JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE DECISION SUMMARIES
March-April 2021
Letter of Informal Adjustment to Lipsmeyer (Arkansas Judicial Discipline & Disability Commission March 19, 2021)
The Arkansas Judicial Discipline & Disability Commission informally adjusted a former part-time judge who, while a candidate in a run-off election for a new judicial position in 2020, signed a letter to attorneys asking for contributions to help offset campaign expenses.
Letter of Informal Adjustment to Ryan (Arkansas Judicial Discipline & Disability Commission
March 19, 2021) (https://www.jddc.arkansas.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/Informal- Adjustment-Jerry-Ryan.pdf)
The Arkansas Judicial Discipline & Disability Commission informally adjusted a former judge for signing, in 2018, an order in a guardianship case in which he had been attorney of record for several months in 2013 before the court granted his request to withdraw.
In the Matter Concerning Connolly, Decision and order (California Commission on Judicial Performance April 2, 2021)
(https://cjp.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/40/2021/04/Connolly_DO_Pub_Adm_4-2- 2021.pdf)
The California Commission on Judicial Performance publicly admonished a judge for (1) displaying improper demeanor toward 2 criminal defense attorneys who appeared by phone during an arraignment and (2) making an inappropriate remark about a jury verdict to a defendant who had been acquitted.
(1) In a criminal matter pending before the judge, Martin Lijtmaer represented Jorge
Ramirez, and Rachel Steinback represented co-defendant Felipe Ramirez. On March 20, 2020, the day after the governor announced the statewide stay-at-home order due to COVID-19,
Lijtmaer called the judge’s clerk to request permission to appear by telephone for the
arraignment scheduled that afternoon because he and Steinback were concerned about having been exposed to the virus and the possibility of spreading it at the courthouse. The judge spoke to Lijtmaer over the phone and said his clerk would call back to communicate his decision. Lijtmaer and Steinback attempted to find another attorney who could appear at the arraignment in their stead, but they were unable to do so. At approximately 2:00 p.m., the clerk told Lijtmaer that the judge would allow counsel to appear by telephone.
At the arraignment, Lijtmaer and Steinback appeared by telephone; their clients were in custody and appeared in person. After arraignment, Lijtmaer asked that his client, Jorge Ramirez, be released on his own recognizance, citing, among other reasons, health concerns
outlined in a recent letter in Lijtmaer’s possession. The following exchange occurred:
THE COURT: How am I going to see that letter, if you’re not in my courtroom?
LIJTMAER: Well --
THE COURT: How am I going to see that letter if you are not in my courtroom? I’m not
going to, am I?
- LIJTMAER:
- As an officer of the court –
THE COURT: All right. LIJTMAER:
-- I’d ask the court to --
THE COURT: Is there anything further? Is there anything further, sir? Anything further, sir?
- LIJTMAER:
- Yes, your honor. I have letters -- Yes. I have letters from both --
THE COURT: Which I cannot see, because you have not come to my courtroom? All right. LIJTMAER: THE COURT: Respectfully? You have not come to the courtroom. LIJTMAER: Your honor --
Your honor, respectfully, the reason I didn’t --
THE COURT: All right. So, with that, I’m going to set -- I am going to set -- I am
speaking, sir. I am speaking. We are setting the preliminary hearing at this time for April 13th, for each. Bail is going to be set for Mr. Ramirez, Jorge, for $150,000; and for Felipe at $100,000. If you have those letters, you can bring those in at the time.
Steinback requested that her client be released on his own recognizance. Before
Steinback finished explaining that her client was vulnerable to complications from COVID-19,
which he was more likely to contract if he remained in custody, the judge asked: “And how do you know this? And how do you know this?” Steinback responded that she had learned about her client’s medical history from his family. The judge replied: “I suggest you bring in that paperwork at the time of the preliminary hearing.” Steinback said that her client has a family to
support and a full-time job that has been deemed essential under the stay-at-home orders and that he would lose if he were not released from custody. The judge responded:
Okay. I’m going to stop you there. Because we’re done. All right. I am not releasing
either of these people, with these charges. There are multiple charges. If you wished to present this evidence, you should have been here or had someone represent you. . . . Bail for Jorge in the amount of $150,000, and for Felipe at $100,000.
