained that “a judge does not have a duty to advise a criminal defendant that the defendant has been given the gift of an acquittal. While a judge may encourage a defendant to make better choices and take advantage of opportunities in the future, the judge must not do so at the expense of the jury and its verdict.” The Commission found that the judge’s remarks to Germany were gratuitous, undignified, and improper. The Commission considered the judge’s prior discipline to be a significant aggravating factor. In 2016, the Commission had publicly admonished the judge for “a course of conduct reflecting embroilment with a criminal defense attorney and for setting multiple post-trial hearings regarding possible contempt charges, which was an abuse of his authority.” In 2010,

3 the Commission privately admonished him for using profanity during a judicial profile interview and in chambers discussions with attorneys. The Commission also considered the judge’s failure to fully appreciate his misconduct as an additional aggravating factor.

In the Matter of Chase, Order (Colorado Supreme Court April 16, 2021) (https://www.courts.state.co.us/userfiles/file/Court_Probation/Supreme_Court/Opinions/2021 /21SA91.pdf) Based on a stipulation and the recommendation of the Commission on Judicial Discipline, the Colorado Supreme Court accepted the resignation of a judge and publicly censured her for (1) using the N-word in a conversation with a Black staff member; (2) expressing her views about criminal justice, police brutality, race, and racial bias while wearing her robe in court staff work areas and on the bench; (3) using court staff for personal tasks; and (4) referring to a judicial colleague in derogatory terms. (1) In late January or early February 2020, the judge attended a safe baby program with a family court facilitator and the judge’s law clerk. The judge drove both court employees in her car to and from the program. The judge is White; the family court facilitator is Black. On the way back from the program, the judge asked the family court facilitator why Black people can use the N-word but not White people, and whether it was different if the N-word is said with an “er” or an “a” at the end of the word. During the conversation, the judge used the full N-word a number of times. The family court facilitator was uncomfortable because she could not leave the car or the conversation. The facilitator was angry and hurt by the conversation. She explained that the judge’s use of the full N-word was “like a stab through my heart each time.” The facilitator did not feel free to express her discomfort or emotions because she feared retaliation by the judge. The judge maintained that she did not intend any racial animus, but acknowledged that her statements violated the code of judicial conduct. The Commission concluded that, “although not directed at any person, saying the N-word has a significant negative effect on the public’s confidence in integrity of and respect for the judiciary.” (2) In early February 2020, the judge was wearing her robe on the bench during a break while 2 or 3 other people were in the courtroom. 2 employees in the courtroom were Black. When someone brought up watching the Super Bowl, the judge stated, from the bench, that she would be boycotting the Super Bowl because she objected to the NFL players who were kneeling during the National Anthem in protest of police brutality against Black people. On the Monday after George Floyd was killed in Minneapolis, Minnesota, in May 2020 and there were Black Lives Matter protests in Denver, 2 Black court employees were in the judge’s courtroom. One of them asked the other if they had seen the George Floyd protests. The judge, while wearing her robe and sitting on the bench, told the employees some of her opinions regarding racial justice issues and asked some questions about the Black Lives Matter movement. The employee tried to explain the Black Lives Matter movement, and the judge stated that she believes all lives matter. The judge also stated that the conduct of the police officers in the George Floyd matter should be investigated. In early 2020, the judge directed her law clerk to do some legal research related to a personal family legal issue that was unrelated to the judge’s official case load.

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In August 2020, the judge had a medical episode at the courthouse. After courtroom deputies came to her aid, the judge declined an ambulance. She then asked a court employee to drive her to the emergency room. After arriving, the judge asked the court employee to stay with her at the hospital. The employee missed a half day of work to accommodate the judge. Throughout 2020, the judge forwarded personal emails to her clerk and asked her clerk to edit or rewrite the emails so they sounded better before the judge sent them to the intended recipient. The judge repeatedly discussed personal and family matters with staff and other employees in office work areas and as part of court business in an undignified and discourteous manner. In the first half of 2020, the judge told her clerk that she was leaving briefly to meet with another judge. When she returned from the meeting and the clerk asked how it went, the judge replied with a derogatory reference to the other judge, calling her a “f****** b****.”

In re Heath, Report of disposition (Georgia Judicial Qualifications Commission January 15, 2021) Based on a consent agreement and the magistrate’s resignation and agreement not to serve in judicial office again, the Georgia Judicial Qualifications Commission disposed of complaints against a former chief magistrate judge; the judge had resigned while the Commission was investigating complaints that he had (1) inserted himself into the investigation of an acquittance that was unrelated to his position and used the prestige of his office to obtain information in that investigation; (2) improperly issued arrest warrants; and (3) displayed intemperate behavior on the bench.

In re Taliaferro, Report of disposition (Georgia Judicial Qualifications Commission January 20, 2021) Based on a consent agreement and the magistrate’s resignation and agreement not to serve in judicial office again, the Georgia Judicial Qualifications Commission disposed of complaints against a former magistrate judge who had resigned while the Commission was investigating complaints that he had attempted to engage in an improper relationship with a female litigant who appeared before him in an eviction matter, exploited the prestige of his office to further his interest in her, and presided over a bond hearing in an unrelated matter involving her without disclosing the prior connection.

In re Wigington, Report of disposition (Georgia Judicial Qualifications Commission February 22, 2021) Based on a consent agreement and the magistrate’s resignation and agreement not to serve in judicial office again, the Georgia Judicial Qualifications Commission disposed of complaints against a former chief magistrate judge and probate judge; the magistrate had resigned while the Commission was investigating complaints that he had misused a government issued financial transaction card to steal funds from the county and court. In January 2020, the judge had been arrested and charged with 6 counts of felony theft by taking, 3 counts of misuse

5 of a government issued financial transaction card, and 1 count of violating the oath of office. In November 2020, he was indicted on 57 counts, including the offenses related to his previous arrest and other offenses discovered after further investigation.

In re Ruttle, Agreed order of suspension (Kentucky Judicial Conduct Commission April 7, 2021) (https://kycourts.gov/Courts/JCC%20Actions%20Documents/2021agreedorderRuttle04072021. pdf) Based on an agreement, the Kentucky Judicial Conduct Commission suspended a judge for 7 days without pay for (1) requiring defendants in criminal trials to file written demands for jury trials; (2) making comments to attorneys with the Department of Public Advocacy that were not patient, dignified, and courteous; and (3) in a proceeding with an unrepresented defendant, suggesting a plea agreement that could reasonably be perceived as coercive for the defendant. The order notes that, during a preliminary investigation of 2 complaints, the Commission had received information concerning proceedings on 2 days in June 2020, 2 days in July, and 2 weeks and 1 day in August. In mitigation, the Commission considered “the circumstances and impact caused by the Covid-19 pandemic” and the judge’s cooperation.

In the Matter of Nickerson, 248 A.3d 298 (Maryland 2021) Granting the recommendation of the Commission on Judicial Disabilities based on the judge’s admissions (https://www.courts.state.md.us/sites/default/files/import/cjd/pdfs/cjd20180332019013nicker sonfindingsoffact.pdf), the Maryland Court of Appeals removed a judge from office for (1) her conviction on charges of driving while impaired by alcohol, exceeding posted maximum speed limit, negligent driving, reckless driving, and throwing, dumping, discharging, or depositing refuse on highway; (2) failing to be truthful and cooperative during the traffic stop, injecting her position as a judge as soon as she was stopped by the officer, and mentioning the officer’s superior to try to influence the officer not to charge her or to consult with his supervisor before charging her; and (3) failing to comply with the terms of a conditional diversion agreement with the Commission; failing to comply with the conditions of a reprimand by the Commission; and failing to cooperate with the investigative counsel and the Commission. The judge is not an attorney. She had been barred from presenting fact witnesses or testimony at the hearing because she failed to respond to written discovery. She did not present any character witnesses. (1) On March 9, 2018, Sergeant Harry Kettner of the county sheriff’s office stopped the judge after determining she was speeding using his in-car radar unit and observing that she hit a cone when turning the corner. She was charged with driving a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, driving a vehicle while impaired by alcohol, exceeding the posted maximum speed limit (43 in a posted 30 mph zone), exceeding the posted maximum speed limit (31 in a posted 25 mph zone), negligent driving, reckless driving, and throwing, dumping, discharging, or depositing refuse on a highway. Following a trial, the judge was acquitted of driving under the influence but convicted of the other charges and placed on probation.

