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The Role of Parliaments in the Semi-Presidential Systems: the Case of the Federal Assembly of Russia a Thesis Submitted to Th

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The Role of Parliaments in the Semi-Presidential Systems: the Case of the Federal Assembly of Russia a Thesis Submitted to Th THE ROLE OF PARLIAMENTS IN THE SEMI-PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEMS: THE CASE OF THE FEDERAL ASSEMBLY OF RUSSIA A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES OF MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY BY RABĠA ARABACI KARĠMAN IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE IN THE DEPARTMENT OF EURASIAN STUDIES OCTOBER 2019 DEDICATIONTASLAK I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work. Name, Last name : Rabia Arabacı Kariman Signature : iii ABSTRACT THE ROLE OF PARLIAMENTS IN THE SEMI-PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEMS: THE CASE OF THE FEDERAL ASSEMBLY OF RUSSIA Arabacı Kariman, Rabia M.Sc., Department of Eurasian Studies Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. IĢık KuĢçu Bonnenfant October 2019, 196 pages The purpose of this thesis is to scrutinize the role and status of the Federal Assembly of Russia within the context of theTASLAK semi-presidential system in the Russian Federation. Parliaments as a body incorporating the representative and legislative functions of the state are of critical importance to the development and stability of democracy in a working constitutional system. Since the legislative power cannot be thought separate from the political system in which it works, semi-presidentialism practices of Russia with its opportunities and deadlocks will be vital to understand the role of parliamentary power in Russia. The analysis of the the relationship among the constitutional bodies as stipulated by the first post-Soviet Constitution in 1993 will contribute to our understanding of the development of democracy in the Russian Federation. In the thesis, I aim to examine the parliament‘s role and functioning in Russia as an indicator of the democratic consolidation level by on the parliamentary committee competence, parliamentary oversight authority, law making process, and deliberation capacity of their deputies. I will discuss the relationship between the executive and legislative bodies, as well as the rights and duties of these political powers in under different presidential terms. Throughout the study, I will seek an iv answer whether the Russian Federal Assembly is able to counterweight the presidential authority or not. Keywords: Semi-Presidential System, Federal Assembly of Russia, Legislatures, President, Constitution. TASLAK v ÖZ YARI-BAġKANLIK SĠSTEMLERĠNDE PARLAMENTOLARIN ROLÜ: RUSYA FEDERAL MECLĠSĠ ÖRNEĞĠ Arabacı Kariman, Rabia Yüksek Lisans., Avrasya ÇalıĢmaları Tez DanıĢmanı: Assoc. Prof. Dr. IĢık KuĢçu Bonnenfant Ekim 2019, 196 sayfa Bu tezin amacı; Rusya Federasyonu‘ndaki yarı-baĢkanlık sistemi bağlamında, Rusya Federal Meclisinin rolünü ve statüsünüTASLAK incelemektir. Devletin temsil ve yasama iĢlevlerini yekvücut hâline getiren kurumlar olarak parlamentolar, iĢleyen bir anayasal sistemde demokrasinin geliĢimi ve istikrarı bakımından kritik öneme sahiptir. Yasama erki, içinde bulunduğu siyasi sistemden ayrı düĢünülemeyeceği için Rusya‘nın fırsatlar ve çıkmazları olan yarı-baĢkanlık uygulamaları, Rusya‘daki parlamento gücünün rolünü anlamak bakımından hayati önemi haizdir. Sovyet sonrası dönemin ilk anayasası olan 1993 Anayasası‘nın öngördüğü anayasal organlar arasındaki iliĢkinin analizi, Rusya Federasyonu‘ndaki demokrasinin geliĢmesine dair anlayıĢımıza katkı sunacaktır. Bu tezde, parlamentonun Rusya‘daki rolünü ve iĢleyiĢini; demokratik konsolidasyon seviyesinin bir göstergesi olarak parlamento komisyonların yeterliliği, parlamenter denetim yetkisi, kanun yapım süreci ve milletvekillerinin müzakere kapasiteleri üzerinden incelemeyi amaçlamaktayım. Farklı baĢkanlık dönemlerinde bu siyasi güçlerin hak ve yetkileri kullanımının yanı sıra yasama ve yürütme organları arasındaki iliĢkiyi de tartıĢacağım. ÇalıĢma vi boyunca, Rus Federal Meclisi‘nin Devlet BaĢkanı‘nın yetkileri ile kıyas edildiğinde karĢı bir ağırlık oluĢturup oluĢturamadığı sorusuna yanıt arayacağım. Anahtar Kelimeler: Yarı-BaĢkanlık Sistemi, Rusya Federal Meclisi, Yasama Organları, BaĢkan, Anayasa. TASLAK vii DEDICATION To my parents,TASLAK Fatma and Hasan Arabacı, with my deepest love and respect viii ACKLOWLEDGEMENTS I accumulated a number of debts of gratitude throughout the study. First and foremost, I would like to extend my deepest thanks to her supervisor Assoc. Prof. Dr. IĢık KuĢçu Bonnenfant for her guidance, advice and criticism. I would not ever dream of writing this thesis without her vital