In the judge’s response to the preliminary investigation letter, he acknowledged that he
“should not have demonstrated irritation or impatience with defense counsel” and that he “spoke too sharply” to them. He asked the Commission to “take into account the highly unusual circumstances present at that time:” the court had not yet implemented operations to
conduct matters remotely; it was not clear how long the governor’s stay-at-home order would be in effect; and there was no clear guidance about how to handle the attorneys’ request to appear telephonically at a criminal proceeding.
The Commission acknowledged that the circumstances were unusual and presented
challenges, but noted that “the unusual circumstances and challenges affected the defense attorneys as well as the court” and concluded that “the initial lack of clarity about how to
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handle court proceedings during the public health crisis did not excuse or explain the judge’s mistreatment of the attorneys.” The Commission emphasized that there was “no evidence of
provocative conduct by counsel,” whom the judge had given permission to appear by telephone.
At his appearance before the Commission, the judge “claimed—for the first time—” that
he had spoken with Lijtmaer on the telephone twice and told him to send whatever information he had to present to the court before the hearing, but that he had not received anything. The judge told the Commission that, during the telephone arraignment, he did not mention his earlier instruction to Lijtmaer because of the relationship between the attorneys and their clients who were in his courtroom. The Commission noted that it does not consider new evidence at an appearance, absent certain circumstances that were not present, and found that the judge’s explanation for not questioning Litjmaer during the telephonic hearing was unpersuasive.
The Commission stated that the judge seemed sarcastic and impatient and interrupted
both Lijtmaer and Steinback while “the attorneys, in contrast, appear polite and respectful.” At his appearance before the Commission, the judge acknowledged that the transcript “looks bad,” but did not admit that he committed misconduct or display contrition, arguing instead that he had not treated the “attorneys any differently because they were not in the courtroom.”
(2) On August 20, 2018, a jury convicted Dalisha Jordan and another defendant but acquitted defendant Eugene Germany. After the jurors left the courtroom, the judge said to
Germany: “Let me tell you, you’ve been given a gift from God because there’s no question in my mind that you’re guilty of this crime. Now, with that, though -- well, I’ll tell you, chivalry is not dead. If you’d taken the deal, Ms. Jordan would have had that six year deal. She’s going to get a lot more time than that. So, you know, take that into consideration. All right. But you’ve been given a gift. What you do with it is your choice. Fair enough?” Germany responded, “Yeah.”
At his appearance before the Commission, the judge asserted that he thinks what he
said “was right” and “what [he] should have done” and that it was his “duty” and his “responsibility” as a judge to advise Germany that he had been “given a gift from God” so that “Germany would take advantage of opportunities he has been given.” However, the Commission found, the judge had disparaged “the jury’s determination that the defendant had
not been proven guilty. The jury system is an essential pillar of American democracy. The
judge’s role in a jury trial is to be neutral. Judge Connolly’s remark was likely to undermine public confidence in the independence of the jury and its important role in the justice system.” Further, it explained that “a judge does not have a duty to advise a criminal defendant that the
defendant has been given the gift of an acquittal. While a judge may encourage a defendant to make better choices and take advantage of opportunities in the future, the judge must not do
so at the expense of the jury and its verdict.” The Commission found that the judge’s remarks
to Germany were gratuitous, undignified, and improper.
The Commission considered the judge’s prior discipline to be a significant aggravating factor. In 2016, the Commission had publicly admonished the judge for “a course of conduct
reflecting embroilment with a criminal defense attorney and for setting multiple post-trial
hearings regarding possible contempt charges, which was an abuse of his authority.” In 2010,
3the Commission privately admonished him for using profanity during a judicial profile interview
and in chambers discussions with attorneys. The Commission also considered the judge’s
failure to fully appreciate his misconduct as an additional aggravating factor. In the Matter of Chase, Order (Colorado Supreme Court April 16, 2021)
(https://www.courts.state.co.us/userfiles/file/Court_Probation/Supreme_Court/Opinions/2021 /21SA91.pdf)
Based on a stipulation and the recommendation of the Commission on Judicial
Discipline, the Colorado Supreme Court accepted the resignation of a judge and publicly censured her for (1) using the N-word in a conversation with a Black staff member; (2) expressing her views about criminal justice, police brutality, race, and racial bias while wearing her robe in court staff work areas and on the bench; (3) using court staff for personal tasks; and (4) referring to a judicial colleague in derogatory terms.