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(2) When Kettner approached the judge’s vehicle, he observed that her eyes were glassy and bloodshot and her actions were slow and delayed. Kettner smelled alcohol emanating from her vehicle and observed a clear cup with a clear liquid and a straw in the center console. Kettner asked, “Is there anything in that cup in the center console?” The judge’s response was “No. I mean, it’s club soda.” Kettner later asked the judge, “I mean, you -- and there’s nothing in that club soda?” The judge again replied “No.” Kettner tested the substance in the cup and determined that it had alcohol in it. The judge later confirmed that the cup contained vodka. The judge told Kettner that she had just left work at her second job as a hostess at a restaurant. Kettner then asked the judge to exit her vehicle. She complied after completing a phone call and after Kettner asked a second time. The judge stated to him, “Can I tell you something else? I’m a judge of the Orphans’ Court. So please. I’m serious.” The judge also advised Kettner that she had called an individual whom she referred to as “Kirby” and told Kirby that she was pulled over by Kettner. Lieutenant Kirby is Sergeant Kettner’s superior. Kettner asked the judge to rate her level of intoxication on a scale of 1 to 10, with 10 being the highest; the judge stated that she was a “five.” The judge also stated that she had had a couple of drinks before leaving work, at different points during the traffic stop saying that she had 3 drinks or 4 drinks since 7:30 or 8:00 p.m.; specifically, “two Deep Eddy Lemon Vodkas and diet ginger beer, and then another Tito’s with diet root beer.” The judge performed poorly on multiple field sobriety tests administered by Kettner. The judge then raised, for the first time, a medical condition that she claimed to be the reason for her poor performance. Kettner allowed the judge to take measures to alleviate the effects of the medical condition including drinking a beverage that was in her vehicle and contacting a family member to bring her another beverage. The judge cited several different benchmarks for alleviation of the effects of her condition at which she felt she would be able to properly complete the tests. Before completing the field sobriety tests, the judge advised Kettner that she lived a short distance away and asked if he would permit her to continue driving home while the officer followed her. The judge mentioned for a second time that she was a judge, and Kettner responded, “Okay… shouldn’t you know better then?” Once her medical symptoms were abated to what the judge described as an appropriate level, Kettner asked her to step out of her vehicle to perform the field sobriety tests again. When asked to recite the alphabet from the letter “D” to the letter “R,” the judge did not remember to stop at “R.” The judge also failed to stop at the correct number when asked to count backwards to “21." Kettner noted that the judge had poor results on these tests as well and advised the judge that he was placing her under arrest. The judge was uncooperative during the arrest and ignored several directives from Kettner. After placing the judge under arrest, Kettner transported her to a location a short distance from the scene of the arrest. The judge advised Kettner during this trip, “I’m serious, I’ll show you where I live” and asked to retake the field sobriety test. Kettner explained to the judge that she was under arrest, and the judge said that this was going to ruin her whole life and that she was “losing my whole f---ing life.” The judge mentioned her upcoming election and asked Kettner for advice, stating that she had “a lot hinging on . . ..” Kettner asked the judge 13 times whether she planned to go to Centerville and submit to a blood alcohol test, and the judge was recalcitrant and repeatedly refused to answer the question. The judge repeatedly asked Kettner what he would do given her upcoming election,

7 and asked him for advice generally, notwithstanding his repeated demurrals. The Commission noted that “Kettner was professional, calm and patient throughout the encounter with Judge Nickerson.” On one occasion, the judge responded to the question of whether she would submit to the blood alcohol test by asking to call “Lieutenant Kirby.” Kettner advised Judge Nickerson that she could not call Lieutenant Kirby and reminded her that their conversation was being recorded. She asked Kettner if she could call her lawyer, and they discussed calling Kirby again. The judge attempted to call someone who did not answer the phone, and Kettner told her that she could call another individual. The judge asked Kettner what she should do and repeated that her life was gone. Kettner invited her to call someone else and read to her the law regarding the breathalyzer test. The judge proceeded to speak with an unidentified male; after the call ended, Kettner asked her if she wanted to speak with anyone else. The judge sought to prolong the traffic stop by asking Kettner to repeat the various consequences for specific blood alcohol concentrations. The judge further delayed responding to the officer’s request by calling the unidentified male again. Kettner spoke with this individual, discussed the judge’s blood sugar and said he would need to drive her home. During this call, Kettner advised the judge’s phone contact twice that she needed to decide whether she was going to take the blood alcohol concentration test because enough time had passed that her failure to make a decision would be considered a refusal. After the call ended, the judge asked Kettner’s opinion “off the record.” When Kettner said there is no off the record, the judge responded, “Isn’t that some s--t.” The judge told Kettner “[b]ecause if I lose my job with the courts, I’ll lose my health insurance.” She again referenced her upcoming election and possibly having to withdraw. Kettner asked the judge 2 more times whether she planned to submit to the blood alcohol concentration test and did not receive a response other than “I don’t know.” Kettner ultimately advised her that due to the passage of time that he would have to mark her as a “refusal,” and the judge responded, “Okay.” The Commission noted that, at the disciplinary hearing, the judge stated: “I was not trying to use my position to influence the officer in any way. I just was telling him who I was in case he had seen me around or in the courthouse, because, you know, he could have run into me in the hallway or seen me, or recognized me and thought that I was there for District Court. Who knows?” The Commission found it “troubling” that the judge “still refuses to take responsibility for her behavior, almost three (3) years later.” (3) On November 20, 2019, the judge entered into a conditional diversion agreement with the Commission that required her to submit to Investigative Counsel by January 20, 2020, verification from the probation department that she had successfully completed the terms of the probation in the traffic case. The judge failed to submit that verification by the deadline. Investigative Counsel extended the deadline to January 31. The judge failed to meet that deadline or to ask for an extension. The conditional diversion agreement also required the judge to submit to Investigative Counsel verification of her compliance with and active participation in all recommendations for the treatment and management of her diabetes as directed by her treating physician. This verification was to be submitted quarterly, with the first verification due on or before February 20, 2020. The judge failed to submit to Investigative Counsel that verification by the deadline.

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On February 25 and 27, the judge provided documentation to Investigative Counsel that purported to verify her compliance, but it was untimely and substantively did not satisfy the requirements of the conditional diversion agreement. In April 2020, the Commission revoked the conditional diversion agreement. Although after the revocation the judge submitted additional information, the Commission “maintained its decision to revoke the [conditional diversion agreement] due to the judge’s history of non- compliance, untimely submissions and lack of cooperation.” The Commission stated:

Orphans’ Court judges oversee complex transactions with many required deadlines. Judge Nickerson did not meet deadlines and did not cooperate with the Commission. The judge did not even extend the courtesy of advising the Commission she could not meet the deadlines or request extensions. She had no regard for the Commission and her obligations to it, the judiciary and the public. She did not and does not set a good example for the litigants who appear before her.

(3) On November 13, 2019, the Commission reprimanded the judge, which she did not oppose. The reprimand was conditioned on the judge providing proof that she had filed income tax returns for 2013 through 2018 and that she had satisfied and paid in full any and all tax obligations owed to the Internal Revenue Service or the State of Maryland Comptroller’s Office by May 13, 2019. The judge failed to comply with that condition even after the deadline was extended to July 1, 2020. At a pre-hearing conference, the judge indicated that she had documentation of her filed tax returns, and, over the objection of Investigative Counsel, the Commission chair gave the judge the opportunity to provide the tax returns, but she again failed to provide the documents to the Commission and, to date, she has not been provided documentation that she has filed her tax returns. The Commission noted that it “did not conclude that the traffic violations alone justified removal; instead, the violations, coupled with Judge Nickerson’s conduct, and her subsequent failure to cooperate justify removal.” The Commission explained:

Upon consideration of the actions of Judge Nickerson, the violation of Maryland Rules . . . , the seriousness of the transgressions, the failure to make amends for the transgressions, as well as the patterns of lack of transparency, accountability, and cooperation, the Commission found it was in the best interest of the public and judicial system for Judge Nickerson to be removed from the Orphans’ Court for Kent County. . . .