helps. I would also like to thank Prof. Dr. AyĢe Ayata and Assoc. Prof. Dr. AyĢe Kavuncu Yaldız for their involvements in my examining committee, and their valuable recommendations. I owe a special debt of gratitude to the Turkish Embassy in Moscow for enabling me to the reliable sources as to the Russian parliamentary works. This thesis is an outcome of intense study that would have hardly been completed without the encouragement by my husband, Hakan Kariman. He forbearingly aided my drive to complete this study. I owe, last but not least, much of the success in following my academic career TASLAK to my parents who instill me for gaining ground and eagerness to learn through all my life. For being such peerless parents, I dedicate this thesis to them. ix TABLE OF CONTENTS PLAGIARISM ............................................................................................................ iii ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................ iv ÖZ ................................................................................................................................ vi DEDICATION .......................................................................................................... viii ACKLOWLEDGEMENTS ......................................................................................... ix TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................. x LIST OF TABLES ..................................................................................................... xii LIST OF FIGURES ................................................................................................... xiii TASLAK CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................... 1 2. SEMI-PRESIDENTIALISM ............................................................................. 11 2.1. Conceptual Framework ........................................................................... 11 2.2. Semi-Presidential Systems in the World ................................................. 18 2.3. The Role of Parliaments in the Semi-Presidential Systems .................... 30 2.4. Advantages and Disadvantages of Semi-Presidential Systems ............... 34 3. CONSTITUTIONAL BODIES: SCRUTINIZING THE STATUS OF THE PARLIAMENT ..................................................................................................... 44 3.1. Russian Parliamentary Bodies in Retrospect and from 1991 Onwards ... 44 3.2. Constitutional Bodies under the 1993 Constitution ................................ 61 3.2.1. The President ................................................................................. 63 x 3.2.2. The Federal Assembly ................................................................... 70 3.2.2.1. The State Duma ..................................................................... 72 3.2.2.2. The Council of Federation ..................................................... 89 3.2.2.3. Law-Making Process .................................................................. 92 3.2.3. The Government ............................................................................ 99 4. THE RELATIONSHIP AMONG THE CONSTITUTIONAL BODIES ........ 102 4.1. The President and the Federal Assembly .............................................. 102 4.1.1. The Yeltsin Era (1993-99)........................................................... 110 4.1.2. The Putin Era (From 2000 onwards) ........................................... 125 4.1.3. The Decree-Making Authority .................................................... 138 4.2. The Federal Assembly and the Government ......................................... 145 4.3. Concluding Remarks: An Evaluation of the Status of the Federal TASLAK Assembly ...................................................................................................... 148 5. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................... 156 REFERENCES ......................................................................................................... 164 APPENDICES A. TURKISH SUMMARY/ TÜRKÇE ÖZET ........................................................ 183 B. TEZ ĠZĠN FORMU / THESIS PERMISSION FORM ........................................ 196 xi LIST OF TABLES Table 1: Pure Types of Executive-Legislative Structure and Their Mirror Hybrids . 15 Table 2: Original Hypothesis of Executive Relationship ........................................... 22 Table 3: The USSR Congress of People‘s Deputies and Supreme Soviet (1989-91) 56 Table 4: Information On The Subjects Of The Right Of Legislative Initiative On The Passage Of Bills And Laws ................................................................................. 97 Table 5: Source of Initiation for All Bills Passed
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