(1) In late January or early February 2020, the judge attended a safe baby program with
a family court facilitator and the judge’s law clerk. The judge drove both court employees in
her car to and from the program. The judge is White; the family court facilitator is Black. On the way back from the program, the judge asked the family court facilitator why Black people can use the N-word but not White people, and whether it was different if the N-word is said with an “er” or an “a” at the end of the word. During the conversation, the judge used the full N-word a number of times. The family court facilitator was uncomfortable because she could not leave the car or the conversation. The facilitator was angry and hurt by the conversation.
She explained that the judge’s use of the full N-word was “like a stab through my heart each time.” The facilitator did not feel free to express her discomfort or emotions because she
feared retaliation by the judge.
The judge maintained that she did not intend any racial animus, but acknowledged that her statements violated the code of judicial conduct. The Commission concluded that,
“although not directed at any person, saying the N-word has a significant negative effect on the public’s confidence in integrity of and respect for the judiciary.”
(2) In early February 2020, the judge was wearing her robe on the bench during a break while 2 or 3 other people were in the courtroom. 2 employees in the courtroom were Black. When someone brought up watching the Super Bowl, the judge stated, from the bench, that she would be boycotting the Super Bowl because she objected to the NFL players who were kneeling during the National Anthem in protest of police brutality against Black people.
On the Monday after George Floyd was killed in Minneapolis, Minnesota, in May 2020 and there were Black Lives Matter protests in Denver, 2 Black court employees were in the
judge’s courtroom. One of them asked the other if they had seen the George Floyd protests.
The judge, while wearing her robe and sitting on the bench, told the employees some of her opinions regarding racial justice issues and asked some questions about the Black Lives Matter movement. The employee tried to explain the Black Lives Matter movement, and the judge stated that she believes all lives matter. The judge also stated that the conduct of the police officers in the George Floyd matter should be investigated.
In early 2020, the judge directed her law clerk to do some legal research related to a
personal family legal issue that was unrelated to the judge’s official case load.
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In August 2020, the judge had a medical episode at the courthouse. After courtroom deputies came to her aid, the judge declined an ambulance. She then asked a court employee to drive her to the emergency room. After arriving, the judge asked the court employee to stay with her at the hospital. The employee missed a half day of work to accommodate the judge.
Throughout 2020, the judge forwarded personal emails to her clerk and asked her clerk to edit or rewrite the emails so they sounded better before the judge sent them to the intended recipient.
The judge repeatedly discussed personal and family matters with staff and other employees in office work areas and as part of court business in an undignified and discourteous manner.
In the first half of 2020, the judge told her clerk that she was leaving briefly to meet with another judge. When she returned from the meeting and the clerk asked how it went, the
judge replied with a derogatory reference to the other judge, calling her a “f****** b****.”
In re Heath, Report of disposition (Georgia Judicial Qualifications Commission January 15, 2021)
Based on a consent agreement and the magistrate’s resignation and agreement not to
serve in judicial office again, the Georgia Judicial Qualifications Commission disposed of complaints against a former chief magistrate judge; the judge had resigned while the Commission was investigating complaints that he had (1) inserted himself into the investigation of an acquittance that was unrelated to his position and used the prestige of his office to obtain information in that investigation; (2) improperly issued arrest warrants; and (3) displayed intemperate behavior on the bench.
In re Taliaferro, Report of disposition (Georgia Judicial Qualifications Commission January 20, 2021)
Based on a consent agreement and the magistrate’s resignation and agreement not to
serve in judicial office again, the Georgia Judicial Qualifications Commission disposed of complaints against a former magistrate judge who had resigned while the Commission was investigating complaints that he had attempted to engage in an improper relationship with a female litigant who appeared before him in an eviction matter, exploited the prestige of his office to further his interest in her, and presided over a bond hearing in an unrelated matter involving her without disclosing the prior connection.