Judge Nickerson’s conduct is a personal and professional embarrassment to herself as well as the judiciary, and thus, the Commission recommends she be removed from the bench with no opportunity to return. She has repeatedly failed to demonstrate the integrity and dignity that the public and the office deserve. . . .

In formal hearings, the Orphans’ Court judges – like any other trial court judges – must consider the evidence submitted (including testimony) and apply the appropriate Maryland laws in order to resolve the dispute. As an Orphan’s Court judge, Judge Nickerson has the duty to supervise the management of estates, direct the conduct of

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individuals with authority over property and money, and to remove personal representatives who do not carry out properly their duties. Judge Nickerson’s conduct in these cases demonstrates that she has not carried out properly her judicial duties, should not be vested with authority over such important litigation, and should accordingly be removed from the bench.

In the Matter of Quinn, Public reprimand (Minnesota Board on Judicial Standards March 9, 2021) (http://www.bjs.state.mn.us/file/public-discipline/2026-public-reprimand-Quinn.pdf) The Minnesota Board on Judicial Standards publicly reprimanded a judge for posts and reactions on his Facebook page endorsing or opposing candidates for public office. The judge did not demand a formal hearing. The judge had approximately 70 Facebook friends. The account settings on his page were set to private, and he did not use his judicial title. On Facebook the judge:

• Was tagged in numerous photographs showing him wearing a MAGA hat and piloting a boat displaying at least 2 Trump flags in the Trump Boat Parade on the Mississippi River on September 5, 2020; • Responded, “Here we are!” and included a screenshot of photographs of himself in the parade published in the St. Cloud Times; • “Liked” Donald J. Trump’s Facebook page; • Commented, “Trump will steam roll this election. Those who’s [sic] eyes are closed move their mouths more to make up for their insecurities. Stay strong; pray against evil,” on a video on Trump’s page captioned, “We’re showing that we can create jobs, safeguard the environment, and keep energy prices low for America.” • “Liked” posts on Trump’s Facebook page that stated: ▪ “I will NEVER support Biden ever . . . . he’s been in politics for 49 years no wonder why the U.S. has so many problems;” ▪ “I was thrilled to be back in WISCONSIN tonight with thousands of loyal, hardworking American Patriots! 47 days from now, we are going to win Wisconsin, and we are going to win 4 more years in the White House! #MAGA.” ▪ “One of the worst polls in 2016 was the @FoxNewsPoll. They were so ridiculously wrong. Fox said they were going to change pollsters, but they didn’t. They totally over sample Democrats to a point that a child could see what is going on. Rasmussen, which was accurate, at 52%.” ▪ “Joe Biden is a disgrace. A 47 year career waste. Wake up people do we need someone like this as president.” • “Liked” a post regarding the Duluth News Tribune’s endorsement of Jason Lewis for U.S. Senate and commented on another post regarding the endorsement, “Whoa! That is a weighty endorsement for Lewis and quite an indictment of Smith since she’s had years to work on her platform and record. Clearly a big difference here.”

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• Commented “Dips**t Biden. Oops,” in response to an image that stated, “I’ve decided to cut back on political posts for a bit . . . instead I will share some word scrambles. MURPT0022.”

On learning of the Board’s investigation, the judge immediately deactivated his Facebook account. He admitted that his Facebook activity had been “imprudent, indecorous and contrary to the spirit of the Canons.” The Board stated that it does not generally discourage judges from using social media because it recognizes that judges commonly maintain family and social connections through social media and often feel isolated due to the nature of their work, especially during the COVID-19 pandemic. However, it emphasized that it is possible and imperative for judges to participate in social media without violating the code of judicial conduct. The Board found that the judge’s Facebook activity endorsed and opposed candidates for public office and “abuse[d] the prestige of judicial office to advance the personal or economic interests of the judge or others . . . .” The Board found that the judge’s posts regarding his participation in the “Trump Boat Parade” were the most flagrant examples of his endorsement of a candidate for public office. The Board also stated that his posts endorsing and opposing the 2020 presidential candidates could reasonably have influenced how his Facebook friends might vote, violating the prohibition on abuse of the prestige of office. The Board emphasized that, “even when a judge maintains strict privacy settings in Facebook, the judge’s Facebook activity may become public.” It noted that, even though the judge “maintained a private Facebook page, not all of his activity remained private;” his “like” of the Trump page was public and he had approximately 70 Facebook friends, some of whom are lawyers and judges, who were able to view and publicize his Facebook activity. The Board stated that “maintaining a private Facebook page, especially when a judge has a large group of Facebook friends, does not provide a shield for a judge who violates the Code.”

In the Matter of Scotti, Stipulation and order of consent to public reprimand (Nevada Commission on Judicial Discipline March 15, 2021) (https://judicial.nv.gov/uploadedFiles/judicialnvgov/content/Discipline/Dicisions/Certified_Cop y_of_Stipulation_and_Order_of_Consent_to_Public_Reprimand_2019-183.pdf) Based on a stipulation, the Nevada Commission on Judicial Discipline publicly reprimanded a judge for, during voir dire in a criminal case, throwing a book against the wall and cursing, berating, yelling at, and threatening a prospective juror for expressing her belief that she could not be impartial, which led to reversal of the jury verdict on appeal. From March 23 through May 1, 2017, the judge presided over a jury trial in which the defendant was charged with multiple sex offenses against children and related charges. He was convicted of multiple counts of lewdness with a child under 14; child abuse, neglect, or endangerment; indecent exposure; attempted lewdness with a child under 14; first-degree kidnapping; and sexual assault of a minor under 14. The defendant appealed, and the Nevada Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial because, during voir dire, the judge, as described by the Court, “‘threw a book against the wall, cursed, and berated, yelled at, and threatened a prospective juror for expressing her

11 belief that she could not be impartial.’” The judge did excuse the potential juror from the venire. The Commission decision quoted the Court’s finding that the judge’s “’statements and conduct with the prospective juror may have discouraged other prospective jurors from responding honestly about their own biases out of fear of repercussions,’” adding that “the judge created an atmosphere of intimidation and did nothing to alleviate the impact of his behavior.” The Commission also quoted the Court’s conclusions that “’such behavior and statements constitute judicial misconduct’” and that an impartial jury could not have been “’selected under these circumstances where the judge did nothing to alleviate the intimidating atmosphere that he created.’” In the discipline proceeding, the judge noted that, “in his perception,” his conduct “amounted to the tossing of a small pamphlet (i.e., a ‘pocket’ U.S. Constitution) rather than throwing a book against a wall, and that his demeanor toward the prospective juror was not threatening.” Nevertheless, the judge stipulated that the Commission could establish a violation of the code by clear and convincing evidence and that it was an aggravating factor that his conduct resulted in reversal of the jury verdict.

In the Matter of Andress-Tobiasson, Stipulation and order of consent to resignation and resolution of all pending matters (Nevada Commission on Judicial Discipline April 29, 2021) (https://judicial.nv.gov/uploadedFiles/judicialnvgov/content/Discipline/Dicisions/Certified%20C opy%20of%20Stipulation%20and%20Order%20of%20Consent%20to%20Resignation%20and%2 0Resolution%20of%20All%20Pending%20Matters.pdf) Based on the judge’s resignation and agreement not to serve in judicial office again in the state, the Nevada Commission on Judicial Discipline dismissed with prejudice all matters pending against a judge. In a formal statement of charges filed in August, the Commission alleged that the judge personally investigated a business, a man she suspected of being a pimp, and a double murder that took place outside the business; failed to disqualify herself from cases involving the man and the business; and made public statements criticizing the police. In addition, the current order notes that the Commission filed a verified statement of complaint against the judge in another case in May 2019. Pursuant to the agreement, the formal statement of charges has been removed from the Commission website; the verified statement of complaint was never on the website. The judge agrees that both documents are public documents. She disputes the allegations, but agrees that, if proven by clear and convincing evidence, the allegations could result in disciplinary action against her. The Commission also agrees to take no action on any further matters, “known or unknown.” The judge also agrees to dismiss her pending federal lawsuit against the Commission.

In the Matter of Introcaso, Order (New Hampshire Supreme Court March 23, 2021) Based on the summary report of the Judicial Conduct Committee, which was based the judge’s resignation and stipulation and “nolo contendere” plea to the allegations in the statement of formal charges, the New Hampshire Supreme Court ordered that a former judge pay attorney’s fees and expenses of $74,935.69 incurred by the Committee’s appointed counsel during the investigative, charging, and prosecutorial stages of the case; the Committee had

12 alleged that the judge had signed a master’s recommendation that a close friend who was on her recusal list be appointed as a guardian ad litem for a parenting petition; signed orders over the mother’s objection granting the guardian ad litem’s motions that the mother be required to pay the GAL retainer by cash, money order, or check (the mother wanted to use Apple Pay) and that the GAL be allowed to exceed the fee cap; and used white-out correction tape to obscure the handwritten parts of those orders after receiving notice of the Committee’s investigation. The day before the evidentiary hearing, the judge had agreed to resign.

In the Matter of Gomez, Order (New Mexico Supreme Court March 26, 2021) Granting a petition to accept a stipulation to permanent resignation from judicial office in lieu of further disciplinary proceedings, the New Mexico Supreme Court ordered that a former judge’s resignation be permanent; in a notice of formal proceedings, the Judicial Standards Commission had alleged that the judge, on his way to a hunt, had spotted a deer from his vehicle, stopped and got out of the vehicle, and illegally shot at artificial wildlife, in violation of state statutes.

In the Matter of Salazar, Order (New Mexico Supreme Court March 26, 2021) Granting a petition to accept a stipulation to permanent resignation from judicial office in lieu of further disciplinary proceedings, the New Mexico Supreme Court ordered that a former judge’s resignation be permanent; in a notice of formal proceedings, the Judicial Standards Commission had alleged that the judge, while making a purchase for the court at a Lowe’s home improvement store, had willfully and aggressively shoved Arturo Meza, also a city employee, after Meza had placed a lollipop in the judge’s pocket as a prank, and that the judge had then asked Meza’s supervisor to report Meza’s conduct.

In the Matter of Killen, 246 A.3d 186 (New Jersey 2021) Based on a stipulation of discipline by consent (https://www.njcourts.gov/attorneys/assets/acjc/GuyWKillenStipulation.pdf), the New Jersey Supreme Court publicly reprimanded a part-time judge for failing to maintain an IOLTA account and to obtain and maintain in good standing a lawyers’ professional liability insurance policy. The judge is a part-time municipal judge allowed to practice law. Pursuant to Rule 1:28A, any attorney admitted to practice law in New Jersey must maintain an interest-bearing account or accounts into which all sums received on behalf of clients are deposited. In October 2017, the Court declared the judge administratively ineligible to practice law based on his noncompliance with Rule 1:28A. Nonetheless, the judge appeared in court on behalf of clients and continued to sit as a municipal court judge. In March 2018, the judge submitted the proper registration forms to the IOLTA fund trustee, and on April 3, 2018, the Court removed him from the IOLTA ineligibility list. Because he operated his law office as a professional corporation, the judge was required by Rule l:21-1A(a)(3) to obtain and maintain in good standing a lawyers' professional liability insurance policy and to file a certificate of insurance with the Court clerk within 30 days after

13 filing a certificate of incorporation. Twice in 2014 and once in 2016, the Court clerk wrote to the judge requesting a copy of the certificate of insurance, but the judge failed to file the certificate. In July 2014, in a voicemail message left at the judge's law firm on behalf of the Court clerk, the judge was advised that his failure to produce the required certificate of insurance would result in notification to the Office of Attorney Ethics. The judge failed to provide proof of professional liability insurance, however, and the matter was referred to the Office of Attorney Ethics in May 2017. In March 2018, the Office of Attorney Ethics filed a complaint alleging that the judge was administratively ineligible to practice law due to his failure to comply with the requirements of the IOLTA program, but he was not charged with violating the Rules of Professional Responsibility for that non-compliance. The complaint did charge him with the unauthorized practice of law based on his failure to maintain professional liability insurance and with failure to cooperate with disciplinary authorities based on his failure to respond to the inquiries from the Office of Attorney Ethics and Clerk of the Supreme Court. In his answer and at a hearing, the judge admitted that he failed to comply with the requirements of the IOLTA program and failed to obtain and maintain in good standing a lawyers' professional liability insurance policy. At the hearing, the judge testified that he could not afford to carry professional liability insurance and, since 2014 or 2015, had stopped holding himself out as a professional corporation, identifying himself on letterhead and pleadings as "Guy W. Killen, Attorney at Law." The judge now realizes that he had not formally dissolved the professional corporation. The panel recommended a public censure. Reviewing that recommendation, the Disciplinary Review Board recommended a reprimand, noting that the complaint had not charged him regarding his IOLTA ineligibility and that the Court clerk is not a disciplinary authority. The judge's attorney disciplinary matter remains pending before the Court. In his answer to the complaint filed by the Advisory Committee on Judicial Conduct, the judge admitted he was on the IOLTA list of ineligible attorneys from October 17, 2017 through March 29, 2018 and that he had failed to obtain and maintain in good standing a policy of lawyers' professional liability insurance, as required. In mitigation, the stipulation noted that the judge has no prior judicial disciplinary history, admitted the facts alleged in the formal complaint, admitted that the facts constituted multiple violations of the code of judicial conduct, and demonstrated remorse for his misconduct. The stipulation notes that there is no evidence that the judge's “attention to his judicial duties faltered during the period of ineligibility or that he failed to attend appropriately to the matters before the Vineland Municipal Court during that period.” In a statement of mitigation, the judge explained that he had been "in denial with regard to certain aspects of his personal and professional responsibilities," and, for a time, had not opened or responded “to correspondence [w]ith potential negative ramifications" due to difficulties in his personal life triggered by a death in his family and his divorce after a lengthy marriage. He subsequently sought help, including treatment for mild depression.

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In the Matter of DiVietro, Decision and order (New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct March 18, 2021) (http://www.cjc.ny.gov/Determinations/D/DiVietro.Mark.A.2021.03.18.DEC.pdf) Accepting a stipulation based on the judge’s affirmation that he has vacated his office and will not seek or accept judicial office in the future (http://www.cjc.ny.gov/Determinations/D/DiVietro.Mark.A.2021.03.11.STIP.pdf), the New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct concluded a proceeding against a non-lawyer judge. In July 2020, the Commission had apprised the judge that it was investigating (1) allegations that, inter alia, in the fall of 2018, he repeatedly sent text messages to his then-girlfriend that contained threats about a former girlfriend and that were “vulgar, crude, demeaning and/or featured extreme gender-based slurs and profanity;” and (2) allegations that, after arraigning a defendant on 2 felony charges and 1 misdemeanor charge in April 2019, he repeatedly engaged in unauthorized ex parte communications about the case with the defendant and other individuals and, during one of the defendant's appearances in court, allegedly gave the defendant personal advice about how to avoid having his firearms confiscated by law enforcement.