In re Wigington, Report of disposition (Georgia Judicial Qualifications Commission February 22, 2021)
Based on a consent agreement and the magistrate’s resignation and agreement not to
serve in judicial office again, the Georgia Judicial Qualifications Commission disposed of complaints against a former chief magistrate judge and probate judge; the magistrate had resigned while the Commission was investigating complaints that he had misused a government issued financial transaction card to steal funds from the county and court. In January 2020, the judge had been arrested and charged with 6 counts of felony theft by taking, 3 counts of misuse
5of a government issued financial transaction card, and 1 count of violating the oath of office. In November 2020, he was indicted on 57 counts, including the offenses related to his previous arrest and other offenses discovered after further investigation.
In re Ruttle, Agreed order of suspension (Kentucky Judicial Conduct Commission April 7, 2021)
(https://kycourts.gov/Courts/JCC%20Actions%20Documents/2021agreedorderRuttle04072021. pdf)
Based on an agreement, the Kentucky Judicial Conduct Commission suspended a judge for 7 days without pay for (1) requiring defendants in criminal trials to file written demands for jury trials; (2) making comments to attorneys with the Department of Public Advocacy that were not patient, dignified, and courteous; and (3) in a proceeding with an unrepresented defendant, suggesting a plea agreement that could reasonably be perceived as coercive for the defendant. The order notes that, during a preliminary investigation of 2 complaints, the Commission had received information concerning proceedings on 2 days in June 2020, 2 days in
July, and 2 weeks and 1 day in August. In mitigation, the Commission considered “the
circumstances and impact caused by the Covid-19 pandemic” and the judge’s cooperation. In the Matter of Nickerson, 248 A.3d 298 (Maryland 2021)
Granting the recommendation of the Commission on Judicial Disabilities based on the
judge’s admissions
(https://www.courts.state.md.us/sites/default/files/import/cjd/pdfs/cjd20180332019013nicker
sonfindingsoffact.pdf), the Maryland Court of Appeals removed a judge from office for (1) her conviction on charges of driving while impaired by alcohol, exceeding posted maximum speed limit, negligent driving, reckless driving, and throwing, dumping, discharging, or depositing refuse on highway; (2) failing to be truthful and cooperative during the traffic stop, injecting her
position as a judge as soon as she was stopped by the officer, and mentioning the officer’s
superior to try to influence the officer not to charge her or to consult with his supervisor before charging her; and (3) failing to comply with the terms of a conditional diversion agreement with the Commission; failing to comply with the conditions of a reprimand by the Commission; and failing to cooperate with the investigative counsel and the Commission. The judge is not an attorney. She had been barred from presenting fact witnesses or testimony at the hearing because she failed to respond to written discovery. She did not present any character witnesses.
(1) On March 9, 2018, Sergeant Harry Kettner of the county sheriff’s office stopped the
judge after determining she was speeding using his in-car radar unit and observing that she hit a cone when turning the corner. She was charged with driving a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, driving a vehicle while impaired by alcohol, exceeding the posted maximum speed limit (43 in a posted 30 mph zone), exceeding the posted maximum speed limit (31 in a posted 25 mph zone), negligent driving, reckless driving, and throwing, dumping, discharging, or depositing refuse on a highway.
Following a trial, the judge was acquitted of driving under the influence but convicted of the other charges and placed on probation.
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(2) When Kettner approached the judge’s vehicle, he observed that her eyes were glassy
and bloodshot and her actions were slow and delayed. Kettner smelled alcohol emanating from her vehicle and observed a clear cup with a clear liquid and a straw in the center console.
Kettner asked, “Is there anything in that cup in the center console?” The judge’s response was “No. I mean, it’s club soda.” Kettner later asked the judge, “I mean, you -- and there’s nothing in that club soda?” The judge again replied “No.” Kettner tested the substance in the cup and
determined that it had alcohol in it. The judge later confirmed that the cup contained vodka.
The judge told Kettner that she had just left work at her second job as a hostess at a restaurant. Kettner then asked the judge to exit her vehicle. She complied after completing a
phone call and after Kettner asked a second time. The judge stated to him, “Can I tell you something else? I’m a judge of the Orphans’ Court. So please. I’m serious.” The judge also advised Kettner that she had called an individual whom she referred to as “Kirby” and told Kirby that she was pulled over by Kettner. Lieutenant Kirby is Sergeant Kettner’s superior.