In the Matter of Peck, Determination (New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct March 19, 2021) (http://www.cjc.ny.gov/Determinations/P/Peck.John.R.2021.03.19.DET.PDF) Accepting an agreed statement of facts (http://www.cjc.ny.gov/Determinations/P/Peck.John.R.FWC.2021-01-14.pdf), the New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct publicly admonished a non-lawyer judge for posting on his Facebook page 2 photographs of himself wearing a county sheriff’s uniform and personal comments expressing his appreciation for law enforcement officers and describing his appearance at a “Back the Blue” event held to show support for law enforcement. The judge’s Facebook page is viewable by the public. The judge retired from the Ontario County Sheriff’s Office in December 2017. On July 19, 2020, the judge attended a “Back the Blue” event in which a procession of motorists drove their vehicles in a show of support for law enforcement. For approximately 30 minutes, the judge displayed a sign approximately 2 feet by 3 feet on which he had painted “Thank You” in blue lettering. On July 21, the judge’s Facebook page, which he made viewable to the public, displayed a “cover photo” depicting himself in his Ontario County Sheriff’s uniform while standing with 3 other individuals, one of whom was his daughter who was wearing a similar uniform. The photograph was taken at his daughter’s police academy graduation in August 2018. By July 21, the judge’s “cover photo” had approximately 277 Facebook “likes,” 2 “shares,” and 37 comments from other Facebook users. Beginning on July 21, the judge’s Facebook page included a post that stated:

Today, my daughter … and I stood at the side of the road and watched in appreciation as hundreds of motorcycles and other vehicles passed by … It was the Back the Blue ride in support of law enforcement …

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I always tell her that she and her brothers and sisters in blue are still appreciated in OUR community. Today’s event, and the overwhelming number of participants is a true example of that appreciation. We both had tears streaming down our cheeks as folks waved and honked, acknowledging our sign thanking them for their support.

It is a tough time for law enforcement. To those of my friends who served or continue to, always remember that you have chosen the noblest of professions and you ARE making a difference …

With this post was the photograph of the judge and his daughter wearing county sheriff’s office uniforms. By July 21, this post had approximately 940 Facebook “likes,” 355 “shares,” and 219 comments from other Facebook users. Among the comments was one that identified him as “Judge!” In April 2019, the Commission had issued the judge a letter of dismissal and caution for posting a comment criticizing a candidate in an election for county sheriff to Facebook. The judge now recognizes that individuals viewing his Facebook posts and seeing him in a law enforcement uniform would reasonably question his ability to conduct himself in a fair and impartial manner while presiding over cases involving law enforcement. The judge takes full responsibility for his actions, has been cooperative and contrite with the Commission throughout its inquiry, regrets his failure to abide by the rules, and pledges to conduct himself in accordance with the rules for the remainder of his tenure as a judge. The Commission found that the judge’s “public Facebook post in which he aligned himself with and expressed his strong support for law enforcement personnel, casts doubt on respondent’s ability to act impartially when he presided over matters which involved law enforcement personnel.” It stated that, given his prior letter of dismissal and caution, the judge “should have been circumspect and particularly attentive to his obligations under the Rules when he made Facebook posts.”

In the Matter of Rana, Determination (New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct March 19, 2021) (http://www.cjc.ny.gov/Determinations/R/Rana.Lisa.R.2021.03.19.DET.PDF) Accepting an agreed statement of facts and recommendation (http://www.cjc.ny.gov/Determinations/R/Rana.Lisa.R.ASF.2021-03-05.pdf), the New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct publicly admonished a judge for editing political opinion essays and letters to the editor intended and/or submitted for publication by a candidate for non- judicial elected town office and offering advice by email to the candidate about issues raised in his proposed submissions. Beginning in April 2019, David Gruber was a candidate for East Hampton Town Supervisor, running on the Independence and Libertarian lines. Prior to that time, the judge had been a candidate for re-election as East Hampton Town Court Justice, running on the Republican, Conservative, Independence, and Libertarian lines. The judge stated that she and Gruber were friends before he decided to run for office in April 2019. In June 2019, by email, Gruber invited his campaign staff, his running mates, and his friends, including the judge, to edit drafts he circulated of political opinion essays and letters to

16 the editor that he intended to submit for publication in local newspapers. From June through August 2019, the judge edited at least 8 of Gruber’s submissions using Microsoft Word’s “Track Changes” feature that displayed all of her proposed changes in demarcated colored text. All the submissions were statements in Gruber’s name alone. Copies of the edited articles showing the judge’s changes are appended to the agreed statement of facts. Although many of the judge’s suggested edits to Gruber’s draft submissions were stylistic, others were substantive and concerned political topics. For example, in a draft article published on August 8, the judge changed a reference about local political maneuvers from “corrupt bargain” to “backroom deal” and added a new sentence alleging that the town board had shown “ineptitude in addressing the emergency communications disaster in the Springs.” In another version of the same draft article, the judge deleted half a page in redline and then rewrote the text, stating that “public officials ha[d] shown their indifference to our residents on many . . . occasions.” In addition, the judge also separately emailed Gruber “with additional advice, both substantive and strategic.” Copies of the emails were appended to the agreed statement of facts. On August 5, the judge emailed the following suggestion to Gruber:

David, if you start off with DW Wind, you will only reach the same people. This letter isn’t about DDW and should not begin with that. If you start off talking about the upcoming election and that there is something new happening, others will start to read it. . . . The letter is about you guys, not 1 political issue. You can touch on these issues briefly but these issue mentions are only there to illustrate how and why you are different.

In another email, the judge wrote to Gruber: “We can tighten up the fusion party part. . . . Let me know what issues D[emocrat]s will want to have focued [sic] on. There are a lot of D[emocrat]s in Springs so focusing on Springs issues is important.” In another email, the judge advised Gruber: “I agree that quoting Murphy is good but what he has really done in his quote is defined what the current status quo is. So, I noted that. We refer to the status quo several times in the letter so using his words as the definition of what the status quo currently helps -- I think.” In another email to Gruber, the judge expressed her concern that he had submitted an article to a local newspaper with her “Track Changes” edits still visible, stating that it would be “very bad…indeed” if her involvement in editing his articles were to be made public. After Gruber incorrectly assured her that he had not made this mistake, the judge continued to edit his submissions. On October 17, a local newspaper revealed that Gruber had in fact submitted an article with the “Track Changes” feature enabled and showing that edits had been made by a user named “lisa rana.” When reached for comment by the newspaper, the judge did not deny having edited Gruber’s submissions. In 2005, the Commission had confidentially cautioned the judge for personally preparing and approving a radio advertisement for her judicial candidacy that misrepresented facts about her opponent’s reasons for seeking judicial office.

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In mitigation, the Commission noted that the judge admitted that her conduct warrants public discipline and that she has pledged to fully comply with the rules.

In the Matter of Carter, Decision and order (New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct April 22, 2021) (http://www.cjc.ny.gov/Determinations/C/Carter.William.A.2021.04.22.DEC.pdf) Accepting a stipulation based on the judge’s affirmation that he has vacated his office and will not seek or accept judicial office in the future (http://www.cjc.ny.gov/Determinations/C/Carter.William.A.2021.04.07.STIP.pdf), the New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct concluded a proceeding against a former judge; in March, the Commission had apprised the judge that it was investigating allegations that he had attempted to have a purported friend’s pistol permit application assigned to himself and then initiated a conversation about the matter with the judge to whom the case had been assigned. The judge denies the allegations.

In the Matter of Gallanter, Decision and order (New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct April 22, 2021) (http://www.cjc.ny.gov/Determinations/G/Gallanter.Peter.2021.04.22.DEC.pdf) Accepting a stipulation based on the judge’s affirmation that he has vacated his office and will not seek or accept judicial office in the future (http://www.cjc.ny.gov/Determinations/G/Gallanter.Peter.2021.04.07.STIP.pdf), the New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct concluded a proceeding against a former judge; prior to his resignation, the Commission had notified the judge that it was investigating complaints that he had (1) dismissed or reduced tickets in multiple cases for defendants with whom he had personal relationships; (2) repeatedly described female litigants and lawyers in demeaning and sexist terms; and (3) improperly used a security camera to record proceedings in his courtroom.

In the Matter of Hartwell, Decision and order (New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct April 22, 2021) (http://www.cjc.ny.gov/Determinations/H/Hartwell.Larry.D.2021.04.05.STIP.pdf) Accepting a stipulation based on the judge’s affirmation that he has vacated his office and will not seek or accept judicial office in the future (http://www.cjc.ny.gov/Determinations/H/Hartwell.Larry.D.2021.04.22.DEC.pdf), the New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct concluded a proceeding against a former non-lawyer judge; before the judge resigned, the Commission had notified him that it was investigating complaints alleging that he repeatedly engaged in unauthorized ex parte communications and gave the appearance of bias in a small claims case.

In the Matter of Miller, Decision and order (New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct April 22, 2021) (http://www.cjc.ny.gov/Determinations/M/Miller.Michael.R.2021.04.22.DEC.pdf)

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Accepting a stipulation based on the judge’s affirmation that he has vacated his 2 judicial offices and will not seek or accept judicial office in the future (http://www.cjc.ny.gov/Determinations/M/Miller.Michael.R.2021.04.05.STIP.pdf), the New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct concluded a proceeding against a former judge. In June 2020, the Commission had authorized an investigation of a complaint alleging that the judge had been charged with criminal contempt in the first degree, a felony, and stalking in the fourth degree, a misdemeanor, for violating a stay-away order of protection held by a former girlfriend. In October 2020, the judge pled guilty to criminal contempt in the second degree, a misdemeanor, in satisfaction of the charges. In March 2021, he was sentenced to 3 years' probation; the sentence included a 5-year, no-contact, final order of protection for the victim, a waiver of appeal, a requirement that he attend domestic violence and mental health counseling, and a mandated payment of the $50 DNA data bank registration fee and the $200 mandatory surcharge/crime victim assistance fee.

In the Matter of Knab, Determination (New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct April 28, 2021) (http://www.cjc.ny.gov/Determinations/K/Knab.Donald.F.2021.04.28.DET.pdf) Accepting an agreed statement of facts and recommendation, the New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct publicly censured a non-lawyer judge for knowingly making materially false statements regarding a grant in a report he filed with the court system and using unexpended grant funds to buy an audio-visual system even though he knew that the purchase was unauthorized. The judge is not an attorney. The Unified Court System’s Office of Justice Court Support periodically makes funds available to town and village courts in the form of grants administered through the Justice Court Assistance Program. The courts must spend the funds on specified items or categories of items designated by the program, and they must account for such expenditures in written reports. The judge was aware of the protocols, having properly executed and accurately reported on the grant to his court for 2016-2017. On January 14, 2019, the judge was notified that his court had been awarded a 2018- 2019 grant of $7,479.47 that had to be spent within 180 days of receipt and that a reconciliation report also had to be returned with paid receipts within that time. The notice stated that grant funds could be used only to purchase a walk-through metal detector for $4,238.47; a hand-held metal detector for $120; and a judicial robe for $250; and to make exterior renovations/repairs (i.e., replacing a door) for $2,871. He was also notified that, if there were savings resulting from purchase prices that were lower than the award amounts, Justice Court Assistance Program approval was required for the expenditure of any savings over 10% and that savings of less than 10% could only be spent “toward another grant item or towards consumable office supplies.” On March 29, the town purchased a walk-through metal detector for the court for $4,056.47, $182 (or approximately 4.3%) less than the awarded amount. The judge did not purchase a hand-held metal detector. Between May 6, May 24, the town purchased components for the replacement of a door from 3 separate suppliers with a total expenditure of $1,448.50, or approximately 50% less than the awarded amount.

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On October 25, the judge purchased a judicial robe for $260, which was $10 more than the approved grant amount. On September 2, the judge signed and submitted his 2018-2019 Justice Court Assistance Program reconciliation report. The judge knew at the time that he filed the report that the amounts he reported were not accurate. In the report, the judge represented that he had spent the entire grant amount of $7,479.47 on the walk-through metal detector, the hand-held metal detector, the door improvements, and a judicial robe, even though he knew he had spent only $5,764.97. The report did not disclose that the judge saved $1,714.50, and the judge did not submit receipts. The judge also included an expenditure for the robe although he had not purchased it at the time that he filed the report. Even though he knew that it would not be permitted without approval, the judge intended to spend the $1,714.50 savings toward the purchase of an unapproved audio-visual system for his court. On October 25, the judge approved a town voucher for $3,387, for the purchase of an audio-visual system, including a 50-inch LED TV and assorted accessories by signing his name in the box on the form labeled, “Department Approval.” On December 10, the judge was notified by email that his reconciliation report had been rejected by the Office of Justice Court Support because he had not provided “paid receipts or invoices with the cancelled checks reflecting the funds have been spent.” On December 23, the judge was notified by email that the Office could not close the 2018-2019 grant cycle because the savings he had realized “were used to offset the cost of unapproved items.” The Office requested that the judge return the money he had saved on the authorized items and subsequently spent on the AV equipment, advising him that “[a] court simply cannot use the savings to purchase items that were not requested or approved.” On January 30, 2020, the town issued a check for $1,714.50 to the Office of Justice Court Support as a refund of grant monies that were spent on unapproved items. On January 31, the judge filed a revised report that showed expenditures on approved items of $5,764.97 and the return of $1,714.50 in unused grant funds. On February 6, the Office of Justice Court Support notified the judge that it was closing the grant. The Commission noted that all monies from the 2018-2019 grant to the court have been accounted for, and it appears that all of the items the judge purchased with grant money are being used for court purposes. The town ultimately paid the entire purchase price of the audio- visual equipment, and it appears the equipment is being used for court purposes. The judge affirms that he did not personally benefit financially from any of the transactions described, and the Commission Administrator has no evidence to the contrary. The judge affirms that his sole purpose was to assist the court. In mitigation, the Commission noted that the judge has admitted that his conduct warrants public discipline and that he has pledged to carefully comply with the rules.

In re Inquiry Concerning Brooks, 856 S.E.2d 777 (North Carolina 2021) Adopting the findings and conclusions of the Judicial Standards Commission, based on a stipulation and agreement, the North Carolina Supreme Court suspended a judge for 30 days

20 without pay for serving as executor for the estates of 2 former clients that were not members of his family, collecting substantial fees or commissions for such service, and failing to properly report that income. The Commission had recommended a censure. In April 2009, the judge prepared and executed wills for 2 clients, Robert and Mary Grace Crawford. Each will designated the judge as the executor. The judge had known the Crawfords for many years and considered them to be like family, but acknowledges that he was not related to them by blood or marriage. In October 2013, the judge was appointed to serve as a district court judge. In March 2014, Robert Crawford passed away. In November 2014, Mary Grace Crawford died. While serving as judge, the judge also served as executor of both wills. He admitted both wills to probate and filed inventories and accountings with the county court clerk until both estates were closed in 2017. In 2016, the judge was compensated with a $2,550 commission for serving as executor of Robert Crawford’s estate and a $85,320.77 commission for serving as executor of Mary Grace Crawford’s estate. The judge failed to disclose the extra-judicial income he earned from serving as the executor for the Crawfords in 2016 on his extra-judicial income report for the 2016 and on his statement of economic interest filed with the State Ethics Commission for the 2016 calendar year. The judge “affirmatively indicated ‘None’ in the column asking him to identify any source of extra-judicial income of more than $2,000 for 2016. On his statement of extra-judicial income “No Change Form” for the calendar year 2016, the judge “affirmatively acknowledged that he read and understood the statute regarding concealing or failing to disclose material information and further acknowledged that knowingly concealing or failing to disclose information that is required to be disclosed is a Class I misdemeanor. After the Commission filed its statement of charges, the judge amended the public reports at issue to reflect his outside income for 2016. The Commission found:

Even assuming Respondent did not act in bad faith . . . , Respondent without question knew that as a judge of the General Court of Justice, the duties of his judicial office required him to file annual reports that would disclose for public scrutiny his sources of outside income. Despite earning nearly $90,000 in extra income in 2016, Respondent in his capacity as a judicial officer affirmatively and knowingly represented in public financial disclosure that he had no new reportable income. Such conduct amounts to willful misconduct in office.

As mitigating factors, the Commission noted that the judge cooperated, admitted error, and showed remorse and that the conduct appears to be a single event and not a pattern of recurring misconduct. In aggravation, the Commission noted that “the amount of outside income was large, making his failure to disclose it particularly egregious” and that “the income came from activity expressly prohibited” by the code of judicial conduct. The Court agreed with the Commission that a public reprimand was not appropriate because the misconduct was not “minor” and recognized the mitigating factors, particularly the judge’s “cooperation with the Commission and his near-immediate acknowledgment of the impropriety of his conduct.” The Court emphasized that the activity that produced the non- reported income was explicitly prohibited by the code of judicial conduct and that the estates

21 were settled in the judge’s own judicial district with the judge seeking and receiving a significant commission for serving as executor.

In the Matter of Mendelsohn (South Carolina Supreme Court March 31, 2021) (https://www.sccourts.org/opinions/HTMLFiles/SC/28018.pdf) Accepting an agreement for discipline by consent, the South Carolina Supreme Court publicly reprimanded a former judge for finding a friend not guilty of a traffic violation without a trial, plea, or appearance and asking a police officer to dismiss a ticket issued to his brother- in-law. On February 13, 2019, the judge obtained from the docket clerk a City of Charleston traffic ticket that had been issued to J.T., telling the docket clerk that J.T. was his friend. The trial date on the ticket was February 14. The judge filled out J.T.'s traffic ticket, checking the boxes for "Municipal Court," "Trial Judge," "Appeared," and "Not Guilty." The judge signed J.T.'s traffic ticket and dated it February 14. On February 14, Judge Alesia Rico Flores presided over the City of Charleston Municipal Court Traffic Court cases. When Judge Flores obtained J.T.'s ticket, a note was attached that read "Mendolsohn disposed of ticket." J.T. did not appear in the City of Charleston Municipal Court on February 13 or February 14. On February 22, the judge attached a note to a City of Charleston traffic ticket Officer Coghlan had issued to the judge's brother-in-law that asked: "Mr. Coghlan, Can you see your way clear to a dismissal? Thanks, Joe Mendelsohn." “Not by way of excuse for his inappropriate conduct,” the judge explained that both tickets were written in an area where, during times of heavy traffic, drivers chose to illegally traverse an area to avoid being forced to stop on the downside of a bridge in a position for a rear-end collision as other drivers cleared the crest of the expressway.

Velez, Voluntary agreement to resign from judicial office in lieu of disciplinary action (Texas State Commission on Judicial Conduct April 9, 2021) (http://www.scjc.state.tx.us/media/46828/velez17-0355final-voluntary-resignation-in-lieu.pdf) Based on the judge’s resignation and agreement to be disqualified from judicial service in the state, the Texas State Commission on Judicial Conduct agreed not to pursue further disciplinary proceedings against a former judge who had entered into orders of deferred adjudication of 3 felonies in 2 state criminal cases regarding a pyramid promotional scheme. The deferred adjudication was predicated on the judge’s successful completion of a community supervision for 6 years. In December 2016, the Commission had received a confidential complaint alleging that the judge had participated in a pyramid promotional scheme and collected money from numerous people pursuant to that scheme. In August 2019, a grand jury indicted the judge, and the Commission suspended her.

Public Warning of Phillips and Order of Additional Education (Texas State Commission on Judicial Conduct April 9, 2021) (http://www.scjc.state.tx.us/media/46831/phillips19-0661pubwarn-oae4921.pdf)

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The Texas State Commission on Judicial Conduct publicly warned a judge for attending a luncheon hosted and paid for by a law firm involved in a highly contested civil case pending before her and set for post-judgment matters the following day and failing to disclose the luncheon to all parties in the litigation; the Commission also ordered the judge to obtain 2 hours of instruction with a mentor. In 2018, the judge presided over a multi-party civil case brought by plaintiffs David and Donna Hotze. One of the defendants in the case, Steven Hotze, was represented by John Zavitsanos and his law firm. The trial on the merits was conducted in September 2018 and resulted in a jury verdict in favor of the defendants. The defendants moved for entry of judgment on the verdict and for attorney’s fees. On November 7, the day before the hearing on the defendants’ post-judgment motions, the judge conducted a swearing-in ceremony for 5 new attorneys employed with Zavitsanos’ law firm and attended a celebratory luncheon with Zavitsanos and the new lawyers at a restaurant in downtown Houston. Neither the law firm nor the judge disclosed her participation in the luncheon to the plaintiff’s counsel. The next day, the judge conducted the hearing on the defendant’s post-judgment motions and took the matter under advisement. The judge subsequently entered a judgment awarding defendants $2 million in attorney’s fees. The plaintiffs filed a motion for a new trial and, subsequently, a motion to recuse the judge. The judge refused to voluntarily recuse and referred the motion to the administrative presiding judge. After a hearing, the administrative presiding judge ordered Judge Phillips recused based on her attendance at the luncheon. The judge indicated that, although she left the luncheon before it was over and before the table received the check, she assumed that Zavitsanos and/or his firm paid the bill. The judge did not believe anyone could reasonably view her attendance at the luncheon as improper given that the luncheon was a celebration of the new attorneys, the price of her meal was small, and the luncheon was very public, taking place in the open at a restaurant frequented by attorneys.

Public Admonition of Issacs and Order of Additional Education (Texas State Commission on Judicial Conduct April 9, 2021) (http://www.scjc.state.tx.us/media/46830/isaacs20- 0281pubadm-oae4921.pdf) The Texas State Commission on Judicial Conduct publicly admonished a judge for orally ordering a defendant to perform community service without entering a written order and then, when she failed to complete her community service, issuing a warrant for her arrest without giving her notice and an opportunity to be heard; the Commission also ordered the judge to obtain 4 hours of instruction with a mentor. On January 28, 2016, the judge accepted Kathleen Washpon’s plea of nolo contendere on a traffic offense and orally ordered her to complete 20 hours of community service cleaning the government offices in which his court is located. The judge did not enter a written order specifying the number of hours of community service Washpon was to complete or the date by which she must verify her completion. Washpon fell ill and did not complete the community service.

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In April 2016, the judge issued an arrest warrant for Washpon as a result of her failure to complete the community service. The court did not notify Washpon in writing of her failure to complete the community service and did not require Washpon to appear to show cause why her deferral should not be revoked. In an appearance before the Commission, the judge did not dispute the facts. The judge acknowledged the problems identified by the Commission in his handling of Washpon’s case and testified that he has instituted procedures to ensure his compliance with the code of criminal procedure, including reducing his orders to writing.

Public Reprimand of Baldwin and Order of Additional Education (Texas State Commission on Judicial Conduct April 9, 2021) (http://www.scjc.state.tx.us/media/46829/baldwin19-1297-19-1160pubrep-oae4921.pdf) The Texas State Commission on Judicial Conduct publicly reprimanded a judge for (1) while at the jail to magistrate an African-American defendant, stating that the defendant needed to be hung “with a f***ing noose around his neck” and (2) without jurisdiction, determining the right to possession of a trailer in an ex parte letter; the Commission also ordered the judge to obtain 11 hours of instruction with a mentor. (1) On April 21, 2019, the judge was called to the county jail to magistrate Chester Jackson, an African-American man who had been arrested for public intoxication. A different judge had attempted to magistrate Jackson the previous evening but had been unable to because Jackson was incoherent. Judge Baldwin was also unable to complete the process because Jackson continued to speak and act incoherently. Jail staff returned Jackson to his holding cell. The judge told jail staff that Jackson needed a medical evaluation to show that he was not under the influence of drugs or withdrawing from drugs. As the judge left the magistration area, a state trooper and a dispatcher for the sheriff’s department heard the judge say that Jackson needed to be hung “with a f***ing noose around his neck.” The judge denied that he made that comment but claimed that he had used a “figure of speech” that Jackson needed to be “hung by his feet, so his brains would get out of his a** and back on top of his shoulders and between his ears. That way he can make a good decision.” (2) James Luce filed suit in the judge’s court to evict Jessica Trehern and Jessie Jones from real property he owned where Trehern and Jones lived in a trailer. Following trial on April 17, 2019, the judge signed a judgment granting Luce possession of the real property and $200 in delinquent rent. Luce later came to court to obtain a writ possession and complained to the court clerk that a third party owned the trailer house and wanted it back. On April 23, the judge issued a writ of possession identifying only the street address of the real property. Later that day, Trehern called the court and complained directly to the judge that Luce was harassing her and blocking her from removing her possessions and the trailer. After his discussion with Trehern, “so there would be no confusion of ownership of trailer and other possessions in the trailer,” the judge had the court clerk write a letter addressed only to the defendants and stating that the defendants had been “awarded the trailer” and, if title to

24 the trailer was in dispute, it would need to be settled in small claims court. The judge lacked jurisdiction to determine the right of possession to the trailer. In his response to the Commission, the judge acknowledged having the letter prepared but explained that it should have stated that the defendants “retained the trailer.” In his testimony before the Commission, the judge said that the “class of people” he was dealing with influenced his handling of this eviction suit.

In re Burchett, Stipulation, agreement, and order of reprimand (Washington State Commission on Judicial Conduct April 23, 2021) (https://www.cjc.state.wa.us/materials/activity/public_actions/2021/9848FinalStip.pdf) Based on a stipulation and agreement, the Washington State Commission on Judicial Conduct publicly reprimanded a judge for (1) failing to advise defendants at probation review hearings of their rights; (2) conducting an ex parte investigation into whether a defendant had performed community service hours and stating on the record that she intended to recommend significant jail time and further charges; (3) at arraignment hearings in 2 traffic offense cases, asking the defendants whether they had a valid driver’s license and how long it had been since they had a valid driver’s license; (4) as she sat on cases on the bench, regularly recommending specific businesses to defendants for re-licensing and insurance purposes related to their charges; (5) regularly presiding over cases in which a notice of disqualification had been filed against her; and (6) at the end of 1 calendar, declining to ascertain who was attempting to appear in court via Zoom. The judge also agreed to continue to work with a mentor judge and to participate in at least 4 hours of ethics training. The judge was elected in 2018 and took the bench in January 2019. In January and February 2020, the Commission received multiple, separate complaints alleging that the judge failed to conduct hearings in accordance with court rules and established case law that protected criminal defendants’ fundamental due process and constitutional rights. (1) The judge failed to advise defendants at probation review hearings of their rights, including their right to counsel and the right to a hearing to contest the allegations. For example, on January 27, 2020, at a probation review hearing involving an unrepresented defendant, the judge imposed a 7-day jail term without advising the defendant of her right to counsel or her right to contest the allegations. (2) At a probation hearing on February 6, 2020, the judge acknowledged on the record that she had conducted an ex parte investigation into whether the defendant had performed community service hours and stated on the record that she intended to recommend significant jail time and further charges. She then recused from the matter and reassigned it to another judicial officer. (3) At arraignment hearings in 2 cases, the judge asked defendants charged with driving offenses whether they had a valid driver’s license and how long it had been since they had a valid driver’s license, thus eliciting statements from them against their interest and in violation of their 5th Amendment rights to remain silent. In the disciplinary proceedings, the judge, acknowledged that her questions had elicited statements in which the defendants could be admitting to an element of the crime but stated that she had not intended to do so but that she

25 had asked about the defendants’ license status to better understand the posture of the case and possibly mitigating efforts to become relicensed. (4) As she sat on cases on the bench, the judge regularly recommended specific businesses to defendants for re-licensing and insurance purposes related to their charges. In the discipline proceedings, the judge explained that she had recommended business to try to be helpful and not for personal gain. She stated that she will no longer suggest defendants patronize specific businesses. (5) The judge regularly presided over cases in which a notice of disqualification had been filed against her. In the discipline proceedings, the judge said that she had amended her practice to prevent her from presiding over cases in which she had previously been disqualified, explaining that she had not intentionally continued to preside over such cases but acknowledging that it is her responsibility to assure that she does not. (6) On February 26, 2021, just after 3:15 p.m., at the conclusion of the afternoon calendars, the court clerk told the judge that there was 1 more person in the Zoom “waiting room” and asked if they should be “let in” so that the judge could speak with them. Apparently tired, the judge said that she “just can’t.” The clerk indicated that they needed to see who it was and set the case over. The person in the Zoom waiting room had renamed themselves “Help I couldn’t log in at 2 p.m.,” and the clerk surmised that it could be the 1 individual from the 2:00 p.m. docket who had failed to appear and for whom a warrant had been issued. The judge said, “You almost hate to not talk to them if they can figure that out,” referring to the way the person had renamed themselves, but the judge again declined the clerk’s request to bring the person in from the waiting room and said that they “would have to do the bench warrant docket.” The Commission found that the judge had displayed “disregard for an individual attempting to navigate technology and appear in court.” Other than the February 2021 incident, the Commission’s “investigation confirmed that, following contact from the Commission, Respondent has substantially improved her practice and has discontinued the identified shortcomings.” The judge had acknowledged that, as a new judge, she had made mistakes, but stated that she was open to learning and improving her performance. In addition, on multiple occasions in open court, on the record in the presence of the prosecution, the judge had asked about defendants’ confidential financial information when they were requesting court-appointed lawyers. The Commission noted that, because many courts do not have regular public defense screeners, “it is left to the judicial officer to make the determination of indigency.” Based on the judge’s “claim that she followed what she believed had previously been the practice in her court regarding following up on unclear or incomplete financial information,” the stipulation did not include a finding that the judge’s practice on the issue warrants sanction. However, it highlighted the issue “to put the judge and other judicial officers on notice that failing to conduct such inquiry in confidence could violate the governing statute, court rule, and Code of Judicial Conduct.” The judge indicated that she would stop inquiring into license or financial status in open court.

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Public Admonishment of Poe (West Virginia Judicial Investigation Commission March 12, 2021) (http://www.courtswv.gov/legal-community/JICAdmonishments/2021/17- 2021MagCharlesPoe.pdf) Based on the magistrate’s agreement to resign and never seek judicial office again, the West Virginia Judicial Investigation Commission publicly admonished a former magistrate for making numerous inappropriate sexual, homophobic, and racist comments to 2 individuals verbally and by text message and sending indecent photos, cartoons, and at least 1 video by text message. In January 2021, a member of the public who frequents the courthouse because of their employment filed a complaint alleging that, over the past year, the magistrate had made numerous inappropriate sexual, homophobic, and racist comments to them verbally and by text message. The complainant also alleged that the magistrate sent indecent photos, cartoons, and at least 1 video to them by text message. Sometimes when the complainant failed to reply to the text messages, the magistrate would remind them that he was a magistrate, stating, “Hello I’m talking to you. This is your honor speaking.” In a sworn statement on March 8, the magistrate admitted that the text messages came from him. The investigation revealed at least 1 former judicial employee who suffered the same type of conduct. The Commission found that the magistrate’s statements displayed bias and prejudice and constituted harassment of the 2 individuals. The Commission stated:

Discrimination and harassment should be things of the past. They have no place in today’s society. They do not belong in the courtroom, the boardroom, the classroom, the workplace, or anywhere. Judges must lead by example. Justice is supposed to be blind. Therefore, it is provident for judges to treat all litigants in a courtroom or all persons in a courtyard equally. To do otherwise, casts doubt on the judiciary as a whole. As Eleanor Roosevelt once said:

Where after all, do universal human rights begin? In small places, close to home – so close and so small that they cannot be seen on any maps of the world. Yet they are the world of the individual person; the neighborhood he lives in; the school or college he attends; the factory, farm or office where he works. Such are the places where every man, woman and child seeks equal justice, equal opportunity, equal dignity without discrimination. Unless these rights have meaning there, they have little meaning anywhere. Without concerned citizen action to uphold them close to home, we shall look in vain for progress in the larger world.

There is no place in the judiciary for a judge who does not practice equality for all both on and off the bench. By his actions, Respondent cast shame on the judiciary as a whole. Because of his actions, Respondent no longer deserves the mantle of judge.

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